Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Liberalism; Social philosophy'

In this thesis I will attempt to develop a phenomenological account for Political Liberalism. My hypothesis is that a re-articulation of the main issues in transcendental phenomenology as it relates to social philosophy, first in a genetic sense (as developed by Alfred Schutz), but also in a generative context (as developed by Bernhard Waldenfels), provides us with a methodological ground that can instigate a more complex account for the questions of social choice and the way in which we establish preferences. My thesis is that such a complex account of social choice can motivate us to focus on the disordered nature of our constitution of preferences, and point at the importance of a deep comprehension of historicity, along with a defense of freedom of speech as a tool for resignification of social values.

Recent literature in various practical fields calls for a 'relational approach' to social justice, as a theoretical alternative that transcends limitations with liberal contractarianism to offer more penetrating analysis of social justice. I critically engage literature from radical intellectual-political traditions such as Marxism, feminism, and critical race theory to propose what can - and can't - form the basis of a cogent relational critique of liberalism and an alternative positive account. I hone this through dialogue with Rawlsian 'justice as fairness', as well as more recent developments such as relational egalitarianism. The most distinguishing feature of a relational approach is ontological: its social-theoretic account of injustice comprises supra-individual phenomena - relations, social groups, structure, historical causality - as opposed to individual locations hosting portions of a distribuend. Moreover, I define an intermediate position in the ideal vs non-ideal theory debate, arguing that a persuasive relational approach would 'start from injustice'; it would identify the primary desideratum incumbent on social justice theory as being that it enhances understanding of real injustice and thereby informs counteraction. One upshot is a closer relationship between political philosophy and social theory; in turn this reflects how a relational approach to social justice can enjoy symbiosis with the broader 'relational turn' in humanities and social sciences. The argument is furthered through exemplificatory reference to the empirical context of Brazil's post-redemocratisation experimentation with participatory democracy in the social assistance sector, as an aspect of the country's putative 'new social contract'.

This thesis examines the relation between two contrasting approaches to justice: the constructive and reconstructive projects of Rawls and Habermas on the one hand, and the deconstructive projects of Levinas and Derrida on the other. First, I identify the central difference between the two projects, reconstructing each account of justice as it develops in relation to Kant??s practical philosophy. I then argue that the two projects are complementary. [New Paragraph] Whilst Rawls and Habermas emphasise the possibility of objectively realising Kant??s idea of an impartial standpoint among autonomous persons, Levinas and Derrida defend the impossibility of determining the content of justice. Rawls and Habermas subscribe to the ??art of the possible??, rendering Kant??s impartial standpoint by means of the ??original position?? (Rawls) or the ??procedures of discourse ethics?? (Habermas). By contrast, Levinas argues for justice??s failure, discovering, in Kant??s moral law, a principle of responsibility for the particular other which conflicts with impartiality. Distinguishing himself from both the reconstructive tradition and Levinas, Derrida affirms, in part through his readings of Kant, the ??undecidability?? of the critical function of justice. Committed to the possibility of justice, Derrida also acknowledges its impossibility: no local determination can reconcile responsibility before the other with impartiality among all. [New Paragraph] Having identified the central difference between the two traditions, I then defend their complementarity. ??Reasonable faith?? in the possibility of justice must be supplemented by the acknowledgment of its impossibility. Conversely, attesting to justice??s failure is unsatisfactory without commitment to the possibility of constructing just social forms. Distancing myself from the liberal critique whereby deconstruction withdraws from the political (Fraser, McCarthy, Benhabib, Gutmann), I instead add my voice to a dissenting group (Young, Cornell, Mouffe, Honig, Honneth, Patton, Thomassen) which affirms that deconstruction can productively engage with the constructive tradition. Deconstruction is at home in Rawls?? view that ??the ideal of a just constitution is always something to be worked toward??.

This dissertation develops a new theory of specific and overall socio-political freedom and discusses its role in normative political theory. The aim is to dissolve some of the conceptual confusions that have often beset previous discussions and to develop a theoretical framework with which to approach questions of public policy. This dissertation consists of three parts. In the first part, I develop a new account that specifies under which conditions a person is specifically free and when she is unfree to do something. It is shown that republican accounts of freedom are unsatisfactory and that a trivalent liberal account that equates freedom with ability is most plausible. A new analysis of unfreedom is defended according to which a person is made unfree (as opposed to merely unable) to do something only if she would have this freedom in a better and available distribution that another person could have foreseeably brought about. In the second part, I discuss how to move from an account of specific freedom and unfreedom to a measure of overall freedom. I develop a new and simple aggregation function and argue that the measurement of overall freedom requires both quantitative and evaluative factors. In the third part, I then discuss what role freedom should play in a theory of distributive justice. Instead of freedom deontologically constraining the reach of distributive justice, freedom should be one of its distribuenda. I will first discuss how best to distribute freedom across a person’s lifetime and how this impacts on discussions of paternalistic policies. It will then be shown that we ought not simply maximise freedom between persons, not aim to give everyone enough freedom nor aim at equal freedom. Instead, distributing freedom requires a principle that combines maximisation with a concern for fairness.

Can contemporary liberalism justify antidiscrimination law? The question seems impertinent until we consider contemporary liberalism’s commitment to limited government. Once we do, we realize that contemporary liberals may not complacently assume that their theories justify antidiscrimination law simply because discrimination based on race or sex is so obviously wrongful. Rather, they must scrutinize antidiscrimination law just as they do other regulation of individual conduct. Providing such scrutiny, this thesis argues that three of the most prominent contemporary liberal doctrines of political legitimacy—John Rawls’s “political liberalism,” an antiperfectionist version of the “harm principle,” and Joseph Raz’s “liberal perfectionism”—all fail to justify core applications of antidiscrimination law, applications that we intuitively consider perfectly legitimate. In light of this failure, contemporary liberalism faces a dilemma: it must jettison either its commitment to comprehensive, uniform antidiscrimination regimes or its antiperfectionism and overriding commitment to personal autonomy. This thesis argues for the latter course by providing an account of the wrongfulness of discrimination based on race or sex that condemns all instances of the conduct. According to this account, discrimination is wrong because acting on discriminatory intentions is wrong. More specifically, by taking another person’s race or sex as a reason to treat her less favorably than one would treat people of other races or the other sex, one fails to respect her as a person, to regard her as a being of ultimate value. Unlike contemporary liberal accounts, this account is fully perfectionist, since it defines discrimination in terms of the intentions of discriminators, and the intentions of discriminators in terms of their attitudes, which partly constitute their moral characters. So long as we remain committed to antidiscrimination law in its current form, we must attend to discriminators’ characters. And to attend to discriminators’ characters, we must be willing to espouse perfectionism.

A just society must provide a range of goods: police protection, education, medical care, legal representation, to name only a few. But how should a just society organize production of these goods? To ask this question is to broach the topic of productive justice. We need a theory of this topic in order to explain the content of the ideal of social justice. A certain theory of productive justice is now widely taken for granted. It has the following commitments. Every able beneficiary of just institutions owes some productive contribution. There is no free-loading on just institutions. Therefore, income support from the state should normally be conditioned on working. Those who would be idle must find a way to support themselves. Beyond this general requirement, however, each citizen gets to decide his own contribution, because each citizen has a right to choose his occupation. The state may not assign occupations or specify anyone’s place of work. Nor may it direct anyone to work longer than he prefers, provided he is not loafing on public support. Instead, labor must be allocated through a market, where everyone is free to decline any given job offer. The labor market thus fixes the possibilities of just production: the socioeconomic goals that a society may justly accomplish are limited to those that can be pursued in or alongside a labor market. This theory is now widely accepted. I argue that its central elements are importantly mistaken. Income support from the state should not normally be conditioned on working. To think this is to misunderstand the nature of each citizen’s contributory duty. Nor is it the case that a just state may never assign urgent jobs or otherwise restrict occupational decisions. To think this is to misunderstand several of the basic rights and liberties of citizenship. In my dissertation, I defend a different theory, with three elements. The first is a theory of every citizen’s right to free choice of occupation. The second is a theory of the scope and basis of the economic duties of modern citizenship. The third is a theory of the permissibility conditions of restricting labor market liberties. Together these three elements comprise a new theory of productive justice.
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Este trabalho apresenta uma análise dos artigos publicados pela pensadora brasileira Maria Lacerda de Moura na revista espanhola Estudios (1930-1936). Nestes artigos identificamos elementos para a constituição de uma filosofia unicista libertária da natureza, de onde vem o nosso objetivo de compreender a proposta desta autora, além das suas contribuições críticas à relação estabelecida entre natureza e humanidade na sociedade burguesa industrial. A imprensa foi instrumento privilegiado no final do século XIX para a organização do movimento anarquista bem como difusão de conhecimento e ideais e valores contraculturais à ideologia dominante. Visando a transformação social, editoriais de viés anarquista emergiram trazendo elementos críticos à sociedade vigente e atentos às descobertas científicas da época. Além da difusão do conhecimento, os libertários também questionavam o papel da classe científica e ressignificavam conhecimentos e conceitos a fim de transformá-los em instrumentos para a mudança revolucionária. Neste sentido, identificamos nos artigos publicados na Revista Estudios, ligada ao campo do anarco-individualismo espanhol, a construção de diversas filosofias da natureza com vistas à sociedade libertária. Neste período de fortalecimento a nível mundial dos Estados-nação após a Primeira Guerra Mundial e a ascensão dos Estados totalitários, os militantes e pensadores anarquistas questionavam o avanço tecnológico, a democracia e as instituições da sociedade burguesa. Nesta perspectiva, constituíam diferentes visões da natureza que se opunham à das classes dirigentes, base de um conhecimento científico normalizador e de uma sociedade de controle. Releituras críticas e emancipatórias de temas científicos tão diversos como a eugenia, o neomalthusianismo, o naturismo, a educação sexual, o vegetarianismo, o proteanismo, a plasmogenia, aliados ao combate anticlerical e a um pacifismo radical, baseavam a crítica libertária às políticas autoritárias exercidas pelos governos fascistas. A partir dos artigos da brasileira Maria Lacerda de Moura, publicados neste periódico entre os anos de 1930 e 1936, procuraremos demonstrar a constituição de saberes e de uma “ciência radical”, crítica à sociedade vigente e voltada para a construção de uma nova ética, de uma nova sociedade harmônica através da cooperação, educação, emancipação, avanço tecnológico e participação democrática direta. Na revista Estudios, Maria Lacerda de Moura constrói pontes ibero-americanas a fim de combater inimigos em comum e desativar quaisquer mecanismos de dominação. Neste caminho, a partir das resistências locais e cotidianas, a construção de uma filosofia unicista da natureza se faz evidente.
This work presents an analysis of articles published by brazilian thinker Maria Lacerda de Moura in the spanish journal Estudios (1930-1936). In these articles we identified elements for the creation of a libertarian unicist philosophy of nature, hence our goal to understand the purpose of this author beyond their critical contributions to the relationship established between nature and humanity in the industrial bourgeois society. The press was a privileged instrument in the late nineteenth century to the organization of the anarchist movement and diffusion of knowledge and countercultural ideals and values of the dominant ideology. Aimed at social transformation, editorials with anarchist bias emerged, attentive to the scientific discoveries of the time and bringing critical elements to the existing society. In addition to the dissemination of knowledge, libertarians also questioned the role of class and they gave their own meanings to scientific knowledge and concepts in order to turn them into an instrument for revolutionary change. In this sense, we identify in articles published in the journal Estudios, linked to the field of spanish anarcho-individualism, the construction of various philosophies of nature with a view to libertarian society. In this period of strengthening of global nation-states after the First World War and the rise of totalitarian states, militants and anarchist thinkers questioned the technological progress, democracy and the institutions of bourgeois society. In this perspective, they constituted different views of nature which opposed the one defended by the ruling class, based on a normalizing scientific knowledge and a society of control. Libertarian critique of authoritarian policies exercised by fascist governments was based on critical and emancipatory reinterpretations of scientific topics as diverse as eugenics, neomalthusianism, naturism, sex education, vegetarianism, the "proteanismo", the "plasmogenia", allies to combat anti-clerical and radical pacifism. From the articles published by the Brazilian Maria Laceda de Moura. in this journal between the years 1930 and 1936, we will seek to demonstrate the constitution of knowledges and a "radical science," critique of current society and toward the construction of a new ethics, of a new harmonious society through cooperation, education, empowerment, technological advances and direct democratic participation. In Estudios magazine, Maria Lacerda de Moura built Ibero- American bridges in order to combat enemies in common and disable any mechanisms of domination. In this way, from local and daily resistance, the construction of a unicist philosophy of nature is evident.

This thesis explores the normative propriety of immigration detention in liberal states. In the first part of the thesis, I explore the development, current practice, and popular justifications for immigration detention in the United Kingdom. I argue that a crucial but unacknowledged role for immigration detention is to function as a political spectacle of the centralisation of power in liberal states. I find that the key motivation for detaining non-citizens is that they could abscond before their removals. I conclude that this basis for detention is normatively acceptable in only very limited cases and, even then, alternatives are often available and ethically preferable. Based on the fact that there is a normatively acceptable rationale, albeit circumscribed, for detention practices, I then propose a framework of minimum standards of treatment in detention that I advise all liberal states to follow. After outlining my proposal, I turn in the second part of the thesis to an examination of the normative theories of immigration control and how they take account of detention. Normative theorists differ in how they balance their commitments to individual and state rights, yet I find the majority concedes the need for some degree of immigration admissions control. Such theories face a moral dilemma: there can be no immigration control without detention, and so detention becomes an implicit assumption for these normative theories to be coherent. A potential solution for combating the practical problems associated with the growing, worsening detention estates as well as the moral dilemma of incarcerating a non-citizen based on fear of absconding would be to open borders and eliminate immigration control. Given the reality of the sovereign right to control immigration, however, I argue that the more feasible normative answer is lobby liberal states to adopt my framework of minimum standards of treatment while simultaneously pressing for open borders as the long-term ethical goal.

Esta investigación es una reflexión teórico-práctica desde el pensamiento filosófico de lo político, cuya línea argumentativa emerge con la pregunta por lo político postotalitario, planteada por: Hannah Arendt, Carl Schmitt y Claude Lefort. La primera, como crítica a la tradición filosófica de lo político y su “olvido” de la acción, así como la relación entre pensamiento y acción, y la Crisis de la Cultura; el segundo, sobre: lo estatal y lo político, el enemigo interior y la legitimidad de la lucha política al interior del mismo Estado moderno, y su original crítica a la paradoja democrática liberal; y, el tercero, la política y el movimiento de Mai 68, así , como la dramática tensión entre imperialismo liberal económico versus marxismo social, modelos hegemónicos del siglo XX, como el fracaso de los dos. Lefort plantea la invención democrática, a partir de su confirmación del rol político de los Derechos del Hombre/humanos como fórmula de Resistencia anti-dominación totalitaria. Ya, para el estudio del caso colombiano, retomamos la problemática relación: violencia versus política, en el marco de la “paradoja democrática” colombiana y sus períodos de legislatura constitucional, procesos electorales a corporaciones públicas, vigencia y alternancia de partidos políticos, junto a una tragedia humanitaria que exige la apertura de la oficina de DH de la ONU en 1997 en Bogotá. Obtenemos, de esta forma una crítica al contexto social usurpado por la Guerra Fría y los imperios URSS y USA, como las secuelas socioculturales de toda sociedad postcolonial, oligárquica, que termina fagocitada a partir 1980 por el mercado mundial de la droga, carteles organizados en la que participan: oligarquía política, guerrillas FARC, ELN, M19, paramilitares, delincuencia común, quebrando todos los parámetros analíticos de las ciencias sociales.
This research is a practical and theoretical reflection of Politics from a philosophical approach. The main idea emerges from the quest for post-Totalitarian Politics, as proposed by Hanna Arendt, Carl Schmitt and Claude Lefort. The first as seen by Hanna Arendt, is a critic to philosophical tradition of Politics and its “forgetfulness” of the political action, and the relation between thought and action, and the Crisis in Culture; the second by Carl Schmitt, is the State and Politics, the enemy within and the legitimacy of the political struggle within the modern State, and Schmitt's original critic to the Liberal Democracy Paradox. Third is Politics and the “May of 68” movement, as the dramatical tension between Liberal Economical Imperialism and Social Marxism as hegemonic models of the XXth century, and the failure of both. With the Democratic Invention Claude Lefort confirms the importance of Man / Human rights (DH) as a form of anti-Totalitarian Resistance. In the analysis of the Colombian case, we will study the conflictual relationship of Violence vs Politics, within the frame of the Colombian Political Paradox composed of constitutional legislature, electoral processes, public corporations, permanence and alternation of political parties and a humanitarian crisis that required the opening of a UN Human Rights office in Colombia in 1997. Having this elements in mind, we can elaborate a critic to the Colombian social context that ends being defined by the Cold War proxy wars between the USSR and the USA, as by the sociocultural scars of any post-colonial oligarchical society. A society that ends being devoured in 1980 by the globalisation of drug trafficking and the organisations that profit from it: The Political oligarchy, the FARC, ELN, M19, Paramilitary organisations, Drug Cartels and criminals. All this elements end defining Colombia as an outlier that breaks all analytical parameters of Social Sciences.

This work examines the acceptance of the theoretical construct of political virtue in contemporary liberalism. The thesis suggests that the instrumental use of political virtue fulfills an ideological function in the liberal theory. It also discusses the use of political virtue beyond the mere distributive function of the dominant goods. The study proposes that political virtue must be understood as a dialectical disposition between individuals and institutions. The first chapter presents a preliminary approach to John Rawls’s liberalism. The aims is identify political virtues as qualities of people’s moral character, and examine the influence of the distributive conception of justice and the priority of the right over the good. The second chapter considers two liberal theories that follow Rawls’s ideas, in terms of the political notion of justice. However, both theories assign a specific role to virtue as a key element for prosperity in a liberal society. That is why both theories reject some liberal principles, as neutrality, in favour of liberal ideology. On one hand, Richard Dagger’s republican liberalism intends to show the compatibility between the individual rights, autonomy with republican ideas –civic virtues- and duties. On the other hand, Stephen Macedo’s civic liberalism claims that liberal virtues contribute to improve liberal policy. The third chapter critically considers the notions on political virtues from a liberal anthropological perspective of liberal ‘self’, and moral conceptions of people related to Michael Sandel’s ideas. It includes Iris Marion Young´s perspectives, specifically her idea of displace the concept of justice from distribution, in order to associate the concept of virtue with the negative dimension of justice which requires citizens willing to challenge the dominant order.
La presente investigación expone el tema de la virtud política en el liberalismo contemporáneo. El objetivo es desentrañar el papel instrumental de la virtud política en la estructura básica. La investigación sigue el método genealógico que se propone sacar a la luz los valores dominantes que el liberalismo guarda para la virtud política, en torno a la moralización de las conductas en nombre de la sociedad justa. El trabajo parte rastreando la entrada de la virtud política en el liberalismo de John Rawls. Luego examina dos enfoques liberales que desarrollan el ideal de virtud política. El primer enfoque es el liberalismo republicano de Richard Dagger, cuya postura intenta articular principios liberales como la autonomía y los derechos individuales, con la virtud cívica y los deberes de los ciudadanos. El segundo enfoque es el liberalismo cívico que presenta Stephen Macedo que concibe la virtud liberal como instrumento de la ideología individualista que privatiza las formas de vida. En seguida se presenta el aparato crítico que permite desembarazar la virtud política de la estructura básica, del concepto normativo y de la justícia distributiva. Se sigue la propuesta de Iris Marion Young que cuestiona el ideal de imparcialidad y propone una concepción de justicia política que admite el conflicto y la indignación como reclamos de injusticia. Finalmente la presente tesis propone reformular el concepto de virtud liberal a través de su composición dialéctica, como Hegel plantea. Desde ahí, la virtud se vislumbra como una disposición capaz de expresar la contradicción con los valores dominantes y reivindica la tensión entre lo particular y lo universal. De tal modo la virtud se configura como una disposición a la justicia frente a situaciones de opresión y dominación.

Notre idée principale est d'essayer de comprendre la pensée politique de Raymond Aron à partir de sa théorie sur l'histoire. Pour nous, derrière sa proclamation d'une politique raisonnable ou progressive existe un support épistémologique, à savoir la proposition d'un déterminisme de probabilité concernant la vérité historique, proposition qui ne peut se constituer que dans le cadre d'une critique de la philosophie spéculative de l'histoire. Dans l'Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire, Aron tente de surmonter l'antinomie du devenir humain entre unité totale du modèle hégélien-marxiste et pluralité irréductible du modèle d'Oswald Spengler, mais sans tomber dans le piège du relativisme absolu. Plus précisément, sa propre critique de la philosophie de l'histoire se constitue à double niveau : au niveau méthodologique, il essaye de réinterpréter la relation entre la compréhension et l'explication pour établir l'objectivité historique. Et au niveau ontologique, pour éviter une conclusion relativiste, il réintroduit l'idée d'une société humanisée au sens kantien, mais d'une manière moins téléologique et plus régulatrice. Dans le domaine politique, corrélativement, il rejette tout type de messianisme garanti d'avance, car, à ses yeux, ce n'est que par choix et décision instantanée que l'homme fait son histoire, tout en gardant l'espoir de la liberté. Et son libéralisme se différencie du libéralisme purement économique et apparaît à la fois conservateur vis-à-vis de la tradition et essentiellement politique. Notre recherche consistera à montrer comment s'est élaboré, en surmontant les philosophies dogmatiques de l'histoire, ce déterminisme de probabilité ; comment il a su appliquer cette conviction historique à son analyse de la société, notamment en tant que libérale et quel rôle doit jouer, selon lui, un intellectuel face à la politique ; nous reprendrons ensuite sa critique vis-à-vis des intellectuels français, pour l'appliquer au débat entre les intellectuels chinois.

Desde las leyendas griegas a los relatos religiosos, la relación entre la inmanencia y la trascendencia es fundamental para la comprensión de la estabilidad y la conservación de la comunidad política. La modernidad inaugura un cambio en los modos en la relación entre fantasmas y hombres que impacta en la escenografía de lo político. El cambio en esta relación no es un proceso lineal ni sencillo. Y, sobre todo, no es un proceso acabado. Durante los últimos años la relación entre hombres y fantasmas, ha sido, sin embargo, subestimada. La subestimación de la relevancia central de la teología política como ontología de lo político no tiene solamente implicancias teóricas, sino que también afecta la capacidad de comprensión de los fenómenos políticos contemporáneos que señalan los límites de nuestras democracias liberales. Estructurada en tres pares y con el objetivo de fundamentar la centralidad de la teología política, la tesis utiliza las imágenes que ofrecen el libro bíblico del Éxodo y el Hamlet de Shakespeare como vehículo argumentativo para replantear esta relación. La tesis analiza las diferentes alternativas a la resolución del problema de la conservación del orden político en Hobbes. Analizamos luego, por un lado, los modos en los que Carl Schmitt reivindica una teología política que liga la política a la verdad y, por otro, los modos en los que Leo Strauss reivindica un retorno a la Filosofía Política para hacer frente a los desafíos de la legitimidad política moderna. Concluimos nuestro análisis afirmando que, para nosotros, lo relevante para nuestras democracias liberales es rescatar una ontología de lo político que, al mismo tiempo que no reniega de la relevancia política de los espectros que se aparecen del más allá, reivindica una política que sea consciente de sus peligros. Una democracia liberal que es consciente de sus límites y principios como régimen político.
From the Greek legends to religious narratives, the relationship between the immanent and the transcendent has been fundamental to the understanding of the stability of the political communality and its preservation. Modernity incites change in the nature of the relationship between ghosts and men, which impacts political scenography. The change in this relationship is neither simple nor lineal. And, more importantly, it is an unfinished process. What is more, during the last years, the relationship between ghosts and men has been underestimated; The underestimation of the relevance of Political Theology as the ontological form of the political does not only have theoretical implications but it also affects our capacity to understand contemporary political phenomena. This shows the limits of our liberal democracy. Structured in three parts that defend the hypothesis that political theology is central, this dissertation uses the images offered by the book of exodus and Shakespeare´s Hamlet to rethink the relation between ghosts and men. First, the dissertation looks at different ways of solving the problem of preserving political community, as offered by Hobbes. Then the thesis analyses how, in first instance, Carl Schmitt describes the revival of a political theology that links the political with the truth, and, additionally, the way in which Leo Strauss emphasises the need to return to the tradition of political philosophy in order to face the challenges of modern political legitimacy. We conclude in stating that the relevant point for our Liberal Democracies is that we revive a political ontology that does not neglect the political relevance of the transcendent while predicating it upon a political practice that is conscious of its danger. This implies a form of Liberal democracy that is aware of its own limits and principles as a political regimen.

Ce livre part d’un double constat : la philosophie véhicule des distinctions dualistes dont la conflictualité affaiblit gravement notre sentiment de solidarité humaine et qui sont autant d’obstacles au développement humain et au progrès social ; affronter la philosophie sur son propre terrain mène à une impasse, toute objection à son règne métaphysique devant, pour être reçue, se formuler dans les termes mêmes de la métaphysique... Il s’agit donc de changer de terrain, ou de chemin. Pour pacifier la pensée et ainsi les rapports humains, il faut instaurer une véritable démocratie dans/de la pensée : établir une pensée dépourvue de but, qui substitue à la recherche de la Vérité celle de la Liberté, ouvrant la voie d’une Utopie libérale.Cette pensée, pour être réelle, doit s’appuyer sur le seul réel qui soit : l’Homme lui-même, en tant qu’Étranger complet, non seulement à l’ensemble des « sciences humaines », mais à la pensée dans sa totalité. On parle d’Utopie radicale de l’Homme, telle que la Philosophie non-standard ou Non-Philosophie en propose la posture. Une posture qui consonne étrangement avec la pratique en kâta, développée au Japon depuis plusieurs millénaires comme « posture en-pratique-complète » de la pensée. Le kâta est au cœur de tous les arts et pratiques au Japon, il forme la base la plus générale des techniques de soi, et façonne la pensée et les pratiques sociétales dans leur ensemble. Kâta, de même que la Philosophie non-standard, permet l’axiomatisation de la pensée et sa posture sans tenter de véhiculer de vérité. Ils constituent de la sorte une alternative crédible à la pensée-monde occidentale aujourd’hui en impasse.L’ouvrage a été publié chez L’Harmattan sous le titre « POSTURES ET PRATIQUES DE L'HOMME - Libéralisme, philosophie non-standard et pensée japonaise »[en ligne: ]
The actual system of thought is founded on the use and proliferation of dualist distinctions that are responsible for the weakening of our sentiments of human solidarity thus represents an obstacle to the future social and human development. Confronting this model on its own terms leads to a dead end, for any objection to its metaphysical reign is expected to be formulated in the same terms of the metaphysical vocabulary that the standardized model of philosophy uses therefore we need to change the field of action trough the idea of efficient democracy inside the economy of knowledge that is built as a rigid and centralized system. Establishing a democracy of thought implies establishing a system of thought that doesn’t rely on a metaphysical purpose beyond Man. I rely on the research done by Richard Rorty and Michel Foucault on the relation between various forms of power, knowledge and language. Furthermore I use the theoretical model developed by François Laruelle known as Non-standard philosophy in order to analyze the shortcomings of both Rorty and Foucault. Non-standard philosophy demonstrates how all forms of philosophy are structured around a prior decision of dialectical division of the world in order to be able to grasp the world philosophically. Philosophers remain constitutively unaware of this prior decision making process thus perpetuating a self-sufficient practice of philosophy. Relying on the model of Non-standard philosophy I am able to analyze an alternative system of thought based on the use of Kâta developed in Japan as a successful example of alternative history of thought to that of the West. This work has been published under the title « POSTURES ET PRATIQUES DE L'HOMME - Libéralisme, philosophie non-standard et pensée japonaise » (online: )

A critical investigation of the public/private distinction as it has been conceived in Anglo-American political thinking in the second half of the 20th century. A broadly held consensus has developed amongst many theorists that public/private does not refer to any single determinate distinction or relationship but rather to an often ambiguous range of related but analytically distinct conceptual oppositions. The argument of this thesis is that if we approach public/private in the search for analytic or conceptual clarity then this consensus is correct. Against this I propose that a number of the most dominant invocations of the distinction can be understood to express public/private as an irreducibly political dialectic that mediates the relationship between the subjective and objective side of social and political life. By locating these conceptually diverse invocations within a broader and more determinate framework of the historical development and contestation of the boundaries which establish the conditions for subjectivity, as the assertion of political agency, on the one hand, and which demarcate, police and defend these particular boundaries, as part of the objectively given character of social life and institutional organisation, on the other hand, then a more determinate character to public/private can be recognized. I then seek to explore the capacity of this model to capture and explain the peculiar post-war problematisation of public/private amongst a number of new left thinkers in Britain and America.

This thesis is an attempt to constructively interpret and critically evaluate the liberal doctrine that we may not limit a person’s liberty for her own good, and to discuss its implications and alternatives in some concrete areas of public health policy. The thesis starts theoretical and goes ever more practical. The first paper is devoted to positive interpretation of anti-paternalism with special focus on the reason component – personal good. A novel generic definition of paternalism is proposed, intended to capture, in a generous fashion, the object of traditional liberal resistance to paternalism – the invocation of personal good reasons for limiting of or interfering with a person’s liberty. In the second paper, the normative aspect of this resistance is given a somewhat technical interpretation in terms of invalidation of reasons – the blocking of reasons from influencing the moral status of actions according to their strength. It is then argued that normative anti-paternalism so understood is unreasonable, on three grounds: 1) Since the doctrine only applies to sufficiently voluntary action, voluntariness determines validity of reasons, which is unwarranted and leads to wrong answers to moral questions. 2) Since voluntariness comes in degrees, a threshold must be set where personal good reasons are invalidated, leading to peculiar jumps in the justifiability of actions. 3) Anti-paternalism imposes an untenable and unhelpful distinction between the value of respecting choices that are sufficiently voluntary and choices that are not. The third paper adds to this critique the fourth argument that none of the action types typically proposed to specify the action component of paternalism is such that performing an action of that type out of benevolence is essentially morally problematic. The fourth paper ignores the critique in the second and third papers and proposes, in an anti-paternalistic spirit, a series of rules for the justification of option-restricting policies aimed at groups where some members consent to the policy and some do not. Such policies present the liberal with a dilemma where the value of not restricting people’s options without their consent conflicts with the value of allowing people to shape their lives according to their own wishes. The fifth paper applies the understanding of anti-paternalism developed in the earlier papers to product safety regulation, as an example of a public health policy area. The sixth paper explores in more detail a specific public health policy, namely that of mandatory alcohol interlocks in all cars, proposed by the former Swedish government and supported by the Swedish National Road Administration. The policy is evaluated for cost-effectiveness, for possible diffusion of individual responsibility, and for paternalistic treatment of drivers. The seventh paper argues for a liberal policy in the area of dissemination of information about uncertain threats to public health. The argument against paternalism is based on common sense consequentialist considerations, avoiding any appeal to the normative anti-paternalism rejected earlier in the thesis.
QC 20100714

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 transformed the way in which Americans and their leaders viewed the world. The tragic events of that day helped give rise to a foreign policy strategy commonly referred to as the “Bush Doctrine.” At the heart of this doctrine lay a series of propositions about the need to foster liberal democracy as the antidote to terrorism. President George W. Bush proclaimed in a variety of addresses that democracy now represented the “single surviving model” of political life to which all people aspired. In the course of making this argument, President Bush seemed to relate his policies to an overarching “teleology” of progress. This discourse implied that the United States might use force to hasten the emergence of liberal norms and institutions in selected states. With a sense of irony, some commentators soon referred to the Bush administration’s position as “Leninist” because of its determination to bring about the so-called “end of history” today. Yet, surprisingly, these critics had little more to add. This thesis is an attempt to assess in greater depth the Bush administration’s claim to comprehend historical eschatology. Developing a concept termed “democratic vanguardism,” this study investigates the idea of liberal modernity, the role of the United States as a force for democracy, and the implications of using military intervention in the service of idealistic ends. It examines disputes among political theorists, public intellectuals and elected statesmen which help to enrich our understanding of the United States’ efforts under President Bush at bending history to its will.

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A partir de um caso ocorrido no ano de 2006, em um estabelecimento comercial denominado Bar Tuim, no centro da cidade de Porto Alegre, Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil, em que frequentadores entraram em disputa física com agentes da Prefeitura Municipal em torno da interpretação do alcance de uma lei de polícia administrativa, esta dissertação apresenta critérios para definição de limites do poder de polícia frente ao direito à liberdade individual inscrito na Constituição Federal. O caso concreto conduz a uma hipótese de fato, qual seja, a de que há um novo paradigma existencial na sociedade contemporânea, que se denominou paradigma existencial dos hábitos saudáveis, caracterizado como uma supervalorização dos cuidados com a saúde como modo de vida. O pressuposto deste trabalho é justamente o de que esse novo paradigma existencial vem pondo em marcha sucessivas e crescentes proibições no terreno atinente aos hábitos individuais, tendentes a limitar a liberdade individual das pessoas. O novo paradigma existencial é examinado à luz de várias teorias que procuram explicar a realidade contemporânea. Para definir critérios aptos a delinear limites ao instituto do poder de polícia, recorre-se à disciplina da filosofia política para, a partir de conceitos próprios desta, aportar elementos de conteúdo para construir critérios para a definição de limites. Esses elementos de conteúdo são elencados a partir da escola do liberalismo político europeu do século XIX, do liberalismo político contemporâneo e da filosofia política norte-americana. Partindo dessa hipótese de fato, procuraremos estabelecer critérios para a definição de limites à ação do Estado no que se refere a proibições relativas aos hábitos individuais. A presente dissertação é também uma contribuição à crítica a determinados aspectos do modo de vida contemporâneo, no que se refere à supervalorização dos hábitos saudáveis.
After an event held in the year of 2006, at Bar Tuim, a business premise, located at downtown of Porto Alegre, Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, in which customers disagreed with Porto Alegre Council employees about the interpretation of an administrative police law scope, this paper presents some criterion for the definition of the police power boundaries in what refers to the right of personal freedom in Brazil Federal constitution. The present case leds us to the hypothesis that there is a new existential paradigm in the contemporary society which refers to healthy habits and is characterized as an overvaluation of heath care as a way of life. This work assumption is exactly that this new existential paradigm is raising sucessive and growing prohibitions in the field of individual habits, which might limitate our individual freedom. We analyzed this new existential paradigm using many theories which intend to explain the contemporary reality. In order to define some criteria useful for drawing the boundaries of the police power institute, we have appealed to the discipline of political philophy so that we can through its concepts access some elements important to develop criteria for defining these boundaries. These content elements can be seen in the political liberalism from the European school of the nineteenth century, in the contemporary political liberalism, and in the North American political philosophy. Through this hypothesis we intend to establish some criteria in the definition of boundaries to the States actions in what refers to prohibitions related to individual habits. This paper also intends to be a contribution to the critic raised to several aspects in our contemporary way of live, as the overvaluation of healthy habits.

Ma recherche vise à développer une interprétation originale de la pensée de Bertrand de Jouvenel, un des penseurs libéraux les plus importants du siècle passé. Je veux démontrer que Jouvenel ne doit pas être seulement considéré comme un philosophe. L’interprétation purement philosophique de sa pensée est due à la popularisation de ses deux œuvres, Du Pouvoir (1945) et De la Souveraineté (1955). Il est connu par avoir développé une vision historique et philosophique du pouvoir à partir de la théorie politique d’Alexis de Tocqueville. L’essentiel de la littérature critique sur cet auteur se concentre sur cette conception. Ma thèse se propose d’illustrer une vision plus complète de la pensée de Jouvenel. Je veux analyser ses écrits méconnus, comme The Pure Theory of Politics (1963). Jouvenel fut longtemps considéré comme un philosophe libéral. Cette vision, certes correcte, est pourtant incomplète: Jouvenel était un ami et collaborateur de Friedrich von Hayek, l’auteur libéral le plus important du XXème siècle. Toutefois, le Jouvenel des années 1940 et 1950, ne peut être considéré comme un libérale à part entière, car contrairement à Hayek, il n’était pas membre de l’École Autrichienne d’Économie. Jouvenel a élaboré un antiétatisme communautaire, très proche de la doctrine sociale de l’Église catholique. L’individualisme n’est pas la solution contre le pouvoir de l’État. Pour éviter que L’État acquière trop de pouvoir, il faut valoriser les corps intermédiaires de la société civile, comme la famille, les associations, etc
My research aims to develop an original interpretation of the thought of Bertrand de Jouvenel, one of the most important liberal thinkers of the previous century. I intend to prove that Jouvenel has not only got to be considered a philosopher. The purely philosophical interpretation of his thought is due to the popularization of his two works, Du Pouvoir (1945) and De la Souveraineté (1955). He is known for having developed a historical and philosophical vision of power influenced by the political theory of Alexis de Tocqueville. Most of the critical literature on this author focuses on this conception.My dissertation aims to illustrate a more complete view of Jouvenel's thought. I want to analyse his misconceived works, such as The Pure Theory of Politics (1963).Jouvenel was long regarded as a liberal philosopher. This vision, however correct, is incomplete: Jouvenel was a friend and collaborator of Friedrich von Hayek, the most important liberal author of the 20th century. However, the Jouvenel of the 1940s and 1950s cannot be considered a liberal in its own right, because unlike Hayek, he was not a member of the Austrian School of Economics. Jouvenel developed a communitarian anti-statism, very close to the social doctrine of the Catholic Church. Individualism is not the solution against the power of the state. In order to prevent the State from gaining too much power, it is necessary to enhance the intermediary bodies of civil society, such as the family, associations, etc

Cette thèse cherche à comprendre pourquoi Aron juge essentiel d’étudier la question du meilleur régime politique à l’épreuve des relations internationales. Il s’agit de s’interroger sur l’ampleur et le sens politique de ce que Raymond Aron appelle le drame humain, en précisant la nature de la distinction entre l’intérieur et l’extérieur, entre la politique domestique et les affaires étrangères qu’il juge essentiel, tout en examinant les rapports complexes qui se nouent entre ces deux domaines de la vie politique. Nous tâchons d’éclairer la signification que revêt aux yeux d’Aron la primauté de la politique dans l’organisation des choses humaines, alors que pourtant l’organisation politique des sociétés modernes lui apparaît essentiellement indéterminée. Ceci nous amène à nous interroger sur la conception aronienne singulière de la démocratie et du libéralisme, au regard des tensions fondamentales de la vie politique entre les réquisits du bon gouvernement et les contraintes du jeu international. L’étude des antinomies de l’action politique, nous conduit à revenir sur les principaux débats entre réalistes et idéalistes au sujet du problème de la guerre et de la paix, qu’Aron examine à travers ses réflexions sur le « problème machiavélien » et « le « problème kantien ». Il s’agit de préciser le sens de la prudence politique selon Aron, en s’interrogeant sur les limites inhérentes à la recherche du meilleur ordre politique qui soit et en tenant compte du défi que représente la menace thermonucléaire
This dissertation explores the reasons why Raymond Aron deems it essential that the question of the best regime be framed in the context of international relations. In doing so, it seeks to draw out the full scope and political meaning of what Raymond Aron calls "the human drama" by specifying the distinction he makes between domestic politics and foreign affairs, whilst also examining the complex interactions through which he connects these two essential domains of political life. I take as a starting-point the apparent dissonance between Aron's belief in the primacy of politics as an organising principle for human affairs and his perception of modern political societies as essentially indeterminate. From there, I move on to question the singular nature of the Aronian conception of democracy and liberalism in light of the fundamental tension between the imperatives of good governance and the constraints imposed by the international system. The study of the antinomies of political action leads me to revisit the main debates between realists and idealists on the problem of war and peace, as addressed by Aron in his reflections on the Machiavellian problem and the Kantian problem. The aim here is to clarify the meaning Aron gives to political prudence by taking account of the limits inherent to the search for the best possible political order, especially in light of the existential threat raised by the prospect of thermonuclear warfare

Par une analyse du discours de la théorie juridique serbe du XXe siècle, cette thèse contribue non seulement à la description des traits distincts de la pensée juridique serbe, mais aussi à la détermination de la possibilité de la réception des concepts libéraux par une société transitoire, dont la culture politique est bien différente de celle de la société occidentale. En ce sens, l’influence modeste de la théorie du droit social d’origine française indique le conservatisme de l’élite universitaire serbe, qui ne faisait pas confiance à la société et à ses capacités autonomes. Cette élite s’est rendu compte que la société serbe était toujours traditionaliste, patriarcale et pauvre en institutions civiles bien établies. C’est pourquoi l’idée libérale d’une société civile qui englobe l’État, et dont ce dernier n’est qu’une entité au service des citoyens, leur est connue, mais peu convaincante. Au contraire, leur programme libéral s’appuie sur l’idée de l’État de droit qui s’opposerait à l’énergie des masses populaires et, par ses institutions élitistes, présuppose la société des individus libres. Croyant fort à la société comme la source ultime de l’activité législative et judiciaire, les théories françaises du droit social ont lancé une idée inadmissible pour la théorie serbe: la domination de la société sur l’État. Cependant, cette aversion des théoriciens serbes vis-à-vis de la société autonome ne révèle pas seulement le manque de la tradition libérale dans leur pensée. Elle explique aussi les raisons d’une transplantation difficile des institutions démocratiques occidentales et, en général, d’une dure transition de la société post-communiste serbe
The discourse analysis of the Serbian theory of law in the 20th century in the thesis contributes not only to the description of the distinctive features of the Serbian legal thought but also to the establishment of a possibility for the reception of liberal concepts by a society in transition, whose political culture differ from the western society. In that sense, a modest influence of the theory of social law of French origin indicates a conservatism of the Serbian university elite, who did not have faith in the Serbian society and its capacities. This elite was aware of the fact that the Serbian society was still traditionalistic, patriarchal and poor in the institutions of the civil society. Therefore, although they were familiar with the liberal idea of the civil society that includes the state, according to which the state is nothing else but a citizens’ service, it was unconvincing. On the contrary, their liberal program relied on the idea of the Legal state which would stand against the energy of the masses and which would put the existence of a society of free individuals before its elitist institutions. Firmly believing in the society as the final source of the legislative and judicial activity, these French theories of social law launched an idea which was unacceptable for the Serbian theory: the idea of the domination of the society over the state. Still, an aversion towards the autonomous society of Serbian theoreticians does not only reveal the lack of liberal tradition in there thought. It explains the causes of the problematic mapping of the western democratic institutions, but also a difficult transition of the Serbian post-communist society in general

L'intérêt de l'humanité pour la connaissance se joue sur deux fronts : celui de la réduction de l'ignorance, et celui de l'action tant individuelle que collective. Aussi la manière dont nous acquérons le savoir est-elle essentielle, parce qu'elle préjuge aussi bien de notre perception du monde que de notre conscience de nous-mêmes et de la société. Car si, avec la raison comme alliée, l'homme se découvre des potentialités illimitées, nous aurions pourtant tort de passe outre une stricte réalité, celle de notre ignorance infinie, celle, au fond, de notre incapacité à cerner, de façon sûre et certaine, quoi que ce soit de ce monde complexe et en évolution constante qui nous accueille. C'est pourquoi, pour Karl Popper, toute rationalité véritable doit être critique, c'est-à-dire pluraliste et débattante, seule façon de considérer objectivement l'écart qui nous sépare de la vérité et, par suite, d'agir avec prudence et discernement, dans l'intérêt de la science comme dans celui de la collectivité.

La présente thèse porte sur la mise en place des nouvelles manifestations festives en France, et plus particulièrement à Paris, depuis les années 80. Ces fêtes marquent un déplacement par rapport aux fêtes « traditionnelles » qui étaient en grande partie organisées autour des concepts de sacré et de nation. Nourri par une observation ethnographique de plusieurs années, ce travail met en évidence une multiplicité de facettes des fêtes nouvelles: les processus de conceptualisation et de création par les autorités publiques ; leur gestion et mise en œuvre par des managers culturels ou par des associations et des collectifs ; l’invention de nouvelles formes rituelles ou l’adaptation de plus anciennes ; les mises en scène urbaines et l’emploi des codes distinctifs ; l’appropriation de ces fêtes par la société et les différents débats qu’elles ont soulevés. Chacune des trois parties de la thèse est consacrée à une fête. Une place majeure est réservée à la Fête de la musique, la Marche des fiertés et la Nuit blanche, sans pour autant passer sous silence d’autres fêtes résolument nouvelles et d’envergure, telles que la Capitale européenne de la culture et les Allumées de Nantes, permettant de mieux saisir les mutations qui s’opèrent au niveau européen. Enfin, s’appuyant sur la thèse classique de Durkheim, ce travail propose d’envisager ces fêtes comme points d’entrée pour appréhender les idéaux de la société ouverte. L’intention affirmée des organisateurs de mettre en place une nouvelle conception du vivre ensemble et du lien social, est à bien des égards l’occasion de célébrer une société française et européenne, pacifique, réconciliée et tolérante
The present thesis examines the installation of new festive events in France, and more particularly in Paris, since the 80s. These celebrations mark a shift in regard to "traditional" celebrations which mostly revolve around the concepts of the sacred and the nation. Nourished by an ethnographic observation of several years, this work highlights a variety of aspects: the process of their invention and their creation and by the public authorities; the supervision of the events by cultural managers or associations and collectives; the invention of new ritual forms and the adaptation of older ones; the design of the urban scenery and the use of distinctive codes; the appropriation of these events fro, the society and the various debates to which they gave rise. Each part of the thesis deals with a celebration in an independent way. The Fête de la musique, the Gay Pride and the Nuit blanche are analyzed here in priority. However, next to them parade also other events, entirely new and ambitious, such as the European Capital of Culture and the Allumées of Nantes which offer a better insight into changes that took place on a European level. Finally, based on Durkheim's classic thesis, this work proposes to consider these festive events as an entry point into a greater inquiry about the ideals of the open society. The asserted intention of the organizers to put in place a new conception of living together and the social bond is in many ways the occasion to celebrate a French and European society, that is peaceful, reconciled and tolerant

En prenant comme point d'horizon l'entrée du concept de travail mécanique dans la physique théorique par les ingénieurs-savants du début de 19e siècle (Coriolis et Navier notamment), cette thèse montre la filiation de ce concept vis-à-vis de démarches apparaissant à l'aube du 18e siècle à l'Académie Royale des Sciences de Paris, notamment dans les oeuvres d'Amontons et de Parent. La thèse montre alors comment et pourquoi le concept commence à se développer au premier 18e siècle dans cet environnement, comment il est ensuite repris, enrichi, modifié par Pitot, Bélidor, Desaguliers, D. Bernoulli, et comment au contraire ce concept semble ignoré de savants plus théoriciens tel que D'Alembert. Le rôle de la rupture de la vision statique de la machine semble déterminant. Apparaît alors la forte dépendance de ce concept aux problématiques qu'il permet de résoudre, axées sur la quantification et l'optimisation de l'effet des hommes, des animaux et des machines en situation laborieuse, et leurs comparaisons mutuelles dont l'une des finalités est la recherche du profit économique. L'histoire du concept se donne à voir comme une interface permanente entre mécanique théorique, mécanique pratique, et aspects productifs. On suggère alors que la légitimité du concept tient dans sa pertinence à rendre compte du travail des agents producteurs. Enfin, la thèse s'attache à recréer l'épaisseur du réel derrière les concepts et les problématiques, en montrant ce qu'ils doivent aux stratégies gouvernementales et aux pratiques d'ingénieurs.

This study investigates the subject of Muslims’ citizenship in contemporary Western European societies from the viewpoint of John Rawls’s political liberalism, in particular in light of the ‘idea of public reason’ [see John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) and the 1997 essay “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” originally published in University of Chicago Law Review 64 (1997), 765-807 and now included in Political Liberalism, expanded edition, 440-490]. By its very nature, political liberalism does not prescribe a single model for being Muslim in contemporary Europe. Thus, one may wonder if it is too vague as a point of departure for the analysis. On the other hand, however, here I argue that political liberalism specifies a peculiar evaluative framework that allows citizens to answer questions such as “What is politically at stake when citizens of Muslim faith are publicly presented as permanent aliens in contemporary European societies?”, “On what grounds is such exclusion based?”, and “What requirements can European citizens be reasonably expected to meet?” in a distinctively political way and, ideally, to solve the political and social problems from which those questions spring. In this research, I claim that public reason provides a common discursive platform that establishes the ground for a public political identity and for shared standards for social and political criticism. Together, these two elements solve the two dimensions of the problem of ‘stability for the right reasons’ (in Rawls’s terms) in contemporary European societies, because they secure both the political inclusion of Muslims on an equal footing as citizens and civic assurance that they will remain committed to fair terms of social cooperation. A joint solution of these two apparently conflicting demands of stability for the right reasons (i.e. inclusion and mutual assurance) requires an effort in political reconciliation. After having compared public reason citizenship with two prominent normative alternatives, I will conclude that the former is an adequate ideal conception of citizenship for European societies. Finally, I will apply the justificatory evaluative methodological framework (whose requirements I will specify starting from the idea of public reason itself) to a conception of citizenship elaborated by one of the most renowned Muslim public intellectuals in Europe: Tariq Ramadan. (I justify the choice of this author in sections 2.3 and 6.1). Such an evaluation sheds light on one of the main insights of this research, that is, the idea that public reason makes a decompression of the public space possible: it frees the public space from those forces that would prevent citizens from the possibility of exercising effectively their two moral powers (once more in Rawls’s words, the ‘capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good’) as free equals. In this sense, public reason tries to reconcile ideal political consensus and the fact of reasonable pluralism on a public political ground. I believe that this is the deepest meaning of what Rawls calls ‘reconciliation through public reason’: its aspiration is to reabsorb reasonable pluralism politically without annihilating it.This research is structured in three parts: the first is methodological, the second is reconstructive, and the third is evaluative. Each part is composed of two chapters.In chapter one (“General Framework”), I begin from some empirical observations about the role of perceptions and identities in relation to the issue of Muslims’ citizenship in contemporary Europe. I claim that from this point of view Islam seems to “make problem” in a very specific sense. This does not mean that Islam is a problem, but that Islam is frequently publicly presented and perceived as a problem. This is the background problem from which my work starts. Thus, I explore some dimensions of such a problem (see 1.1). Subsequently, I provide a more specific formulation of the research problem and questions and of the aims of this study. Then, the main research question (Q) is stated in these terms: Which ideal conception of citizenship should provide the common normative perspective in contemporary Western European societies, which are characterised by both demands of inclusion of Muslims and the need for solving a ‘problem of mutual assurance’ [on which, see in particular Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)] concerning citizens’ commitment to shared terms of social cooperation, so that those societies can be stable for the right reasons? In order to answer this question, I also specify three sub-questions that I call respectively Q1, Q2, and Q3 (see 1.2).In chapter two (“Toward a Justificatory Evaluative Political Theory”), I firstly try to frame the problem of public justification within Rawls’s political liberalism (see 2.1). I then consider a specific approach to the question of Muslim citizenship in liberal democracies which can be adopted from a Rawlsian perspective: namely, reasoning from conjecture (see 2.2). Finally, I explain my own approach (which I call justificatory evaluative political theory) by means of comparison with the method of reasoning from conjecture (see 2.3). In presenting the evaluative framework specified from a political liberal standpoint, I point out three political liberal evaluative requirements: the reciprocity requirement (RR), the consistency requirement (CR), and the civility requirement (CiR).Chapter three (“What is Public Reason?”) deals with the history of the notion of public reason from Kant to Rawls and its enunciation within Rawls’s work (see 3.1 and 3.2 respectively). In doing so, I also identify three specifications for the three political liberal evaluative requirements considered in the second chapter. Furthermore, in chapter three I also unpack CR in three different dimensions (PR1, PR2, and PR3).Chapter four (“Public Reason and Religion. Reinterpreting the Duty of Civility”) completes the reconstructive stage by analysing Rawls’s ‘wide view’ of public reason and two major lines of objection to it (see 4.1). After having discussed such criticisms, I then introduce my own interpretation of the ‘proviso,’ which is structured around a two-level (or bifurcate) model of the ‘duty of civility’ (see 4.2).Chapter five (“Reconciliation through Public Reason: Justificatory Evaluative Political Theory between Modelling and Application”) bridges the second and the third part, that is, the reconstructive and the evaluative stage respectively. In the first section of the chapter, I summarise the political liberal evaluative requirements developed in the second part. In doing this, my purpose is to present my justificatory evaluative model of public reason citizenship (see 5.1). In the second section, I firstly argue that a conception of citizenship grounded in public reason is not only possible in existing European societies, but also preferable if compared with alternative conceptions (I consider liberal multiculturalism and Cécile Laborde’s critical republicanism [Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)]) with reference to the problem under scrutiny in this research. In conclusion, I show that public reason citizenship is able to solve the theoretical problem and the main research question mentioned above: Which ideal conception of citizenship should provide the common normative perspective in contemporary Western European societies, which are characterised by both demands of inclusion of Muslims and the need for solving a problem of mutual assurance concerning citizens’ commitment to shared terms of social cooperation, so that those societies can be stable for the right reasons? In the final part of chapter five, I try to demonstrate that public reason citizenship can both include Muslim citizens and solve the assurance problem because it provides both shared standards for political criticism and a common political identity on the basis of which citizens politically recognise one another as free equals. If my argument succeeds, then public reason citizenship not only could but also should be adopted as the ideal conception of citizenship in European societies (see 5.2).In the sixth chapter (“Tariq Ramadan’s European Muslims and Public Reason”) I apply the evaluative framework based on public reason to the conception of citizenship for Muslims in Europe developed by Tariq Ramadan. (According to a principle introduced in chapter two which I call the “plausibility principle” PP, I argue that Ramadan’s theory of citizenship can be plausibly presented as a “European Muslim” approach to the issue of citizenship, see 6.1). The purpose of such an evaluative work is twofold. Firstly, it aims at examining whether and how the idea of public reason accounts for a version of European citizenship for Muslims coming from Muslims themselves. Secondly, it aims at disclosing whether what such a Muslim conception of citizenship in Europe says about the two dimensions of ‘stability for the right reasons’ of the system of social cooperation (namely, inclusion and ‘mutual assurance’) is consistent with the provisions of public reason citizenship (see 6.2-6.5).
Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales
N.B. 1) Le lieu de défense de la thèse en cotutelle est ROME (Luiss Guido Carli)2) L'affiliation du co-promoteur de la thèse en cotutelle (Sebastiano Maffettone) est: LUISS Guido Carli
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

L’histoire a très souvent opposé catholicisme et libéralisme. Tout du moins, les a-telle situés dans deux domaines séparés. Pour autant, cette opposition relève d’une confusion au sujet de la doctrine libérale qui s’en trouve figée dans une conception tronquée. À nos yeux le libéralisme est multiple. S’il convient de parler « des » libéralismes, il reste à penser ce qui les rapproche, la spécificité d’« un » esprit, de « son » esprit. Cette thèse a pour objectif de l’élucider et, pour ce faire, elle établit que le libéralisme dépend d’une conception de l’homme qui trouve sa source en terre chrétienne. En plus de rapporter les principales étapes de l’entrelacement des idées théologiques, philosophiques, économiques et de leur rôle dans la constitution « du » libéralisme, il s’agit donc de porter à la lumière la dépendance d’une doctrine philosophique et économique vis-à-vis d’un principe, « l’être-personne-en-relation », appelé à la féconder
Catholicism and Liberalism have historically been subject to controversial debate. It’s a matter of fact that these two notions are considered as very different, if not opposed, in most people’s mind. However, this kind of antagonism can be explained by the basic confusion made about the liberal doctrine itself, actually opened to various understandings and that hence to an unrealistic scrutiny. In our opinion, liberalism can be understood as different levels of meanings. The main goal of our work is precisely to define a commune feature between these different opinions by adopting a specific “spirit” that fits with all of these interpretations. This thesis aims to get a better approch, in definig liberalism in generalas the result of a conception that came up in christian countries. In a first step, we have to relate the interlacing of theological, philosophic and economic ideas and their role in the constitution of Liberalism/ how they played a role in the constitution of Liberalism. In addition, it’s a question of putting the light on the dependence of Liberalism towards a concept, “être-personne-en-relation” that is fertilizing the philosophic and economic doctrine

Comment rendre compte de la richesse syncrétique, souvent mésestimée, de la pensée politique de John Stuart Mill ? Nous soutenons que celle-ci est cohérente et que sa clé d'unification se trouve dans sa conception du Progrès, conçu à la fois comme nature et comme destination humaine, qui permet de subsumer la diversité de ses théories au sein d'une utopie d'un type nouveau, libérale et centrée sur les conditions de sa production et de son maintien. En ce sens, la Partie I s’attache à identifier les différents apports idéologiques qui nourrissent ses écrits, entre libéralisme, socialisme et conservatisme, ainsi que leurs limites respectives. La Partie II propose le concept de « libéralisme transcendantal » pour décrire la relation et la complémentarité de ces différentes influences au sein d’une doctrine unifiée sous l'hégémonie du libéralisme, promouvant avec exigence l’autonomie humaine à l’échelle individuelle comme à l'échelle collective en s'attachant toujours à ses conditions de possibilité, aux fins du Progrès. La Partie III s'intéresse alors aux ressorts matériels, moraux et politiques de ce Progrès : développement indéfini des individualités et de « l'art de vivre », c'est-à-dire bonheur dynamique, dans un état économique et démographique pourtant « stationnaire », et sous des institutions représentatives vouées à cultiver l'excellence dans le respect du pluralisme. Au terme de cette reconstitution théorique, les Perspectives proposent des éléments pour une refondation de la pensée progressiste, en particulier écologique et éducative, émancipée des clivages partisans contemporains, dans l'esprit de John Stuart Mill
John Stuart Mill's syncretic political thought is too often misestimated. My work aims to demonstrate that it is though consistent and that its pivotal point lies in Mill's vision of Progress: this one is conceived at the same time as the human nature and the human telos and as such, it unifies his views on education, happiness, social justice, economic stability and the aims and means of the representative government. All these elements build a new kind of utopia, a liberal utopia focused on the conditions of its own advent and preservation. In this perspective, my First Part will sort out which influences nourish Mill's writings, between liberalism, socialism and conservatism – none of these ideologies being completely accurate. Part Two will then theorize “transcendantal liberalism” so as to describe his approach as a unified doctrine polarized by liberalism but always keeping in mind what “liberty” relies on, i.e. the preconditions of individual and collective autonomy. Part Three will stress on which material, moral and political devices are required by such a goal: a steady-state economy and demography, moral growth and the culture of an “Art of Living” and a “religion of Humanity”, and finally the flourishing of a truly pluralist representative government. To conclude, the Perspectives will highlight a few elements inspired by Mill and likely to be useful for the renewal of nowadays ideology of Progress, particularly from an ecological standpoint

Taine ( 1828-1893 ), historien et politologue du xixe siecle, associe histoire et politique, tradition et nation, et relance le courant de pensee contre-revolutionnaire et traditionaliste. Disciple de spinoza et de hegel, il laicise le tradtionalisme en rejetant la reference a dieu pour le primat de la science. Comtisme, positivisme anglais de stuart mill et buckle, scientisme, naturalisme et darwinisme le conduisent a adopter une methode historique deterministe reposant sur les concepts de "race, milieu et moment". De cette methode, taine entend fonder une science de la politique naturelle, historique et experimentale. Par ailleurs, la pensee politique de taine est de type dualiste, entre traditionalisme et liberalisme. Taine pose la question de la place de l'individu face au pouvoir. Il se montre liberal en preconisant une monarchie constitutionnelle et un regime parlementaire. Face a l'etat, qu'il souhaite limite, il defent les droits et les libertes de l'individu. Il propose d'amenager le suffrage universel en le rendant indirect mais accepte cependant la force du nombre. La pensee politique de taine aparait ainsi tres originale; c'est ce que montre sa posterite puisqu' elle inspire les penseurs nationalistes comme barres mais egalement les hommes de gauche de la iiie republique comme herriot et blum
Taine ( 1828-1893 ), historian and politist of the xixth century, associates history and politic, tradition and nation, and follows up the french traditionalist thought. Disciple of spinoza and hegei, he laicizes traditionalism with rejecting the reference in god for the science's primacy. Comtism, positivism of s. Mill and buckle, scientism, naturalism and darwinism conduct him to adopt a determinist method which sets on " race, mean and moment ". With this method, taine wants determine a political science. Taine7s political thought is dualist, between traditionalism and liberalism. He asks the question of the citizen's place in front of power. He is liberal and he advocates constitutional monarchy and parliamentary regim. He wants limited state and defends rights and liberties for citizens taine's political thought inspire french nationalists as m. Barres and also republicans or socialists as e. Herriot and l. Blum

Cette thèse sur travaux s’appuie pour l’essentiel sur un ouvrage publié en 2006, Le libéralisme contre le capitalisme (Paris, Fayard), dont il est également proposé une version augmentée et mise à jour. Le propos consiste d’abord à examiner les contradictions entre le libéralisme tel qu’il est défini dans la Richesse des nations d’Adam Smith et la pratique économique contemporaine : travail sans valeur comptable, capital antilibéral, État capitaliste. Il en ressort que la synonymie largement partagée entre « libéralisme » et « capitalisme » relève de l’idéologie, idéologie que l’on peut qualifier de totalitarisme en référence au travail d’Hannah Arendt, en l’espèce de « totalitarisme mou ». Il est ainsi opéré dans la sphère économique une distinction entre les pratiques, les normes qui les façonnent, les théories censées rendre compte des pratiques, et les discours, pouvant prendre la forme de l’idéologie. Cette distinction ouvre une voie pour penser l’économie autrement, sous des modalités différentes de celles proposées par la Théorie de la Justice de John Rawls. Dans la lignée de l’analyse faite par Ludwig Wittgenstein des jeux de langage, il s’agit en l’occurrence de reprendre à leur racine la définition des acteurs économiques et la nature de leur langage (le langage comptable en particulier)
This PhD thesis is mainly based on a book published in 2006, Liberalism against capitalism (Paris, Fayard), which a revised and updated version is also included. The main aim is first to examine the contradictions between liberalism as defined in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and current economic practice: work without accounting value, antiliberal capital, capitalist state. It results from this that the widely shared synonymy between "liberalism" and "capitalism" is ideologically, and can be identified with totalitarianism in reference to Hannah Arendt's work, in this case a "soft totalitarianism". A distinction is made in the economic sphere between practices, norms (that shape practices), theories (that are supposed to reflect practices) and wording (which take the form of ideology). This distinction opens a way to think the economy in a radically different perspective, but in different way from John Rawls' Theory of Justice. In line with Ludwig Wittgenstein's analysis of language games, the aim here is to frame a new definition of economic actors and of the nature of their language (accounting language in particular)

Nesta tese procuro responder à questão: quais são as implicações da filosofia de Wittgenstein para a filosofia social? A tese está dividida em três partes. Na primeira parte discuto a natureza da filosofia de Wittgenstein e das ciências sociais. Concluo que a filosofia de Wittgenstein envolve investigações gramaticais com vista à dissolução de problemas filosóficos. A filosofia, na ótica de Wittgenstein, enriquece ou alarga o nosso entendimento em vez de adicionar elementos ao nosso conjunto de conhecimentos, como as ciências sociais fazem. Na segunda parte considero a relação de Wittgenstein com a ideologia: com o conservadorismo, o liberalismo e o socialismo. Defendo que Wittgenstein não era um conservador mas que também não era um liberal ou um socialista. Na parte final da tese considero o valor de Wittgenstein em ajudar a dissolver problemas em filosofia social e política. Concluo que a filosofia de Wittgenstein tem algumas implicações negativas para a filosofia social e política. Ela dissolve confusões filosóficas e destrói castelos de cartas. Mas a sua filosofia tem também implicações positivas. A filosofia de Wittgenstein enriquece o nosso entendimento de questões sociais e políticas e pode ser de grande benefício no quadro da epistemologia social e política.
In this thesis I set out to answer the question: what are the implications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy for social philosophy? The thesis is divided into three parts. In the first part I discuss the nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and of the social sciences. I conclude that Wittgenstein’s philosophy involved grammatical investigations aimed at dissolving philosophical problems. Philosophy, on Wittgenstein’s view enriches or broadens our understanding rather than adding to our stock of knowledge, as social sciences do. In the second part I look at Wittgenstein’s relation to ideology: to conservatism, liberalism, and socialism. I argue that Wittgenstein was not a conservative but nor was he a liberal or a socialist. In the final part of the thesis I look at Wittgenstein’s value in helping to dissolve problems in social and political philosophy. I conclude that Wittgenstein’s philosophy has some negative implications for social and political philosophy. It dissolves philosophical confusions and knocks down houses of cards. But his philosophy also has positive implications. Wittgenstein’s philosophy enriches our understanding of social and political issues and can be of great benefit within social and political epistemology.

博士
淡江大學
美國研究所
88
Herbert Clark Hoover (1874-1964) has been a principal figure in one of American history''s most turbulent eras, an era marked by World War I, the decade of the so-called "roaring twenties," the depression with its disorder and chaos, World War II and its aftermath, and finally, the Vietnam War. During this same age there have been social changes and scientific discoveries. It is within this setting that Hoover must be considered and his successes or failures evaluated. Although Hoover the politician and statesman has been the subject of a number of studies, no detailed study of Hoover the thinker has been done. In the current age in which flux rather than stability is the rule, Hoover''s writings and speeches reflect certain human values and social principles that are worth re-examining. The purpose of this dissertation is to study Hoover''s thought (individualism, liberalism, and corporatism) for the light that it sheds upon a mind and personality that may be said to be uniquely American. There is need for a book which at least outlines the thought of one of America''s most controversial public figures, one who for fifty years has been an active participant in or a careful observer of the most turbulent era. This dissertation is written with the hope that it may at least partially meet the need. Historical analysis approach and content analysis approach are adopted. A positive relexive scepticism is the kind of approach. The point is this: ''history'' is really ''histories.'' One should be in control of his own discourse, instead of being subjected to the dominant readings. Chapter One: Introduction. Chapter Two: Herbert C. Hoover''s Background (Life and times; The Influence of Quakerism; Hoover as a symbol of the Age of the American Dream). Chapter Three: Hoover''s Concept of Individualism (The concise history of the development of individualism; The politics of individualism; The economics of individualism; The societal dimension of individualism). Chapter Four: Hoover''s Concept of Liberalism (The concise history of the development of liberalism; The Reflection of the sense of sins; The essential character of liberalism; Hoover''s speeches and the American "political sermons" jeremiad tradition). Chapter Five: Hoover''s Concept of Corporatism (The Origins of Hoover''s corporatism; The promotion of the corporative association movement; Capital-government-labor cooperation and balance; Hoover''s administrative measures). Chapter Six: Hoover and the New Deal (The essential character of the New Deal; Hoover''s critique of the New Deal; Reverse viewpoint - the "Hoover New Deal"). Chapter Seven: Conclusion.

This study addresses the dialectic between two kinds of liberal political philosophy which have strongly influenced Western politics, and remain highly relevant to current debates – libertarian theory and social-liberal theory. In particular, it examines how representative theories on both sides are based on claims about our human nature as reasoning, self- determining, individual agents; and claims about how this nature may be fulsomely expressed or inhibited under different kinds of socio-political conditions. I show that broadly naturalistic claims of this sort support normative claims about aspects of our nature we ought to value, and about the kind of political system we ought to prefer. Social-liberals and libertarians disagree about how human capacities for reasoning, self-determining agency will tend to fare within a liberal State-free market political system. This leads them to different conclusions about the role of the State. The overall approach is to test the relevant claims about our nature and social psychology against current theory and evidence in cognitive neuroscience and epidemiology, and then to interpret the normative implications for each political position. At the heart of the project is a neuroscience-based model of capacities for everyday social reasoning and decision making (‘SRD’ capacities), which I claim offers a plausible, evidence-based account of universal human capacities which both social-liberals and libertarians claim to value. Once in place, the model is employed for critical analysis of data in epidemiological research into aspects of mental health within Western populations. I conclude that certain socioeconomic circumstances commonly encountered within Western societies causally contribute to detrimental impacts on SRD capacities, in the form of psychiatric disorders or diversion behaviours. This material is then used to reinterpret the normative claims of libertarians and social- liberals. I argue that the kind of political system recommended by libertarians will tend to generate conditions which have significant detrimental effects on SRD capacities, which they claim to value; and do so to a greater extent than a social-liberal system. This puts libertarians out of step with their own basic values and initial arguments justifying a liberal State. The libertarian system will also tend to create significant social risks and costs, to the point of being self-undermining. A social-liberal system will tend to mitigate these risks and costs. Thus I argue that, if SRD capacities are regarded as valuable, we have reason to prefer a social-liberal system over a libertarian system. However, in the light of the proposed model, I claim that the ‘standard’ form of contemporary social-liberal politics and programs also has weaknesses. Familiar forms of egalitarian social program partially address some social conditions implicated in undermining SRD capacities, but there are other aspects of the problem which are outrunning the usual methods. The associated risks and liabilities are still cause for prudential concern. A more creative and psychologically astute politics is required. In conclusion I make a number of proposals in that direction, and claim that the project as a whole offers elements of a new social-liberal theory.
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Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Humanities, 2009

In this dissertation I retrace the notion of social individuality in early German liberal thought to respond to the ongoing criticism of liberal individuality as being at its foundation anti-social and atomistic. I concentrate on the exposition of this concept in the works of Wilhelm von Humboldt and Friedrich Schleiermacher at the turn of the 18th to 19th century, who I argue presented the clearest defense of individuality understood as interdependent uniqueness. Analyzing their relevant academic writings, speeches, sermons, letters, diary entries as well as political reports, I situate their conceptualization of social individuality within their wider thought, and examine what social institutions and practices as well as political consequences derive from understanding individuality as inherently social.

This thesis examines the viability of the concept of political liberalism. Since its emergence, the idea of a purely political liberalism has been the subject of a voluminous amount of discourse and debate. The concept of political liberalism has been presented as both a solution to the problems of justice and political stability troubling liberal democracies and an exemplar of all that is wrong with contemporary political philosophy; it has, quite literally, altered the landscape and the vernacular of contemporary political theory. Herein it is argued that, despite the significant amount of literature that has been devoted to the analysis of the idea of a purely political liberalism, the idea itself has yet to be subjected to the type of critique that is required if one is to assess its viability effectively. Though there have been a number of contemporary political theorists who have developed conceptions of political liberalism which they believe differ in important ways from those of their doctrinal colleagues, detailed analyses of the concept of political liberalism have and remain focussed almost exclusively on a single formulation: namely, Rawlsian political liberalism. This singular focus has precluded the completion of a comprehensive assessment of the viability of the concept (as opposed to a single conception) of political liberalism as represented both by Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian models. This thesis confronts this problem by expanding the scope of investigation to include a fulsome examination of other prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism namely, those developed by Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar and in so doing provides a more inclusive and, subsequently, thorough critique than has previously been offered. Adopting such an approach reveals that, despite protestations to the contrary, the prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism are sufficiently similar in all important respects to enable their conflation for the purpose of analysis; and when subjected to a thorough analysis, the idea of a purely political liberalism proves itself to be untenable.
Political Science
D. Litt. et Phil. (Politics)

This thesis provides a critical examination of John Rawls’s political philosophy as it relates to international justice and human rights, Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness has made an enormous impact on contemporary political and ethical theory, yet it has been criticized by some for failing to address the extra-domestic aspects of social justice, including universal human rights. In Chapter One I describe the theoryof.rights, developed in the social contract tradition and how this theory has influenced the modern discourse of human rights. In Chapter Two I discuss Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, the basic rights and liberties, and the idea of political liberalism. In Chapter Three 1 analyze Rawls’s account of international justice and argue that it fails to uphold the same rigorous principles of justice as found in his account of domestic justice. Finally, in Chapter Four l discuss Rawls’s more recent attempts to theorize international justice and human rights, I conclude that Rawls is not justified in limiting the set of human rights available to persons in different societies, and that this limitation is an unnecessary feature of his theory of justice. In contrast 1 argue for a more cosmopolitan system of social justice that is strongly normative and grounded in Rawlsian ideal theory.
Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology
D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

Ondřej Lánský The Examination of One Form of the Atlantic Modernization's Moral Background Abstract This thesis deals with critique of fundamental moral pattern of the Atlantic social space, that shapes some important features of social, political, and human action in the global era and endorses legitimacy of the reigning social order. The main task of this thesis is to show pathological moments of the contemporary development of global society through comparison of some constitutive features of Atlantic and Latin-American societies. The most important theoretical basis for this thesis is Axel Honneth's theory of recognition. As articulations of constitutive features of social normativity (ergo as expressions of shared social imaginaries of social configuration) are used chosen social philosophical concepts: John Rawls' liberalism and Enrique Dussel's philosophy of liberation. The thesis contains therefore four steps in three main chapters. Firstly the author sociologically analyzes the concept of social esteem in the context of theory of recognition. Secondly he examines John Rawls' normative theory of justice. Thirdly the author points some aspects of Rawls' theory, which allow certain interpretation and critique of the social esteem and of the liberal definition of moral legitimacy of the Atlantic...

I argue in my dissertation that the Marxist ethical claim against capitalism could be bolstered through: 1) a recognition of the inaccurate human ontology that capitalist theories of entitlement presuppose, 2) a reconceptualization and replacement of that old paradigm of human ontology with a concept that I call “organicism” and 3) a normative argument for why this new paradigm of human ontology necessitates a new political economy and a new way of structuring society. I use the debate between Robert Nozick and G.A. Cohen as a launching point for my case.

In his book, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, G.A. Cohen argues that Robert Nozick’s “entitlement theory” is unable to produce the robust sense of freedom that libertarians and capitalist proponents aggrandize. According to Cohen, the reason for this is due to the limitations and consistency errors produced by the libertarian adherence to the “self-ownership principle.” (the moral/natural right that a person is the sole proprietor of their own body and life). Namely, that the pale freedom that the proletariat enjoys within capitalism is inconsistent with the Libertarian’s own standard for freedom. So, Cohen argues for the elimination of the self-ownership principle. My project picks up where Cohen’s leaves off, claiming that the consistency errors don’t lie in entitlement theory’s use of the self-ownership principle (it is important that we don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater). Rather, the errors lie in the principle’s metaphysics - specifically in the ontology of the human being. The self-ownership principle is only faulty because it presupposes an impossible self. I show that entitlement theory heedlessly presupposes the self (or a human ontology) as a “rational, autonomous, individual.” I then deconstruct each of these three features (rationality, autonomy, and individuality) to show that this picture of the human being is not necessarily incorrect, but it is incomplete.

Although we are indeed rational, autonomous, individual creatures, these are only emergent characteristics that merely arise after the organic and socially interconnected aspects of our selves are nurtured. I encompass these latter features of our selves under the heading: “organicism”. So, my contribution is to provide a different ontological foundation of the human being – “organicism” – to replace the Enlightenment grown: “rational, autonomous, individual”. I draw heavily from Karl Marx’s philosophical anthropology, and G.W.F. Hegel’s theory of the unfolding of Geist/Spirit, with a little inspiration from Aristotle and ecological theory to construct “organicism” – a pancorporealist, naturalistic materialism. It is the theory that the human being is, in essence, an organic creature, inseparable from nature, but through the nurturing of these material, organic, symbiotic relationships (with other humans and with the ecosystem) that these “super”-natural capacities of rationality and autonomy arise along with and because of a full self-consciousness.

Finally, I infer the normative implications of this ontology of subjectivity. This organicist conception of the self has transformational effects on our notions of property and the way we structure society. So, I contend that organicist ontology then serves as the foundation for a normative theory of political economy that sees the flourishing or health (broadly speaking) of the organicist human as the primary ethical goal. I speculate on an alternative political economy that can provide the robust sense of freedom that Nozick’s entitlement theory (capitalism) was lacking because it actually produces the conditions necessary for rationality, autonomy and individual freedom.

A large portion of the population of South Africa is made up of people who, due to poverty, disability, old age and/or lack of education, rely solely on social assistance provided by the government for their survival. The issue of the welfare state in terms of responding to these issues has been subject to increasingly heated debates especially with regard to long-term socio-economic improvements, moral obligations and economic sustainability. This dissertation generally explores the status of social welfare in South Africa, and more specifically, South Africa’s socio-economic status as a welfare state against the backdrop of selected philosophical arguments used to justify and criticize existing social welfare laws in South Africa, whilst keeping South Africa’s unique history in mind. Although South Africa already has a detailed set of social welfare laws and policies, the social and economic needs of the country are ever evolving and therefore it is important that these laws and policies be constantly re-evaluated in order to ensure that they are effective in addressing and meeting the changing socio-economic and other demands.
Jurisprudence
LL. M. (Jurisprudence)

Ce mémoire traite de la prostitution d’un point de vue philosophique. Pour ce faire, il est nécessaire que l'on étudie le concept d’autonomie, puisqu’il est employé de part et d’autre par les intervenants dans le débat public et théorique. En évaluant les contributions de philosophes, ce mémoire esquisse une position mitoyenne. Ainsi, dans un premier temps, on rapportera la contribution d’auteurs de la tradition libérale, qui considèrent que la prostitution est un travail ou une vision de la sexualité acceptable. En dénonçant le lourd tribut d’une morale conventionnelle dépassée, ils ont montré que le respect des choix individuels est primordial et doit servir de guide au moment de penser l’intervention de l’État. Ce faisant, ils ont néanmoins omis de considérer dans leur équation des éléments contextuels qui teintent négativement le quotidien de la personne prostituée. Les féministes radicales et auteurs libéraux perfectionnistes ont mis en lumière le système que l’anthropologue Paola Tabet appelle échange économico-sexuel et qui fait qu’en général, l’acte sexuel porte en écho la socialisation qui fait des hommes les prestataires du service sexuel des femmes. Plus encore, c’est la participation à la vie sociale et politique des personnes prostituées qui est limitée. La stigmatisation et la violence qui caractérisent l’exercice de la prostitution détruisent des vies, mais privent également les personnes prostituées du crédit social nécessaire à l’exercice de leur citoyenneté. Explorer une redéfinition du concept d’autonomie dans une perspective féministe et relationnelle permettra de répondre aux considérations que partagent les défenseurs du travail du sexe et les abolitionnistes : aucune femme ne subissant de contraintes économiques et sociales ne devrait voir en la prostitution la seule option qui s’offre à elle. Aussi, si une personne autonome décide de monnayer ses services sexuels, ce doit être toujours selon des modalités qu’elle aura elle-même définies.
I will discuss the issues raised by prostitution in a philosophical way. It seems necessary to analyze autonomy, a concept used in the public debate about prostitution. I will try to sketch a middle view on the question inspired by the work of Liberals and Feminists. Some of these authors view prostitution like any other job or as a legitimate way to live one’s sexuality. They show that the State must consider individual choices and they criticize a moralistic common perspective on prostitution. Nonetheless, they choose to ignore a global perspective about a systematic representation of the female sexuality as a service. Women are socialized in a way that they can only offer their sexuality, not live it. Moreover, it is the political and social participation of women that is made precarious out of this. Stigmatization and violence that commonly shapes the experience of sex workers not only destroys lives, but is also threatening the expression of their citizenship. Exploring a redefinition on autonomy in a feminist and relational way will offer the tools to think another way. Consequently, we will be able to address two considerations that both abolitionist and sex work advocates share. First, that nobody wants a woman to be placed in front of prostitution thinking that it is her only choice. Second, that every woman who wants to do sex work should be the only one who shapes her practice.