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Journal articles on the topic 'Liar paradox'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 30 July 2024

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1

CHERUVALATH, Reena. "Analysing the Concept of “Paradox” in the Liar Paradox Arguments." Cultura 17, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 87–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.3726/cul012020.0006.

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Abstract: This paper examines the concept of “paradox” in the Liar paradox. The paradox in the “Liar Paradox” arguments is created with the support of law of contradiction. Four arguments consist of different versions of the Liar paradox are analysed. The author explains the issues related to communication, beliefs and the principle of identity in the various arguments of the Liar paradox leading to inconsistencies. There are ambiguities in these arguments and if the ambiguities are removed, then there is no contradiction which constitutes the paradox. Thus, the “paradox” in the “Liar Paradox” arguments is questionable.

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2

Ladov, Vsevolod. "Is the Liar Paradox a semantic paradox?" ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition 13, no. 1 (2019): 285–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/1995-4328-2019-13-1-285-293.

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The Liar Paradox has been widely discussed from the ancient times and preserved its importance in contemporary philosophy of logic and mathematics. At the beginning of the 20th century, F.P. Ramsey asserted that the Liar Paradox is different from pure logical paradoxes such as Russell’s paradox. The Liar Paradox is connected with language and can be considered a semantic paradox. Ramsey's point of view has become widespread in the logic of the 20th century. The author of the article questions this view. It is argued that the Liar Paradox cannot be unequivocally attributed to the semantic paradoxes and therefore Ramsey's point of view should be revised.

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3

Wu, Kuang-Ming. "The Liar Paradox." Open Journal of Philosophy 05, no. 05 (2015): 253–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2015.55032.

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4

Heck, Richard G. "A Liar Paradox." Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1, no. 1 (March 2012): 36–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.5.

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5

Lee, Byeong D. "Burge on Epistemic Paradox." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28, no. 3 (September 1998): 337–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1998.10715976.

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In his papers ‘Semantic Paradox (1979)’ and ‘The Liar Paradox: Tangles and Chains (1982),’ Tyler Burge provides a hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox. And in his paper ‘Epistemic Paradox (1984)’ Burge extends his hierarchy approach to the epistemic paradox of belief instability, which I shall explain shortly. Although Burge's views on the Liar paradox have been widely criticized (e.g., Gupta 1982, Grim 1991), his views on the paradox of belief instability have not received notable attention (except Conee 1987). In this paper I shall argue that Burge's proposal is inadequate as a solution to the paradox of belief instability. For this purpose, I shall criticize Burge's claim that a circular evaluation of a thought (or a belief) is impossible, which is crucial for his proposal. The question of whether or not a circular evaluation of belief is possible is of its own philosophical interest as well.

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6

Lamberov, Lev D. "Problems of deflationism: liar paradox." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Politologiya, no. 4(36) (December 1, 2016): 144–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/1998863x/36/15.

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7

Buckner, D., and P. Smith. "Quotation and the liar paradox." Analysis 46, no. 1 (January 1, 1986): 65–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/46.1.65.

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8

Hardy, J. "Is Yablo's paradox Liar-like?" Analysis 55, no. 3 (July 1, 1995): 197–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/55.3.197.

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9

Buckner, Dean, and Peter Smith. "Quotation and the Liar Paradox." Analysis 46, no. 2 (March 1986): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3328172.

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10

McDonough, Richard. "Sartre's Nausea as Liar Paradox." Philosophy and Literature 44, no. 2 (2020): 461–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/phl.2020.0034.

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11

Weaver, Nik. "Intuitionism and the liar paradox." Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163, no. 10 (October 2012): 1437–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apal.2012.01.014.

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12

Heck, Richard G. "More on ‘A Liar Paradox’." Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1, no. 4 (December 2012): 270–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.47.

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13

Martínez-Fernández, José, and Sergi Oms. "The many faces of the Liar Paradox." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 28, no. 1 (July 10, 2024): 15–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2024.e96700.

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The Liar Paradox is a classic argument that creates a contradiction by reflection on a sentence that attributes falsity to itself: ‘this sentence is false’. In our paper we will discuss the ways in which the Liar sentence (and its paradoxical argument) can be represented in first-order logic. The key to the representation is to use first-order logic to model a self-referential language. We will also discuss several related sentences, like the Liar cycles, the empirical versions of the Liar and the Truth teller sentences.

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14

Ahmad, Rashed. "A Recipe for Paradox." Australasian Journal of Logic 19, no. 5 (December 20, 2022): 254–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/ajl.v19i5.7887.

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In this paper, we provide a recipe that not only captures the common structure of semantic paradoxes but also captures our intuitions regarding the relations between these paradoxes. Before we unveil our recipe, we first talk about a well-known schema introduced by Graham Priest, namely, the Inclosure Schema. Without rehashing previous arguments against the Inclosure Schema, we contribute different arguments for the same concern that the Inclosure Schema bundles together the wrong paradoxes. That is, we will provide further arguments on why the Inclosure Schema is both too narrow and too broad. We then spell out our recipe. The recipe shows that all of the following paradoxes share the same structure: The Liar, Curry's paradox, Validity Curry, Provability Liar, Provability Curry, Knower's paradox, Knower's Curry, Grelling-Nelson's paradox, Russell's paradox in terms of extensions, alternative Liar and alternative Curry, and hitherto unexplored paradoxes. We conclude the paper by stating the lessons that we can learn from the recipe, and what kind of solutions the recipe suggests if we want to adhere to the Principle of Uniform Solution.

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15

Smith, Nicholas J. J. "Semantic Regularity and the Liar Paradox." Monist 89, no. 1 (2006): 178–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/monist200689139.

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16

Ladov, Vsevolod A. "The Liar Paradox Without Self-Reference." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya, sotsiologiya, politologiya, no. 50 (August 1, 2019): 249–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/1998863x/50/22.

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17

Hájek, Petr, Jeff Paris, and John Shepherdson. "The liar paradox and fuzzy logic." Journal of Symbolic Logic 65, no. 1 (March 2000): 339–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586541.

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AbstractCan one extend crisp Peano arithmetic PA by a possibly many-valued predicate Tr(x) saying “x is true” and satisfying the “dequotation schema” for all sentences φ? This problem is investigated in the frame of Łukasiewicz infinitely valued logic.

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18

Clark, M. "Recalcitrant variants of the liar paradox." Analysis 59, no. 2 (April 1, 1999): 117–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/59.2.117.

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19

Read, S. "Freeing assumptions from the Liar paradox." Analysis 63, no. 2 (April 1, 2003): 162–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/63.2.162.

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20

Snapper, J. "The liar paradox in new clothes." Analysis 72, no. 2 (February 20, 2012): 319–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans040.

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21

Read, Stephen. "Plural signification and the Liar paradox." Philosophical Studies 145, no. 3 (May 10, 2008): 363–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9236-y.

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22

Benétreau-Dupin, Yann. "Buridan's Solution to the Liar Paradox." History and Philosophy of Logic 36, no. 1 (June 3, 2014): 18–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2014.922363.

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23

Alzboon, Laith, and Benedek Nagy. "Truth-Teller–Liar Puzzles with Self-Reference." Mathematics 8, no. 2 (February 4, 2020): 190. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math8020190.

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In this paper, we use commonsense reasoning and graph representation to study logical puzzles with three types of people. Strong Truth-Tellers say only true atomic statements, Strong Liars say only false atomic statements, and Strong Crazy people say only self-contradicting statements. Self-contradicting statements are connected to the Liar paradox, i.e., no Truth-Teller or a Liar could say “I am a Liar”. A puzzle is clear if it only contains its given statements to solve it, and a puzzle is good if it has exactly one solution. It is known that there is no clear and good Strong Truth-Teller–Strong Liar (also called SS) puzzle. However, as we prove here, there are good and clear Strong Truth-Teller, Strong Liar and Strong Crazy puzzles (SSS-puzzles). The newly investigated type ‘Crazy’ drastically changes the scenario. Some properties of the new types of puzzles are analyzed, and some statistics are also given.

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24

Daşdemir, Yusuf. "A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY OTTOMAN SOLUTION TO THE LIAR PARADOX BY ḪAṬĪBZĀDE MUḤYIDDĪN." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 33, no. 2 (August 9, 2023): 237–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957423923000048.

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AbstractThis paper deals with a solution to the infamous liar paradox, usually known in the Arabic literature as Maġlaṭat al-ǧaḏr al-aṣamm. The solution is raised by a fifteenth-century Ottoman treatise that is attributed, among others, to Ḫaṭībzāde Muḥyiddīn Efendī. The paper also compares it with the solution by the contemporary Persian philosopher, Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī. The short treatise devoted to the paradox is one of the few works by Ottomans on the subject and it comprehensively addresses the paradox in its two forms. An analysis of the solution offered by the treatise to the paradox, the paper aims to bring Ottoman discussions of the liar to the attention of contemporary scholarship and contribute to filling the obvious gap in the literature on the paradox in Islamic thought.

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25

Mills, Andrew P. "Unsettled Problems with Vague Truth." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25, no. 1 (March 1995): 103–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1995.10717407.

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A tempting solution to problems of semantic vagueness and to the Liar Paradox is an appeal to truth-value gaps. It is tempting to say, for example, that, where Harry is a borderline case of bald, the sentence(1)Harry is baldis neither true nor false: it is in the ‘gap’ between these two values, and perhaps deserves a third truth-value. Similarly with the Liar Paradox. Consider the following Liar sentence:(2)(2) is false.That is, sentence (2) says of itself that it is false. If we accept the Tarskian schema(T) S is true iff pwhere ‘S’ is a name of a sentence ‘p,’ we are led into paradox. Both the assumption that (2) is true, and the assumption that (2) is false lead us, via (T), to(3)(2) is true if and only if (2) is false.Given this result, a natural reaction is to place (2) in a ‘gap’ between true and false.

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26

Nekhaev, Andrei V. "Yablo’s Paradox: Is the Infinite Liar Lying to Us?" Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 56, no. 3 (2019): 88–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps201956351.

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In 1993, the American logic S. Yablo was proposed an original infinitive formulation of the classical ≪Liar≫ paradox. It questioned the traditional notion of self-reference as the basic structure for semantic paradoxes. The article considers the arguments underlying two different approaches to analysis of proposals of the ≪Infinite Liar≫ and understanding of the genuine sources for semantic paradoxes. The first approach (V. Valpola, G.-H. von Wright, T. Bolander, etc.) imposes responsibility for the emergence of semantic paradoxes on the negation of the truth predicate. It deprives the ≪Infinite Liar≫ sentences of consistent truth values. The second approach is based on a modified version of anaphoric prosententialism (D. Grover, R. Brandom, etc.). The concepts of truth and falsehood are treated as special anaphoric operators. Logical constructs similar to the ≪Infinite Liar≫ do not attribute any definite truth values to sentences from which they are composed, but only state certain types of relations between the semantic content of such sentences.

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27

Levi, Don S. "The Liar Parody." Philosophy 63, no. 243 (January 1988): 43–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100043126.

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The Liar Paradox is a philosophical bogyman. It refuses to die, despite everything that philosophers have done to kill it. Sometimes the attacks on it seem little more than expressions of positivist petulance, as when the Liar sentence is said to be nonsense or meaningless. Sometimes the attacks are based on administering to the Liar sentence arbitrary if not unfair tests for admitting of truth or falsity that seem designed expressly to keep it from qualifying. Some philosophers have despaired of ever beating the Liar; so concerned have they been about the threat posed by the Liar that they have introduced legislation to exclude the Liar sentence and anything like it.

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28

Bhave, S. V. "The Liar Paradox and Many-Valued Logic." Philosophical Quarterly 42, no. 169 (October 1992): 465. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2220287.

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29

Pinheiro, I. M. R. "Concerning the Solution to the Liar Paradox." E-LOGOS 19, no. 1 (June 1, 2012): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.18267/j.e-logos.336.

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30

WEAVER, Nik. "The Liar paradox is a Real Problem." Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 25 (2017): 89–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.4288/jafpos.25.0_89.

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31

Jacquette, Dale. "Liar Paradox and Substitution into Intensional Contexts." Polish Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 1 (2010): 119–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pjphil2010417.

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32

Walker, James S. "An Elementary Resolution of the Liar Paradox." College Mathematics Journal 35, no. 2 (March 2004): 105. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4146863.

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33

Badici, Emil. "The Liar Paradox and the Inclosure Schema." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 4 (November 17, 2008): 583–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048400802215430.

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34

Priest, Graham. "Badici on Inclosures and the Liar Paradox." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88, no. 2 (July 6, 2009): 359–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048400903018980.

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35

Walker, James S. "An Elementary Resolution of the Liar Paradox." College Mathematics Journal 35, no. 2 (March 2004): 105–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07468342.2004.11922060.

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36

Hsiung, Ming. "Equiparadoxicality of Yablo’s Paradox and the Liar." Journal of Logic, Language and Information 22, no. 1 (October 5, 2012): 23–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10849-012-9166-0.

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37

Littmann, Greg. "Dialetheism and the Graphic Liar." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42, no. 1 (March 2012): 15–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.2012.0007.

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A Liar sentence is a sentence that, paradoxically, we cannot evaluate for truth in accordance with classical logic and semantics without arriving at a contradiction. For example, consider LL L is falseIf we assume that L is true, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is false. On the other hand, if we assume that L is false, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is true. Thus, L is an example of a Liar sentence.Several philosophers have proposed that the Liar paradox, and related paradoxes, can be solved by accepting the contradictions that these paradoxes seem to imply (including Priest 2006, Rescher and Brandom 1980). The theory that there are true contradictions is known as ‘dialetheism’ and we may call this the ‘dialethic solution.’ One standard response to the dialethic solution to the Liar paradox and related paradoxes has been to attempt to develop new ‘revenge’ versions of the paradoxes that are not subject to the dialethic solution (e.g. Parsons 1990, Restall 2007, Shapiro 2007).

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38

Menshikova, E. R. "The liar`s paradox — a wild interation. Zong-fantasy by Filet: The through aporia of the liar`s paradox." Voprosy kul'turologii (Issues of Cultural Studies), no. 6 (June 30, 2022): 444–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.33920/nik-01-2206-03.

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There are more and more precedents with offended infants of 30–40 years old — they are not emotionally abstinent, because they are in an artificial coma of infantilism, in which 'desire' has replaced 'sacrifice', and are clearly hypocritical, which is why the Holiday of Disobedience, hanging around the planet with a blinking garland of conflicts and wars, creates a turbulent zone in which the bifurcation points are taken out — beyond the orbit of common understanding, turning Consciousness into the quietest Sphinx, producing hypotheses.

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39

Alwishah, Ahmed, and David Sanson. "The Early Arabic Liar: The Liar Paradox in the Islamic World from the Mid-Ninth to the Mid-Thirteenth Centuries CE." Vivarium 47, no. 1 (2009): 97–127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853408x345909a.

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AbstractWe describe the earliest occurrences of the Liar Paradox in the Arabic tradition. The early Mutakallimūn claim the Liar Sentence is both true and false; they also associate the Liar with problems concerning plural subjects, which is somewhat puzzling. Abharī (1200-1265) ascribes an unsatisﬁable truth condition to the Liar Sentence—as he puts it, its being true is the conjunction of its being true and false—and so concludes that the sentence is not true. Tūsī (1201-1274) argues that self-referential sen-tences, like the Liar, are not truth-apt, and defends this claim by appealing to a correspondence theory of truth. Translations of the texts are provided as an appendix.

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40

Arenhart, Jonas R. B., and Ederson S. Melo. "Dialetheists’ Lies About the Liar." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 22, no. 1 (August 22, 2018): 59–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2018v22n1p59.

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Liar-like paradoxes are typically arguments that, by using very intuitive resources of natural language, end up in contradiction. Consistent solutions to those paradoxes usually have difficulties either because they restrict the expressive power of the language, or else because they fall prey to extended versions of the paradox. Dialetheists, like Graham Priest, propose that we should take the Liar at face value and accept the contradictory conclusion as true. A logical treatment of such contradictions is also put forward, with the Logic of Paradox (LP), which should account for the manifestations of the Liar. In this paper we shall argue that such a formal approach, as advanced by Priest, is unsatisfactory. In order to make contradictions acceptable, Priest has to distinguish between two kinds of contradictions, internal and external, corresponding, respectively, to the conclusions of the simple and of the extended Liar. Given that, we argue that while the natural interpretation of LP was intended to account for true and false sentences, dealing with internal contradictions, it lacks the resources to tame external contradictions. Also, the negation sign of LP is unable to represent internal contradictions adequately, precisely because of its allowance of sentences that may be true and false. As a result, the formal account suffers from severe limitations, which make it unable to represent the contradiction obtained in the conclusion of each of the paradoxes.

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41

Jones, Joseph R. "The Liar Paradox in Don Quixote II, 51." Hispanic Review 54, no. 2 (1986): 183. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/473901.

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42

Tomi, Paula-Pompilia. "Denying the problem. Deflationists and the Liar Paradox." Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia 63, no. 3 (December 20, 2018): 89–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2018.3.04.

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43

Joaquin, Jeremiah Joven. "TRUTH GAPS, TRUTH GLUTS, AND THE LIAR PARADOX." Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy 21, no. 2 (June 20, 2020): 241–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.46992/pijp.21.2.a.5.

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44

OVER, D. E. "Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox." Philosophical Books 27, no. 2 (February 12, 2009): 105–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1986.tb01161.x.

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45

Armour-Garb, Bradley, and James A. Woodbridge. "Alethic fictionalism, alethic nihilism, and the Liar Paradox." Philosophical Studies 174, no. 12 (December 23, 2016): 3083–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0847-4.

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46

Kearns, John T. "An illocutionary logical explanation of the liar paradox." History and Philosophy of Logic 28, no. 1 (February 2007): 31–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340600763321.

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47

Simmons, Keith. "On a medieval solution to the liar paradox." History and Philosophy of Logic 8, no. 2 (January 1987): 121–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445348708837113.

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48

Eldridge-Smith, Peter. "Two Fallacies in Proofs of the Liar Paradox." Philosophia 48, no. 3 (January 13, 2020): 947–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00158-5.

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49

Yang, Tao. "Computational verb systems: The paradox of the liar." International Journal of Intelligent Systems 16, no. 9 (2001): 1053–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/int.1049.

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50

Teijeiro, Paula. "Circularity is Still Scary." Análisis Filosófico 32, no. 1 (May 1, 2012): 31–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.36446/af.2012.106.

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Cook (forthcoming) presents a paradox which he says is not circular. I see no reasons to doubt the non-circularity claim, but I do have some concerns regarding its paradoxicality. My point will be that his proposal succeeds in offering a formalization, but fails in providing a formal paradox, at least of the same type and strength as the Liar.

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