Academic literature on the topic 'Liberal humanist view of TESOL'

Western children's literature has traditionally been dominated by liberal humanism, which stresses the centrality and inviolability of the human subject. Recently, though, some speculative novels for young adults have begun to question this notion of humanity following posthumanist thinking. This article examines the post-apocalyptic YA-novel Shade's Children and investigates what view of humanity it offers and how it ties this view up with its representation of children, childhood and the concept of innocence. It is argued that although the novel undermines bodily definitions of humanity in favour of a posthuman inclusiveness, it ultimately ends up tying the idea of humanity to liberal humanist notions of cherishing the innocence of children and protecting those weaker than oneself. The novel centres on a nostalgia for the myth of innocence, which, while acknowledging the heroism and agency of its adolescent characters, also stresses the value of freedom from responsibility.

AbstractRecent scholarship on the history of German anthropology has tended to describe its trajectory between 1900 and the Nazi period as characterized by a paradigmatic shift from the liberal to the anti-humanistic. This article reconstructs key moments in the history of anthropometric photography between 1900 and 1925, paying particular attention to the role of the influential liberal anthropologist Rudolf Martin (1864–1925) in the standardization of anthropological method and technique. It is shown that Rudolf Martin's primary significance was social and institutional. The article reconstructs key stages in Martin's writing on and uses of photography and analyses the peculiar form of scientific debate surrounding the development of anthropometric photography, which centred on local and practical questions. Against the political backdrop of German colonialism in Africa and studies of prisoners of war during the First World War, two key tensions in this history surface: between anthropological method and its politicization, and between the international scientific ethos and nationalist impulses. By adopting a practical–epistemic perspective, the article also destabilizes the conventional differentiation between the German liberal and anti-humanist anthropological traditions. Finally, the article suggests that there is a certain historical irony in the fact that the liberal Martin was central in the process that endowed physical anthropology with prestige precisely in the period when major parts of German society increasingly came to view ‘race’ as offering powerful, scientific answers to social and political questions.

This article examines the issues in preventing mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) of HIV in rural communities in Nigeria. It assesses the cultural practices that propel mother-to-child-transmission (MTCT) vis-à -vis their implications on development. It uses J.P Clark’s play, Song of a Goat as a premise to argue that the dramatic characters in the play as well as traditional symbols and idiolects embody diverse tropes which touch on the components of PMTCT such as stigmatisation, gender inequality and discrimination of persons living with HIV. It further contends that the in/action of the dramatic characters in the play’s plot as well as some aspects of the thematic thrusts convey diverse perspectives which community workers should consider in designing, with participation of beneficiary communities, communication strategies for effective public health awareness campaign and PMTCT intervention programmes. The paper uses liberal humanism as a theoretical bastion to maintain that cultural practices are catalysts that are capable of increasing or reducing PMTCT across rural communities in Nigeria. It concludes that intervention workers should as well look in the direction of play-texts to understand the cultural dynamics at play in apprehending the extant realities in communities and working with the people to reflect on their contexts with a view to forging ways that can instigate behavioural change. Keywords: PMTCT, Liberal humanism, Dramatic characters, HIV, Impotence, Infidelity

Theoretically ideology is the theoretical foundation and philosophical view that provides operational direction. In its development there are current of three major ideology that influence education, namely: conservative, liberal, and critical. Traditional education systems tend to use conservative ideology as the basis for their education. Meanwhile, modern education that is currently growing rapidly in the pace of globalization is guided by liberacy the education management by carrying the spirit of high humanism. On the other hand, Islam as a religious building that carries the concept of rahmatan lil 'alamin basically has the concept of humanist value that is actually available in the Qur'an. It's just how humans can dig up and maximize their use in educational studies appropriately and to achieve the ideal educational concept needs to be developed more broadly. Thus, the concept or ideology of Islamic education actually already exists in the Qur'an and how human can maximize their potential to explore these sciences.

The goal of this book “is to provide a way of conceptualizing the Islamic traditionthat is different from that proposed by conventional scholarship”(p. 6). The author wants to highlight howMuslims themselves view modernitybecause their own views have been overshadowed by western scholarshipand have problematized assumptions founded on the oppositionaldichotomies of modern versus traditional or secular versus sacred. Sheargues that a tradition is not simply the recapitulation of previous beliefs andpractices, but that each successive generation confronts its own particularproblems via an engagement with a set of ongoing arguments. Therefore, theauthor asserts, one effective way of addressing Islam is to approach it asMuslims do – as a discursive tradition embodied in the practices and institutionsof their communities.Haj intends to attain her goals and highlights these problems by analyzingthe work of two significant Muslim reformers: Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-87) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905). Although theybelong to different historical periods and social settings, she feels that theirwork has inspired the two major strands of contemporary Islamic politicalthought. The former, an Arabian reformer, has often been referred to as the“legendary mastermind of a ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘violent’ political movement,the inspiration for the present-day militant Muslim groups (like al-Qa`ida) in their struggle against modernity” (p. 30). The latter is an Egyptianreformer regarded as a liberal humanist who underlined the essence ofMuslim humanism for the modern world ...

To view culture as a multispecies and not as an anthropocentric one is the call of the era. The liberal Humanist idea of human as an autonomous entity is to be debunked, as culture involves not only Homo sapiens, but also other species – animals, plants, microbes, machines and hybrids. No species can dwell independently. Each species thrives in a network, interconnected and interdependent to each other. This network forms a culture of multispecies, where every being is akin to the other. Multispecies culture is all inclusive and all encompassing, disregarding the crippling binaries of human/ non-human, culture/nature, abled/disabled, normal/abnormal and so on. It is important to realize that each binary is an anthropocentric cultural construct. It must be discarded in order to create the culture of companion species, that is includes all forms of existence, not overlooking the ‘unwanted’ object as the minor ‘other’, in the anthropocentric view. The paper aims to argue that each species (highlighting the figure of tree in the paper) is an active actor in the bio cultural space. It strives to emancipate the figure of a tree from the clutch of anthropocentric notion, as ‘nature’/ ‘passive recipient’/ ‘care-giver’/ ‘mother’. To serve my purpose, I have chosen a Science Fiction, titled The Saliva Tree by Brian Aldiss. The fiction has an alien tree, functioning in a farm on the Earth. The tree has a horrendous physical appearance, is carnivorous and is non-sessile. All such features compile to render the arboreal creature as a ‘monster’, an identity imposed upon a misfit, considering it as a threat to the human-centered culture. I have argued how the farm with the ‘monster’ tree and other variety of species and machines becomes an archive, a dynamic biocultural space. It also enhances the botanical culture or ‘FloraCulture’, as termed by John Charles Ryan.

The focus of this study is to answer the subject matter of how the concept of the nation-state according to Abdullah Munsyi in the constellation of Malay Islamic political ideology in the 19th century AD and how is the relevance of the concept of the current Indonesian nation state ? The study used the conscience morale theory of Ernest Renan and the social contract theory initiated by J. J. Roussae. This research is included in the library research category and uses historical approaches and political philosophy. The primary data in this study are Abdullah Musnyi's Hikayat Abdullah book published by Yayasan Karyawan, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 2007 and secondary data, in the form of books, journal articles, papers, and others related to research problems. the findings of the research are: 1). In accordance with the theory of conscience morale Ernest Renan and the social contract theory initiated by J. J. Roussae, Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir Munsyi was the originator of nationalism. Through his most important work, Hikayat Abdullah, he put forward the formulation of Malay identity in the formulation of the nation which was understood as a Malay tribe or race who had the right to be involved in determining the Malay political format not as a community under a political system that was authoritarian. 2). His closeness with the British colonial side, thus forming the liberal thinking he obtained from Raffles and his friends. He not only dismantled the manipulation of royal ideology, but at the same time put forward a new view of the existence of a humanist individual. 3). The understanding of nationality has egalitarian values ​​that are very relevant to the current Indonesian context, especially the values ​​of equality (egalitarianism) in the midst of the emergence of conflicts in various conflicts today. Likewise the concept of nation-state is closely related to nationalism and good governance where good governance is based on the absolute existence of transparency, open participation, and accountability in all state activities at every level of state management, so that a clean government is formed. Keywords: Abdullah Munsyi, Nation-State, and Malay Political ideology

Matthew Arnold cuts a familiarfigure in narratives of Victorian secularization, although commentators often cast him in contradictory roles. In some accounts we meet him as an elegiac liberal who laments the loss of a no-longer-tenable faith but feels powerless to produce an alternative – “Wandering,” in a famous couplet, “between two worlds, one dead, / The other powerless to be born” (Arnold, “Stanzas from the Grand Chartreuse” 85–86; see Miller 212–69). Meanwhile other studies portray Arnold as a cautionary example of aggressive counter-secularization, a humanist whose vaunted ideal of “Culture” becomes as absolutist as the religion it is designed to replace (Williams,Culture and Society125–26). What both accounts share, however, is an understanding of secularization as the process whereby a definite thing called religion lost its hold upon European public life, leaving worried intellectuals to search for substitutes. Since the Second World War this view of secularization has come under increased scrutiny from sociologists, historians, anthropologists, and lately some literary critics; yet it remains difficult to imagine nineteenth-century literary history without it, largely because it is a narrative that was first developed by major Victorian writers like Arnold himself. Perhaps the best way, then, to engage Victorian crisis-of-faith writers is to follow the lead of recent commentators like Talal Asad and Michael Kaufmann and reframe the problem in discursive terms. Rather than retrace the rise and fall of two definite things called religion and secularity, Kaufmann argues, we should instead assume from the outset that “[t]here is no idea, person, experience, text, institution, or historical project that could be categorized as essentially . . . secular or religious” and mark how the significance of this opposition gets reordered in “varying discursive contexts” (Kaufmann 608; see Asad 25–26). We can see such thinking at work in recent scholarship that effectively replaces “secularization” with the conceptual emergence of religion as such – that is, the modern redescription of religion as a specific and limited sphere of human life, marked by certain energies (the irrational, the affective), whose role within the public is considered problematic. Anthropologist Timothy Fitzgerald, for instance, suggests that the Enlightenment turn toward regarding religion as the arena of strong personal belief was instrumental in establishing the space of the secular in the first place, insofar as it helped to define by contrast the new public sphere of “this-worldly . . . freedoms, laws, and markets” (Fitzgerald 5). Similarly, historian Callum Brown argues that late eighteenth-century Evangelicalism produced, as a sort of necessary pair, both the sociological idea of religion as an empirically discrete thing and our popular notion of religion as under threat or in decline (C. Brown 1–34).

Et rids af Grundtvig-forskningen og dens stilling i efterkrigens Danmark. William Michelsen in memoriam [A sketch o f Grundtvig scholarship and its position in postwar Denmark. In memory of William Michelsen]By Kim Arne PedersenWith the death of William Michelsen a distinct era in the history of Gr scholarship reached its close, for he was the last surviving member of the small circle who (gathered in Bishop C. I. Scharling’s residence in Ribe for Gr’s birthday ) celebrated on the stroke of midnight the founding of The Grundtvig Society of 8th September 1947 [Grundtvig-Selskabet af 8. September 1947] which was to prove such an important initiative in Danish academic activity and in Danish culture more widely. In the forthcoming reinstatement of Gr in the mainstream of Danish scholarship and debate Michelsen was to maintain a long, unstinting and untiring involvement, both through his own scholarly output and through the encouragement, advice and criticism he offered to younger and rising scholars.Michelsen was markedly the product of his own background in a middleclass family linked over two generations with teaching, a liberal theological outlook and a quiet Christian piety in the home. Similarly, the motives and objectives of his involvement with Gr over his long working-life were distinctly responsive to the times through which he lived, and not least to the threats posed to democracy in the twentieth century by totalitarian regimes.Like others of his distinguished contemporaries, notably his lifelong friend Henning Høirup, he perceived Gr as »our contemporary« whose life-work remained of living relevance and should be accorded a functional place within the national cultural inheritance.Though not a theologian by formal education, Michelsen along with his generation came to be influenced by Karl Barth’s insistence that the revealed word of God must be the premise of any confession. This principle inspired his own studies of Gr’s thought-world, and particularly of Gr’s thesis of history, which in turn led him to see that religious idealism alone was not a sufficient response to the actualities of living in the present moment. Here he was also fairly clearly influenced by Hal Koch who, during the years of the German occupation of Denmark in the Second World War, was most instrumental in presenting Gr as his generation’s contemporary.With fellow-scholars such as Høirup and Regin Prenter, Michelsen found Gr’s authorship informed not only by Christianity’s radical profession of the forgiveness of sins but also, equally importantly, of a creation-theology which for them made it possible to harmonise the modem world’s scientific awareness with a belief that life and the universe were created by God. His contribution to the anthology Grundtvig og grundtvigianismen i nyt lys [Gr and grundtvigianism in a new light] (1983) is a key discussion of Gr’s conversion in 1810 and Gr’s relationship to Søren Kierkegaard. Various of Michelsen’s writings set forth Gr’s historical perspective as being based upon a mosaicchristian view, in a consciousness of Gr’s shift from faith to knowledge, from church to school around the critical year 1832. The view that he and Kai Thaning constitute opposite poles misrepresents the affinities and distinctions carefully drawn by Michelsen himself (‘Brev til en Grundtvigforsker’ [Letter to a Gr-scholar] in Dansk Udsyn 1964,443); nevertheless, his analysis of Gr’s universal-historical work formulates a significant challenge to Thaning’s reading of Gr and demonstrates the sense in which Gr was, as Michelsen later wrote in Grundtvig Studier 1983, ‘Sin samtids kritiker’ [Critic of his own times].After early work on H. C. Ørsted, Michelsen wrote his doctoral thesis, published as Tilblivelsen af Grundtvigs historiesyn [The formulation of Gr’s view of history] (Copenhagen, 1954). During this period (1941) he married Signe, niece of the Greenland explorer Knud Rasmussen who was herself an authority on Greenland and collaborated in translating Gr into the Greenlandic language. His doctoral thesis was based on an examination of the works Gr is known to have studied in his formative years (though he has been criticised for exaggerating the cohesion of the sources of influence upon Gr) out of which Gr shaped a view of history which was not a learned construct or theory but a conscious expression of the picture he formed for himself of existence.Michelsen depicts Gr as standing in opposition to the contemporary compromise between Christianity and romanticism, and as allowing the biblical perspective of history to model his own exposition of history.Characteristically, when his doctoral thesis was eventually overshadowed by the work of Sigurd Aa. Aames (1961) with its different approach, methodology and findings, Michelsen responded constructively (Grundtvig Studier 1962). Meanwhile he had been extending his own exploration of the way in which Gr’s Christian view of history developed after 1810, in Den sælsomme forvandling i N. F. S. Grundtvigs liv [The strange Metamorphosis inNFSG’slife] (1956). His two studies together raised issues-concerning for example Gr’s relationship to Lutheran tradition, his view of the divine image in man, and affinities between Gr and Kiekegaard’s existential standpoint - which ought to have generated a greater scholarly response than has been the case.Many of Michelsen’s articles in Grundtvig Studier remain indispensable items for students and researchers. He made a distinguished contribution to the great catalogue of the Grundtvig archives in the Royal Library, Copenhagen. Much work (in which his son Knud collaborated) on the transcription of unprinted Gr manuscripts and the identification of textual correlations illustrative of Gr’s philosophical thinking remains unpublished - though the big two-part introduction to Gr’s thought as reflected in his Danne-Virke (Grundtvig Studier 1985-86) to some extent compensates for this. Michelsen’s appointment (1968) to a lectureship in Aarhus University, in fulfilment of Professor Gustav Albeck’s desire to give Gr a central place in Danish studies, coincided with turbulent times which he did not find easy, but the fruits of his teaching are seen in the long series of fine articles by his pupils in Grundtvig Studies, of which he became an editor in 1969, scrupulously active to the last. In 1997 he was honoured by the Grundtvig-Selskab upon its Fiftieth Anniversary. He was an active participant in the newly-founded Grundtvig Academy in Vartov, in 2000.With William Michelsen’s death a notable Christian humanist and scholar has passed on. May his memory be held in honour.

1. In this paper, I want to begin to contemplate the possibility that the concept of culture could one day be thought outside modern Western thought, via a reading of Martin Heidegger's 'Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer'. As we shall see, for Heidegger, the dominant position here is representationalism. And so a large part of what I want to do here is to begin to shake the concept of culture from these dominant representationalist moorings.1 Heidegger's problem with the history of Western thought may be put as follows. In this tradition, the difference between Being and beings (the ontological difference) is forgotten so that Being comes primarily to be considered in terms of beings. Beings are, in turn, considered in terms of their relations to one another, with the being called 'man' routinely standing to one privileged side of those known as 'objects'. Thereby thinking about Being is reduced to the question: how is it that man relates to objects? The problem is compounded when the answer to this question is given as: man knows objects. And it is even further compounded by the dominance throughout all of this of representational thinking: the idea that man knows objects only 'indirectly' through their representations.2 To challenge representational thinking in Heidegger's sense, then, is to challenge not just a 'way of knowing' but also the dominance of 'man' (Foucault's central uptake of Heidegger), the separation between 'man' and 'things', subject and object, and, ultimately, it is to challenge the very idea that Being is no more than the aggregate of empirically accessible beings. To find alternatives to representational thinking Heidegger looks elsewhere, or, more precisely, in turning to the pre-Socratic Greeks, elsewhen. He does this throughout his work, but most explicitly in Early Greek Thinking. Yet even this work barely distinguishes between (what we would now think of as) natural and cultural production in any clear way. Instead, it appears there as if the ontological difference itself -- the difference between Being and beings, between sheer coming-to-presence and that which happens to be present -- is of such urgent importance that it cuts across the apparently less important distinction between natural and cultural varieties of beings. As an advancement of his claims about the ontological difference (as a neglected and almost unthinkable difference today), the Heidegger of Early Greek Thinking in effect obviates the nature/culture distinction along with representational thinking. If the modern Western concept of culture, then, depends for its existence on the prior existence of a constitutive outside (such as nature) then is it possible that culture as such (whatever theory of it we hold) is irrevocably part of representationalist thinking? Is it intrinsically representationalist -- from, say, Hobbes to the present day or, indeed, in whatever past or future manifestation -- by virtue of its dependence on a culture/non-culture distinction? If this is so, again, there is a remarkable consequence for all the cultural disciplines and for cultural studies in particular. It is this: any non-representationalist approach to culture would be a contradiction in terms; so that, by virtue of it being specifically culture we are interested in, our interest will be necessarily representationalist. Outside representationalism, what we are dealing with could not be culture as such. The sorts of objects which we have, until now, thought of as cultural objects (photographs, museums, policy documents, forms of dress, music and so on) become interesting and significant outside representationalism only to the extent that they instanciate the ontological difference. We can, that is, no longer afford to think of the cultural as ontologically separate in any way. Instead, the move away from representational thinking would mean that objects of whatever kind -- 'gods and men, temples and cities, sea and land, eagle and snake, tree and shrub, wind and light, stone and sand, day and night' (Early 40) -- are effects of the distinction between coming-to-presence and merely happening to be present. And they ought to be experienced, inspected and understood for what they are, fundamentally, in this respect. What would this mean? One occasion where the later Heidegger does treat 'cultural' matters (in several senses and by, perhaps for the first and only time, going across contemporary cultures) is in his 'Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer'.3 This strangely readable little colloquy requires inspection, I believe, if we are to proceed any further along what the Heidegger of Early Greek Thinking calls 'the lines of usage' and into the peculiar territory beyond representational thinking.4 2. What is at stake here may be this: whether in this dialogue we are experiencing a cultural difference. Or perhaps, whether we are experiencing the presence of culture(s) at all. Put another way: the essay in question (in the form of a dialogue) may be an instance of either (a) a cultural difference or dialogue; or else of (b) an accidental similarity or monologue. Let us look briefly at both possibilities. If (a), then we have a clear lesson (on the model of the 'danger' of language): the nature of culture cannot derive from a metaphysical distinction between culture and contenders for the title of 'non-culture' (for example, physical nature or science or barbarism); for anything that was a culture would have to be already in place in order to generate such a division (or anything like it) in the first place. The name, then, of this prior condition cannot be 'culture' itself. But that is precisely how the cultural disciplines have used the term -- 'cultures', we hear, are what make the 'nature/culture' distinction -- albeit that each may do it in its own, 'culturally specific', way.5 This is why the cultural disciplines cannot imagine a culture which does not, in itself, have a deeply-seated representational concept of culture as its ultimate ground. Anthropological thinking -- in the broadest philosophical sense, not just in reference to a specific discipline -- entails the search for the other's meaning of its own (anthropology's) idea of culture. In effect, it cannot imagine a culture outside Western metaphysics but must forever translate 'different cultures' into versions of it (albeit with minor empirical differences). So if the name of the condition for the nature/culture distinction (that is, the name of the nature of culture) cannot be 'culture', instead its name must be 'representational thinking' -- at least for all cultural theory to date. The modern concept of culture's ultimate contradiction would be that it would rest upon the assumption of its own universal presence while also denying cultural universals. If (b) -- if, that is, we are not, in this dialogue, undergoing an experience with culture at all -- then the 'Japanese' is no more than a token non-European Heideggerian. He is whatever may be non-European 'in' Heidegger himself. He is a fictional device for having Heidegger's fellow Europeans (his readers) see how it is possible to think outside Western thinking -- or at least to get a glimpse of such a possibility. He is a stooge, a ploy, and -- what's more -- an 'orientalised' ploy: a classically European fictional depiction of the mysterious Orient and its inscrutable thinking. So much is at stake in how we read this work. And a number of very important issues depend on our (necessarily ethical and political) decision as to how we should read the essay. For if reading (a) prevails, cultural difference (or whatever term we decide to use to replace it and its ultimately limited horizon) is not something, in itself, of its nature or essence, that can give any comfort to notions of 'orientalism' or 'stereotypes' or any of the other tropes of fashionable (cross-)cultural criticism. Instead, the cultural itself, wherever it is predicated on Western representational thinking, is intrinsically Western thinking. There is no outside of Western culture (the Western concept of culture) for that culture to grasp -- whether it would ideally grasp it in scientific, anthropological, liberal humanist, cultural relativist, orientalist, colonialist or racist ways. These 'ways' and the differences between them have no meaning on reading (a). They are all, in effect, one way. But if reading (b) prevails, then all seems well with Western representational thinking. It has no problem because, now, all cultures would, factually, have a Western concept of culture at their core, albeit of a particular inflexion. They would all be just like 'us' in their essential metaphysics. He who recorded the different tensions or versions of this single metaphysics might be a scientist or anthropologist. He who appreciated such small variations might be a liberal humanist or a cultural relativist. He who dogmatically believed in the superiority of his own tension or difference and degraded others might be an orientalist, a colonialist or a racist. But these would be, on reading (b), but small variations along a single path. They would be like the right, left and centre lanes of a one-way street. So neither reading turns out to be very hopeful for today's cultural disciplines. The first suggests a much deeper-seated difference than those disciplines have been able to imagine hitherto; something much less easily grasped than the culture/non-culture distinction (and such that some 'cultures' are not, in and of themselves, quite that). The second suggests that the easy victories of principled cultural criticism and cultural identity politics (as well as those of less 'enlightened' positions) are grounded on the most Western of Western thinking: its representationalist theology.6 It looks as if there are only two possibilities: either culture rests upon a bed of difference that lies so deep as to remain forever outside Western thinking; or every other is ultimately, at the deepest point of difference we can think, a version of the West. But on both sides of the divide, the initial idea of culture is culture-as-presence: 'are we in the presence of an intercultural dialogue?'; or 'are we in the presence of a culture talking to itself?' If we could move even a little way from this and begin to think of culture-as-coming-to-presence (or just as 'to come', to invoke a Derridean variation on the theme), then it turns out that (a) and (b) are necessarily undecidable matters within representational thinking itself but that, as we begin to move outside it,the decision becomes irrelevant. But we must reserve this (in)decision for another occasion and proceed with the dialogue at hand. 3. To proceed, we must continue with the dialogue's attention to language and particularly to the 'danger' of speaking about it. Language, that is, has a nature but it is concealed (by the representationalist difference between the sensuous and the suprasensuous) and this concealing is a 'danger' (21). One contender for the nature of language is to take it as 'the house of Being' (22). And this prompts us to remember that the dialogue describes the two cultures as different 'houses' (5) -- different 'language realities' (24) -- so that 'the nature of language remains something altogether different for the East asian and the European peoples' (23). In fact, it is so different that the question of what language is may not be a possible one for the Japanese (23). He insists that his people 'pay no heed' to the question of the nature of language. Instead they have a word that 'says the essential being of language, rather than being of use as a name for speaking and for language' (23). So this is not a referring word but rather a 'hinting' word (24). And the 'hint' would be what the Japanese translator feels when he feels the 'wellspring' from which such different languages as German and Japanese might arise. He also describes this in terms of a 'radiance'. This 'hinting', or 'gesturing', or 'bearing' (26) must not, the Inquirer demands, be clarified into a form of 'conceptual representation' (25). Were it to be, we would miss its nature outside Western reason. There is no analytic or empirical equivalent of 'the nature of language'. To think so is itself an instance of the worst sorts of metaphysics at work. Following through the dialogue, we also find that to ask about the nature of language is also to ask the hermeneutic question in its non-standard sense;that is not as a methodological question about the means of interpreting texts but as a metaphysical question about what interpretation itself is (29-30). And this in turn has to do with 'bearing' (as in bearing a message, being a messenger -- gesturing, bearing, hinting). The so-far unannounced Japanese word for the nature of language, on the one hand, and the question of what hermeneutics is, on the other, stand together. 'Man stands in hermeneutical relation to the two-fold' (32), where 'the two-fold' is glossed as presencing (coming-to-presence) and present beings. This hermeneutic relation, however, is complex. It involves man in preserving the two-fold (32) and also in the two-fold (presencing/present) using man (33). And, obviously enough perhaps, this idea of 'use' can no longer mean empirical usage in its quasi-linguistic sense. For, as we soon learn from the rest of the essays in On the Way to Language, the linguistic arts and sciences are thoroughly representationalist since they begin with the assumption of the simple existence of present beings (forgetting coming-to-presence and language's criticality to it) and consider language, as it were, to come later as a means of, and for, their re-presentation. (And this is, I would argue, precisely the function of terms such as 'language', 'discourse', 'signification' and 'image' in, for example, cultural studies.) Nevertheless the alternative to this mistaken view of language, the alternative that Heidegger calls 'the hermeneutic relation', is agentive. In fact it is doubly so. It involves, that is, practices (of preserving and using): 'the sway of usage' (33) and 'the sway of the two-fold' (34). The Japanese claims that there is a kinship between this thinking and his (or their) own (41). This hermeneutic relation, however, is complex. It involves man in preserving the two-fold (32) and also in the two-fold (presencing/present) using man (33). And, obviously enough perhaps, this idea of 'use' can no longer mean empirical usage in its quasi-linguistic sense. For, as we soon learn from the rest of the essays in On the Way to Language, the linguistic arts and sciences are thoroughly representationalist since they begin with the assumption of the simple existence of present beings (forgetting coming-to-presence and language's criticality to it) and consider language, as it were, to come later as a means of, and for, their re-presentation. (And this is, I would argue, precisely the function of terms such as 'language', 'discourse', 'signification' and 'image' in, for example, cultural studies.) Nevertheless the alternative to this mistaken view of language, the alternative that Heidegger calls 'the hermeneutic relation', is agentive. In fact it is doubly so. It involves, that is, practices (of preserving and using): 'the sway of usage' (33) and 'the sway of the two-fold' (34). The Japanese claims that there is a kinship between this thinking and his (or their) own (41). Footnotes Representational thinking is clearly alive and well today in cultural studies -- perhaps even to the point whereby this otherwise critical discipline rarely subjects this concept to critical scrutiny. See Hall (Representation). A draft paper 'Representation and Cultural Studies' (available on request) deals with this question. Hall's Representation book lists three such forms of indirect representation: 'the production of meaning through language, discourse and image'. Two other central locations for Heidegger on culture are 'The Age of the Word Picture' and 'Science and Reflection'. Here and elsewhere, of course, Heidegger has very little time for the idea of culture and 'culturalist' explanations -- possibly because of their traditionally deep imbrication in representationalism. At times, his opposition is so vehement that we can practically hear him reaching for his gun. In Early Greek Thinking, Heidegger translates a crucial part of the Anaximander fragment as follows: '... along the lines of usage [custom, practice]: for they let order and thereby also reck belong to one another (in the surmounting) of disorder' (Early 57). A paper submitted for this issue of M/C nicely displays this in a single phrase: 'the Western cultural pattern that assigns things masculine to the cultural and things feminine to the natural' (my emphases). On this matter, see Hunter on 'Setting Limits'. References Hall, Stuart (ed). Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. London: Sage, 1997. Heidegger, Martin. "The Age of the Word Picture." Trans. W. Lovitt. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York: Garland, 1977. 115-54. ---. "A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer." Trans. P.D. Hertz. On the Way to Language. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1971. 1-54. [First German publication 1959] ---. Early Greek Thinking. Trans. D. Farrell Krell & F.A. Capuzzi. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. ---. "Science and Reflection." Trans. W. Lovitt. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York: Garland, 1977. 155-82. Hunter, Ian. "Setting Limits to Culture." Nation, Culture, Text: Australian Cultural Studies. Ed. G. Turner. London: Routledge, 1993. 140-63. Citation reference for this article MLA style: Alec McHoul. "Talking (across) Cultures: Grace and Danger in the House of the European Inquirer." M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3.2 (2000). [your date of access] <http://www.api-network.com/mc/0005/grace.php>. Chicago style: Alec McHoul, "Talking (across) Cultures: Grace and Danger in the House of the European Inquirer," M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3, no. 2 (2000), <http://www.api-network.com/mc/0005/grace.php> ([your date of access]). APA style: Alec McHoul. (2000) Talking (across) cultures: grace and danger in the house of the European inquirer. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3(2). <http://www.api-network.com/mc/0005/grace.php> ([your date of access]).

My dissertation asserts that the discourses which at the present time construct the world of work for teachers in adult TESOL, are no longer adequate to represent the field in these new and rapidly changing times. For the last forty years the discourses that have constructed the field present a totalising, gender free, liberal humanist view of TESOL, rendering women's experience invisible, no longer speaking to or for women teachers who make up more than ninety percent of the teachers in Victorian adult TESOL programs (Cope & Kalantzis 1993, Brodkey 1991, Fine 1992, Peirce 1995). I begin by exploring the work of women teachers in adult TESOL, focusing on women teaching in the fast growing de-institutionalised settings of adult TESOL programs, which remain marginalised from the central programs in terms of administrative policy and practice. I report the findings of a series of projects undertaken by the teachers and the researcher by which new insights and understandings of teachers beliefs about their work and the changes which are currently reconstructing the field of adult language and literacy education in Australia, have been gained. I questions the discourses of applied linguistics which have for the past forty years constructed the field of adult TESOL in Australia and suggests that these lack a social theory (Candlin 1989). From the research findings I questions the possibility of continuing to work in the ways of the past, in the current climate of reconstruction of the field, rapid policy change and continued erosion of resources. I suggest that the previously loose system which held this field of work together, the ways of working, the understandings of practice, have in the light of these new times, been stretched to the limit and are in real danger of collapse. For the women working in TESOL this continued incursion of the systems into their work and the changes that have taken place, the denial of their ways of working, their local knowledge and gendered experiences, can be read against Habermas' concept of the colonisation of the lifeworld of language teaching (Habermas 1987).

Vico's concept of the Heroic Mind forms the pedagogical basis for his view of the liberal arts in university education. It is also the key to understanding his humanist critique of Cartesian epistemology. This essay studies Vico's Heroic Mind concept as revealed in his 1732 De mente heroica Oration, discusses the nature of Vico's challenge to Descartes' view of the human person and of knowledge, and points out the development of Vico's ideas on mind, education, and knowledge from his earlier works. Vico's writings not only offer a portrait of eighteenth century European intellectual and cultural thought, but also prophesy the change, disruption, and dehumanization that result from the exaggerated emphases on rationality as the end of all knowledge divorced from other physical, emotional, natural, or historical contingencies and from a neglect of the de mente heroica concept at the foundation of the humanistic world view. His understanding of the state of learning, wisdom, and culture in his own age as well as his exposure to the aversion of the Cartesian mathematical paradigm which discounted the Heroic Mind issues forth in an understanding of the forces driving modern technological society and the problems plaguing contemporary consciousness and life. He has influenced and inspired much modern thinking in sociology, politics, anthropology, language, pedagogy, literature, psychology, and even science. It is the concept of the historical and cultural evolution of the Heroic Mind which Vico passionately pursued in his monumentally creative The New Science.