Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Legislative bodies – European Union countries'

Defence date: 17 September 2007
Examining Board: Prof. Morten Kelstrup, (University of Copenhagen) ; Prof. Peter Mair, (European University Institute) ; Prof. Gianfranco Pasquino, (University of Bologna) ; Prof. Philippe C. Schmitter, (EUI Professional Fellow)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
no abstract available

Defence date: 13 July 2007
Examining Board: Prof. Adrienne Héritier, (European University Institute/SPS/RSCAS) ; Prof. Stefano Bartolini, (European University Institute/RSCAS) ; Prof. Ellen M. Immergut, (Humboldt University Berlin) ; Prof. Claudio Radaelli, (University of Exeter)
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This thesis asks how the framing of policy issues in EU legislative politics influences the way issues are processed, how it affects which interests play a role during policy drafting and deliberation, and what type of political conflicts and coalitions emerge as a result. Focusing in particular on the European Commission’s role in EU policy-making, this thesis goes on to investigate how actors in EU politics define and redefine the issues at stake according to their shifting policy agendas and in doing so attempt to shore up support and marginalise political opposition. Drawing on the empirical investigation of two decades of EU biotechnology policy-making, the thesis finds that the framing of policy issues systematically affects how the complex and fragmented EU political decision-making process involves or excludes different sets of actors and interests from the diverse political constituencies of the Union. It argues that the Commission’s role in structuring the EU policy space can at times be substantial. Yet the longitudinal perspective adopted in this study also reveals how the structuring and restructuring of the biotechnology policy space led to the increasing politicisation of the EU decision-making process. Eventually, the empirical investigation concludes, the Commission was unable to control the political dynamics set off by the reframing of the policy choices, and the resulting revision of the EU biotechnology policy framework ran counter to the Commission’s original policy objectives. This study thus provides fresh insights into the dynamics of policy-level politicisation and its effects on political conflict and competition in the EU. The framing perspective allows students of EU politics to trace how political agents and institutions interact to shape and at times exploit the complexities of EU policy-making in pursuit of their often conflicting agendas. Finally, the findings suggest that the key to conceptualising the scope of Commission agency in terms of systematic policy dynamics lies in exploring the interlocking effects of policy framing and EU politicisation in the political construction of interests at the supranational level.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2007.
Title from first page of PDF file (viewed June 26, 2007). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 284-305).

This assessment of European Union foreign policy towards the South Caucasus shows that while the EU has developed a coherent transport policy since 1992, paradoxically, it has had no corresponding coherent conflict resolution policy for this region. The fact that the EU deepened transport cooperation without a mediation policy in an area with a multiplicity of protracted conflicts is a puzzle. Although the EU eventually added mediation to its policy during the Russia-Georgia armed conflict in 2008, it was unable to facilitate a political solution. The research examines what has been the nature of EU foreign policy towards the South Caucasus. The dissertation argues that incoherence in conflict resolution policy has been consequent upon two causal factors: (i) preferences of the EU member states conditioned by their historical experience with Russia, and (ii) institutional framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). By contrast, with functional approach, the three dominant factors that have enabled coherence in transport cooperation are (i) legislative alignment, (ii) common transport area, including technical assistance for transit development, and (iii) restrictive measures. Examination of these two areas of EU foreign policy, shows a discrepancy, demonstrating its inconsistent nature. The theoretical framework of realism and liberal intergovernmentalism, is applied to empirically grounded EU foreign policy analysis. Adopting a case study methodology, this work examines the EU's policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan, with special focus on Georgia between 1992 and 2014. The research combines social science methods of literature review, document analysis and expert interviews.

Defence date: 17 June 2005
Examining board: Prof. Stefano Bartolini, Università di Bologna and former EUI, Supervisor ; Prof. Jean Blondel, EUI, Professional Fellow ; Prof. Giuseppe Ieraci, Università di Trieste, Co-supervisor ; Prof. Philippe Schmitter, EUI, Professional Fellow
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017

Defence date: 8 September 2009
Examining Board: Profs. Christian Joerges (Supervisor, former EUI and University of Bremen); Hans-W. Micklitz (EUI); John Paterson (External Co-Supervisor, University of Aberdeen); David M. Trubek (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
This thesis is devoted to analysing the emerging relationship in the European Union between 'new governance' - epitomised by the development of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) - and law. While some scholars have seen the project of new governance as a purely political or functional enterprise - a mechanism of 'soft law' - the thesis will argue against such a view through an empirical analysis of a particular OMC process - the OMC for social inclusion and social protection (the OMC SPSI). While on the one hand, the OMC SPSI has achieved considerable success in creating a new social policy vocabulary in Europe, the very description of the OMC as an instrument of 'soft law' has handed considerable power to frame key policy decisions to national and European executives, while depriving Parliaments and local authorities from their normal rights of scrutiny. The OMC SPSI illustrates why - far from invoking a merely 'technical' or procedural set of questions - 'new governance' is deeply implicated in debates over the future of the European welfare state. The indicators and recommendations of the method are not seen by its participants as neutral descriptors, but rather invoke competing views of the very ends of social policy in Europe. The description of new governance as soft and heterarhical does not therefore dilute its key legitimacy challenges, but makes them ever more pressing. In response, the thesis will argue for a 'constitutionalisation' of new governance. This constitutionalisation, the thesis will argue, should not be aimed at a legal 'juridification' of OMC procedures, or at re-enforcing their participatory potential, but rather at creating opportunities for political contestation and scrutiny in procedures too long the preserve of a small and mutually re-enforcing circle of executive actors. A 'republican' constitutionalisation of the OMC - one able to politicise the norms and indicators through which national social policy is being evaluated - may allow 'new governance' a last opportunity to refute accusations of executive dominance and technocratic paternalism that threaten to undermine its 'procedural' potential.

Defence date: 17 September 2013
Examining Board: Professor Stefano Bartolini, EUI (Supervisor) Professor Mark N. Franklin, MIT/EUI Professor Kaare Strøm, University of California, San Diego (External Supervisor) Professor Shane Martin, University of Leicester.
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
Recent contributions in legislative studies field have coined the term mega-seats to denote committee systems and leadership bodies. The significance of viewing the internal bodies of legislatures as mega-seats is that they are conceived as part of the democratic delegation chain. Consequently, such an approach adds a political bargaining dimension to the allocation of mega-seats. During the internal organization process of the legislature, plenary legislators become principals, who delegate power to internal bodies, mainly to enhance labor division, tackle information asymmetries, and channel party demands. This thesis examines the process of payoff distribution in legislatures, using an original dataset containing 350 parties, in 12 Western European parliamentary democracies. The analysis is carried out at the party level as well as at the legislature level. Moreover, I conduct two case studies - Portugal and the United Kingdom - to further disentangle the causal mechanisms used to explain mega-seats allocation in parliamentary democracies. The empirical analysis starts with an examination of whether the division of payoffs (i.e., mega-seats) follows a proportionality logic. The proportionality assumption is borrowed from coalition studies, which have long established that institutional payoffs are distributed in a 1:1 proportionality. Using a new index to gauge disproportionality in the allocation of legislative mega-seats, the first finding of this thesis is that mega-seats allocation in parliamentary democracies is not proportional. Subsequently, I adduce a model that explains this counterintuitive finding at the party and legislature levels. The second main finding is that a party’s degree of disproportionality is a function of its power. Parties are conceived as having a number of resources to spend on mega-seats distribution. The way they spend these resources is constrained by the existence of proportionality protection rules within an institution and incentivized by the value of the payoff. Regarding the former, I find that rules matter in protecting proportionality whilst for the latter I find that the amount of resources parties are willing to spend on a mega-seat depends on the mega-seat’s power. Finally, the third main finding is that, at the aggregate level, the overall power of the legislative branch vis-à-vis the executive branch is important in determining the degree of disproportionality. Powerful legislatures tend to be more disproportional, as executive members seek control of its internal bodies.

Defence date: 6 December 2013
Examining Board: Professor Adrienne Héritier, EUI (Supervisor); Professor Stefanie Bailer, ETH Zürich (External Supervisor); Professor Mark Franklin, EUI & MIT; Professor Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science.
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
Voting unity in parliamentary parties is an inescapable phenomenon in parliamentary democracies. Knowing only which party a legislator belongs to and how the majority of that party voted allows for the identification, with extremely high levels of accuracy, how said legislator actually voted. However, most explanations of why this is the case rests of unsustainable assumptions about the effects of institutions and electoral systems on the behaviour of parliamentarians. Further, most work ignores the most basic explanation of why legislators vote the way they do: Their policy preferences. Without first explaining the role they play in legislative behaviour, little else can be explained with confidence. This work first theorises and develops measures of how parliamentarians’ policy preferences lead to incentives for them to vote against their party’s line in floor votes, and then applies them to a series of diverse institutional setups, showing that while parliamentarians’ preferences may explain significant parts of parliamentary party voting unity, it is also clear that they cannot, except in rare circumstances, explain all of it. Having shown that preferences cannot explain unity, this work then argues that by analysing MPs’ attitudes to party unity, we can understand why MPs choose to vote contrary to what their preferences alone would predict. Applying this logic to parliaments at either extreme of the spectrum of parliamentary institutionalisation, it is shown that there is little evidence that legislators are compelled to act in ways they do not want. Rather, what is found is that they recognise the value of party voting unity and can overcome the temptation to free-ride on their co-partisans. Finally, analysing floor votes in the European Parliament, it is shown that what explains defection are the long-term rather than short-term goals of parliamentarians, complementing the previous findings.

Defence date: 20 May 1997
Examining board: Prof. R. Barents (Luxembourg/Maastricht) ; Prof. R. Dehousse (Florence), co-supervisor ; Prof. Ch. Joerges (Bremen/Florence), supervisor ; Judje P.J.G. Kapteyn (Luxembourg)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017

Defence date: 6 December 2004
Examining board: Mercè Barceló i Serramalera, Directora externa (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Bruno de Witte (Instituto Universitario Europeo de Florencia) ; Luciano Vandelli (Università degli Studi di Bologna) ; Jacques Ziller, Driector (Instituto Universitario Europeo de Florencia)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017

Defence date: 7 June 2010
Awarded the François Mény Prize for the Best Comparative Study of Political Institutions, 2011
Examining Board: David Farrell (UCD), Mark Franklin (EUI), Adrienne Héritier (EUI/RSCAS) (Supervisor), Simon Hix (LSE)
Awarded the European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Prize for Best Dissertation in EU studies: the thesis marks a substantial contribution not only to the literature on parliaments in general and the European Parliament in particular, but also to the understanding of the democratic deficit in Europe and how it might be tackled.
First made available online: 27 August 2021
The European Parliament (EP) now acts as an equal co-legislator with the Council of Ministers in adopting many policies that affect 500 million European citizens on a daily basis. However, the parliamentary legislative organisation is under-researched despite its profound consequences for EU policies and policy-making. Addressing this gap, this thesis studies the internal setup and legislative impact of the EP committees. Drawing on congressional literature, I confront distributive, informational and partisan theoretical approaches to answer the research questions of this project, namely whether and why the EP committees and their legislative output are dominated by preference-outlying legislators with special interests, experts serving the informational needs of the plenary, or loyal members of the working majority party group (coalition). Statistical analyses of committee assignments, allocation of legislative tasks, and adoption of committee reports in plenary are conducted using data on the 6th European Parliament (2004-2009). They are complemented with evidence from semi-structured interviews. The results show that legislators’ special interests and expertise account for the formally regulated assignment to committees depending on the predominant character of their legislative output (distributive or regulatory). In contrast, party group affiliation and loyalty shape the allocation of important legislative tasks in committees, owing to the informal allocation process. Furthermore, committee reports are more successful on the floor if drafted by rapporteurs from the working majority party group - perhaps a natural consequence of the EP open amendment rule. Thus, the parliamentary legislative output is ultimately controlled by the working majority party group and not committees. The congressional rationales fail to account for committees’ legislative influence when an informal early agreement is reached with the Council of Ministers. This occurs increasingly often, rendering decision-making in committees largely obsolete. The observed regularities are used to advance the literature on legislative organisation by identifying conditions under which each of the main congressional rationales can explain committee setup and influence, namely: 1) the policy areas a committee covers; 2) the parliamentary rules regulating committee-party and committee-plenary relationships; and 3) the balance of power and mode of negotiation between the legislative chambers. More substantively, the EP committees are not conducive for pursuing particularistic policies. Instead, they promote left-right party politics. This has important implications for EU legislative politics, interest representation, legitimacy, and more generally the EU democratic deficit.

Defence date: 20 May 1996
Examining board: Prof. Ignacio Borrajo Iniesta ; Prof. Luis María Díez-Picazo (orientador) ; Prof. Maria Eduarda Gonçalves ; Prof. Federico Mancini ; Prof. Armando Marques Guedes
First made available online 2 July 2015.

Defence date: 18 November 2005
Examining board: Prof. Gráinne de Búrca (Supervisor, European University Institute) ; Prof. Neil Walker (European University Institute) ; Prof. Stephen Weatherhill (Oxford University) ; Prof. Marise Cremona (University of London)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017
What is the federal philosophy inspiring the structure of European law? The federal principle stands for constitutional arrangements that find "unity in diversity". The two most influential manifestations of the federal principle emerged under the names of "dual" and "cooperative" federalism in the constitutional history of the United States of America. Dual federalism is based on the idea that the federal government and the State governments are co-equals and each is legislating in a separate sphere. Cooperative federalism, on the other hand, stands for the thought that both governments legislate in the same sphere. They are hierarchically arranged and complement each other in solving a social problem. Can the European Union be understood in federal terms? The book's General Part introduces three constitutional traditions of the federal idea. Following the American tradition, the European Union is defined as a Federation of States as it stands on the "middle ground" between international and national law. But what federal philosophy has the European Union followed? The Special Part of the dissertation investigates the structure of European law. Three arguments are advanced to show the evolution of the European legal order from dual to cooperative federalism. The first looks at the decline of constitutional exclusivity on the part of the Member States and the European Union. For almost all objects of government, the Union and its States operate in a universe of shared powers. The second argument analyzes the decline of legislative exclusivity. European and national legislation - increasingly - complement each other to solve a social problem. The third argument describes the "constitutionalisation" of cooperative federalism in the form of the principle of subsidiarity and the idea of complementary competences. A final Chapter is dedicated to Europe's foreign affairs federalism. It analyzes, whether the external sphere must be regarded as subject to different constitutional or federal principles. The dissertation concludes that cooperative federalism will benefit both levels of government - the Union and the Member States - as the constitutional mechanism of uniform European standards complemented by diverse national standards best expresses the federal idea of "unity in diversity".