Relevant bibliographies by topics / Liar paradox

Academic literature on the topic 'Liar paradox'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 30 July 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Liar paradox"

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CHERUVALATH, Reena. "Analysing the Concept of “Paradox” in the Liar Paradox Arguments." Cultura 17, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 87–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.3726/cul012020.0006.

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Abstract: This paper examines the concept of “paradox” in the Liar paradox. The paradox in the “Liar Paradox” arguments is created with the support of law of contradiction. Four arguments consist of different versions of the Liar paradox are analysed. The author explains the issues related to communication, beliefs and the principle of identity in the various arguments of the Liar paradox leading to inconsistencies. There are ambiguities in these arguments and if the ambiguities are removed, then there is no contradiction which constitutes the paradox. Thus, the “paradox” in the “Liar Paradox” arguments is questionable.
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Ladov, Vsevolod. "Is the Liar Paradox a semantic paradox?" ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition 13, no. 1 (2019): 285–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/1995-4328-2019-13-1-285-293.

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The Liar Paradox has been widely discussed from the ancient times and preserved its importance in contemporary philosophy of logic and mathematics. At the beginning of the 20th century, F.P. Ramsey asserted that the Liar Paradox is different from pure logical paradoxes such as Russell’s paradox. The Liar Paradox is connected with language and can be considered a semantic paradox. Ramsey's point of view has become widespread in the logic of the 20th century. The author of the article questions this view. It is argued that the Liar Paradox cannot be unequivocally attributed to the semantic paradoxes and therefore Ramsey's point of view should be revised.
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Wu, Kuang-Ming. "The Liar Paradox." Open Journal of Philosophy 05, no. 05 (2015): 253–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2015.55032.

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Heck, Richard G. "A Liar Paradox." Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1, no. 1 (March 2012): 36–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.5.

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Lee, Byeong D. "Burge on Epistemic Paradox." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28, no. 3 (September 1998): 337–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1998.10715976.

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In his papers ‘Semantic Paradox (1979)’ and ‘The Liar Paradox: Tangles and Chains (1982),’ Tyler Burge provides a hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox. And in his paper ‘Epistemic Paradox (1984)’ Burge extends his hierarchy approach to the epistemic paradox of belief instability, which I shall explain shortly. Although Burge's views on the Liar paradox have been widely criticized (e.g., Gupta 1982, Grim 1991), his views on the paradox of belief instability have not received notable attention (except Conee 1987). In this paper I shall argue that Burge's proposal is inadequate as a solution to the paradox of belief instability. For this purpose, I shall criticize Burge's claim that a circular evaluation of a thought (or a belief) is impossible, which is crucial for his proposal. The question of whether or not a circular evaluation of belief is possible is of its own philosophical interest as well.
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Lamberov, Lev D. "Problems of deflationism: liar paradox." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Politologiya, no. 4(36) (December 1, 2016): 144–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/1998863x/36/15.

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Buckner, D., and P. Smith. "Quotation and the liar paradox." Analysis 46, no. 1 (January 1, 1986): 65–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/46.1.65.

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Hardy, J. "Is Yablo's paradox Liar-like?" Analysis 55, no. 3 (July 1, 1995): 197–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/55.3.197.

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Buckner, Dean, and Peter Smith. "Quotation and the Liar Paradox." Analysis 46, no. 2 (March 1986): 65. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3328172.

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McDonough, Richard. "Sartre's Nausea as Liar Paradox." Philosophy and Literature 44, no. 2 (2020): 461–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/phl.2020.0034.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Liar paradox"

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Eldridge-Smith, Peter, and peter eldridge-smith@anu edu au. "The Liar Paradox and its Relatives." The Australian National University. Faculty of Arts, 2008. http://thesis.anu.edu.au./public/adt-ANU20081016.173200.

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My thesis aims at contributing to classifying the Liar-like paradoxes (and related Truth-teller-like expressions) by clarifying distinctions and relationships between these expressions and arguments. Such a classification is worthwhile, firstly, because it makes some progress towards reducing a potential infinity of versions into a finite classification; secondly, because it identifies a number of new paradoxes, and thirdly and most significantly, because it corrects the historically misplaced distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I emphasize the third result because the distinction made by Peano [1906] and supported by Ramsey [1925] has been used to warrant different responses to the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I find two types among the paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and membership, but the division is shifted from where it has historically been drawn. This new distinction is, I believe, more fundamental than the Peano-Ramsey distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. The distinction I investigate is ultimately exemplified in a difference between the logical principles necessary to prove the Liar and those necessary to prove Grelling’s and Russell’s paradoxes. The difference relates to proofs of the inconsistency of naive truth and satisfaction; in the end, we will have two associated ways of proving each result. ¶ Another principled division is intuitively anticipated. I coin the term 'hypodox' (adj.: 'hypodoxical') for a generalization of Truth-tellers across paradoxes of truth, satisfaction, membership, reference, and where else it may find applicability. I make and investigate a conjecture about paradox and hypodox duality: that each paradox (at least those in the scope of the classification) has a dual hypodox.¶ In my investigation, I focus on paradoxes that might intuitively be thought to be relatives of the Liar paradox, including Grelling’s (which I present as a paradox of satisfaction) and, by analogy with Grelling’s paradox, Russell’s paradox. I extend these into truth-functional and some non-truth-functional variations, beginning with the Epimenides, Curry’s paradox, and similar variations. There are circular and infinite variations, which I relate via lists. In short, I focus on paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and some paradoxes of membership. ¶ Among the new paradoxes, three are notable in advance. The first is a non-truth functional variation on the Epimenides. This helps put the Epimenides on a par with Curry’s as a paradox in its own right and not just a lesser version of the Liar. I find the second paradox by working through truth-functional variants of the paradoxes. This new paradox, call it ‘the ESP’, can be either true or false, but can still be used to prove some other arbitrary statement. The third new paradox is another paradox of satisfaction, distinctly different from Grelling’s paradox. On this basis, I make and investigate the new distinction between two different types of paradox of satisfaction, and map one type back by direct analogy to the Liar, and the other by direct analogy to Russell's paradox.
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Eldridge-Smith, Peter. "The liar paradox and its relatives /." View thesis entry in Australian Digital Theses Program, 2008. http://thesis.anu.edu.au/public/adt-ANU20081016.173200/index.html.

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Oms, Sardans Sergi. "On Common Solutions to the Liar and the Sorites." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/399925.

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In this dissertation I examine some of the most relevant proposals of common solutions to the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to do that, I present first a definition of what a paradox is so that, with this at hand, I can characterize in detail what should we expect from a common solution to a given collection of paradoxes. Next, I look into the reasons we might have to endorse a common solution to a group of paradoxes and some consequences are drawn with respect to Vann McGee's and Graham Priest's proposals to cope with both the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes, In the next chapters, three authors are examined in some detail. First, Jamie Tappenden's account is judged inappropriate, specially in the case of the Liar paradox. With respect to the Sorites, it is showed to be at least as problematic as Supervaluational approaches. Second, Paul Horwich's epistemicist proposal is examined with a special focus on the treatment of the Liar paradox. Horwich's account about how to construct his theory of truth is formalized and critically discussed with the use of a fixed-point construction. In the last chapter, I introduce and discuss some logics based on the work of Hartry Field that use two conditionals in a language with a truth predicate and vague predicates.
En aquesta tesi examino algunes de les propostes mes importants de solució comuna a les paradoxes del Mentider i la Sorites. Per tal de fer-ho, introdueixo, primer, una definició de la noció de paradoxa i, amb ella, caracteritzo en detall que cal esperar d'una solució comuna a un grup de paradoxes. A continuació, considero quines són les raons que podem tenir per tal d'adoptar una solució comuna a una col·lecció de paradoxes i extrec algunes conclusions respecte les propostes de Vann McGee i Graham Priest per fer front al Mentider i la Sorites. En els tres capítols següents, examino tres autors en detall. Primer, rebutjo la proposta de Jamie Tappenden per inapropiada, especialment en el cas del Mentider. Pel que fa a la Sorites, mostro que la teoria que Tappenden defensa es, al menys, tan problemàtica com les propostes superavaluacionistes. En segon lloc, examino la teoria epistemicista de Paul Horwich, amb especial atenció a la seva aplicació al mentider. A traves d'una construcció de punt fixe, formalitzo i discuteixo críticament la proposta de Horwich sabre com construir la seva teoria de la veritat. En l'últim capítol, introdueixo i discuteixo algunes lògiques, basades en les propostes de Hartry Field, que usen dos condicionals en llenguatges amb un predicat de veritat i predicats vagues.
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Li, Dilin. "Can silence be a proper response to the liar paradox?" HKBU Institutional Repository, 2020. https://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_oa/877.

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Many attempts at solving the liar paradox involve either rejecting some principles in classical logic so as to block the argument that leads to the contradiction or modifying the notion of truth so that the liar sentence can be classified as true in one aspect while false in another. However, the prominent approaches based the above strategies may suffer from the revenge problem. That is, while they solve the pristine liar paradox, the introduction of the solution triggers another one with the same structure. In this dissertation, three prominent approaches to the liar paradox are first introduced and examined. In particular, they are, first, the Tarskian hierarchical approach, whose main idea can be roughly characterized as that a natural language is a hierarchy of a series of languages and the liar sentence is true at one level of the hierarchy and is false at another; second, Saul Kripke's paracomplete approach, whose main idea can be roughly characterized as that the liar sentence is ungrounded and has no classical truth value at all; finally, Gupta and Belnep's revision theory of truth, the main idea of which is that truth is a circular concept and that the truth predicate is circularly defined. With a new semantics and logic for circular concept and definition, one can classify the liar sentence as not categorical. Based on two general patterns that give rise to the revenge paradox by Graham Priest, it is shown that none of the above approaches can escape the revenge paradox, at least, not satisfactorily. After the examination of three prominent approaches, I provide an initial characterization of a kind of approach which I call the silence approach. The main idea of the silence approach is that, perhaps what the liar paradox teaches us is that the semantic status of the liar sentence is eventually not classifiable, in the sense that the accepted or correct semantic theory for natural language simply does not apply to the liar sentence. There are two theoretical possibilities that can evoke the failure of classification. Either there is just no semantic category that fits the liar sentence or the necessary principles for the classification do not apply to the sentence. In either case, the silence approach suggests that although the liar sentence could have a semantic status according to the accepted or correct semantic theory, but given that we cannot classify it, we cannot know it. In this dissertation, I do not provide a detailed and well-developed theory of the silence approach. Instead, after the initial characterization of this approach, I go on to introduce and examine two current theories on the liar paradox which I think satisfy at least part of my characterization of the silence approach. The first theory is the semantic epistemicism by Paul Horwich. The second one is what I call exceptional theory, which is given by Thomas Hofweber. The result of the examination is that, both theories can indeed be interpreted as a silence approach. However, although they can block both the pristine liar paradox and the revenge paradox, they suffer severely from the problem of being ad hoc. The current conclusion of this dissertation about the silence approach thus is that, it is possible to construct a silence approach which can block the pristine liar paradox and the revenge, but it is hard to find a rationale for the solution. That is, it is hard to answer the question as to why the liar sentence is not classifiable. Finally, as an overlook to the future development of the silence approach, I suggest that even if we can solve the problem of ad hocness, there remains a question as to whether the incompleteness of classification is a symptom revealing that the accepted semantic theory is defective, or it is a symptom showing that there is just no possible semantic theory that can eventually do the job. Without answering this question, the silence approach still lacks a plausible theoretical ground
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Hassman, Benjamin John. "Semantic objects and paradox: a study of Yablo's omega-liar." Diss., University of Iowa, 2011. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1228.

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To borrow a colorful phrase from Kant, this dissertation offers a prolegomenon to any future semantic theory. The dissertation investigates Yablo's omega-liar paradox and draws the following consequence. Any semantic theory that accepts the existence of semantic objects must face Yablo's paradox. The dissertation endeavors to position Yablo's omega-liar in a role analogous to that which Russell's paradox has for the foundations of mathematics. Russell's paradox showed that if we wed mathematics to sets, then because of the many different possible restrictions available for blocking the paradox, mathematics fractionates. There would be different mathematics. This is intolerable. It is similarly intolerable to have restrictions on the `objects' of Intentionality. Hence, in the light of Yablo's omega-liar, Intentionality cannot be wed to any theory of semantic objects. We ought, therefore, to think of Yablo's paradox as a natural language paradox, and as such we must accept its implications for the semantics of natural language, namely that those entities which are `meanings' (natural or otherwise) must not be construed as objects. To establish our result, Yablo's paradox is examined in light of the criticisms of Priest (and his followers). Priest maintains that Yablo's original omega-liar is flawed in its employment of a Tarski-style T-schema for its truth-predicate. Priest argues that the paradox is not formulable unless it employs a "satisfaction" predicate in place of its truth-predicate. Priest is mistaken. However, it will be shown that the omega-liar paradox depends essentially on the assumption of semantic objects. No formulation of the paradox is possible without this assumption. Given this, the dissertation looks at three different sorts of theories of propositions, and argues that two fail to specify a complete syntax for the Yablo sentences. Purely intensional propositions, however, are able to complete the syntax and thus generate the paradox. In the end, however, the restrictions normally associated with purely intensional propositions begin to look surprisingly like the hierarchies that Yablo sought to avoid with his paradox. The result is that while Yablo's paradox is syntactically formable within systems with formal hierarchies, it is not semantically so.
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Burgis, Benjamin. "Truth is a One-Player Game: A Defense of Monaletheism and Classical Logic." Scholarly Repository, 2011. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_dissertations/677.

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The Liar Paradox and related semantic antinomies seem to challenge our deepest intuitions about language, truth and logic. Many philosophers believe that to solve them, we must give up either classical logic, or the expressive resources of natural language, or even the “naïve theory of truth” (according to which "P" and “it is true that 'P'” always entail each other). A particularly extreme form of radical surgery is proposed by figures like Graham Priest, who argues for “dialetheism”—the position that some contradictions are actually true—on the basis of the paradoxes. While Priest’s willingness to dispense with the Law of Non-Contradiction may be unpopular in contemporary analytic philosophy, figures as significant as Saul Kripke and Hartry Field have argued that, in light of the paradoxes, we can only save Non-Contradiction at the expense of the Law of the Excluded Middle, abandoning classical logic in favor of a “paracomplete” alternative in which P and ~P can simultaneously fail to hold. I believe that we can do better than that, and I argue for a more conservative approach, which retains not only “monaletheism” (the orthodox position that no sentence, either in natural languages or other language, can have more than one truth-value at a time), but the full inferential resources of classical logic.
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Bacon, Andrew Jonathan. "Indeterminacy : an investigation into the Soritical and semantical paradoxes." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b4490a8c-0089-4c77-8d24-1ab1ca5baaf0.

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According to orthodoxy the study of the Soritical and semantical paradoxes belongs to the domain of the philosophy of language. To solve these paradoxes we need to investigate the nature of words like `heap' and `true.' In this thesis I criticise linguistic explanations of the state of ignorance we find ourselves in when confronted with indeterminate cases and develop a classical non-linguistic theory of indeterminacy in its stead. The view places the study of vagueness and indeterminacy squarely in epistemological terms, situating it within a theory of rational propositional attitudes. The resulting view is applied to a number of problems in the philosophy of vagueness and the semantic paradoxes.
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Butler, Jesse. "Circularity and infinite liar-like paradoxes." [Gainesville, Fla.] : University of Florida, 2005. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/UFE0013270.

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Eldridge-Smith, Peter. "The Liar Paradox and its Relatives." Phd thesis, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1885/49284.

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My thesis aims at contributing to classifying the Liar-like paradoxes (and related Truth-teller-like expressions) by clarifying distinctions and relationships between these expressions and arguments. Such a classification is worthwhile, firstly, because it makes some progress towards reducing a potential infinity of versions into a finite classification; secondly, because it identifies a number of new paradoxes, and thirdly and most significantly, because it corrects the historically misplaced distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I emphasize the third result because the distinction made by Peano [1906] and supported by Ramsey [1925] has been used to warrant different responses to the semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. I find two types among the paradoxes of truth, satisfaction and membership, but the division is shifted from where it has historically been drawn. This new distinction is, I believe, more fundamental than the Peano-Ramsey distinction between semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes. The distinction I investigate is ultimately exemplified in a difference between the logical principles necessary to prove the Liar and those necessary to prove Grelling’s and Russell’s paradoxes. The difference relates to proofs of the inconsistency of naive truth and satisfaction; in the end, we will have two associated ways of proving each result. ¶ ...
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Oro, Douglas S. "The liar paradox and bivalence." 1988. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/23959504.html.

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Books on the topic "Liar paradox"

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C, Beall J., ed. Revenge of the liar: New essays on the paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

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Beall, J. C. Spandrels of truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

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Beall, J. C. Spandrels of truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

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Rüstow, Alexander. Der Lügner: Theorie, Geschichte und Auflösung. New York, N.Y: Garland Pub., 1987.

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Danesi, Marcel. The Liar Paradox and the Towers of Hanoi. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2004.

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Gupta, Anil. The revision theory of truth. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1993.

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C, Beall J., ed. Revenge of the liar: New essays on the paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

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C, Beall J., ed. Revenge of the liar: New essays on the paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

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Godart-Wendling, Béatrice. La vérité et le menteur: Les paradoxes sui-falsificateurs et la sémantique des langues naturelles. Paris: Editions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1990.

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Russell, Bertrand. Toward the "Principles of mathematics" 1900-02. London: Routledge, 1993.

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Book chapters on the topic "Liar paradox"

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Inan, Ilhan. "Liar Paradox." In A Referential Theory of Truth and Falsity, 191–205. New York: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003165705-17.

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Huemer, Michael. "The Liar." In Paradox Lost, 17–44. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90490-0_2.

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Visser, Albert. "Semantics and the Liar Paradox." In Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 617–706. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1171-0_10.

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Visser, Albert. "Semantics and the Liar Paradox." In Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 149–240. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0466-3_3.

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Orji, Cyril. "Christianity and the Liar Paradox." In Exploring Theological Paradoxes, 91–118. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003299820-5.

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Burgis, Benjamin Alan. "Logic and the Liar Paradox." In Logic Without Gaps or Gluts, 1–15. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94624-1_1.

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Priest, Graham. "Unstable Solutions to the Liar Paradox." In Self-Reference, 145–75. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3551-8_9.

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Armour-Garb, Bradley, and James A. Woodbridge. "Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox." In Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, 339–54. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9673-6_17.

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Frápolli, María José. "The Liar Paradox (And Other Logico-Semantic Issues)." In The Nature of Truth, 87–109. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4464-6_5.

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Hyde, Dominic. "Are the Sorites and Liar Paradox of a Kind?" In Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications, 349–66. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4438-7_19.

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Conference papers on the topic "Liar paradox"

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Aguiar, Amanda, Marco Ianniruberto, Welitom Borges, Henrique Roig, Gabriela Turquetti, and Paulo de França. "Mapeamento topo-batimétrico de reservatório utilizando LIDAR e batimetria no Lago Paranoá – DF." In International Congress of the Brazilian Geophysical Society&Expogef. Brazilian Geophysical Society, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.22564/16cisbgf2019.267.

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Silva, Luciana Montel Corado da, and Paula Rocio Lucero. "RESTAURAÇÃO DO BEM VIVER: PROTAGONISMO JUVENIL PROPICIA A INCLUSÃO DO MANGUEZAL NO PPP DE UMA ESCOLA EM VILA VELHA, ES." In I Congresso Nacional On-line de Conservação e Educação Ambiental. Revista Multidisciplinar de Educação e Meio Ambiente, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.51189/rema/1720.

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Introdução: Os principais pontos de partida deste trabalho foram os desafios da educação tanto preparar estudantes para enfrentamento à convivência com mudanças climáticas quanto lidar com o paradoxo de atender ao pedido do mercado de formar profissionais ou formar seres humanos para habitar uma Terra viva. Objetivo: Relatar a resposta de estudantes dos 7°, 8° e 9° anos do Ensino Fundamental frente às discussões de problemas ambientais locais após desenvolvimento de autonomia e sentimento de pertencimento. Material e métodos: Foram realizadas mediações de educação e gestão ambiental voltadas para importância dos manguezais, da preservação das matas ciliares e da água, conhecimentos prévios dos alunos, diferentes cosmovisões, pesquisas, rede familiar e a organização de mutirão de limpeza do trecho de floresta de mangue próximo à UMEF Leonel de Moura Brizola, periferia de Vila Velha, ES. Desta forma, esperava-se facilitar o desenvolvimento de um sentimento de integração a natureza e olhar investigativo sobre árvores e águas locais. Resultados: Um grupo de seis educandas propôs incluir o manguezal no Projeto Político Pedagógico (PPP) da Escola, a fim de mobilizar um maior número de pessoas. Devidamente orientadas apresentaram, em diferentes momentos, a importância do PPP e do manguezal e, em seguida, aplicaram enquete para consultar o interesse da comunidade escolar sobre a inclusão do tema manguezal no PPP da Escola. Foram consultadas 415 pessoas entre funcionários da secretaria, limpeza, cozinha, alunos e professores, onde 90% foram a favor dessa inclusão. A realização desta ação fez essas educandas despertarem para importância da participação crítica, ativa e democrática de jovens como agentes de transformação e comunicadores na educação e gestão ambiental. Conclusão: Tendo educandas como agentes ativas da aprendizagem, professoras como mediadoras do conhecimento técnico-científico, a construção de uma relação baseada no respeito e diálogo, o conhecimento prévio de educandas e diferentes “cosmovisões”, foram capazes de gerar percepção crítica do ambiente, seus impactos, responsabilidades e possíveis formas de gestão. O ensino emancipador proporcionou o protagonismo juvenil das alunas envolvidas através da ampliação e aprofundamento da relação íntima com sua Escola e com o planeta Terra como organismo vivo para o Bem Viver.
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