Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Legal theory, jurisprudence and legal interpretation'
To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Legal theory, jurisprudence and legal interpretation.
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 dissertations / theses for your research on the topic 'Legal theory, jurisprudence and legal interpretation.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse dissertations / theses on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Deagon, Alex. "The Contours of Truth: Using Christian Theology and Philosophy to Construct a Jurisprudence of Truth." Thesis, Griffith University, 2015. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/110544/2/110544.pdf.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis proposes that the modern Western legal system contains secularised or otherwise distorted Christian theology as an integral part of its conceptual foundation. It argues that this secularisation has led to legal violence in the form of antagonism between the members of the legal community, and alienation of the individuals in the community from each other and the state. In order to establish a peaceful system of law and mitigate this violence, the thesis contends that these distorted concepts ought to be identified and returned to their ‘orthodox’ understandings. In particular, the Christian ideas of truth, faith and reason require analysis in a jurisprudential context. To this end, the thesis engages the work of John Milbank and attempts to articulate a particular conception of the relationship between truth, faith and reason – one which will be conducive to the construction of a legal community characterised by peace rather than violence.
The introductory chapter summarises the thesis and its methodology, and positions the thesis in its relevant jurisprudential, philosophical and theological context. The first chapter of the thesis more specifically structures the content by reviewing and critiquing John Milbank’s work in terms of constructing working definitions of truth, faith and reason. Having proposed these, chapter two examines and extends Milbank’s theological critique of science, exposing the secularisation of ‘scientific’ reason and its divorce from ‘Christian’ faith which forms the foundation for ‘modern’ (secular) thinking. With an analysis of Jacques Derrida in chapter three, the thesis proceeds to explain how faith and reason are reconciled in Christian theology, allowing the development of a ‘post-modern’ theology with the view of producing peace rather than violence.
Chapter four adopts this postmodern theology, tracing the genealogy of secularisation and violence in the development of law and the modern legal community. This shows the contingent nature of the secular legal system and creates a space for it to be redeemed and made peaceful. Chapter five commences the process of articulating this Christian idea of a peaceful legal community through the revelation of theological truth by reading law and truth in the trial of Christ, arguing for a system which embraces a loving mutual trust rather than a calculating drive for decision or finality. Chapter six contends that trust in the face of the mysterious divine is in fact the desirable Christian legacy, one which is nevertheless materialised and accessible through Christ’s resurrection, and makes possible eternal life beyond the constraints of violence. The resurrection instantiates the Pauline law to love your neighbour as yourself, and chapter seven explores the nature of this theological truth, and argues that its application to the modern legal system will allow a love beyond law which produces a peaceful community.
2
Stobbs, Nigel. "Mainstreaming therapeutic jurisprudence and the adversarial paradigm—incommensurability and the possibility of a shared disciplinary matrix." Thesis, Bond University, 2013. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/63846/1/Stobbs_Thesis_Submit_PhD_2013.pdf.
Full textAbstract:
Problem-solving courts appear to achieve outcomes that are not common in mainstream courts. There are increasing calls for the adoption of more therapeutic and problem-solving practices by mainstream judges in civil and criminal courts in a number of jurisdictions, most notably in the United States and Australia. Currently, a judge who sets out to exercise a significant therapeutic function is likely to be doing so in a specialist court or jurisdiction, outside the mainstream court system, and arguably, outside the adversarial paradigm itself. To some extent, this work is tolerated but marginalised.
However, do therapeutic and problem-solving functions have the potential to help define, rather than simply complement, the role of judicial officers? The core question addressed in this thesis is whether the judicial role could evolve to be not just less adversarial, but fundamentally non-adversarial. In other words, could we see—or are we seeing—a juristic paradigm shift not just in the colloquial, casual sense of the word, but in the strong, worldview changing sense meant by Thomas Kuhn?
This thesis examines the current relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence in the context of Kuhn’s conception of the transition from periods of ‘normal science’, through periods of anomaly and disciplinary crises to paradigm shifts. It considers whether therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism are incommensurable in the Kuhnian sense, and if so, what this means for the relationship between the two, and for the agenda to mainstream therapeutic jurisprudence.
The thesis asserts that Kuhnian incommensurability is, in fact, a characteristic of the relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence, but that the possibility of a therapeutic paradigm shift in law can be reconciled with many adversarial and due process principles by relating this incommensurability to a broader disciplinary matrix.
3
Marmor, Andrei. "Interpretation and legal theory /." Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1992. http://www.gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/recht/toc/277092086.pdf.
Full text
4
Marmor, Andrei. "Interpretation in legal theory." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.386453.
Full text
5
Eleftheriadis, Pavlos. "A theory of legal rights." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.360732.
Full text
6
Mitrophanous, Eleni. "Constructive interpretation : Dworkin on interpretation as a method for understanding law." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.285251.
Full text
7
McCoubrey, Hilaire. "The obligation to obey in legal theory : towards a contextual approach." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.280262.
Full text
8
Bergeron, Gregory Michael. "On how the debate about what is law should proceed in the face of the methodology conflict in jurisprudence." Texas A&M University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/85953.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis focuses on the contemporary literature in Anglo-American analytic
jurisprudence that takes answering the question â what is law?â as the primary goal.
Agreement about what is lawâ that is, agreement about which theory of law is accurate and
adequateâ is necessary to achieve the primary goal. Theorists have come to acknowledge
that no such agreement exists due to their disagreements over two subjects: (S1) what is law
and (S2) what methodology theorists should follow to produce an accurate and adequate
theory of law. I refer to theoristsâ disagreement about S2 as the methodology conflict.
Today, theorists advance towards the primary goal in two different directions: directly or
indirectly. The direct course labors to accomplish agreement about which theory of law is
accurate and adequate. The indirect course toils to accomplish agreement about which
methodology a theory of law should satisfy to be accurate and adequate, before advancing to
the direct course. If one course is the correct or best way to achieve the primary goal, it is
imprudent for theorists to continue to work towards the same goal in separate directions.
How, then, should theorists proceed? Answering this question, loosely put, is the main
objective of this thesis. I argue that theorists must resolve the methodology conflict first to be able to
achieve the primary goal of jurisprudence (i.e., to reach a common answer to the question
â what is law?â ). I reveal that the methodology conflict poses a serious problem for theorists
working to reach an agreement about S1: namely, theorists cannot agree about which legal
theory is accurate and adequate unless they agree about which methodology a legal theory
should satisfy to be accurate and adequate. Next, I settle the methodology conflict. I show
that a particular synthesis of the current two approaches to resolve theoristsâ disagreement
about S2 â imperialism and relativismâ provides a way out of the methodology conflict. I
explain that the solution to the methodology conflict is a reasonable four-step examination
process that enables theorists to engage in meaningful debate about S1 and S2 and work
more successfully towards achieving the primary goal.
9
Roumeliotis, Michael D. "The jurisprudence of 'ordinary language' : a study of epistemology in legal theory." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/20156.
Full textAbstract:
Part 1: The distinction between a social rule and convergence of behaviour does not depict the internal point of view regarding behaviour in traditional rural social groups. Nor does it depict how people actually behave. It is ideological, contingent on the modern era and the emancipation of the individual. It is a matter of the theorist's presuming a logic, a form of life, that stipulates what may count as a reason for action. Part 2: Linguistic jurisprudence, as ordinary language philosophy that it is, does not expect, regarding the conceptual, to find a reality independent of society and the happenstance of society's language. In a positivist fashion, it merely describes social reality. The distinctions it comes up with (and so the one Part 1 was about) are factual instead, part of the logic/ form of life of modern Western society. - Yet social reality is complex and many sided, not a coherent theory. Existing assumptions/distinctions in social reality/ language are contradictory and interminable. - Linguistic jurisprudence is not concerned with all assumptions that may exist as possibilities, only with the typical ones that form the network of assumptions, which communication presupposes. - There are many languages not one. Communication exists no more, even if Oxonian armchair philosophy keeps taking it for granted. - Communicating is not presupposing rules. It is changing them, adjusting them to the people we encounter. We are both the same and different, there are both many and one languages. It is all a matter of what we choose to see. The positive reality of any given aggregate will entail an infinite number of communities/ societies, and corresponding languages, along with their negations. Uncommitted description cannot take place (is interminable) without the adoption by the theorist of a logic, which cannot be found in the external reality to be described. Part 3: Language is not a matter of uncommitted observation of social practice, but rules in our minds. The theorist is not reporting social groups' languages, but examining his own.
10
Voyatzis, Hernandez Xochiquetzal Panagia. "Changing hearts and minds in Mexico : a cognitive-jurisprudential approach to legal education reform in a legal system in transition." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/16443.
Full textAbstract:
The starting assumption of this thesis is that to fully understand legal practices – including legal reasoning – we need to get a grasp of the complex body of knowledge into which they are immersed. Legal studies have often assumed that legal knowledge can be reduced to the knowledge of legal rules. This research departs from this perspective and argues for an understanding of legal knowledge that includes the complex set of conceptual, procedural and affective considerations which shape legal practices in general, and legal reasoning in particular. Herein we argue that not only legal knowledge is wider than the knowledge of rules, but that there are also some aspects of legal practice that cannot be properly addressed by explicitly drafted legal rules. We purport to build such an account upon epistemologically-informed comparative legal perspectives and insights of the cognitive sciences, by way of discussing a particular factual problem. The case to be studied in this thesis is the apparent loss of certainty in Mexican legal practice, when legal professionals engage in precedent-based reasoning. The situation, which was first reported in 2006, has remained broadly unexplored, and by default has been reputed as a problem concerning the set of explicit rules that regulate the system of legal precedents in that national context. We argue that the situation cannot be fully comprehended and remedied if we exclusively focus on the dimension of legal rules, but that it would be better understood if we direct our attention to the deeper knowledge structures in which that practice is immersed. This thesis builds a case for a broadened approach to legal knowledge by unveiling the historically built knowledge structures in which the Mexican understanding of precedents is embedded. As we shall see, this particular framework has acted as a deterrent to precedent-based reasoning, as accounted by a set of theories of law and legal reasoning. By focusing on the several processes of legal change and the collateral epistemic revisions that Mexican legal professionals seem to be experiencing for the past decades, this thesis argues that changing deeply embedded knowledge structures is a difficult task that needs to be supported by revising the processes of knowledge construction, and most importantly legal education.
11
Petoussi, Vassiliki Jr. "From Reified Abstractions to Situated Contexts: Feminist Jurisprudence, Paradigm Shift and Legal Change." Diss., Virginia Tech, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/30306.
Full textAbstract:
This study addresses the extent to which feminist jurisprudence literature has developed the potential to initiate a legal paradigm shift leading to legal and consequent social change that would alleviate gender inequality. Drawing upon Kuhn's (1970) and Stacey and Thorne's (1985) arguments, I theorized that for a paradigm shift centered upon women and women's experiences to occur, feminist jurisprudence, particularly second- and third-phase feminist jurisprudence, needs to be incorporated into, and accepted by the mainstream. Through quantitative analysis I evaluated, first, the publication and citation patterns and the diffusion of feminist jurisprudence litearature as evidenced in articles published between the years 1983 and 1994 in legal journals assigned impact factors by the Social Science Citation Index. Second, using content analysis, I classified feminist jurisprudence articles published in the subfields of family and penal law --theorized to differ in degree of androcentrism-- according to the three phases of feminist jurisprudence theory. My quantitative analysis showed that the number of feminist jurisprudence articles published in mainstream legal journals is increasing over time. Further, feminist jurisprudence articles published in legal journals with higher impact factors tend to receive larger numbers of citations than articles published in journals with lower impact factors. Finally, although the overall impact factor of journals publishing feminist jurisprudence articles is declining, feminist jurisprudence literature is present among a wide spectrum of legal specializations. My qualitative analysis showed that there was an equivalent number of family and penal law articles which exhibited second- and third-phase characteristics. However, family law articles tended to cover a wider range of topics than penal law articles. Furthermore, family law scholars were more likely than penal law scholars to address issues of differences among women and feminists, thus, exhibiting third-phase characteristics. In constrast, penal law scholars tended to focus upon differences between feminists and non-feminists and the practical difficulties resulting from the structure, organization and practitioners of the criminal justice. Overall, my analysis showed that feminist jurisprudence appears to have developed the potential to initiate a paradigm shift within the legal discipline. However, in addition to feminist theorizing, feminist activism is important for the realization of legal and social changes that will alleviate gender inequality.Ph. D.
12
Lobban, Michael John Warrender. "The development of common law theory : English jurisprudence c. 1760- c. 1830." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.330033.
Full text
13
Dordelli, Rosales Nelson Richard. "Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court of Venezuela." Thèse, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/26250.
Full textAbstract:
The prime focus of this dissertation consists in exploring constitutional jurisprudence in the Supreme Court of Venezuela over the last five decades, making use of arguments drawn from Venezuelan history and the existing jurisprudential approaches to theories about the general character of law as integrated in numerous public law cases. This study offers a new approach, one that focuses on ensuring that fundamental constitutional principles are aligned with the concrete objectives (purposes) that the Constitution sets out to achieve. This account is developed through a theoretical framework comprising of: I. A historical overview from independence (1811) to democratization (1947 and beyond), emphasizing the fundamentals of the Constitutions of 1961 and 1999, to portray a vivid and accurate picture of the origins of Venezuela’s constitutional democracy; II. A survey, of constitutional cases that illustrates the evolution of the Venezuelan constitutional jurisprudence under the overt or subliminal use of certain default legal theories, namely, legal positivism in the era of the 1961 Constitution, legal realism and Ronald Dworkin’s adjudication theory in the era of the 1999 Constitution III. An insightful discussion of the main arguments of Ronald Dworkin’s principled theory and Justice Aharon Barak’s purposive theory, in an effort to build theorectical support, which links the various points of their respective theories in order to articulate one in the context of the Venezuelan jurisprudence; IV An original attempt to build a theoretical approach based on the Venezuelan constitutional system, history, culture, and identity to bring together the priorities of formalism, particularly the written principles of the Constitution and the priorities of functionalism and social welfare. This is to ensure that the Supreme Court decides accordingly with the constitutional principles as much as their underlying purposes to provide solutions to legal conundrums.
14
Donayre, Lobo Gabriel. "The Legal Interpretation: Proposals for its Application in Tax Law." Derecho & Sociedad, 2015. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/118642.
Full textAbstract:
The first half of this report contains the concept of interpretation and its relationship with the written language. In addition, it proposes how the ambiguity of the language is one of the main problems for legal interpretation. The second half of this report establishes which components of the legal interpretation are, from a theoretical perspective –according to doctrine and practice– following jurisprudence, criteria and methods of interpretation allowed in Law. This part also proposes a route for the legal interpretation in Tax Law. The third part of this report contains the interpretation of two resolutions from the Tax Court following the described route.En la primera parte del artículo se determina el concepto de interpretación y su relación con el lenguaje escrito. Asimismo, se plantea la ambigüedad como uno de los principales problemas que se presenta en la comprensión del lenguaje escrito, así como en la interpretación jurídica. En la segunda parte del artículo se plasman los componentes de la interpretación jurídica, desarrollando desde un punto de vista teórico-doctrinario y práctico-jurisprudencial, los criterios y métodos de interpretación admitidos por el Derecho. Asimismo, se propone un itinerario para la interpretación en el Derecho Tributario. En la tercera parte se desarrolla la interpretación de dos resoluciones del Tribunal Fiscal, utilizando el itinerario propuesto.
15
Moles, R. N. "Definition and rule in jurisprudence : a critique of H.L.A. Hart's response to John Austin." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.370587.
Full text
16
Raban, Ofer. "Law, impartiality and rationality." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.270467.
Full text
17
Lubis, Nazly Hanum. "Al-Ṭūfī's concept of Maṣlaḥah : a study in Islamic legal theory." Thesis, McGill University, 1995. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=23341.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis studies a method of legal reasoning used in determining legal rulings guided by the principle of maslahah (public interest), promulgated by a liberal thinker of the medieval period, Najm al-Din al-Tufi (d. 710/716 A.H.). His theory of maslahah is not confined only to cases which have no textual basis but is also applied to those problems that come within the purview of the revealed texts. His theory of maslahah is, no doubt, unique and original. He prefers to place maslahah above all legal sources, including the Qur'an and the Hadith which, according to him, cannot lead people to uniform rulings. He believes that only with this theory can human welfare be secured.Due to its unique and controversial nature, al-Tufi's theory of maslahah was not welcomed and even received severe criticism from other jurists. Indeed, this theory went beyond al-Tufis times and was much later seen as suitable for anticipating social change. Therefore, in modern times, in which law reform is needed his theory of maslahah receives serious attention. This thesis also attempts to argue that, even though their concept of maslahah is not as liberal as that of al-Tufi the modern reformists' theory of maslahah is, by and large, inspired and even influenced by al-Tufis maslahah.
18
Gould, James Peter David. "Equality Act 2010 : law, reason and morality in the jurisprudence of Robert P. George." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/32560.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis provides a critical application of Robert P. George’s views to English equality law. The research question is what George, with his view of religion as a basic human good, might think about the religious liberty cases taken under the provisions of the Equality Act 2010. In addressing this question, it will be necessary to look at those - to some eyes - irreconcilable tensions which have emerged between laws protecting religious freedom. A number of legal claims have been brought by employees who have been instructed to carry out new legal obligations which they have been unwilling to perform. Questions have arisen regarding the current state of reasonable accommodation and proportionality analysis within indirect discrimination law. To examine these questions, this thesis will be in two parts: first, it will consider Robert George’s distinctive contribution to new natural law theory (NNL) and critically analyse George’s NNL approach that arises from this. To do so the key themes: a) practical reason and b) natural rights, will be considered in George’s work. Second, by reading George’s views on practical reason in line with his approach to natural rights, from this position this thesis will give an applied example of NNL, displaying George’s critique of the relevant equality law and arguing for an innovative understanding and approach to religious equality law. This is in an effort to find whether George’s theory is useful in exploring English religious equality law. By doing so this will reconstruct George’s NNL approach through using religious equality law as an applied example. This thesis argues that at a time when religious liberty often loses out in a balancing of rights, legitimate interests and protected characteristics, a superior way to approach equality law in this area may be through an application of a modified version of George’s NNL thought presenting religion as a public good. This will emphasise the priority of the good in religious conscience over legal rights within law viewed by George as a public morality. Viewing religion not only as a basic human good but also as a public good could provide the basis for future accommodation towards freedom of religious conscience and solve the tensions regarding the protection of religion or belief at work. Religion and religious freedom will be shown to be a form of flourishing within an understanding of the public good.
19
Crawley, Karen. "Limited ink : interpreting and misinterpreting GÜdel's incompleteness theorem in legal theory." Thesis, McGill University, 2006. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=101814.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis explores the significance of Godel's Theorem for an understanding of law as rules, and of legal adjudication as rule-following. It argues that Godel's Theorem, read through Wittgenstein's understanding of rules and language as a contextual activity, and through Derrida's account of 'undecidability,' offers an alternative account of the relationship of judging to justice. Instead of providing support for the 'indeterminacy' claim, Godel's Theorem illuminates the predicament of undecidability that structures any interpretation and every legal decision, and which constitutes the opening to justice. The first argument in this thesis examines Godel's proof, Wittgenstein's views on rules, and Derrida's undecidability, as manifestations of a common concern with the limits of what can be formalized. The meta-argument examines their misinterpretation and misappropriation within legal theory as a case study of just what they mean about meaning, context, and justice as necessarily co-implicated.
20
Behn, Daniel. "A theory of configurative fairness for evolving international legal orders : linking the scientific study of value subjectivity to jurisprudential thought." Thesis, University of Dundee, 2013. https://discovery.dundee.ac.uk/en/studentTheses/76f73f77-b861-4afd-8396-75e2c957705e.
Full textAbstract:
Values matter in both legal decision (lawmaking and lawapplying) and discourse (lawshaping and lawinfluencing). Yet, their purported subjectivity means that gaining or improving knowledge about values (whether they be epistemic, legal, moral, ethical, economic, political, cultural, social, or religious) in the context of analytic legal thought and understanding is often said to be at odds with its goal of objectivity. This phenomenon is amplified at the international level where the infusion of seemingly subjective political values by sovereigns, and the decisionmakers to whom they delegate, can, and does, interfere with an idealized and objective rule of law. The discourse on value subjectivity, and its relation to the purpose and function of the law, is particularly apparent in evolving international legal orders such as investment treaty arbitration. The primary aim of this work is to provide a new method for gaining empirical knowledge about value subjectivity that can help close a weak link in all nonpositivist (value-laden) legal theory: a weakness that has manifest itself as skepticism about the possibility of measuring value objectively enough to permit its incorporation as a necessary component of analytic jurisprudence. This work proposes a theory of configurative fairness for addressing the problem related to the development or evolution of legal regimes, and how legal regimes perceived as subjectively unfair can be remedied. Such a theory accepts the premise that perceptions of fairness matter in directing the way that legal orders develop, and that perceptions of fairness relate to the manner in which values are distributed and maximized in particular legal orders. It is posited that legal orders perceived as fair by their participants are more likely to be endorsed or accepted as legally binding (and are therefore more likely to comply with the processes and outcomes that such laws mandate). The purpose of a theory of configurative fairness is an attempt to provide a methodological bridge for improving knowledge about value in the context of legal inquiry through the employment of a technique called Q methodology: an epistemological and empirical means for the measurement and mapping of human subjectivity. It is a method that was developed in the early twentieth century by physicist-psychologist William Stephenson: the last research student of the inventor of factor analysis, Charles Spearman. What Stephenson did was to create a way for systematically measuring subjective perspectives, and although not previously used in jurisprudential thought, Q methodology will facilitate a means for the description and evaluation of shared subjectivities. In the context of law generally, and in investment treaty arbitration specifically, these are the subjectivities that manifest themselves as the conflicting perspectives about value that are omnipresent in both communicative lawshaping discourse and authoritative and controlling lawmaking and lawapplying decision. Knowledge about these shared value subjectivities among participants in investment treaty arbitration will allow the legal analyst to delineate and clarify points of overlapping consensus about the desired distribution of value as they relate to the regime-building issues of evolving legal orders. The focus for a theory of configurative fairness pertains to the identification of the various value positions that participants hold about a particular legal order and to configure those values, through its rules and principles, in a manner that is acceptable (and perceived as fair) by all of its participants. If such a value consensus can be identified, then particular rules in the legal order can be configured by decisionmakers in a way so as to satisfy participants’ shared value understandings. To engage such a theory, a means for identifying shared value subjectivities must be delineated. This work conducts a Q method study on the issues under debate relating to regime-building questions in investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study asked participants knowledgeable about investment treaty arbitration to rank-order a set of statements about the way that the values embraced by this legal order ought to be configured. The results of the study demonstrate that there is significant overlap about how participants in investment treaty arbitration perceive the desired distribution of values across the regime. The Q method study identified six distinct perspectives that represent shared subjectivities about value in the context of the development of investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study was also able to identify where there is an overlapping consensus about value distribution across the distinct perspectives. It is these areas of overlapping consensus that are most likely to reflect shared value understandings, and it is proposed that it is upon these shared value understandings that the future development of investment treaty arbitration ought to aim.
21
Psarras, Charalampos. "Law's authority and the division of moral labour between legislation and adjudication." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/9601.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis claims that if law has a distinctive and genuine normative force, then it is thanks to the fact that law’s authority originates from a particular institutional layout that allows for a division of moral labour between legislation and adjudication. After establishing what the moral dimension of authority is a matter of, and how law’s normative force can be justified by reference to it, this thesis defends a comprehensive-moral account of law’s authority. In this respect, the thesis argues that the moral dimension of law’s authority can be highlighted well if we consider it as emerging through a morally meaningful institutional distinction between legislation and adjudication: the institutional profile of legislative authority and that of adjudicative authority differ from each other, in that each can be said to be underlain by its own evaluative standards. On the one hand, the particularity of legislative authority is a matter of its community-driven, forward-looking character and of its consensual structure; as well as of the declaratory nature and the agent-relative status of reasons issued by legislative provisions. On the other hand, adjudicative authority is distinctive because it has a litigant-driven, remedial character and employs an adversarial structure so that it accomplishes its impartial investigatory task through the issuance of agent-neutral reasons. So understood, the institutional profile of legislative authority is considered to be morally meaningful in the sense that it incorporates a rule-consequentialist and value-pluralist rationale; while that of adjudicative authority is taken to owe its own moral meaningfulness to the fact that it fosters reciprocity between litigants.
22
Peyser, Nell. "Liberal and Conservative Jurisprudence on the Contemporary Supreme Court: An Analysis of Substantive Due Process Interpretation." Oberlin College Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=oberlin1305309468.
Full text
23
Gwee, Kenji. "Stakeholders’ perceptions of the potential therapeutic value of the Mental Capacity Act of Singapore for people who lack legal capacity." Thesis, Edith Cowan University, Research Online, Perth, Western Australia, 2011. https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/383.
Full textAbstract:
Part 1of the Mental Disorders and Treatment Act (38 of 1952) of Singapore, was recently replaced by the Mental Capacity Act (22 of 2008). The latter Act introduces legal mechanisms, such as lasting powers of attorney and court-appointed deputies, in respect of people who lack legal capacity. In documents explaining the purpose of the legislation, the Ministry responsible for the administration of the legislation, the Ministry of Community, Youth and Sport, indicated that it is meant to enhance the personal and financial well being of people who lack the capacity to make legal decisions. This is a laudable aim, but a review of the scientific literature reveals that mental health legislation of this nature often, at best, fails to benefit those it is aimed to assist, and at worst, may even be to their detriment. It is therefore important to examine the Act to determine whether it will actually be beneficial to the target population. A review of the legal and scientific literature in Singapore revealed that no such investigation has to date taken place. The purpose of this study was to determine what the perceptions of three groups of stakeholders (patients, caregivers and psychiatrists) are about whether the Mental Capacity Act is likely to promote the personal well being of Singaporeans who lack legal capacity. A qualitative methodology was used and the research was guided by two theoretical frameworks: therapeutic jurisprudence and an interpretive constructive framework.
24
Rigby, H. J. "History Matters: A Survey of Ideas about Evolution in Western Legal Theory from Antiquity to the Present Day in order to Propound a Theory of Evolutionary Jurisprudence." Thesis, Rigby, H.J. (2017) History Matters: A Survey of Ideas about Evolution in Western Legal Theory from Antiquity to the Present Day in order to Propound a Theory of Evolutionary Jurisprudence. PhD thesis, Murdoch University, 2017. https://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/36963/.
Full textAbstract:
Evolutionary jurisprudence (also known as evolutionary legal theory or legal evolutionary theory) is a relatively new concept in legal theory. Some jurisprudence textbooks cheerfully dedicate entire chapters to it, while others do not even mention it. Evolutionary jurisprudence has struggled to gain a place in the legal theory pantheon due to its association with misconceived notions of what ‘evolution’ means such as Social Darwinism. However, linking evolution with jurisprudence is understandable since ideas about evolution, had a significant influence on western legal, social, economic, and political theories long before Darwin. This thesis surveys ideas about evolution from pre-Socratic Ancient Greece to the present day in law, sociology, economics, politics, and science. In particular, this thesis examines the influence of evolutionary thought on schools of western legal theory including historical and anthropological jurisprudence, sociological jurisprudence, Marxist Jurisprudence, feminist jurisprudence, critical legal studies, and postmodernist jurisprudence. Finally, the author propounds, based on this survey and what he submits to be an appropriate conceptualisation of evolution in a law and legal systems context, a fully workable theory of evolutionary jurisprudence, not only in descriptive terms but also in normative terms.
25
Domit, Otávio Augusto Dal Molin. "Interpretando decisões e precedentes : proposta de uma abordagem antiformalista moderada sobre a interpretação das decisões judiciais aplicada à metodologia dos precedentes." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/185060.
Full textAbstract:
Trabalhando sobre as bases do paradigma metodológico atual do processo civil brasileiro, a presente tese propõe uma abordagem antiformalista moderada sobre a interpretação das decisões judiciais e aplica-a para reconstruir a faceta metodológica da teoria dos precedentes judiciais no contexto do direito brasileiro. A tese central alvitrada está em que as decisões judiciais, em geral, sofrem de um problema de tríplice indeterminação (limitada potencialidade normativa, equivocidade e vagueza), que se apresenta em três dimensões (respectivamente, nos percursos que vão do texto decisório ao enunciado normativo; do enunciado normativo, à norma; e da norma ao caso) e que pode ser minimizado por meio da interpretação. A tese específica está em que os principais problemas metodológicos de que se ressente a teoria tradicional dos precedentes judiciais decorrem dessa tríplice indeterminação e podem ser melhor compreendidos e encaminhados, especialmente no contexto brasileiro, por meio da reconstrução de conceitos clássicos da teoria dos precedentes a partir de instrumentos metodológicos lato sensu interpretativos destinados à redução das causas de indeterminação da decisão-precedente fornecidos pela metodologia proposta para a interpretação das decisões judiciais.Working on the bases of the current methodological paradigm of the Brazilian civil procedural law, this thesis proposes a moderate anti-formalist theory of interpretation of judicial decisions and applies it in order to reconstruct the methodological facet of the theory of judicial precedents within the Brazilian legal framework. The central thesis proposed is that, generally, judicial decisions suffer from a problem of triple indetermination (limited normative potentiality, ambiguity and vagueness) which appears in three dimensions (respectively, on the way from the judicial decision to the normative provision; from the normative provision to the norm; and from the norm to the case) and that may be minimized by means of interpretation. The specific thesis is that the main methodological problems that the traditional theory of judicial precedents resents derive from this triple indetermination and may be better understood and approached, specially under the Brazilian context, by means of the reconstruction of the classical concepts of the theory of judicial precedents using interpretative methodological instruments intended to reduce the causes of indetermination of the precedent-decision provided the proposed methodology for the interpretation of judicial decisions.
26
Spagnolo, Benjamin James. "Kelsen and Raz on the continuity of legal systems : applying the accounts in an Australian context." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2013. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a9025e33-e70e-49e9-994f-52f8daa311fd.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis has three objectives. Its primary objective is to examine, and critically evaluate, the theoretical accounts offered by Hans Kelsen and Joseph Raz to explain the temporal continuity and discontinuity of legal systems. In particular, it evaluates the explanatory power of those accounts by combining an abstract analysis of the accounts in principle and an evaluation based on systematically applying them to one concrete, historically circumstanced instance: the legal systems of British derivation in Australia between 1788 and 2001. The thesis thus tests each account’s factual fit: how adequately it corresponds to, accords with, and persuasively makes sense of, the facts – including complex social facts, attitudes and normative standards – for which it purports to offer an account. Second, the thesis aims to demonstrate, more generally, the utility of applying theoretical accounts to a particular historical instance to complement abstract analysis. Third, the thesis aims to advance the understanding of the evolution of Australian legal systems between 1788 and 2001. These three objectives are achieved through the critical exposition and reconstruction of the accounts, their development and enrichment where refinement is appropriate, their application to the specific context of Australia and their evaluation, individually and in comparison.
27
Caudill, David S. "Law on the analyst’s couch?: the uses of psychoanalytic theory in contemporary U.S. scholarship." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2016. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/115340.
Full textAbstract:
In the U.S. legal context, psychoanalysis is viewed by most scholars (and most judges) as outdated, even unscientific, and there is little room for psychoanalytic expertise in U.S. courts of law. However, there are some scholars who continue to do theoretical work in the conventional Freudian tradition, as well as numerous critical legal theorists who have appropriated the psychoanalytic conceptions of Jacques Lacan in their critiques of the law. This is a brief survey of how these scholars conceive of the law in psychoanalytic terms. Is it the judge being analyzed? Is it the lawyers, or the law students? Is the law itself viewed as subject with an unconscious and with symptoms? Or is it an analysis of legal texts as having an unconscious dimension that is hidden like an ideology? I identify examples of all four frameworks, and conclude that these scholars, notwithstanding their theoretical orientation, have practical goals for law in mind.En el contexto jurídico de los Estados Unidos, el psicoanálisis es visto por la mayoría de académicos (y jueces) como anticuado, incluso anticientífico, y hay poca cabida para el conocimiento psicoanalítico en los tribunales de justicia estadounidenses. Sin embargo, hay algunos académicos que continúan realizando labor teórica en la tradición convencional freudiana, así como numerosos teóricos críticos del derecho que han adoptado la visión psicoanalítica de Jacques Lacan en sus críticas al derecho. Este es un breve estudio de cómo dichos académicos conciben el derecho en términos psicoanalíticos. ¿Se está analizando al juez? ¿O se está analizando a los abogados, o a los estudiantes de derecho? ¿Se percibe el derecho en sí como un paciente con subconsciente y con síntomas? ¿O se está analizando los textos jurídicos como textos que poseen una dimensión inconsciente, como una ideología? En este ensayo identifico ejemplos de los cuatro contextos y concluyo que estos académicos, a pesar de su orientación teórica, tienen metas prácticas para el derecho en mente.
28
Jacob, Jean-Baptiste. "La valeur dans la jurisprudence constitutionnelle." Thesis, Paris 1, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019PA01D094.
Full textAbstract:
L’idée selon laquelle le droit serait étranger à la valeur constitue un véritable lieu commun de la pensée juridique moderne. Elle méritait, pour cette raison, d’être interrogée. Si le droit est avant tout un discours, la valeur est assurément un objet de ce discours comme en attestent les nombreuses controverses que la notion est susceptible de provoquer. Norme et valeur, norme juridique et valeur morale, fait et droit, constituent autant d’incarnations des controverses que la problématique de la valeur est susceptible de générer. Contrairement aux idées reçues, l’analyse montre que la valeur constitue un véritable objet juridique dont il est possible, au sein d’un champ particulier de la discipline juridique et à l’issue d’une démarche spécifique de conceptualisation, de rendre compte. Premièrement, l’analyse laisse apparaître que la valeur appartient au genre normatif (intension du concept). Elle participe ainsi de la rationalité juridique. Si la valeur peut s’entendre d’une norme, il s’agit bien, en tout état de cause, d’une norme spécifique ; distincte de la façon dont la pensée juridique a, jusqu’à présent, conçu la norme juridique. La valeur juridique est alors une norme substantiellement valide – par opposition à la norme juridique formellement valide – mais également une norme hypothétique – par opposition à la valeur morale catégorique. Définie de la sorte, la valeur s’accommode tout particulièrement de certaines évolutions contemporaines, propres au phénomène juridique (développement des droits fondamentaux, convergence des ordres juridiques, évolution du contrôle de constitutionnalité vers un contrôle de la proportionnalité). Deuxièmement, l’analyse laisse apparaître que, dans l’acception retenue, les valeurs sont omniprésentes dans la jurisprudence constitutionnelle (extension du concept). Les propositions de valeur constituent l’essentiel des termes de la décision du juge constitutionnel français, et guident également son interprétation. Dans la première hypothèse, les valeurs sont bien des normes de références de la décision et s’incarnent alors dans les catégories langagières spécifiquement mobilisées par le juge constitutionnel – notamment les exigences, nécessités et impératifs constitutionnels. Dans la seconde hypothèse, les valeurs constituent le sens des décisions du juge constitutionnel et permettent d’assigner à la normativité constitutionnelle – la constitutionnalité – une certaine rationalitéThe idea that law is unrelated to value is a commonplace in modern legal thinking. For this reason, it deserved to be questioned. If law is above all a discourse, value is certainly an object of that discourse, as evidenced by the many controversies that the notion is likely to provoke. Norm and value, legal norm and moral value, fact and law, are examples of the controversies that the issue of values is likely to generate. Contrary to common belief, the analysis shows that value constitutes a real legal object for which it is possible, within a particular field of legal discipline and following a specific conceptualization approach, to report. First, the analysis shows that the value belongs to the normative gender (intension of the concept). It thus contributes to the legal rationality. If the value can be understood as a norm, it is, in any case, a specific norm; distinct from the way in which legal thought has, until now, conceived the legal norm. Legal value is then a substantially valid norm - as opposed to the formally valid legal norm - but also a hypothetical norm - as opposed to the categorical moral value. Defined in this way, value is particularly suited to explain certain contemporary developments specific to the legal phenomenon (development of fundamental rights, convergence of legal systems, evolution from constitutionality control to proportionality control). Secondly, the analysis shows that, defined in this way, values are omnipresent in constitutional jurisprudence (extension of the concept). The value propositions constitute the essential terms of the French constitutional judge's decision and also guide its interpretation. In the first case, the values are indeed reference norms of the decision and are then embodied in the language categories mobilized by the constitutional judge – in particular the constitutional requirements, necessities and imperatives. In the second case, the values constitute the sense of the decisions of the constitutional judge and make it possible to assign a certain rationality to constitutional normativity – constitutionality
29
Malan, Yvonne. "Justice and the law : a perspective from contemporary jurisprudence." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/51807.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis examines the relationship between law and justice. Firstly, it is argued that the concept of justice tends to be defined too narrowly as distributive justice or as a mechanism to maintain social order. It is argued that Jacques Derrida's understanding of justice not only gives a richer and broader understanding of the concept, but also on its complex relationship with the law. Lastly, some of the possible implications for jurisprudence (with specific reference to Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory and Drucilla Cornell) are examined.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis ondersoek die verhouding tussen geregtigheid en die reg. Daar word eerstens geargumenteer dat geregtigheid te maklik gedefinieer word as distributiewe geregtigheid of as In meganisme om sosiale orde te bewerkstellig. Daar word geargumenteer dat Jacques Derrida se verstaan van die konsep nie aileen 'n breer en ryker verstaan moontlik maak nie, maar dat dit ook fokus op die komplekse verhouding met die reg. Laastens word sommige van die moontlike implikasies vir regsfilosofie (met spesifieke verwysing na Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory en Drucilla Cornell) ondesoek,
30
Blanc-Fily, Charlotte. "Les valeurs dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme : Essai critique sur l'interprétation axiologique du juge européen." Thesis, Montpellier 1, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014MON10022/document.
Full textAbstract:
Partout présentes au cœur de la jurisprudence européenne des droits de l'homme, les valeurs fondamentales des sociétés démocratiques constituent un sujet d'étude pertinent pour apprécier dans quelle mesure ces valeurs sont mobilisées et si elles participent d'une interprétation axiologique de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. Simple rappel rhétorique ou véritable outil argumentatif, le recours aux valeurs dans la jurisprudence de la Cour EDH mérite ainsi d'être analysé au travers du prisme de l'interprétation de la Convention. A côté de l'interprétation téléologique, des interprétations évolutive et consensuelle, aucune étude n'a jusqu'alors recherché à systématiser la référence aux valeurs des sociétés démocratiques pour tenter d'en déduire une interprétation axiologique. Mais alors que le juge européen multiplie les références aux valeurs dans ses décisions, il y a néanmoins lieu de constater que l'utilisation de ces valeurs est concurrencée par d'autres politiques jurisprudentielles plus contemporaines et soucieuses des attentes actuelles des populations, de la revendication libertaire individualiste de plus en plus prégnante, et du nécessaire respect du principe de subsidiarité. Phénomènes qui s'accommodent difficilement d'une protection conservatrice de valeurs communes aux Etats parties à la Convention européenne des droits de l'hommeEverywhere in the legal precedents of the European court of human rights (ECHR), fundamental values of democratic societies are a relevant study subject to understand in which part the values are used and if they participate of a specific interpretation of the European convention based on axioms defense's. Simple rhetoric use or true argumentative tool, values resort's in the legal precedents of the ECHR need to be appreciated as an isolate interpretation method. Next to teleologic, evolutive, and consensual interpretative methods, none study try until then to systematize the resort of fundamental values of democratic societies by the judge and deduct of the European court case law the existence of a specific interpretation based on values defense's. If the European judge multiplies the resorts of values in case law, we have to notice that utilization of values competes with others interpretative methods, more contemporary, and respectful of actual societal expectations, individual claims and to enforce the subsidiarity principle. All social facts and jurisdictional necessities which are difficult to conciliate with requirement of a conservative protection of common values of the contracting States
31
Brady, Paul. "Towards a theory of adjudication : some issues of method and principle." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:ebfc484a-5593-445f-83d1-9cf30466e314.
Full textAbstract:
A sound theory of adjudication and of judicial duty requires or presupposes a sound theory of law and of legal argument. Jurisprudential inquiry is properly grounded not in reflections on conceptual properties of law but in reflections on human goods and needs as understood in a morally articulated theory of practical reason and compactly expressed in the normative concept of the common good. Such reflections confirm that law exists, in its central case, as a means to various types of authoritative co-ordination solutions. The underdetermined nature of (a) the positive requirements of practical reasonableness and the common good and of (b) the appropriate means of enforcing compliance and remedying non-compliance with either these requirements or the determinate negative precepts of practical reasonableness entails that a practically necessary aspect of the positive law’s role is constituting the requirements of justice, i.e. of what is due to whom generally and in particular situations (including situations where an injustice has been or is alleged to have been done). As a distinct and practically necessary mode of legal co-ordination for the common good, adjudication, in its central case, answers litigated questions of justice by applying all relevant law in accordance with the legal system’s practice of legal argument. Thus adjudication is performed by authoritative law-applying institutions precisely because it is about answering questions of justice, and not despite that fact. Theories of law developed on the assumption that it is possible to understand the ‘what’ of law without reliance on any moral judgments deny any practically necessary connection between (a) the promotion of justice and the common good and (b) the nature of law, in its central case, and, hence, the adjudicative application of the law. In the absence of this connection a judicial duty to do justice according to law is unintelligible.
32
Beloushi, Hasan J. E. H. M. "The theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa in Shīʿī jurisprudence : Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī as a model." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/18525.
Full textAbstract:
The emergence of the theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa as a legal theory, which is a purposive approach to the law in which the main purposes of the law are considered as deriving elements of the legal rulings, has occurred in a particular socio-political and cultural context for the Shīʿa and within a particular epistemological construction. Given the lack of a historical reading of Shīʿī jurisprudence and the limitations of the methodological approaches which have to date been employed, this research applies a holistic approach. “The Bahbahānian paradigm” is identified as the overarching epistemological paradigm in modern and contemporary Shīʿī jurisprudence. The Bahbahanian paradigm was formed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and is arguably characterised as being a combination of Aristotelian epistemologically, formalist methodologically and soft utilitarianism. Within this paradigm in the context of the twentieth century, maqāṣid al-sharīʿa emerged in Shīʿī thought, especially in its systematic and comprehensive theorisation by Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī - a contemporary Shīʿī scholar. The introduction of the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa approach represents a paradigm shift that departs epistemologically, methodologically and functionally from the Bahbahānian paradigm. Mudarrisī’s maqāṣid al-sharīʿa paradigm is characterized as pragmatic epistemologically, more accessible and dynamic methodologically and employing a virtue ethic. Mudarrisī’s maqāṣid al-sharīʿa reflects the eclipse of the quietist character of the previous paradigm and the ambition of the contemporary Shīʿī religious institution. This ambition comprises a more significant role in the public sphere, which is embodied in the application or renewal of the sharīʿa in reality on one hand, and confronting the systematical secularization of the modern nation-state of the public sphere on the other. Mudarrisī’s version of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa is obligated to challenge three intellectual enterprises; that is, the classical Shīʿī jurisprudential reasoning by embracing hermeneutical tools which are more accessible to religious knowledge; the Sunnī soft utilitarian maqāṣidī approaches by providing virtue ethical jurisprudence; and the secular nation-state by providing a flexible legal system.
33
Weber, Ruth. "Der Begründungsstil von Conseil constitutionnel und Bundesverfassungsgericht : eine vergleichende Analyse der Spruchpraxis." Thesis, Paris 2, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA020096.
Full textAbstract:
Le style, c’est la Cour ! – Cette thèse examine la manière dont le Conseil constitutionnel français et la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande motivent leurs décisions, et ce que ces motivations nous disent sur la façon dont chaque Cour se perçoit. Le Conseil constitutionnel peut-il être qualifié de bouche de la Constitution ? et la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande est-elle l’incarnation différenciée de l’état de droit constitutionnel ? Telles sont les questions qui sous-tendent la thèse.La thèse montre que les styles de motivation façonnent l’identité de chaque Cour nationale. Depuis la création de la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande, son style de motivation a contribué à garantir l’acceptation de ses décisions, notamment en ce qui concerne son rôle d’autorité constitutionnelle suprême du pays. En revanche, le style de motivation du Conseil constitutionnel français a traditionnellement servi à mettre en évidence sa subordination au législatif. Toutefois, les réformes de 2016 suggèrent que le Conseil constitutionnel commence lui aussi à s’affirmer en tant que gardien de la Constitution. L’une des raisons probables de ces changements réside dans la manière dont la jurisprudence française est reçue par les autres juridictions nationales et supranationales en Europe. Les réformes facilitant une communication inter-juridictionnelle européenne sont en effet souhaitables. Et bien qu’il soit trop tôt pour le dire, on pourrait faire valoir qu’elles représentent un premier pas important vers un style de motivation européenThe style is the Court! – This thesis explores both how the French Constitutional Council and the German Federal Constitutional Court justify their decisions, and what those justifications tell us about how each Court sees itself. Can the Constitutional Council be characterized as an authoritative voice, the "bouche de la Constitution"?, and is the German Federal Constitutional Court the sophisticated embodiment of a constitutionalized state?, are the questions that underpin the dissertation.The thesis finds that the reasoning styles shape the identity of each national Court. Since the founding of the German Federal Constitutional Court, its reasoning style has helped guarantee the acceptance of its decisions, particularly as it concerns its role as the country’s foremost constitutional authority. By contrast, the reasoning style of the French Constitutional Council traditionally served to highlight its subordination to the legislative. Reforms from 2016, however, suggest that the Constitutional Council, too, is beginning to assert itself as the guardian of the constitution. One probable reason for the changes lies in how French case law is received by other national and supranational courts in Europe, with the reforms facilitating desirable European inter-jurisdictional communication. And although it is too early to tell, it could be argued that they represent a significant first step towards a European reasoning style
34
Tamouza, Ahlem. "Les cultures dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme." Thesis, Paris 3, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019PA030024.
Full textAbstract:
La diversité culturelle interétatique ainsi que diverses cultures nationales et sociétales sont régulièrement invoquées par la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme. Un constat de récurrence et de diversité des références aux cultures dans la jurisprudence européenne conduit à poser la question de savoir comment la Cour utilise les cultures dans l’exercice de son office. L’objectif est donc de découvrir, à partir d’une analyse de discours, les contours et la raison d’être d’« usages des cultures » en droit européen des droits de l’Homme. Divers usages peuvent, d’abord, être relevés. Par exemple, la Cour prend en compte des intérêts culturels sociétaux, interprète la Convention à la lumière de la culture sociétale, ou encore mobilise les cultures pour justifier certains choix juridictionnels. Bien que divers et inconstants, les usages identifiés ont pour caractéristique de s’écarter d’une méthode de contrôle habituelle. Ils viseraient le prononcé d’un choix intermédiaire ou d’une solution qui n’auraient pu être présentés à l’issue d’un raisonnement habituel. S’ils semblent, de ce fait, opportunistes et procéder de l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire, les usages des cultures ont cependant la particularité de pouvoir renforcer la motivation des jugements – et ainsi de compenser le manque en légitimité qu’un choix discrétionnaire entrainerait. Une certaine valeur argumentative peut, en effet, être reconnue aux références aux et à la prise en compte des cultures. Finalement constitutif de l’exercice de l’office du juge, le recours aux cultures est apparu utile dans le contrôle juridictionnel et opportun au regard de la réception des jugements rendus par la CourThe inter-State cultural diversity as well as the various national and societal cultures are regularly invoked by the European Court of Human Rights. The diversity and the recurrence of the references to cultures in the legal precedents lead to the question of how the Court uses national and societal cultures in the exercise of its function. Thus, the purpose is to shed light on the characteristics and the raison d’être of the “uses of cultures” in European human rights law. First, a discourse analysis unveils a variety of uses in the Court’s reasoning. For instance, it shows the Court takes into account cultural interests, interprets the Convention in the light of the cultural context, and invokes cultures to account for its own decisions. Secondly, the common feature of the diverse uses of cultures appears to be their exceptional nature. While using cultures, the Court does not follow a usual method of monitoring. Hence, it uses cultures exceptionally to deliver a decision different from the one that would have been taken following a regular reasoning. In that respect, the uses of cultures appear to stem from the exercise of a discretionary power that can be regarded as a threat to the European judge’s legitimacy. However, the references to and the consideration of cultures display the special capacity of having an argumentative power. Initially considered as a component of the Court’s reasoning, the uses of cultures ultimately deem to be relevant in the motivation of the Court’s discretionary decisions
35
MacDonald, Paulo Baptista Caruso. "Direito e equidade : os requisitos para a legitimidade da imposição de deveres jurídicos." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/77146.
Full textAbstract:
A distinção entre ser obrigado a fazer alguma coisa por meio de coerção e ter a obrigação jurídica de fazê-la foi apresentada por H. L. A. Hart como a distinção entre atos coercitivos praticados com ou sem o respaldo de uma regra jurídica válida. Para o esse autor, a validade jurídica de uma regra está condicionada à aceitação do ordenamento ao qual pertence por parte significativa da sociedade, principalmente das autoridades responsáveis por aplicar as sanções correspondentes ao seu descumprimento. A aceitação, por seu turno, pode ter fundamento nos mais diversos tipos de razão, não sendo necessária a concordância moral. Ainda que essa possa ser uma boa descrição do funcionamento do direito enquanto prática social, ela carece de elementos para justificar certos atos coercitivos praticados pelos aparatos estatais como a imposição de deveres jurídicos autênticos àqueles que porventura não os percebam assim. Esta tese busca esclarecer quais seriam os requisitos para a justificação da imposição de tais deveres e a importância dessa investigação na fundamentação das decisões judiciais.The distinction between being obliged to do something by coercion and having the legal obligation of doing it was presented by H. L. A. Hart as the distinction between coercive acts either backed or not by a valid legal rule. According to him, the legal validity of a rule is conditioned to the acceptation of the legal system to which it belongs by a large part of the society, especially by the officials who are responsible for the application of the sanctions related to their infringement. The acceptation, in turn, may be founded in several kinds of reasons, which do not entail moral approbation. Even though that might be a good description of law as a social practice, it lacks the necessary elements to justify certain coercive acts practised by the officials as the imposition of authentic legal duties to those who happen to see them as mere acts of violence. This dissertation seeks to elucidate the requirements for justifying the imposition of legal duties and the importance of this investigation to the justification in judgements.
36
Mangwiro, Heather K. "A critical investigation of the relevance of theories of feminist jurisprudence to African women in South Africa." Thesis, Rhodes University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1007328.
Full textAbstract:
Feminist theories emerged out of the revolutionary enthusiasm that swept the Western world during the late eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. Based on the assumption that all persons have "inalienable or natural" rights upon which governments may not intrude, feminists in Europe and America advocated that equal rights should be extended to women who up to this point were not considered legal beings separate and deserving of these rights. Most African writers and feminists have argued that since most of the theories of feminist jurisprudence have their roots in this Euro-centric context, they cannot be applicable to African women and should therefore be discarded. The thesis acknowledges that to a certain extent their assertions are true. For years feminist jurisprudence has been restricted to an academic engagement with the law failing to take into account the practices and customs of different communities. It has largely been the realm of the middle class bourgeois white female and therefore has been inaccessible to the African woman. The thesis aims, however, to prove that these theories of feminist jurisprudence although Euro-centric have a place in the understanding and advancement of African women's rights in South Africa. In Chapter One the writer traces the history of South African women's rights and the laws that affect African women. Chapter Two presents the emergence of feminist theories and categories of feminism. The writer then seeks to identify the misunderstandings and tensions that exist between the two. The narrow conception of Euro-centric feminism has been that its sole purpose has been the eradication of gender discrimination, however, for African women in South Africa they have had to deal with a multiplicity of oppressions that include but are not restricted to gender, race, economic and social disempowerment. This is dealt with in Chapter Three. It is the opinion of the writer that despite these differences feminism does play a critical role in the advancement of women's rights in South Africa. Taking the South African governments commitment to the advancement of universal rights, the writer is of the opinion that African women can look to the example set by Western feminists, and broaden these theories to suit and be adaptable to the South African context. The answer is not to totally discard feminist theories but to extract commonalities that exist between African and European women, by so doing acknowledging that women's oppression is a global phenomenon. This is the focus of Chapter Four. To avoid making this work a mere academic endeavour, the writer in Chapter Five also aims, through interviews, to include the voices of African women and to indicate areas that still need attention from both the lawmakers and women's rights movements (Feminists). Finally, the writer aims to present a way forward, one that is not merely formal but also substantively attainable.
37
Daïmallah, Hakim. "La famille dans la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013AIXM1012.
Full textAbstract:
Comment le Conseil constitutionnel appréhende-t-il la famille ? Cette question conduit à s’intéresser aux relations entretenues par le droit constitutionnel et la famille, dont l’ignorance mutuelle semble acquise. Une approche positiviste du droit et analytique de la jurisprudence du Conseil montrent néanmoins que ce désintérêt réciproque n’est que de façade. La famille apparaît en effet comme une institution à la fois protégée et obligée par le droit constitutionnel : celui-ci prescrit de protéger la famille et prescrit à la famille de protéger. Le droit constitutionnel prescrit en définitive de construire la famille. La question conduit ensuite à s’intéresser à la concrétisation législative des normes constitutionnelles relatives à la famille. L’étude met ainsi en évidence les techniques contentieuses utilisées par le Conseil. Elle met aussi et surtout en évidence le fait que cette concrétisation tantôt protège, tantôt menace, la reconnaissance, le développement et l’unité de la famille. La réalisation du droit constitutionnel conduit en définitive à une construction législative de la famille. La question conduit enfin à constater que la famille consiste moins en la construction d’un objet juridique qu’en la construction juridique d’un objet. La concrétisation infra-législative des normes constitutionnelles témoigne en effet d’un pluralisme familial, qui contribue à révéler la dynamique de la construction juridique de la familleHow does the Conseil constitutionnel apprehend the family? This question leads to study the relationship between constitutional law and family, whose mutual igorance seems acquired. A positivist and analytic approach of the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel however illustrates that this apparent mutual disinterest is not grounded. Family is an institution protected and protective according to positive constitutional law; the latter prescribes to protect the family and also prescribes to the family to protect. Constitutionnal law prescribed after all to build family. This question leads to study the legislative concretizations of the constitutional norms concerning family. This study illustrates the techniques used by the Conseil constitutional in its judicial review. The study also emphasizes the fact that this concretization protects, but also sometimes threatens, the recognition, the development and the unity of the family. The realization of the constitutional law leads after all to a legislative construction of the family. This question leads finally to observe that family consists more in the legal construction of an object than in the construction of a legal object. The concretization of constitutional norms concerning family illustrates in effect a “familial pluralism”, which contributes to reveal the dynamics of the legal construction of the family
38
Luker, Trish, and LukerT@law anu edu au. "THE RHETORIC OF RECONCILIATION: EVIDENCE AND JUDICIAL SUBJECTIVITY IN CUBILLO v COMMONWEALTH." La Trobe University. School of Law, 2006. http://www.lib.latrobe.edu.au./thesis/public/adt-LTU20080305.105209.
Full textAbstract:
In August 2000, Justice O�Loughlin of the Federal Court of Australia handed down the decision in Cubillo v Commonwealth in which Lorna Cubillo and Peter Gunner took action against the Commonwealth Government, arguing that it was vicariously liable for their removal from their families and communities as children and subsequent detentions in the Northern Territory during the 1940s and 1950s. The case is the landmark decision in relation to legal action taken by members of the Stolen Generations.
Using the decision in Cubillo as a key site of contestation, my thesis provides a critique of legal positivism as the dominant jurisprudential discourse operating within the Anglo-Australian legal system. I argue that the function of legal positivism as the principal paradigm and source of authority for the decision serves to ensure that the debate concerning reconciliation in Australia operates rhetorically to maintain whiteness at the centre of political and discursive power. Specifically concerned with the performative function of legal discourse, the thesis is an interrogation of the interface of law and language, of rhetoric, and the semiotics of legal discourse.
The dominant theory of evidence law is a rationalist and empiricist epistemology in which oral testimony and documentary evidence are regarded as mediating the relationship between proof and truth. I argue that by attributing primacy to principles of rationality, objectivity and narrative coherence, and by privileging that which is visually represented, the decision serves an ideological purpose which diminishes the significance of race in the construction of knowledge.
Legal positivism identifies the knowing subject and the object of knowledge as discrete entities. However, I argue that in Cubillo, Justice O�Loughlin inscribes himself into the text of the judgment and in doing so, reveals the way in which textual and corporeal specificities undermine the pretence of objective judgment and therefore the source of judicial authority.
39
Darcie, Jonathan Doering. "A interpretação jurídica na perspectiva do realismo filosófico crítico." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/130536.
Full textAbstract:
Sendo mais do que as partes que o compõem, o direito histórico – expressão que designa o direito efetivo de um povo, localizado no espaço e no tempo – constitui uma unidade existencial própria, inserindo-se na realidade da mesma forma que outros tantos entes, como os objetos cotidianos. O direito histórico é, assim, um ente espiritual. Trata-se de uma consequência inexorável de uma visão crítica da realidade. A interpretação jurídica deve, com isso, respeitar a contingencialidade do direito histórico, ou seja, o modo como esse é construído e ganha a sua existência. Sempre ou naquilo em que construído com uma pretensão de independência daqueles responsáveis institucionalmente pela sua aplicação, o direito histórico há de receber do intérprete um esforço para a descoberta do seu verdadeiro conteúdo, tal como determinado pelas condições prévias da sua existência.Being more than its component parts, the historical law - an expression that designates the effective law of one people located both in space and time - consists in an existential unit which is inserted in the reality the same way many other ordinary entities do. With its characteristics, the historical law consists in an spiritual being. This is an inexorable consequence of a critical view of reality. The legal interpretation shall therefore respect the contingent nature of the historical law, that is, the way it is built and gains its own existence. Whenever or in which it is built to be independent of those responsible for its institutional aplication, historical law must receive from the interpreter an effort in order to discover its true content, as determined by the preconditions of its existence.
40
Durán, Rojo Luis Alberto. "The Transformation of modern law and its impact on the conception of Tax Law." IUS ET VERITAS, 2016. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/122411.
Full textAbstract:
This article analyzes the process of paradigm change in Law, a non-peaceful transition from a model developed in the XX century to a new law which will sit throughout the XXI century. The changes that have occurred from this new legal paradigm are not superficial, but rather crossing the structures and foundations of modern legal ideology and technique that underlies, as the constitutionalization of national law, the internationalization of economic relations, the development of treaties or development of Community law. Furthermore, the author refers to the impact that this change took place in the theoretical construction of taxes and the delimitation of the scope of the tax phenomenon.El presente artículo analiza el proceso de cambio de paradigma en el Derecho, un tránsito no pacífico entre un modelo ideado en el siglo XX a un nuevo Derecho que se asentará a lo largo del siglo XXI. Los cambios que se han producido a partir de este nuevo paradigma jurídico no son superficiales, sino que atraviesan las estructuras y bases de la ideología jurídica moderna y la técnica que la subyace, como la constitucionalización del derecho nacional, la internacionalización de las relaciones económicas, el desarrollo de los tratados o el desarrollo del Derecho comunitario. Asimismo, el autor hace referencia a la incidencia que produjo este cambio en la construcción teórica del tributo y la delimitación de los alcances del fenómeno tributario.
41
Delanlssays, Thomas. "La motivation des décisions juridictionnelles du Conseil d’Etat." Thesis, Lille 2, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017LIL20018.
Full textAbstract:
Cette étude se donne pour ambition de saisir et de comprendre ce qu’est la motivation des décisions juridictionnelles du Conseil d’État, au demeurant souvent critiquée. Notion fondamentale en droit processuel, la motivation est un discours argumentatif, expression d’une technique juridique, à savoir un discours visant à justifier au plan juridique et factuel la décision à travers un raisonnement afin de persuader l’auditoire. Ainsi faudra-t-il analyser à la fois son architecture et ses fonctions dans une perspective dynamique. En tout état de cause, on constate,depuis au moins le début du XXIe siècle, une certaine évolution de la motivation. Ce phénomène résulte, notamment, de l’européanisation et de la complexité normatives, de la protection renforcée des droits fondamentaux, des exigences de sécurité juridique ou encore de la volonté du Conseil d’État de promouvoir une politique communicationnelle afin de légitimer son action. L’étude implique de revisiter certaines thématiques traditionnelles, en particulier le syllogismejudiciaire, l’argumentation, l’interprétation, le style de la motivation ou encore le pouvoir normatif jurisprudentiel pour constater et mesurer cette évolutionThe aim of this research is to tackle and understand the Conseil d’Etat’s court’s decisions motivation which are often criticised. Fundamental notion in procedural law, motivation is an argumentative discourse expressing a jurisdictional technique but moreover it is specifically a discourse trying trough a legal reasoning to justify a decision in order to convince the audience. Thus we shall have to analyse its architecture and its functions in a dynamic perspective. Either way we can note that since the beginning of the 21st century the court’s motivation has evolved.This phenomenon is the result of the Europeanization and the complexity of the normative production and is also due to enhanced protection of the fundamental rights, legal certainty and the Conseil d’Etat’s wish to promote a communicational policy in order to legitimise its action. This research entails to revisit certain traditional topics such as jurisdictional syllogism, argumentation, interpretation, the motivation’s style or the normative jurisprudential power to both note and measure this evolution
42
Cimardi, Cláudia Aparecida. "A jurisprudência uniforme como elemento estruturante do sistema jurídico brasileiro." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2014. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/6364.
Full textAbstract:
Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:22:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
Claudia Aparecida Cimardi.pdf: 1385322 bytes, checksum: a491bfd495839b832e44a24d24a264e0 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2014-02-18This thesis aims to analyze the current role of jurisprudence in the face of Brazilian legal system. First, the historical aspects that led to the evolution of the concept of legal system were presented. From these considerations, the following approaches were conducted: (i) historical delineation of the development of law enforcement, especially in the Civil Law legal system, showing how mass society demanded that the Brazilian legislator implanted new trial procedural techniques; (ii) presentation of the concepts of jurisprudence and judicial precedents to the Brazilian legal system; (iii) demonstration of need for the jurisprudence to be dedicated to standardization, function to be exercised by superior courts (Supreme Justice Court and Supreme Federal Court; (iv) demonstration that the performance of this function results a paradigm for future trials and, therefore, comply with the ideals of stability and predictability of the legal system; (v) exposure that uniform jurisprudence of higher courts can and must undergo changes, being inadmissible sudden and unjustified changes; (vi) demonstration of the importance of judicial precedents in the Brazilian legal system, as conductors of uniform jurisprudence; (vii) exposure of standardization techniques of jurisprudence governed by civil process, and (viii) new discipline of the subject, presented in the Draft ot Civil Process Law. As a result of the research, it was found that uniform jurisprudence of higher courts integrates the meaning of rules, reason why it is the structuring element of the legal system, hence it should be observed in future trials, throughout society and the Administration. We sought, therefore, to develop a methodical study, based on extensive local and foreign literature, which intended to establish a current legal framework of the uniform jurisprudence of higher courts and techniques for jurisprudence standardization
Esta tese tem como objetivo principal analisar o atual papel da jurisprudência em face do sistema jurídico brasileiro. Primeiramente, foram apresentados os aspectos históricos que resultaram na evolução do conceito de sistema jurídico. A partir de tais considerações, foram realizadas as seguintes abordagens: (i) delineamento histórico do desenvolvimento da aplicação do direito em concreto, especialmente no sistema jurídico do civil Law, evidenciando como a sociedade de massa exigiu que o legislador brasileiro implantasse novas técnicas processuais de julgamento; (ii) exposição dos conceitos de jurisprudência e precedentes judiciais para o sistema jurídico brasileiro; (iii) demonstração da necessidade de a jurisprudência ser vocacionada à uniformização, função a ser desempenhada pelos tribunais superiores (Superior Tribunal de Justiça e Supremo Tribunal Federal; (iv) demonstração de que a jurisprudência uniforme resulta em paradigma de julgamentos futuros e, por essa razão, cumprir com os ideais da previsibilidade e estabilidade do sistema jurídico; (v) exposição de que a jurisprudência uniforme dos tribunais superiores podem e devem sofrer mudanças, sendo inadmissíveis as transformações bruscas e injustificadas; (vi) demonstração da importância dos precedentes judiciais no sistema jurídico brasileiro, como condutores da jurisprudência uniforme; (vii) exposição das técnicas de uniformização de jurisprudência disciplinadas pelo processo civil; e (viii) nova disciplina do tema, apresentada no Projeto de Código de Processo Civil. Como resultado da pesquisa, constatou-se que a jurisprudência uniforme dos tribunais superiores integra o sentido das normas, razão pela qual é elemento estruturante do sistema jurídico e, por isso, deve ser observada em julgamentos futuros, por toda a sociedade e pela Administração. Buscou-se, assim, elaborar um trabalho metódico, baseado em ampla bibliografia nacional e estrangeira, que pretendeu estabelecer o enquadramento jurídico atual da jurisprudência uniforme dos tribunais superiores e das técnicas de uniformização de jurisprudência
43
Paschoalini, Felipe. "Interpretação e instituições: o diálogo entre Cass Sunstein e Ronald Dworkin." Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2139/tde-18112015-145137/.
Full textAbstract:
Este trabalho analisa o diálogo entre Cass Sunstein e Ronald Dworkin. Enquanto Dworkin desenvolveu uma abordagem da prática jurídica como a continuação de uma grande teoria baseada em valores morais, Sunstein recomenda um caminho supostamente mais modesto, baseado em passos obtidos em acordos que pudessem ser alcançados por pessoas com convicções morais diversas. A escolha por esse caminho é justificada não só por razões institucionais, mas também por razões morais e políticas substantivas. A crítica central de Sunstein a Dworkin é um suposto ponto cego quanto às questões de capacidade institucional. Sunstein pode ser lido de duas maneiras: como um autor essencialmente pragmático (e incompatível com Dworkin) ou como um interpretativista ao modo Dworkiniano. Conforme o caso, os contornos do seu diálogo com Dworkin são diferentes. De acordo com a primeira leitura, o argumento do ponto cego levantado por Sunstein tem o objetivo de desqualificar todo o projeto teórico Dworkiniano, na medida em que o problema das capacidades institucionais seria tomado como fundamento para um tipo específico de ceticismo moral, o que inutilizaria o critério de correção moral que embasa o interpretativismo Dworkiniano. Essa visão considera que o debate entre Sunstein e Dworkin seria um capítulo do debate entre Dworkin e os pragmatistas céticos. Nos termos da segunda leitura, Sunstein não é um cético na verdade, ele pressupõe um interpretativismo Dworkiniano e sua posição é complementar à obra de Dworkin. No capítulo I, analiso alguns trabalhos centrais de Sunstein e concluo que ele é melhor lido como um Dworkiniano, visto sua teoria pressupõe valores independentes. No capítulo II, estudo os principais pontos da teoria do direito de Dworkin e sugiro que o conceito de integridade, entendido como um conceito corretivo que serve para construir um sistema judicial no qual os juízes podem barganhar uma concepção de justiça ideal por outros fatores do mundo real, indica que a teoria Dworkiniana pode sim ser sensível às questões empíricas e de capacidade institucional. No capítulo III, identifico os pontos do confronto direto entre Sunstein e Dworkin e exponho o proveito que pode ser extraído do estudo desse debate.This dissertation analyzes the dialogue between Cass Sunstein and Ronald Dworkin. While Dworkin developed an approach that sees the legal practice as a continuum of a greater theory based on moral values, Sunstein recommends a supposedly more modest approach, based on steps obtained in agreements which could be achieved by people holding different moral convictions. The choice of this path is justified not only for institutional reasons, but also for moral and political reasons. The central criticism of Sunstein against Dworkin is a \"blind spot\" with respect to the institutional capacities of judges. Sunstein can be read in two ways: as an essentially pragmatist author (and incompatible with Dworkin) or as an interpretative Dworkinian. As the case may be, the contours of his debate with Dworkin are different. Under to the first reading, the \"blind spot\" argument raised by Sunstein aims to disqualify any Dworkinian theoretical project to the extent that the problem of institutional capacities should be taken as the basis for a specific type of moral skepticism, which would deny the claim to moral correctness that supports Dworkinian interpretativism. In this case, that the debate between Dworkin and Sunstein should be seen as a chapter of the debate between Dworkin and the skeptic legal pragmatists. Under the the second reading, Sunstein is not a skeptic - in fact, he presupposes a Dworkinian interpretativism and his position is complementary to Dworkins work. In Chapter I, I analyze Sunsteins central work on legal interpretation and conclude that he is best read as a Dworkinian, as his theory assumes independent values. In Chapter II, I study the main points of Dworkins jurisprudence and I suggest that the concept of integrity, understood as a \"corrective\" concept used to build a judicial system in which judges can bargain an ideal conception of justice by other factors of the real world, indicates that Dworkin´s theory can be sensitive to the empirical institutional capacities raised by Sunstein. In Chapter III, identify the points of direct confrontation between Sunstein and Dworkin and explain the agenda that can be extracted from the debate.
44
Fonseca, Gabriel Ferreira da. "A interpretação jurídica no Estado Regulador: da legislação racional à administração/jurisdição eficiente." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2016. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/7034.
Full textAbstract:
Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
Gabriel Ferreira da Fonseca.pdf: 890723 bytes, checksum: e906a14fa0db3edc77689a81ff071c2d (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2016-03-03The field of legal interpretation was not immune to recent changes that took place in the State and in Law. Along the last decades, this important communicative activity of the legal system underwent a number of metamorphosis which justified the conduction of the research of which this work is a product. Aiming to apprehend the profound changes that took place in the field of legal interpretation, we investigated the singularities of the new models of Regulatory State and the Law ( pragmatic , flexible , soft , responsive , ductile , heterarchical ) currently in development, in contrast with the outstanding characteristics of the previous models of State and Law. The outcome of the work, which was based on Niklas Luhmann s systems theory, was a description of the investigated social reality, which may be understood as an auto-reflection of legal system, conventionally named legal theory . The option for this theoretical way to observe the investigated reality allowed to place the inquiry in a different position from those of legal practice and legal dogmatics, which are directly associated to the need to decide, and from sociology of law, disassociated from the need to decide. This ambivalent position between internal and external perspectives of the legal system contributed to a heterodox investigation on a useful traditional rhetorical resource of the legal dogmatics: the rational legislator hypothesis. Finally, after having approached the characteristics of this traditional ideal of the law hermeneutics, this work reflects on the risks, limits and possibility of a new rhetoric figure, which is possibly being developed in the interior of the legal system: the efficient administrator/ruler
A interpretação jurídica não escapou às recentes transformações ocorridas no Estado e no direito. Ao longo das últimas décadas, esta importante operação comunicativa do sistema jurídico sofreu metamorfoses que justificaram a realização da pesquisa que resultou no presente trabalho. Com o objetivo de compreender as profundas mudanças sofridas pela interpretação jurídica, foram investigadas as peculiaridades dos novos modelos de Estado Regulador e de direito ( pragmático , flexível , brando , responsivo , dúctil , heterárquico ) que se desenvolvem na contemporaneidade, contrastando-as com as características marcantes dos modelos estatais e jurídicos anteriores. O resultado da pesquisa, que tomou como principal referência a teoria dos sistemas sociais de Niklas Luhmann, foi uma descrição acerca da realidade social investigada, que pode ser entendida como uma autorreflexão do sistema jurídico, convencionalmente chamada de teoria do direito . A opção por este modo teórico-jurídico de observar a realidade investigada permitiu situar a pesquisa em uma posição diferente daquelas da prática do direito e da dogmática jurídica, ligadas diretamente à necessidade de decisão, e da sociologia do direito, desvinculada desta preocupação. Esta posição ambivalente entre os pontos de vista interno e externo ao sistema jurídico contribuiu para uma investigação heterodoxa acerca de um recurso retórico útil e tradicional da dogmática jurídica: a hipótese do legislador racional. Por fim, após abordar os contornos deste ideal tradicional da hermenêutica jurídica, o trabalho refletiu acerca dos riscos, limites e possibilidade de uma nova figura retórica, que pode estar se desenvolvendo no interior do sistema jurídico: a hipótese do administrador/julgador eficiente
45
Noriega, Christina R. "Rawlsian Foundations for Justification and Toleration of Civil Disobedience." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2013. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/232.
Full textAbstract:
Though ultimately seeking more just law, civil disobedience still entails the breaching of a law. For this reason, most theories hold that people who practice civil disobedience must be willing to accept the legal consequences of their actions. On the other hand, a nation that is truly committed to justice will recognize that its constitution and legal order may in some ways fall short of perfect justice. In this thesis, I defend Rawls’s theory of civil disobedience as unique in its capacity for justification and even government toleration. Appealing to a shared conception of justice, Rawlsian civil disobedients are able to ground their actions in the same principles to which the state is committed. I argue that Rawls’s shared conception of justice is further substantiated when read in the light of his later theory of the overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines. I ultimately conclude that civil disobedience construed in the Rawlsian sense ought to receive some degree of toleration by the state, and particularly by constitutional states which maintain a formal commitment to justice in the protection of rights and intentional design of government institutions.
46
Piper, Helen. "Constitution of religious liberty : God, Politics and the First Amendment in Trump's America." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Teologiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-364787.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis starts by describing the legal foundation of religious liberty in the United States and the evolvement of the religion clause jurisprudence. Then follows an outline of the main legal theories on religious liberty. It continues to describe a case study conducted on how Americans citizens perceive the protection of their religious liberty. Upon this there is a chapter where the detailed findings from the case study are described in juxtaposition to the relevant jurisprudence and how this can be applied to the overall legal framework protecting religious liberty. The final chapter is a discussion on what conclusions that can be drawn.
47
Lainé, Julien. "Empirisme et conceptualisme en droit constitutionnel." Thesis, Lille 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011LIL20014/document.
Full textAbstract:
Connu en droit administratif, le thème de l’empirisme et du conceptualisme interroge la possibilité pour la doctrine, d’induire de la jurisprudence des catégories plus générales et abstraites, facilitant la connaissance d’une discipline essentiellement jurisprudentielle. L’idée de confronter cette problématique au droit constitutionnel est d’abord liée aux mutations de la discipline depuis la création du Conseil constitutionnel en 1958. Précisément, le développement de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle pouvait laisser présumer une facette empirique en droit constitutionnel, susceptible d’interroger la nécessité pour la doctrine, de procéder a posteriori à une mise en ordre synthétique des décisions du Conseil constitutionnel. En réalité, l’alternance entre l’empirisme et le conceptualisme en droit constitutionnel dépasse le seul rapport de la doctrine et la jurisprudence. La présente étude s’efforce alors de saisir dans tous les stades de la discipline, et quelles que soient les sources, le travail de systématisation du droit. Néanmoins, il ne s’agit pas de se contenter de suivre, conformément à une démarche chronologique, l’évolution de la pensée en droit constitutionnel, mais de procéder à l’identification de périodes. Le conceptualisme ancien, hérité des premiers manuels de droit constitutionnel à la fin du XIXe siècle, a permis d’élaborer les grands principes du droit constitutionnel français. Partant, l’évolution des méthodes doctrinales tout au long du XXe et au début du XXIe siècle, en lien avec l’évolution du droit lui-même, soumet ces principes à des démarches plus empiriques. Il s’agit d’abord, d’un premier courant doctrinal apparu à la suite de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, qualifié dans le cadre de la présente étude de « empirisme politique », puis, aux alentours des années 1970, d’un second courant, défendant un « empirisme juridique ». Enfin et cette dernière période demeure en cours, le développement de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel, caractérisée par son empirisme, ouvre la voie à un « empirisme jurisprudentiel », dont les enjeux sont plus largement abordés dans la présente étudeThe issue of empiricism and conceptualism has been studied in administrative law. It refers to the possibility for academics to infer general and abstract categories from case law. Such reasoning by induction aims to facilitate the knowledge of administrative law, which essentially consists of case law. Studying this issue in constitutional law is justified by the changes which have occurred in the discipline since the birth of the Conseil Constitutionnel in 1958. Specifically, the development of constitutional case law has led to the assumption that constitutional law has a more empirical dimension and that new relations are being established between academics and judges. In practice, the alternation between empiricism and conceptualism in constitutional law goes beyond the relation between legal scholars and case law. Thus, this study attempts to capture the systematization of law in all stages of the discipline and whatever the sources. The analysis is not only following the changes in the mode of thinking concerning constitutional law by respecting a chronological sequence, it also aims at identifying periods.The conceptualism of the past, inherited from the first treatises on constitutional law at the end of the nineteenth century, has developed the main principles of French constitutional law. Since then, the evolution of doctrinal methods, throughout the twentieth and the early twenty-first century, in conjunction with the development of law itself, subjects these principles to more empirical approaches, bringing them closer to the reality of constitutional law. More precisely, three empirical periods can be identified. The first period emerged after Word War II and is described as “political empiricism” in this study. The second time appeared in the 1970’s and advocates a “legal empiricism”. Finally, the development of the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel opens the way for “case law empiricism”, widely discussed in this analysis
48
Rodrigues, Guilherme Tavares Marques. "Antropologia e direito : a justiça como possibilidade antropológica /." Marília : [s.n.], 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/100997.
Full textAbstract:
Orientador: Chritina de Rezende RubimBanca: Ana Lúcia Pastore Schritzmeyer
Banca: José Geraldo Poker
Banca: Jayme Wanderley Gasparoto
Banca: Gilberto Giacóia
Resumo: Nos últimos anos tem sido notado no campo do direito um significativo aumento do interesse pelo referencial teórico e metodológico fornecido pela antropologia. No entanto, e apesar de algumas relevantes contribuições direcionadas a uma aproximação entre a antropologia e o direito, o fato é que a antropologia jurídica, ao menos no cenário acadêmico nacional, ainda ressente de uma maior reflexão sobre o seu espaço epistemológico e possibilidades práticas. Nesse âmbito de análise, e partindo do pressuposto de que o conhecimento reivindicado de forma autônoma pelo direito e pela antropologia representam, sobretudo, domínios de saber que se expressam como discursos históricos, o presente estudo apresenta duas finalidades: primeiramente, identificar os fundamentos e as possibilidades de análise do discurso jurídico-antropológico através de uma leitura dos seus principais referenciais epistemológicos; e, num segundo momento, desenvolver uma etnografia do discurso jurídico no campo cultural da execução penal sob a proposta de uma antropologia do conhecimento
Abstract: In recent years it has been noticed in the field of law a significant increase in interest in the theoretical and methodological framework provided by anthropology. However, despite some outstanding contributions aimed at a rapprochement between anthropology and law, the fact is that anthropology of law, at least in the national academic scene, still lacks a major reflection on your epistemological space and practical possibilities. Within this framework of analysis, and assuming that the knowledge claimed autonomously by law and anthropology especially represent areas of knowledge that are expressed as historical discourses, this study has two purposes: first, identify the reasons and possibilities of discourse analysis, legal and anthropological frames; and, second, to develop an ethnography of legal discourse in the cultural field of criminal enforcement under the proposal for an anthropology of knowledge
Doutor
49
Rodrigues, Guilherme Tavares Marques [UNESP]. "Antropologia e direito: a justiça como possibilidade antropológica." Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/100997.
Full textAbstract:
Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:31:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0
Previous issue date: 2010-08-25Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:01:21Z : No. of bitstreams: 1
rodrigues_gtm_dr_mar.pdf: 1990070 bytes, checksum: 2b9a38eef2efa194166a8fb33cae6826 (MD5)Nos últimos anos tem sido notado no campo do direito um significativo aumento do interesse pelo referencial teórico e metodológico fornecido pela antropologia. No entanto, e apesar de algumas relevantes contribuições direcionadas a uma aproximação entre a antropologia e o direito, o fato é que a antropologia jurídica, ao menos no cenário acadêmico nacional, ainda ressente de uma maior reflexão sobre o seu espaço epistemológico e possibilidades práticas. Nesse âmbito de análise, e partindo do pressuposto de que o conhecimento reivindicado de forma autônoma pelo direito e pela antropologia representam, sobretudo, domínios de saber que se expressam como discursos históricos, o presente estudo apresenta duas finalidades: primeiramente, identificar os fundamentos e as possibilidades de análise do discurso jurídico-antropológico através de uma leitura dos seus principais referenciais epistemológicos; e, num segundo momento, desenvolver uma etnografia do discurso jurídico no campo cultural da execução penal sob a proposta de uma antropologia do conhecimento
In recent years it has been noticed in the field of law a significant increase in interest in the theoretical and methodological framework provided by anthropology. However, despite some outstanding contributions aimed at a rapprochement between anthropology and law, the fact is that anthropology of law, at least in the national academic scene, still lacks a major reflection on your epistemological space and practical possibilities. Within this framework of analysis, and assuming that the knowledge claimed autonomously by law and anthropology especially represent areas of knowledge that are expressed as historical discourses, this study has two purposes: first, identify the reasons and possibilities of discourse analysis, legal and anthropological frames; and, second, to develop an ethnography of legal discourse in the cultural field of criminal enforcement under the proposal for an anthropology of knowledge
50
Mendonça, Christine. "Argumentação jurídica nas decisões do STF em matéria tributária e o Estado de direito." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2011. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/5732.
Full textAbstract:
Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
Christine Mendonca.pdf: 2253283 bytes, checksum: 178d246138f7a4db20c37d186b09aa66 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2011-11-07The purpose of this doctoral thesis is to analyze the arguments presented by the Brazilian Supreme Court s decisions on tax matters so as to identify the ways in which that constitutional agency has contributed to maintain and protect the Rule of law. Theoretical tools provided by the logical-semantic constructivist method and the Luhmanian systems theory help understand the range and importance of the legal interpretation of the law, and, based on that, help verify how to process interferences coming from other social subsystems. The process of interpretation developed by the law s observer-interpreter will be registered in the juridical argumentation by him presented. And, in the case of the Supreme Court, it will be part of the reasoning supporting the Ministers votes. The analysis of those arguments is a fundamental tool to investigate the occurrence of corruption between inter-systemic codes that undermines the maintenance of the Rule of law
A presente tese de doutorado tem por objetivo analisar a argumentação nas decisões judiciais em matéria tributária produzidas pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal de modo a identificar de que forma esse órgão constitucional está contribuindo para a manutenção do Estado de Direito. A partir dos instrumentos teóricos fornecidos pelo método construtivista lógico-semântico e pela teoria sistêmica luhmaniana compreende-se a extensão e a importância da interpretação jurídica do direito. Verifica-se, a partir dela, como devem ser processados os ruídos provenientes de outros subsistemas sociais. O processo de interpretação realizado pelo observadorintérprete do direito será registrado na argumentação jurídica por ele apresentada. E, no caso do Supremo, comporá a fundamentação dos votos dos Ministros. A análise desses argumentos é fundamental para investigar a ocorrência de corrupção entre os códigos intersistêmicos que tanto fragiliza a manutenção do Estado de Direito