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1
Beiner, Ronald. "What Liberalism Means." Social Philosophy and Policy 13, no. 1 (1996): 190–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500001576.
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My purpose in this essay is to give an account of the kind of robust social criticism that I associate with the very enterprise of theory and to explain why the liberal philosophy that prevails in the contemporary academy is averse to this sort of social criticism. My purpose, then, is both to explore a certain conception of radical socialtheory and to defend this conception against familiar objections posed by those who represent the dominant liberal political philosophy.
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Dewar, Kenneth C. "Liberalism, Social Democracy, and Tom Kent." Journal of Canadian Studies 53, no. 1 (February 28, 2019): 178–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/jcs.2018-0011.
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This article argues that the lines separating different modes of thought on the centre-left of the political spectrum—liberalism, social democracy, and socialism, broadly speaking—are permeable, and that they share many features in common. The example of Tom Kent illustrates the argument. A leading adviser to Lester B. Pearson and the Liberal Party from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, Kent argued for expanding social security in a way that had a number of affinities with social democracy. In his paper for the Study Conference on National Problems in 1960, where he set out his philosophy of social security, and in his actions as an adviser to the Pearson government, he supported social assistance, universal contributory pensions, and national, comprehensive medical insurance. In close association with his philosophy, he also believed that political parties were instruments of policy-making.
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Lemos, Ramon M., and Terry Pinkard. "Democratic Liberalism and Social Union." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49, no. 4 (June 1989): 755. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2107866.
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GUNOR, RECEP BATU. "Prince Sabahaddin's Social Philosophy from the Perspective of Classical Liberalism." Türkiyat Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi 25 (December 30, 2019): 163–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.34189/gtd.25.007.
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Grafstein, Robert. "Missing the Archimedean Point: Liberalism's Institutional Presuppositions." American Political Science Review 84, no. 1 (March 1990): 177–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963636.
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Though liberalism has been widely criticized for its attempt to frame a detached judgment of society based on an asocial conception of individuals, insufficient attention has been paid to the particular social and political relationships this search for an Archimedean point presupposes. Using collective choice theory, I show that liberalism has adopted two distinct kinds of Archimedean points reflecting different and unjustified presuppositions about the true institutional relation between politics and society. Liberalism's Archimedean search is not merely unsuccessful but biased in a way that is significant even for positions critical of liberalism. It is possible, I argue, to have a normative political theory that avoids an asocial conception of individuals without falling victim to liberalism's specific biases concerning institutional relations. The implications for both Rawlsian- or Nozickian-style liberalism are discussed, including the possibility of a political philosophy that avoids their “analytical extremism.“
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Talisse, Robert B. "Toward a Social Epistemic Comprehensive Liberalism." Episteme 5, no. 1 (February 2008): 106–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1742360008000269.
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ABSTRACTFor well over a decade, much of liberal political theory has accepted the founding premise of Rawls's political liberalism, according to which the fact of reasonable pluralism renders comprehensive versions of liberalism incoherent. However, the founding premise presumes that all comprehensive doctrines are moral doctrines. In this essay, the author builds upon recent work by Allen Buchanan and develops a comprehensive version of liberalism based in a partially comprehensive social epistemic doctrine. The author then argues that this version of liberalism is sufficiently accommodating of the fact of reasonable pluralism. The conclusion is that the founding premise of political liberalism admits of a counterexample; there is a version of comprehensive liberalism that is sufficiently pluralistic.
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Gray, John. "Agonistic Liberalism." Social Philosophy and Policy 12, no. 1 (1995): 111–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500004581.
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In all of its varieties, traditional liberalism is a universalist political theory. Its content is a set of principles which prescribe the best regime, the ideally best institutions, for all mankind. It may be acknowledged — as it is, by a proto-liberal such as Spinoza — that the best regime can be attained only rarely, and cannot be expected to endure for long; and that the forms its central institutions will assume in different historical and cultural milieux may vary significantly. It will then be accepted that the liberal regime's role in political thought is as a regulative ideal, which political practice can hope only to approximate, subject to all the vagaries and exigencies of circumstance. Nonetheless, the content of traditional liberalism is a system of principles which function as universal norms for the critical appraisal of human institutions. In this regard, traditional liberalism — the liberalism of Locke and Kant, for example — represents a continuation of classical political rationalism, as it is found in Aristotle and Aquinas, where it also issues in principles having the attribute of universality, in that they apply ideally to all human beings.
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Milosavljevic, Boris. "dr. Boris Milosavljevic: Vladimir Jovanovic: Philosophy, science, politics." Theoria, Beograd 59, no. 2 (2016): 113–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1602131m.
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The unity of freedom, science and nation, viz. liberalism, positivism and nationalism, as well as his belief in two fundamental principles - freedom and justice, were the two lodestars and credo of Vladimir Jovanovic`s entire political work and view of life. Although he was strongly inclined to the continental liberalism, he corrected it with Millian liberalism and embracement of the Westminster system, thus avoiding the radicalism of the French role model, which was followed by the prevalent majority of socialist and Marxian-oriented Serb intelectuals in the second half of the XIX century and the first half of XX century. Vladimir Jovanovic firmly belived that liberty was the right exercise of which must not be blocked out by the ideal of equality. As a positivist, he appreciated Herbert Spencer?s theory of evolution, organic interpretation of society and analogy between the natural and social domains, according to which social phenomena could be reduced on natural laws. Under Mazzini?s influence he made a synthesis of liberalism and nationalism. Vladimir Jovanovic`s son Slobodan Jovanovic pointed out that unity of freedom, science and nation was not founded in sciences itself, but in rationalist philosophy. Liberalism, positivism and patriotism were not only concepts of Vladimir Jovanovic`s political theory, but also ideological basis for his active political work.
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Kymlicka, Will. "Liberalism and Communitarianism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 2 (June 1988): 181–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1988.10717173.
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It is a commonplace amongst communitarians, socialists and feminists alike that liberalism is to be rejected for its excessive ‘individualism’ or ‘atomism,’ for ignoring the manifest ways in which we are ‘embedded’ or ‘situated’ in various social roles and communal relationships. The effect of these theoretical flaws is that liberalism, in a misguided attempt to protect and promote the dignity and autonomy of the individual, has undermined the associations and communities which alone can nurture human flourishing.My plan is to examine the resources available to liberalism to meet these objections. My primary concern is with what liberals can say in response, not with what particular liberals actually have said in the past. Still, as a way of acknowledging intellectual debts, if nothing else, I hope to show how my arguments are related to the political morality of modem liberals from J.S. Mill through to Rawls and Dworkin. The term ‘liberal’ has been applied to many different theories in many different fields, but I’m using it in this fairly restricted sense. First, I’m dealing with a political morality, a set of moral arguments about the justification of political action and political institutions. Second, my concern is with this modem liberalism, not seventeenth-century liberalism, and I want to leave entirely open what the relationship is between the two. It might be that the developments initiated by the ‘new liberals’ are really an abandonment of what was definitive of classical liberalism. G.A. Cohen, for example, says that since they rejected the principle of ‘self-ownership’ which was definitive of classical liberalism (e.g. in Locke), these new liberals should instead be called ‘social democrats.’My concern is to defend their political morality, whatever the proper label.
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Pestritto, Ronald J. "FOUNDING LIBERALISM, PROGRESSIVE LIBERALISM, AND THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY." Social Philosophy and Policy 28, no. 2 (May 31, 2011): 56–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026505251000021x.
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AbstractThis article contends that liberalism in America underwent a fundamental transformation during the Progressive Era. This transformation took place, partly, through the Progressives' reinterpretation of the doctrine of property rights that had served as a foundation for founding-era liberalism. Progressives rejected the eighteenth-century, natural-rights principles which had privileged individual rights to life, liberty, and property as the fundamental aims of any just government, and argued instead that America at the turn of the twentieth century was beset by a tyranny of the minority which was employing property rights to inhibit genuine freedom for the bulk of the population. This article examines the character of founding-era liberalism and points to the connection between the political theory of the Declaration of Independence and John Locke's Second Treatise of Government. It then provides an account of the Progressive critique of this original version of American liberalism. The Progressive critique is shown to take two forms: a rejection of property rights in principle, followed by a rejection of them in practice.
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Robert B. Talisse. "Toward a Social Epistemic Comprehensive Liberalism." Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 5, no. 1 (2008): 106–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/epi.0.0026.
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Kelly, Paul. "The Social Theory of Anti‐Liberalism." Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 9, no. 2 (June 2006): 137–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230600654985.
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Kukathas, Chandran. "Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Political Community." Social Philosophy and Policy 13, no. 1 (1996): 80–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500001539.
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The primary concern of this essay is with the question “What is a political community?” This question is important in its own right. Arguably, the main purpose of political philosophy is to provide an account of the nature of political association and, in so doing, to describe the relations that hold between the individual and the state. The question is also important, however, because of its centrality in contemporary debate about liberalism and community.
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Lomasky, Loren E. "LIBERALISM BEYOND BORDERS." Social Philosophy and Policy 24, no. 1 (December 18, 2006): 206–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052507070094.
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While citizens of developed countries enjoy lives of unmatched affluence, over a billion people struggle to subsist on incomes of less than $1/day. Can't we conclude that their poverty constitutes a glaring injustice? The answer almost certainly is yes—but not because some countries are rich, nor because of inadequate levels of redistribution. Liberal political theory traditionally maintains that persons are rights-holders, and the primary duty owed them is noninterference. Corrupt and tyrannical governments flagrantly violate the liberty rights of their captive populations. External governments conspicuously fail to respect noninterference, however, when they erect barriers to trade between foreign nationals and their own citizens, subsidize domestic industries, prevent innocent movement across borders by would-be workers, and when they tender assistance to abusive states (such as foreign aid that lines the pockets of kleptocrats and enhances their power). The theory advanced here is similar to that of Rawls in rejecting an international difference principle, but unlike Rawls it advances an account of international justice as continuous with domestic principles of justice.
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Miroff, Bruce. "Getting the Left Right: The Transformation, Decline, and Reformation of American Liberalism. By Thomas A. Spragens, Jr. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009. 304p. $34.95." Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 2 (June 2010): 620–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592710000472.
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Why have American liberals been losing most political contests in recent decades? Theorist Thomas A. Spragens argues that the core of liberalism's problems lies in an ill-conceived transformation in public philosophy. In a “political treatise informed by scholarly resources” (p. ix), he defends an older liberalism, which he describes as populist and progressive, and decries a new one that he associates with the social justice approach of John Rawls. Shifting his attention back and forth from theory to practice, Spragens constructs an argument that liberalism will not recoup its political fortunes until it rediscovers its “populist heart” (p. xvii). Bearing some resemblance to previous treatises by Richard Rorty and Michael Sandel (along with important differences that Spragens notes), Getting the Left Right is provocative and powerful as theoretical critique and advocacy, but is less effective in providing a historical explanation for contemporary liberalism's troubled state.
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Buchanan, Allen. "Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology." Philosophy Public Affairs 32, no. 2 (April 2004): 95–130. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2004.00008.x.
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Sherwin, Emily. "How Liberal is Liberal Equality?: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's Tanner Lecture." Legal Theory 1, no. 2 (June 1995): 227–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135232520000015x.
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Liberalism is a wonderful theory, but its adherents have a difficult time explaining why. In his Tanner Lecture entitled Foundations of Liberal Equality, Ronald Dworkin proposes to defend liberalism in a new way. Dworkin is not content to view liberalism as a political compromise in which people set aside their personal convictions in the interest of social peace. Instead, he undertakes to make liberal political theory “continuous” with personal ethics, by describing an ethical position that endorses liberalism as a matter of conviction.
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Ryan, Alan. "NEWER THAN WHAT? OLDER THAN WHAT?" Social Philosophy and Policy 24, no. 1 (December 18, 2006): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026505250707001x.
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The essay approaches the question: Older Than What; Newer Than What? as naively as possible; it begins by asking whether there can be, and perhaps was, liberalism before the word was coined, and argues that there could have been but as a matter of fact was not. It then changes tack to ask whether liberalism is in essence a modern phenomenon, and answers that it is. This, however, raises the further question of what, if anything, lends coherence to modern forms of liberalism. The paper then argues that, contrary to Rawls, it is a comprehensive, or more narrowly ‘autonomist,’ conception of liberalism that provides the only reliable basis in ethics, metaphysics, and in a view of human nature for more limited forms of liberalism. It is argued throughout that liberalism so construed is a contentious creed, and that liberals should not be daunted by that fact.
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Zuckert, Michael P. "ON CONSTITUTIONAL WELFARE LIBERALISM: AN OLD-LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE." Social Philosophy and Policy 24, no. 1 (December 18, 2006): 266–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052507070112.
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One new form of liberalism is a doctrine that might be called Constitutional Welfare Liberalism. It stands in some continuity with the varieties of welfare and equality oriented liberalism that emerged in the Nineteenth Century and which found expression in the U.S. in political movements like the New Deal of F.D.R. and the Great Society of L.B.J. Constitutional Welfare Liberalism differs somewhat from earlier versions of Welfare Liberalism in that it claims to be solidly grounded in the fundamentals of the liberal tradition and of the American Constitution. Advocates of Constitutional Welfare Liberalism would replace what they call the “negative-liberties model” of the Constitutional order with a “benefits model.” They rest their case on an analysis of rights that denies the meaningfulness of the common distinction between negative and positive rights. Some advocates of Constitutional Welfare Liberalism also base their claims on the positive empowerments and ends of government as expressed in the Preamble to the Constitution. It is shown here via an analysis of the negative/positive rights distinction that the distinction is indeed meaningful when understood more accurately than Constitutional Welfare Liberalism theorists do. Likewise it is shown that neither the general character of the Constitution as an empowerment of government, nor the particular goals stated in the Preamble imply the benefits model.
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Barber, Sotirios A. "LIBERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION." Social Philosophy and Policy 24, no. 1 (December 18, 2006): 234–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052507070100.
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If the U.S. Constitution is a liberal Constitution, liberal governments can have a constitutional obligation to secure positive benefits or welfare rights. The original constitutional text describes a government instrumental to the Preamble's abstract ends or goods. Constitutional rights can be reconciled to the text's instrumentalist logic by viewing them as functional to better conceptions of abstract ends among actors who would compensate for their fallibility. The Federalist confirms the instrumentalism of the constitutional text. Conservative writers who treat negative liberties as constitutional ends err in several ways. They assume rational actors would establish a government for the sake of limiting it, and they ignore the positive nature of goods (life, liberty, property) that are the objects of negative liberties. They also fail to see that tax-supported protections for all positive goods, including the objects of negative liberties, must be justified by public purposes.
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Martin, Bill. "Liberalism: Modern and postmodern." Social Epistemology 7, no. 1 (January 1993): 75–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691729308578681.
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Adiprasetya, Joas. "In Search Of A Christian Public Theology In The Indonesian Context Today." DISKURSUS - JURNAL FILSAFAT DAN TEOLOGI STF DRIYARKARA 12, no. 1 (April 22, 2013): 103–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.36383/diskursus.v12i1.121.
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Abstract: This article deals with the contemporary task of Christian public theology in constructing a contextual model that is able to maintain the dialectic of commonality and particularity. Such a model must pay attention to the search for common ground among many cultural-religious identities, while at the same time it must respect those identities in their own paticularities. The sensitivity to and solidarity with the victims of the New Order’s’ regime must also be fundamental elements of such a model. To do so, this article discusses two competing theories in social philosophy (liberalism and communitarianism), and their parallel theories in theology (revisionism and post-liberalism). The necessity to construct a more balanced third way between those theories is needed, if Indonesian Christians want to be open to their social and political call and faithful to their Christian distinctiveness.
Keywords: Public theology, liberalism, communitarianism, revisionism, post-liberalism, commonality, particularity.
Abstrak: Artikel ini membahas tugas kontemporer teologi publik Kristen dalam mengkonstruksi sebuah model kontekstual yang mampu mempertahankan dialektika kesamaan dan kekhususan. Model semacam ini haruslah memperhatikan usaha menemukan dasar bersama di antara banyak identitas kultural-religius, sekaligus pada saat bersamaan menghargai identitas-identitas tersebut di dalam keunikan mereka masing-masing. Kepekaan dan solidaritas pada para korban di bawah rejim Order Baru di masa silam harus menjadi unsur-unsur mendasar bagi model semacam itu. Artikel ini mendiskusikan dua teori yang saling bersaing di dalam filsafat sosial (liberalisme dan komunitarianisme), dan teori-teori sejajar di dalam teologi (revisionisme dan pascaliberalisme). Tuntutan untuk mengkonstruksi sebuah jalan ketiga yang lebih seimbang antara teori-teori tersebut sungguh dibutuhkan, jika orang-orang Kristen Indonesia ingin berbuka pada panggilan sosial dan politis mereka sembari tetap setia pada keunikan Kristiani mereka.
Kata-kata Kunci: Teologi publik, liberalisme, komunitarianisme, revisionisme, pascaliberalisme, komunalitas, partikularitas.
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Engelmann, João Gilberto. "O LIBERALISMO POLÍTICO DE RAWLS SOB UMA ÓTICA HEGELIANA: CONTRATUALISMO E O ASPECTO SOCIAL NOS PRINCÍPIOS DE JUSTIÇA." Revista Direito em Debate 26, no. 48 (December 28, 2017): 252. http://dx.doi.org/10.21527/2176-6622.2017.48.252-264.
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o texto foca duas questões principais que emergem da Conferência VII da obra <em>Liberalismo político,</em> de John Rawls: i) a defesa do contratualismo contra Hegel e ii) os princípios de justiça como refletores do aspecto social das relações humanas. O artigo usará, preponderantemente, as obras <em>Elements of Philosophy of Right</em> (Hegel) e <em>Political Liberalism</em> (Rawls). A tese central subjacente é a de que as aproximações que são possíveis entre e Rawls e Hegel são tópicas e não sistemáticas, ou seja, Rawls e Hegel não comungam de uma mesma matriz teórica (<em>identity of standpoint</em>).
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Foster, Roger. "The catastrophe of neo-liberalism." Philosophy & Social Criticism 43, no. 2 (August 2, 2016): 123–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453716651666.
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My article provides a systematic interpretation of the transformation of capitalist society in the neo-liberal era as a form of what Karl Polanyi called ‘cultural catastrophe’. I substantiate this claim by drawing upon Erich Fromm’s theory of social character. Fromm’s notion of social character, I argue, offers a plausible, psychodynamic explanation of the processes of social change and the eventual class composition of neo-liberal society. I argue, further, that Fromm allows us to understand the psychosocial basis of the process that Polanyi calls cultural catastrophe. This requires an elucidation of the major social forces of financialization and emancipation which, I argue, proved to be important formative factors in the emergence of neo-liberal society. The cultural catastrophe of neo-liberalism concerns the working class, whose prevailing social character has become misaligned with the new expectations and requirements of neo-liberal society.
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Nolan, Daniel, and Caroline West. "Liberalism and mental mediation." Journal of Value Inquiry 38, no. 2 (June 2004): 186–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-004-0074-7.
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Kelly, Paul. "Liberalism and Epistemic Diversity: Mill's Sceptical Legacy." Episteme 3, no. 3 (October 2006): 248–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2006.3.3.248.
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ABSTRACTAlthough John Stuart Mill places considerable emphasis on three information signalling devices – debate, votes and prices – he remains curiously sceptical about the prospects of institutional or social epistemology. In this paper, I explore Mill's modest scepticism about institutional epistemology and compare and contrast that with the attitudes of liberal theorists such as F. A. Hayek and John Dewey who are much more enthusiastic about the prospects of social epistemology as part of their defences of liberalism. The paper examines the extent to which Hayek and Dewey ignore concerns originally raised by Mill. I conclude that Mill's modest scepticism is reflected in the epistemological abstinence of contemporary liberal philosophers such as John Rawls, and that his elevation of philosophy over democracy remains a challenge to contemporary defenders of the political value of social or institutional epistemology.
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Arneson, Richard J. "LIBERALISM, CAPITALISM, AND “SOCIALIST” PRINCIPLES." Social Philosophy and Policy 28, no. 2 (May 31, 2011): 232–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052510000282.
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AbstractOne way to think about capitalism-versus-socialism is to examine the extent to which capitalist economic institutions are compatible with the fulfillment of socialist ideals. The late G. A. Cohen has urged that the two are strongly incompatible. He imagines how it would make sense for friends to organize a camping trip, distills the socialist moral principles that he sees fulfilled in the camping trip model, and observes that these principles conflict with a capitalist organization of the economy. He adds that these principles are ethically attractive, so if it is feasible to organize the economy on the camping trip model, we ought to do so. This essay argues to the contrary that for all that has been said, capitalist economic arrangements might be in the set of institutional arrangements that overall would best fulfill the camping trip principles, and anyway, the principles themselves ought to be rejected, so the question whether or not a capitalist set-up might satisfy these principles should not interest us. The grounds for rejecting the camping trip principles support a form of welfarist consequentialism that denies that equality of distribution of any sort is per se ethically desirable and also denies that liberal freedoms to live as one chooses are per se morally desirable. Equality and freedom should rather be regarded as in the light of possible means (or hindrances) to advancing good for people, fairly distributed.
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Rosenkranz, Sven. "Liberalism, entitlement, and verdict exclusion." Synthese 171, no. 3 (April 9, 2008): 481–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9331-9.
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Demaine, Jack, and Penny Smith. "Liberalism, neoliberalism, social democracy: thin communitarian perspectives on political philosophy and education." British Journal of Sociology of Education 31, no. 4 (July 2010): 509–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01425692.2010.484925.
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Islamy, Athoillah. "THE PROBLEM OF LIBERALIZING ISLAMIC MARRIAGE LAW IN INDONESIA : The Perspective of Science Philosophy." AL-SYAKHSHIYYAH Jurnal Hukum Keluarga Islam dan Kemanusiaan 2, no. 1 (June 21, 2020): 53–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.35673/as-hki.v2i1.744.
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The phenomenon of liberalism on Islamic marriage law in Indonesia often creates social problems. Therefore, it is important to understand understanding and wise attitudes towards the phenomenon within the framework of the scientific paradigm. This research aims to understand various forms of liberalism on Islamic marriage law in Indonesia in the perspective of the philosophy of Science. This research is a qualitative research in the form of literature review. The type of legal research in this study is philosophical normative legal research. The research data used is various research on liberalism on the law of Islamic marriage in the Compilation of Islamic Law (KHI). Meanwhile, the theory used as a knife of analysis is the theory of the scientific revolution of Thomas Samuel Kuhn. This study concludes that liberalism on Islamic marriage law in Indonesia is a form of paradigm shift over the construction of legal thinking in various KHI articles that are considered to have experienced anomalies, which are not relevant to social development and do not answer the challenges of modernity, such as issues of gender equality, democracy, human rights Humans, and pluralism. Such conditions have encouraged contemporary Islamic law reviewers in Indonesia to voice a paradigm shift and even a scientific revolution by giving birth to the construction of new Islamic marriage law.
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Zuckert, Michael P. "JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND CAPITALISM: JUSTICE FIELD RECONSIDERED." Social Philosophy and Policy 28, no. 2 (May 31, 2011): 102–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052510000233.
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AbstractJustice Stephen J. Field was the champion of a form of liberalism often said to be especially friendly to capitalism, the approach to the Constitution traditionally identified with “Lochnerism,” i.e., a laissez-faire oriented judicial activism. More recently a form of judicial revisionism has arisen, challenging the accepted descriptions of “Lochnerism” and of Field's jurisprudence. This article is an attempt to extend the revisionist approach by arriving at a more satisfactory understanding of the grounding of Field's jurisprudence in the natural rights philosophy. Field, it turns out, orienting around natural rights, was not so unambiguously friendly to capitalism as previous generations of scholars maintained, but his approach is surely friendlier than the constitutional theories that have replaced natural rights since Field's day.
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Mäkinen, Jukka, and Arno Kourula. "Pluralism in Political Corporate Social Responsibility." Business Ethics Quarterly 22, no. 4 (October 2012): 649–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/beq201222443.
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ABSTRACT:Within corporate social responsibility (CSR), the exploration of the political role of firms (political CSR) has recently experienced a revival. We review three key periods of political CSR literature—classic, instrumental, and new political CSR—and use the Rawlsian conceptualization of division of moral labor within political systems to describe each period’s background political theories. The three main arguments of the paper are as follows. First, classic CSR literature was more pluralistic in terms of background political theories than many later texts. Second, instrumental CSR adopted classical liberalism and libertarian laissez-faire as its structural logic. Third, new political CSR, based on a strong globalist transition of responsibilities and tasks from governments to companies, lacks a conceptualization of division of moral labor that is needed to fully depart from a classical liberalist position. We end by providing a set of recommendations to develop pluralism in political CSR.
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Estlund, David. "LIBERAL ASSOCIATIONISM AND THE RIGHTS OF STATES." Social Philosophy and Policy 30, no. 1-2 (January 2013): 425–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052513000204.
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AbstractIt is often argued that if one holds a liberal political philosophy about individual rights against the state and the community, then one cannot consistently say that a state that violates those principles is owed the right of noninterference. How could the rights of the collective trump the rights of individuals in a liberal view? I believe that this debate calls for more reflection, on the relation between liberalism and individualism. I will sketch a conception of liberalism (“liberal associationism”) in which there is nothing awkward about saying that associations, as such, have some moral (not just, say, legal) rights to noninterference. If liberal associationism is compelling in general terms then, if states (or some of them) can be shown to be associations in the relevant respects, then liberalism itself will supply the moral basis for a right of that kind, held by a state or people as such, to nonintervention.
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Dubniak, Zlatyslav. "Versions of Pragmatic Liberalism: from Rorty back to Dewey." Journal of Education Culture and Society 12, no. 2 (September 25, 2021): 15–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.15503/jecs2021.2.15.30.
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Aim. The aim of this study is to analyze and evaluate two versions of the theory of liberalism which emerged within the philosophical tradition of pragmatism: Richard Rorty’s “ironic liberalism” and John Dewey’s “renascent liberalism”.
Methods. The study is based on: 1) comparative analysis, which shows the differences and points of contact between Dewey’s classical pragmatism and Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, in particular, between different versions of their liberal theories; 2) critical analysis, which made it possible to identify the shortcomings and advantages in the arguments of the above-mentioned philosophers.
Results. The author analyzed Rorty’s and Dewey’s theories of liberalism in relation to their theories of reality, human specificity, and ethics. In this way, the specific liberal views of these American philosophers on such issues as the relationship between private and public, the main goals of politics, and the values of the social order were explicated. It allowed offering a thorough critique of Rorty’s “ironic liberalism”, and supporting of Dewey’s “renascent liberalism”.
Conclusion. While Dewey saw the mission of liberalism in enabling individuals to improve their experience, Rorty insisted on the need for a liberal policy of providing the basic conditions for individual self-creation. The main disadvantage of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, and, in particular, “ironic liberalism”, was the exclusion from the philosophy of the modifying tools of human behavior, which were expressed by the concepts of “good” or “virtue”, in Dewey’s “renascent liberalism”. This circumstance necessitates a return from Rorty back to Dewey in the discussions on pragmatic liberalism.
Key words: philosophy of pragmatism, Richard Rorty, John Dewey, historicism, naturalism, liberalism.
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PITT, ALAN. "THE IRRATIONALIST LIBERALISM OF HIPPOLYTE TAINE." Historical Journal 41, no. 4 (December 1998): 1035–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x98008152.
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The critic and philosopher Hippolyte Taine is presented here as one of the pioneers of the theory of the unconscious in European social thought: a source of the more explicit writings on unconscious motivation in the works of Nietzsche, Pareto, and others. Preceding forms of French liberalism – particularly those of Guizot and Cousin – had depended upon an underlying belief in a number of ideas – in God, in our ability to understand his will, and in reason. A representative regime would be able to mobilize rationality in society and give it effective sovereignty. Taine's life can be interpreted as one of increasing conservatism, but it was consistent in his rejection of such a conception of rationality; first through his technical philosophy, then through the discussion of psychological motivation in mass political movements set out in the Origines de la France contemporaine. It is argued that such a rejection of rationalism was a crucial first step in the elaboration of new forms of liberalism – technocratic, welfarist, and economically individualist. Taine's work represents the passage from one type of liberal theory to another at a crucial moment in French history, the consolidation of universal male suffrage as a foundation of the Third Republic.
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Scoccia, Danny. "Autonomy, Want Satisfaction, and the Justification of Liberal Freedoms." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 3 (September 1987): 583–601. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1987.10716455.
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By ‘Liberalism’ or ‘a liberal-democratic theory of justice’ I understand the thesis that a modern, affluent society is just only if it respects and enforces certain rights. Among these are rights to free speech, the liberty to make one's own self-regarding choices (free from excessive paternalistic meddling by the state), privacy, due process of law, participation in society's political decision-making, and private property in personal posessions. By a ‘justification’ of these core rights of liberalism I understand a moral theory (plus necessary empirical assumptions) from which they are derivable. A moral theory which justifies the core rights will, ipso facto, condemn slavery, totalitarianism, and other social arrangements incompatible with a liberal-democratic constitution. What shape that moral theory should have is a matter of some dispute. According to philosophers like Ronald Dworkin it must be ‘rights-based.’ The core rights of liberalism in his view are derivable from the fundamental human right to ‘equal respect and consideration.’ A widely held alternative view is that the core rights are simply social rules the existence of which promotes human welfare.
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Crook, Tom. "Habit as Switchpoint." Body & Society 19, no. 2-3 (May 22, 2013): 275–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1357034x13484372.
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Building on Mary Poovey’s reflections, this article outlines a two-fold genealogy of habit in the context of the philosophy and practice of liberalism. One aspect relates to the word ‘habit’, which by the 19th century had come to mean the repetitive actions of the body and mind, thus shedding its former association with dress and collective customs. The second relates to how ‘habit’ functioned as a means of mediating the tensions of liberalism, three in particular: between the self and the social; between an individual’s past, present and future actions; and between the role of the state and the role of self-government.
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Ball, Carlos A. "Essentialism and Universalism in Gay Rights Philosophy: Liberalism Meets Queer Theory." Law & Social Inquiry 26, no. 01 (2001): 271–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2001.tb00178.x.
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Kautz, Steven. "The Postmodern Self and The Politics of Liberal Education." Social Philosophy and Policy 13, no. 1 (1996): 164–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500001564.
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Richard Rorty is one of the principal architects of a new way of thinking about liberalism. He calls his way “liberal ironism”: it is a postmodern liberalism, without Enlightenment rationalism, without the hopeless and finally enervating aspiration to discover an a historical philosophical foundation (“natural rights”) for liberal principles and practices. The postmodern liberal ironist, unlike the classical liberal rationalist, “faces up to the contingency of his or her own most central beliefs and desires,” says Rorty, including the characteristic liberal belief that “cruelty is the worst thing we do.” Such postmodern liberals frankly admit the apparently unhappy consequence of that essential “contingency,” that “there is no neutral, noncircular way to defend” liberal ways, no good argument to deploy against “Nazi and Marxist enemies of liberalism”; but no such argument is needed, says Rorty, since loyalty to one's own community is morality enough, even where that loyalty is without foundation. Here, I begin with a few words about Rorty's postmodern liberalism, as preface to a discussion of the effects of postmodern doctrines on liberal moral psychology.
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Spragens, Thomas A. "POPULIST PERFECTIONISM: THE OTHER AMERICAN LIBERALISM." Social Philosophy and Policy 24, no. 1 (December 18, 2006): 141–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052507070069.
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Recent debates over American liberalism have largely ignored one way of understanding democratic purposes that was widely influential for much of American history. This normative conception of democracy was inspired by philosophical ideas found in people such as John Stuart Mill and G. W. F. Hegel rather than by rights-based or civic republican theories. Walt Whitman and John Dewey were among its notable adherents. There is much that can be said on behalf of Richard Rorty's recent argument that American liberals would be well advised to recover and reclaim the heritage of Whitman and Dewey; but some additions and emendations to his construction of these champions of democracy would strengthen his case.
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Graham, Kevin M. "Race and the Limits of Liberalism." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32, no. 2 (June 2002): 219–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004931032002005.
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Sandel, Michael J. "Populism, liberalism, and democracy." Philosophy & Social Criticism 44, no. 4 (March 13, 2018): 353–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453718757888.
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The right-wing populism ascendant today is a symptom of the failure of progressive politics. Central to this failure is the uncritical embrace of a neo-liberal version of globalization that benefits those at the top but leaves ordinary citizens feeling disempowered. Progressive parties are unlikely to win back public support unless they learn from the populist protest that has displaced them —not by replicating its xenophobia and strident nationalism, but by taking seriously the legitimate grievances with which these ugly sentiments are entangled. These grievances are not only economic but also moral and cultural; they are not only about wages and jobs but also about social esteem.
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Vranic, Bojan. "Toward ideational collective action: The notions of common good and of the state in late 19th century social liberalism." Filozofija i drustvo 30, no. 3 (2019): 369–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1903369v.
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The aim of this paper is to analyze notions of common good and of the state in late 19th century British social liberalism and their relation to collective action of the citizens. The author shows that British social liberals argued for a type of state that uses top down strategy to encourage collective action in order to transform individuals into a socially responsible groups, i.e. good citizens. The paper focuses on philosophical works of F. H. Bradley, ethics of T. H. Green and political philosophy of B. Bosanquet, analyzing their efforts to reconceptualize ideas of classical liberalism and utilitarian doctrine of the individual, society and the state in light of emerging influence of leftist social movements. The author argues that the works of British social liberals are a foundation of the state and society which will dominate liberalism in the second half of 20th century, i.e. the idea of the welfare state.
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Corlett, J. Angelo. "Marx and Rights." Dialogue 33, no. 3 (1994): 377–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300039020.
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It is often either assumed or argued that political liberalism respects rights, while Marxism does not. In fact, many believe that the omission of rights in communism counts decisively against the viability of Karl Marx's social philosophy. Is there room for rights in Marx's social philosophy?This paper examines Allen E. Buchanan's interpretation of Marx's critique of rights. Contrary to Buchanan's view, I shall argue that Marx's critique of rights is limited rather than comprehensive in scope. I shall also set forth part of a foundation of a Marxian theory of rights.
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Levy, Jacob T. "LIBERALISM'S DIVIDE, AFTER SOCIALISM AND BEFORE." Social Philosophy and Policy 20, no. 1 (December 18, 2002): 278–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052503201126.
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For most of the century and a half that began roughly with the later works of John Stuart Mill, the most important divide within liberal political thought was that between classical (or market, or libertarian) liberalism and welfare (or new, or redistributionist) liberalism. The questions that were important to the socialist/liberal debate also became important for debates within liberalism: What is the relationship between property and freedom? Between free trade and freedom? Is freedom of commercial activity on a moral par with other sorts of freedom? Is the alleviation of poverty or material need a more important political goal than freedom? How do freedom and equality fit together in a liberal understanding of justice? What degree of state economic planning, or state taxation and expenditure, is compatible with liberal freedom?
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Gaus, Gerald F. "ON JUSTIFYING THE MORAL RIGHTS OF THE MODERNS: A CASE OF OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES." Social Philosophy and Policy 24, no. 1 (December 18, 2006): 84–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052507070045.
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In this essay I sketch a philosophical argument for classical liberalism based on the requirements of public reason. I argue that we can develop a philosophical liberalism that, unlike so much recent philosophy, takes existing social facts and mores seriously while, at the same time, retaining the critical edge characteristic of the liberal tradition. I argue that once we develop such an account, we are led toward a vindication of “old” (qua classical) liberal morality—what Benjamin Constant called the “liberties of the moderns.” A core thesis of the paper is that a regime of individual rights is crucial to the project of public justification because it disperses moral authority to individuals thus mitigating what I call the “burdens of justification.”
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Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Liberalism, Conservatism, and Americanism." Ethics & International Affairs 3 (March 1989): 205–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.1989.tb00219.x.
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Lipset sets out to demonstrate the distinct differences between American and European notions of liberalism and conservatism. Tocqueville's coined term “American exceptionalism” reaffirms that social, political, and religious systems took a unique form in the United States. American liberals and conservatives alike have sought to extend the “good society” based on the Protestant ethic worldwide, though, ironically, both see their domestic opponents as advocates of immoral policies. The author concludes with an assessment of the current global movement toward classical liberalism: “We are all liberals-even the socialists and communists,” he asserts. As economic liberalism is not a panacea for the world's problems, Lipset predicts a return to the state-centric world in the not-so-near future.
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Boettcher, James W. "Diversity, toleration and recent social contract theory." Philosophy & Social Criticism 45, no. 5 (January 9, 2019): 539–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453718820907.
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Ryan Muldoon has recently advanced an interesting and original bargaining model of the social contract as an alternative to Rawlsian social contract theory and political liberalism. This model is said to provide a more plausible account of social stability and the acceptance of diversity, at least as compared to those approaches that emphasize the traditional liberal idea of toleration. I challenge this claim by pursuing three criticisms of Muldoon’s new social contract theory. First, the principle of distribution that he proposes is likely to be rejected by some (or even many) members of the public, due to its indeterminacy or highly inegalitarian implications. Second, Muldoon tends to reduce the benefits of cooperation to gains from trade, ignoring other cooperative benefits that complicate his call for small-scale social experimentation. Finally, while motivating the acceptance of diversity is a commendable goal, distinguishing more defensible conceptions of toleration from less defensible conceptions requires attending to those elements of political liberalism that Muldoon seems to abandon, namely, standards of public reason and public justification.
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Jønch-Clausen, Karin, and Klemens Kappel. "Social Epistemic Liberalism and the Problem of Deep Epistemic Disagreements." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18, no. 2 (June 5, 2014): 371–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9523-y.
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Prodanovic, Srdjan. "Rorty and contemporary social theory." Filozofija i drustvo 21, no. 2 (2010): 97–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1002097p.
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The aim of this paper is to show certain aspects of Rorty?s philosophy that are relevant to social theory, and also to point out the most important divergences of Rorty?s insights from postmodern understanding of social reality. Therefore, in the first part of the paper I will examine both Rorty?s philosophy of edification and all relevant criticisms to his view of philosophy ?as a communication of mankind?. Furthermore, I will try to establish to which extent Rorty?s understanding of contingency and its implications really falls close to postmodern thought. I will also argue that the impossibility of philosophical justification of social reality, according to Rorty, does not entail impossibility of moral progress and that the role of social theory is actually in raising the level of inclusion of social interaction and in providing social hope. Moreover, it will be shown that Rorty, unlike Foucault and Derrida, thought that the institutions of Western democracy and liberalism are quite capable to achieve these goals and that accomplishment of this liberal utopia greatly depends on the degree of commitment to moral progress that all actors (writers, social scientists and philosophers) within the cultural field share.