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Taekema, Sanne. "The concept of ideals in legal theory /." The Hague : Kluwer Law International, 2003. http://opac.nebis.ch/cgi-bin/showAbstract.pl?u20=904111971X.
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Crawley, Karen. "Limited ink : interpreting and misinterpreting GÜdel's incompleteness theorem in legal theory." Thesis, McGill University, 2006. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=101814.
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This thesis explores the significance of Godel's Theorem for an understanding of law as rules, and of legal adjudication as rule-following. It argues that Godel's Theorem, read through Wittgenstein's understanding of rules and language as a contextual activity, and through Derrida's account of 'undecidability,' offers an alternative account of the relationship of judging to justice. Instead of providing support for the 'indeterminacy' claim, Godel's Theorem illuminates the predicament of undecidability that structures any interpretation and every legal decision, and which constitutes the opening to justice. The first argument in this thesis examines Godel's proof, Wittgenstein's views on rules, and Derrida's undecidability, as manifestations of a common concern with the limits of what can be formalized. The meta-argument examines their misinterpretation and misappropriation within legal theory as a case study of just what they mean about meaning, context, and justice as necessarily co-implicated.
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Macpherson, James A. E. "A Theory of Collective Intentions, with Moral and Legal Applications." The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1259870965.
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Hartney, M. "Hans Kelsen's theory of norms." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.371666.
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Ródenas, Ángeles. "Challenges for Legal Philosophy in the 21st Century." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/115910.
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This paper shows a mismatch between a real and pressing demand for a philosophical analysis that allows us to explain the emergence of new phenomena in law, and the limited supply of theoretical tools to satisfy this demand by the traditional model of positivistic science of law. After an initial diagnosis of a mismatch between supply and demand, the resistance of legal positivism to accept practical rationality stands out as a core problem of the traditional model of positivistic science of law and the viability of this way of rationality is defended. The paper concludes with a proposal for the reinvention of the philosophy of law of the 21st century that incorporates new objectives and rethinks its method.En este trabajo se constata un desajuste entre una demanda real y acuciante de un análisis filosófico que permita dar cuenta de la irrupción de nuevos fenómenos en el panorama del derecho y la limitada oferta de herramientas teóricas con que satisfacer esta demanda que aporta el modelo tradicional de ciencia positivista del derecho. Tras el diagnóstico inicial de desajuste entre la oferta y la demanda, se destaca como un problema medular del modelo tradicional de ciencia positivista del derecho su resistencia a asumir una racionalidad de tipo práctico y se defiende la viabilidad de esta forma de pensamiento. El trabajo concluye con una propuesta para la reinvención de la filosofía del derecho del siglo XXI, redefiniendo sus objetivos y replanteando su método.
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Leslie, Jason. "Pluralist moral theory in the philosophy of property and the legal form of the condominium." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/55068.
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This thesis outlines three major moral theories in philosophy – utilitarian, deontological, and pluralist or neo-Aristotelean – and examines their application to the law of condominium. The thesis uses a combination of moral analytic theory and a study of legislation and case law. The thesis begins with a discussion of theoretical methods in legal philosophy, adopting and defending an approach based on general pragmatism and legal realism. It then canvasses the application of moral approaches to property law, with an emphasis on explaining and further developing the application of pluralist moral theory to property. The thesis then considers how each of the three schools of philosophy analyzes the structure of condominium and makes predictions about how condominium issues would be resolved by each approach. In particular, this analysis focuses on how condominium presents a challenge to traditional views of property and highlights the connection between property and sovereign power by incorporating concepts of democratic governance. Afterward, the thesis engages a detailed review of statutes and case law that apply to condominium disputes in British Columbia and Ontario. The thesis concludes that courts and legislatures have been alternating between deontological approaches and pluralist approaches to condominium, with a general trend in recent developments away from the deontological approaches and towards pluralist approaches. The thesis tentatively suggests that on the whole, pluralist approaches lead to more just and equitable results in condominium, and suggests further avenues for study.Law, Peter A. Allard School of
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Spence, Colin J. "Who Says What the Law Is: How Barack Obama’s Legal Philosophy is Reflected by His Judicial Appointees." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1205.
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Ibrahim, Bilal. "The evolution of the rule of law : the origins and function of legal theory." Thesis, McGill University, 2005. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=98935.
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The thesis examines the origins and function of legal theory ( usul al-fiqh) within the context of the development of early Islamic law. I argue against the depiction of the development of law as a series of compromises between traditionalism and rationalism. Rather, by evading the demands of traditionalism, law evolved into a complex doctrinal entity rooted in the social structures of third-century Abbasid society. This revision of the development of law provides a context to evaluate early works of legal theory. Moreover, in context of my analysis of the development of law, I attempt to explain the emergence of legal theory as an independent discipline and its function within the greater structure of law.
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Link, Astrid. "Descriptive and normative aspects of the theory of legal pluralism : illustrated by problems of media regulation." Thesis, McGill University, 2000. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=31170.
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This thesis explores the potential of the theory of legal pluralism. It examines the extent to which such a theory can contribute to an understanding of the regulatory crisis of the nation-state and serve as a point of departure for new regulatory approaches. A historical overview which looks at the disciplinary origins of legal pluralism is followed by an analysis of several legal pluralist concepts. This analysis serves as the basis for an elaboration of the descriptive and normative aspects of legal pluralism. The concept is compared with other social theories which are concerned with similar questions as legal pluralism. To illustrate the legal pluralist approach, same specific examples from the media sector are introduced. The thesis concludes by showing where a legal pluralist analysis might be appropriate and, moreover, how the theory can contribute to regulatory ways alternative to direct state intervention and market conceptions.
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Ibsen, Alexander Zlatanos. "Inventing Law: The Creation of Legal Philosophies in the American and European Patent Systems." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/222841.
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Although the patent systems of the United States and Europe have become continuously more similar their underlying legal philosophy continues to be different. This study examines how the two patent philosophies emerged out of different social situations and why and how patent systems can develop similar formal arrangements without experiencing a similar harmonization of underlying philosophy. As patent laws are historically unique to western culture it provides a lens through which to observe its relative social appreciation of industry, technology, commerce, and the role of the law. This study argues that the two separate 'patent philosophies' emerged as results of unique historical situations and that the reason as to why they have been able to maintain their distinct natures is that a similar ideological pressure has not been present since. The patent law of the United States, which is based on an 'inventor philosophy', was the product of the ideological currents of the movement toward American independence. This philosophy is friendly to inventors and entrust them with all responsibility over their inventions. Its individualistic and democratic character resonated well with the country's anti-colonial and anti-monarchical political campaign. A similar ideological pressure to revise fundamental opinions on technology and law has not emerged since. Virtually all European nations are today part of the European Patent Organization which administers the world's only true regional patent office. This European system is based on an 'invention philosophy' which was designed in the late 19th century by German industrialists. This philosophy is anti-monopoly and sees the State as a guardian of the public benefits which arise from technological novelties. Due to German industrial efficiency, it was used to model European patent law. Although both philosophies have proved viable, the case of patent law suggests that the role of legal philosophy must be reduced. Apart from being crucial in the creation of a new legal system, this study argues for the need to drastically reconsider the relationship between substantive and formal law. Both patent philosophies have consistently lost importance over time to the point where they today support two formally very similar systems.
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Mustapha, Nadira. "Islamic legal theory and practice in the North American context: an epistemological and methodological analysis of the Fiqh council of North America." Thesis, McGill University, 2013. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=116883.
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The thesis explores the formation of the first official Islamic jurisprudential body in North America—the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA)—as it attempts to respond to the needs of Muslim minorities. The research examines whether the FCNA's legal methodology (minhaj) takes into consideration the development and use of Islamic legal theory, or whether the legal body employs contemporary legal approaches in navigating the intricacies of legal rulings (fatawa). The FCNA and its fatawa, in accommodating legal change, presents a unique object of analysis in order to contextualize the dynamics related to Islamic legal theory and practice in the North America context. The thesis intertwines two academic disciplines: legal institutional history and legal theory history. The theoretical legal background and foundation of the thesis is established in the introductory stages including the parameters of Islamic legal theory. Part I discusses the FCNA as a legal institution, its Fiqh Councilors, and its legal methodology, including the realization of fiqh of minorities (fiqh al-aqalliyyat). Part II engages in a circumspect examination of the fatawa, the FCNA's epistemological and methodological legal foundation, and a critical analysis as well as an evaluation of the status of the FCNA and its fatawa. The FCNA's historical and legal experience illuminates the evolution, history, and path of Islamic legal theory and practice in North America. The thesis concludes that the FCNA, a pioneering institution in North America, engages Islamic legal theory, while at times challenging the existing legal paradigm by way of contemporary legal approaches, in order to address the needs and concerns of Muslim minorities. From Islam's rich legal heritage, the Fiqh Councilors of the Fiqh Council of North America have shaped a contemporary legal body to meet the demands of its context, one that will continue to evolve in the years ahead.Cette thèse explore la formation du premier organisme officiel de jurisprudence islamique en Amérique du Nord—le Conseil de Fiqh de l'Amérique du Nord (CFAN)—et ses tentatives de répondre aux besoins des minorités musulmanes à travers l'émission de fatawa (décisions judiciaires), ainsi que le minhaj (méthodologie) qui en sert de base. Tenant compte du développement et de l'application des usul al-fiqh dans la période pré-moderne, ce travail de recherche analyse comment le CFAN emploie les principes d'usul al-fiqh en faisant face aux complexités de la fatwa contemporaine. Cette recherche vise à découvrir si oui ou non les fatawa reflètent la théorie du droit islamique, ou bien si le CFAN a dû mettre à point de nouvelles approches jurisprudentielles. Le CFAN et ses fatawa, tout en s'adaptant aux changements juridiques, offrent un objet d'analyse unique qui sert à mettre en contexte les dynamiques liées à la jurisprudence islamique en Amérique du Nord.La thèse recouvre deux disciplines académiques, à savoir: l'histoire des institutions juridiques et l'histoire de la théorie du droit. L'Introduction jette les fondations et l'arrière plan théoriques et judiciaires de notre enquête. La première partie traitent du CFAN en tant qu'organisme judiciaire, ainsi que de ses Conseillers en Fiqh et de sa méthodologie judiciaire, y compris la mise en pratique d'un fiqh des minorités (fiqh al-aqalliyyat). La deuxième partie examine de près les fatawa émis par le CFAN, ainsi que les fondations épistémologiques et la méthodologie judiciaire de cet organisme, suivi d'une analyse critique ainsi que d'une appréciation du statut accordé au CFAN et à ses fatawa.L'expérience historique et juridique du CFAN sert à éclairer l'évolution, l'histoire et le trajet du droit islamique en Amérique du Nord dans ses deux dimensions théoriques et pragmatiques. La thèse en arrive à conclure que le CFAN, une institution judiciaire pilote en Amérique du Nord, cherche en permanence à mettre en opération les principes de la théorie du droit islamique traditionnelle, tout en se montrant prêt à défier le paradigme existant en faisant appel à des approches judiciaires contemporaines. En puisant dans le riche patrimoine juridique de l'Islam, les Conseillers en fiqh du Conseil de Fiqh de l'Amérique du Nord en sont arrivés à mettre sur pied un conseil de fiqh contemporain apte à répondre aux exigences de son ambiance et qui, certes, ne cessera d'évoluer et de se développer aux cours des années à venir.
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Brady, Paul. "Towards a theory of adjudication : some issues of method and principle." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:ebfc484a-5593-445f-83d1-9cf30466e314.
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A sound theory of adjudication and of judicial duty requires or presupposes a sound theory of law and of legal argument. Jurisprudential inquiry is properly grounded not in reflections on conceptual properties of law but in reflections on human goods and needs as understood in a morally articulated theory of practical reason and compactly expressed in the normative concept of the common good. Such reflections confirm that law exists, in its central case, as a means to various types of authoritative co-ordination solutions. The underdetermined nature of (a) the positive requirements of practical reasonableness and the common good and of (b) the appropriate means of enforcing compliance and remedying non-compliance with either these requirements or the determinate negative precepts of practical reasonableness entails that a practically necessary aspect of the positive law’s role is constituting the requirements of justice, i.e. of what is due to whom generally and in particular situations (including situations where an injustice has been or is alleged to have been done). As a distinct and practically necessary mode of legal co-ordination for the common good, adjudication, in its central case, answers litigated questions of justice by applying all relevant law in accordance with the legal system’s practice of legal argument. Thus adjudication is performed by authoritative law-applying institutions precisely because it is about answering questions of justice, and not despite that fact. Theories of law developed on the assumption that it is possible to understand the ‘what’ of law without reliance on any moral judgments deny any practically necessary connection between (a) the promotion of justice and the common good and (b) the nature of law, in its central case, and, hence, the adjudicative application of the law. In the absence of this connection a judicial duty to do justice according to law is unintelligible.
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Henry, Daniella. "Reimagining Potential Life: A Socialized Right to Reproductive Freedom." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/1370.
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A more conservative supreme court will likely have the chance to overrule Roe v. Wade. Many states have passed heartbeat laws that will probably be taken all the way to the supreme court, these cases will ask the supreme court to affirm fetal personhood, giving fetuses a constitutionally recognized right to due process and making abortion illegal. In this thesis, I will defend an expansion of protections for pregnant peoples through a socialized right to abortion.
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Khaitan, Tarunabh. "An autonomy-based foundation for legal protection against discrimination." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:1f354185-66aa-45c9-a91b-54f7c1c76cd1.
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The impressive growth of antidiscrimination law in liberal democracies in the past few decades belies the inadequacy of the normative bases on which it has been sought to be justified. Popular ideals such as rationality, equality and dignity have been unsuccessful in providing a coherent liberal framework for the fundamental aspects of the practice of antidiscrimination law. In this thesis, I have argued that a unified normative framework comprising autonomy and dignity-as-autonomy does a markedly better job of justifying the most fundamental aspects of these laws. The ideal of personal autonomy is understood here as a principle that seeks to guarantee an adequate range of valuable options to individuals. Dignity-as-autonomy is understood to be an expressive norm, which forbids certain persons from expressing contempt for the autonomy of another. These ideals have different forms: autonomy is a non-action-regarding principle, while dignity-as-autonomy is action-regarding. They are also distinct substantively: it is often possible to violate one of them without affecting the other. When these ideals make incompatible demands, I argue that those made by autonomy should prevail. Mandating positive action and reasonable accommodation on the one hand, and prohibiting indirect discrimination and harassment on the other, are essential features of a model of antidiscrimination law based on this framework. Further, under this framework, antidiscrimination law is not vulnerable to objections such as ‘levelling down’ and responds well to claims of discrimination on ‘intersectional grounds’. Furthermore, it is not essential to find an ‘appropriate comparator’ in order to prove discrimination. This model also explains when, and under what conditions, can some forms of discrimination be ‘justified’. Finally, on an autonomy-based model, antidiscrimination law is only one of several complementary tools that should be employed to protect and promote personal autonomy.
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Psarras, Charalampos. "Law's authority and the division of moral labour between legislation and adjudication." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/9601.
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This thesis claims that if law has a distinctive and genuine normative force, then it is thanks to the fact that law’s authority originates from a particular institutional layout that allows for a division of moral labour between legislation and adjudication. After establishing what the moral dimension of authority is a matter of, and how law’s normative force can be justified by reference to it, this thesis defends a comprehensive-moral account of law’s authority. In this respect, the thesis argues that the moral dimension of law’s authority can be highlighted well if we consider it as emerging through a morally meaningful institutional distinction between legislation and adjudication: the institutional profile of legislative authority and that of adjudicative authority differ from each other, in that each can be said to be underlain by its own evaluative standards. On the one hand, the particularity of legislative authority is a matter of its community-driven, forward-looking character and of its consensual structure; as well as of the declaratory nature and the agent-relative status of reasons issued by legislative provisions. On the other hand, adjudicative authority is distinctive because it has a litigant-driven, remedial character and employs an adversarial structure so that it accomplishes its impartial investigatory task through the issuance of agent-neutral reasons. So understood, the institutional profile of legislative authority is considered to be morally meaningful in the sense that it incorporates a rule-consequentialist and value-pluralist rationale; while that of adjudicative authority is taken to owe its own moral meaningfulness to the fact that it fosters reciprocity between litigants.
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Behn, Daniel. "A theory of configurative fairness for evolving international legal orders : linking the scientific study of value subjectivity to jurisprudential thought." Thesis, University of Dundee, 2013. https://discovery.dundee.ac.uk/en/studentTheses/76f73f77-b861-4afd-8396-75e2c957705e.
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Values matter in both legal decision (lawmaking and lawapplying) and discourse (lawshaping and lawinfluencing). Yet, their purported subjectivity means that gaining or improving knowledge about values (whether they be epistemic, legal, moral, ethical, economic, political, cultural, social, or religious) in the context of analytic legal thought and understanding is often said to be at odds with its goal of objectivity. This phenomenon is amplified at the international level where the infusion of seemingly subjective political values by sovereigns, and the decisionmakers to whom they delegate, can, and does, interfere with an idealized and objective rule of law. The discourse on value subjectivity, and its relation to the purpose and function of the law, is particularly apparent in evolving international legal orders such as investment treaty arbitration. The primary aim of this work is to provide a new method for gaining empirical knowledge about value subjectivity that can help close a weak link in all nonpositivist (value-laden) legal theory: a weakness that has manifest itself as skepticism about the possibility of measuring value objectively enough to permit its incorporation as a necessary component of analytic jurisprudence. This work proposes a theory of configurative fairness for addressing the problem related to the development or evolution of legal regimes, and how legal regimes perceived as subjectively unfair can be remedied. Such a theory accepts the premise that perceptions of fairness matter in directing the way that legal orders develop, and that perceptions of fairness relate to the manner in which values are distributed and maximized in particular legal orders. It is posited that legal orders perceived as fair by their participants are more likely to be endorsed or accepted as legally binding (and are therefore more likely to comply with the processes and outcomes that such laws mandate). The purpose of a theory of configurative fairness is an attempt to provide a methodological bridge for improving knowledge about value in the context of legal inquiry through the employment of a technique called Q methodology: an epistemological and empirical means for the measurement and mapping of human subjectivity. It is a method that was developed in the early twentieth century by physicist-psychologist William Stephenson: the last research student of the inventor of factor analysis, Charles Spearman. What Stephenson did was to create a way for systematically measuring subjective perspectives, and although not previously used in jurisprudential thought, Q methodology will facilitate a means for the description and evaluation of shared subjectivities. In the context of law generally, and in investment treaty arbitration specifically, these are the subjectivities that manifest themselves as the conflicting perspectives about value that are omnipresent in both communicative lawshaping discourse and authoritative and controlling lawmaking and lawapplying decision. Knowledge about these shared value subjectivities among participants in investment treaty arbitration will allow the legal analyst to delineate and clarify points of overlapping consensus about the desired distribution of value as they relate to the regime-building issues of evolving legal orders. The focus for a theory of configurative fairness pertains to the identification of the various value positions that participants hold about a particular legal order and to configure those values, through its rules and principles, in a manner that is acceptable (and perceived as fair) by all of its participants. If such a value consensus can be identified, then particular rules in the legal order can be configured by decisionmakers in a way so as to satisfy participants’ shared value understandings. To engage such a theory, a means for identifying shared value subjectivities must be delineated. This work conducts a Q method study on the issues under debate relating to regime-building questions in investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study asked participants knowledgeable about investment treaty arbitration to rank-order a set of statements about the way that the values embraced by this legal order ought to be configured. The results of the study demonstrate that there is significant overlap about how participants in investment treaty arbitration perceive the desired distribution of values across the regime. The Q method study identified six distinct perspectives that represent shared subjectivities about value in the context of the development of investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study was also able to identify where there is an overlapping consensus about value distribution across the distinct perspectives. It is these areas of overlapping consensus that are most likely to reflect shared value understandings, and it is proposed that it is upon these shared value understandings that the future development of investment treaty arbitration ought to aim.
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Stein, Sebastian. "The objectivity of freedom : a systematic commentary on the introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:6b709922-9487-4b90-a2b7-9b63c43b0739.
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The introduction (§§1-33) to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is the key to the work’s structure, its argumentative strategy and it functions as a foundation for Hegel’s practical philosophy in general. Its explanatory potential is best realised by situating it within the systematic context of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences and the Science of Logic. This interpretative strategy reveals that for Hegel, the true site of agency is ‘the concept’ and that particular individuals and their arbitrary activity are at best the concept’s ‘appearance’. This does not render their activity ‘false’ but describes how willing and freedom are ‘for us’ as self-conscious subjects that confront an external world. For Hegel, ‘true’ freedom in the sense of ‘self-determination to itself’ resides with the universal and singular concept that negatively unites itself with its objectivity to form what he calls the ‘Idea of the will’ or ‘right’. This interpretation contradicts the mainstream of contemporary Hegel scholarship since its proponents either deny the reality of the universal concept as agent or absolutely differentiate between the concept’s activity (subjective action) and its objective reality (norms, institutions). This prevents the interpreter from appreciating that it is Hegel’s concept that is manifest in form of particular willing subjects and their socio-political context. Since most commentators associate ‘activity’ or ‘freedom’ primarily with particular subjects, their notions of freedom are, by Hegel’s standards, either empty and fail to describe actual willing or they fall short of the standard of ‘true freedom’, viz. ‘self-determination to itself’ because their agents’ freedom depends on something that differs from the agents.1 The present commentary argues that such a dilemma can be avoided by an interpretation that attributes agency to Hegel’s concept. By determining itself to be Idea, the universal concept determines itself (as subject) to itself (as object) and rational agency and rational institutions are grasped as aspects of the same entity. This is what Hegel calls the unconditioned Idea of right or ‘objective freedom’.
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Spagnolo, Benjamin James. "Kelsen and Raz on the continuity of legal systems : applying the accounts in an Australian context." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2013. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a9025e33-e70e-49e9-994f-52f8daa311fd.
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This thesis has three objectives. Its primary objective is to examine, and critically evaluate, the theoretical accounts offered by Hans Kelsen and Joseph Raz to explain the temporal continuity and discontinuity of legal systems. In particular, it evaluates the explanatory power of those accounts by combining an abstract analysis of the accounts in principle and an evaluation based on systematically applying them to one concrete, historically circumstanced instance: the legal systems of British derivation in Australia between 1788 and 2001. The thesis thus tests each account’s factual fit: how adequately it corresponds to, accords with, and persuasively makes sense of, the facts – including complex social facts, attitudes and normative standards – for which it purports to offer an account. Second, the thesis aims to demonstrate, more generally, the utility of applying theoretical accounts to a particular historical instance to complement abstract analysis. Third, the thesis aims to advance the understanding of the evolution of Australian legal systems between 1788 and 2001. These three objectives are achieved through the critical exposition and reconstruction of the accounts, their development and enrichment where refinement is appropriate, their application to the specific context of Australia and their evaluation, individually and in comparison.
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Metcalfe, Eric William. "Are cultural rights human rights? : a cosmopolitan conception of cultural rights." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2000. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:c2002d1f-98de-4131-a758-58a8bb84d85d.
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The liberal conception of the state is marked by an insistence upon the equal civil and political rights of each inhabitant. Recently, though, a number of writers have argued that this emphasis on uniform rights ignores the fact that the populations of most states are culturally diverse, and that their inhabitants have significant interests qua members of particular cultures. They argue that liberals should recognize special, group-based cultural rights as a necessary part of a theory of justice in multicultural societies. In this thesis I examine the idea of special cultural rights. In the first part (Chapters 1 to 4), I begin by setting out some of the different conceptions of culture and multiculturalism that are involved in the debate over cultural rights. I then discuss three claims made by supporters of special cultural rights: (1) that having culture is an essential part of individual autonomy; (2) that people have morally significant interests qua members of particular cultures; and (3) that these interests are inadequately protected by existing liberal conceptions of human rights. Although I conclude that (1) is correct, I argue that both (2) and (3) are mistaken. Among other things, I suggest that the version of culture relied upon by supporters of special cultural rights is an implausible one and I outline what I take to be a more plausible, cosmopolitan conception of culture. In the second part (Chapters 5 to 9), I begin by looking at specific instances of cultural rights-claims, and analyzing the concept of cultural rights qua rights. I consider the practical and conceptual difficulties with special cultural rights at great length. But the core of my thesis is that our interest in culture lies in its contribution of worthwhile goals and options, and that this interest lies in culture generally rather than in particular cultures. Hence, adopting a special or group-based distribution of any right to culture would seem to be inconsistent with liberal egalitarian principles. If there are such things as cultural rights, I argue, they are general rather than special rights. I conclude by offering a very preliminary account of what a cosmopolitan conception of cultural rights might involve in the case of the right to free association and language rights.
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Giddens, Thomas Philip. "Comics, crime, and the moral self : an interdisciplinary study of criminal identity." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10036/3622.
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An ethical understanding of responsibility should entail a richly qualitative comprehension of the links between embodied, unique individuals and their lived realities of behaviour. Criminal responsibility theory broadly adheres to ‘rational choice’ models of the moral self which subsume individuals’ emotionally embodied dimensions under the general direction of their rational will and abstracts their behaviour from corporeal reality. Linking individuals with their behaviour based only on such understandings of ‘rational choice’ and abstract descriptions of behaviour overlooks the phenomenological dimensions of that behaviour and thus its moral significance as a lived experience. To overcome this ethical shortcoming, engagement with the aesthetic as an alternative discourse can help articulate the ‘excessive’ nature of lived reality and its relationship with ‘orthodox’ knowledge; fittingly, the comics form involves interaction of rational, non-rational, linguistic, and non-linguistic dimensions, modelling the limits of conceptual thought in relation to complex reality. Rational choice is predicated upon a split between a contextually embedded self and an abstractly autonomous self. Analysis of the graphic novel Watchmen contends that prioritisation of rational autonomy over sensual experience is symptomatic of a ‘rational surface’ that turns away from the indeterminate ‘chaos’ of complex reality (the unstructured universe), instead maintaining the power of rational and linguistic concepts to order the world. This ‘rational surface’ is maintained by masking that which threatens its stability: the chaos of the infinite difference of living individuals. These epistemological foundations are reconfigured, via Watchmen, enabling engagement beyond the ‘rational surface’ by accepting the generative potential of this living chaos and calling for models of criminal identity that are ‘restless’, acknowledging the unique, shifting nature of individuals, and not tending towards ‘complete’ or stable concepts of the self-as-responsible. As part of the aesthetic methodology of this reconfiguration, a radical extension of legal theory’s analytical canon is developed.
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Harnish, Jason A. "Brockway Correctional Education: A Case Study of Resident Experiences in Reentry." Miami University / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=miami1587556874462589.
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Chassaing, Olivier. "Réprimer les crimes, reconnaître les torts : la fonction normative de la peine." Thesis, Paris 10, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA100088/document.
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La peine est une institution paradoxale des démocraties libérales contemporaines : les excès et les effets de sur-pénalisation qu’entraînent certaines politiques sécuritaires sont critiqués, mais l’impunité de certains crimes fait scandale et l’on appelle à ce que justice soit faite ; l’abolition de certaines peines (de prison par exemple) ou l’introduction de formes alternatives de régulation (telles les mesures de justice restaurative) sont revendiquées, mais l’on bute sur la difficulté à donner force au droit sans sanctions dissuasives. La présente thèse porte sur les raisons qui font passer l’institution pénale pour indépassable. Elle soutient qu’au-delà de son statut d’instrument afflictif ou de véhicule au ressentiment collectif, la justice pénale est investie d’un troisième rôle, que l’on propose de nommer la fonction normative de la peine. Cette fonction se manifeste à plusieurs égards : l’institution pénale affirme le caractère fondamental de certains interdits et participe à reconnaître les torts subis par les individus, parfois au rebours de la morale dominante ; elle contribue à déplacer les normes sociales et à distinguer les infractions qui importent à l’État et celles qui demeurent invisibles ; elle modèle le contenu et les formes de la conflictualité sociale en mettant en scène les demandes de justice face à l’autorité publique. L’examen de cette fonction normative et de ses répercussions sur la justification de la peine constitue les deux versants de ce travail. La première partie montre qu’au nom du rôle de reconnaissance des torts et des injustices dont l’institution pénale peut être investie, son emploi peut délibérément accroître la souffrance et l’exclusion sociale des condamnés. La deuxième partie cherche plus fondamentalement à comprendre si et comment l’État peut imposer des repères pratiques et des critères d’évaluation aux individus par la menace, malgré la généralité de la loi et le désaccord qui peut affecter les décisions des tribunaux. La troisième partie évalue les ambiguïtés de l’identification des condamnations à la reconnaissance d’un tort. Indexer la sévérité de la peine à la demande de la victime tout en tenant compte du châtiment mérité par le coupable revient à confier à la justice la tâche d’évaluer avec justesse les motifs des différends entre individus et groupes. Le problème est qu’elle le fait dans un cadre défini a priori par trois opérations : la qualification des infractions, l’imputation de la responsabilité et l’individualisation de la sentence. L’enquête conclut que la peine ne se réduit pas à un instrument auxiliaire de dissuasion ou de neutralisation. Elle contribue à trancher les conflits et à transformer la vie morale d’une société, ce qui explique en partie sa résistance face aux arguments de l’abolitionnisme ou de la justice restaurative. Elle demeure néanmoins une institution ambivalente, dont la justification est insatisfaisante : à la fois point d’appui à l’expression des demandes de justice, et, en raison de son caractère étatique, source de déception pour ces mêmes demandesPunishment is a paradoxical institution of contemporary democratic societies: the abuses and over-penalisation consequences of security policies are criticized, but the impunity of certain crimes remains scandalous and people urge for justice; the abolition of specific kinds of punishments (for instance prison) or the introduction of alternative forms of regulation (such as practices of restorative justice) are claimed, but the difficulty of enforcing law without deterrent sanctions seems inextricable. This dissertation deals with the reasons why such an institution as criminal justice is considered as unavoidable. It advocates that punishment assumes a third role in society, beyond its use as an afflictive instrument or as a vehicle for collective indignation. I call it the normative function of punishment. This function is manifested through various phenomena: penal institutions affirm the fundamental character of certain prohibitions and take part in recognizing wrongs suffered by individuals, even sometimes against the dominant morality; they help renew social norms and distinguish offenses that matter to the state from those that stay invisible; they shape the content and the forms of social conflictuality by raising demands for justice in front of the public authority. The study of this normative function and its consequences regarding the justification of punishment form the two sides of this dissertation. In the first part, I claim that in order to recognize wrongs and injustices, criminal justice can deliberately increase the social suffering and the exclusion of those who are punished. In the second part, I try to understand more fundamentally how penal institutions provide direct practical guides and evaluation criteria to individuals, despite the generality of legal norms and the disagreement that may affect courts’ decisions. In the third and final part, I assess the difficulty to identify criminal conviction with wrongs recognition. If the severity of sentences is indexed to the request of victims, and if judges still intend to limit deserved punishment to one’s culpability, criminal justice is entrusted with the task of accurately assessing the reasons of conflicts between individuals or groups. The problem is that it does so within a framework based (a priori) on three practices: the legal definition of offenses, the imputation of criminal responsibility and the individualization of sentence. This work concludes that punishment cannot be defined as a secondary instrument of deterrence or neutralization. Punishment contributes to resolve conflicts and transform societies’ moral life, which partly explains its resistance to claims of abolitionism or to restorative justice theory. However, criminal justice remains an ambivalent institution, of which justification is unsatisfactory: it is both a mean to express demands for justice and, as it remains in the hands of the state, a source of disappointment regarding these same demands
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Corcodel, Veronica. "Modern law and otherness : the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in comparative legal thought." Thesis, Paris, Institut d'études politiques, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015IEPP0053.
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Cette thèse porte sur la pensée juridique des comparatistes euro-américains. Elle analyse les travaux d’un nombre important de comparatistes, qui ont eu une place significative au sein de la discipline en Europe et aux Etats-Unis entre les années 1860 et le début des années 2000. En examinant les représentations du monde non-occidental, elle met en avant les tensions entre l’inclusion et l’exclusion des spécificités non-occidentales, tout en insistant sur la nécessité de développer une pratique critique de résistance. En s’inspirant des théories postcoloniales, ce travail aborde les questions suivantes: comment le savoir sur les sociétés non-occidentales est-il construit dans la pensée juridique des comparatistes euro-américains ? Quelles sont les préconceptions qui facilitent la production de ce savoir ? Quel est le fondement théorique qui anime ces constructions et quelles sont leurs implications politiques ? Dans quelle mesure la pensée juridique comparative alimente-t-elle les attitudes de domination ou bien les remet-elle en question ? De quelle manière les réponses à ces questions sont-elles reproduites ou modifiées d’une époque à l’autre, d’un auteur à l’autre ?This dissertation focuses on Euro-American comparative legal thought. It analyses the works of an important number of comparatists operating in Europe and in the United States, roughly from the 1860s to the early 2000s. Examining their representations of non-Western societies, it puts emphasis on the tensions between inclusion and exclusion of particularism and it argues in favor of a critical praxis of particularism. Inspired from postcolonial theories, it addresses the following questions: how are non-Western societies constructed in Euro-American comparative legal thought? What are the preconceptions that make the production of such knowledge possible? What is the theoretical framework that animates these constructions and what are their political implications? What elements internal to comparative legal knowledge fuel attitudes of domination or/and challenge them? How do they change and how are they reproduced from one epoch to another, from one author to another?
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Bülow, William. "Unfit to live among others : Essays on the ethics of imprisonment." Doctoral thesis, KTH, Filosofi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-199567.
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This thesis provides an ethical analysis of imprisonment as a mode of punishment. Consisting in an introduction and four papers the thesis addresses several important questions concerning imprisonment from a number of different perspectives and theoretical starting points. One overall conclusion of this thesis is that imprisonment, as a mode of punishment, deserves more attention from moral and legal philosophers. It is also concluded that a more complete ethical assessment of prison conditions and prison management requires a broader focus. It must include an explicit discussion of both how imprisonment directly affects prison inmates and its negative side-effects on third parties. Another conclusion is that ethical discussions on prison conditions should not be too easily reduced to a question about how harsh or lenient is should be. Paper 1 argues that prisoners have a right to privacy. It is argued that respect for inmates’ privacy is related to respect for them as moral agents. Consequently, respect for inmates’ privacy is called for by different established philosophical theories about the justification of legal punishment. Practical implications of this argument are discussed and it is argued that invasion of privacy should be minimized to the greatest extent possible, without compromising other important values or the rights to safety and security. It is also proposed that respect for privacy should be part of the objective of creating and upholding a secure environment. Paper 2 discusses whether the collateral harm of imprisonment to the children and other close family members of prison inmates may give rise to special moral obligations towards them. Several collateral harms, including decreased psychological wellbeing, financial costs, loss of economic opportunities, and intrusion and control over their private lives, are identified. Two perspectives in moral philosophy, consequentialism and deontology, are then applied in order to assess whether these harms are permissible. It is argued that from either perspective it is hard to defend the claim that allowing for these harms are morally permissible. Consequently, imprisonment should be used only as a last resort. Where it is deemed necessary, it gives rise to special moral obligations. Using the notion of residual obligation, these obligations are then categorized and clarified. Paper 3 focuses on an argument that has figured in the philosophical debate on felon disenfranchisement. This argument states that as a matter of democratic self-determination, a legitimate democratic collective has the collective right to decide whether to disenfranchise felons as a way of defining their political identity. Yet, such a collective’s right to self-determination is limited, since the choice to disenfranchise anyone must be connected to normative considerations of political significance. This paper defends this argument against three charges that has been raised to it. In doing so it also explores under what circumstances felon disenfranchisement can be permissible. Paper 4 explores the question of whether prison inmates suffering from ADHD should be administered psychopharmacological intervention (methylphenidate) for their condition. The theoretical starting point for the discussion is the communicative theory of punishment, which understands criminal punishment as a form of secular penance. Viewed through the lens of the communicative theory it is argued that the provision of pharmacological treatment to offenders with ADHD need not necessarily be conceived of as an alternative to punishment, but as an aid to achieving the penological ends of secular penance. Thus, in this view offenders diagnosed with ADHD should have the option to undergo pharmacological treatment.QC 20170110
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Raynal, Pierre-Marie. "De la fiction constituante. Contribution à la théorie du droit politique." Thesis, Paris 2, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA020058.
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Inspiré par une démarche de droit politique, le présent travail se propose d’envisager la fiction en droit à travers le prisme inédit de la légitimité, afin d’étudier sous un angle théorique son utilité dans la constitution de la réalité juridique, c’est-à-dire dans les fondations du droit en vigueur. Caractérisée en référence à la réalité politique, la fiction constituante est une technique justificative dont la fonction relève soit de la connaissance, soit du gouvernement. En tant qu’instrument de connaissance, la fiction constituante se trouve au coeur de l’épistémologie du positivisme juridique, et sert à reléguer la légitimité en son sens le plus profondément politique à une simple affaire de "Sein", c’est-à-dire « extra-juridique » ; tel est notamment l’objet de la "Grundnorm" de Kelsen. Le propos de la première partie de ce travail est de montrer que cet isolement de la chose juridique empêche d’approfondir la connaissance de ses fondations ; ce faisant, il s’agira de poser les bases de ce que pourrait être une épistémologie de droit politique. En tant qu’instrument de gouvernement, la fiction constituante se trouve au coeur de l’État, et sert à légitimer l’exercice du pouvoir politique par le biais de la représentation. En s’appuyant sur des auteurs classiques tels que Hobbes, Locke et Rousseau, le propos de la seconde partie de ce travail est de montrer que ce sont les caractéristiques de ce système d’organisation politique, quelle que soit au demeurant la forme de gouvernement retenue, qui rendent nécessaire le recours au registre fictionnel "lato sensu" ; celui-ci étant en effet susceptible de s’inscrire dans trois catégories discursives distinctes : la fiction "stricto sensu", le mensonge ou le mytheFollowing an approach inspired by "droit politique", this work aims at considering legal fiction through the unexplored prism of legitimacy in order to study from a theoretical perspective its utility in creating legal reality, i.e. in founding the law in force. Defined through its relation to political reality, constituent fiction is a technique of justification and its function is either a matter of knowledge or of government. As an instrument of knowledge, constituent fiction is at the core of the epistemology of legal positivism. It is used to relegate legitimacy, in its most political sense, to a simple matter of "Sein, i.e". to an “extra legal” matter, as it is notably the case of Kelsen’s "Grundnorm". The first part of this work aims at showing that this isolation of law prevents a deeper understanding of its foundations. In doing so, we will try to lay the grounds for what could be an epistemology of "droit politique". As an instrument of government, constituent fiction is at the core of the State. It is used to legitimize the exercise of political power by the means of representation. Relying on the classical works of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, the second part of this study aims at identifying the characteristics of this system of political organization that makes recourse to fiction a necessity; whatever the form of government chosen. This recourse to fiction, considered here in its broadest sense, can relate to three distinct discursive models: fiction in its strictest sense, falsehood, or myth
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Haselkorn, Amelia A. "When Society Becomes the Criminal: An Exploration of Society’s Responsibilities to the Wrongfully Convicted." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/pitzer_theses/84.
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This thesis explores how society can and should compensate those who have been wrongfully convicted after they are exonerated and how we can prevent these mistakes from happening to others in the future. It begins by presenting research on the scope of the problem. Then it suggests possible reforms to the U.S. justice system that would minimize the rate of innocent convictions. Lastly, it takes both a philosophical and political look at what just compensation would entail as well as a variety of state compensation laws.
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Carrère, Thibault. "La démocratie constitutionnelle à l'épreuve du républicanisme : Sur la dualité philosophique du constitutionnalisme moderne." Thesis, Montpellier, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017MONTD037.
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La modernité juridique porte en elle deux projets parfois contradictoires : le constitutionnalisme et la démocratie, c’est-à-dire la volonté de préserver la liberté de l’individu en limitant le pouvoir par la Constitution et celle d’associer les individus à l’élaboration des normes. Ce double projet se traduit dans le concept de démocratie constitutionnelle, dont il existe deux grandes conceptions. La première, dominante au sein de la doctrine juridique, fait de la protection des droits et libertés par un juge constitutionnel le point central de l’équilibre à réaliser entre liberté individuelle et exercice du pouvoir en commun. L’hypothèse qui sera la nôtre est de considérer que cette conception est soutenue par des discours à la fois descriptifs et prescriptifs, issus des autorités normatives ou de la doctrine, reposant essentiellement sur des présupposés libéraux. La mutation des droits de l’homme en droits fondamentaux ne peut se comprendre que dans le cadre d’une philosophie politique libérale, une conception particulière de la liberté, des droits et de la démocratie, ainsi que dans un contexte historique spécifique. Il existe cependant une seconde conception de la démocratie constitutionnelle, reposant, quant à elle, sur la philosophie républicaine. Celle-ci entend se séparer d’une conception trop centrée sur le juge, pour réévaluer le rôle des institutions élues et du peuple, dans la concrétisation de la Constitution. Ce républicanisme juridique, longtemps ignoré par la doctrine française, mais davantage théorisé à l’étranger, apporte ainsi des réponses utiles aux diverses évolutions venues perturber le champ classique du droit constitutionnel : développement des droits fondamentaux, déploiement de la justice constitutionnelle, érosion de la responsabilité politique, disparition du peuple, évolutions de la souveraineté. À cetitre, l’étude du républicanisme permet à la fois de mettre en lumière les limites de la conception libérale dominante de la démocratie constitutionnelle, tout en proposant une conception renouvelée de celle-ciConstitutionalism, and Democracy, are the two projects of modernity. The concept of constitutional democracy carries theses two projects. There are two conceptions of constitutional democracy. The first one is the most popular in legal scholarship. It is centred on rights-based judicial review. Our hypothesis is that this conception of constitutional democracy is backed up by descriptive and normative discourses resting on liberal assumptions. Therefore, the evolution from human rights to fundamental right is based on a specific conception of freedom, rights, democracy, and a specific historical context. This dominant view is not the only view. The second conception of constitutional democracy is based on republican philosophy. The republican view intent to overtake the judicial-centred conception of democracy, by rehabilitating elected institutions and the people themselves. This legal republicanism is widely ignored by French scholars, but very dynamic abroad, gives us tools to grasp recent constitutional evolutions : the expansion of fundamental rights, the growth of constitutional adjudication, the attrition of political responsibility, the disappearance of the people, the mutation of sovereignty. Therefore, republicanism brings to light the limits of dominant liberal conception of constitutional democracy, and put forward a renewed one
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Diener, Keith William. "A Defense of Soft Positivism: Justice and Principle Processes." unrestricted, 2006. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-04172006-125357/.
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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2006.Title from title screen. Andrew Altman, committee chair; Andrew J. Cohen, William Edmundson, committee members. Electronic text (75 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Apr. 17, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-75).
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Malan, Yvonne. "Justice and the law : a perspective from contemporary jurisprudence." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/51807.
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Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis examines the relationship between law and justice. Firstly, it is argued that the concept of justice tends to be defined too narrowly as distributive justice or as a mechanism to maintain social order. It is argued that Jacques Derrida's understanding of justice not only gives a richer and broader understanding of the concept, but also on its complex relationship with the law. Lastly, some of the possible implications for jurisprudence (with specific reference to Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory and Drucilla Cornell) are examined.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis ondersoek die verhouding tussen geregtigheid en die reg. Daar word eerstens geargumenteer dat geregtigheid te maklik gedefinieer word as distributiewe geregtigheid of as In meganisme om sosiale orde te bewerkstellig. Daar word geargumenteer dat Jacques Derrida se verstaan van die konsep nie aileen 'n breer en ryker verstaan moontlik maak nie, maar dat dit ook fokus op die komplekse verhouding met die reg. Laastens word sommige van die moontlike implikasies vir regsfilosofie (met spesifieke verwysing na Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory en Drucilla Cornell) ondesoek,
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Beloushi, Hasan J. E. H. M. "The theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa in Shīʿī jurisprudence : Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī as a model." Thesis, University of Exeter, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/18525.
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The emergence of the theory of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa as a legal theory, which is a purposive approach to the law in which the main purposes of the law are considered as deriving elements of the legal rulings, has occurred in a particular socio-political and cultural context for the Shīʿa and within a particular epistemological construction. Given the lack of a historical reading of Shīʿī jurisprudence and the limitations of the methodological approaches which have to date been employed, this research applies a holistic approach. “The Bahbahānian paradigm” is identified as the overarching epistemological paradigm in modern and contemporary Shīʿī jurisprudence. The Bahbahanian paradigm was formed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and is arguably characterised as being a combination of Aristotelian epistemologically, formalist methodologically and soft utilitarianism. Within this paradigm in the context of the twentieth century, maqāṣid al-sharīʿa emerged in Shīʿī thought, especially in its systematic and comprehensive theorisation by Muḥammad Taqī al-Mudarrisī - a contemporary Shīʿī scholar. The introduction of the maqāṣid al-sharīʿa approach represents a paradigm shift that departs epistemologically, methodologically and functionally from the Bahbahānian paradigm. Mudarrisī’s maqāṣid al-sharīʿa paradigm is characterized as pragmatic epistemologically, more accessible and dynamic methodologically and employing a virtue ethic. Mudarrisī’s maqāṣid al-sharīʿa reflects the eclipse of the quietist character of the previous paradigm and the ambition of the contemporary Shīʿī religious institution. This ambition comprises a more significant role in the public sphere, which is embodied in the application or renewal of the sharīʿa in reality on one hand, and confronting the systematical secularization of the modern nation-state of the public sphere on the other. Mudarrisī’s version of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa is obligated to challenge three intellectual enterprises; that is, the classical Shīʿī jurisprudential reasoning by embracing hermeneutical tools which are more accessible to religious knowledge; the Sunnī soft utilitarian maqāṣidī approaches by providing virtue ethical jurisprudence; and the secular nation-state by providing a flexible legal system.
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Frimodt, Staffan. "Integralteori och rättsfilosofi." Thesis, Stockholms universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-185489.
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The purpose of this thesis was to analyze four of the most commonly applied theories in jurisprudence by means of using the philosophical framework of in-tegral theory. Natural law, legal positivism, legal realism and critical legal theory were analyzed to find out how they relate to each other and to see what their strengths and weaknesses are in an integral perspective. The integral theory was created by the American philosopher Ken Wilber (1949-). Two of the main com-ponents of the theory are the four quadrants and the levels of development. The quadrants describe dimensions and perspectives of reality, and consists of the inner individual (subjective) quadrant, the outer individual (objective) quadrant, the inner collective (intersubjective) quadrant and the outer collective (interob-jective) quadrant. Individual values develop through different levels in a specific order, as is described in the second component of the integral theory. Different adult individuals can therefore be on different levels of development. This devel-opment is not only seen in individuals, but is also seen in historical and collective development. The levels that both individuals and societies develop through in-cludes (but are not limited to): the absolutistic (traditional) level, the rational (modern) level and the relativistic (postmodern) level.When using the integral theory to analyze the four theories in jurisprudence it became apparent that they can be mapped onto the integral framework. Natural law, which focuses on morality, can be placed in the intersubjective quadrant, and is mostly associated with the traditional level of development. Legal positiv-ism stems mostly from the interobjective quadrant where law is first and fore-most a system of rules that are enforced by different societal institutions. Legal positivism is typically associated with the modern level of development. Legal realism is also typically associated with the modern level of development and focuses a lot on the objective quadrant: on empiricism and on what judges actu-ally do. Critical legal theory is strongly associated with the postmodern level of development. It emphasizes different kinds of oppression in the intersubjective and in the interobjective quadrant. This thesis presents further examples of how the integral theory can be applied in legal theory and practice.
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Bülow, William. "Ethics of Imprisonment : Essays in Criminal Justice Ethics." Licentiate thesis, KTH, Filosofi, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-145357.
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This licentiate thesis consists of three essays which all concern the ethics of imprisonment and what constitutes an ethically defensible treatment of criminal offenders. Paper 1 defends the claim that prisoners have a right to privacy. I argue that the right to privacy is important because of its connection to moral agency. For that reasons is the protection of inmates’ right to privacy also warranted by different established philosophical theories about the justification of legal punishment. I discuss the practical implications of this argument. Ultimately I argue the invasion of privacy should be minimized to the greatest extent possible without compromising other important values and rights to safety and security. In defending this position, I argue that respect for inmates’ privacy should be part of the objective of creating and upholding a secure environment to better effect in the long run. Paper 2 discusses whether the collateral harm of imprisonment to the close family members and children of prison inmates may give rise to special moral obligations towards them. Several collateral harms, including decreased psychological wellbeing, financial costs, loss of economic opportunities, and intrusion and control over their private lives, are identified. Two competing perspectives in moral philosophy are applied in order to assess whether the harms are permissible. The first is consequentialist and the second is deontological, and it is argued that both of them fails and therefore it is hard to defend the position that allowing for these harms would be morally permissible, even for the sake of the overall aims of incarceration. Instead, it is argued that these harms imply that imprisonment should only be used as a last resort. Where it is necessary, imprisonment should give rise to special moral obligations towards families of prisoners. Using the notion of residual obligation, these obligations are defended, categorized and clarified. Paper 3 evaluates electronic monitoring (EM) from an ethical perspective and discusses whether it could be a promising alternative to imprisonment as a criminal sanction for a series of criminal offenses. EM evaluated from an ethical perspective as six initial ethical challenges are addressed and discussed. It is argued that since EM is developing as a technology and a punitive means, it is urgent to discuss its ethical implications and incorporate moral values into its design and development.QC 20140519
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Chahuan, Zedan Marcela. "Sobre las normas irregulares: un aspecto de la realidad jurídica." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Girona, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/671372.
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This doctoral thesis is an analysis of irregular norms, that is to say, norms which do not comply with the conditions for creation of norms established by the law-making rules of a legal system. The aim of this research is to provide a conceptual framework which allows to explain, from a legal theory perspective, the fact that irregular norms produce or may produce legal effects when they are used as foundation of decisions taken by law applying organs. In order to do so, I will review the legal theory concepts involved in this discussion, as well as the main answers given to this matter by the legal literature. In the last part, I will propose the elements that I consider essential to the concept of irregular norm. The reasons developed throughout this research are aimed to demonstrate its main thesis: irregular norms are part of the legal reality and their analysis is closely linked to the configuration of the regularity control mechanisms of a particular legal systemLa present tesi doctoral consisteix en una anàlisi entorn de les normes irregulars, és a dir, normes que no s'ajusten a les condicions per a la creació normativa establertes per les normes sobre producció d'un sistema jurídic. L'objectiu del treball de recerca és proporcionar un marc conceptual, des de la teoria jurídica, que permeti donar compte del fet que les normes irregulars produeixin o puguin produir conseqüències jurídiques, quan són utilitzades com a fonament de les decisions dels òrgans aplicadors del dret. Per a això, revisaré els conceptes de teoria del dret involucrats al debat, així com les principals respostes que la literatura jurídica ha ofert davant la problemàtica. En la part final proposaré els elements que considero centrals per a una noció de norma irregular. Els arguments desenvolupats al llarg d'aquesta recerca estan dirigits a mostrar la seva tesi principal: les normes irregulars són un aspecte de la realitat jurídica, l'anàlisi de les quals està estretament vinculat a la configuració dels mecanismes de control de la regularitat d'un sistema jurídic en concret
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Weber, Ruth. "Der Begründungsstil von Conseil constitutionnel und Bundesverfassungsgericht : eine vergleichende Analyse der Spruchpraxis." Thesis, Paris 2, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA020096.
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Le style, c’est la Cour ! – Cette thèse examine la manière dont le Conseil constitutionnel français et la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande motivent leurs décisions, et ce que ces motivations nous disent sur la façon dont chaque Cour se perçoit. Le Conseil constitutionnel peut-il être qualifié de bouche de la Constitution ? et la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande est-elle l’incarnation différenciée de l’état de droit constitutionnel ? Telles sont les questions qui sous-tendent la thèse.La thèse montre que les styles de motivation façonnent l’identité de chaque Cour nationale. Depuis la création de la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande, son style de motivation a contribué à garantir l’acceptation de ses décisions, notamment en ce qui concerne son rôle d’autorité constitutionnelle suprême du pays. En revanche, le style de motivation du Conseil constitutionnel français a traditionnellement servi à mettre en évidence sa subordination au législatif. Toutefois, les réformes de 2016 suggèrent que le Conseil constitutionnel commence lui aussi à s’affirmer en tant que gardien de la Constitution. L’une des raisons probables de ces changements réside dans la manière dont la jurisprudence française est reçue par les autres juridictions nationales et supranationales en Europe. Les réformes facilitant une communication inter-juridictionnelle européenne sont en effet souhaitables. Et bien qu’il soit trop tôt pour le dire, on pourrait faire valoir qu’elles représentent un premier pas important vers un style de motivation européenThe style is the Court! – This thesis explores both how the French Constitutional Council and the German Federal Constitutional Court justify their decisions, and what those justifications tell us about how each Court sees itself. Can the Constitutional Council be characterized as an authoritative voice, the "bouche de la Constitution"?, and is the German Federal Constitutional Court the sophisticated embodiment of a constitutionalized state?, are the questions that underpin the dissertation.The thesis finds that the reasoning styles shape the identity of each national Court. Since the founding of the German Federal Constitutional Court, its reasoning style has helped guarantee the acceptance of its decisions, particularly as it concerns its role as the country’s foremost constitutional authority. By contrast, the reasoning style of the French Constitutional Council traditionally served to highlight its subordination to the legislative. Reforms from 2016, however, suggest that the Constitutional Council, too, is beginning to assert itself as the guardian of the constitution. One probable reason for the changes lies in how French case law is received by other national and supranational courts in Europe, with the reforms facilitating desirable European inter-jurisdictional communication. And although it is too early to tell, it could be argued that they represent a significant first step towards a European reasoning style
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Marier, April M., and Alex Alfredo Reyes. "Incarceration and Reintegration: How It Impacts Mental Health." CSUSB ScholarWorks, 2014. https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd/26.
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ABSTRACT
Background: Previous criminal justice policies have been non-effective leading to overpopulated prisons and unsuccessful reintegration. There is a lack of effective supportive and/or rehabilitative services resulting in high rates of recidivism and mental health implications. Objective: This study investigated the perceived impact that incarceration and reintegration with little to no supportive and/or rehabilitative services has on the mental health status of an individual. The emphasis was on participant perception and not on professional reports because of underreporting and lack of attention to mental health in the criminal justice system. Methods: Focus groups in the Inland Empire and Coachella Valley were held to gather preliminary data used to develop the survey for this study. The survey was distributed to 88 male and female ex-offenders over the age of 18 who were no longer on probation or parole. Secondary data from United Way 211 and California State Reentry Initiative was collected to report current trends of supportive and/or rehabilitative services. Results: Incarceration was found to negatively impact perceived mental health status, but reintegration was not. Supportive and/or rehabilitative services continue to be rarely offered and accessed, but when accessed, perceived mental health status is better. Supportive and/or rehabilitative services are more readily available. People who are using these services are improving their quality of life, becoming productive members of society, and preventing recidivism. Conclusions: A paradigm shift is currently under way to reduce recidivism by improving supportive and/or rehabilitative services during incarceration and reintegration. Many offenders are receiving services as an alternative to incarceration, recidivism rates are being reduced, and ex-offenders are becoming productive members of society. The field of social work is an integral part of reentry services and should continue advocating for policies and services that support reintegration efforts at the micro and macro level.
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Bouchard, Kevin. "Aux origines conceptuelles du constitutionnalisme de common law contemporain : l’influence de la conception classique de la common law sur la théorie juridique de Wilfrid Waluchow." Thesis, Paris 2, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA020051.
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Ce travail propose une interprétation d’ensemble de la théorie du droit et de la théorie du contrôle judiciaire de constitutionnalité des lois de l’auteur canadien contemporain Wilfrid Waluchow, à partir d’une étude de la manière dont elles s’inspirent de la conception classique de la common law. La partie préliminaire présente de façon synthétique la conception classique de la common law et la critique que lui adresse Thomas Hobbes, pour montrer comment elles font apparaître, dès les origines de la modernité, deux façons opposées de concevoir le droit, qui sous-tendent la pensée contemporaine. La première partie étudie le rapport que les conceptions du droit des inspirateurs plus immédiats de Wilfrid Waluchow entretiennent avec la conception classique de la common law. Elle explique comment H. L. A. Hart contribue à rapprocher le positivisme juridique de la vision coutumière des common lawyers à l’aide de la notion de règles secondaires et comment Ronald Dworkin associe plutôt l’approche de la common law à une méthode d’interprétation centrée sur la dimension argumentative du droit. La deuxième partie examine le positivisme juridique inclusif de Wilfrid Waluchow et la théorie de common law du contrôle judiciaire qu’il élabore à partir de celui-ci et elle montre comment l’effort de l’auteur canadien pour conjuguer dans sa pensée les influences des conceptions du droit de Hart et de Dworkin, à l’aide en particulier de la notion de moralité constitutionnelle, l’amène à développer une vision qui possède des affinités importantes avec la conception classique de la common lawThis work offers a general interpretation of the theory of law and the theory of judicial review of Canadian contemporary author Wilfrid Waluchow, through the study of their relation to classical common law jurisprudence. The preliminary section offers a summary of classical common law jurisprudence and of Thomas Hobbes’s critique of classical common law jurisprudence, and shows how they define two opposite ways of conceptualizing law that still underlie contemporary jurisprudence. The first section studies how the jurisprudence of H. L. A. Hart and of Ronald Dworkin, which directly inspire Wilfrid Waluchow’s theory of law, relate to classical common law jurisprudence. It shows how Hart, with his concept of secondary rules, moves legal positivism closer to classical common law’s customary understanding of the law and how Dworkin defines the common law approach otherwise, by proposing an interpretive method concentrating on the argumentative character of law.The second section studies Wilfrid Waluchow’s inclusive legal positivism and his common law theory of judicial review. It shows how Wilfrid Waluchow’s effort to reconcile Hart’s theory of the law with Dworkin’s jurisprudence, notably through the idea of constitutional morality, leads him to develop an understanding of the law which has important affinities with classical common law jurisprudence
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Renaudie, Maxime. "Les droits sociaux aux Etats-Unis : Essai sur la garantie des droits socaiux dans la culture juridique nord-américaine." Thesis, Cergy-Pontoise, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013CERG0672.
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Le concept et la justiciabilité des droits sociaux et économiques dans le cadre nord-américain n'ont jamais fait l'objet d'une étude à part entière par la doctrine juridique française. En cause, le fait que la culture juridique nord-américaine apparaît aux yeux de la plupart des juristes comme largement imperméable à cette catégorie de droits que nous référençons sous le vocable de « droits sociaux ». Lorsque l'on s'interroge sur la manière d'appréhender leur garantie, l'évolution des droits sociaux dans le droit nord-américain est pourtant riche d'instruction, du fait du cadre culturel particulier dans lequel ils opèrent, et du fait que la doctrine nord-américaine a eu le mérite d'embrasser un large spectre théorique pour penser cette catégorie. Le cas nord-américain a impliqué une construction des droits sociaux en deux temps séparés, relatifs à deux projets sociaux différents : d'abord celui de la Nouvelle donne (New Deal) de la présidence Roosevelt dans les années 1930 ; et celui de la déségrégation raciale amorcée par la Cour suprême d'Earl Warren dans les années 1950, couplée avec la Guerre contre la pauvreté (War on Poverty) de la présidence Johnson la décennie suivante. Ces deux temps dans le traitement de la question sociale nord-américaine nous permettent de distinguer deux conceptions antagonistes des droits sociaux. La première est relative à la période du New Deal, elle est fondée sur l'émancipation individuelle du travailleur, et demeure la responsabilité du pouvoir législatif par des politiques d'assurance sociale. La seconde est relative à la période de la guerre contre la pauvreté et de déségrégation raciale dans les années 1950-1960, elle est fondée sur la réintégration des minorités écartées de la première catégorie, elle opère sur le plan de l'assistance sociale et demeure la responsabilité du juge en « réaction » aux oublis du législateur. Il ressort de cet historique des droits sociaux une dualité conceptuelle qui rend compte des limites à la possibilité de théoriser une garantie uniforme des droits sociaux aux Etats-Unis. Cette dualité permet en revanche d'analyser avec plus de précisions les débats doctrinaux essentiels sur la conception et la justiciabilité des droits sociaux. La doctrine nord-américaine a ainsi nourri deux débats doctrinaux majeurs, celui sur le caractère indéterminé des droits sociaux, impliquant leur caractère fondamentalement dynamique, un débat qui aboutit le plus souvent à condamner les théories transcendantes visant à figer leur contenu. Enfin le débat doctrinal sur la compétence réel du juge, qui interroge plus largement les rouages et les possibilités du modèle américain de Judicial Review relativement à la question sociale. Le résultat théorique de notre étude, relativement à la dualité conceptuelle prise en compte, implique la conclusion que la garantie des droits sociaux ne peut s'apprécier qu'en fonction des conjonctures politiques. Elles dépendent du projet social en cours et des jugements collectifs qui déterminent les vecteurs les justifiant, que ce soit le besoin du bénéficiaire, ou sa contrepartie à la société. Cette perspective vide de sa substance le contenu du concept de garantie, mais permet de mieux définir la réalité et les évolutions en cours au sujet de cette catégorie de droits, notamment les vecteurs décisifs à prendre en compte à leur sujetThe concept and justiciability of social and economic rights in the specific US legal field has never been studied by the French legal doctrine, with the exception of short comparative studies. We see the American legal field as largely aversive to the recognition of the so-called “social rights”. However, when we consider social rights guarantee, American law offers weak but very original perspectives. And the American legal doctrine offers many ways to consider social rights guarantee in the field of Common law. To better appreciate social rights, we need to distinguish two different timeline in American legal history which has influenced the creation and spreading of social rights. First timeline is Franklin Roosevelt New Deal in the 30's, second timeline is Warren court judicial activism against segregation starting in the 50's, joined by Johnson War on poverty the following decade. By dealing with social and economic regulation, these two timelines offers two antagonistic conceptions of social rights. The first conception goes back to the New Deal era. It focuses on the emancipation of worker's rights, and social insurance. That conception implies the exclusive responsibility of legislative branch to make such a social legislation. The second conception goes back mainly to Warren court era and Johnson presidency. That conception implies the protection of the minorities who didn't get access to New Deal reforms because of segregation laws at that time . It is the responsibility of the Supreme Court to put them back into the Welfare State. That specific two channels conception of social rights gave birth to a specific conceptual duality which prevents any possibility to conceive a whole theory of social rights guarantee in US legal doctrine. That conceptual duality is interesting tough, as it permits to better consider doctrinal debates about justiciability of social rights. US legal doctrines focused on two mains debates according to social rights. The first one is the problem of indeterminacy. It implies social rights as a history related and dynamic kind of law, condemning most theories based on moral transcendent principles of justice. The second is the problem of court capability for enforcing such kind of rights. It focuses on a broader debate about the Judicial review model, and the separation of powers between courts and legislative branch. The conceptual duality of social rights made their guarantee strongly contingent of the political process. Social rights guarantee depend on the background social project which put them into reality. That perspective made the basic idea of guarantee a non sense in the case of social rights, but stay as the best tool to better appreciate their evolution and the needs they fulfill
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Noriega, Christina R. "Rawlsian Foundations for Justification and Toleration of Civil Disobedience." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2013. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/232.
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Though ultimately seeking more just law, civil disobedience still entails the breaching of a law. For this reason, most theories hold that people who practice civil disobedience must be willing to accept the legal consequences of their actions. On the other hand, a nation that is truly committed to justice will recognize that its constitution and legal order may in some ways fall short of perfect justice. In this thesis, I defend Rawls’s theory of civil disobedience as unique in its capacity for justification and even government toleration. Appealing to a shared conception of justice, Rawlsian civil disobedients are able to ground their actions in the same principles to which the state is committed. I argue that Rawls’s shared conception of justice is further substantiated when read in the light of his later theory of the overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines. I ultimately conclude that civil disobedience construed in the Rawlsian sense ought to receive some degree of toleration by the state, and particularly by constitutional states which maintain a formal commitment to justice in the protection of rights and intentional design of government institutions.
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Vranaki, Asma A. I. "Rethinking relations and regimes of power in online social networking sites : tales of control, strife, and negotiations in Facebook and YouTube." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:a0872883-98b3-4215-b000-0974a80cad97.
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This thesis investigates the potentially complex power effects generated in Online Social Networking Sites (‘OSNS’), such as YouTube and Facebook, when legal values, such as copyright and personal data, are protected and/or violated. In order to develop this analysis, in Chapter Two, I critically analyse key academic writings on internet regulation and argue that I need to move away from the dominant ‘regulatory’ lens to my Actor-Network Theory-Foucauldian Power Lens (‘ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens’) in order to be able to capture the potentially complex web of power effects generated in YouTube and Facebook when copyright and personal data are protected and/or violated. In Chapter Three, I develop my ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens and explore how key ANT ideas such as translation can be used in conjunction with Foucauldian ideas such as governmentality. I utilise my ANT-Foucauldian Power Lens in Chapters Four to Seven to analyse how YouTube and Facebook are constructed as heterogeneous, contingent and precarious ‘actor-networks’ and I map in detail the complex power effects generated from specific local connections. I argue five key points. Firstly, I suggest that complex, multiple, and contingent power effects are generated when key social, legal, and technological actants are locally, contingently, and precariously ‘fitted together’ in YouTube and Facebook when copyright and personal data are protected and/or violated. Secondly, I argue that ‘materialities’ play key roles in maintaining the power effects generated by specific local connections. Thirdly, I argue that there are close links between power and ‘spatialities’ through my analysis of the Privacy Settings and Tagging in Facebook. Fourthly, I argue that my relational understandings of YouTube and Facebook generate a more comprehensive view of the power effects of specific legal elements such as how specific territorial laws in YouTube gain their authority by virtue of their durable and heterogeneous connections. Finally, I argue that we can extrapolate from my empirical findings to build a small-scale theory about the power effects generated in OSNS when legal values are protected and/or violated. Here I also consider the contributions made by my research to three distinct fields, namely, internet regulation, socio-legal studies, and actor-network theory.
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Bartolucci, Mattéo. "L'acte plurilatéral en droit public." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Bordeaux, 2020. https://buadistant.univ-angers.fr/login?url=https://bibliotheque.lefebvre-dalloz.fr/secure/isbn/9782247218813.
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La notion d’acte plurilatéral est issue d’une doctrine importée en France par Léon Duguit au début du XXe siècle. D’origine allemande, cette doctrine consiste à subsumer tous les accords de volontés sous une méta-catégorie nommée « acte plurilatéral », dont le contrat n’est qu’une sous-catégorie. Avec l’acte unilatéral, l’acte plurilatéral forme la summa divisio des actes juridiques. Comme l’acte unilatéral, l’acte plurilatéral connaît plusieurs subdivisions catégorielles auxquelles sont attachés des régimes juridiques distincts. Face à la crise contractuelle que traverse notre ordre juridique et à la multiplication des pseudo-contrats, le concept d’acte plurilatéral constitue un palliatif nécessaire. Remis au goût du jour, il permet ainsi une classification des accords de volontés à même de clarifier une matière en proie à un certain désordreThe notion of plurilateral decision comes from a doctrine imported in France by Leon Duguit at the beginning of the 20th century. Of German origin, this doctrine consists in subsuming all the agreements under a meta-category called “plurilateral decision”, the contract of which is only a subcategory. Along with the unilateral decision, the plurilateral decision constitutes the summa divisio of legal acts. Like the unilateral decision, the plurilateral decision has several categorial subdivisions to wich distinct legal regimes are attached. Faced with the contractual crisis our legal order is going through and the multiplication of pseudo contracts, the concept of plurilateral decision represents a necessary stopgap. Modernized, it thus provides a classification of agreements able to clarify a subject presently faced to some disorder
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Wallén, Daniel. "Sweden´s moral responsibility to protect Romanian victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation in Sweden." Thesis, Högskolan Dalarna, Statsvetenskap, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:du-28019.
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Trafficking in persons is a serious crime and a serious violation of human rights. Every year, thousands of men, women and children fall into the hands of traffickers, in their own countries and abroad. Trafficking in human beings (THB) can be about forced labour, sexual slavery and/or commercial sexual exploitation, but this this paper focuses on the latter category. One country in Eastern Europe with an exceptionally high proportion of women and children trafficked into Sweden each year is Romania. The purpose of the following study is therefore to investigate what moral responsibility – if any – Sweden has to protect the female part of the victims from Romania being trafficked for sexual purposes in Sweden. They are not Swedish citizens, and that makes it a complicated question. In making an effort to come up with answers, we will have a look at what Sweden is doing for these people today, and what the options look like going forward, if indeed the responsibilty is ours. This is an academic thesis with one normative and one empirical aspect. Normative theoretical principles of global justice, ethics and human dignity from American philosopher Martha Nussbaum are tested on an empirical problem; a case study about the situation for Romanian trafficking victims in Sweden and Norway. Apart from the theory and case study, I have exclusively used applied ethics, secondary sources and an analytical tool to analyze and dissect the problem, reaching the conclusion that Sweden does have a moral responsibility, and that we therefore should continue to work in these people´s favour. However, more so that now by assisting solution solving in Romania, where the biggest problems exist and the best solutions can be expected, if handled intelligently and with ethics in mind.
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Bazowski, Raymond (Raymond Andrew) Carleton University Dissertation Political Science. "Ronald Dworkin's legal and political philosophy." Ottawa, 1993.
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Marmor, Andrei. "Interpretation and legal theory /." Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1992. http://www.gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/recht/toc/277092086.pdf.
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Marmor, Andrei. "Interpretation in legal theory." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.386453.
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Eleftheriadis, Pavlos. "A theory of legal rights." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.360732.
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Icleanu, Constantin C. "A CASE FOR EMPATHY: IMMIGRATION IN SPANISH CONTEMPORARY MEDIA, MUSIC, FILM, AND NOVELS." UKnowledge, 2017. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/hisp_etds/33.
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This dissertation analyzes the representations of immigrants from North Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe in Spain. As engaged scholarship, it seeks to better the portrayal of immigrants in the mass media through the study of literature, film, and music about immigration spanning from the year 2000 to 2016. Because misconceptions continue to propagate in the media, this dissertation works to counteract anti-immigrant, xenophobic representations as well as balance out overly positive and orientalized portrayal of immigrants with a call to recognize immigrants as human beings who deserve the same respect, dignity, and rights as any other citizen.
Chapter 1 examines and analyzes the background to immigration in Spain by covering demographics, the mass media, and political theories related to immigration. Chapter 2 analyzes Spanish music about immigration through Richard Rorty’s social theory of ‘sentimental education’ as a meaningful way to redescribe marginalized minorities as full persons worthy of rights and dignity. Chapter 3 investigates the representation of immigrants in Spanish filmic shorts and cinema. Lastly, Chapter 4 demonstrates how literary portrayals of immigrants written by undocumented immigrants can give rise to strong characters that avoid victimization and rear empathy in their readers in order to affect a social change that minimizes cruelty.
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Jenkins, Maricarmen Marshall. "Philosophical assumptions in legal philosophy, a critique of contemporary philosophy of law." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0027/NQ50993.pdf.
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Jenkins, Maricarmen Marshall. "Philosophical assumptions in legal philosophy : a critique of contemporary philosophy of law /." *McMaster only, 1998.
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Anderson, Scott Alan. "Legal indeterminacy in context." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1162267088.
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Parsley, Stephen. "Rethinking Legal Retribution." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2011. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/98.
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In this paper I discuss retributivist justifications for legal punishment. I argue that the main moral retributivist theories advanced so far fail to support a plausible system of legal punishment. As an alternative, I suggest, with some reservations, the legal retributivism advanced by Alan Brudner in his Punishment and Freedom.