Journal articles: 'Leibniz'

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Liu, Linlin, and Shuanhong Wang. "The construction of Hom-Leibniz H-pseudoalgebras." Filomat 36, no. 8 (2022): 2617–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fil2208617l.

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This paper is devoted to the construction of Hom-Leibniz H-pseudoalgebras, which unify Hom-Lie H-pseudoalgebras, Leibniz H-pseudoalgebras and Hom-Leibniz algebras. Firstly, we give the construction theorem and obtain a class of Hom-Leibniz H-pseudoalgebras. We also construct Hom- Leibniz H-pseudoalgebras from different perspectives, including Leibniz H-pseudoalgebras, Hom-Leibniz (resp. Hom-Lie, Hom-associative) H-pseudoalgebras and their representations, Hom-Leibniz (resp. Homassociative) algebras. Thenwegive some properties of the representations of Hom-LeibnizH-pseudoalgebras. Finally, the annihilation algebras of Hom-Leibniz H-pseudoalgebras are investigated.

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Lodge, Paul. "Leibniz’s Philosophical Dream of Rational and Intuitive Enlightenment." Dialogue and Universalism 32, no. 1 (2022): 203–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du202232112.

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This paper is a new translation and interpretation of the essay by Leibniz which has come to be known as “Leibniz’s Philosophical Dream.” Leibniz used many different literary styles throughout his career, but “Leibniz’s Philosophical Dream” is unique insofar as it combines apparent autobiography with a dreamscape. The content is also somewhat surprising. The essay is reminiscent of Plato, insofar as Leibniz describes a transition from existence in a cave to a more enlightened mode of being outside of it. But, in contrast with the usual identification of Leibniz as a “rationalist,” the mode of being that is valorised involves cognition that is intuitive and supra-rational. The paper begins with the translation followed by an interpretation of the essay. I conclude by considering the ramifications of my interpretation for our conception of Leibniz’s philosophy.

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Garber, Daniel. "Leibniz On Form and Matter." Early Science and Medicine 2, no. 3 (1997): 326–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157338297x00177.

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AbstractThis paper discusses the Aristotelian notions of matter and form as they are treated in the philosophy of Leibniz. The discussion is divided into three parts, corresponding to three periods in Leibniz's development. In the earliest period, as exemplified in a 1669 letter to his former mentor Jakob Thomasius, Leibniz argues that matter and form can be given straightforward interpretations in terms of size and shape, basic categories in the new mechanical philosophy. In Leibniz's middle years, on the other hand, as exemplified in the Discourse on Metaphysics and the correspondence with Arnauld, Leibniz seems to hold a more orthodox Aristotelian view of matter and form as the constituents of the corporeal substances that ground the reality of the physical world. In Leibniz's latest years, as discussed in the letters with Des Bosses, matter and form enter once again in connection with the vinculum substantiale, the substantial bond that is supposed to bind monads together to form corporeal substances.

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Werther, David. "Leibniz and the Possibility of God's Existence." Religious Studies 32, no. 1 (March 1996): 37–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500024057.

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Toward the end of 1676 Leibniz met Spinoza a number of times. In one of those meetings Leibniz presented a proof of the possibility of God's existence. In his proof Leibniz presupposed that a proposition is necessarily true only if its truth is either demonstrable or self-evident and that the divine perfections are simple and affirmative qualities. I contend that Leibniz's presuppositions undermine, rather than establish, the necessary existence of ‘a God of the kind in whom the pious believe’. My assessment is based upon a consideration of Leibniz's argument in the context of other early papers, works written before the Discourse on Metaphysics in 1686.

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ZARIŅŠ, VALTERS. "FREEDOM AS THE MAIN PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY GÜNTHER NEUMANN DER FREIHEITSBEGRIFF BEI GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ UND MARTIN HEIDEGGER. PHILOSOPHISCHE SCHRIFTEN, BAND 9. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2019 ISBN 978-3-428-15537-8 HEIDEGGER UND LEIBNIZ. MIT EINEM GELEITWORT VON FRIEDRICH-WILHELM VON HERRMANN (DAS DENKEN MARTIN HEIDEGGERS II 2 HRSG. VON HANS-CHRISTIAN GÜNTHER). Traugott Bautz Verlag, Nordhausen, 2020 ISBN 978-3-95948-493-0." HORIZON / Fenomenologicheskie issledovanija/ STUDIEN ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE / STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY / ÉTUDES PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIQUES 10, no. 1 (2021): 305–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2021-10-1-305-311.

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Book review focuses on two books by Gunther Neumann, dedicated to the thought of Heidegger and Leibniz. If one of the books deals specifically with the understanding of freedom in both of the two philosophers, then the other one deals more with Heidegger’s three approaches to Leibniz’s thought: (1) Interpretation of Leibniz in the context of the making of fundamental ontology and in Being and Time, as well as the reading of Leibniz after Being and Time; (2) Interpretation of Leibniz during the transition to Ereignis thought; (3) Interpetation of Leibniz in the framework of Ereignis thought. Author’s scrupulous close reading approach allows to show the changes in Heidegger’s approach to Leibniz’s philosophy, as well as sketch out the placement of Leibniz’s great themes on the horizon of Heidegger’s history of the truth of being. Author also shows that from metaphysics there stems a certain view in the modern philosophical discussions oriented on neurosciences—a certain view on the human being and on the freedom of will. On this background Heidegger appears as a thinker who has looked beyond the alloy of metaphysics and sciences, in which the concept of freedom has been greatly restricted. Heidegger manages (thanks to the radical questioning of Being) to turn the view on the problem of freedom, which appears in G. Neumann’s books as the main problem of philosophy—through the contact of Leibniz’s thought and Heidegger’s.

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Krivenko, Ekaterina Yahyaoui. "Space, Law, and Justice in Leibniz: Leibniz as a Theorist of Spatial Justice." Law and History Review 36, no. 4 (September 10, 2018): 891–914. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0738248018000391.

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This article argues that Leibniz should be viewed as a predecessor of the idea of spatial justice and that Leibniz's heritage remains a valuable source for inspiration and critical reading of the contemporary literature on spatial justice. The article first demonstrates interdependency between Leibniz's conceptualisation of space and his conceptualisation of law and justice. This is the first time that this argument is made in relation to Leibniz, therefore significant space is devoted to justifying this argument. The article then proceeds to comparing Leibniz's views on space, law and justice to one of the most “spatial” contemporary articulation of the idea of spatial justice, namely that proposed by Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos. The article concludes by pointing out some aspects of Leibniz's thought that are most valuable for the further study of law, space and spatial justice in contemporary scholarship.

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Solomon, Graham. "Leibniz and Topological Equivalence." Dialogue 32, no. 4 (1993): 721–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300011355.

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Did Leibniz invent or, if you prefer, discover topology with his analysis situs? Yes, urge Nicholas Rescher (1978, p. 70), George MacDonald Ross (1984, p. 29) and Ian Hacking (1984, p. 213). No, urge Hans Freudenthal (1954/1972), Benson Mates (1986, p. 240) and Michael Otte (1989, p. 24). James Alexander (1932/1967, p. 249), drawing a distinction between point set and combinatorial methods, cautiously remarked that combinatorial topology “is more nearly a development of Leibniz's original idea.” Less cautiously, Morris Kline (1972, p. 1163) remarked that “to the extent that he was at all clear, Leibniz envisioned what we now call combinatorial topology.” Louis Couturat (1961, p. 429), Rudolf Carnap (1922, p. 81) and Ernst Cassirer (1950, p. 49) proposed projective geometry as the realization of Leibniz's project. Dennis Martin (1983, p. 5) sees topology as a development from analysis situs. Javier Echeverria (1988, p. 218), reporting on his archival research, argues that Leibniz “successfully introduced very general geometrical notions that boil down to what is known today as topology.” And a good many others, for and against, might be cited.

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Lochmanová, Kateřina. "Jakým relacionalistou byl Leibniz?" Teorie vědy / Theory of Science 41, no. 1 (August 26, 2019): 21–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.46938/tv.2019.407.

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In this paper, I am trying to challenge the mainstream interpretation of Leibniz’s metaphysics of space, introduced in his letters to an English scholar Samuel Clarke. Based on the correspondence with Clarke, Leibniz’s metaphysics of space is usually considered to be a sharp counterpart to Clarke’s as well as Newton’s one. However, in this paper I am pointing out that this interpretation becomes untenable, especially considering Leibniz’s geometry called “analysis situs”. Leibniz did not defend a typically relational conception of space.

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Malek, Abdul. "KEPLER – NEWTON – LEIBNIZ – HEGEL." JOURNAL OF ADVANCES IN PHYSICS 19 (September 15, 2021): 221–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.24297/jap.v19i.9106.

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Kepler’s Laws of planetary motion (following the Copernican revolution in cosmology), according to Leibniz and his follower Hegel, for the first-time in history discovered the keys to what Hegel called the absolute mechanics mediated by dialectical laws, which drives the celestial bodies, in opposition to finite mechanics in terrestrial Nature developed by mathematical and empirical sciences, but that are of very limited scope. Newton wrongly extended and imposed finite mechanics on the absolute mechanics of the cosmic bodies in the form of his Law of one-sided Universal Gravitational Attraction, by distorting and misrepresenting Kepler’s profound laws and in opposition to Leibniz’s more appropriate “Radial Planetary Orbital Equation”. The still-prevailing error by Newton (notwithstanding his well known manipulation of science for selfish ends), not only shows the limitation of mathematical idealism and prejudice driven modern cosmology in the form of Einstein’s theories of relativity; but also, have made gaining positive knowledge of the cosmos an impossibility and has impaired social/historical development of humanity by reinforcing decadent ruling ideas. Hegel’s Naturphilosophie is not only a protest against the misrepresentation of Kepler’s Laws in particular; his Enzyklopädie der Philosophischem Wissenschaften is the negation and the direct rebuttal of Newtonian physics and Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in general. Modern natural science ignores Leibniz and Hegel at its own peril! Kepler’s phenomenological laws of planetary motion and the dialectical insights of Leibnitz and Hegel opens the way for gaining positive knowledge of the dynamics, structure and the evolution of the cosmic bodies and other cosmic phenomena; without invoking mysteries and dark/black cosmic entities, which has been the pabulum of official astrophysics and cosmology so far.

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Nicolás, Juan A. "Hacia un perspectivismo hermenéutico en Leibniz." Estudios: filosofía, historia, letras 19, no. 139 (2021): 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.5347/01856383.0139.000302701.

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There is a long tradition of hermeneutic philosophers who have investigated Leibniz’s philosophy, and also several Leibnizian scholars who have dealt with Heideggerian thought. In this text we propose the thesis that there is a certain convergence between the hermeneutic conception of philosophy (M. Heidegger) and some of Leibniz’s ideas. The result is that there are at least three ideas that, in different formulations, are shared by both philosophers: 1) there is no pure knowledge, knowledge is always circumstantial. This is expressed by Heidegger in the notion of "hermeneutic situation" and by Leibniz with the concept of "notio completa". 2) Heidegger makes a "turn towards facticity" around the notion of "hermeneutic situation". Leibniz also makes a certain "turn towards facticity" concentrated on the notion of "corporeality". This element is not found in Heideggerian thought. 3) Understanding is also self-understanding. For Leibniz development is an unfolding and self-knowledge process of the monadic subject. For Heidegger understanding the world is also a process of self-knowledge of Dasein. Thus Leibniz outlines the "spirit" of hermeneutics in the sense that perspectivism is a form of interpretation.

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Noble, Christopher P. "Immaterial Mechanism in the Mature Leibniz." Idealistic Studies 49, no. 1 (2019): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies201971897.

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Leibniz standardly associates “mechanism” with extended material bodies and their aggregates. In this paper, I identify and analyze a further distinct sense of “mechanism” in Leibniz that extends, by analogy, beyond the domain of material bodies and applies to the operations of immaterial substances such as the monads that serve, for Leibniz, as the metaphysical foundations of physical reality. I argue that in this sense, Leibniz understands “mechanism” as an intelligible process that is capable of providing a sufficient reason for a series of changes. I then apply these findings to enrich our understanding of Leibniz’s well-known mill argument in Monadology ¶17: although material machines and mechanisms cannot produce perceptions, the perceptual activity of immaterial monads is to be understood as “mechanical” according to this analogical sense.

12

Barth, Christian. "Leibniz on Phenomenal Consciousness." Vivarium 52, no. 3-4 (September 11, 2014): 333–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685349-12341280.

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The main aim of this paper is to show that we can extract an elaborate account of phenomenal consciousness from Leibniz’s (1646-1716) writings. Against a prevalent view, which attributes a higher-order reflection account of phenomenal consciousness to Leibniz, it is argued that we should understand Leibniz as holding a first-order conception of it. In this conception, the consciousness aspect of phenomenal consciousness is explained in terms of a specific type of attention. This type of attention, in turn, is accounted for in terms of cognitive appetites aiming at knowledge about a represented object by means of initiating cognitive operations on representational content. Furthermore, against the view that Leibniz holds a reifying account, it is argued that Leibniz accepts an epistemic account of phenomenal character. According to this view, the phenomenal character of phenomenally conscious states rests on the confusing effect of imperfect acts of attention directed towards representational contents. Holding this view, Leibniz finds fruitful middle ground between contemporary standard positions like higher-order theories, representationalist conceptions, and qualia accounts of phenomenal consciousness. His position possesses resources to meet several objections these standard accounts are confronted with.

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Lochmanová, Kateřina. "Inercialita v kontextu Leibnizovy korespondence s Clarkem." Teorie vědy / Theory of Science 42, no. 2 (December 16, 2020): 201–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.46938/tv.2020.482.

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This study deals with a controversy between Leibniz and Clarke concerning the relativity of space. Although substantivalism, i.e. an approach treating space as a substance, is to be indicated as the main target of Leibniz’s attack, it has usually been replaced by Newtonian absolutism instead, as a proper opposition to Leibniz’s relationalism. However, such absolutism has not been defined ontologically, but dynamically, as if the difference between their conceptions consisted of a different approach to the inertiallity of motion. However, this would mean that while Leibniz intended to reduce all motion to an inertial one, Newton reduced it to a noninertial one instead, or that only one of them acknowledged the existence of noninertial motion at all. Nevertheless, none of them actually denied the existence of noninertial motion, and although all motion indeed seemed noninertial to Newton, Leibniz never responded to such a challenge in the course of their correspondence.

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Marques, Edgar. "SOBRE A NECESSIDADE DA LIGAÇÃO DAS MÔNADAS A CORPOS EM LEIBNIZ." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 32, no. 103 (January 12, 2015): 169. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v32n103p169-180/2005.

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Segundo a filosofia de Leibniz, substâncias simples imateriais – as mônadas – são os verdadeiros átomos metafísicos da natureza, possuindo os corpos, em função de serem compostos, um estatuto ontológico derivado e secundário. Entretanto, Leibniz afirma também que as mônadas, apesar de ontologicamente primárias, estão sempre ligadas a corpos. O objetivo do presente artigo é oferecer uma reconstrução conceitual das razões que sus- tentam, no interior da metafísica leibniziana, a tese de que não pode haver que não estejam ligadas a corpos.Abstract: According to Leibniz’s philosophy, simple immaterial substances – monades – are the true metaphysical atoms of nature. Because they are composites, bodies have a secondary ontological status. However, Leibniz also says that athough monades are ontologically primary, they are always bound to bodies. The aim of this paper is to propose a conceptual reconstruction of the reasons that suppport, within Leibniz’s metaphysics, the thesis that all monades are bound to a body.

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Baker, Lynne Rudder. "Was Leibniz Entitled to Possible Worlds?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15, no. 1 (March 1985): 57–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1985.10716409.

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Leibniz has enjoyed a prominent place in the history of thought about possible worlds. I shall argue that on the leading interpretation of Leibniz's account of contingency - an ingenious interpretation with ample textual support - possible worlds may be invoked by Leibniz only on pain of inconsistency. Leibnizian contingency, as reconstructed in detail by Robert C. Sleigh, Jr., will be shown to preclude propositions with different truth-values in different possible worlds.

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Mugnai, Massimo. "Leibniz o la morte di un difensore del "cristianesimo universale"." RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA, no. 1 (February 2012): 141–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/sf2012-001011.

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At death's door, Leibniz firmly refused to see a priest. This seems to be in strong contrast with the central role that he attributes to God in his philosophy and with his explicit acceptance of the Christian religion. Thus, the circumstances surrounding Leibniz's death, as related by some direct and indirect witnesses, provide an opportunity to examine the sincerity of Leibniz's position on religion. The final conclusion is that Leibniz believed in a religion broadly inspired by Christian principles but that he was not a particularly pious believer, which is fully in line with his own kind of ante litteram deism.

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Favaretti Camposampiero, Matteo. "Leibniz’s Appropriation of Spinoza’s Argument against Mind-Body Causation." Leibniz Review 31 (2021): 35–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/leibniz2021313.

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In a 1687 letter to Arnauld, Leibniz draws on an argument against mind-body causation that is reminiscent of one from Spinoza’s Ethics. According to this argument, mind-body causation is impossible because of the lack of proportion between thoughts and motions. This paper aims to shed light on Leibniz’s use of Spinoza’s argument by reconstructing both its internal structure and its development in Leibniz’s later works. In particular, the reconstruction focuses on the new version of this argument that Leibniz adopts against Stahl’s vitalism as well as on the change that this new version reveals in Leibniz’s attitude towards occasionalism. The possible influence of Cordemoy is also taken into consideration. The epistemological and metaphysical issues surrounding this argument are an essential part of the history of Leibniz’s psycho-physical parallelism.

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Feeney, Thomas. "Leibniz’s Early Theodicy and its Unwelcome Implications." Leibniz Review 30 (2020): 1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/leibniz2020301.

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To explain why God is not the author of sin, despite grounding all features of the world, the early Leibniz marginalized the divine will and defined existence as harmony. These moves support each other. It is easier to nearly eliminate the divine will from creation if existence itself is something wholly intelligible, and easier to identify existence with an internal feature of the possibles if the divine will is not responsible for creation. Both moves, however, commit Leibniz to a necessitarianism that is stronger than what prominent interpreters such as Robert Sleigh and Mogens Lærke have found in the early Leibniz, and stronger than the necessitarianism that threatens his later philosophy. I defend this reading of Leibniz and propose that some features of Leibniz’s later metaphysics, including his “striving possibles” doctrine, are an artifact of the effort to rescue the early theodicy from its unwelcome implications.

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Bayuk, Dimitri A., and Olga B. Fedorova. "G.W. Leibniz: Sign and the Problem of Expression." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 57, no. 1 (2020): 146–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202057112.

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The disciplinary differentiation of sciences attracted Leibniz’s attention for a long period of time. From nowadays prospects it looks very well grounded as soon as in Leibniz’s manuscripts a modern scholar finds clue ideas of any research field which would tempt him to consider Leibniz as one of the founders of this particular discipline. We argue that this is possible only in retrospection and would significantly distort the essence of Leibniz’s epistemology. Our approach implies, in contrary, the investigation of the Leibniz doctrine of signs on the background of the related philosophical problem, that of expression. The choice of semiotics is justified by the fact that it took a central place in his theoretical constructions, both those of natural sciences and of philosophy. In Leibniz system of knowledge the concept of notes (notae) and sings (signa) served a theoretical foundation of his most important and long-life aspiration to build up practical science of universal characteristics (characteristica universalis). In his eyes this practical science was the science of sciences (Scientia scientiarum), and we can consider it as the matrix for all possible scientific knowledge.

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Lorczyk, Andrzej. "Inspiracje aksjologii Elzenberga. Monadologia bez Boga." Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 16, no. 4 (December 28, 2021): 95–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1895-8001.16.4.6.

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The absence of references to Leibniz in almost all of Henryk Elzenberg’s writings is surprising, since his first strictly philosophical book was a treatise on Leibniz’s metaphysics. Referring to Elzenberg’s remarks on the sources of his own thinking and its dependence on others, I will aim at finding Leibnizian traces in Elzenberg’s philosophy. By signalling various clues related to Elzenberg’s and Leibniz’s way of philosophizing and community of beliefs, I will try to show that, although at first not obvious, the deepest trace of Leibniz and the work on his metaphysics can be found within Elzenberg’s axiology. I will try to show that Elzenberg’s understanding of perfect value (resp. hypervalue) has its structural roots in Leibniz’s understanding of the monad (resp. requisite).

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Ariew, Roger. "Leibniz On the Unicorn and Various Other Curiosities." Early Science and Medicine 3, no. 4 (1998): 267–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157338298x00068.

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AbstractI discuss some of Leibniz's pronouncements about fringe phenomena__various monsters; talking dogs; genies and prophets; unicorns, glossopetrae, and other games of nature__in order to understand better Leibniz's views on science and the role these curiosities play in his plans for scientific academies and societies. However, given that Leibniz's sincerity has been called into question in twentieth-century secondary literature, I begin with a few historiographical remarks so as to situate these pronouncements within the Leibnizian corpus. What emerges is an image of Leibniz as a sober, cautious interpreter, a skeptic one might say, but one who is prepared to concede the possibility of many strange phenomena. Leibniz expects these fringe phenomena to take their place among the natural curiosities catalogued as part of a hoped for empirical database intended as means toward the perfection of the sciences.

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Palumbo, Margherita. "L’Accademie de Filles de qualité di Luise von Hohenzollern-Hechingen." Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 99, no. 1 (November 1, 2019): 243–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/qufiab-2019-0011.

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Zusammenfassung Luise von Hohenzollern-Hechingen übermittelte Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 1704 einen Plan zur Gründung einer interkonfessionellen Akademie in Deutschland, die sich der Erziehung junger Mädchen katholischer, lutherischer und kalvinistischer Konfession widmen sollte. Sowohl das Dokument als auch Leibnizʼ Antwort an die Fürstin sind im Leibniz-Nachlass der Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek in Hannover nicht mehr erhalten. Im vatikanischen Geheimarchiv findet sich eine Fassung, die Luise vorab an Clemens XI. gesandt hatte; daraus geht ihre eigentliche Absicht hervor, die darin bestand, die „Häretikerinnen“ zum Katholizismus zu bekehren. Diese Initiative war alles andere als bedeutungslos, auch wenn die Kurie ihr ablehnend gegenüberstand. Der Plan gelangte nämlich durch Vermittlung des Lutheraners Anton Ulrich, Herzog von Wolfenbüttel, nach Rom und trug nicht wenig zu den 1709 schließlich erfolgreichen Versuchen bei, den Herzog zu bekehren. Im Anhang finden sich das von Luise übermittelte „Project“ sowie die von der Kurie und dem Kölner Nuntius geführte Korrespondenz.

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MALINK, MARKO, and ANUBAV VASUDEVAN. "THE LOGIC OF LEIBNIZ’S GENERALES INQUISITIONES DE ANALYSI NOTIONUM ET VERITATUM." Review of Symbolic Logic 9, no. 4 (July 18, 2016): 686–751. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020316000137.

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AbstractThe Generales Inquisitiones de Analysi Notionum et Veritatum is Leibniz’s most substantive work in the area of logic. Leibniz’s central aim in this treatise is to develop a symbolic calculus of terms that is capable of underwriting all valid modes of syllogistic and propositional reasoning. The present paper provides a systematic reconstruction of the calculus developed by Leibniz in the Generales Inquisitiones. We investigate the most significant logical features of this calculus and prove that it is both sound and complete with respect to a simple class of enriched Boolean algebras which we call auto-Boolean algebras. Moreover, we show that Leibniz’s calculus can reproduce all the laws of classical propositional logic, thus allowing Leibniz to achieve his goal of reducing propositional reasoning to algebraic reasoning about terms.

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Pąk, Karol. "Leibniz Series for π." Formalized Mathematics 24, no. 4 (December 1, 2016): 275–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/forma-2016-0023.

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Summary In this article we prove the Leibniz series for π which states that $${\pi \over 4} = \sum\limits_{n = 0}^\infty {{{\left( { - 1} \right)^n } \over {2 \cdot n + 1}}.} $$ The formalization follows K. Knopp [8], [1] and [6]. Leibniz’s Series for Pi is item #26 from the “Formalizing 100 Theorems” list maintained by Freek Wiedijk at http://www.cs.ru.nl/F.Wiedijk/100/.

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Ottaviani, Osvaldo. "The Young Leibniz and the Ontological Argument." Journal of Early Modern Studies 10, no. 1 (2021): 47–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jems20211013.

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Leibniz considered the Cartesian version of the ontological argument not as an inconsistent proof but only as an incomplete one: it requires a preliminary proof of possibility to show that the concept of ‘the most perfect being’ involves no contradiction. Leibniz raised this objection to Descartes’s proof already in 1676, then repeated it throughout his entire life. Before 1676, however, he suggested a more substantial objection to the Cartesian argument. I take into account a text written around 1671-72, in which Leibniz considers the Cartesian proof as a paralogism and a petition of principle. I argue that this criticism is modelled on Gassendi’s objections to the Cartesian proof, and that Leibniz’s early rejection of the ontological argument has to be understood in the general context of his early philosophy, which was inspired by nominalist authors, such as Hobbes and Gassendi. Then, I take into account the reconsideration of the ontological argument in a series of texts of 1678, showing how Leibniz implicitly replies to the kind of criticism to the argument he himself shared in his earlier works.

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Yogiswari, Krisna S. "Argumen Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz terhadap Pembuktian Eksistensi Tuhan." Sanjiwani: Jurnal Filsafat 11, no. 1 (July 2, 2020): 93. http://dx.doi.org/10.25078/sjf.v11i1.1536.

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<em>Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz is a German philosopher who provides a comprehensive argument about the existence of God. Although Leibniz has made a mistake in thinking about God, the evidence of God's existence offered by him gives us an example and a strength to deepen our faith: Leibniz's courage is to deepen his faith and his strength to maintain God's existence. Also it seems that with evidence of harmony that had been built before, Leibniz fell into the trap of atheism implicitly because it denied the existence of a personal God and only relied on internal law. Regarding harmony that had been built before, according to Leibniz there was an internal law that worked within the monade. monade so that monades are a natura that has been determined and consequently has only one nature: the nature that governs everything. But the best is that not only for the whole in general, but also for individuals especially especially individuals who have love for God.</em>

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Costantini, Filippo. "Leibniz’s Argument Against Infinite Number." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 22, no. 1 (April 5, 2019): 203–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-02201012.

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This paper deals with Leibniz’s well-known reductio argument against the infinite number. I will show that while the argument is in itself valid, the assumption that Leibniz reduces to absurdity does not play a relevant role. The last paragraph of the paper reformulates the whole Leibnizian argument in plural terms (i.e. by means of a plural logic) to show that it is possible to derive the contradiction that Leibniz uses in his argument even in the absence of the premise that he refutes.

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D'Agostino, Fred, and S. C. Brown. "Leibniz." Philosophical Quarterly 36, no. 142 (January 1986): 95. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219316.

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Becker, Oskar, and Vincent Gérard. "Leibniz." Philosophie N° 136, no. 1 (2018): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/philo.136.0011.

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Heleno, José Manuel. "Leibniz." Intuitio 15, no. 1 (August 5, 2022): e39835. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2022.1.39835.

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De acordo com Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz para compreender as substâncias individuais devemos distanciar-nos e ver a totalidade. De facto, é preciso ver o quadro à distância conveniente para compreender a perfeição da totalidade e da singularidade. A possível saída do labirinto no qual a metafísica nos enredou, estimula o desejo de conhecer tudo e a certeza de que não há duas substâncias iguais. Totalidade e diferença; máxima totalidade e diferença máxima.

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Mugnai, Massimo. "Leibniz." Journal of Philosophy 107, no. 12 (2010): 664–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20101071247.

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Murray, Michael J. "Leibniz." Faith and Philosophy 13, no. 3 (1996): 426–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil199613338.

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Orio de Miguel, Bernardino. "Leibniz." Cultura, Vol. 32 (December 2, 2013): 51–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/cultura.1970.

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Sleigh,, R. C. "Leibniz." Leibniz Society Review 4 (1994): 1–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/leibniz1994410.

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Beeley, Philip. "Leibniz." Leibniz Society Review 5 (1995): 15–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/leibniz1995517.

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Carriero, John, Massimo Mugnai, and Daniel Garber. "Leibniz." Leibniz Society Review 6 (1996): 61–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/leibniz199664.

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Gale, George. "Leibniz." Leibniz Society Review 9 (1999): 87–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/leibniz199992.

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Rozemond, Marleen. "Leibniz." Leibniz Society Review 15 (2005): 155–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/leibniz20051511.

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Look, Brandon C. "Leibniz." Leibniz Society Review 16 (2006): 119–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/leibniz2006169.

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Adams, Robert Merrihew. "Leibniz." Leibniz Society Review 19 (2009): 113–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/leibniz2009197.

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Marshall, Douglas Bertrand. "Leibniz." Leibniz Society Review 21 (2011): 9–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/leibniz2011212.

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Munk, Arthur W. "Leibniz." Idealistic Studies 17, no. 1 (1987): 90–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies198717114.

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Mulvaney, Robert J. "Leibniz." Idealistic Studies 19, no. 1 (1989): 88–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies19891918.

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Zhang, Lu. "Leibniz." International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 215–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2015.1119423.

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Bailhache, Patrice. "Leibniz." Journal of Pragmatics 13, no. 5 (October 1989): 787–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0378-2166(89)90083-0.

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Secundant, Sergii. "Leibniz and Wolf: critical foundations of the idea of scientific revolution in philosophy." Sententiae 40, no. 1 (April 1, 2021): 44–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.31649/sent40.01.044.

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This article reveals the critical content of the idea of scientific revolution in Wolff's philosophy and shows Leibniz's contribution to its formation. Although Wolff's goal was to reform the method of philosophizing on the model of Euclid's geometry, which was based on the Cartesian idea of achieving certainty by clarifying concepts, this clarification Wolff in the sense of Leibniz sees in such an analysis of concepts that would accurately establish a connection between them and show the possibility of the object that expresses this concept. Wolff sees the critical meaning of his method in the fact that by analyzing the concepts to link all concepts and statements into a single system, which was based on consistent grounds and would not contain unproven propositions. This would, according to Wolf, remove from philosophy all the concepts, the objects of which were not possible, and statements that could not be proved. Leibniz's idea of concept analysis also formed the basis of his notion of philosophy as the science of the possible. The critical meaning of this concept of philosophy in Wolff, as in Leibniz, was to limit the subject of philosophy only to the realm of the possible. Although the main critical ideas underlying Wolff's philosophical system were formulated by Leibniz, Wolf's system was still the fruit of his genius. Many of his critical ideas were groundbreaking and had a marked influence on the further development of philosophy. These include, first of all, the requirement to preface the construction of a system of philosophy with research the cognitive abilities of the human mind. However, his attempts to build a universal system of knowledge led to the leveling of the critical content of some of Leibniz's demands, which led to the accusation of him and Leibniz of atheism and fatalism.

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Loday, Jean-louis. "CUP-Product for Leibnitz Cohomology and Dual Leibniz Algebras." MATHEMATICA SCANDINAVICA 77 (December 1, 1995): 189. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/math.scand.a-12560.

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Bender, Sebastian. "Leibniz and the ‘petites réflexions’." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102, no. 4 (November 25, 2020): 619–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/agph-2015-0075.

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AbstractIn this article, I defend the thesis that Leibniz’s rational substances always have higher-order perceptions, even when they are, say, in a dreamless sleep. I argue that without this assumption, Leibniz’s conception of reflection would introduce discontinuities into his philosophy of mind which (given his Principle of Continuity) he cannot allow. This interpretation does not imply, however, that rational beings must be aware of these higher-order states at all times. In fact, these states are often unconscious or ‘small’ (analogous to Leibniz’s famous petites perceptions) and only count as reflections when they become distinct or heightened enough. Reflections thus arise out of ‘petites réflexions’ just as conscious perceptions arise out of petites perceptions. I argue, furthermore, that an analysis of some aspects of Leibniz’s theory of memory shows that he is not only committed to the thesis that rational beings always have higher-order states but that he also accepts it. I conclude by considering whether my interpretation is at odds with Leibniz’s doctrine of transcreation and also whether it has any consequences for which theory of consciousness we should ascribe to Leibniz.

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MORAR, FLORIN-STEFAN. "Reinventing machines: the transmission history of the Leibniz calculator." British Journal for the History of Science 48, no. 1 (July 14, 2014): 123–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007087414000429.

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AbstractThis paper argues that we should take into account the process of historical transmission to enrich our understanding of material culture. More specifically, I want to show how the rewriting of history and the invention of tradition impact material objects and our beliefs about them. I focus here on the transmission history of the mechanical calculator invented by the German savant Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Leibniz repeatedly described his machine as functional and wonderfully useful, but in reality it was never finished and didn't fully work. Its internal structure also remained unknown. In 1879, however, the machine re-emerged and was reinvented as the origin of all later calculating machines based on the stepped drum, to protect the priority of the German Leibniz against the Frenchman Thomas de Colmar as the father of mechanical calculation. The calculator was later replicated to demonstrate that it could function ‘after all’, in an effort to deepen this narrative and further enhance Leibniz's computing acumen.

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Miles, Murray. "Leibniz on Apperception and Animal Souls." Dialogue 33, no. 4 (1994): 701–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300010787.

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InLeibniz: Perception, Apperception, and Thought, Robert McRae alleges a flat “contradiction” (McRae 1976, p. 30) at the heart of Leibniz's doctrine of three grades of monads: bare entelechies characterized by perception; animal souls capable both of perception and of sensation; and rational souls, minds or spirits endowed not only with capacities for perception and sensation but also with consciousness of self or what Leibniz calls (introducing a new term of art into the vocabulary of philosophy) “apperception.” Apperception is a necessary condition of those distinctively human mental processes associated with understanding and with reason. Insofar as it is also a sufficient condition of rationality, it is not ascribable to animals. But apperception is a necessary condition of sensation or feeling as well; and animals are capable of sensation, according to Leibniz, who decisively rejected the Cartesian doctrine that beasts are nothing but material automata. “On the one hand,” writes McRae, “what distinguishes animals from lower forms of life is sensation or feeling, but on the other hand apperception is a necessary condition of sensation, and apperception distinguishes human beings from animals” (McRae 1976, p. 30). “We are thus left with an unresolved inconsistency in Leibniz's account of sensation, so far as sensation is attributable both to men and animals” (ibid., p. 34).

Journal articles on the topic 'Leibniz'

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