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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Liberalism; Social philosophy

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Academic literature on the topic 'Liberalism; Social philosophy'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 16 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Liberalism; Social philosophy"

1

Beiner, Ronald. "What Liberalism Means." Social Philosophy and Policy 13, no. 1 (1996): 190–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500001576.

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My purpose in this essay is to give an account of the kind of robust social criticism that I associate with the very enterprise of theory and to explain why the liberal philosophy that prevails in the contemporary academy is averse to this sort of social criticism. My purpose, then, is both to explore a certain conception of radical socialtheory and to defend this conception against familiar objections posed by those who represent the dominant liberal political philosophy.

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Dewar, Kenneth C. "Liberalism, Social Democracy, and Tom Kent." Journal of Canadian Studies 53, no. 1 (February 28, 2019): 178–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/jcs.2018-0011.

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This article argues that the lines separating different modes of thought on the centre-left of the political spectrum—liberalism, social democracy, and socialism, broadly speaking—are permeable, and that they share many features in common. The example of Tom Kent illustrates the argument. A leading adviser to Lester B. Pearson and the Liberal Party from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, Kent argued for expanding social security in a way that had a number of affinities with social democracy. In his paper for the Study Conference on National Problems in 1960, where he set out his philosophy of social security, and in his actions as an adviser to the Pearson government, he supported social assistance, universal contributory pensions, and national, comprehensive medical insurance. In close association with his philosophy, he also believed that political parties were instruments of policy-making.

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Lemos, Ramon M., and Terry Pinkard. "Democratic Liberalism and Social Union." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49, no. 4 (June 1989): 755. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2107866.

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GUNOR, RECEP BATU. "Prince Sabahaddin's Social Philosophy from the Perspective of Classical Liberalism." Türkiyat Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi 25 (December 30, 2019): 163–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.34189/gtd.25.007.

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Grafstein, Robert. "Missing the Archimedean Point: Liberalism's Institutional Presuppositions." American Political Science Review 84, no. 1 (March 1990): 177–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963636.

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Though liberalism has been widely criticized for its attempt to frame a detached judgment of society based on an asocial conception of individuals, insufficient attention has been paid to the particular social and political relationships this search for an Archimedean point presupposes. Using collective choice theory, I show that liberalism has adopted two distinct kinds of Archimedean points reflecting different and unjustified presuppositions about the true institutional relation between politics and society. Liberalism's Archimedean search is not merely unsuccessful but biased in a way that is significant even for positions critical of liberalism. It is possible, I argue, to have a normative political theory that avoids an asocial conception of individuals without falling victim to liberalism's specific biases concerning institutional relations. The implications for both Rawlsian- or Nozickian-style liberalism are discussed, including the possibility of a political philosophy that avoids their “analytical extremism.“

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Talisse, Robert B. "Toward a Social Epistemic Comprehensive Liberalism." Episteme 5, no. 1 (February 2008): 106–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1742360008000269.

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ABSTRACTFor well over a decade, much of liberal political theory has accepted the founding premise of Rawls's political liberalism, according to which the fact of reasonable pluralism renders comprehensive versions of liberalism incoherent. However, the founding premise presumes that all comprehensive doctrines are moral doctrines. In this essay, the author builds upon recent work by Allen Buchanan and develops a comprehensive version of liberalism based in a partially comprehensive social epistemic doctrine. The author then argues that this version of liberalism is sufficiently accommodating of the fact of reasonable pluralism. The conclusion is that the founding premise of political liberalism admits of a counterexample; there is a version of comprehensive liberalism that is sufficiently pluralistic.

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Gray, John. "Agonistic Liberalism." Social Philosophy and Policy 12, no. 1 (1995): 111–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500004581.

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In all of its varieties, traditional liberalism is a universalist political theory. Its content is a set of principles which prescribe the best regime, the ideally best institutions, for all mankind. It may be acknowledged — as it is, by a proto-liberal such as Spinoza — that the best regime can be attained only rarely, and cannot be expected to endure for long; and that the forms its central institutions will assume in different historical and cultural milieux may vary significantly. It will then be accepted that the liberal regime's role in political thought is as a regulative ideal, which political practice can hope only to approximate, subject to all the vagaries and exigencies of circumstance. Nonetheless, the content of traditional liberalism is a system of principles which function as universal norms for the critical appraisal of human institutions. In this regard, traditional liberalism — the liberalism of Locke and Kant, for example — represents a continuation of classical political rationalism, as it is found in Aristotle and Aquinas, where it also issues in principles having the attribute of universality, in that they apply ideally to all human beings.

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Milosavljevic, Boris. "dr. Boris Milosavljevic: Vladimir Jovanovic: Philosophy, science, politics." Theoria, Beograd 59, no. 2 (2016): 113–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1602131m.

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The unity of freedom, science and nation, viz. liberalism, positivism and nationalism, as well as his belief in two fundamental principles - freedom and justice, were the two lodestars and credo of Vladimir Jovanovic`s entire political work and view of life. Although he was strongly inclined to the continental liberalism, he corrected it with Millian liberalism and embracement of the Westminster system, thus avoiding the radicalism of the French role model, which was followed by the prevalent majority of socialist and Marxian-oriented Serb intelectuals in the second half of the XIX century and the first half of XX century. Vladimir Jovanovic firmly belived that liberty was the right exercise of which must not be blocked out by the ideal of equality. As a positivist, he appreciated Herbert Spencer?s theory of evolution, organic interpretation of society and analogy between the natural and social domains, according to which social phenomena could be reduced on natural laws. Under Mazzini?s influence he made a synthesis of liberalism and nationalism. Vladimir Jovanovic`s son Slobodan Jovanovic pointed out that unity of freedom, science and nation was not founded in sciences itself, but in rationalist philosophy. Liberalism, positivism and patriotism were not only concepts of Vladimir Jovanovic`s political theory, but also ideological basis for his active political work.

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Kymlicka, Will. "Liberalism and Communitarianism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 2 (June 1988): 181–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1988.10717173.

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It is a commonplace amongst communitarians, socialists and feminists alike that liberalism is to be rejected for its excessive ‘individualism’ or ‘atomism,’ for ignoring the manifest ways in which we are ‘embedded’ or ‘situated’ in various social roles and communal relationships. The effect of these theoretical flaws is that liberalism, in a misguided attempt to protect and promote the dignity and autonomy of the individual, has undermined the associations and communities which alone can nurture human flourishing.My plan is to examine the resources available to liberalism to meet these objections. My primary concern is with what liberals can say in response, not with what particular liberals actually have said in the past. Still, as a way of acknowledging intellectual debts, if nothing else, I hope to show how my arguments are related to the political morality of modem liberals from J.S. Mill through to Rawls and Dworkin. The term ‘liberal’ has been applied to many different theories in many different fields, but I’m using it in this fairly restricted sense. First, I’m dealing with a political morality, a set of moral arguments about the justification of political action and political institutions. Second, my concern is with this modem liberalism, not seventeenth-century liberalism, and I want to leave entirely open what the relationship is between the two. It might be that the developments initiated by the ‘new liberals’ are really an abandonment of what was definitive of classical liberalism. G.A. Cohen, for example, says that since they rejected the principle of ‘self-ownership’ which was definitive of classical liberalism (e.g. in Locke), these new liberals should instead be called ‘social democrats.’My concern is to defend their political morality, whatever the proper label.

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Pestritto, Ronald J. "FOUNDING LIBERALISM, PROGRESSIVE LIBERALISM, AND THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY." Social Philosophy and Policy 28, no. 2 (May 31, 2011): 56–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026505251000021x.

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AbstractThis article contends that liberalism in America underwent a fundamental transformation during the Progressive Era. This transformation took place, partly, through the Progressives' reinterpretation of the doctrine of property rights that had served as a foundation for founding-era liberalism. Progressives rejected the eighteenth-century, natural-rights principles which had privileged individual rights to life, liberty, and property as the fundamental aims of any just government, and argued instead that America at the turn of the twentieth century was beset by a tyranny of the minority which was employing property rights to inhibit genuine freedom for the bulk of the population. This article examines the character of founding-era liberalism and points to the connection between the political theory of the Declaration of Independence and John Locke's Second Treatise of Government. It then provides an account of the Progressive critique of this original version of American liberalism. The Progressive critique is shown to take two forms: a rejection of property rights in principle, followed by a rejection of them in practice.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Liberalism; Social philosophy"

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Kley, Roland. "Political philosophy and social theory : a critique of F.A. Hayek's justification of liberalism." Thesis, St. Gallen : [s.n.], 1990. http://aleph.unisg.ch/hsgscan/hm00190430.pdf.

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Petsoulas, Christina. "The idea of spontaneous order in the thought of F.A. Hayek and the Scottish Enlightenment." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.321855.

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Brewer, Bradley R. "High and Classical Liberalism: Economic Liberties "Thin" and "Thick"." Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1408635090.

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Pontin, Fabricio. "CONSTITUTING THE POLITICAL: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON POLITICAL LIBERALISM." OpenSIUC, 2013. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/777.

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In this thesis I will attempt to develop a phenomenological account for Political Liberalism. My hypothesis is that a re-articulation of the main issues in transcendental phenomenology as it relates to social philosophy, first in a genetic sense (as developed by Alfred Schutz), but also in a generative context (as developed by Bernhard Waldenfels), provides us with a methodological ground that can instigate a more complex account for the questions of social choice and the way in which we establish preferences. My thesis is that such a complex account of social choice can motivate us to focus on the disordered nature of our constitution of preferences, and point at the importance of a deep comprehension of historicity, along with a defense of freedom of speech as a tool for resignification of social values.

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Lyon, Christopher. "Towards a relational approach to social justice : liberals, radicals, and Brazil's 'new social contract'." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2018. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/towards-a-relational-approach-to-social-justice--liberals-radicals-and-brazils-new-social-contract(c351f163-f711-4d26-8eff-884e58508c31).html.

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Recent literature in various practical fields calls for a 'relational approach' to social justice, as a theoretical alternative that transcends limitations with liberal contractarianism to offer more penetrating analysis of social justice. I critically engage literature from radical intellectual-political traditions such as Marxism, feminism, and critical race theory to propose what can - and can't - form the basis of a cogent relational critique of liberalism and an alternative positive account. I hone this through dialogue with Rawlsian 'justice as fairness', as well as more recent developments such as relational egalitarianism. The most distinguishing feature of a relational approach is ontological: its social-theoretic account of injustice comprises supra-individual phenomena - relations, social groups, structure, historical causality - as opposed to individual locations hosting portions of a distribuend. Moreover, I define an intermediate position in the ideal vs non-ideal theory debate, arguing that a persuasive relational approach would 'start from injustice'; it would identify the primary desideratum incumbent on social justice theory as being that it enhances understanding of real injustice and thereby informs counteraction. One upshot is a closer relationship between political philosophy and social theory; in turn this reflects how a relational approach to social justice can enjoy symbiosis with the broader 'relational turn' in humanities and social sciences. The argument is furthered through exemplificatory reference to the empirical context of Brazil's post-redemocratisation experimentation with participatory democracy in the social assistance sector, as an aspect of the country's putative 'new social contract'.

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Bankovsky, Miriam Ann History &amp Philosophy Faculty of Arts &amp Social Sciences UNSW. "Social justice after Kant: Between constructivism and deconstruction (Rawls, Habermas, Levinas, Derrida)." Publisher:University of New South Wales. History & Philosophy, 2009. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/41494.

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This thesis examines the relation between two contrasting approaches to justice: the constructive and reconstructive projects of Rawls and Habermas on the one hand, and the deconstructive projects of Levinas and Derrida on the other. First, I identify the central difference between the two projects, reconstructing each account of justice as it develops in relation to Kant??s practical philosophy. I then argue that the two projects are complementary. [New Paragraph] Whilst Rawls and Habermas emphasise the possibility of objectively realising Kant??s idea of an impartial standpoint among autonomous persons, Levinas and Derrida defend the impossibility of determining the content of justice. Rawls and Habermas subscribe to the ??art of the possible??, rendering Kant??s impartial standpoint by means of the ??original position?? (Rawls) or the ??procedures of discourse ethics?? (Habermas). By contrast, Levinas argues for justice??s failure, discovering, in Kant??s moral law, a principle of responsibility for the particular other which conflicts with impartiality. Distinguishing himself from both the reconstructive tradition and Levinas, Derrida affirms, in part through his readings of Kant, the ??undecidability?? of the critical function of justice. Committed to the possibility of justice, Derrida also acknowledges its impossibility: no local determination can reconcile responsibility before the other with impartiality among all. [New Paragraph] Having identified the central difference between the two traditions, I then defend their complementarity. ??Reasonable faith?? in the possibility of justice must be supplemented by the acknowledgment of its impossibility. Conversely, attesting to justice??s failure is unsatisfactory without commitment to the possibility of constructing just social forms. Distancing myself from the liberal critique whereby deconstruction withdraws from the political (Fraser, McCarthy, Benhabib, Gutmann), I instead add my voice to a dissenting group (Young, Cornell, Mouffe, Honig, Honneth, Patton, Thomassen) which affirms that deconstruction can productively engage with the constructive tradition. Deconstruction is at home in Rawls?? view that ??the ideal of a just constitution is always something to be worked toward??.

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Pook, Robert. "Why Rawlsian Liberalism has Failed and How Proudhonian Anarchism is the Solution." University of Toledo / OhioLINK, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=toledo1304018146.

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Schmidt, Andreas Tupac. "Freedom and its distribution." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:dce62f88-1419-4159-ad13-8bdb927a0d3c.

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This dissertation develops a new theory of specific and overall socio-political freedom and discusses its role in normative political theory. The aim is to dissolve some of the conceptual confusions that have often beset previous discussions and to develop a theoretical framework with which to approach questions of public policy. This dissertation consists of three parts. In the first part, I develop a new account that specifies under which conditions a person is specifically free and when she is unfree to do something. It is shown that republican accounts of freedom are unsatisfactory and that a trivalent liberal account that equates freedom with ability is most plausible. A new analysis of unfreedom is defended according to which a person is made unfree (as opposed to merely unable) to do something only if she would have this freedom in a better and available distribution that another person could have foreseeably brought about. In the second part, I discuss how to move from an account of specific freedom and unfreedom to a measure of overall freedom. I develop a new and simple aggregation function and argue that the measurement of overall freedom requires both quantitative and evaluative factors. In the third part, I then discuss what role freedom should play in a theory of distributive justice. Instead of freedom deontologically constraining the reach of distributive justice, freedom should be one of its distribuenda. I will first discuss how best to distribute freedom across a person’s lifetime and how this impacts on discussions of paternalistic policies. It will then be shown that we ought not simply maximise freedom between persons, not aim to give everyone enough freedom nor aim at equal freedom. Instead, distributing freedom requires a principle that combines maximisation with a concern for fairness.

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Shapiro, Matthew Abraham. "Enforcing respect : iberalism, perfectionism, and antidiscrimination law." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:ee83edc5-162c-42ca-92d8-498a09725d5b.

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Can contemporary liberalism justify antidiscrimination law? The question seems impertinent until we consider contemporary liberalism’s commitment to limited government. Once we do, we realize that contemporary liberals may not complacently assume that their theories justify antidiscrimination law simply because discrimination based on race or sex is so obviously wrongful. Rather, they must scrutinize antidiscrimination law just as they do other regulation of individual conduct. Providing such scrutiny, this thesis argues that three of the most prominent contemporary liberal doctrines of political legitimacy—John Rawls’s “political liberalism,” an antiperfectionist version of the “harm principle,” and Joseph Raz’s “liberal perfectionism”—all fail to justify core applications of antidiscrimination law, applications that we intuitively consider perfectly legitimate. In light of this failure, contemporary liberalism faces a dilemma: it must jettison either its commitment to comprehensive, uniform antidiscrimination regimes or its antiperfectionism and overriding commitment to personal autonomy. This thesis argues for the latter course by providing an account of the wrongfulness of discrimination based on race or sex that condemns all instances of the conduct. According to this account, discrimination is wrong because acting on discriminatory intentions is wrong. More specifically, by taking another person’s race or sex as a reason to treat her less favorably than one would treat people of other races or the other sex, one fails to respect her as a person, to regard her as a being of ultimate value. Unlike contemporary liberal accounts, this account is fully perfectionist, since it defines discrimination in terms of the intentions of discriminators, and the intentions of discriminators in terms of their attitudes, which partly constitute their moral characters. So long as we remain committed to antidiscrimination law in its current form, we must attend to discriminators’ characters. And to attend to discriminators’ characters, we must be willing to espouse perfectionism.

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Stanczyk, Lucas. "From Each: Essays in the Theory of Productive Justice." Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10593.

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A just society must provide a range of goods: police protection, education, medical care, legal representation, to name only a few. But how should a just society organize production of these goods? To ask this question is to broach the topic of productive justice. We need a theory of this topic in order to explain the content of the ideal of social justice. A certain theory of productive justice is now widely taken for granted. It has the following commitments. Every able beneficiary of just institutions owes some productive contribution. There is no free-loading on just institutions. Therefore, income support from the state should normally be conditioned on working. Those who would be idle must find a way to support themselves. Beyond this general requirement, however, each citizen gets to decide his own contribution, because each citizen has a right to choose his occupation. The state may not assign occupations or specify anyone’s place of work. Nor may it direct anyone to work longer than he prefers, provided he is not loafing on public support. Instead, labor must be allocated through a market, where everyone is free to decline any given job offer. The labor market thus fixes the possibilities of just production: the socioeconomic goals that a society may justly accomplish are limited to those that can be pursued in or alongside a labor market. This theory is now widely accepted. I argue that its central elements are importantly mistaken. Income support from the state should not normally be conditioned on working. To think this is to misunderstand the nature of each citizen’s contributory duty. Nor is it the case that a just state may never assign urgent jobs or otherwise restrict occupational decisions. To think this is to misunderstand several of the basic rights and liberties of citizenship. In my dissertation, I defend a different theory, with three elements. The first is a theory of every citizen’s right to free choice of occupation. The second is a theory of the scope and basis of the economic duties of modern citizenship. The third is a theory of the permissibility conditions of restricting labor market liberties. Together these three elements comprise a new theory of productive justice.
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Books on the topic "Liberalism; Social philosophy"

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Biya, Paul. Communal liberalism. London: Macmillan, 1987.

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Richard, Bellamy, ed. Liberalism and recent legal and social philosophy: United Kingdom Association for Social and Legal Philosophy : Fifteenth Annual Conference at New College, Oxford, 7-9 April 1988. Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1989.

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Head, Brian. Ideology and social science: Destutt de Tracy and French Liberalism. Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985.

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Sawer, Marian. The ethical state?: Social liberalism in Australia. Carlton, Vic: Melbourne University Press, 2003.

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Olssen, Mark. Liberalism, neoliberalism, social democracy: Thin communitarian perspectives on political philosophy and education. New York: Routledge, 2009.

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Ideology and social science: Destutt de Tracy and French liberalism. Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 1985.

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Gotō, Reiko, editor of compilation, ed. Social bonds as freedom: Revisiting the dichotomy of the universal and the particular. New York: Berghahn Books, 2015.

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Hännikäinen, Timo. Liberalismin petos: Esseistinen pamfletti. Helsinki: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 2012.

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Liberal utilitarianism: Social choice theory and J.S. Mill's philosophy. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

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Cladis, Mark Sydney. A communitarian defense of liberalism: Emile Durkheim and contemporary social theory. Stanford, Calif: Stanford Univerisyty Press, 1992.

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Book chapters on the topic "Liberalism; Social philosophy"

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Christman, John. "Toleration, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Liberalism." In Social and Political Philosophy, 111–37. 2nd Edition. | New York : Routledge, 2017. |: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315693323-5.

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Sterba, James P. "Liberalism and the Challenge of Communitarianism." In The Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy, 177–96. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470756621.ch8.

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"Welfare liberalism." In Social and Political Philosophy, 77. Routledge, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203462645-18.

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"LIBERALISM AND FREEDOM." In Social and Political Philosophy, 90–97. Routledge, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203462645-20.

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"LIBERALISM." In The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy, 255–66. Routledge, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203092231-28.

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Reiman, Jeffrey. "Marxian Liberalism 1." In Reassessing Marx’s Social and Political Philosophy, 163–86. Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315398068-9.

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"Covenant and Social Contract: Classical Judaism and Classical Liberalism." In Jewish Philosophy, 122–28. Academic Studies Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781618111821-009.

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"CONTRACTUALISM AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM." In The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy, 341–52. Routledge, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203092231-36.

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Sypnowich, Christine. "Liberalism, Marxism, Equality and Living Well 1." In Reassessing Marx’s Social and Political Philosophy, 187–207. Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315398068-10.

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Ryan, Alan. "Pragmatism, Social Identity, Patriotism, and Self-Criticism." In The Making of Modern Liberalism. Princeton University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691148403.003.0025.

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This chapter examines the interrelationships between John Dewey's educational ideals, his philosophy more broadly, and his account of American identity. It considers the background of Dewey's discussion of “Americanization” and his philosophical account of national identity; Dewey's pragmatism, with its emphasis on the sociality of thought and individuality; and his distinction of good and bad nationalism. It also places Dewey's ideas in their American political context by contrasting them with those of some other pluralist writers of the period of World War I. The contrast is between Dewey's conception of identity and that of German philosophy of the 1920s and 1930s. The contrast is interesting inasmuch as it is sometimes said that Dewey and Martin Heidegger held similarly nonfoundationalist views of philosophy, held similarly skeptical views about traditional metaphysics, and in a sense agreed that philosophy had become the criticism of culture.

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Conference papers on the topic "Liberalism; Social philosophy"

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Sombra, Laurenio. "Democracy in the presence of liberalism and its enemies: the history of a concept." In XXVI World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Initia Via, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.17931/ivr2013_wg126_04.

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Rodrigues Pereira, Rafael. "Liberals, Communitarians, Republicans and the intervention of the State in the private sphere." In XXVI World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Initia Via, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.17931/ivr2013_sws69_04.

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