Journal articles on the topic 'Legitimate Authority (Weber)'

Key elements of John Searle’s articulation of the Standard Model of Social Ontology can be found within Max Weber’s ideal type of legal-rational authority. However, the fact that, for Weber, legal-rational authority is just one of three types of legitimate authority, along with traditional and charismatic authority, suggests limitations to the Standard Model’s scope of applicability. Where Searle takes himself to have provided an account of “the structure of human civilization,” Weber’s taxonomy suggests that Searle has only given us an account of a way of being a civilization. This understanding of traditional authority also reveals why the Standard Model misconstrues the structure of ordinary, informal statuses, such as friendship.

It is worthwhile debating the meaning of concepts only when they start to hinder the process of inquiry. This seems to be the case with Max Weber's concepts of legitimacy and legitimate authority. They are becoming increasingly popular among students of Soviet-type societies despite the numerous problems posed by their application in a socio-political context that is so different from the one Weber had in mind. This increased popularity results in a ‘conceptual stretch’. More importantly, it increases the danger of a serious misinterpretation of socio-political processes in Soviet-type societies because, as will be argued in this article, the concept of legitimacy is not appropriate for the analysis of mass compliance in such societies. Instead, the persistence of (relatively) stable social and political order in these societies, as well as the occurrences of mass dissent, may be better accounted for in terms of ‘conditional tolerance’. In order to demonstrate the utility of this concept, and to show the problematic nature of accounts in terms of legitimacy and legitimate authority, it is necessary to start with a brief reprise of Weber's conceptual scheme.

Abstract Max Weber proposed three types of legitimate authority: charismatic, traditional and rational-legal. Roughly at the same time, the Chinese scholar Liang Qichao, fully aware of the strong link between ethics and politics in ancient China, put forward the concept of “ethics-politics”, which launched a major debate. None of Weber’s three types of legitimate authority is applicable to the ancient Chinese model of “ethics-politics”, and “ethics-politics” should be considered and explored as a fourth type of legitimate authority. This article gives an outline of the historical origins of “ethics-politics” as well as the principles that gave rise to the concept. Then it cites pre-Qin Confucianism, particularly the thoughts of Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, to exemplify the legitimate authority of “ethics-politics” from five aspects: (1) inwardly being a sage and outwardly being a king; (2) rule of the man of virtue, viz. “to govern by virtue” and “rule by rites” or “rule of rites”; (3) benevolence as the core value; (4) everyone should become good as the goal of government; (5) Heaven/Tian as the supreme divinity.

ResumenEste artículo desarrolla, en tres pasos, una perspectiva original de la teoría de la dominación de Max Weber. El primer paso establece un vínculo necesario entre las formas típicas de dominación política y los intereses sociales, de modo que toda acción política debe legitimarse ante el interés general. El segundo paso explica las crisis de legitimación como una respuesta a cambios de identidad en la base social de la dominación política, de tal forma que se introduce un concepto dinámico de legitimidad. El tercer paso establece que los valores que habitan en las formas legitimas de dominación política son usados como orientaciones simbólicas por parte de intereses sociales y acciones políticas particulares, de manera que toda forma de legitimación de la autoridad encierra, en sus propias premisas, los argumentos que justifican luchas políticas hacia la modificación de los esquemas de dominación.Palabras clave: legitimidad, dominación, acción política, democratización.Abstract This article develops, in three steps, an orignal perspective of Weber’s legitimacy theory. The first one, establishes a necessary link that exists between the typical forms of legitimate domination and the social interests, in such a way that every political action that purse the realization of its interests has to legitimate itself before the general will. The second explains the legitimation crises as a response to indentity changes at the social base of the political domination and, in so doing, it introduces a dinamic concept of legitimacy. The third step states that the values that dwell in legitimate forms of political domination are used as symbolic orientations by particular social intersts and political actions, in a way that each form of authority legitimation encapsulate, in its own premises, the arguments that justify political struggles aiming toward the modification of the domination schemes.Key words: legitimacy, domination, political action, democratization.

ResumenEste artículo desarrolla, en tres pasos, una perspectiva original de la teoría de la dominación de Max Weber. El primer paso establece un vínculo necesario entre las formas típicas de dominación política y los intereses sociales, de modo que toda acción política debe legitimarse ante el interés general. El segundo paso explica las crisis de legitimación como una respuesta a cambios de identidad en la base social de la dominación política, de tal forma que se introduce un concepto dinámico de legitimidad. El tercer paso establece que los valores que habitan en las formas legitimas de dominación política son usados como orientaciones simbólicas por parte de intereses sociales y acciones políticas particulares, de manera que toda forma de legitimación de la autoridad encierra, en sus propias premisas, los argumentos que justifican luchas políticas hacia la modificación de los esquemas de dominación.Palabras clave: legitimidad, dominación, acción política, democratización.Abstract This article develops, in three steps, an orignal perspective of Weber’s legitimacy theory. The first one, establishes a necessary link that exists between the typical forms of legitimate domination and the social interests, in such a way that every political action that purse the realization of its interests has to legitimate itself before the general will. The second explains the legitimation crises as a response to indentity changes at the social base of the political domination and, in so doing, it introduces a dinamic concept of legitimacy. The third step states that the values that dwell in legitimate forms of political domination are used as symbolic orientations by particular social intersts and political actions, in a way that each form of authority legitimation encapsulate, in its own premises, the arguments that justify political struggles aiming toward the modification of the domination schemes.Key words: legitimacy, domination, political action, democratization.

“[I]f a system of rules is to be imposed by force on any, there must be a sufficient number who accept it voluntarily. Without their voluntary co-operation, thus creating authority, the coercive power of law and government cannot be established” 1 – H.L.A. Hart “For a domination...justification of its legitimacy is much more than a matter of a theoretical or philosophical speculation; it rather constitutes the basis of very real differences in the empirical structure of domination. The reason for this fact lies in the generally observable need of any power, or even of any advantage of life, to justify itself.”2 – Max Weber I. Introduction In the above quotes, Hart and Weber both point to a requisite element that all nation states share in their quest to maintain a stable order. To appear legitimate, a state must represent itself in a way that is palatable to its citizens. Put differently, a state must convince its populace that the power it wields is rightly wielded. If the majority of its citizens do not accept the legitimacy of the state, then the very stability of the state is undermined; generally, it is only a matter of time before this state is overthrown or reconfigured in a fashion agreeable to the citizenry.3 This issue of legitimacy forms the basis of this study. With a focus on Canada, the following will consider a means by which legitimate status is presented and maintained by the state. 1 H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) at 201 [Hart]. 2 Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society. Trans. Edward Shils (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969) at 335 [Weber]. It is important to note that Weber devotes a significant amount of discussion to the definition of ‘domination’. Broadly speaking, Weber states, “in our terminology domination shall be identical with authoritarian power of command. To be more specific, domination will thus mean the situation in which: The manifested will (command) of the ruler or rulers is meant to influence the conduct of one or more others (the ruled) and actually does influence it in such a way that their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake” (Weber at 328). 3 Hart, supra note 1 at 201.

Hierarchy is a persistent feature of international politics. Existing accounts recognize that there are many ways in which actors can stand in relation to one another. Yet they struggle to make sense of this complexity. This study considers Max Weber’s contribution to understanding international hierarchy. It discusses three ideal types of stratification based on the distribution of capabilities (class), estimations of honor and prestige (status), and command relationships (authority). Following the neo-Weberian approach, these dimensions matter because they make social action intelligible. Furthermore, Weber clarifies how class and status are connected and how these two dimensions relate to authority through the process of ‘social closure’. The study concludes that scholars who focus exclusively on authority structures miss the fact that authority typically derives from other forms of stratification: although based on different logics of social stratification, class and status hierarchies often coalesce into (legitimate) authority.

Abstract:Current usages of the terms patrimonial and neopatrimonial in the context of Africa are conceptually problematical and amount to a serious misreading of Weber. His use of the term patrimonial delineated a legitimate type of authority, not a type of regime, and included notions of reciprocity and voluntary compliance between rulers and the ruled. Those reciprocities enabled subjects to check the actions of rulers, which most analyses of (neo) patrimonialism overlook. We apply these insights to a case study of Botswana and suggest that scholars reconsider the application of Weber's concepts to African states.

The majority of interpretations of social authority is based upon its definition by M. Weber as an opportunity to exercise one’s will even against the will of other persons. In this context the authority constitutes a capacity of an individual or a community of people to force others (own members) to a certain type of conduct. In the primitive society the authority was natural, direct and detached neither from anindividual nor from a team, in general. The appropriation and xercise of authority was “interwoven” in daily activities of people and the observance (collective subordination to) of certain rules of conduct was ultimately essential for survival and thus natural and indisputable. The development of production activities of an individual and its sociality, in broad terms, led to the division of labor, inter alia, to segregation of the ruling and managerial activities and the consequent isolation of private and public areas of activity of an individual, attribution of the degree of publicity to social authority. Public authority is institutionalized authority; it is appropriated by artificial ways developed by the society and exercised through specially designated persons for these purposes (established entities) within the framework of the set procedures based on the territorial principle. Public authority is universal; it extends to all society members and to the entire area of their public activities. Once emerged in a socially stratified society, public authority inevitably acquires political nature – it is aimed at streamlining relationships between various groups and layers of the society and alignment (delineation, suppression) of their interests. This particular comprehension of public political authority underpins various definitions of the state which basically come down to the most efficient (sovereign) as well as (in a set of conceptions) proper (fair, legitimate, legal etc.) form of its organization.

We propose a typology of forms of legitimacy of authority in the university, based on the well-known classification by Max Weber of the forms of political authority based on the types to legitimacy typically invoked by those in a position of authority. This framework is adapted and expanded to the field of university governance taking into consideration the specialized literature on models of governance in higher education, and with the aid of data obtained from interviews of former university leaders with whom we discussed their experiences as university officials. Our typology consists of six forms of legitimacy: traditional, which distinguishes two forms, academic and administrative; rational-bureaucratic, which also has two modalities, managerial and legalistic, and finally, the political and charismatic forms. To stress the differences across these types of legitimacy, and try out a possible translation of them into designs amenable to empirical research, we also present an operationalization of the typology into variables and hypotheses.

Most political science interpretations of the post-2010 Orbán regime have been written either within the framework of populism or in the democratization paradigm. We have learned much from these papers about Hungary’s drift in an authoritarian direction, but they also have drawbacks. This article aims to fill the gap between these two approaches and offers a theoretical framework to analyze the impact of populism and other trends of contemporary politics (like de-alignment, growing electoral volatility, citizens’ disengagement, personalization, legitimacy problems, the decline of party membership and partisanship, the mediatization of politics, etc.) on the political regime. It argues that these trends add up to an authority and regime type that can be conceptualized by Weber’s concept of plebiscitary leader democracy (PLD). PLD forms a new hybrid regime type that differs from comparative authoritarianism and other hybrid regime types known from the literature in three respects. First, PLD is less about institutional framework and procedures than about the sources of legitimacy; second, it serves better to understand how the regime works than measuring its distance from liberal democracy; third, it is an ideal type that aims to reveal the endogenous logic of democracy that generates authoritarian elements of the regime. The article also demonstrates the suitability of the concept of PLD for empirical research through presenting a structured case study of the Orbán regime. The PLD model enables us to reveal the endogenous logic of the Orbán regime and the impact of populist governance on it.

AbstractSince the 1990s, the concept of ‘state-building’ has become the means by which intervenors have attempted to tackle ‘state failure/fragility’. The ‘ideal’ referred to when attempting to do this – both theoretically and in practice – has been that of the classic ‘nation-state’ as developed by Max Weber. To answer the question posed by the title above, the article first looks generally at the evolution of the current state-building paradigm and global governance discourse. Second, a background of historical attempts at state-building in Afghanistan is given. Third, an assessment is made of the international community's approach to Afghanistan since 2001. Finally, the appropriateness of replicating a Weberian state-building model onto more traditional societies such as Afghanistan – where modes of governance and authority are often informal, complex, and characterized by historical and charismatic sources of legitimacy – is addressed. Until now, such contexts have barely been acknowledged, still less understood, by intervenors. Today, however, some academics are beginning to outline an alternative response to state fragility, recognizing more traditional sources of legitimacy and a hybridity of political order.

Resumen: El presente artículo se encuentra dividido en cinco apartados que permiten que su lectura y comprensión sea mucho más amigable. Es interesante y entender que el tema del terrorismo es un tema de naturaleza dinámica y cambiante, en el artículo se estudiara los diferentes tipos de terrorismo que existe y el impacto que ha tenido en el establecimiento de los estados de seguridad pública, así como la afectación a los derechos humanos de las personas y los regímenes jurídicos en los cuales se tipifica esta figura. Abstract: This article is divides into five sections that allow its reading and understanding to be much more user-friendly. It is interesting to understand that the issue of terrorism is a dynamic and changing issue, the article will study the different types of terrorism that exist and the impact it has had on the establishment of states of publica security as well as the impact to the human rights of persons and the legal regimes in which this figure is typified. Fuentes de consulta: Arendt H. (2006) Sobre la revolución, Madrid: Alianza. Báez Corona, J. F. (2015). El realismo mágico jurídico (recreación legal de una ficción literaria con especial referencia a Latinoamérica). Justicia. (28), 15-31. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.17081/just.20.28.1032 Báez, J. (2021). Tradición contra innovación en los modelos de formación jurídica universitaria en México. Revista de Derecho. (56). 137-153. https://dx.doi.org/10.14482/dere.56.340 Bakke E. (2015) Terrorism and Conterterrorism studies, comparing theory and practice, Netherlands, Leiden University Press. Bobbio N. (2004) Estado, Gobierno y Sociedad por una teoría general de la política, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica. Caillois R. (1973) La cuesta de la guerra (trad.) Rufina Bórquez, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica. Coteño Muñoz A. (2018) “Terrorismo individual los atentados perpetrados por actores solitarios” Eunomía. Revista en Cultura de la Legalidad, número 15 Madrid, Universidad Carlos III. Donner, F. (2007) “Fight for God- But Do So with Kindness: Reflections on War, Peace, and Communal Identity in Early Islam”. In War and Peace in the Ancient World, Oxford. Blackwell. Durham M. (2000) The Christian right, the far right and the Boundaries of American Conservatism. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Dworkin R, (2013) “Foreword”, in Extreme Speech and Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Essig, C. (2001). Terrorism: Criminal Act of Act of War? Implications for National Security in the 21st Century. Pennsylvania: US Army War College. Foucault, M. (2009) Historia de la sexualidad 1. La voluntad de saber, México, Siglo XXI. Friedman B, H., Harper J, Preble C. (2010) Terrorizing ourselves. Why U.S. Counterterrorism Policy is Failing and How to Fix It. Washington D.C. Instituto Cato. Gallego, C. (2012). El concepto de seguridad jurídica en el Estado social. Revistas jurídicas. Vol 2, Núm 9, Recuperado de http://juridicas.ucaldas.edu.co/downloads/Juridicas9(2)_6.pdf Griset, P. L., Mahan, S. (2003) Terrorism in perspective, United States of America. Sage Publications Inc. González Calleja, E. (2013). El Laboratorio del Miedo, Madrid, Crítica. Habermas J. (1998) Derechos humanos y soberanía popular. Las versiones liberal y republicana, en Rafael del Águila, Fernando Val, Madrid, Alianza Habermas J. (1994) La desobediencia civil, piedra de toque del Estado democrático de Derecho, en Ensayos políticos, Barcelona, Península. Heydar S. (2017) Islamic Peace Ethics. Legitimate and Illegitimate Violence in Contemporary Islamic Thought. United States of America, Baden-Baden: NomosAschendorff Verlag. Hoffman B., Howard R. (2011) Terrorism and counterterrorism: Understandin the new security environment readings and interpretations: 4a eth, United States of America, Mcgraw-Hill. Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. Jackson, R, et al., (2011) Terrorism. A Critical Introduction, New York, Palgrave Macmillian Jassies N. (2009) Mrinus Van Der Lubbe y el incendio del Reichstag. Trad., García Velasco C., España, Editorial Alikornio. Jellinek G (1954) Teoría Geenral de los Estados. Trad. Fernando de los Ríos. Buenos Aires, ed. Albatroz. Jenkins, B.M. (1975), "International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict", in Garitón D, y Schaerf C. Internactional Terrorism and World Security, Londres, Cromm Helm. Johnston, T. D. (1981). Selective costs and benefits in the evolution of learning. En J. S. Rosenblatt, R .A. Hinde, C. Beer y M. C. Busnel (Eds.). Advances of the study of behavior. New York: Academic Press Kilpatrick J (2020) Quand un état d’urgence temporarire devient permanent, le cas de la France. París, Transnational Institute. Khadduri, M. (1955) War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press. Kyrou, A. (2012). L’imaginaire des Anonymous, des luddites à V pour Vendetta. París Folis esssays Lasoen, K. (2018). “War of Nerves: The Domestic Terror Threat and the Belgian Army”. In Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 42, no. 11. Le Goff J. (1984) La Civilisation d l’occident médiéval, París, Foils Essay. Lillich, B. R. (1985) Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 79, No. 4 Locke J. (1997), Segundo tratado sobre el gobierno civil, Madrid, Alianza. Loubet Del Bayle, J. L. (1992) La Police. Approche socio-politique. Paris, Montchrestien. Luhmann, N. (2005) El derecho de la sociedad, 2a ed., México, Herder, Universidad Iberoamericana. Majoran, A. (2015). The illusion of war: Is terrorism a criminal act or an act of war? International Politics Reviews, Vol.3 Issue 1 Martin J-C, (2006) Les règles internationales relatives à la lutte contre le terrorismo. París, edición Bruylant. Nateras González M, E. (2018) Colombia Las autodefensas en Michoacán, México: ¿rescate de la ciudadanía ante la violencia? Revista Opinión Jurídica, Universidad de Medellín, Vol. 17, Núm. 33 Placido A. P., y Perkins L K. (2010) Drug Trafficking violence in México implications for the United States. Washington D.C. U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control Departmente of Justice Poczynok, I. (2019). Fuerzas armadas y contraterrorismo. Apuntes para renovar un “debate crónico” en la Argentina. Revista Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia Y Seguridad, vol. 2, Núm. 14 Poland J. (2004) Understanding Terrorism: Groups, Strategies and responses. New York. Pretince Hall. Rawls J (1999) La justificación de la desobediencia civil, en Justicia como equidad. Materiales para una teoría de la justicia, Madrid, Tecnos. Reinares, F y García-Calvo, C. (2016) Estado Islámico en España. Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano. Rivas, P., y Rey, P. (2008) Las autodefensas y el paramilitarismo en Colombia (1964-2003), Bogotá, CON Fines. Rapoport, D. (2004). “The four waves of modern terrorism”. En Audrey, C. y James, L. Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. Washington D.C. George town University Press Rodley N. (1985) International Human Rights Law, dans Evans, M. D, International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Reitberger M (2013) “License to kill: is legitimate authority a requirement for just war? in International Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 5, Issue 1. Robespierre Maximilien (2005) Por la felicidad y por la libertad, discursos. España, El viejo topo. Rousseau J. J., (2013) Discurso sobre el origen y fundamento de la desigualdad entre los hombres, Madrid, Calpe. Tinnes J. (2020) Bibliography: Defining and Conceptualizing Terrorism Compiled PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 14, Issue 6, The Netherlands Universiteit Leiden. recuperado de https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism/archives/2020#volume-xiv-issue-6 Toboso Buezo M. (2020) Colección Segmentos de Seguridad Terrorismo y antiterrorismo. España. Institut de Seguretat Pública de Catalunya.. Saint Thomas Aquinas (2003) On law, morality and Politics, translated by Regan Richard United States of America, Hackett publishing company. Sinai, J. (2008) “How to Define Terrorism”, Perspectives on Terrorism, Journal of the Terrorism Research Initiative and the Center for Terrorism and Security Studies, The Netherlands, Universiteit Leiden, Vol. 2, No.4, recuperado de http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/33/html Skinner, B. F. (1953) Science and human behavior. New York, The Macmillan Company. United States Department of State. (2004) Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. Valadés D. (1974) La dictadura constitucional en América Latina, México, UNAM. Walther T C., Höhn A., (2020) El ejército alemán y sus graves problemas con la ultraderecha. DW noticiero recuperado de https://www.dw.com/es/el-ej%C3%A9rcito-alem%C3%A1n-y-sus-graves-problemas-con-la-ultraderecha/a-54044495 Wallace, D. (2008). Combatiendo el terrorismo bajo las leyes de la guerra. Military Review Hispan-American, Vol. 88, Issue 2 Weber M. (1986) El político y el científico. (trad) Francisco Rubio Llorente, Madrid, Alianza Editorial.

AbstractMax Weber’s typology of legitimate ‘Herrschaft’ has provided the basis for the treatment of legitimacy in twentieth century sociology and political science. The thesis of the article is that this typology is a misleading tool for the analysis of the modern state, and especially for the comparative analysis of political systems. This is because of basic flaws in Weber’s conceptualisation of legitimacy itself, and in his account of the normative basis of authority. The article offers an alternative, multi-dimensional, account of political legitimacy, and suggests how it might be used to develop a typology of forms of ‘Herrschaft’ more appropriate to the analysis of the modern state.

Managerialism and legitimate authority: A Weberian perspective on the coherence of legitimate rulership Managerialism is one of the most prominent doctrines that have challenged the traditional model of governance in public administration in recent years. This article presents an alternative frame of reference for making sense of the socio-political implications of managerialism, based on the theory of types of authority articulated by Weber (2019) as part of his investigation into the structures and processes of legitimate rulership. It is argued that central to the study of legitimate authority is a consideration of the internal coherence among the elements of the emergent type of rulership. Emphasizing the congruence helps better understand why some ways of legitimization succeed in achieving an orderly state of power, and why others fail at achieving authority. The approach is illustrated by a case study of processes related to the constitution of legitimate rulership in a government

ZusammenfassungWie reproduziert sich Legitimitätsgeltung in der Alltagspraxis hierarchischer Führung? Diese Frage wird erörtert in einer interaktionstheoretischen Erweiterung der HerrschaftssoziologieMax Webers und der neo-institutionalistischen Organisationstheorie. Das Dilemma von Verfügung und Aushandlung in bürokratischen Führungsbeziehungen impliziert das Kommunikationsproblem, die Gültigkeit hierarchischer Verfügungsrechte zu klären, ohne Aushandlungserfordernisse zu beeinträchtigen. Mit Kategorien der Interaktionsanalyse von Erving Goffman wird ein nonverbal kommuniziertes Interaktionsschema bestimmt, in welchem die Herrschaftsgrundlagen symbolisch repräsentiert sind. Für die bürokratische Hierarchie wird das Alternationsschema von Anordnung und Erledigung als ritualisiertes Strukturmuster rekonstruiert, mit welchem sich Vorgesetzte und Untergebene die Gültigkeit der Herrschaftsordnung wechselseitig anzeigen. Fallbeispiele aus der betrieblichen Führungspraxis veranschaulichen, wie sich diese latente Alternationsstruktur in komplementärem Dominanz- und Fügsamkeitsgebaren konstituiert.

The term anti-politics has been used in recent years as never before. However, the concept is used to describe political phenomena and actors that appear at first sight to be mutually exclusive. Starting from the difficulties in defining anti-politics, the main goal of the article is to elucidate its intellectual roots, showing that it is a kind of shadow of modern politics, mirroring its many forms. From an examination of Thomas Hobbes’ political philosophy, it will be shown that anti-politics was born at a moment when politics was no longer seen as a natural condition of social life, but an artificial construct that can be dismantled and reassembled. By no means coincidentally, the main manifestations of anti-politics are nothing but the radical and destructive reinterpretation of what Max Weber identifies as the three “inner justifications” of political authority (i.e. tradition, charisma, competence). Although Weber lays down those principles as underpinning political authority in ancient and modern times, the contention of this article is that they can only be used to deny the legitimacy of politics once this comes to be seen as an artifice that can be taken to pieces and put together again: in short, in the modern era.

It’s a cool autumn morning and I am grateful for the sun as it warms the wet concrete. I have been told we will be spending some time outside later, so I am hopeful it will remain sunny. When everyone arrives, we go directly to the principal’s office. Once inside, someone points at the PA system. People pull out their cameras and take a quick photo—we were told the PA system in each school can be different so information about the broadcasting mechanism could be helpful in an emergency. I decide to take a photo as well. Figure 1: PA system inside the principal's office (Photo by Michelle Stewart) The principal joins us and we begin the task of moving through the school: a principal, two plain clothes police officers, two uniformed police officers, two police volunteers and an anthropologist researcher. Our goal is to document the entire school for a police program called School Action For Emergencies (SAFE) that seeks to create emergency plans for each school on a national Canadian police database. It is a massive undertaking to collect the data necessary to create the interactive maps of each school. We were told that potential hiding spaces were one focus alongside the general layout of the school; the other focus is thinking about potential response routes and staging for emergency responders. We snap photos based on our morning training. Broom closets and cubbyholes are now potential hiding spots that must be documented with a photo and narrated with a strategy. Misplaced items present their own challenges. A large gym mattress stored under the stairs. The principal comments that the mattress needs to be returned to the gym; a volunteer crouches down and takes a picture in the event that it remains permanently and creates a potential hiding spot. Figure 2: Documenting gym mat in hallway/potential hiding spot (Photo by Michelle Stewart) We emerge from the school, take a photo of the door, and enter the schoolyard. We move along the fence line: some individuals take notes about the physical characteristics of the property, others jot down the height of the retaining wall, still others take photos of the neighboring properties. Everyone is taking notes, taking photos, or comparing notes and photos. Soon we will be back at the police station for the larger project of harmonizing all the data into a massive mapping database. Locating the State in Its Objects Focusing on a Canadian police program called School Action for Emergency (SAFE), this article discusses the material labour practices required to create a virtual object—an augmented map. This mapping program provides a venue through which to consider the ways augmented objects come into the world. In this article, I discuss the labour practices necessary to create this map and then illustrate how labour practices are erased as part of this production and consumption of an augmented technology meant to facilitate an effective emergency response. In so doing, I will also discuss the production of authority and expertise through deployment of these police aids. As someone concerned with the ways in which the state instantiates itself into the lives of its subjects, I look at the particular enrollment practices of citizen and state agents as part of statecraft (Stewart). From Weber we are told about the role of police as they relate to state power, “state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Note that 'territory' is one of the characteristics of the state. Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it” (Weber, 34 my emphasis). I would argue that part of this monopoly involves cultivating citizen consent; that the subordination of citizens is equally important to police power as is the state’s permission to act. One way citizen consent is cultivated is through the performance of expertise such that subjects agree to give police power because police appear to be experts. Seen this way, police aids can be critical in cultivating this type of consent through the appearance of police as experts when they appear all knowing; what is often forgotten are the workers and aids that support that appearance (think here of dispatchers and databases). Becoming SAFE The SAFE project is an initiative of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the national police force in Canada. The goal of the program is to “certify” every school in the country, meaning each school will have documentation of the school that has been uploaded into the SAFE computer program. As illustrated in the introduction, this is a time-consuming process requiring not only photos and other data be collected but also all of this data and material be uploaded into the RCMP’s centralized computer program. The desired effect is that each school will have a SAFE program so police and dispatchers can access this massive collection of the data in the event of an emergency. During my time conducting research with the RCMP, I attended training sessions with John, a young corporal in the national police force. One of John’s duties was to coordinate the certification of the SAFE program that included training sessions. The program was initiated in 2007, and within one year, the province we were working in began the process of certifying approximately 850 of its 1700 schools; it had completed over 170 schools and identified 180 local SAFE coordinators. In that first year alone over 23,000 photos had been uploaded and 2,800 school layouts were available. In short, SAFE was a data heavy, labour-intensive process and one of John’s jobs was to visit police stations to get them started certifying local schools. Certification requires that at least one police officer be involved in the documentation of the school (photos and notes). After all the data is collected it must be articulated into the computer program through prompts that allow for photos and narratives to be uploaded. In the session described in the introduction, John worked with a group of local police and police auxiliaries (volunteers). The session started with a short Power Point presentation that included information about recent school tragedies, an audio clip from Columbine that detailed the final moments of a victim as she hid from killers, and then a practical, hands-on engagement with the computer software. Prior to leaving for on-site data collection, John had the trainees open the computer program to become familiar with the screens and prompts. He highlighted the program was user-friendly, and that any mistake made could be corrected. He focused on instilling interest before leaving for the school to collect data. During this on-site visit, as I trailed behind the participants, I was fascinated by one particularly diligent volunteer. He bent, climbed, and stretched to take photos and then made careful notations. Back at the police station he was just as committed to detail when he was paired up with his partner in front of the computer. They poured over their combined notes and photos; making routes and then correcting them; demanding different types of maps to compare their handwritten notes to the apparent errors in the computer map; demanding a street map for one further clarification of the proposed route. His commitment to the process, I started to think, was quite substantial. Because of his commitment, he had to engage in quite a bit of labour. But it was in this process of refining his data that I started to see the erasure of labour. I want to take some time now to discuss the process of erasure by turning attention to feminist and labour theory emerging from science and technology studies as means to articulate what was, and was not, taking place during the data entry. Maria Puig de la Bellacasa highlights the role of care as it relates to labour. In so doing, she joins a literature that draws attention to the ways in which labour is erased through specific social and material practices (see for example works in Gibson-Graham, Resnick and Wolf). More specifically, Puig de la Bellacasa investigates care in labour as it effects what she calls “knowledge politics” (85). In her work, Puig de la Bellaca discusses Suchman’s research on software design programs that produce virtual “office assistants” to assist the user. Suchman’s work reveals the ways in which this type of “assistant” must be visible enough to assist the user but not visible enough to require recognition. In so doing, Suchman illustrates how these programs replicate the office (and domestic servant) dynamics. Seen this way, labour becomes undervalued (think for example interns, assistants, etc.) and labour that is critical to many offices (and homes). Suchman’s work in this area is helpful when thinking about the role of augmented objects such as the augmented police map because in many ways it is a type of office assistant for police officers, handing over virtual notes and information about a location that police would otherwise not necessarily know thereby replicating the office dynamic of the boss that appears all knowing because, in part, s/he has a team that supports every aspect of their work. This devalued work (the lower paid intern or assistant) facilitates the authority—and ultimately the higher wage of the boss—who appears to earn this status. Let me layer this analysis of the “office assistant” with the similar phenomena in scientific knowledge production. Steven Shapin, a sociologist of science, discusses Robert Boyle’s 17th century laboratory and the various technicians in the background that assisted in experiments but remained ignored. Shapin argues contemporary scientific practice has changed little in this regard as technicians remain unaccounted for in the scientific record. He points out “science could not be made if this technician’s work were not done, but it is thought that anyone can do it” (Shapin, 557). Without these workers and their labour, scientific knowledge would not be possible, and yet they are ignored and their labour contribution erased (for example not included in formal discussion about the research, or more recently not included as authors in articles). Of course many technicians are/were paid, but nevertheless their role in the experiment erased. One figure emerged as the expert, the scientist, whose work appeared to be solely configured and created. Programs such as the SAFE project illustrate ways in which the police officer can emerge as an authority figure; but the authority rests on labour practices that move around in the background and go unacknowledged. Much like the lab, there are many ignored figures that produce the necessary objects of police work. In the case of the SAFE program, the ideal is that a police officer will respond to a call for service and with the click of a computer screen will be immersed in this augmented map. One click reveals data about the PA system, another click offers a full layout of the school, instructions about the design of the exits, notes about potential hiding spots inside, the list goes on. Each click is a product of labourer(s) that compiled the data. But these individuals, much like Boyle’s laboratory technicians, fade into the background and are erased as the police officer emerges as an authority. The map, an augmented object, may be credited with the data it holds, but the data collectors are long forgotten as the police officer stands alone as the subject of authority because of the smooth effects of the augmented map. Smooth Effects In an era of big data and data-intensive experiences, augmented objects are increasingly present in our daily lives—with expanded tolerance and appetite. When engaging an augmented object, there is a built-in expectation that the object will "work;" meaning it will run smoothly and effectively. Take Google Maps as an example: one expects the program will run on different scales, offer the capacity to map directions, and perhaps most importantly to be accurate. When these augmented objects run smoothly they appear to be a self-contained and organized object in and of themselves. This paper intervenes on these assumptions to illustrate that this “smooth effect” can serve to erase the labour necessary to produce the effect. Thinking here of the commodity fetish, one can recall Karl Marx’s intervention that illustrated how objects, commodities, permeate our social worlds in such ways that we can see the object—that we only see the object. This concept, commodity fetishism, argues that we erase the labour and social relations involved in the production of the objects, that we forget all that was required to create the object, and we don’t see all that was destroyed in its making. An example is to think of a cup of coffee. As you sip and consume it, do you think of the commodity chain? Do you think of the worker, the working conditions necessary to plant, harvest, roast and distribute the beans; do you think about the production of the bag the beans were transported in; do you think of the warehouse or coffeehouse from which the bag of beans came from? You more likely think about how it tastes—as an object in and of itself, how it is, rather than how it came into being in the world. Similarly, I want to think about this augmented map and how attention turns to it, not how it came into the world. Thinking about labour as it relates to computer programs and computer worlds, social scientists have investigated the necessary work of computer programmers and other labourers (see for example Kelty). Tiziana Terranova discusses the immaterial and affective labour that makes online communities thrive as individuals lend their labour (often unpaid) to create an online “world” that appears to organically come together—she argues these online communities are a product of free labour. Although the police are not working for “free” the volunteers are and the valorization of labour, if erased, still results in the similar outcome. Terranova is concerned about online communities that don’t simply come into being, but rather are the product of free labour. In the case of the SAFE program, labour practices are rendered invisible when augmented objects appear to be running smoothly —when in fact this appearance of smoothness necessarily requires labour and the commodity being exchanged is the claim to authority. Figure 3: Cross referencing hardcopy map (Photo by Michelle Stewart) Figure 4: Using a hand-drawn map to assist data entry (Photo by Michelle Stewart) Moving in a different direction, but still thinking about labour, I want to turn to the work of Chris Kortright. In his work about agricultural scientists, Kortright carefully details the physical practices associated with growing an experimental crop of sorghum. From the counting and washing of the seeds, to the planting and harvesting of the seeds, he delivers rich ethnographic stories from experimental fields and labs. He closes with the story of one researcher as she enters all the data into the computer to generate one powerpoint. He explains her frustration: “You can’t see all the time we spent. The nights we slept here. All the seeds and plants. The flooding and time at the greenhouse. All the people and the labour.” I nodded, these things had disappeared. In the table, only numbers existed. (Kortright, 20) Kortright argues for the need to recognize the social relations carved out in the field that are erased through the process of producing scientific knowledge—the young researcher ultimately knowing her labour did have a place on the slide.In much the same way, the police and volunteers engaged in a practice of removing themselves from the map. There was not enough space for long sentences explaining the debate about the best route to take; longer sentences were replace with short-phrased instructions. Conjuring the image of the police officer looking for fast, quick information, quick data was what they would deliver. The focus of the program was to place emergency icons (police cars, ambulance, fire engines and helicopters) onto the map, outline response routes, and offer photos as the evidence. Their role as individuals and their labour and creativity (itself a form of labour) was erased as the desired outcome was ease and access to data—a smooth effect. I was often told that many of the police cars don’t yet have a computer inside but in an idealized future world, police cars would be equipped with a computer console. In this world, officers could receive the call for service, access the program and start to move through layers of data rapidly while receiving the details of the call. This officer would arrive informed, and prepared to effectively respond to the emergency. Thinking back to labour required to create the SAFE map for each school (photographing, mapping, writing instructions, comparing details, etc.) and then the processes of hiding that labour (limited photos and short instructions) so that the program would appear to run smoothly and be user-friendly, the SAFE program, as an object, serves to abstract and erase labour. Indeed, the desired result was a smooth running program that operated much like Suchman’s office assistant who should be just visible enough to provide the needed help but otherwise remain invisible; similar in many ways to Shapin/Boyle’s scientific technician who is critical to knowledge production and yet remains formally unrecognized. Conclusion This article investigated a map as an entry point to understand the ways in which labour can be erased in augmented objects and, concurrently, how authority figures or experts instead emerge. My goal was to discuss the labour necessary to make one augmented map while also describing the process by which the labour necessary for the map was concurrently erased. Central to this article are the ways in which labour is erased as one clicks between these layers of data and, in the process, thinks the smoothly operating computer program is a measure of the strength of program itself, and not the labour required therein. By focusing on this augmented object, I am pointing out the collective labour needed to co-produce the map but how that map then helps to produce the police officer as authority figure. My intention is to look at the map as an unexpected entry point through which to understand how consent and authority is cultivated. Accordingly, I am concerned with the labour that is erased as this police figure emerges and authority is cultivated on the ground. I focus on the labour that necessarily to produce the police officer as expert because when that labour is erased we are left only with the authority figure that appears to be self-evident—not co-constructed. To understand state practices, as practices and not magical phenomena, we must look for the ways in which the state comes into being through particular practices, such as policing and to identify the necessary labour involvedReferencesGibson-Graham, J.K., Stephen Resnick, and Richard Wolff, eds. Re/Presenting Class: Essays in Postmodern Marxism. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000. Kelty, Chris. Two Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free Software. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008. Kortright, Chris. “On Labour and Creative Transformations in the Experimental Fields of the Philippines.” East Asian Science, Technology and Society: An International Journal 7.4 (2013). Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Econony Vol. 1. New York: Penguin Books, 2004. Puig de la Bellacasa, Maria. “Matters of Care in Technoscience: Assembling Neglected Things.” Social Studies of Science 41.1 (2011): 85-106. Shapin, Stephen. “The Invisible Technician.” Scientific American 77 (1989): 554-563. Stewart, Michelle. “The Space between the Steps: Reckoning in an Era of Reconciliation.” Contemporary Justice Review 14.1 (2011): 43-63. Suchman, Lucy. Human-Machine Reconfigurations. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Terranova, Tiziana. “Free Labour: Producing Culture for the Digital Economy.” Social Text 63 (2000): 33-58. Weber, Max. The Vocation Lectures: "Science as a Vocation", "Politics as a Vocation." Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004.

“One has to get rid of the bad taste of wanting to be in agreement with many.” (Nietzsche 53)Community is a policing word: the local community, the Christian community, the school community, the international community. The word evokes informal, benign, yet insistent patterns of authority, built around imagined consensuses. It is a judgement word. It includes and excludes, and always on terms that are imagined pre-set, pre-determined by an identity also already determined or incipient, yet always legitimate, receiving the credit, the credibility it deserves. The community is always licensing actions on its own behalf because it is the very authentic logic of legitimation, of folk sovereignty, of a natural peace that should not be disturbed. It is defensive in its very nature, always at risk of being disturbed from its regular state, its constitutive, deserved and deserving calm. It is the community against which you are most likely to offend. It is easily offended.Communities still claim to be natural. They stabilise, definitively, around an identity they assume to have inherited from fact, a locality, a choice, a lifestyle, a sexual preference. This is what allows them to normalise and judge so determinedly. Normalising judgement is the genre of signifying practice which most clearly defines community. Community is not unrelated to family, one of its isotopes. It even evokes family as its formalising logic and rhetorical resource, yet especially now, it cannot, even in its national forms, especially its post-colonial national forms, lay more than a token claim to the consanguinity that still haunts even the most reformed construction of family. The impetus of community therefore is to naturalise. It cites an identity, imagined to be pre-given, and then renders it incontestable by making it the lodestone of a local policy, one that can be used to make you an offender.Coalition is to community what friendship is to family. If family implies a pre-given situation into which one emerges without option, friendship allows for agency, your circulation in the world as a self-fashioning person, an adventurer, a discoverer, a forger of ties. You are a member of a family at home. Family like community even at its most attenuated is where you are at home, even in its most abstract and discontinuous. Yet, you are a friend in the same way you are a citizen, because you are in the world, where you are what you are by the right of election. You choose your friends. You decide who they are to be. Family naturalises even when it forms from those who share no genetic inheritance. Community too naturalises, imagining its chosen identity to be inherited from the established states of the world and therefore enduring, before and beyond us all, and therefore possessed of an authority and legitimacy no-one has chosen and that therefore no-one can question. Friendship, on the other hand, is an artifice. It is taken up and abandoned at will. Coalition too is chosen. Its only past is that of decision, not of inheritance. You enter into friendship with someone because you share no blood or family inheritance with them. The claim of friendship between family members does not convince because it is not necessary, and because it would create a contradictory history: you cannot chose what you have inherited from nature. The past doesn’t need to be that crowded. It can’t be. It is the same with coalition. If you were a member of a community with someone, you wouldn’t need to form a coalition with them. What would be the point? You are together with them, whether you like it or not.Coalition, therefore, requires an irreducible difference. This is both its practical logic, and its governing ethic. It assumes and respects otherness. This is what it has in common with friendship. You are friends with someone because you are different to one another, not because of what you have in common. That is the charm and attraction of friendship, the discovery of connection in difference. Coalition is friendship magnified to a politics. It repeats friendship’s respect for otherness without needing to risk its experiment with intimacy. Unlike community, coalition is a venture. It is proudly extensive, not defensive. It holds out its hand to you even if it doesn’t like you. It is not only the invention of a practice, but of a value, the value of human exteriority. Even when we are at our most solipsistic and closed, our most misanthropic and scornful, it is never impossible for human beings to connect with one another. That possibility can never be reduced to zero. Coalition assumes this irreducible openness to the other, and that is what links it irrevocably to the progressive as an incontestable virtue. What Derrida says of (what Aristotle says of) friendship here is also true of coalition. It is by nature a virtue:Since friendship does not – and above all must not – have the reliability of a natural thing or a machine; since its stability is not given by nature but is won, like constancy . . . through the endurance of a virtue, primary friendship, ‘that which allows all others to be named’ . . . we must say that it is founded on virtue. (Derrida, Politics 23)If we pursue the analogy with friendship, coalition is in itself a value, regardless of the reason that the coalition has formed. Unlike communities which keep obscuring their origins and claiming the authority of the natural or at least the inherited, contrived or naturalised, coalitions never deny they are artifice. They are formed historically for historical purposes. Often they even seem to concede that this makes them second-best. They are the substitute for perhaps the greater legitimacy that a community might purportedly have if we don’t think about it too deeply, or if we rest our politics on sentimentality, the endlessly resurging underside of the politics of the ideological era. Coalitions substitute for the natural bond of community the political purpose of history, even of the moment, as they form and un-form to repeal rogue legislation, combat sectional interests, clarify obscured rights, challenge illegal occupations and so on. Yet, over and above, beyond and before this, they are the institution of a primary, perhaps the primary social value. They are the positive enactment of the idea that relationships form in difference. Coalitions are not inherited or determined, but chosen as the result of a decision, and this decision is the taking on of the responsibility not only towards a specific political issue but to those who might only share with me a momentary commitment. Again unlike community, in which universality, specifically the conformity of all members to a fundamental identity or nature, is not only taken for granted but required, definitive and ineluctable, in coalition, the universality of a shared idea or judgement is merely an agreement destined to be outlived. Coalition is universality without conformity, agreement without oneness.In political terms, it is a double benefit, therefore. It both responds to some kind of political emergency, and models democratic openness to the other as purposeful social action. It is an action and a virtue. The risk, of course, is that these two enter into conflict with one another, especially that the virtue of social relationship trumps the exigencies of the critical political moment. In other words, the logic of relationship becomes the fundamental achievement at the expense of political engagement. It is here that the virtues and dangers of coalition become apparent. What is virtuous about coalition might in fact be the very thing that threatens its political effectiveness. Coalition works by persuasion and enlistment. It is a logic of the endlessly open “plus one.” Because no singular identity restricts membership of the coalition, it is endlessly open to an ever extending inclusivity. If you can be persuaded to agree about perhaps only one thing, then you can become part of a coalition. You can even pronounce on your own membership, given that the formal protocols of coalition membership are loose and the threshold to be crossed for membership is so specific. You can perhaps even be a member of a coalition without anyone else ever knowing. It can rely on the most limited and specific of agreements. The risk is that the logic of persuasion, enlistment and agreement over-shadows the particular politics which is the ostensible pretext for the formation of the coalition in the first place. In short, the logic of persuasion and enlistment takes over from the logic of opposition and resistance, which is what defines the political. Coalition risks becoming a church logic, therefore, and it is arguable that its cultural inheritance is fundamentally consistent with the social mission of Christianity and Islam, which aim to gradually enlist all, despite difference and non-identity. By committing to enlistment, coalition risks substituting an indefinitely extendable agreement for the political efficacy of enmity, the virtues of peace for the achievements of struggle. At its worst, coalition risks substituting the satisfactions of feeling positive about the other for the recognition of enmity as fundamentally definitive of the political and thus of the social. It risks becoming what Nietzsche disliked in democracy, its “talkative good conscience” (cited in Derrida, Politics 38), which is in the end nothing but a repression.The problem lies with coalition’s fundamentally positive construction of the other, and of sociality in general. This emerges through the definitive role of decision in coalition. You don’t decide to join a community. You find yourself in it. You may elect to leave but only in order to become a renegade. Your identity remains haunted by the community you have spurned as a lapsed member. To become a member of a coalition, on the other hand, is the result of some kind of election on your part, and this special event can take on a major significance in the evolution of your self-relation, as an instantiation of your will and thus autonomy. In Derrida, however, the decision is aporetic. Its relationship to the subject is indeterminate. What makes a decision is its openness on an in-determinacy, its possibility of always being radically otherwise, what Derrida calls, citing Nietzsche, its perhaps (Politics 68). The decision is, therefore, an event. It is a pivoting. It turns on what might and might not happen. It always, at some irreducible level, surprises. In any event, what happens might not happen: every event carries within it the traces of what does not happen. Even in its most emphatic confirmation of an option, the event remains haunted by all those things that did not happen, that did not become it, that it did not specify, that still define it as the chosen thing. Something cannot be chosen unless there is that which remains un-chosen.The decision, then, inevitably involves an openness of the subject towards that which it does not and cannot do. It arises in a field unchosen by the subject in which choosing takes place. To this extent, it happens to a subject more than it is a doing by a subject. To Derrida, this makes the decision irreducibly passive, even “unconscious,” (Politics 68), an idea he embraces in its heretical relationship to traditional understandings of agency: “In sum,” he writes, “a decision is unconscious – insane as that may seem, it involves the unconscious and nevertheless remains responsible” (Politics 69). Because it involves the other possibility, it is not certain in the way the automatic enactment of a pre-fixed program you know is right is certain. The latter Derrida calls mere calculation, the implementation of that to which you have or even know no alternative. Calculation does what is known unambiguously to be right, to be without alternative. Decision, requires doubt, uncertainty. It opens the subject to the ineluctable certainty of its own failure, if not now then inevitably. This is what makes it a taking on of the unknown, of the enactment within the subject of that which is unknown to it, its unconscious.Decision then is the overcoming of the subject in its own action. It defies self-identity, exposing the subject to that which is other to it, that otherness which now defines it in its relationship to itself. As the social enactment of decision, then, coalition instantiates the subject’s excess over itself, its constitutional and necessary orientation to that which exceeds it, which it now understands not simply as otherness but as other people. Again, this makes coalition analogous to friendship, the other social relation formed by election. In both cases, the actual decision seems to happen to the subject as much as it seems to be the simple result of will. Why do I find myself a friend with you, but not the person standing next to you? What draws me to this coalition and not that is not simply the patient, systematic, rational evaluation of moral and political alternatives, but my enthusiasm for one thing, my disgust with another. It is through this unstable, semi-obscure and dynamic producing of separating options that my decision suddenly emerges to always in some way surprise me. I don’t know why I like you. I don’t know why I believe this and not that, why I connect in the way I do, even though I know I am answerable, responsible for these choices, at some point, if even just before the casual court of my own curiosity.Friendship then and coalition are made but they are also received. They deconstruct the opposition between these alternatives. This is what distinguishes them from community, which routinely denies that it is made in which the making is denied, even though a rigorous deconstruction would contest the notion that pure inheritance is possible especially as the constitution of a self. Community would then merely be coalition in denial of itself. But the quality of otherness should not be simply taken for granted. Alain Badiou complains about the value given to respect for otherness as the only contemporary ethic. The responsibility of our behaviour is not towards the enactment of priorities and values of our own individual or collective subjectivity, but to a mere logic of do no harm. To engage properly with Badiou’s point would require a whole other argument, but he does alert us to the temptations of sentimentalising respect for otherness as the definition of social relations which thus risk settling into an ethic of a benign and self-justifying harmlessness as the final social good.Is the other always good? Again, I want to approach this question by returning to Derrida’s account of friendship, and its relationship to enmity. Derrida recalls that at least in the hands of Carl Schmitt, decisionism is always a logic of enmity (Politics 67). How does this relate to what we have said about decision, otherness and friendship? As we have seen, coalition like friendship is the enactment of a decision, albeit possibly an unconscious one, in Derrida’s terms. You elect who is to be your friend, and you elect the coalitions you will join. Coalition is artificial, therefore. It does not make the claim implied by the notion of community; that the primary social bonds are natural, and therefore, inherited, unelected, perhaps even instinctive. The institution of the coalition by way of the decision is, therefore, an historical event. Where in community, the natural bond to which I am subject already exists, perhaps even was the very thing that called me into being, the formation of the bond between me and others is something I choose, one way or another in coalition. Where in community, only certain people marked out by some essential attribute over which they have little control (their only choice is to express or repress it) are the ones with whom I can join, in coalition, nothing necessarily or essentially distinguishes the people with whom I enter into alliance, other than the fact that they too have made the decision. The decision, therefore, groups together in coalition those who are in themselves indistinguishable from anyone else. They become my partner in coalition. They become my political friend. Yet, there is nothing about them that has pre-marked them for this friendship. They could just as easily not have entered into relationship with me, or indeed they could have become my enemy. This is the fulfilment of the logic of decision: the option chosen in decision is always in relation to that which has not been chosen. It is marked by the trace of the un-elected. The friend too is marked by the trace of those who are not chosen.In Politics of Friendship, Derrida pursues these issues by way of a reading of Carl Schmitt. Schmitt famously argued that the political grouping is defined by the collective identification of a shared enemy. You become a friend only by agreeing on a specific other who is to be your foe. There is, according to Schmitt’s argument, nothing about the enemy that marks them out to be your enemy: no traditional rivalry, no ethnic contempt, no economic competition or cultural antipathy, nothing about the enemy requires them to be your enemy. If such markers are seen to exist, they are superadded to the antagonism in order to invest it with a motivating intensity. Yet, such emotion is unnecessary. Someone is the constituting enemy of your group because your group could not be a group without an enemy, some enemy or other, someone you need to be prepared to kill, as the enactment of your political being. So, you become a member of a political grouping – you attain political friendship – by your preparedness to kill some other, even though there is nothing about them in themselves that requires you to do this, or even want it. They could just as easily be your friend if circumstances were different. The fact they are your enemy is purely historically contingent.Derrida puts it like this in his reading of Schmitt:There is no friend without this possibility of killing which establishes this non-natural community. Not only could I only enter into friendship only with a mortal, but I could love in friendship only a mortal at least exposed to so-called violent death – that is, exposed to being killed, possibly by myself. (Politics 122)So, in coalition, I decide to enter into relationship with those who could just as well be my enemies. Derrida’s aim in his reading of Schmitt is to show that the fundamental opposition on which the latter’s theory of the political depends – the historically enduring distinction between friend and enemy – is untenable. Since the friend can only be my friend because they are just as equally qualified to be my enemy, the distinction cannot be sustained. The rapid renomination of friends as enemies and enemies as friends in historical experience would seem to bear out the radical fragility of these categories.For our purposes in a discussion of coalition, I want to derive a slightly different point. The formation of political friendship will always bear with it a trace of enmity. You cannot be friends with someone who cannot just as easily be your enemy – in fact perhaps tomorrow, if not in some way always already. The formation of political friendship must also involve the inevitable enactment or at least acknowledgement of enmity. This is clear in the logic of community which imagines essential, natural differences which pre-identify groups implicitly alien and therefore constitutively already on the threshold of enmity. We have seen how these assumptions enact the willing blindness, the determined naivety, of community. Yet, there is blindness in coalition as well, a denial of its constitutive relationship with enmity. Because it forms by way of decision, coalition operates by a practice of persuasion and enlistment, the endlessly open to the other logic of the “plus-one” we have mentioned, the addition of the extra other comrade and so on theoretically forever. In other words, coalition believes in the hypothesis that everyone can enlist, that the addition of yet one more ally, one more member, one more willing other, can go on forever, as long as you use the right language to persuade them, theoretically to the point of absolute universality.The risk here is the repression of the constituting logic of enmity, the forgetting of the role of antagonism in politics. The selection of the political friend involves distinguishing them from those who are your enemies. Your friends are those who are not (now) your enemies. In other words, the selection of your friend involves the ready identification of the non-friend, and this withholding of friendship must stretch, open-endedly, all the way to antagonism and opposition. The formation of coalition should not be seduced by its own image of itself as the incipience of a potential universal agreement. Coalition involves the establishment of political friendship in the context of the separation from political opponents, who will, at some level, never be less than to-be-opposed. Post-1960s politics in the west has been beset by different styles of coalition that have in their own ways striven to deny or frustrate political conflict: on the soft left, an automatic rejection of violence and war, regardless of what might need to be achieved; on the soft right, a complete acceptance of the market as the measure of social progress, a neo-liberal consensus that has tolerated no alternative social logic in planning and policy in government, mainstream media, corporation and institution. Coalition, by valuing agreement as a virtue in and of itself, risks disregarding the historical role and necessity of conflict in politics, a conflict that must potentially run to physical violence.In the historical context of an issue like the politics of climate change, there is the risk of being taken by the idea that what is required is more effective communication, better explanation, more persuasion. Then everyone will understand, agree and join the coalition of the willing to act. What this overlooks is the fact that already, no matter what the stakes, the political context is one in which antagonists have already emerged: whether by way of dogma, self-interest or sub-cultural intolerance. The politics of climate change is a politics nonetheless, built on antagonism as much as consensus, hostility as much as care, enmity as much as friendship. The politics of climate change must be recognised as being, as much about fighting as it is about persuasion.Is otherness always good? The ethic of openness to the other about which Badiou complains is routinely seen as the enactment of the ultimate and endlessly extending commitment to a social generosity. Derrida’s elaborations of a justice in excess of law, of an absolute hospitality in excess over local customs and practices of asylum, of a democracy-to-come in excess of any enacted historical democratic practice, all of which acknowledge the indeterminateness and immeasurability of the other, have all been read as socially optimistic and positive ethical instances of an opening towards a new Enlightenment. But as Derrida never avoided saying, these opennesses on the indeterminate nature of otherness always involves the risk of the worst, perhaps even of “radical evil” (Faith 83). The formation of political friendships, like coalition, also always involves the recognition of enmities. Without enmity, coalitions could not form. The very openness on the other that makes friendship available is the perhaps slightly withheld but always possible identification of the other as enemy, as danger, as something to be fought, as bad. It is this that in the end, every decision decides, in its openness to the other, whether it likes it or not. Without the willingness to accept enmity as necessary, even desirable, politics is not possible.ReferencesBadiou, Alain. Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. Trans. Peter Hallward. London: Verso, 2001.Derrida, Jacques. “Faith and Knowledge.” Acts of Religion. Ed. Gil Anidjar. Trans. Samuel Weber. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. 40-101. ———. Politics of Friendship. Trans. George Collins. London: Verso, 1997.Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973.