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1
HIROSE, JUNKO. "The Legislative Record: The Japan National Diet in 2004." Japanese Journal of Political Science 5, no. 2 (November 2004): 327–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109904001550.
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The general election in November 2003 and the Upper House election in July 2004 indicate that the Japanese politics is going from a one party dominant toward a two major party system. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) narrowly keeps a majority in both Houses by merging the New Conservative Party and by forming a coalition with New Komeito.
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Kurakina-Damir, Aleksandra. "Elections in Madrid in the National Context of Spain." Scientific and Analytical Herald of IE RAS 22, no. 4 (August 31, 2021): 55–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/vestnikieran420215562.
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The article examines the elections in the Autonomous Community of Madrid, held on May 4, 2021. The purpose of the work is to determine how the regional election campaign influenced the balance of power at the national level. In the process of research, the author comes to the conclusion that the main task of the head of the autonomy was the absorption of the liberal party - the main competitor in his own ideological bloc. The task was brilliantly completed, which was reflected in national electoral polls – the opposition Conservative Party bypassed the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, which leads the coalition government. The future of the once highly popular Liberal Party is now very hazy. The failure of the left-populist Unidas Podemos forced its founder, who had recently held the post of vice-chairman of the government, to leave politics. Its further place in national politics will depend on the new leader. Such a significant regrouping of forces may entail even greater political turbulence in the country and ultimately lead to a change in the ruling party.
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Craig, Lyn, Killian Mullan, and Megan Blaxland. "Parenthood, policy and work-family time in Australia 1992—2006." Work, Employment and Society 24, no. 1 (March 2010): 27–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0950017009353778.
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This article explores how having children impacted upon (a) paid work, domestic work and childcare (total workload) and (b) the gender division of labour in Australia over a 15-year period during which government changed from the progressive Labor Party to the socially conservative National/Liberal Party Coalition. It describes changes and continuity in government policies and rhetoric about work, family and gender issues and trends in workforce participation. Data from three successive nationally representative Time Use Surveys (1992, 1997 and 2006), N=3846, are analysed. The difference between parents’ and non-parents’ total workload grew substantially under both governments, especially for women. In households with children there was a nascent trend to gender convergence in paid and unpaid work under Labor, which reversed under the Coalition.
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Stegman, Trevor. "“Jobsback” and the Future of Wages Policy." Economic and Labour Relations Review 4, no. 1 (June 1993): 50–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/103530469300400103.
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The implications of the Liberal-National Party Coalition's policy with regard to wage determination in Australia are assessed in relation to appropriate goals for wages policy. Although the current Accord-based system has shifted its focus over the last decade, from generally applied wage determination principles aimed at inflation control to an enterprise based system aimed at productivity enhancement, the Coalition's policy should not be seen as merely an extension of the current system. This is because, in pursuit of faster productivity gains, the Coalition policy aims at the permanent exclusion from the wage determination process of the two institutional elements which provide the scope for an anti-inflation incomes policy in Australia — the Industrial Relations Commission and the Australian Council of Trade Unions.
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Mickel, John, and John Wanna. "The Longman by-election of 2018: An ordinary result with extraordinary consequences." Queensland Review 27, no. 1 (June 2020): 83–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/qre.2020.6.
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AbstractThis article sets out to explain how the relatively unremarkable 2018 by-election result in which a sitting Labor candidate held her seat with a mediocre swing towards her resulted in the panicked removal of Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull from office and his immediate resignation from the parliament. The combined Queensland state Coalition party, the Liberal National Party, convinced itself that it could win the marginal outer-metropolitan seat of Longman in Queensland but when its expectations were dashed, it became spooked and set in train a chain of events that ousted Turnbull and installed Scott Morrison as prime minister. Turnbull was widely seen by the Coalition party room as having run a lack-lustre campaign in the 2016 federal election, and not having performed well in the 2018 by-election campaigns. Perhaps unwisely, Turnbull made the Longman by-election a direct leadership contest between himself and opposition leader Bill Shorten. However, Labor’s tactics in the by-election ‘outmanned, outspent and out-campaigned’ the Coalition’s faltering campaign in the seat, causing the relatively unremarkable outcome in Longman to become a catalyst for a challenge to Turnbull’s leadership. When parliament reconvened, Peter Dutton became the ‘stalking horse’ who resulted in the rise of Scott Morrison to the top office.
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van Fossen, Anthony. "One Nation and Privatisation: Populist Ethnic Nationalism, Class and International Political Economy." Queensland Review 5, no. 2 (December 1998): 44–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1321816600001045.
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AbstractThe rise of ethnic nationalism (as expressed by the political ascent of Pauline Hanson and her One Nation Party) has created divisions within the Right of Australian politics and impediments to a privatisation program which had been proceeding under the aegis of the Labor Party and the Liberal-National Party Coalition over the last fifteen years. This paper focuses on how Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party has opposed privatisation of government assets on the basis that privatisation offers opportunities for subversive foreign capital to weaken national solidarity, which is conceived in ethnic and racial terms. The One Nation Party, this new anti-privatisation movement, is interpreted on two levels: 1as one of a growing number of ethnic nationalist movements across the globe which are recurrent outcomes of hegemonic decline and increasing multipolarity in the world-system (e.g., the current situation of declining American hegemony being similar to the crisis of British hegemony in the interwar period of the early twentieth century)2as the outcome of neo-liberal policies (including privatisation) which have failed to produce full employment or to arrest the decline of the petite bourgeoisie, which forms the primary basis of the support for Hanson and her One Nation party.
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Pijovic, Nikola. "The Liberal National Coalition, Australian Labor Party and Africa: two decades of partisanship in Australia’s foreign policy." Australian Journal of International Affairs 70, no. 5 (May 18, 2016): 541–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2016.1167835.
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Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. "The Shaping of Party Preferences in Turkey: Coping with the Post-Cold War Era." New Perspectives on Turkey 20 (1999): 47–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0896634600003137.
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An overview of general elections and the party system from the beginning of multi-party politics in Turkey would indicate a proclivity towards an increasing number of major parties coupled with fragmentation of the party system. The predominant party system of the 1950s favored stability over representativeness (see Table 1). The 1961 Constitution established new electoral rules and a liberal political regime, which provided for more opportunity for representativeness. The 1965 and 1969 elections produced party governments, with a proportional representation formula that wasted almost no votes; even those parties with the smallest number of followers won some seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) (see Table 1). For a while in the 1960s Turkey therefore appeared to have discovered the optimal ground of converging stable governments with consummate representativeness. The party governments of the 1960s, however, gave way to the unstable coalition governments of the 1970s, which coincided with a wave of terror and political instability. Coalition governments came to be equated with political instability and terror in the minds of not only the masses, but also the most powerful political forces in the country.
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Liff, Adam P., and Ko Maeda. "Electoral incentives, policy compromise, and coalition durability: Japan's LDP–Komeito Government in a mixed electoral system." Japanese Journal of Political Science 20, no. 1 (December 5, 2018): 53–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109918000415.
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AbstractPolitical parties’ behavior in coalition formation is commonly explained by their policy-, vote-, and office-seeking incentives. From these perspectives, the 20-year partnership of Japan's ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its pacifistic Komeito junior coalition partner is an anomalous case. The longevity, closeness, and nature of their unlikely partnership challenges core assumptions in existing theories of coalition politics. LDP–Komeito cooperation has sustained for two decades despite vastly different support bases and ideological differences on fundamental policy issues. LDP leaders also show no signs of abandoning the much smaller Komeito despite enjoying a single-party majority. We argue that the remarkable durability of this puzzling partnership results primarily from the two parties’ electoral incentives and what has effectively become codependence under Japan's mixed electoral system. Our analysis also demonstrates that being in a coalition can induce significant policy compromises, even from a much larger senior partner. Beyond theoretical implications, these phenomena yield important real-world consequences for Japanese politics: especially, a far less dominant LDP than the party's Diet seat total suggests, and Komeito's remarkable ability to punch significantly above its weight and constrain its far larger senior partner, even on the latter's major national security policy priorities.
10
McAllister, Ian. "Australia: 11 July—Consolidating the Hawke Ascendancy." Government and Opposition 22, no. 4 (October 1, 1987): 435–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1988.tb00066.x.
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ON 11 JULY 1987 THE AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY (ALP) WAS returned, with an increased majority, to an unprecedented third term in federal government. The election result was doubly remarkable. First, the ALP has traditionally been unable to gain more than two terms in office. Schisms and factional conflict have generally ruined Labor's chances of a third period in office, as in 1949, when Ben Chifley failed to gain a third term, and in 1975, when the same fate befell Gough Whitlam, following a constitutional crisis. Secondly, the party retained office during a period of economic crisis unprecedented in Australia's modern history, a crisis which might have been expected to sweep the opposition Liberal–National coalition to power.
11
Mollenkopf, John. "New York: The Great Anomaly." PS: Political Science & Politics 19, no. 03 (1986): 591–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096500018151.
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Rufus Browning, Dale Marshall, and David Tabb present some straightforward and convincing theses in their admirable workProtest Is Not Enough. Urban policy responsiveness to minority interests, they argue, depends not so much on the direct impact of protest as on the advent of a dominant liberal coalition in which blacks and Hispanics have some role. Where such coalitions have not succeeded, racial exclusion and policy resistance tend to hold sway. Where blacks or Hispanics have played a leading role in bringing such a coalition to power, or in Browning, Marshall and Tabb's terms where political incorporation has been greatest, then policy results favor minority interests. Political incorporation depends on protest and electoral mobilization among blacks and Hispanics combined with favorable white attitudes toward minority interests. The size of the minority community and its leadership capacity in turn explain minority political mobilization.By these propositions, New York City should be characterized by substantial black and Hispanic political incorporation and the resulting targeting of policy outputs on minority interests. In the 1980 Census, New York's population was 23.9% black and 19.9% Hispanic; these numbers may have been substantially undercounted. In any case, two-thirds of a decade later New York is clearly a majority minority city. Black political participation dates from Adam Clayton Powell and Benjamin Davis' election to the city council in 1941 and 1943. The first Puerto Rican assemblyman was elected on the Republican and American Labor Party lines in 1938. Subsequently, both groups have had a long and sophisticated history of political participation. From the 1960s onward, a new generation of leadership led both groups to assert their political demands more strongly. The Lindsay administration afforded a national model of how a new liberal coalition could experiment with new forms of political incorporation. Voting in state and national elections would suggest the city is on the liberal end of the urban political spectrum. In short, by Western lights New York should be a model of strong minority incorporation and the consequent targeting of city policies toward minority interests. The problem, however, is that New York City has not incorporated minorities and, depending on what indicators are chosen, has not produced policies that are especially aimed toward minorities.
12
Woodward, Susan L. "Orthodoxy and solidarity: competing claims and international adjustment in Yugoslavia." International Organization 40, no. 2 (1986): 505–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300027223.
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Yugoslav policies of domestic adjustment to world economic changes during 1973–85 are the result of two sets of constraints imposed by the strategy of the ruling communist party for retaining its power:(1) an open international strategy for economic growth and national autonomy, chosen in the 1940s, that includes extensive use of foreign capital resources, and (2) the coalition of competing political and economic interests gathered within the party, which has been maintained by granting autonomy to producers, limits on the economic role of the state, and successive devolution of financial and administrative authority. The first imposes external budget constraints, the terms of which are defined by foreign creditors and supported by domestic economic liberals; the second imposes domestic political constraints that narrow the policy alternatives, limit their effective implementation, and require compromises that encourage further borrowing and political reform. The policy result is central party determination of policy orientation; macroeconomic stabilization policies that have continually given priority to maintaining the external balance and that combine orthodox deflation with administrative controls; periodic alternation in structural adjustment policies between a developmental, redistributive emphasis and an exportoriented, liberal, market emphasis, depending on the external constraints; and political and institutional flexibility in response to each policy shift and in order to maintain political order.
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WANG, YING. "The Pendulum Swings: Experiences from the LDP on Democratizing Party Leadership Selection." Japanese Journal of Political Science 17, no. 1 (January 29, 2016): 106–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109915000419.
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AbstractEmpowering the rank and file members in choosing a party leader has become an increasing trend in parliamentary democracies. This study examines the process of adopting more inclusive methods to choose a party leader in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan. The LDP introduced a national primary to elect a leader in 1978. However, this first attempt to open up the party leadership selection was soon replaced by traditional coalition-making politics. In this regard, the LDP is different from most of the Westminster parties that followed a smooth linear process of transferring more power to the rank and file members. This article identifies a ‘swing-back’ effect between 1980 and 1990 in the democratization process of party leadership selection. Working like a pendulum, the LDP did not resume a primary until 1991. It was in 2003 that a nationwide primary became a regular way. This article argues that the discontinuity of reformist actors caused this uncommon swing-back effect. The reformist split in 1976, the sudden death of Masayoshi Ohira, and Kanemaru mediation in 1984 stalled the reforms. Although one finds a similar trend in democratizing party leadership selection outside Europe, the LDP presented an abnormal inactivity and time-lag differences.
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Johnson, Carol. "The 2019 Australian election." Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 5, no. 1 (November 6, 2019): 38–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2057891119886053.
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Opinion polls suggested that Australia’s Coalition (Liberal and National Party) government was likely to be replaced by a Labor government at the 2019 election. However, in fact the government was returned. Key issues in the 2019 election centred around managing the economy, including levels of taxation and issues of inequality; around spending on government services such as health and education; and around issues of climate change. There were elements of populism in both major parties’ campaigns, and two minor populist parties played a significant role in preference distribution. There were also some simmering issues that reflect the broader geopolitical and geo-economic changes that are impacting upon Australia. These include not only challenges for Australia’s economy and identity in the ‘Asian Century’, but also issues of Australia’s relationship with China.
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Schickler, Eric. "New Deal Liberalism and Racial Liberalism in the Mass Public, 1937–1968." Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 1 (March 2013): 75–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592712003659.
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Few transformations have been as important in American politics as the incorporation of African Americans into the Democratic Party over the course of the 1930s–60s and the Republican Party's growing association with more conservative positions on race-related policies. This paper traces the relationship between New Deal economic liberalism and racial liberalism in the mass public. A key finding is that by about 1940, economically-liberal northern white Democratic voters were substantially more pro-civil rights than were economically-conservative northern Republican voters. While partisanship and civil rights views were unrelated among southern whites, economic conservatives were more racially conservative than their economically liberal counterparts, even in the south. These findings suggest that there was a connection between attitudes towards the economic programs of the New Deal and racial liberalism early on, well before national party elites took distinct positions on civil rights. Along with grassroots pressure from African American voters who increasingly voted Democratic in the 1930s–40s, this change among white voters likely contributed to northern Democratic politicians' gradual embrace of civil rights liberalism and Republican politicians' interest in forging a coalition with conservative white southerners. In attempting to explain these linkages, I argue that the ideological meaning of New Deal liberalism sharpened in the late 1930s due to changes in the groups identified with Roosevelt's program and due to the controversies embroiling New Dealers in 1937–38.
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Ames, David. "The things that batter." International Psychogeriatrics 28, no. 6 (April 27, 2016): 879. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1041610216000387.
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Over 20 years ago, the Australian Liberal/National Party Federal Opposition had a set of policies with which it hoped to persuade the Australian people to return it to government in the election due in 1996. This particular collection of proposed initiatives was called “The things that matter”. When the then leader of the opposition, Alexander Downer (later Australia's Foreign Minister 1996–2007 and now Australian High Commissioner in London), launched the Opposition's policy on family violence (the Coalition parties, like their Labor opponents, were and are against it in principle), his introductory line was: “From the things that matter to the things that batter”. Not long afterwards he lost his job as Opposition Leader, his engagement with what was and is a serious and troubling issue having been deemed too glib by half by the shapers of public opinion.
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Mendes, Philip. "From minimal intervention to minimal support: Child protection services under the neo-liberal Kennett Government in Victoria 1992-1999." Children Australia 26, no. 1 (2001): 4–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s103507720001004x.
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This article examines the politics and ideology of Victorian child protection services during the Kennett years. The argument advanced is that the Kennett Liberal/National Party Coalition Government viewed child abuse in narrow, individualistic terms. In contrast to the previous Labor Government, which emphasized a philosophy of minimal intervention based on a partnership of family, community and the state, the Kennett philosophy was one of minimal support. The key emphasis was on the reporting of child abuse to statutory child protection authorities, and the treatment and punishment of individual offenders. Spending on broader structural prevention and support services which actually help the victims of abuse was not a priority.A number of examples of this neo-liberal agenda are given, including the poorly timed introduction of mandatory reporting and the associated diversion of resources from support services to investigation; the early cuts to accommodation and non-government support services; the inadequate response to demonstrated links between child abuse and poverty; the censorship of internal and external critics; and the appalling handling of the strike by child protection workers. Attention is focused primarily on the broader macro-political debates, rather than specific micro-service delivery issues.
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López Burian, Camilo, and Diego Hernández Nilson. "URUGUAY, LOS REGIONALISMOS Y LA INTEGRACIÓN REGIONAL: EL PARTIDO NACIONAL, SU NEOHERRERISMO Y LA DESVINCULACIÓN DE LA REGIÓN COMO ESTRATEGIA." Cadernos de Campo: Revista de Ciências Sociais, no. 29 (March 12, 2021): 97–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.47284/2359-2419.2020.29.97124.
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In 2020, a right coalitional government leaded by the National Party started in Uruguay, after 15 years of left governments. There are signs that show the beginning of a eorientation of foreign policy towards greater trade openness and attracting investment. As a counterpart, there seems to be a loss of the relative importance of the region in Uruguayan foreign policy, which includes demands for the opening up and flexibilitation of the Mercosur and a repositioning against regionalism. This change promoted by the new government may be counterintuitive in relation to the regional vocation traditionally attributed by literature to the National Party. However, through the analysis of a census and interviews with legislators, the article shows that in the last decade party preferences have already outlined this relegation of the region. In this way, we argue that a pragmatic, realistic and deeply liberal “neoherrerismo” is emerging in the National Party, as a predominant tendency in the international vision of the government
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Harris, Bede. "Human Rights and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate in Australia." Journal of Politics and Law 10, no. 4 (August 30, 2017): 60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v10n4p60.
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Australia is currently confronting the issue of whether to legalise same-sex marriage. Thus far debate has been conducted with little reference to human rights theory. This article draws on the theories of John Rawls and John Stuart Mill and analyses whether, by confining the right to marry to heterosexual couples, the law infringes the right to privacy and, conversely, whether the legalisation of same-sex marriage would infringe religious rights of those who are unwilling to provide goods and services to same-sex couples. In so doing, the article adopts a comparative approach, drawing on case law from the United States. The article examines the way in which political debate on the issue has been conducted by the major parties in Australia, and concludes that both the Liberal-National coalition and the Labor party have been motivated by a desire to appease the religious right within their ranks, at the expense of human rights principles.
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Jefferys, Kevin. "British Politics and Social Policy during the Second World War." Historical Journal 30, no. 1 (March 1987): 123–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x00021944.
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This article sets out to examine the relationship between party politics and social reform in the Second World War. The issue of government policy towards reform was raised initially by Richard Titmuss, who argued in his official history of social policy that the experience of total war and the arrival of Churchill's coalition in 1940 led to a fundamentally new attitude on welfare issues. The exposure of widespread social deprivation, Titmuss claimed, made central government fully conscious for the first time of the need for reconstruction; the reforms subsequently proposed or enacted by the coalition were therefore an important prelude to the introduction of a ‘welfare state’ by the post-war Labour administration. These claims have not been borne out by more recent studies of individual wartime policies, but as a general guide to social reform in the period the ideas of Richard Titmuss have never been entirely displaced. In fact the significance of wartime policy, and its close relationship with post-war reform, has been reaffirmed in the most comprehensive study of British politics during the war – Paul Addison's The road to 1945. For Addison, the influence of Labour ministers in the coalition made the government the most radical since Asquith's Liberal administration in the Edwardian period. The war, he notes, clearly placed on the agenda the major items of the post-war welfare state: social security for all, a national health service, full employment policies, improved education and housing, and a new system, of family allowances.
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Miller, William L. "Modified Rapture All Round: The First Elections to the Scottish Parliament." Government and Opposition 34, no. 3 (July 1999): 299–322. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1999.tb00483.x.
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AS ELECTION DAY APPROACHED IT SEEMED CERTAIN THAT LABOUR would come out on top and the Scottish National Party (SNP) would come second. Thanks to the new German-style electoral system it also seemed certain that Labour could not win an overall majority in the new Scottish Parliament and that the Conservatives would get some parliamentary representation however low their vote. But each of the parties had hopes and ambitions as well as expectations. Labour hoped to get over 60 seats in the new parliament of 129, enough at least to have the option of forming a minority government. The SNP hoped to get well over 40 seats, enough to let it assume the undisputed role of the opposition, and to mark a further step along the road to independence. The Liberal Democrats hoped to be more than a small but useful coalition partner in the new parliament. Out in the country they hoped the new electoral system would end the traditional handicap of a Liberal Democrat vote being dismissed as a ‘wasted vote’ and so let their votes rise to equal their underlying level of popular support. ‘Other’ parties and candidates hoped that the new electoral system and the new inclusive politics would somehow include them.
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Batakovic, Dusan. "The road to democracy: The development of constitutionalism in Serbia 1869-1903." Balcanica, no. 38 (2007): 133–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/balc0738133b.
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After the swiftly abolished liberal Constitution of 1835 and the imposed 'Turkish' one of 1838 (imposed by the Russians and Ottomans, guarantors of Serbia's autonomy granted in 1830, to limit the princely power), the development of constitutionalism in modern Serbia went through several phases. As elsewhere in the Balkans, constitutions usually resulted from a compromise between the ruler and the elites rather than from the will of the people. The 1868 Constitution drew to an extent upon the early nineteenth-century German constitutional monarchies, but, under pressure from the politically mobilized population, the 1888 Constitution, proposed by the Radical Party in response to the egalitarian aspirations of the nation's agrarian majority, adopted a French constitutional model - with a unicameral system and frequent coalition governments. Shaped on the model of the Belgian Constitution of 1831, which in its turn was a modified version of the French Charte of 1830, it restored a French influence, expressed for the first time in the 1835 Constitution. The 1888 Constitution was passed by the Grand National Assembly with its five-sixth majority of Radicals, representatives of the agrarian majority. It was soon annulled by the coup d'?tat of 1894 and the Court-imposed Constitution of 1869 was reinstituted. The Constitution of 1901 was an attempt to introduce a bicameral system as a means of upholding the influential role of the ruler, while limiting that of the Radical Party, which had enjoyed an ample electoral support since the 1888 Constitution. After the assassination in 1903 of the last Obrenovic ruler king Alexander, and his wife, queen Draga, the liberal Constitution of 1888 with minor modifications was reinstituted. Under this Constitution - which is commonly known as the 1903 Constitution and which, during the democratic reign of king Peter I Kardjordjevic, was no longer challenged - Serbian democracy remained fragile, because there was no upper house to counteract as it did in the French Third Republic, the predominantly party-biased way of running the affairs of state.
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Pešić, Miroslav. "Party struggles in the Kingdom of Serbia from 1884 to 1887." Зборник радова Филозофског факултета у Приштини 50, no. 4 (2020): 143–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/zrffp50-26092.
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Garašanin's Progressive Government proposed to the National Assembly, which was held in Niš in May 1884, to adopt amendments to several laws of a political nature after the demise of the Timok rebellion. These were the bills amending the law: on the press, on the associations and choirs, on the municipality, and on the gendarmerie. By adopting these repressive laws, the progressives practically prevented the work of political parties, reinforced police surveillance over the municipalities, and increased the gendarmerie forces further. The lost war with Bulgaria in 1885 marked the beginning of the political breakdown of the Progressives and King Milan, who was close to them, although they repeatedly disagreed with his political actions. However, their departure from the political scene did not begin immediately after the lost war, as many expected, but took another year and a half for the Progressives, and three years for King Milan. On the other hand, the Radicals began to believe in the possibility that the defeat that they experienced during the Timok rebellion could come to a victory, that is, to power. A long-standing march against the Radical Party was halted, as King Milan realized that he could not rule with the constant ignorance of the will of the people. The broad popular masses led by the People's Radical Party should have approached the throne and the dynasty and together with the representatives of the Progressive Party alleviate the difficult situation created by the war against Bulgaria, and later provide the crown prince with a safer ruler. The royal attempt to persuade the Radicals to agree with the Progressives failed, as representatives of the Radical Party at the assembly held in February 1886 in Niš resolutely refused an agreement with the Progressives. In April 1886, they signed an agreement with the Liberals, which contained a joint program of work of both parties. The most important points of this program, which was a reflection of the compromise on both sides, concerned the change of the Constitution in the internal and the improvement of relations with the Russians in foreign policy. In June 1887, a liberal-radical government was formed, the first coalition government in the political history of Serbia.
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Petrie, Malcolm. "ANTI-SOCIALISM, LIBERALISM AND INDIVIDUALISM: RETHINKING THE REALIGNMENT OF SCOTTISH POLITICS, 1945–1970." Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 28 (November 2, 2018): 197–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0080440118000105.
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ABSTRACTThis paper presents an alternative interpretation of Scottish politics between 1945 and 1970, a period that witnessed the decline of a once-powerful Unionist tradition, the revival of Liberalism and the rise of the Scottish National party (SNP). While existing accounts have focused principally upon social and economic factors, this study foregrounds the role of ideology and rhetoric. During the 1940s and early 1950s, Scottish Unionists were, like their Conservative colleagues elsewhere in Britain, able to construct a popular, but essentially negative, anti-socialist coalition that prioritised the defence of individual liberty. This electoral alliance, defined by opposition to Labour's programme of nationalisation and expressed via an individualist idiom, was able to attract broad support; it was, however, always provisional, and proved increasingly difficult to sustain after the Conservative party returned to office in 1951. It was, this paper suggests, the fragmenting of this anti-socialist coalition in the late 1950s and early 1960s that created the opportunity for both the Liberals and the SNP to present alternative renderings of this individualist appeal, and to emerge as credible political alternatives. Crucially, by the 1960s, individual liberty was beginning to be understood in constitutional rather than economic terms.
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Fraeys, William. "Les élections législatives du 18 mai 2003 Analyse des résultats." Res Publica 45, no. 2-3 (September 30, 2003): 379–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.21825/rp.v45i2-3.18483.
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After four years of a so called «Rainbow» coalition, which had the support of the Socialists (red), the Liberals (blue) and the Greens, the electorate rewarded the first two political families and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Greens. The latter lost nearly 60 % of their electorate, which had occurred only once before to a political party since the introduction of universal suffrage in Belgium in 1919. The outcome of the elections is fairly similar in the three regions of the country.In Flanders, the Socialists progress by more than 8 %, reaping the benefits of the alliance formed with «Spirit», one of the successor parties of the former Volksunie. Half of the Socialists' progress can be attributed to this effect. Moreover, the Socialist party started off from an absolute low hit in 1999 and has not regained its top scores of the 1960s. The advance of the Liberal VLD is more modest, (some 2.5 %), but it followed upon excellent previous results. With some 25 % of the vote, the VLD, which is the first party in Flanders, has reached an absolute high.Conversely, the Christian Democrats of the CD&V slightly regress, thereby continuing a downward trend. These results take them to their historical low, and make them into Flanders ' third party, with some 21.9 % of the vote. Agalev, the Green party, no langer has any representation in parliarnent and falls back from11 to 3.85 %. The far right, the Vlaams Blok, continues its advance and reaches 17,86 %, an increase of2,5 %.In Wallonia too one observes a significant advance of the Socialists. The PS remains the first party in the South of the country with 36.39 % of the vote, progressing by 7 %. It exceeds all its results of the previous twelve years, without however reaching its earlier highs. The Liberals of the Mouvement Réformateur (MR) gain 3.65 % and are at their historical high with 28.38 % of the vote. The Christian Democrats, under the denomination CDH (Centre democrate humaniste) slip back by some 1.5 %, but this decline is almost equivalent to the result of a dissident list of the CDH, which had wanted to maintain «christian» as a reference. This doesn't alter the fact that the Christian Democrats have also reached their all time low.The Greens, Ecolo, lose some 57 % of their vote and stand at 7.45 %. In contrast with 1999, one observes a slight advance ofthe Front National, a far right party, that only obtained 5.56 % of the vote however. With the exception ofan increase in the French and a decline in the Flemish vote, the Brussels districts show the same characteristics as the two other regions of the country; a very significant advance of the Socialists, a slight increase in the Liberal vote, the collapse of the Greens; the status quo ofthe Christian Democrats and an advance of the far right with almost 2 %.The 2003 election therefore seems to be a correction on the 1999 one, where the advance of the greens had been amplified by the dioxineJood scare. But the width of the swing makes it into one of the elections where the volatility of the vote will have been the highest.
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Ndegwa, Stephen N. "Citizenship and Ethnicity: An Examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics." American Political Science Review 91, no. 3 (September 1997): 599–616. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2952077.
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In some African countries, democratic openings have intensified ethnic competition and led to protracted transitions or outright conflict. In Kenya, I argue, the stalled transition reflects the effects ofrepublicancitizenship in ethnic political communities andliberalcitizenship in the national political community. This duality in citizenship engenders conflict over democracy—conceived as liberal majoritarian democracy—and results in ethnic coalitions disagreeing over which institutions are appropriate for a multiethnic state. I provide evidence from discourses over institutions from two transition periods in Kenya: at independence and in the recent shift from one-party rule. This study makes two contributions. First, it adds to current citizenship theory, which is largely derived from Western experience, by demonstrating that republican and liberal citizenships are not necessarily compatible and that the modern nation-state is not the only relevant community for forming citizens. Second, it adds to studies of African transitions by highlighting citizenship issues in institutional design with regard to ethnicity in Kenya.
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Brown, Scott A. W. "Free Trade, Yes; Ideology, Not So Much: The UK’s Shifting China Policy 2010-16." British Journal of Chinese Studies 8, no. 1 (April 3, 2019): 92–126. http://dx.doi.org/10.51661/bjocs.v8i1.21.
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Fox and Godement’s (2009) Power Audit of EU-China Relations grouped the EU’s member states into four categories based on their national approaches to relations with, as well as their preferences for, the EU’s policies towards China. In this typology, the UK, at the time governed by New Labour, was deigned an “Ideological Free Trader”—seeking to facilitate greater free trade while continuing to assert its ideological position, namely in the areas of democracy and human rights. Since the Conservative Party took the reins of power in 2010 (in coalition with the Liberal Democrats until 2015), China’s prominence on the UK’s foreign policy agenda has arguably increased. This paper examines the direction of the UK’s China policy since 2010, and asks whether the label “Ideological Free Trader” remains applicable. Through qualitative analysis of the evolving policy approach, it argues that while early policy stances appeared consistent with the descriptor, the emphasis on free trade has grown considerably whilst the normative (ideological) dimension has diminished. Consequently, the UK should be redefined as an “Accommodating Free Trader” (an amalgamation of two of Fox and Godement’s original groups—“Accommodating Mercantilist” and “Ideological Free Trader”).
At time of publication, the journal operated under the old name. When quoting please refer to the citation on the left using British Journal of Chinese Studies. The pdf of the article still reflects the old journal name; issue number and page range are consistent.
Picture credit: Georgina Coupe
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Van Velthoven, Harry. "'Amis ennemis'? 2 Communautaire spanningen in de socialistische partij 1919-1940. Verdeeldheid. Compromis. Crisis. Eerste deel: 1918-1935." WT. Tijdschrift over de geschiedenis van de Vlaamse beweging 77, no. 1 (April 4, 2018): 27–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.21825/wt.v77i1.12007.
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Na de Eerste Wereldoorlog en de invoering van het enkelvoudig stemrecht voor mannen werd de socialistische partij bijna even groot als de katholieke. De verkiezingen verscherpten de regionale en ideologische asymmetrie. De katholieke partij behield de absolute meerderheid in Vlaanderen, de socialistische verwierf een gelijkaardige positie in Wallonië. Nationaal werden coalitieregeringen noodzakelijk. In de Kamer veroverden zowel de socialisten als de christendemocratische vleugel een machtsbasis, maar tot de regering doordringen bleek veel moeilijker. Die bleven gedomineerd door de conservatieve katholieke vleugel en de liberale partij, met steun van de koning en van de haute finance. Eenmaal het socialistische minimumprogramma uit angst voor een sociale revolutie aanvaard (1918-1921), werden de socialisten nog slechts getolereerd tijdens crisissituaties of als het niet anders kon (1925-1927, 1935-1940). Het verklaart een toenemende frustratie bij Waalse socialisten. Tevens bemoeilijkte hun antiklerikalisme de samenwerking van Vlaamse socialisten met christendemocraten en Vlaamsgezinden, zoals in Antwerpen, en dat gold ook voor de vorming van regeringen. In de BWP waren de verhoudingen veranderd. De macht lag nu gespreid over vier actoren: de federaties, het partijbestuur, de parlementsfractie en eventueel de ministers. De eenheid was bij momenten ver zoek. In 1919 was het Vlaamse socialisme veel sterker geworden. In Vlaanderen behaalde het 24 zetels (18 meer dan in 1914) en werd het met 25,5% de tweede grootste partij. Bovendien was de dominantie van Gent verschoven naar Antwerpen, dat met zes zetels de vierde grootste federatie van de BWP werd. Het aantrekken van Camille Huysmans als boegbeeld versterkte haar Vlaamsgezind profiel. In een eerste fase moest Huysmans nog de Vlaamse kwestie als een vrije kwestie verdedigen. Zelfs tegen de Gentse en de Kortrijkse federatie in, die de vooroorlogse Vlaamsgezinde hoofdeis – de vernederland-sing van de Gentse universiteit – hadden losgelaten. Naar 1930 toe, de viering van honderd jaar België, was de Vlaamse beweging opnieuw sterker geworden en werd gevreesd voor de electorale doorbraak van een Vlaams-nationalistische partij. Een globale oplossing voor het Vlaamse probleem begon zich op te dringen. Dat gold ook voor de BWP. Interne tegenstellingen moesten overbrugd worden zodat, gezien de financiële crisis, de sociaaleconomische thema’s alle aandacht konden krijgen. Daarbij stonden de eenheid van België en van de partij voorop. In maart 1929 leidde dit tot het ‘Compromis des Belges’ en een paar maanden later tot het minder bekende en radicalere partijstandpunt, het ‘Compromis des socialistes belges’. Voortbouwend op de vooroorlogse visie van het bestaan van twee volken binnen België, werd dit doorgetrokken tot het recht op culturele autonomie van elk volk, gebaseerd op het principe van regionale eentaligheid, ten koste van de taalminderheden. Voor de Vlaamse socialisten kwam dit neer op een volledige vernederlandsing van Vlaanderen, te beginnen met het onderwijs en de Gentse universiteit. Niet zonder enige tegenzin ging een meerderheid van Waalse socialisten daarmee akkoord. In ruil eisten zij dat in België werd afgezien van elke vorm van verplichte tweetaligheid, gezien als een vorm van Vlaams kolonialisme. Eentalige Walen hadden in Wallonië en in nationale instellingen (leger, centrale besturen) recht op aanwerving en carrière zonder kennis van het Nederlands, zoals ook de kennis ervan als tweede landstaal in Wallonië niet mocht worden opgelegd. De betekenis van dit interne compromis kreeg in de historiografie onvoldoende aandacht. Dat geldt ook voor de vaststelling dat beide nationale arbeidersbewegingen, de BWP vanuit de oppositie, in 1930-1932 mee de invoering van het territorialiteitsbeginsel hebben geforceerd. Een tussentijdse fase C uit het model van Miroslav Hroch.________‘Frenemies’? 2Communitarian tensions in the Socialist Party 1919-1940. Division, Compromise. Crisis. Part One: 1918-1935After the First World War and the introduction of simple universal male suffrage, the Socialist Party was almost as large as the Catholic Party. Elections sharpened the regional and ideological asymmetry. The Catholic Party maintained an absolute majority in Flanders; the Socialists acquired a similar position in Wallonia. Coalition gov-ernments were a necessity at the national level. In the Chamber, both the Socialists and the Christian Democratic wing of the Catholics had a strong base of power, but entering in the government turned out to be much more difficult. Governments remained dominated by the conservative wing of the Catholic Party and by the Liberal Party, with support from the king and high finance. Once the Socialist minimum program had been accepted out of fear of a social revolution in the years 1918-1921, the Socialists were only tolerated in government during crises or in case there was no other possibility (1925-1927, 1935-1940). This explains an increasing frustration among Walloon Socialists. At the same time, Flemish Socialists’ anticlericalism hindered their cooperation with Christian Democrats and members of the Flemish Movement, as in Antwerp, and that also held true for the forming of national governments.In the Belgian Workers’ Party (BWP), balance had changed. Power now lay spread among four actors: the federations, the party administration, the parliamentary faction, and sometimes, government ministers. Unity was sometimes hard to find. In 1919 Flemish socialism became much stronger. In Flanders it took 25 seats (18 more than in 1914) and, with 25.5% of the vote, was the second-largest party. In addition, the centre of gravity moved from Ghent to Antwerp, which with six seats became the fourth-largest federation in the BWP. Camille Huysmans’s appeal as the figurehead strengthened its profile with regard to the Flemish Movement. At first, Huysmans had to defend the treatment of the Flemish Question as a matter of individual conscience for party members, even against the Ghent and Kortrijk federations, which had abandoned the foremost pre-war demand of the Flemish Movement, the transformation of the University of Ghent into a Dutch-language institution. As 1930, the centenary of Belgium, approached, the Flemish Movement became stronger once again and an electoral breakthrough by a Flemish nationalist party was feared. An overall solution to the Flemish problem was pressing, also in the BWP. Internal divisions needed to be bridged in order to give full attention to socioeconomic questions, in light of the financial crisis. The unity of Belgium and of the party came first and foremost. In 1929 this led to the ‘Compromis des Belges’ (Compromise of the Belgians) and a few months later to the lesser-known but more radical position of the party, the ‘Compromise of the Belgian Socialists’. Building on the pre-war vision of the existence of two peoples within Belgium, this point of view was imbued with the right of each people to cultural autonomy, based on the principle of regional monolingualism, at the expense of linguistic minorities. For Flemish socialists this came down to a full transformation of Flanders into a Dutch-speaking society, beginning with education and the University of Ghent. The majority of Walloon socialists went along with this, though not without some reluctance. In return, they demanded the elimination of any form of required bilingualism in Belgium, which they saw as a form of Flemish colonialism. In Wallonia and in national institutions (the army, the central administration), monolingual Walloons had a right to be recruited and have a career without a knowledge of Dutch, just as knowledge of Dutch as a second national language was not supposed to be imposed in Wallonia. The significance of this internal compromise has received insufficient attention in the historiography. The same observation applies to the finding that both national workers’ movements – the BWP from the ranks of the opposition – forced the introduction of the principle of territoriality in 1930-1932: an interim phase C of Miroslav Hroch’s model.
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Evans, Elizabeth, and Emma Sanderson-Nash. "From Sandals to Suits: Professionalisation, Coalition and the Liberal Democrats." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 13, no. 4 (May 4, 2011): 459–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2011.00455.x.
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The Liberal Democrats have traditionally been viewed as a ‘bottom-up’ party with a relatively high degree of influence open to grass-roots members and party activists. However, following the dramatic increase in the number of Liberal Democrat MPs at the 1997 election the party has increasingly tried to professionalise its operation, leading to a more top-down approach. This article argues that the professionalisation process has not only changed the dynamics within and between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary party, but has also paved the way for the party, more usually identified as being on the centre-left of British politics, to enter into coalition government with the Conservatives. Analysing changes to the federal conference structure and to policy-making processes, the article explores the ways in which the party has professionalised, both within the parliamentary party and at party headquarters, and assesses the potential impact that this may have upon the role of the party's grass roots.
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Saalfeld, Thomas. "Coalition Governance Under Chancellor Merkel's Grand Coalition: A Comparison of the Cabinets Merkel I and Merkel II." German Politics and Society 28, no. 3 (September 1, 2010): 82–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2010.280305.
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A comparison of the 2005-2009 cabinet Merkel I (the “Grand“ Coalition) and the Christian Democrat-Liberal coalition cabinet Merkel II formed in 2009 presents an interesting puzzle. Political commentators and coalition theorists alike would have expected the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition to experience a relatively high, and the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition a relatively low level of overt inter-party conflict. In reality, however, relations in the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition were relatively conflictive, whereas the Grand Coalition seemed to manage conflict between reluctant partners successfully. This article seeks to explain these seemingly paradoxical differences between the two coalitions. It demonstrates that both the positioning of the coalition parties in the policy space and important institutions constraining coalition bargaining after the formation of the cabinet Merkel II (portfolio allocation, role of the CDU/CSU state minister presidents) disadvantaged the FDP in pursuing its key policy goals (especially tax reform). As a result, the Liberals resorted to “noisy“ tactics in the public sphere. The grand coalition, by contrast, was an alliance of co-equals, which facilitated a more consensual management of inter-party conflict.
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Ma, Ngok. "Parties without Power." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 53, no. 4 (December 1, 2020): 118–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/j.postcomstud.2020.53.4.118.
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This article reviews how Beijing’s design of a liberal autocracy constrains party development in Hong Kong. It shows how the governing philosophy and the institutional design and mechanics of the electoral system disallow a strong governing party and suppress political participation. This situation brings about a weakened state capacity and a fragmented ruling coalition with elites working on contrasting incentives. It also leads to legislative fragmentation and declining public confidence in legislative and party politics. Unable to contain political participation, radical street actions arose to challenge the government. The 2019 Anti-Extradition Movement best exemplifies the weakness of the ruling coalition and the radicalization of street politics posing major challenges to the governance of Hong Kong.
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Evans, A. B. "The squeezed middle? The Liberal Democrats in Wales and Scotland: A post-coalition reassessment." Scottish Affairs 24, no. 2 (May 2015): 163–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/scot.2015.0065.
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In the wake of the repeated electoral losses suffered by the Scottish and Welsh Liberal Democrats in 2011 and 2012, it is perhaps unsurprising that recent analysis has focused on the ‘toxic impact of the federal party's coalition with the Conservative party’ on the devolved state parties electoral fortunes. Certainly this significant electoral collapse, alongside the hostility to both parties recorded in the 2011 Scottish and Welsh electoral surveys, could be said to lend credence to such a research focus. However, this article argues that the real potency of the Westminster coalition has resulted from it exacerbating and exposing weaknesses that have long blighted the Liberal Democrats in Scotland and Wales. Indeed, by adopting an approach that places the Scottish and Welsh Liberal Democrats' current woes within a historical context, this article will contend that such frailties highlight structural weaknesses at the very heart of the Liberal Democrats federally.
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Inoguchi, Takashi. "A Step Toward One-Party Predominance: Japan’s General Election of 20 October 1996." Government and Opposition 32, no. 1 (January 1997): 48–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1997.tb01209.x.
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THE GENERAL ELECTION IN JAPAN OF OCTOBER 1996 brought back the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to a position of predominance, if not preponderance, in the House of Representatives. Out of 500 seats, the LDP acquired 239, while the second largest New Frontier Party (FNP) won 156, the newly-formed Democratic Party 52, the Communist Party 26, the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) 15, and the Sakigake New Party two seats. Prior to the general election, the LDP, the SDPJ and the Sakigake had cooperated in a coalition government with 211, 30 and 9 seats, respectively. After the election, the LDP formed a minority government without making a formal coalition arrangement with the much enfeebled SDPJ and Sakigake. Why was the LDP able to make this sort of comeback? Why have ‘reformist parties’, starting with the New Japan Party, the Renewal Party, the New Frontier Party and most recently the Democratic Party, experienced such a brief period of increased power before their fall (or stagnation)? These are the questions that this article addresses in describing and explaining Japanese politics today.
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Bessant, Judith. "“DEREGULATING POVERTY”: LIBERAL-NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND YOUNG PEOPLE." Australian Journal of Social Issues 34, no. 1 (February 1999): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1839-4655.1999.tb01067.x.
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Saito, Jun. "Infrastructure as the Magnet of Power: Explaining Why Japanese Legislators Left and Returned to the LDP." Journal of East Asian Studies 9, no. 3 (December 2009): 467–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800006743.
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By examining party-switching decisions among members of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), this article shows how distributive policy programs exclusively available to the governing party attract incumbents to the party in power. In a stable electoral environment where the government party is likely to stay in power, legislators elected from infrastructure-poor constituencies are effectively tied to the party. However, when the party's electoral prospects are uncertain, legislators behave more sincerely and switch parties to match their policy preferences. It is also found that defectors elected from infrastructure-poor constituencies tended to return to the LDP once the party installed a stable surplus coalition.
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Chambers, Paul. "In Response to Michael H. Nelson." Journal of East Asian Studies 7, no. 1 (April 2007): 159–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800004896.
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I am flattered by Michael Nelson's interest in my article (“Evolving To ward What? Parties, Factions, and Coalition Behavior in Thailand Today,” Journal of East Asian Studies 5, no. 3). He takes issue with my discussion of four levels of parliamentary games: the arenas of lead party in a coalition government versus lead party in the opposition camp; inter-party games in a coalition government; inter-factional games; and games between individual MPs themselves, the most micro-level. Nelson is right to suggest that “we really need a more realistic and comprehensive conceptualization of local-provincial-regional-national political linkages” in Thailand. However, that is not what I sought to do in my article. As I make clear, my focus is on the national level of analysis with regard to parties, factions, and coalition behavior in Thailand.
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Sussman, Gerald. "Reheating the Cold War: us, Russia, and the Revival of Rollback." Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 16, no. 6 (December 6, 2017): 736–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691497-12341459.
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Abstract A neoconservative coalition of oppositional forces, comprised of the Clinton wing of the Democratic Party and their allies in the Republican Party, the liberal mainstream media, and the deep state have promoted a new Cold War against Russia. This is intended as a mobilizing strategy to overturn the Trump presidency, weaken the Russian state, and reconstruct state legitimacy following years of decline in the quality of life and democracy in America. The coalition reconstructed the Cold War as an ideological tool in the interest of continuing to pursue domestic and global neoliberal policies and dealing with a fractious public disenchanted with government, its elected officials, the mainstream media, and a failing democracy.
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Hayao, Kenji. "Ending the LDP Hegemony: Party Cooperation in Japan. By Ray Christensen. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000. 228p. $52.00 cloth, $27.95 paper." American Political Science Review 95, no. 1 (March 2001): 231–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055401552016.
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The Japanese party system has been in flux in recent years. In 1993, two groups defected from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and joined with the opposition to form a broadly based coalition government. A year later, the LDP regained power by creating a coalition government with its ideological opponent, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Both events shocked virtually everyone at the time. The LDP had been in power for so long-almost 40 years-that it seemed almost inconceivable that it could lose power. For just as long, the JSP had been the main opposition. By the 2000 election, a dozen parties had come and gone, the JSP's strength dropped to a very small fraction of what it was a decade earlier, and the LDP had to turn to various coalition partners to maintain its control of government. All this is quite puzzling to even close watchers of Japanese politics, because party politics, especially the role of opposition parties, has been a relatively understudied area. For those who want to make sense of how these events came to pass, Ray Christensen's Ending the LDP Hegemony will be very helpful.
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Lupton, Robert N., William M. Myers, and Judd R. Thornton. "Party Animals: Asymmetric Ideological Constraint among Democratic and Republican Party Activists." Political Research Quarterly 70, no. 4 (July 24, 2017): 889–904. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912917718960.
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Existing literature shows that Republicans in the mass public demonstrate greater ideological inconsistency and value conflict than Democrats. That is, despite a commitment to the conservative label and abstract belief in limited government, Republican identifiers’ substantive policy attitudes are nonetheless divided. Conversely, Democrats, despite registering lower levels of ideological thinking, maintain relatively consistent liberal issue attitudes. Based on theories of coalition formation and elite opinion leadership, we argue that these differences should extend to Democratic and Republican Party activists. Examining surveys of convention delegates from the years 2000 and 2004, we show that Democratic activists’ attitudes are more ideologically constrained than are those of Republican activists. The results support our hypothesis and highlight that some of the inconsistent attitudes evident among mass public party identifiers can be traced to the internal divisions of the major party coalitions themselves.
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KECK, THOMAS M. "Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Federal Statutes?" American Political Science Review 101, no. 2 (May 2007): 321–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055407070190.
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This paper explores three competing accounts of judicial review by comparing the enacting and invalidating coalitions for each of the fifty-three federal statutes struck down by the Supreme Court during its 1981 through 2005 terms. When a Republican judicial coalition invalidates a Democratic statute, the Court's decision is consistent with a partisan account, and when a conservative judicial coalition invalidates a liberal statute, the decision is explicable on policy grounds. But when an ideologically mixed coalition invalidates a bipartisan statute, the decision may have reflected an institutional divide between judges and legislators rather than a partisan or policy conflict. Finding more cases consistent with this last explanation than either of the others, I suggest that the existing literature has paid insufficient attention to the possibility of institutionally motivated judicial behavior, and more importantly, that any comprehensive account of the Court's decisions will have to attend to the interaction of multiple competing influences on the justices.
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Bruce, John M., John A. Clark, and John H. Kessel. "Advocacy Politics in Presidential Parties." American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (December 1991): 1089–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963937.
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Analysis of data from a 1988 survey of presidential parties demonstrates that campaign leaders are better understood as true believers than as either representatives or vote maximizers. Analysis of leaders' attitudes reveals four issue groups in both the Republican and Democratic parties. The dominant coalition in the Republican party is slightly more conservative, and that in the Democratic party is slightly more liberal, than the party median. Comparison with similar 1972 data shows stable patterns of issue advocacy and intraparty cohesion over this time period but somewhat increased issue distance between the parties in 1988.
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Southern, Neil. "The pitfalls of power sharing in a new democracy: the case of the National Party in South Africa." Journal of Modern African Studies 58, no. 2 (June 2020): 281–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x2000018x.
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AbstractA key political feature of South Africa's transformation was the African National Congress, the National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party working together in a grand coalition. This arrangement was praised by leading power-sharing theorist Arend Lijphart. The unity government began in 1994 but two years later the National Party withdrew. This article explores power sharing during the initial phase of the settlement and discusses three aspects of it. First, the South African example points to the electoral drawbacks of power sharing for minor parties. Second, the National Party's participation in the coalition stifled the early development of substantial political opposition which slowed the pace of democratic consolidation. Third, participation in a power-sharing arrangement undermined the National Party's electoral fortunes contributing to its dissolution in 2005. This was an unexpected outcome for a party which had co-authored the country's settlement a little over a decade earlier.
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Umeda, Michio. "The Liberal Democratic Party: Its adaptability and predominance in Japanese politics for 60 years." Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 4, no. 1 (June 28, 2018): 8–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2057891118783270.
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This article discusses the origin and continuity of the predominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japanese politics since the party’s formation in 1955. The LDP experienced two crises in its history, the first owing to the transformation of Japanese society by rapid economic development during the 1960–1970s, and the second due to the electoral reform in 1994 and the challenge from the Democratic Party of Japan thereafter. I argue that the LDP’s continuous success is attributable to its adaptability to new environments: the party overcame the first crisis by shifting the policy focus, reorganizing its support base and the party organization to achieve intraparty consensus. It coped with the second crisis by forming a coalition with the Clean Government Party and reforming the party’s presidential election and the ministerial post-allocation system. The article concludes with a summary and a brief discussion regarding the future of the LDP.
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Pekkanen, Robert J., and Saadia M. Pekkanen. "Japan in 2015." Asian Survey 56, no. 1 (January 2016): 34–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.1.34.
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The year 2015 revolved around Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, who led his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to a resounding electoral victory in December 2014, thus opening the door for the LDP and its coalition partner Komeito to pass a major revision of Japan’s security policy, despite public outcry and over a fragmented field of opposition parties.
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Bryden, P. E. "The Liberal Party and the Achievement of National Medicare." Canadian Bulletin of Medical History 26, no. 2 (October 2009): 315–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/cbmh.26.2.315.
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Raskall, Phil. "The Liberal-National Party Fightback! Package: A Distributional Analysis." Economic and Labour Relations Review 3, no. 1 (June 1992): 48–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/103530469200300104.
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This paper examines the distributional analysis of the impact of the Fightback! package on Australian households. The paper examines the veracity of both the results presented and the analysis undertaken by the Opposition. The critique by the Treasury is investigated, as are omissions by both Treasury and the Opposition. Some attempt to measure the direction and significance of these excluded impacts is also analysed.
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Flynn, John F. "At the Threshold of Dissolution: the National Liberals and Bismarck 1877/1878." Historical Journal 31, no. 2 (June 1988): 319–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x00012905.
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Allied to Bismarck and more national than liberal, the National Liberal party split the liberal movement and became the largest and most successful party in Germany from 1867 to 1879. But it acted singularly ineffectively when it plunged headlong into the greatest crisis of its history by failing to support tax legislation during a year-long negotiation with Bismarck begun in the summer of 1877. For one thing, the party focused its attention on a single issue when many were at stake, any one of which could have been an obstacle to an agreement with Bismarck. Secondly, although its factions had continually demonstrated their willingness to reach unanimity, these agreements had taken so long to develop and lasted so briefly that in effect the party spent the greater part of a critical year in opposition to Bismarck. Furthermore, by weakening the degree of its commitments in response to Bismarck's hostility towards its demands, the National Liberal party appeared indecisive, unreliable and deceptive. The issue which had produced this inept behaviour was the implementation of the party goal of maintaining parliamentary power in Germany, specifically of assuring to the Reichstag the right to vote annually the sources of the revenue of the imperial government. The story of that issue is the concern of this article. It argues that knowledge of the tensions generated by divergent principles and goals on parliamentary rights will clarify both the schismatic tendencies and the character of the National Liberal party in the later 1870s. Thus the proper assessment of the role that the issue played in the history of the party requires that the actual decision-making process be counted at least equally with agreements. Whether continual co-operation among National Liberals on parliamentary rights was based upon increased hostility or cordiality has remained the critical and unanswered practical question.
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Dutton, David. "John Simon and the post-war National Liberal Party: an Historical Postscript." Historical Journal 32, no. 2 (June 1989): 357–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x0001219x.
Full textAbstract:
Historians have not expended much energy in tracing the fortunes of the National Liberal party. Though the party enjoyed a theoretically independent existence for nearly forty years, there is general agreement that it is best seen as a mere adjunct of Conservatism. Writers whose sympathies lie with the mainstream Liberal party have been particularly dismissive. Roy Douglas notes that as early as the autumn of 1933 the Liberal Nationals ‘had become Conservatives for all practical purposes’. In similar terms, Sir Dingle Foot concludes that they ‘became the obedient servants of their Tory masters. In return they received their quota of offices and honours.’ Yet while the policies of National Liberalism became increasingly indistinguishable from those of their Conservative allies, many who bore this label clung tenaciously to it and proved most reluctant to give up their independent identity and ‘the grand old name of Liberal.’ The fortunes of the post-war party, and in particular the role played by its elder statesman, Lord Simon, are not without interest for the student of the modern British political system.
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Iwai, Tomoaki. "Legislative Records, 2000." Japanese Journal of Political Science 1, no. 2 (November 2000): 333–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109900002085.
Full textAbstract:
The political scene behind Japan's legislation in 2000 was uneasy and flurried. The ascent to political power by Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori following the sudden death of Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, the shift in political framework caused by the separation of the Liberal Party from the coalition government, and the general election came one after the other in a series of restless succession.
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Salihu, Mustapha. "Holy or Unholy Alliance? Political Coalition, Interest Articulation and Governance in New Democracies." African Journal of Law, Political Research and Administration 4, no. 2 (July 30, 2021): 21–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.52589/ajlpra-wfnvujzb.
Full textAbstract:
Employing qualitative content analysis and building on the submissions of coalition data theories, the study ascertains the governability and extent to which Nigeria’s ruling coalition, the All Progressives Congress (APC) is able to effectively aggregate various political interests and deliver on its campaign promises. Within mainstream studies, there is a consensus on the uphill task of labelling political parties as office, or policy seeking, exclusively. Nonetheless, the study argues, despite running on key programs of fighting corruption, countering Boko Haram and diversifying the economy, the APC fits the description of an office-seeking coalition. Although the party attracted key regional power brokers from two main opposition parties, the Congress for Progressive Change and Action Congress, and aggrieved members of the former ruling party, now main opposition the then ruling People’s Democratic Party. Shortly after it took power in 2015, the APC could not reach a consensus on the appointment of principal officers for the 8th National Assembly, as this was the practice. The maneuverings that led to the selection process, the uneasy relationship between legislature and executive, as well as attempts by leaders from coalescing parties to superimpose on the party which had adverse effects on the supremacy of Nigeria’s ruling coalition and institutionalization of partisan party politics. While conflicts of interests are not unusual in politics, its prevalence within Nigeria’s ruling coalition adversely affects the probability of the party to actualize its campaign programs, given the seeming battle for the soul of the party. However, the dissolution of the party’s National Working Committee in 2020 and the constitution of the APC Caretaker committee by President Muhammad Buhari suggests, the party is making conscious attempts to reconcile aggrieved members, register new members and retrace its steps in preparation for the 2023 general election.