Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Legal theory and philosophy / Journal articles

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Legal theory and philosophy.

Journal articles on the topic 'Legal theory and philosophy'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Legal theory and philosophy.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Edmundson, William A. "WHY LEGAL THEORY IS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY." Legal Theory 19, no. 4 (December 2013): 331–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325213000189.

Full text

Abstract:

The concept of law is not a theorist's invention but one that people use every day. Thus one measure of the adequacy of a theory of law is its degree of fidelity to the concept as it is understood by those who use it. That means “saving the truisms” as far as possible. There are important truisms about the law that have an evaluative cast. The theorist has either to say what would make those evaluative truisms true or to defend her choice to dismiss them as false of law or not of the essence of law. Thus the legal theorist must give an account of the truth grounds of the more central evaluative truisms about law. This account is a theory of legitimacy. It will contain framing judgments that state logical relations between descriptive judgments and directly evaluative judgments. Framing judgments are not directly evaluative, nor do they entail directly evaluative judgments, but they are nonetheless moral judgments. Therefore, an adequate theory of law must make (some) moral judgments. This means that an adequate theory of law has to take a stand on certain (but not all) contested issues in political philosophy. Legal theory is thus a branch of political philosophy. Moreover, one cannot be a moral-aim functionalist about legal institutions without compromising one's positivism about legal norms.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Varga, Csaba. "Legal philosophy, legal theory — and the future of theoretical legal thought." Acta Juridica Hungarica 50, no. 3 (September 2009): 237–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/ajur.50.2009.3.1.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Atria, Fernando. "Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Revisited." Law and Philosophy 18, no. 5 (September 1999): 537. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3505144.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Windham, Mary E. "Feminist Legal Theory." Teaching Philosophy 16, no. 4 (1993): 355–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil199316450.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Tur, Richard. "American Legal Philosophy." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 19 (March 1985): 255–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004628.

Full text

Abstract:

Given statements like these about current developments in intellectualizing about law in America it is an exciting time to look at American legal philosophy. Given the ferment in the law schools and the volume of literature in the law journals it is also a difficult task confidently to extract the main lines of current thought and adequately to assess the significance of current intellectual movements. American lawyers are inclined to point out that there is no such thing as ‘American law’. Rather, in addition to Federal law and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction there are some fifty jurisdictions each with its own Constitution, Legislature and Supreme Court and consequently diversity rather than uniformity is the rule. Equally, the very idea that there is some single, coherent and widely accepted theory of law deserving description as ‘American legal philosophy’ obviously begs all manner of significant questions.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Tur, Richard. "American Legal Philosophy." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 19 (March 1985): 255–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00004624.

Full text

Abstract:

Given statements like these about current developments in intellectualizing about law in America it is an exciting time to look at American legal philosophy. Given the ferment in the law schools and the volume of literature in the law journals it is also a difficult task confidently to extract the main lines of current thought and adequately to assess the significance of current intellectual movements. American lawyers are inclined to point out that there is no such thing as ‘American law’. Rather, in addition to Federal law and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction there are some fifty jurisdictions each with its own Constitution, Legislature and Supreme Court and consequently diversity rather than uniformity is the rule. Equally, the very idea that there is some single, coherent and widely accepted theory of law deserving description as ‘American legal philosophy’ obviously begs all manner of significant questions.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Stankovic, Dejan. "Anti-metaphysical foundation of contemporary theory of natural law: Theory of law and practical rationality in works of John Mitchel Finnis." Theoria, Beograd 60, no. 1 (2017): 5–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1701005s.

Full text

Abstract:

The contemporary natural law theory was grounded in the philosophical and the jurisprudential work of Australian legal and moral philosopher John Mitchell Finnis. He reaffirmed the natural law and also corrected some of false notions about it which were dominant through the history of legal philosophy. Finnis moral and legal philosophy could be understood by the specific theoretical figure - moral argument for law. This theoretical concept implies unity of two mutually connected moments which are necessary for a philosophical treatment of any socially relevant phenomena: methodological and epistemological as well as practical. The meeting point of these two philosophically relevant dimensions is theory of practical rationality exposed in the philosophy of John Mitchell Finnis. By grounding his concept of natural law on the theory of practical rationality, John Finnis historically contextualize it. He made some sort of specific anti metaphysical concept of natural law theory that is alternative to the classical natural law as well as to the legal positivism, which mainly exposed in the legal theories of Hans Kelsen and H.L.A Hart.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Endicott, Timothy A. O. "Vagueness and Legal Theory." Legal Theory 3, no. 1 (March 1997): 37–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135232520000063x.

Full text

Abstract:

The use of vague language in law has important implications for legal theory. Legal philosophers have occasionally grappled with those implications, but they have not come to grips with the characteristic phenomenon of vagueness: the sorites paradox. I discuss the paradox, and claim that it poses problems for some legal theorists (David Lyons, Hans Kelsen, and, especially, Ronald Dworkin). I propose that a good account of vagueness will have three consequences for legal theory: (i) Theories that deny that vagueness in formulations of the law leads to discretion in adjudication (including Dworkin's) cannot accommodate “higher-order” vagueness, (ii) A legal theory should accept that the law is partly indeterminate when it can be stated in vague language, (iii) However, the traditional formulation of the indeterminacy claim, that a vague statement is “neither true nor false” in a borderline case, is misconceived and should be abandoned.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Kaufmann, A. "Philosophy of Law, theory of law, legal dogma." Gosudarstvo i pravo, no. 5 (May 2019): 18–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013207690004857-4.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Beckwith, Francis J. "Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory: An Anthology." Philosophia Christi 5, no. 1 (2003): 350–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc20035140.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

McManus, Matthew. "Linguistic Meaning, Rigid Designators, and Legal Philosophy." Philosophies 4, no. 2 (April 3, 2019): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4020015.

Full text

Abstract:

This essay is intended to engage some of the controversies that have emerged in legal philosophy concerning the theory of linguistic meaning we should adopt with reference to the law. In particular, I will focus on two theories of linguistic meaning that have opposing positions both on the nature of meaning, and the consequences this might have for law and legal objectivity. The first can be called plain meaning view. The plain meaning theory claims that the meaning of legal terms is a settled thing, and it is the duty of legal officials, especially judges, to simply apply that meaning to a given case in hand. In modern American jurisprudence, the plain meaning theory is often associated with various originalist figures, most notably the late Antonin Scalia who called his iteration of the plain meaning theory “textualism.” For this reason, I will largely be focusing on Justice Scalia’s account. The second theory of linguistic meaning I will be examining can be called the indeterminate theory. The indeterminate theory holds that there is no set or foundational meaning to any semantic term in the law which can be objectively applied by legal practitioners.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Sion Li, Luana. "INFLUENCE OF LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY ON ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE THROUGH THE PERSPECTIVE OF H. L. A. HART." PÓLEMOS – Revista de Estudantes de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília 9, no. 18 (August 31, 2020): 315–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.26512/pl.v9i18.30465.

Full text

Abstract:

This article discusses the influence of emerging linguistic philosophy theories in the 20th century on the development of analytical jurisprudence through an examination of the way those theories influenced the legal philosopher H. L. A. Hart. Although Hart is significantly influenced by linguistic philosophy, his legal theory could not have been developed solely with it. This is evidenced by Hart’s disownment of the essay Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, his attempt to employ ideas from ordinary language philosophy in the context of law. Hart’s theoretical development shows that he was above all not a linguistic, but a legal philosopher; and that analytical jurisprudence, albeit influenced by linguistic philosophy, depends on aspects beyond it.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Roberts, Thomas. "Legal Positivism and Scottish Common Sense Philosophy." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 18, no. 2 (July 2005): 277–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s084182090000401x.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper identifies a volitional theory of meaning common to speech act theory and legal positivism, represented by Hart and Kelsen. This model is compared and contrasted with the model of social operations developed by Reid, a Common Sense Enlightenment philosopher. Whereas the former subscribes to the view that meaning is generated by acts of will, the latter finds meaning to consist of the dual elements of sign and ‘directedness’.The ability of positivist theories to provide a structural account of the difference between legal rules and other rules is inextricably linked to this commitment to the volitional theory of meaning. The commitment to the volitional view however leads to problems in requiring that some kind of authority be presupposed in for plain rules to attain legal force. Such authority can only be established with recourse to further rules (thus falling into a malign infinite regress) or must be accepted as a matter of faith. Reid's criterion of direction however vitiates the need for an authority, instead accounting for social communication in general, and rules in particular, in terms of sociological factors. Although no comprehensive critique of the volitional theory is proposed, Reid's model is preferable on the grounds of explanatory richness.The core claims of the paper are that: (a) legal positivism necessarily subscribes to the volitional theory of meaning; (b) rejection of the volitional theory necessarily entails rejection of the positivist view that legal and non-legal rules can be differentiated on structural grounds (c) another counter-model exists which avoids some of the pitfalls of the volitional theory; (d) if the volitional theory is rejected then the existence of rules can only be accounted for in a 'strong' sociological sense and legal theory must accordingly accept the dominant role of sociology in conceptualising the nature of rules.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Dajovic, Goran. "Study of the law: Legal science, legal theory and philosophy of law." Pravni zapisi 8, no. 2 (2017): 222–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/pravzap0-16070.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Groot, Muriel De, and Mirjan Oude Vrielink. "Legal Theory and Sociological Facts." Law and Philosophy 17, no. 3 (May 1998): 251. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3504881.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Villa, Vittorio. "Legal Theory and Value Judgments." Law and Philosophy 16, no. 4 (July 1997): 447. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3504984.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Sigmund, Paul E., and John Finnis. "Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory." Philosophical Review 110, no. 1 (January 2001): 129. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2693614.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Sigmund, P. E. "AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY." Philosophical Review 110, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 129–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-1-129.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Burgess‐Jackson, Keith. "Teaching Legal Theory with Venn Diagrams." Metaphilosophy 29, no. 3 (July 1998): 159–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9973.00088.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Laabdi, Mourad. "Ibn Khaldūn Between Legal Theory and Legal Practice." Journal of Islamic Studies 32, no. 1 (December 20, 2020): 27–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jis/etaa046.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract Modern studies of Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406) have covered several aspects of his thought including historiography, pedagogy, philosophy, economy, urbanism and, most recently, mysticism. However, there remains conspicuously little on the place of the law within his intellectual enterprise despite the fact that the law had played a central role in his career as scholar, teacher, and statesman. This paper reconstructs two expressions of his relationship with the law: his conceptualization of it as a scholar, and his practice of it as a justice administrator. It first examines Ibn Khaldūn’s legal training, writings and performance, with close attention to his role as a Mālikī chief judge in Mamlūk Egypt. Then, it probes his perspective on the development of Islamic law and its institutions through a systematic analysis of his account of fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh in the Muqaddima. The paper concludes that Ibn Khaldūn’s narrative fulfills two main tendencies: to contribute a critical analysis of the history of Islamic law, and to represent this history in a novel fashion through his theory of society and culture (ʿilm al-ʿumrān).

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Taylor, C. C. W. "The Sophists and Legal Philosophy." Classical Review 55, no. 1 (March 2005): 47–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/clrevj/bni029.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Wall, Jesse. "On hating and despising legal philosophy." Journal of Legal Philosophy 46, no. 1 (March 1, 2021): 29–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/jlp.2021.01.02.

Full text

Abstract:

This article is a cry for help. It is a search for some possible view of legal philosophy that does not render it either intrinsically useless or useless in its current form. In this article I focus on two methodological hallmarks of contemporary anglophone legal philosophy. The first is the Archimedean way in which the legal theorist places a critical distance between him- or herself and the subject matter of the philosophical inquiry. The second is the introverted way in which the accuracy of any given legal theory is confined to the theorist’s own puzzles, concerns, controversies, and preoccupations. Whilst I consider those who have turned against these methodological commitments and called for an anti-Archimedean or extroverted approach to legal theory, I explain how those who accept both commitments adopt a very modest view of the helpfulness of legal philosophy. I then consider whether, contrary to the modest view, if we accept both commitments, then whatever is true in legal philosophy will always be trivially true, irrelevant, or inconsequential, for any non-philosophical practice or non-philosophical inquiry about the law. The value of this article, I hope, lies in its refutation.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Zirk-Sadowski, Marek. "Jerzy Wróblewski’s Legal Theory and His Influence on Humanist Legal Thought." Review of Central and East European Law 45, no. 2-3 (June 23, 2020): 200–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15730352-bja10004.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper presents Jerzy Wróblewski’s (1926–1990) theory of law. He was an eminent Polish legal philosopher. His philosophical minimalism, anticognitivism, relativism and moderate reconstructivism constitute the basis for analytical theory of law in Poland. He was developing his theory of law over the span of several dozens of years but the assumptions were formulated already in his first work on legal interpretation published in 1959. His paradigm of legal theory includes several areas: the theory of the legal norm, theory of legal interpretation, theory of the legal system, theory of application of law, theory of law-making and the methodology of legal sciences.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Morelli, Mario. "A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory." Teaching Philosophy 21, no. 1 (1998): 105–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil199821111.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Doliwa, Katarzyna. "Filozoficzne podstawy Herberta L. A. Harta teorii prawa." Studia Iuridica, no. 83 (February 19, 2021): 43–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.31338/2544-3135.si.2020-83.3.

Full text

Abstract:

This article shows H. L. A. Hart as a leading representative of the analytic orientation in legal philosophy. Hart proved that the methods of analytic philosophy yield generous implications to law, where they may promote new ideas and innovative solutions. The text emphasizes the linguistic aspect of Hart’s works; his achievements in legal theory are discussed in the context of the principles of ordinary language philosophy.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Brooks, Thom. "Hegel’s Ambiguous Contribution to Legal Theory." Res Publica 11, no. 1 (March 2005): 85–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11158-004-0735-1.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Heritier, Paolo. "Vico’s “Scienza Nuova”: Sematology and Thirdness in the Law." International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique 33, no. 4 (August 25, 2020): 1125–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11196-020-09768-9.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractIs it the task of legal semiotics or the legal philosophers to define legal semiotics? For the philosopher of law, the question recalls the distinction between philosophers’ philosophy of law and legal scholars’ philosophy of law. The thesis that the paper argues is that a semiotic legal perspective can also be sought from the analysis of anthropological knowledge on the origin of the social bond and society, implying a social and institutional theory of the mind. In the first paragraph, the search for a different kind of rationality emerges from a semiotician, Jürgen Trabant, who analyses semiotically the thought of a rhetorician and philosopher of law, Giambattista Vico. In the second paragraph, the anthropological notion of social bond emerges from the debate on the relationship between the idea of the gift and that of exchange. In the third paragraph, the analysis of the legal notion of thirdness recognizes the central role of myth and fiction in the configuration of the civil world and sign, returning to Vico’s critical view of the philosophy of language as an institution of society.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Davies, Margaret. "Unity and Diversity in Feminist Legal Theory." Philosophy Compass 2, no. 4 (July 2007): 650–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00091.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Rottleuthner, Hubert. "Legal Positivism and National Socialism: A Contribution to a Theory of Legal Development." German Law Journal 12, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 100–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s207183220001676x.

Full text

Abstract:

Recent theories of societal development carry a heavy load; they are weighed down by their inheritance from the philosophy of history. Only at the price of a paradoxical forgetfulness can they ignore the fact that there have been predecessors, whose origin and decline, as well as the particular circumstances of their revival, must also be of interest. However, there appears to be a quest for the meaning of life, coupled with an aesthetic requirement to do a kind of elegant violence to historical complexity, which gives rise to such forgetfulness about one's own history. If one has discerned the difficulties with philosophy of history, it is only with considerable irony that one could erect a handsome structure in the form of a theory of development. There are, nevertheless, some lessons from the development of theories of development, which may permit a cautious advance. In what follows I want to attempt such a cautious advance towards a theory of legal development.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Klein, Joel T. "Kant on Legal Positivism and the Juridical State." Kant Yearbook 13, no. 1 (September 6, 2021): 73–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2021-0004.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract In this paper I argue that Kant’s political and juridical philosophy justifies a type of normative legal positivism that implies specific notions of law and legal freedom which determine and restrict the sphere of action of judges and jurists. Finally, I defend that, according to Kant’s practical philosophy, the normative connection between justice and law is not supposed to be carried out at the juridical level, as a meta-juridical theory, but at the political one, making it a meta-political theory.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Raz, Joseph. "Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison." Legal Theory 4, no. 3 (September 1998): 249–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325200001026.

Full text

Abstract:

In Law's Empire Prof. Ronald Dworkin has advanced a new theory of law, complex and intriguing. He calls it law as integrity. But in some ways the more radical and surprising claim he makes is that not only were previous legal philosophers mistaken about the nature of law, they were also mistaken about the nature of the philosophy of law or jurisprudence. Perhaps it is possible to summarize his main contentions on the nature of jurisprudence in three theses: First, jurisprudence is interpretive: “General theories of law… aim to interpret the main point and structure of legal practice” (LE, 90). Second, legal philosophy cannot be a semantic account of the word “law.” Legal philosophers “cannot produce useful semantic theories of law” (id.). Third, legal philosophy or jurisprudence “is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law” (id.).

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

박은정. "Legal Philosophy in Transition―A Return of Natural Law Theory(?)." Korean Journal of Legal Philosophy 20, no. 1 (April 2017): 7–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.22286/kjlp.2017.20.1.001.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Tamanaha, Brian Z. "Pragmatic Reconstruction in Jurisprudence: Features of a Realistic Legal Theory." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 34, no. 1 (February 2021): 171–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2020.19.

Full text

Abstract:

A century ago the pragmatists called for reconstruction in philosophy. Philosophy at the time was occupied with conceptual analysis, abstractions, a priori analysis, and the pursuit of necessary, universal truths. Pragmatists argued that philosophy instead should center on the pressing problems of the day, which requires theorists to pay attention to social complexity, variation, change, power, consequences, and other concrete aspects of social life. The parallels between philosophy then and jurisprudence today are striking, as I show, calling for a pragmatism-informed theory of law within contemporary jurisprudence. In the wake of H.L.A. Hart’s mid-century turn to conceptual analysis, “during the course of the twentieth century, the boundaries of jurisprudential inquiry were progressively narrowed.”1 Jurisprudence today is dominated by legal philosophers engaged in conceptual analysis built on intuitions, seeking to identify essential features and timeless truths about law. In the pursuit of these objectives, they detach law from its social and historical moorings, they ignore variation and change, they drastically reduce law to a singular phenomenon—like a coercive planning system for difficult moral problems2—and they deny that coercive force is a universal feature of law, among other ways in which they depart from the reality of law; a few prominent jurisprudents even proffer arguments that invoke aliens or societies of angels.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Udovyka, Larysa. "Formation of the legal system theory in Legal science (Part 2)." Law Review of Kyiv University of Law, no. 1 (April 15, 2020): 26–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.36695/2219-5521.1.2020.03.

Full text

Abstract:

The article is devoted to the study of the formation of the theory of the legal system in legal science. The third stage in the development of the theory of law is characterized system, which begins at the beginning of the second decade of the XXI century. and continues to this day. t this stage, the interpenetration of ideas, provisions, conclusions about the development of the legal system within the legal sciences and areas that study the legal systems: the theory of state and law, comparative law, international law, philosophy of law is increasingly being traced. This stage is characterized by the search for answers to the question of approximation of the domestic legal system to European law; the mechanism of interaction between the national legal system and the EU legal system; features of systematization and unification of legislation at the stage of legal integration; directions of transformation and modernization of the legal system of Ukraine in the context of European integration and globalization, etc. The interpenetration of ideas and provisions largely reflects the objective process of strengthening and deepening the interaction of national and international legal systems, the inability to answer the vast majority of questions that arise in this regard, limited only to national or international law In recent years, the legal system of Ukraine, along with the traditional ones, has faced fundamentally new problems caused by external factors, including such as the establishment and consolidation of European foreign policy priorities, the search for effective legal means to counter threats to independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, territorial integrity, territorial integrity, energy threats, protection of citizens' rights violated as a result of annexation of Crimea, occupation in eastern Ukraine. Solving these and other problems is possible only through a comprehensive, systematic understanding, based on the achievements of the general theory of law, comparative law, international law, philosophy of law with the use of new approaches and methods, that is, within the framework of the general (universal) theory of law. The peculiarities of the development of legal science at this stage at the present day raise the question of the need to form a universal (general) theory of law as a conceptual basis of the theories of national and international law.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Doliwa, Katarzyna. "Philosophical and Linguistic Sources of Herbert L. A. Hart’s Theory of Law." Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46, no. 1 (September 1, 2016): 231–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2016-0042.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract The paper presents H. L. A. Hart as a leading exponent of the analytic orientation in legal philosophy. Hart showed that the principles and methods of analytic philosophy yield fruitful implications to law, where they may foster fresh ideas and innovative solutions. The text emphasizes the linguistic aspect of Hart’s works; his achievements in legal theory are discussed in the context of the principles of ordinary language philosophy.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Green, Leslie. "The Political Content of Legal Theory." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 17, no. 1 (March 1987): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004839318701700101.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Herbeck, Dale A. "Critical Legal Studies and argumentation theory." Argumentation 9, no. 5 (December 1995): 719–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00744752.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Plotica, Luke Philip. "A Different Legal Conservatism." Contemporary Pragmatism 15, no. 4 (December 3, 2018): 515–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01501124.

Full text

Abstract:

In Conservatism and Pragmatism, Seth Vannatta posits and explores several major conceptual and practical affinities between classical (especially Peircean) pragmatism and conservatism. Characterizing both as essentially methods rather than ideologies, he argues that the two ought to be understood as mutually supportive and corrective, and that they conjointly supply an especially robust set of intellectual resources relevant to contemporary moral, political, and legal concerns. This essay critically examines Vannatta’s marriage of conservatism and pragmatism in the realm of legal theory. It argues that while Vannatta’s work provides a rigorous pragmatist alternative to the familiar legal formalism adopted by many American conservatives, its foundations may be narrower than Vannatta appreciates and the resulting theory may have little necessary connection to the dispositional, methodological conservatism upon which it is purportedly based.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Bator, Andrzej. "PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW. REMARKS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY." PRACE NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU EKONOMICZNEGO WE WROCŁAWIU, no. 497 (2017): 15–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.15611/pn.2017.497.01.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Sulistyawan, Aditya Yuli. "FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY DALAM TELAAH PARADIGMA: SUATU PEMETAAN FILSAFAT HUKUM." Masalah-Masalah Hukum 47, no. 1 (January 30, 2018): 56. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/mmh.47.1.2018.56-62.

Full text

Abstract:

Feminist Legal Theory (FLT) is a groundbreaking thought against the enactment of the law against women. As one of the schools of thought, the distinctiveness of FLT can not be freely explained. The explanation of this will only be done precisely by the 'umbrella philosophy' called the paradigm. Through the paradigm, FLT will be placed in one paradigm, according to its ontology, epistemology, and methodology. In summary, the purpose of this paper is to create a mapping of legal philosophy to FLT. Based on the discussion, FLT can eventually be mapped as one of the flows within the Critical Theory et. al. paradigm.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Peters, Bernhard. "On reconstructive legal and political theory." Philosophy & Social Criticism 20, no. 4 (October 1994): 101–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/019145379402000405.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Ward, Ian. "Bricolage and low cunning: Rorty on pragmatism, politics and poetic justice." Legal Studies 28, no. 2 (June 2008): 281–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-121x.2008.00088.x.

Full text

Abstract:

Richard Rorty died in June 2007. According to some he was the most interesting, perhaps even the most important, philosopher of his generation. His influence on legal theory, especially legal theory of the more critical and literary kind, was considerable. And yet, in comparison with his reputation in the philosophical and literary academy, for many legal academics Rorty remains a relatively hazy figure. The purpose of this paper is to provide an introduction to Rorty; to his broader philosophy of pragmatism, a philosophy as he termed it of ‘bricolage’ and ‘law cunning’, as well as to his writings which focused rather more closely on jurisprudential questions, most importantly those that addressed the nature of rights. It closes with some thoughts on Rorty's final, provocative, and timely, observations on the decline of American civil society. If lawyers and legal theorists have, in large part, neglected Rorty, it is unfortunate; for, in our present age of vaulting political pretence, rarely has the need for a strong measure of intellectual scepticism seemed to be more urgent.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Finnis, John. "GROUNDS OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY: A Response." Legal Theory 13, no. 3-4 (December 2007): 315–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325208070122.

Full text

Abstract:

Linking theses of Plato, Wittgenstein, and Weber, section I argues that identification of central cases and settling of focal meanings depend upon the theorist's purpose(s) and, in the case of theory about human affairs—theory adequately attentive to the four irreducible orders in which human persons live and act—upon the purposes for which we intelligibly and intelligently act. Among these purposes, primacy (centrality) is to be accorded (by acknowledgement, not fiat) to purposes which are, as best the theorist can judge, reasonable and fit to be adopted by anyone, the theorist included. Section II defends the reasonableness (and hence entitlement to universal assent) of practical and moral judgments, against Michael Perry's ultimately nihilist claims that egoism's challenge to moral normativity has gone unanswered and that “reason for A” does not entail “reason for” anyone else. Section III takes up Steven Smith's suggestion that such subjectivism is encouraged by the talk in Natural Law and Natural Rights of “pursuing goods,” talk which (he argues) is individualistic and neglectful of (other) persons, inimical to an understanding of friendship, and impotent in the face of egoism. Here as elsewhere the key is to grasp that understanding any basic or intrinsic human good is to understand it as good for anyone like me and thus—since as I instantiate and embody a universal, viz. human being—as a good common to (good for) anyone and everyone. Section IV argues that common good (which includes respect for human rights, and the Rule of Law) gives reason for exercise and acceptance of authority, and for allegiance, even (and in a sense, especially) in time of breakdown. Section V argues that natural law theory is no more dependent on affirming God's existence than any other theory is, in any of the four orders of theory, but equally that is not safe for atheists. For, like any other sound theory, it suggests and is consistent with questions and answers about its grounds, in this case about the source of its normativity and of the human nature that its normative universals presuppose and affirm; and the answers are those argued for, too abstemiously, in the last chapter of NLNR and, more adequately, in the equivalent chapter of Aquinas.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Roermund, Bert C. Van, and Bernard S. Jackson. "Semiotics and Legal Theory. Law, Fact, and Narrative Coherence." Noûs 27, no. 1 (March 1993): 121. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2215911.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

O'Brien, Sean Marie. "FISH VS. CLS: A DEFENSE OF CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY." Journal of Social Philosophy 23, no. 1 (March 1992): 64–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1992.tb00485.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Batchelor, Nim. "The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory." Teaching Philosophy 28, no. 4 (2005): 373–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil200528454.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Wolthuis, Bertjan, and Wouter Werner. "World Legislation Perspectives from International Law, Legal Theory and Political Philosophy." International Organizations Law Review 8, no. 1 (2011): 197–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157237411x594227.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Purcell, Edward A., and Gregory Leyh. "Legal Hermeneutics: History, Theory, and Practice." Journal of American History 79, no. 4 (March 1993): 1567. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2080221.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Villa Rosas, Gonzalo. "Commanding and Defining. On Eugenio Bulygin’s Theory of Legal Power-Conferring Rules." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 49, no. 146 (October 31, 2017): 75–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.182.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper aims to explore two objections raised against Bulygin’s second approach to the definition of the nature of legal power-conferring rules. According to the first objection, such an account is vague about what is defined by legal powerconferring rules qua constitutive rules. I maintain that this vagueness is rooted in the lack of a suitable definition of legal power. I shall be arguing for the reduction of the complexity of the definientia by defining legal power as a species of competence. According to the second objection, this non-reductive approach cannot explain the normativity of this kind of rules. Against this approach, it argues that legal powerconferring rules perform a deontic and a definitional function as constitutive rules of legal practice.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Schlegel, John Henry. "American Legal Theory and American Legal Education: A Snake Swallowing its Tail?" German Law Journal 12, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 67–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200016746.

Full text

Abstract:

My story is a story about American Legal Realism. It is part of an attempt to understand what Realism was by addressing the question, “Why is the study of Realism a subject of legal history and not of current events?” Of course, the “answer” to such a question is made up of several partial answers, of which what follows is but one. Others would talk about the relationship between legal doctrine and capitalist economic development or about legal theory and political philosophy or about legal theory and legal practice, to name a few examples. However, this partial answer can best be approached by examining how a simple idea about law - the liberal idea of the rule of law in its guise as the “rule theory of law” - has had in its rise and in its demise an impact on legal education and to attempt to understand why that is so. My attempt however, requires that I start my story back aways with Christopher Columbus Langdell and the Harvard Law School.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!