Academic literature on the topic 'Legalità penale europea'

The country that adheres to the continental european legal system of Indonesia that regulate euthanasia is contained in the provisions of Article 344 of the Criminal Code while Netherlands The provisions are contained in the code penal section 40 and Article 293 of the Dutch Criminal. Code anglo saxon like USA hardness of euthanasia. this is based on a court decision in USA that rejects the application of euthanasia as a jurisprudence. Indonesia does not Regulate clearly about the enactment of euthanasia. Netherlands legalize Euthanasia, while State with Anglo Saxon Law system, does not legalize EuthanasiaKeywords: Euthanasia, Continental European Legal System, Anglo Saxon Legal System Negara yang menganut sistem hukum eropa kontinental yaitu Indonesia yang mengatur tentang Euthanasia yaitu termuat dalam ketentuan pasal 344 KUHP sementara di Belanda ketentuan ini dimuat dalam code penal section 40 dan pasal 293 KUHP Belanda. Sistem hukum Anglo saxon seperti Amerika Serikat melarang keras adanya euthanasia. hal ini didasarkan adanya putusan pengadilan di Amerika Serikat yang menolak penerapan euthanasia sebagai sebuah yurisprudensi. Indonesia tidak Mengatur secara jelas tentang pemberlakuan euthanasia. Belanda melegalkan Euthanasia, sedangkan negara dengan sistem Hukum Anglo Saxon tidak melegalkan EuthanasiaKata Kunci: Euthanasia, Sistem Hukum Eropa Kontinental, Sistem Hukum Anglo Saxon

The issue of optimizing the mechanism for providing public services in the field of social protection of the population due to the ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine on the part of Russia (from 2014 to the present), as a result of which internally displaced persons need to solve a number of urgent needs both in European countries (Poland, Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, etc.), including related to their accounting in these countries. In this sense, the objective of this editorial is twofold, on the one hand, to present volume 40, number 74 of Political Questions and, on the other, to highlight the concept and types of guarantees of ensuring legality concerning provision of public services in the sphere of social protection of population. It is concluded that the following types of guarantees of ensuring legality concerning provision of public services in the sphere of social protection of population in Ukraine have been justified: appeal of decisions, actions or inaction of public administration subjects on the provision of public services in the sphere of social protection of population in court (administrative proceedings); control over activities of public administration subjects concerning provision of public services in the sphere of social protection of population.

The subject of this paper is the individualization of penalty in the French Penal code of (Code pénal de 1810). It is a Code that brought a very important innovation in comparative legal history – a relative system of penal determination – that will be crucial for further development of system of penal determination. Thereto, the French Penal code of 1810 had the greatest influence in the development of European substantive criminal law, because the whole array of penal codes, from the Prussian to the Serbian Criminal code of 1860, adopted its solutions. The author analyses the multi-decade process of development of the idea and practice of the individualization of criminal punishment in French criminal law, starting from the complete judicial arbitrariness that characterized pre-Revolutionary law to the absolute system of penal determination brought by the Penal code of 1791, and from the absolute system to relative system of penal determination present in the Penal code of 1810. The author shows that the innovation from 1810 actually represents a sui generis synthesis of the various experiences gained over decades of application of previously mentioned forms of penal determination. Special attention is paid to the problem of judicial individualization of penalty between penal minimum and maximum established by the Penal code of 1810. Although the relative system of penal determination enabled the individualization of penalty by reconciling it with the principle of legality, the start of the implementation of the Penal code of 1810 brought up some weak points of this system. In regard to that, the author analyses the statistics of convictions made by French courts in second and third decade of the 19th century. At last, the research of the problem of individualization of penalty in the Penal code of 1810 the author complete by analyzing the Penal code Reform Bills of 1824 and 1832, that introduced the institute of extenuating circumstances as one of the instruments for the individualization of penalty.

This article addresses issues arising in the context of transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, namely in Germany (former East Germany), Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. The contribution reflects various means of transitional justice which were applied in these countries: access to the archives of secret police, lustration and prosecution of the crimes of the past (successor trials). Central issue of this article is the criminal prosecution of communist crimes. Here authors focus their attention on two interrelated aspects: choice of applicable law and statutory limitations, which both are linked to the principle of legality. Practice and methods in prosecution of the communist crimes adopted across the analyzed countries reveal considerable heterogeneity and from comparative perspective pose a unique legal laboratory. Despite differences in applicable law, including treatment and interpretation of statutory limitations, and differences in overall outcomes of prosecution and punishment of the communist crimes, all countries were conformed to requirements of the principle of legality. The article thus confirms that states, when dealing with their past, enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.Keywords: Communist crimes. Central and Eastern Europe. Transitional justice. Successor trials. Nullum crimen sine lege.

Abstract The opportunity and the necessity of simplifying the texts of criminalization, the restoration in natural limits of the sanctioning treatment corroborated with the economic and social evolution, the national and international doctrine and jurisprudence, the necessity to ensure the legality, the impartiality, the independence and firmness in the application of the law, represented the justificatory premises of the legislator in order to amend The Penal Code with regard to the crimes against justice. The rationality for introducing new crimes such as "obstruction of justice" suppose to adapt criminal law to the realities of the democratic society, to the provisions of the European norms, the Romanian experience in the field proving that the means of criminal protection of justice were applied shyly and unconvincingly. The sources of obstruction of justice have not reduces but, instead, it amplified and gained new forms, some very subtle, in close contact with the international world

The article discusses the clause provided in the Lithuanian Criminal Code, which limits the court’s extended powers of confiscation in regard of crime proceeds of value less than EUR 12,500. The developing practice of the application of extended powers of confiscation in Lithuania makes this issue not only a matter of principle but also a practical one. The article analyzes to what extent such a precondition is compatible with the principle of legality and in particular the principle that rights do not arise from wrongdoing (Ex iniuria ius non oritur). Further, the author discusses the arguments justifying the discussed limitation to confiscate low-value crime proceeds – rational organisation of law enforcement resources, the principle of proportionality and a requirement of legal systematicity. The article concludes that the latter arguments are not always used accurately. The limitations of law enforcement resources ought to be regarded by providing authorities with discretion, not by limiting confiscation powers. The principle of proportionality and legal systematicity are hardly applicable in the discussion due to the specific legal nature of the confiscation powers. In parallel, the article concludes that the limitation of the minimum value of confiscatable crime proceeds is contrary to the European Union law – Directive 2014/42/EU.

Indonesia's national legal system based on modern law with a philosophy liberalism, individualism and rationalisme background of the nineteenth century in Europe (Penal Code), that contains the class characteristics. The characteristics of the national law classes imply of the Court as a judicial dictatorship. The existence of three different decision in terms of budget corruption committed by members of parliament, namely decision-free, loose and criminal verdict in the same case is proof of the dictatorship of the Court. To prevent the necessary expansion of the meaning of a judicial dictatorship legality principle, from the formal justice-procedural justice toward substantial material with 3-integral approach, the approach of juridical science religious, juridical contextual, and insightful approach to comparative/global recall the problem of corruption is an issue international. In addition it needs to be revisited Constitutional Court Decision No. 003/PUU-IV/2006 to be replaced with understanding the material unlawfully receiving AVAW as set forth in Supreme Court Jurisprudence No. 42 K/Kr/1965 and also article 2 and article 5 of Law. 48 of 2009 and the possible penal settlement by mediation. Keywords : modern law, judicial dictatorship, reconstruction of criminal responsibility, criminal acts of corruption.

El Tribunal Supremo en la S.197/2006 de 28 de Febrero establece la doctrina «Parot» aplicando la legislación penitenciaria vigente –más restrictiva que la anterior en ciertos supuestos– al entonces existente beneficio penitenciario de reducción de la pena máxima privativa de libertad de 30 años que puede cumplir un condenado mediante el trabajo del penado en prisión, caso de condena múltiple por diferentes hechos en distintas sentencias. La restricción no se hace de forma directa sobre la pena concreta máxima privativa de libertad que puede imponerse en la sentencia al amparo de los art. 70 y 100 CP 1973 y 988 LECRIM sino de forma indirecta al aplicar la legislación penitenciaria vigente sobre aquel beneficio penitenciario de forma individual y sucesiva sobre cada una de las particulares condenas. No creo que la doctrina del TS sea una aplicación o interpretación retroactiva desfavorable al reo del vigente CP. Pero la ley penitenciaria incide sobre un beneficio penitenciario establecido en la anterior cual es la reducción del tiempo de cumplimiento de la condena a los reclusos por el trabajo realizado en prisión mientras cumplen la pena impuesta –en nuestro caso– en diferentes procesos y sentencias. Según sea la incidencia podrá ser o no admisible, constitucional o no según vulnere o no el principio de legalidad de los Art. 1-1 y 9-3 CE. En el caso de autos se interpuso recurso de súplica contra el Auto de la AN de 23-6-2008 –que aplica la doctrina «Parot» del TS de 2006– y fija como fecha de salida de prisión de la recurrente el año 2017 (el Auto precedente la fijaba en 2008) y contra la decisión de la AN pronunciándose sobre el recurso de súplica de 10-7-2008 que es firme se interpone Amparo al TC que por ATC de 17-2-2009 declara el recurso inadmisible y contra éste la recurrente solicita tutela del TEDH por demanda en el recurso 42750/09. La Sentencia de 12-7- 2012 TEDH condena al Estado Español por la aplicación de la doctrina «Parot» (a lo que establecen sus pronunciamientos) pero esta sentencia no es firme y el hecho de que esté pendiente de ulterior decisión justifica este trabajo.The Supreme Spanish Court in the S.197/2006 of February 28 establishes the doctrine «Parot» applying the penitentiary in force legislation – more restrictive than the previous one in certain suppositions – to the existing penitentiary benefit at the time of reduction of a maximum exclusive sentence of freedom that a reprobate can fulfill by means of the work of the convict in prison case of multiple sentence for different facts in different judgments. The restriction doesn´t do to itself of direct form on a concrete sentence exclusive maxim of freedom that can be imposed in the judgment under the protection of the art. 70 and 100 CP and 988 LECRIM but also indirect form on having applied the penitentiary in force legislation on that penitentiary benefit of individual and successive form on each of the particular sentences. I do not relieve that the doctrine of the TS is and application or retroactive unfavorable interpretation to the convict of the in force CP. But the penitentiary law affects on a penitentiary benefit established in the previous one which is the reduction of the time of fulfilment of the sentence to the prisoners for the work realized in prison while the fulfil the sentence –in our case– in different processes and judgments. As it is this incident it will be able to be or not admissible, constitutional or not according violates or not the principle of legality of the art. 1-1 and 9-3 CE. In this case entilted resource of petition intervened against the Case of the AN of 23-6-2008 – that applies the doctrine Parot of the TS of 2006-and hinge as date of exit of prison of the appellant the year 2017 (the previous Case was fixing it in 2008) and against the decision of the AN they declaring on the resource of petition of 10- 7-2008 that is firm Protection intervenes to the TC that for ATC of 17-2-2009 he declares the inadmissible resource and against this one the appellant requests guardianship of the ECHR for demand in the resource 42750/09. The Judgment of 12-7-2012 ECHR condemns to the Spanish State by the application of the doctrine Parot (to what they establish his pronouncements) but this judgment is not firm and that decision is pending further justifies this work.

Il fenomeno del c.d. «diritto penale europeo», sebbene siano risalenti le prime riflessioni teoriche sulle sue possibilità di sviluppo e da tempo l’influsso più o meno manifesto del diritto sovranazionale sul diritto penale nazionale sta operando come un inarrestabile fiume sotterraneo, è ancora oggi oggetto di un sostanziale «deficit conoscitivo» e si pone più che mai al centro di necessarie approfondite analisi. Questo essenzialmente per tre ragioni. Innanzitutto, la fluidità e continua mutevolezza dello scenario istituzionale, normativo e giurisprudenziale in cui si collocano i possibili interventi dell’Europa in materia di giustizia penale necessitano di una continua attenta opera di aggiornamento. In secondo luogo, le difficoltà di analisi che si riscontrano in materia, dovute al già rilevato carattere sotterraneo di molti dei fenomeni che vengono in rilievo in questo ambito, al loro alto grado di tecnicismo, alla marcata interdisciplinarietà della materia e alla difficoltà culturale di dover abbandonare la tradizionale forma mentis del giurista, fanno sì che, nonostante l’intervento nel tempo di un folto numero di studi, siamo forse ancora solo all’inizio del superamento di quella situazione di «deficit conoscitivo» inizialmente evocata. Tali difficoltà, forse mai del tutto superabili, devono, quindi, necessariamente condurre ad una costante tensione verso il miglioramento e perfezionamento delle analisi di un fenomeno che si presenta ancora, anche agli occhi degli esperti, come un «labirinto», senza sorprendersi del fatto che, anche alla luce della sua già rilevata fluidità, le acquisizioni di oggi potrebbero un domani costituire forse solo un angolo visuale intermedio, parziale e momentaneo, seppur necessario, per la futura lettura critico-ricostruttiva dell’intero sistema...
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Il diritto dell’Unione europea possiede oggi un’influenza sempre più rilevante sul diritto penale degli Stati membri. A partire dall’entrata in vigore del Trattato di Lisbona, tale influenza coinvolge espressamente anche le scelte di criminalizzazione, potendo l’Unione operare direttamente la decisione circa l’an e in parte anche il quantum di pena. Le istituzioni dell’Unione hanno già iniziato ad adottare direttive in materia penale impiegando quale base giuridica l’art. 83 TFUE, e ci si può ragionevolmente attendere che tale prassi si consolidi e aumenti il numero degli atti adottati, andando così a costituire un corpus normativo di crescente rilevanza per gli ordinamenti nazionali e in ultima analisi per i singoli individui. La tesi ripercorre le più importanti tappe che hanno condotto all’attuale sviluppo della competenza penale europea, soffermandosi principalmente sul quadro istituzionale introdotto dal Trattato di Lisbona (capitolo primo). Successivamente fornisce un sintetico riepilogo degli strumenti istituzionali e normativi di maggiore rilievo nel settore considerato e delle loro più rilevanti caratteristiche (capitolo secondo), passando poi ad effettuare una disamina dei principali atti sino ad oggi adottati, prima nel vigore del terzo pilastro e poi sotto la base giuridica fornita dal Trattato di Lisbona (capitolo terzo). Infine, prova a verificare la presenza, i caratteri e la giustiziabilità dei fondamentali principi della legislazione penale nell’ordinamento dell’Unione europea, alla luce della normazione vigente e della giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia (capitolo quarto), per poi tentare di affermare la sussistenza di basi fondative per lo sviluppo di una vera e propria politica penale europea.
European Union law today has an increasingly relevant influence on national criminal law. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, this influence has expressly involved the choices of criminalization as well, as the European Union may directly operate the decision on if and partly how much to punish. The institutions have already begun to adopt directives on criminal matters using art. 83 TFEU as a legal basis, and one can reasonably expect that this practice will consolidate and that the number of measures adopted will increase, thus creating a corpus of legislation which has a growing relevance on the national legal systems and, ultimately, on individuals. The dissertation recalls the most important landmarks that have led to the present development of the European criminal competence, focusing mainly on the institutional framework adopted by the Lisbon Treaty (chapter one). Later, it provides a brief recall of the institutional and legal instruments that have a main role in the relevant subject and of their main characteristics (chapter two). Then, it moves to deal with the main legal acts that have been adopted till now, first in the third pillar framework and then under the legal basis provided by the Lisbon Treaty (chapter three). Eventually, it aims to verify the presence, the characteristics and the possibility to be appealed to on a trial of the fundamental principles of criminal legislation, in the light of the legislation in force and of the case law of the CJEU (chapter four), in order to attempt to maintain the existence of founding basis to the development of an actual European criminal policy.

Serious forms of crime have abandoned the merely national dimension and become transnational: think of terrorism, organized crime, computer crime, trafficking in human beings, just to name a few. In order to adequately fight this kind of phenomena, criminal law should do the same and not be so tied to the merely national dimension. European citizens ask for security and their request should be interpreted as expressing the need for regulatory interventions in the criminal field. Of course they deserve certainty as to the fact that appropriate sanctioning measures will be taken by all the Member States of the European Union (EU) in order to effectively deal with crime. Anyway, one should remember that criminal law must not be dissociated from the protection of fundamental rights because that would result in the denial of basic values inherent in democratic societies, first of all the rule of law. Then, the need for an axiological horizon and principles which found and limit the EU criminal system arises. So, my research question is: what are the axiological horizon and the principles which found and limit the EU criminal system? This work focuses on the precedents of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), so on a judge-made law whose development has basically been made possible thanks to the preliminary ruling procedure. No one denies that case law should remain bound to the specific case, inasmuch the extension of the ratio decidendi to other cases always is the result of selective operations. However, the presentation of the topics in this PhD thesis shows not only that the judgments of the ECJ in the criminal field are numerous, but also that they are characterized by the progressive emergence of a criminal law consciousness, a criminal law sensibility, and the will to create a system which is intrinsically consistent. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is also taken into account in light of the phenomenon called cross-fertilization. The works of Italian and European legal scholars are considered too. So, after an Introduction on the relationship between globalization, crime, and competences of the EU in criminal matters, the thesis deals with the concept of criminal law (First Chapter), the principles of legality of criminal offences and penalties (Second Chapter), offensiveness (Third Chapter), guilt (Fourth Chapter), and proportionality (Fifth Chapter) in the case law of the ECJ. In the Conclusion, an assessment of the results is provided. As problematic as it seems, the search for an axiological horizon and principles of EU criminal law has proven fruitful. In the first chapter, I found out that it is possible to identify two notions of criminal law which have been developed by the ECJ in the last twenty-five years. According to the former, criminal law is that branch of law which aims at protecting the values that are deemed fundamental by national communities. According to the latter, the criminal nature of a sanction should be asserted in light of the so-called Engel criteria as developed by the EctHR (legal classification of the offence under national law, very nature of the offence, and degree of severity of the sanction). The latter approach is now prevailing. At first sight, they do not look so different, but I think the latter should be preferred because of the different axiological horizon. The former approach relies on the values that are deemed fundamental by national communities, while the latter one implicitly relies on the European Convention on Human Rights. So, it is characterized by an inclusive dimension which may lack in the former one, since fundamental national values may not be consistent with human rights (think of the case of Hungary). The second chapter is devoted to the principle of legality of criminal offences and penalties and takes into account five major issues: the interpretative incidence of EU directives in criminal matters (the prohibition of determining or aggravating the liability in criminal law and the duty of conforming interpretation); the interpretative incidence of EU regulations and frameworks decisions (the duty of conforming interpretation); the integrating incidence of EU law (how EU law shapes the meaning of national legislation); the disapplying incidence (in case national provisions are not consistent with EU law, with in bonam partem effects); the lex mitior principle. The analysis led to the conclusion that the principle of legality of criminal offences and penalties is not dead, as someone said, but has adapted to national and international realities which have changed. The third chapter deals with the principle of offensiveness and is divided into two parts. In the first part, an analysis is provided with reference to those judgments (Amsterdam Bulb, Commission v Hellenic Republic) in which the ECJ ruled that some legal interests which belong to the EU (above all, the financial ones) should be protected by the Member States under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive, in light of the principle of sincere cooperation. In the second part, recent judgments concerning criminal law and immigration law (El Dridi, Achughbabian, Sagor) are considered in order to show how the ECJ has questioned national lawmakers' choices which were inconsistent with the principle of sincere cooperation. The fourth chapter is dedicated to the principle of guilt and, more specifically, to six topics: The distinction between intentionally-committed and unintentionally-committed offences, the concept of intentional offence, the concept of negligence, strict criminal liability, Ignorantia legis non excusat, and the concept of force majeure. In the fifth chapter, the case law concerning the principle of proportionality is taken into consideration by highlighting how the ECJ has solved the cases in which a clash between national regulations criminal in nature and one of the four fundamental freedoms had occurred. It is quite interesting to notice that the solution given by the Court has always aimed at finding a balance point between the values at stake by identifying some conditions under which the four fundamental freedoms may be sacrificed. In conclusion, the gradual recognition of competences in criminal matters to the European Union is the result of the emergence of the political identity of the Union, since the creation of criminal law – both at the international and national level – requires the prior identification of a system of shared fundamental values, which are expressive of an identity. Some legal scholars, in analyzing the events and reasons for the failure of the draft European Constitution, spoke of the absence of a European people characterized by common ethnicity, culture, society and language. Such reasoning has been discussed among criminal law scholars for a long time with reference to European criminal law, since the unification of criminal law presupposes the cultural unification of Europe. The point is that, without assuming a world legal commonality, one can hypothise a European legal commonality. In my opinion, it is very convincing the reasoning of those who state that the foundation of human rights must be sought not – or not only – in the human nature, but also – and most of all – in the history and culture of peoples, considering, at least at the European level, the set of ideas and principles of the tradition of the old continent, through the reference to the Christian roots of Europe and the Enlightenment. So, those values already exist. Undoubtedly, the culture of the Europeans is the culture of human rights, and the lingua franca of Europe is the language of rights as declined in the Nice Charter and the European Convention of Human Rights. As demonstrated in the thesis, the jurisprudential experience of the Court of Justice has been mature enough to get to deal with the issues of protection of fundamental rights and, most of all, the protection of those rights through criminal law. The Court did so by progressively becoming aware of the nature of that branch of law – as explained in the first chapter – which has been considered not as a simple tool of repression, but as a means through which affirm and reaffirm freedoms. I believe that can reasonably be confirmed by turning the attention to the essence of the principles of legality, offensiveness, guilt, proportionality. As a matter of fact, they represent the limits to the use of criminal methods of repression, the observance of which leads to the outcome of legitimization and re-legitimization of criminal law, both at the national and international level; they indicate the existence of criminal awareness and sensitivity of the Court; they mark the road that will lead to the final result of the emergence of a criminal law of the European Union, made up of both a general part and a special part, both inspired, supported and controlled by those principles.
Il testo è così organizzato: Introduzione: nella quale si trattano le questioni relative al riconoscimento di una competenza in materia penale in favore dell'Unione europea alla luce dei problemi posti dal fenomeno della globalizzazione. Si provvede altresì all'illustrazione della metodologia della ricerca, basata sull'analisi delle sentenze della Corte di giustizia dell'Unione europea e, ove necessario, della Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo. Capitolo I: dedicato al concetto di diritto penale come definito da parte degli avvocati generali nelle loro conclusioni e quindi adottato da parte della Corte di giustizia dell'Unione europea nelle proprie pronunce. Esso assume rilievo in quanto delimita l'orizzonte assiologico di riferimento, rappresentato, in un primo momento, dai valori fondamentali delle singole comunità statali, per essere individuato in seguito nella Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo, in un'ottica di cross-fertilization fondata sul richiamo alla sentenza della Corte EDU Engel e altri c. Paesi Bassi (1976) e sulla giurisprudenza sviluppatasi successivamente. Capitolo II: nel quale è affrontato il tema del principio di legalità, considerato a partire dai diversi angoli prospettici dell'incidenza interpretativa delle fonti comunitarie / dell'Unione europea (regolamenti, direttive e decisioni quadro) sul diritto penale interno (soprattutto con riferimento al divieto di determinare o aggravare la responsabilità penale e l'obbligo di interpretazione conforme relativi alle direttive), dell'incidenza integratrice (il rapporto tra normativa interna e normativa dell'Unione quanto alla nozione di rifiuto), dell'incidenza disapplicatrice (la disapplicazione della normativa penale statale contrastante con quella europea con efficacia in bonam partem) e del principio di lex mitior, per quindi volgere l'attenzione al problematico rapporto tra legalità europea ed erosione della sovranità statale. Capitolo III: dedicato al principio di offensività, nel quale si analizzano due orientamenti giurisprudenziali. Il primo, a partire dal principio di leale cooperazione, ha condotto all'affermazione dell'obbligo per gli Stati membri di predisporre per gli interessi comunitari / dell'Unione europea una tutela analoga a quella stabilita per i corrispondenti interessi a livello statale, facendo ricorso a sanzioni effettive, proporzionate e dissuasive (sentenze Amsterdam Bulb, Commissione c. Grecia); il secondo ha invece portato a escludere che scelte di criminalizzazione operate da parte dei legislatori nazionali possano impedire la realizzazione dell'effetto utile del diritto dell'Unione europea, con un conseguente e tendenziale abbandono dello strumento di repressione penale nell'ambito del diritto dell'immigrazione (sentenze El Dridi, Achughbabian, Sagor). Capitolo IV: nel quale si tratta del principio di colpevolezza, dando conto di una giurisprudenza puntiforme che ha individuato la distinzione tra reati intenzionali e non intenzionali, definito i concetti di intenzionalità e negligenza grave, affermato e quindi superato la responsabilità penale oggettiva, cercato di valorizzare la regula iuris secondo cui ignorantia legis non excusat ed esplicitato una nozione di forza maggiore. Capitolo V: dedicato al principio di proporzionalità, nel quale si considera come la Corte di giustizia, posta dinanzi a situazioni caratterizzate da un contrasto tra la normativa penale interna, da un lato, e una delle quattro libertà fondamentali riconosciute nell'ordinamento dell'Unione europea, dall'altro, abbia valorizzato detto principio, in un senso non esclusivamente protezionistico, cercando anzi di individuare un punto di equilibrio tra valori tutelati, valori sacrificati e mezzi attraverso i quali realizzare la tutela dei primi e il sacrificio dei secondi. Conclusioni: nelle quali si sottolinea come l'Unione europea sia ormai diventata un soggetto avente natura costituzionale, dato che il processo di integrazione ha raggiunto il livello più autenticamente costituzionale, ossia la tutela dei diritti fondamentali, il quale rappresenta l'espressione più alta della sovranità e l'elemento principale di legittimazione di essa, cosa che sembra dunque militare a favore di una definitiva attribuzione di competenza penale alle istituzioni dell'Unione, almeno per quel che riguarda la protezione di beni giuridici propriamente europei.

This chapter addresses the judicial review of European Commission decisions regarding concentrations. The Courts of the European Union have exclusive jurisdiction to control the legality of the decisions adopted by the Commission in the field of concentrations. Over the years, judicial review of these decisions has touched many aspects of the Commission's practice, raising questions as to where the balance of discretion of the Commission and intensity of the review should lie. The European Courts have also examined the conformity of actions of Member States in relation to the Regulation. The resulting body of case law has been instrumental in the review and improvement of the working methods of the Commission and has played a major instigating role in the reform process that the Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) and the Merger Control Regulation (MCR) itself have undergone. Articles 263 TFEU and 21(2) of the MCR provide for the direct review by the EU Courts of decisions adopted by the Commission under the Regulation. That principle is reiterated in respect of decisions imposing fines or periodic penalty payments by Article 16 of the MCR, where the courts enjoy unlimited jurisdiction pursuant to Article 262 TFEU. Other acts adopted by the Commission under the MCR may also be challenged before the EU Courts.