Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Legal reasoning'
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Atria, Lemaître Fernando. "On law and legal reasoning /." Oxford [u.a] : Hart, 2001. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy043/2003269428.html.
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García, Figueroa Alfonso. "Neo-Constitutionalism and Legal Reasoning." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/115635.
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This paper aims to explore the functions of the theory of legal argumentation (TLA) on Constitutional States and will especially focus on the political and self-reflective functions of the TLA within the framework of a neo-constitutionalistic legal theory. The first part of the paper includes a definition of the TAL and an analysis of its main functions. At the end of the paper the author provides the bases for the development of a neoconstitutionalistic legal theory.Este trabajo pretende explorar las funciones de la teoría de la argumentación jurídica (TAJ) en los Estados constitucionales y se concentrará en subrayar las funciones políticas y autorreflexivas de la TAJ en el marco de una teoría del Derecho neoconstitucionalista. La primera parte incluye una definición de la TAJ y un examen de sus funciones generales. En la parte final, el autor ofrece un programa para el desarrollo de una teoría neoconstitucionalista.
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Atria, Fernando. "On law and legal reasoning." Oxford ; Portland : Or. : Hart Publ, 2001. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb38862958c.
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Braman, Eileen Carol. "Motivated reasoning in legal decision-making." Connect to this title online, 2004. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1091730982.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2004.Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xvi, 213 p. Includes bibliographical references (p. 203-213). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center
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Williams, Ian Scott. "English legal reasoning and legal culture, c.1528-c.1642." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.612476.
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Berger, Daniel Robert Howard James. "Improving legal reasoning using Bayesian probability methods." Thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2015. http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/8914.
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A thesis which explores the possibility of introducing Bayesian probability methods into the criminal justice system, and in doing so, exposing and eradicating some common fallacies. This exposure aims to reduce miscarriages of justice by illustrating that some evidence routinely relied upon by the prosecution, may not have as high a probative value towards its ultimate hypothesis of ‘guilt’ as has been traditionally thought and accepted.
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Chorley, Alison. "Reasoning with legal cases seen as theory construction." Thesis, University of Liverpool, 2006. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.443914.
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Coyle, Sean. "On the foundations of legal reasoning in international law." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 1998. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/5124/.
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Issues pertaining to the "foundations" of legal reasoning in international law break down into several discrete questions: what do statements about law mean; how do they get their meaning: to what do legal terms refer; in what does knowledge of law consist; how do we reason with legal concepts; what constitutes a criterion for argumentative success; how do bodies of legal concepts combine to form systems; is the conceptual organisation of different types of legal system, such as municipal law and international law, necessarily (or even factually) the same at some fundamental level?... This thesis is concerned with some measure with all of these questions, but the focus throughout is on those of the meaning of what we say about law, of legal knowledge, and of topological issues regarding legal systems (that is, how various types of legal system stand, conceptually, to one another). The thesis falls into two parts. The first, which is critical in nature, looks at some of the ways in which modern positivism has attempted to supply answers to these questions. It shall be argued that underlying those attempts is a particular view about the foundations of legal reasoning which has remained fairly constant in modern legal theory, not only among the positivists but also commonly among their sceptic rivals. Several difficulties with this view are raised and explored, all of which have contributed to the notion that international law is, when viewed through the spectacles of a municipal lawyer, at best a primitive system of law. The heart of Part I is a discussion of the character of legal knowledge. This takes place in the context of an account of the "Institutional Theory of Law" (ITL), as propounded by Neil MacCormick and Ota Weinberger. The argument that emerges is one broadly in favour of ITL, though critical of the methodological and philosophical assumptions on the basis of which the main edifice of the theory rests. It is submitted that such assumptions are the result of misplaced views about semantics and the nature of reference. Part I ends with the suggestion of an alternative, and hopefully more stable, strategy for generating the account of legal knowledge for which ITL strove. Part II comprises a positive thesis about the foundations of legal reasoning in international law, developed on the back of the strategy in Part I.
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Hunter, Daniel Ashley Douglas. "Processes in precedent : a multiple-constraint model of legal reasoning." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1999. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/251675.
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This dissertation examines what it means to decide a legal case according to precedent. I present a descriptive model of precedent, which relies on cognitive science studies of human reasoning to explain some characteristics of precedential reasoning. My basic thesis is that the traditional view of precedential reasoning is an inadequate descriptive model of how adjudication actually operates. The traditional view suggests that precedential reasoning involves the deductive application of a rule to the undecided case, where the rule is derived either from other precedents or from a fundamental legal or moral principle. On this view, precedential reasoning is just a modified form of deductive reasoning. I shall suggest that this view does not account for the freedom judges have to ignore precedent that might seem to bind them, and equally the constraints judges feel upon them to decide according to precedent in situations where they are not bound. To counter this, I present a model which relies on three fundamental concepts. First, I suggest that precedential reasoning involves two inter-linked processes of discovery and justification. Discovery is the process by which a judge concludes that a precedent can be applied to the current case, on account of a number of similarities between the precedent and the case. Justification is the process of explaining why a particular 'discovered' precedent should apply to the current case. The second major concept is the idea of constraints on decision-making. Rather than suggesting that legal cases or rules are the only constraints on precedential reasoning, I shall show that many other psychologically-explicable constraints operate when judges decide cases. These constraints include the effect of metaphors, the nature of analogical reasoning, and the effect of inductive inference. The final fundamental concept is the application of Gestalt psychology to understand how these constraints can unconsciously affect precedential reasoning. Using this approach, I show how it can be that judges can be constrained, but be unaware of those constraints.
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Scobbie, Iain Girvan Mann. "Legal reasoning and the judicial function in the international court." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.335827.
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Kruuse, Helen. "Substantive second-level reasoning and experiential learning in legal ethics." Juta Law Publishing, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/68983.
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Publisher versionThis article takes a critical look at law teaching in South Africa and seeks to consider how the application of experiential learning theory may assist law students in gaining a deeper understanding of the law in general, and the complexities of real life practice in particular. While clinical legal education is often seen as the locus of experiential learning in law, the author proposes that well-structured simulations in class can achieve similar goals. The article comprises a description of the nature of experiential learning and a further description of the application of the principles of experiential learning in a particular simulation exercise in a Legal Ethics course (using the US case of Wash St Phys Ins Exch v Fisons Corp 858 P2d 1054 (Wash 1993) as a basis). The author posits that the so-called experiential learning "cycle" or "process" enables a process of learning which draws out the students' beliefs and ideas about a topic so that it can be examined, tested and integrated with new, more refined ideas. This notion is then in keeping with the expectation that students who emerge from higher education institutions have developed meta-cognitive skills. Essentially then, it is hoped that, by using the methods proposed in this article, students can then manage their own development and learning throughout life.
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Aikenhead, Michael. "Legal knowledge-based systems : new directions in system design." Thesis, Durham University, 2001. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/4384/.
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This thesis examines and critiques the concept of 'legal knowledge-based’ systems. Work on legal knowledge-based systems is dominated by work in 'artificial intelligence and law’. It seeks to automate the application of law and to automate the solution of legal problems. Automation however, has proved elusive. In contrast to such automation, this thesis proposes the creation of legal knowledge-based systems based on the concept of augmentation of legal work. Focusing on systems that augment legal work opens new possibilities for system creation and use. To inform how systems might augment legal work, this thesis examines philosophy, psychology and legal theory for information they provide on how processes of legal reasoning operate. It is argued that, in contrast to conceptions of law adopted in artificial intelligence and law, 'sensemaking' provides a useful perspective with which to create systems. It is argued that visualisation, and particularly diagrams, are an important and under considered element of reasoning and that producing systems that support diagramming of processes of legal reasoning would provide useful support for legal work. This thesis reviews techniques for diagramming aspects of sensemaking. In particular this thesis examines standard methods for diagramming arguments and methods for diagramming reasoning. These techniques are applied in the diagramming of legal judgments. A review is conducted of systems that have been constructed to support the construction of diagrams of argument and reasoning. Drawing upon these examinations, this thesis highlights the necessity of appropriate representations for supporting reasoning. The literature examining diagramming for reasoning support provides little discussion of appropriate representations. This thesis examines theories of representation for insight they can provide into the design of appropriate representations. It is concluded that while the theories of representation that are examined do not determine what amounts to a good representation, guidelines for the design and choice of representations can be distilled. These guidelines cannot map the class of legal knowledge-based systems that augment legal sensemaking, they can however, be used to explore this class and to inform construction of systems.
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CESAR, PEDRO NAVARRO. "THE DEDUCTIVE MODEL IN NEIL MACCORMICK S THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2006. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=9556@1.
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COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOREm 1978, Neil MacCormick publica o livro Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory com o principal objetivo de construir uma teoria do raciocínio jurídico (legal reasoning) descritiva e normativa que fosse compatível com o positivismo jurídico de H. L. A. Hart. O método utilizado para apresentar a teoria parte da reconstrução racional de casos concretos pré- selecionados. A análise das decisões judiciais oferece comprovações empíricas às teses de MacCormick e também indica o foco de sua teoria sobre o raciocínio jurídico: o estudo do processo de justificação judicial. É com base neste enfoque que o autor estabelece a divisão entre justificação de primeira ordem (first-order justification) e justificação de segunda ordem (second-order justification). A presente dissertação analisa apenas a justificação de primeira ordem, que está relacionada com a correção formal do raciocínio judicial. O modelo adotado para avaliar essa característica é a dedução, em especial o silogismo hipotético misto dos lógicos tradicionais. Para o autor escocês, a decisão judicial que lograr subsumir as variáveis do caso concreto nos componentes universais do fato operativo da regra jurídica, derivando como conclusão a conseqüência normativa daquela regra, estará justificada em um Estado que promove a legalidade (Rule of Law).
In 1978, Neil MacCormick published the book Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory with the goal of constructing a descriptive and normative theory of legal reasoning, compatible with the legal positivism of H. L. A. Hart. The author used the rational reconstruction of concrete pre-selected cases as the method to present his theory. The analysis of judicial decisions offers empirical backing to MacCormick s theses and highlights the focus of his theory of legal reasoning: the study of the process of legal justification. Based on this focus, the author establishes the split between first-order justification and second-order justification. This dissertation only analyzes the first- order justification, which is related with the formal correction of legal reasoning. The model adopted to evaluate this characteristic is deduction, especially the mixed hypothetical syllogism of traditional logicians. According to the Scottish author, the judicial decision that attempts to subsume the variables of the concrete case in the universal components of the operative fact of the legal rule, coming to the conclusion of a normative consequence of that same rule, will be justified in a State that promotes the Rule of Law.
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Veitch, T. Scott. "Moral conflict and legal reasoning : contradictions between liberalism and liberal legalism." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/21585.
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The thesis explores the significance of moral conflict for an understanding of the role of law and legal reasoning in contemporary society. In doing so it suggests that there are contradictions between liberalism, in a version drawn from the work of Isaiah Berlin, and liberal legalism. The thesis looks at recent critiques of liberal theory, and centrally on that provided by Alasdair MacIntyre, to help understand the significance of moral conflict in contemporary society. It then explores how a liberal understanding of moral conflict ought to view current structures of law and legal reasoning. It is here that key contradictions emerge. In focusing on both the internal justificatory practices of liberal legalism, and on those practices understood from an external point of view, the thesis draws out incompatibilities between such practices and the liberal theory here expressed. It concludes that the vested institutional power of the legal system ought to be challenged if the concerns and aspirations of such a theory are to be taken seriously.
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Dementis, Georgios Sousa Goncalo. "A legal reasoning component of a network security command and control system." Monterey, California : Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Mar/10Mar%5FDementis.pdf.
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Thesis (M.S. in Computer Science)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2010.Thesis Advisor(s): Michael, James B. Second Reader: Wingfield, Thomas C. ; Sarkesain, John F. "March 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 26, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Cyberspace, Cyberspace Defense, Network Defense, Distributed Systems, Command and Control, Battle Management, Information Assurance, Situational Awareness. Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-77). Also available in print.
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Sousa, Goncalo. "A legal reasoning component of a network security command and control system." Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5457.
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimitedThere are numerous computer-aided tools to enable Computer Network Defense. However, their effectiveness in countering attacks is less than optimal when they are used independently of one another. Research has identified the requirements for an integrated command and control (C2) system that is able to conduct full-spectrum operations in the cyberspace environment. The most notable of that research revolves around the development and experimentation with the prototype system known as Cyber Command, Control and Information Operations System (C3IOS). C3IOS provides for a loose confederation of the cooperating systems with interaction between systems going through C2 interfaces. In this thesis, the authors introduce into C3IOS a means to support the commander's ability to take measured responses to coercive actions in a timely manner, specifically to facilitate the interaction between experts in the law of information conflict and information warriors responding to a cyber attack. The authors' research results in a set of use cases and requirements for the C2 understanding, planning, and deciding activities involved in such a capability, using Schmitt's analysis as an example.
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Chan, Adrian Baihui. "Logic with a literary twist : essays in common law reasoning." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2016. http://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/logic-with-a-literary-twist(82ecb4c5-b015-40b8-abdd-7b235283ebe5).html.
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What makes a good common law argument? Ronald Dworkin’s answer commands much respect within legal practice. To him, the correctness of a legal conclusion rests upon its capacity to fit within a narrative of normative progress that judges deliberately impose for the sake of (i) rendering overt the shared membership of discretely decided cases within a single determinate category (ii) depictive of moral attractiveness at its best. Yet, the inherent plausibility of Dworkin’s presentation of judicial reasoning has ironically resulted in the erosion of respect for the common law. If judicial narratives are imposed for aesthetic considerations, then legal conclusions must – per Kant – be mere idiosyncratic judicial desires that have the added quality of being objectively intelligible to other individuals who could nonetheless – owing to the absence of any criteria of norm correctness – justifiably disagree. If accurate, this characterization of legal decision-making would be anemic with modernity’s conviction that law is an entity inherently distinguishable from power because of the rationality – and therefore non-dogmatic nature – of its dictates. This thesis demonstrates – contra Dworkin – that judicial narratives go hand-in-hand with rationality. Judicial reasoning is thus of great importance to the aspirational goal of governance through law. As will be seen, only a constructed narrative renders possible the objective demonstrability (i) of the membership of discrete judicial decisions within the classificatory ambit of a specific norm and (ii) the legitimacy of that specific norm’s selection – from a set of countless other possibilities - via its evidential capacity to order those same discrete decisions tentatively asserted to be under its ambit into a coherent whole. Thus, because (i) the narrative is the methodological process by which a norm comes into agreement with its observed applications and (ii) truth is exactly this just-mentioned correspondence between intellect and reality, narrative construction is – quite properly – logic.
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Susskind, Richard Eric. "Expert systems in law : a jurisprudential enquiry." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.328926.
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Shaleh, Ahmad Syukri. "Ibn Taymiyya's concept of istiḥsān : an understanding of legal reasoning in Islamic jurisprudence." Thesis, McGill University, 1995. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=23241.
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This thesis studies the theory of istihsan, an aspect of Islamic legal reasoning, as a method for ascertaining the legal norm in cases where qiyas dictates an overly strict ruling. The study primarily focuses on the concept presented by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), a prominent Muslim theologian, philosopher, sufi and outstanding jurist. Placed in the context of later development, Ibn Taymiyya's theory proposes both a criticism and reformulation of the Hanafi school's perception of istihsan. Having observed previous formulations, Ibn Taymiyya sees this theory as being understood as an arbitrary contradiction to qiyas. Although attempts to redefine the theory, through rigorous definition and well-calculated application were conducted by later Hanafi jurists, criticism from other schoools continued unabated. To this effect, Ibn Taymiyya's contribution emerges as an alternative solution. In order to fully understand istihsan, Ibn Taymiyya contends that one must determine particularization of the cause (takhsid s al-'illa). By doing this, istihsan and qiyas can be easily distinguished. He, thus, perceives istihsan as takhsid s al-'illa. Unlike the Hanafis, Ibn Taymiyya does not juxtapose istihsan against qiyas sahid h. He argues that if there is a contradiction, it must be proved by a decisive descrepancy (farq mu'aththir) provided by the law giver. Furthermore, when qiyas produces an unsatisfactory legal norm, takhsid s al-'illa represents a viable alternative. Above all, Ibn Taymiyya contends that istihsan must be supported by the revealed texts, consensus or necessity.
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Blackwood, Hayley L. "Miranda Reasoning and Competent Waiver Decisions: Are Models of Legal Decision Making Applicable?" Thesis, University of North Texas, 2013. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc271782/.
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Miranda understanding, appreciation, and reasoning abilities are essential to courts' determinations of knowing and intelligent Miranda rights waivers. Despite the remarkable development of Miranda research in recent decades, studies have generally focused on understanding and appreciation of Miranda rights, but have not examined Miranda reasoning and waiver decisions. Therefore, examining the nature of defendants' decisional capacities constitutes a critical step in further developing theoretical and clinical models for competent Miranda waiver decisions. The current study evaluated Miranda waiver decisions for 80 pretrial defendants from two Tulsa-area Oklahoma jails. Previously untested, the current study examined systematically how rational decision abilities affect defendants' personal waiver decisions. Components from general models of legal decision making, such as decisional competence and judgment models, were examined to determine their applicability to Miranda waiver decisions.
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Bengoetxea, Joxerramon. "The legal reasoning of the European court of justice : towards a European jurisprudence /." Oxford : Clarendon press, 1993. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb373946877.
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Brennan, Sean Campbell. "Method in legal-ethical reasoning, the criminal lawyer's conscience, the client and the court." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp01/MQ53095.pdf.
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Pethick, Stephen. "An investigation of coherence and coherence theory in relation to law and legal reasoning." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.275750.
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Parr, A. N. "The legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice : the role of principle policy and ideology." Thesis, University of Exeter, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.376404.
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Ramic, Sukri Husayn. "Linguistic principles in Usul al-fiqh and their effect on legal reasoning in Islamic law." Thesis, University of Wales Trinity Saint David, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.504414.
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This present study deals with the linguistic principles that are used in the process of legal reasoning in Islamic law. These linguistic principles represent an important branch of the science of usu1 al-fiqh on its part represents the theoretical basis for the Shari ah and indisputable foundations upon which the whole structure of Islamic law is built. It is a unique study in the sense that no similar work, as far as we know, is available and its comparative and analytical approach has not been presented before. This study is divided into four parts. The first part deals with the linguistic principles that are related to the methods of textual indication on legal rulings. In this part these principles have been analysed according to both the Hanafi and the Shäfi'i approach. In the second part this study deals with linguistic principles which are related to clarity and ambiguity of words. It is a comparative study of the Hanafi and the Shdfi'i approach to this issue. The third part highlights the generality and specific qualities of words, and the fourth part analyses the possibility of interpretation of authoritative texts not according to their obvious meanings (ta'wi7). In general this is a comparative study of the methodology of interpretation of authoritative texts in Islamic law presented through the study of the linguistic principles in usül al-fiqh and their effect on legal reasoning in Islamic law.
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Conway, Gerard Martin. "Conflict of norms in European Union law and the legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice." Thesis, Brunel University, 2010. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/5235.
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This thesis examines the topic of conflict of norms in European Union (EU) law and the legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), arguing that the framework of conflict of norms provides conceptual insight into justification and the role of value choices in legal reasoning. After examining the theory of conflict of norms, which seems to have been relatively under-studied generally and especially in EU law, it examines three particular aspects of norm conflict resolution in the legal reasoning of the ECJ and EU law: conflict of interpretative norms, especially the opposition between conserving and innovative interpretation; conflicts of human rights norms, looking in particular at the idea of a hierarchy of rights and of specificationism in the articulation of rights; and conflicts of competence norms. It concludes that the scope exists for a fuller justification of the choice of norms in the legal reasoning of the ECJ and generally in EU law and offers a perspective on how the values articulated by the EU suggest particular approaches to norm conflict resolution by the ECJ in its decision-making in these fields, in particular, a greater resort to lex specialis and originalist or historical interpretation, in contrast to its current method.
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Lusa, Bordin Fernando. "The analogy between states and international organizations : legal reasoning and the development of the law of international organizations." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2014. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.708385.
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Kowalski, Andrzej. "Beyond rule-based legal expert systems : using frames and case-based reasoning to analyze the tort of malicious prosecution." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/42045.
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Most legal expert systems to date have been purely rule-based. Case-based
reasoning is a methodology for building legal expert systems whereby profiles of
cases contained in a database, rather than specific legal rules, direct the outcomes of
the system. Frame-based knowledge representation in legal expert systems involves
the use of frames to represent legal knowledge. Case-based reasoning and frame-based
knowledge representation offer significant advantages over purely rule-based
legal expert systems in case-based law. These advantages are realizable by using
the deep structure approach to knowledge representation. This involves searching
beneath law at the doctrinal level for underlying fact patterns and structures which
explain decisions in cases. This is demonstrated by the Malicious Prosecution
Consultant, a legal expert system which operates in the domain of the tort of
malicious prosecution. The Malicious Prosecution Consultant confirms the results
of earlier research at The University of British Columbia, Faculty of Law that it is
possible to build legal expert systems in unstructured areas of case-based law with
relatively cheap commercially available expert system shells by using the deep
structure approach to knowledge representation.Law, Peter A. Allard School of
Graduate
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Barradas, de Freitas Raquel. "Explaining meaning : towards a minimalist account of legal interpretation." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:6660c431-e278-4a42-9e3d-ca43893fcf31.
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To interpret is to seek understanding. This formulation hides as much as it reveals and I propose to unpack it. I argue that interpreting is only a part of what legal theorists and practitioners do. In Part I, I attempt an ‘in vitro’ analysis and present the bare concept of interpretation: interpretation is an activity that needs an object; interpreting is reasoning about meaning when there is a possibility of mistake about that meaning. Part II focuses on two domains of interpretation: musical performance and adjudication. I rely on Joseph Raz’s account of interpretation as explanation or display and identify the former domain as a paradigm of display and the latter as a paradigm of explanation. Both are examples of interpretation for others and involve a claim to theoretical authority on the part of interpreters. But, unlike musicians- who interpret only works of music- judges interpret a great variety of objects. Musical interpretation is identified by its object, whereas legal interpretation is not. Legal interpretation is explanation of legal meaning. I then discuss the tenets of the minimalist view of legal interpretation: (i) legal rules are not interpretable and legal texts are not primary objects of legal interpretation; (ii) there is a difference between interpretative authority (a form of theoretical authority) and legal authority (a form of practical authority) and interpretative conclusions can be theoretically authoritative without being exclusionary reasons for action; (iii) Interpreting and adjudicating are different activities. Interpretation explains, adjudication resolves. Legal interpreters do not produce legal rules: they are required to be guided by them.
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Pénet, Pierre. "Calculating and governing risk in times of crisis : the role of credit ratings in regulatory reasoning and legal change (1930s - 2010s)." Thesis, Paris, Institut d'études politiques, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014IEPP0053.
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Située à l’articulation de la sociologie de l’économie, de l’histoire de la finance et de la sociologie de la connaissance, cette thèse présente donc une analyse du rôle de la notation du crédit dans la régulation financière, et plus largement, du rôle de l’incertitude et de l’incomplétude juridiques sur les anticipations économiques des acteurs financiers. Le cadre d’analyse de la recherche se résume en quatre points : Premièrement, la thèse rompt avec une lecture strictement intellectualiste de l’action publique et présente une approche de la régulation financière par ses instruments, empruntant ainsi l’approche pragmatiste développée par les social studies of finance et par la nouvelle sociologie économique d’inspiration américaine. Deuxièmement, l’hypothèse centrale de la recherche est que les instruments réglementaires sont à la fois des techniques de connaissance et des outils juridiques. Aussi, ce sont les frictions qu’occasionnent les deux activités parfois contradictoires de calculer et de gouverner qui donnent au changement réglementaire sa dynamique historique. Troisièmement, prenant l’exemple de l’usage de la notation dans la supervision financière comme dispositif de calcul et technique de gouvernement, la thèse propose une histoire de longue durée (1865-2010) de l’activité réglementaire sur les marchés financiers aux Etats-Unis et en Europe au travers de cinq régimes de régulation (régime statutaire, d’appel, disciplinaire, fictionnel et contractuel). Quatrièmement, l’originalité de la recherche est de combiner une approche macroscopique du changement réglementaire avec une approche méticuleuse de plusieurs courtes séquences historiques durant lesquelles d’importantes innovations réglementaires ont vu le jour, notamment le New Deal aux Etats-Unis et la crise de la dette souveraine en Europe. Ainsi, en plus de définir les contours de cinq régimes réglementaires, la thèse analyse la façon dont les régulateurs se sont saisis de la notation financière comme « mécanisme d’embrayage » afin d’opérationnaliser la transition d’un régime à un autreLocated at the intersection of economic sociology, financial history, and the sociology of knowledge, this dissertation examines the role of credit ratings in financial regulation, and more broadly, the role of financial uncertainties and legal incompleteness on financial actors’ anticipatory decisions. The framework set forth in this study can be summarized as follows. First, this study breaks with an intellectualist approach of public action to analyze financial regulation from the perspective of its instruments. As such, this research draws on a pragmatist agenda developed in social studies of finance and recent work in economic sociology. Second, the main hypothesis of this dissertation is to approach regulatory instruments as technologies of knowing and tools of government. From this double viewpoint, I hypothesize that the frictions generated by the two competing activities of calculating and governing impart the regulatory activity with both its structural features and historical dynamics. Third, using the example of regulatory reliance on ratings, I propose a longue durée historical analysis (1865-2010) of the regulatory activity in the U.S. and Europe through the examination of five regulatory regimes (statutory, appeal, disciplinary, fictional, and contractual). Four, one original feature of this dissertation is to combine a macroscopic analysis of regulatory change with a meticulous approach of several short historical sequences during which important regulatory innovations came into being, notably the New Deal in the U.S. and the European sovereign debt crisis. Thus, in addition to setting the contours of five regulatory frameworks, this dissertation analyses the ways in which regulators used ratings as “clutching” devices to operationalize the legal transition from one regime to another
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Theilen, Jens T. [Verfasser]. "European Consensus between Strategy and Principle : The Uses of Vertically Comparative Legal Reasoning in Regional Human Rights Adjudication / Jens T. Theilen." Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2021. http://d-nb.info/1233108921/34.
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Hazelwood, Lisa L. "Deficits in Miranda Comprehension and Reasoning: The Effects of Substance Use and Attention Deficits." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2009. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc12132/.
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Each year, an estimated 318,000 defendants who do not comprehend the Miranda warnings waive their rights and provide incriminating evidence without the protection of counsel (Rogers, 2008), which make Miranda-related competencies one of the most pervasive pretrial issues. A wide range of issues could potentially affect an individual's capacity to provide a knowing and intelligent waiver. Previous Miranda research has focused narrowly on the effects of cognitive and developmental factors. The current study added to the Miranda literature by examining the impact of two highly prevalent conditions found in correctional populations, attention deficits and substance abuse. Adult defendants in custody (N = 118) were evaluated within 36 hours of arrest in order to assess both chronic psychological disorders and situational variables. Results indicate that attention deficits have a significant impact on defendants' ability to provide a knowing Miranda waiver, whereas substance use profoundly affected their reasoning about Miranda waiver decisions. This study represents the first systematic investigation of the effect of transient mental states on Miranda-related abilities with criminal defendants. Important implications for forensic practice are addressed.
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Mendonça, Rodrigo Baraldo. "Raciocínio analógico no direito : entre indeterminação e segurança jurídica." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/178462.
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O raciocínio jurídico analógico tem sido visto ora como forma de raciocínio essencial ao Direito, ora como mecanismo pernicioso e arbitrário de tomada de decisões, em prejuízo ao Estado de Direito. O presente trabalho parte da hipótese de que o raciocínio analógico é mecanismo que promove segurança jurídica, e, não, indeterminação. Para sustentar tal ideia, a primeira parte desta discussão apresenta o ponto de vista de diferentes teóricos do direito que procuraram expor ou negar a existência de uma estrutura própria dessa forma de raciocínio. A segunda parte, por sua vez, propõe um balanço acerca dessas perspectivas, identificando-se elementos pertinentes à estrutura do raciocínio analógico e passíveis de análise específica e de crítica, com possibilidade de reformulação ou de melhor compreensão dos pontos colocados em evidência. A terceira parte, por fim, estabelece relação entre raciocínio analógico e coerência, entendendo esta como essencial para compreender de que maneira tal espécie de raciocínio pode promover segurança jurídica; para tanto, discute os conceitos de coerência e de integridade do direito, e, então, propõe que é possível verificar, do ponto de vista prático, relação entre a forma de desenvolvimento de raciocínios analógicos e os institutos jurídicos, de maneira a sustentar, por fim, que a analogia pode constituir mecanismo de segurança jurídica e de densificação do direito. O trabalho conclui que o raciocínio analógico desempenha papel relevante no Estado de Direito, nem sempre percebido como tal.Analogical legal reasoning has been seen both as a form of reasoning essential to the law and as a pernicious and arbitrary mechanism of decision-making, undermining the rule of law. The present work is based on the hypothesis that analogical reasoning is a mechanism that increases legal certainty, not indetermination. To support this idea, the first part of this discussion presents the point of view of different legal theorists who sought to expose or deny the existence of a proper structure of this form of reasoning. The second part, in turn, proposes a balance on these perspectives, identifying pertinent elements to the structure of analogical reasoning, which are subject to specific analysis and criticism, with the possibility of reformulation or better understanding of the highlighted points. The third part, finally, establishes a relation between analogical reasoning and coherence, understanding this as essential to comprehend how this kind of reasoning can promote legal certainty; for this, it discusses the concepts of coherence and integrity of the law, and then it proposes that it is possible to verify, from a practical point of view, the relationship between the development of analogical reasoning and institutions of law, in order to sustain, lastly, that analogy can constitute a mechanism of legal certainty and densification of the law. This work concludes that analogical reasoning plays a relevant role in the rule of law, not always perceived as such.
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Pintore, Anna. "Legal formalism: a comparison between Jori and Schauer." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/116188.
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This essay examines and juxtaposes Mario Jori’s and Frederick Schauer’s ideas on legal formalism. Although developed independently of each other, these ideas show remarkable similarities: both focus on the notion of norm or rule as a tool for clarifying the notion of legal formalism; both defend legal formalism from the criticisms routinely moved against it. The author maintains that Jori’s and Schauer’s theories may contribute to shed light on (and criticize) the controversial notion of defeasibility of legal rules; they may also contribute to scale down, from a legal-theoretical point of view, the novelties of contemporary constitutional orders; finally, it may help to better understand their working machinery.In questo saggio vengono esaminate e messe a confronto le idee di Mario Jori e di Frederick Schauer in tema di formalismo giuridico. Pur essendo state elaborate l’una indipendentemente dall’altra, presentano notevoli somiglianze, perché entrambe usano la nozione di norma o regola come punto focale per chiarire la nozione di formalismo giuridico, e perché entrambe difendono quest’ultimo dalle critiche usualmente rivolte ad esso. L’autrice ritiene che l’esame delle idee dei due autori possa contribuire a chiarire (e criticare) la controversa nozione di defeasibility delle norme giuridiche e possa altresì, in via generale, contribuire a ridimensionare, dal punto di vista teorico-giuridico, le novità del diritto degli odierni Stati costituzionali, oltre che a comprenderne meglio i meccanismi di funzionamento.
En este trabajo se examina y compara las ideas de Mario Jori y de Frederick Schauer en relación con el formalismo jurídico. A pesar de haber sido desarrolladas de forma independiente unas de las otras, dichas ideas presentan notables semejanzas ya que ambos autores utilizan el concepto de una norma o regla como punto focal para aclarar la noción de formalismo jurídico, y porque ambos lo defienden de las críticas que usualmente se le dirigen. La autora considera que el examen de las ideas de los dos autores puede contribuir a aclarar (y criticar) la controvertida noción de defeasibility (derrotabilidad) de las normas jurídicas y, de modo general, también a redimensionar, desde el punto de vista teórico-jurídico, las novedades que presentan los derechos de los modernos Estados constitucionales, y comprender mejor los mecanismos de su funcionamiento.
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Shmilovits, Liron. "Deus ex machina : legal fictions in private law." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2019. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/286225.
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This PhD dissertation is about legal fictions in private law. A legal fiction, broadly, is a false assumption knowingly relied upon by the courts. The main aim of the dissertation is to formulate a test for which fictions should be accepted and which rejected. Subsidiary aims include a better understanding of the fiction as a device and of certain individual fictions, past and present. This research is undertaken, primarily, to establish a rigorous system for the treatment of fictions in English law - which is lacking. Secondarily, it is intended to settle some intractable disputes, which have plagued the scholarship. These theoretical debates have hindered progress on the practical matters which affect litigants in the real world. The dissertation is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is a historical study of common-law fictions. The conclusions drawn thereform are the foundation of the acceptance test for fictions. The second chapter deals with the theoretical problems surrounding the fiction. Chiefly, it seeks precisely to define 'legal fiction', a recurrent problem in the literature. A solution, in the form of a two-pronged definition, is proposed, adding an important element to the acceptance test. The third chapter analyses modern-day fictions and recommends retention or abolition for each fiction. In the fourth chapter, the findings hitherto are synthesised into a general acceptance test for fictions. This test, which is the thesis of this work, is presented as a flowchart. It is the author's hope that this project will raise awareness as to the merits and demerits of legal fictions, de-mystify the debate and bring about reform.
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Leal, Fernando Angelo Ribeiro. "Ônus de argumentação, relações de prioridade e decisão jurídica: mecanismos de controle e de redução da incerteza na subidealidade do sistema jurídico." Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2012. http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=5168.
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O escopo deste trabalho é investigar a natureza e as funções dos ônus de argumentação em suas relações com o sistema jurídico e com a argumentação jurídica. O pano de fundo para o desenvolvimento dessas análises é o triplo condicionamento do direito. De acordo com essa visão, o direito e a argumentação jurídica são condicionados extrínseca, intrínseca e institucionalmente. Nesse cenário, defende-se, por um lado, que os ônus argumentativos são componentes necessários de um sistema jurídico que compreende regras e princípios. Analisados estruturalmente, os ônus argumentativos são compreendidos, por outro lado, como efeitos de regras e standards que consolidam relações de prioridade normativas. A partir dessas relações, defende-se que ônus de argumentação são mecanismos de redução e controle da incerteza que caracteriza necessariamente a subidealidade do sistema jurídico ao (i) facilitarem a manutenção das relações de prioridade que os sustentam na solução de casos concretos, (ii) dificultarem a inversão dessas relações e (iii) instituírem pontos de parada na argumentação jurídica em situações nas quais o desenvolvimento de cadeias argumentativas não é capaz de garantir se, em determinado caso concreto, certa relação de prioridade deve ser mantida ou invertida.The goal of this thesis is to analyze the nature and functions of burdens of argumentation, within the context of their relationship with the structure of the legal system and their role in legal reasoning. Such analysis understands law as limited domain, subject to constraints that can be analytically represented by a three-level approach. According to this view, law and legal reasoning are extrinsically, intrinsically and institutionally constrained. In this complex scenario, the argument of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it claims that burdens of argumentation are necessary components of a legal system that contains rules and principles. On the other hand, by looking at their structure, it claims that these burdens can be understood as effects of rules and standards that establish normative priority relations. On the basis of these analyses, I argue that burdens of argumentation are mechanisms of control and stabilization of the uncertainty that characterizes the suboptimal character of law. First, they make it easier to justify the maintenance in concreto of a preexistent relationship of priority between different principles. Second, they make it harder to invert these relationships of priority. Lastly, burdens of argumentation create stopping points in legal reasoning whenever there is uncertainty about whether the development of new chains of arguments is enough to justify the maintenance or the inversion, in a concrete case, of a given normative relationship of priority.
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MacDonald, Paulo Baptista Caruso. "Direito e equidade : os requisitos para a legitimidade da imposição de deveres jurídicos." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/77146.
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A distinção entre ser obrigado a fazer alguma coisa por meio de coerção e ter a obrigação jurídica de fazê-la foi apresentada por H. L. A. Hart como a distinção entre atos coercitivos praticados com ou sem o respaldo de uma regra jurídica válida. Para o esse autor, a validade jurídica de uma regra está condicionada à aceitação do ordenamento ao qual pertence por parte significativa da sociedade, principalmente das autoridades responsáveis por aplicar as sanções correspondentes ao seu descumprimento. A aceitação, por seu turno, pode ter fundamento nos mais diversos tipos de razão, não sendo necessária a concordância moral. Ainda que essa possa ser uma boa descrição do funcionamento do direito enquanto prática social, ela carece de elementos para justificar certos atos coercitivos praticados pelos aparatos estatais como a imposição de deveres jurídicos autênticos àqueles que porventura não os percebam assim. Esta tese busca esclarecer quais seriam os requisitos para a justificação da imposição de tais deveres e a importância dessa investigação na fundamentação das decisões judiciais.The distinction between being obliged to do something by coercion and having the legal obligation of doing it was presented by H. L. A. Hart as the distinction between coercive acts either backed or not by a valid legal rule. According to him, the legal validity of a rule is conditioned to the acceptation of the legal system to which it belongs by a large part of the society, especially by the officials who are responsible for the application of the sanctions related to their infringement. The acceptation, in turn, may be founded in several kinds of reasons, which do not entail moral approbation. Even though that might be a good description of law as a social practice, it lacks the necessary elements to justify certain coercive acts practised by the officials as the imposition of authentic legal duties to those who happen to see them as mere acts of violence. This dissertation seeks to elucidate the requirements for justifying the imposition of legal duties and the importance of this investigation to the justification in judgements.
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Meister, Marie. "Etude comparative du raisonnement dans le contentieux de l'Union européenne et de l'OMC." Thesis, Strasbourg, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013STRAA037.
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L’analyse comparée du raisonnement du juge européen et du juge de l’OMC est menée en deux temps. Le raisonnement est, d’une part, déterminé, et d’autre part, finalisé. Il apparaît tout d’abord que le raisonnement du juge de l’Union et du juge de l’OMC est déterminé par des caractéristiques systémiques et normatives de ces organisations. Ainsi, la fonction assignée au juge et le caractère incohérent ou lacunaire des systèmes européen et de l’OMC conduisent les juges à raisonner de façon comparable. De même, l’indétermination des règles juridiques et la substance économique du droit ont une influence sur leur raisonnement. Il apparaît ensuite que le raisonnement est finalisé. La première finalité est inhérente au juge d’une organisation internationale ou supra nationale, et le raisonnement est alors un instrument mis au service de la réalisation des objectifs des Traités. La seconde finalité est consubstantielle au juge qui raisonne afin d’assurer l'acceptabilité de ses décisionsComparative analysis of legal reasoning of the EU and WTO judge is conducted in two steps.On the one hand, reasoning is determined, on the other hand, harnessed. First, it appears that the reasoning of both judges is determined by the systemic and normative characteristics of these organizations. Thus, the function the judge is given, along with the incompleteness and inconsistencies of the european and multilateral systems, lead both judges to reason in asimilar way. Likewise, the indeterminacy of legal rules and the economic nature of the lawboth have an impact on reasoning. Second, it appears that reasoning is harnessed. As it is true for any supranational or international judge, reasoning is used as an instrument to achieve theTreaties' objectives. Furthermore, reasoning is an integral part of the judge who uses it in order to ensure the acceptability of his ruling
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Francescutto, S. "IL LEGISLATORE COME METAFORA. UN'ANALISI CRITICA." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/403057.
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It is common for courts and interpreters to refer to legislative intent to justify a particular interpretation of a statute. Although the nature of legislative intent has raised vigorous theoretical debates, the reference to what the legislature meant, wanted, implied or aimed to realize is usually accepted as an argument to solve questions and doubts concerning the meaning of legal texts.
In this thesis I claim that the reference to legislative intent is not as innocuous as it may seem. On the contrary, justificatory reasoning based on this interpretative technique can be extremely misleading and therefore unable to count as a good reason in favor of interpretative conclusions. I maintain that the deceiving role of legislative intent in legal argumentation is due to the inevitable influence that figurative language has on they way in which speakers perceive and conceptualize the world. By using expressions like ‘legislative intent’, ‘intentions of the legislature’ and similar, in fact, we tend to consider a collective body (the legislature) as a single legislator capable of having intentions. In other words, language allows its speakers to personify a group and to confer to it features, intentions, and behaviors that belongs to single individuals only. Because of this personification I argue that, when used as if it designated a single legislator, the term ‘legislature’ works as a metaphor, i.e. a linguistic shorthand to imply an entire network of allusions, suggestions and connections by saying little.
The first part of the thesis is dedicated to the examination and critique of some of the most significant and remarkable theories of metaphors. In particular, I examine the theories offered by Aristotle, I. A. Richards, M. Black, P. Grice, J. Searle and G. Lakoff. I conclude the evaluation of these theories claiming that through metaphors an undefined number of associations between two conceptual domains are created. For this system of association remains implicit and speakers may infer different conclusions from it, metaphors are a deceptive tool and cannot stand for a premise in justificatory reasoning. The first part of the thesis thus offers the theoretical means to turn to the examination of the ‘legislature’ as a metaphor, which is the topic of the second part.
The first section of the second part is devoted to the nature of intentions. After presenting intentions as peculiar state of mind of single individuals, I illustrate the difficulties connected to the alleged possibility of retrieving the intentions of the legislature. Then I examine the role of legislative intent in legal reasoning and I illustrate how this argument indirectly influences and affects many others. After criticizing five theoretical models that offer different solutions to the identification of the legislature and its relevant intentions, I claim that the consideration of the retrieval of legislative intentions as a key moment of the interpretative process is rooted in the legal positivism developed in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century that had wrongly been considered overtaken. I close this first section claiming that the retrieval of the author’s intentions in neither necessary nor appropriate to confer meaning to the text.
In the second section I analyze the outcomes of this conclusion. Claiming that no retrieval of the intentions of the author of the statute would help justifying its interpretations, in fact, the authority of the legislature is inevitably questioned as well. I analyze the connection between authorship and authority through the works of J. Raz who claims that the justification to legislative intent comes directly from the authority of the legislature. After criticizing this position I conclude the thesis with a possible solution to separate authorship and authority.
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POSTIGLIONE, MIRIAM. "IL VALORE DEL 'PRECEDENTE' NELLA GIURISPRUDENZA DEL GIUDICE DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/789947.
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The value of “precedent” in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the attempt to identify its characteristics within the European Union legal framework cannot be proceeded without the preemptive analysis of the legal reasoning and of the creative role of the judge.
The role of the precedent in the legal reasoning and in the interpretation of the European Union law, as well as the unanimously accepted capacity of the judge to “create” law, are to be indented as the pivotal conditions allowing the development of a stare decisis system.
The second part of the present thesis is focused on the peculiar features of the judicial precedent in the case law of the Court of Justice. In particular, we could notice, firstly, the absence of a clear definition and distinction between the concept of ratio decidendi and obiter dicta; secondly, we underline the need to overcome the classical distinction between persuasive precedent and binding precedent, in order to properly evaluate the scale of value that the precedent can take following the use and the function that is playing from time to time. Moreover, the analysis of the efficacy of the precedent will be confined, in this second part of the work, to the “self-precedent” of the Court, meaning to the obligation for the judge to follow his own precedent. The analysis will then highlight the role of precedent in case it is overruled or distinguished by the Court: practice that, ultimately, has to be conceived as a confirmation, as well as a recognition, of the precedent’s value.
Furthermore, in spite of the absence of a doctrine of precedent in the European Union legal system, we recall two circumstances in which the judicial precedent assumes a de facto binding value. Firstly, we analyse the use of precedent in the decision-making activity of the judge, and then those norms of the rules of procedure that required the Court of Justice to decide by explicit reference to the previous judgment.
Lastly, the analysis will be focus on the efficacy of the Court’s precedent with respect to the Tribunal is the evaluation of the impact of the vertical relationship between the two judges and the extension to which the Tribunal is bound by the Court’s as well as in the relationship between the Court and the national judge.
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Guerreiro, João. "Modulação pragmática no raciocínio com condicionais deônticas: Um estudo exploratório com reclusos." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.12/1276.
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Dissertação de Mestrado em Psicologia LegalO presente estudo inscreve-se no âmbito da teoria dos modelos mentais e dos seus desenvolvimentos mais recentes, em especial, no que se refere ao princípio da modulação pragmática. Procurou-se testar de forma exploratória, a hipótese de que a experiência de reclusão prisional pode gerar formas de interpretação de frases condicionais deônticas (e, consequentemente, padrões de inferência) diferentes daqueles que se registam em indivíduos que não tenham atravessado essa experiência de vida. A teoria dos modelos mentais (v. Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002), mais do que outras abordagens ao raciocínio dedutivo, sublinha a importância dada ao contexto, i.e., aos conhecimentos gerais e específicos que as pessoas armazenam nas suas memórias de longo termo, e ao modo como esses factores modulam o significado de uma determinada proposição. Esses conhecimentos são representados mentalmente de forma explícita, facilitando o processo de construção de modelos mentais, ou impedindo-o em outros casos. Neste estudo quisemos avaliar de que forma os conhecimentos específicos de um grupo de reclusos acerca do que é permitido ou proibido, podem modular a interpretação de frases condicionais de conteúdo deôntico e, consequentemente, determinar o seu padrão inferencial. Esses conhecimentos, ou o contexto, como é designado no âmbito da teoria dos modelos mentais, foram avaliados através de uma tarefa de juízo moral - o Teste de Definir Valores Morais desenvolvido por James Rest e seus colaboradores (Rest, 1979, 1986a; Rest, Thoma & Edwards, 1997). Participaram na nossa investigação 60 pessoas, metade das quais a cumprir pena num estabelecimento prisional, e as restantes sem qualquer experiência prévia de reclusão. Aferimos ainda da forma como os indivíduos interpretam as frases condicionais de conteúdo deôntico, utilizando para isso uma tarefa em que se pedia às pessoas para avaliar um conjunto de possibilidades associadas a essas mesmas frases. No que se refere aos conteúdos, usámos frases deônticas, ligadas a permissões, e obrigações de dois tipos: Obrigações violáveis e obrigações invioláveis - que correspondem a dois tipos de interpretação, de acordo com a classificação proposta por Johnson-Laird e Byrne (2002): Interpretação capacitante (a c; a ¬c; ¬a ¬c) e interpretação condicional (a c; ¬a c; ¬a ¬c). Corroboramos de uma forma geral as nossas previsões, relativamente à forma como os indivíduos, interpretam as frases correspondentes aos dois tipos de interpretação (i.e. interpretação capacitante e condicional), e confirmámos parcialmente os padrões inferenciais esperados para as frases estudadas, de acordo com a teoria dos modelos mentais, para os quatro tipos de inferência. Não encontrámos diferenças entre reclusos e não reclusos, relativamente ao nível de juízo moral. Isto significa que os 60 participantes correspondem a uma só população, no que se refere ao nível de juízo moral. Nos dois grupos de participantes, não se registaram diferenças na forma como avaliaram a violação de obrigações (dos dois tipos estudados, i.e., violáveis e não violáveis) e permissões, não se evidenciando também diferenças em termos do seu padrão inferencial. Os resultados deste estudo são discutidos no âmbito da teoria dos modelos mentais, em especial, no que se refere à contribuição que deram para a discussão do papel da modulação pragmática no raciocínio condicional deôntico.
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Leivas, Paulo Gilberto Cogo. "A correção e a fundamentação de decisões jurídicas, em bases pragmático-universais, na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/143354.
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A fundamentação e a correção de decisões jurídicas na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral exigem o cumprimento das regras e formas do discurso jurídico fundado em bases pragmático-universais. As viradas lingüística e pragmática, por obra de Frege, Wittgenstein e Peirce, fundaram os alicerces de uma teoria dos atos de fala, de Austin e Searle, de uma teoria da argumentação, de Toulmin, e de uma teoria comunicativa e discursiva da verdade e correção, em Habermas. A ética procedimentalista e cognitivista habermasiana reconstrói o princípio da universabilidade em trajes discursivos. Alexy enuncia um conceito não-positivista e inclusivo da moral fundamentado na pretensão de correção jurídica e argúi a tese do discurso jurídico como caso especial do discurso prático geral. Uma decisão jurídica correta deve ser justificada com base nas regras e formas da justificação interna e externa do discurso. A fundamentação das decisões por meio de argumentos de princípios coloca a exigência da aplicação do preceito da proporcionalidade. As dogmáticas e jurisprudências alemã e brasileira, na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral, utilizam inicialmente uma fórmula da proibição da arbitrariedade ou correlação lógica, da qual resulta uma vinculação fraca do legislador, e passam a adotar uma fórmula baseada na proporcionalidade, com uma vinculação severa do legislador, especialmente quando há tratamento desigual de indivíduos com características especiais elencadas na Constituição. A racionalidade de uma decisão que se utiliza da estrutura da proporcionalidade depende da justificação externa de cada uma das premissas usadas na justificação interna. Há uma relação necessária entre discurso jurídico, proporcionalidade e dogmáticas dos direitos fundamentais.The justification and correction of legal decisions in the application of general equality principle demands the fullfilment of rules and forms of legal discourse founded on a universal-pragmatic basis. The linguistic and pragmatic turn, by Frege, Wittgenstein, and Peirce, established the foundations of a theory of speech acts, by Austin and Searle, of a theory of reasoning, by Toulmin, and a communicative and discoursive theory on truth and correctness in Habermas. The habermasian proceduralism and cognitivism ethics reconstructs the principle of universability in discoursive ways. Alexy states a non-positivistic and moral inclusive concept of law grounded in the claim to legal correction and argues that the legal discourse must be understood as a special case of general practical discourse. A correct legal decision must be justified on the rules and forms of internal and external justification of discourse. The justification for the decisions by means of arguments of principle sets the demand of applying the partial requirements of proportionality. German and Brazilian legal theory and jurisprudence, in applying the right to general equality, apply initially a formula of prohibition of arbitrary and correlational logic, where there is a weak attachment of the legislature, and start adopting a formula based on proportionality, where there is severe attachment of the legislature, especially in the case of discrimination against individuals with special features listed in the Constitution. The rationality of a decision which uses the structure of proportionality depends on the external justification of each of the premises used in the internal justification. There is a necessary link between proportionality, legal discourse and fundamental rights legal theory.
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Barba, Rafael Giorgio Dalla. "A (in)transparência dos direitos fundamentais: das origens aos limites da teoria discursiva em Robert Alexy." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2017. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/6653.
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CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
PROEX - Programa de Excelência Acadêmica
O trabalho aborda a problemática da argumentação jurídica em decisões judiciais que interpretam e aplicam normas de direitos fundamentais. Essa abordagem é realizada sob a perspectiva da teoria discursiva de Robert Alexy, importante jusfilósofo alemão contemporâneo. O primeiro capítulo expõe algumas origens e fundamentos filosóficos que amparam a estrutura básica da sua teoria, demonstrando pormenorizadamente a relação da dicotomia entre deveres perfeitos e imperfeitos em Kant com a distinção estrutural entre regras e princípios. O segundo capítulo realiza uma reconstrução compilada dos elementos centrais da teoria discursiva de Alexy, vinculando a teoria dos princípios com a teoria da argumentação jurídica, sem deixar de abordar o formato da relação entre Direito e Moralidade no pensamento do autor. O terceiro capítulo, por sua vez, traz o desenvolvimento da discussão filosófica e metodológica exposta anteriormente diante de um caso concreto julgado pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal, demonstrando não apenas a simplificação da fundamentação utilizada pela Corte Constitucional, mas também os limites do procedimento discursivo apresentado por Alexy para garantir a racionalidade da argumentação jurídica. O trabalho tem como finalidade básica uma exposição geral da teoria discursiva de Alexy a partir de alguns de seus alicerces filosóficos, tomando como fio condutor a questão da discricionariedade judicial e os reflexos práticos. Além disso, oferece algumas críticas a sua proposta, apontando três possíveis objeções a esse modelo teórico, que correspondem respectivamente aos três componentes centrais da teoria discursiva: a teoria dos princípios, a teoria da argumentação jurídica e o conceito não-positivista inclusivo de Direito. A metodologia utilizada no desenvolvimento do trabalho se realizou a partir de extensa consulta e revisão bibliográfica em material especializado e apropriado à temática. Como resultados parciais, pode-se dizer que a partir do referencial filosófico adotado por Alexy, a sua teoria discursiva pode oferecer recursos importantes para encarar a problemática da fundamentação das decisões judiciais, inclusive por meio da incorporação de critérios de racionalização dos argumentos morais que ingressam no discurso jurídico, mas ainda permanece um considerável espaço de discricionariedade para determinar a justificação da decisão judicial, cujo resultado pode variar devido a valorações diversas e impasses, ratificando inclusive posições antagônicas.
The thesis addresses the issue of legal argumentation in judicial decisions that interpret and apply fundamental rights norms. This approach is taken out from the perspective of the discursive theory of Robert Alexy, an important contemporary German philosopher. The first chapter exposes some philosophical origins and foundations that support the basic structure of his theory, showing in details the relationship from the dichotomy between perfect and imperfect duties in Kant to the structural distinction between rules and principles. The second chapter performs a compiled reconstruction of the central elements of Alexy’s discursive theory, linking the theory of principles with the theory of legal argumentation, while addressing the relationship between law and morality in the author's thinking. The third chapter, in turn, brings the development of the philosophical and methodological discussion previously exposed a judicial case judged by the Federal Supreme Court, demonstrating not only the simplification of the reasoning used by the Constitutional Court, but also the limits of the discursive procedure presented by Alexy to ensure the rationality of legal argumentation. The thesis has as its basic purpose a general exposition of Alexy's discursive theory based on some of its philosophical foundations, taking as its guiding line the problem of judicial discretion and practical reflexes. In addition, it offers some critics to this proposal, pointing out three possible objections to this theoretical model, which correspond respectively to the three central components of discursive theory: theory of principles, theory of legal argumentation and the inclusive non-positivist concept of Law. The methodology used on the development of the college paper was taken out from extensive consultation and bibliographical review in specialized material appropriate to the theme. As partial results, from the philosophical reference adopted by Alexy, his discursive theory can offer important resources to face the problem of legal reasoning in judicial decision, including by incorporating rationalization criteria of moral arguments that enter on legal discourse, but still remains a considerable discretion space to determine the justification of judicial decision, in order that the result may vary due to different values and deadlocks, ratifying even antagonistic positions.
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Mawa, Michael Uzukwu Elochukwu Eugene. "Book Reviews: Obiora F. Ike & Ndidi Nooli Edozien, "Understanding Africa: Traditional Legal Reasoning, Jurisprudence & Justice in Igboland" and Paulinus Ikechukwu Odozor C.S.Sp., "Moral Theology in an Age of Renewal - A Study of the Catholic Tradition since Vatican II"." Bulletin of Ecumenical Theology, 2003. http://digital.library.duq.edu/u?/bet,890.
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BONAVENTURA, GIOIA. "Il dialogo tra giudici nello spazio costituzionale europeo." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Genova, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/11567/1031601.
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This dissertation provides an analysis of judges’ and, more generally, jurists’ language and reasoning on a specific topic: the judicial dialogue in the European constitutional space.
“European constitutional space” is an expression which concisely denotes the idea, increasingly popular with European legal culture, of different legal orders conceptualized as open towards one another, interdependent, and capable of confrontation as well as conflict. Within this European constitutional space, the idea of a “dialogue” occurring between the European Union’s Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the domestic judicial authorities (especially in the matter of fundamental rights) is equally popular among European jurists.
More precisely, this analysis aims at clarifying which phenomena the legal culture claims this dialogue describes and which problems it claims it can solve: essentially, why the legal culture has felt the impulse to resort to the idea of an on-going dialogue between European judges.
The investigation into the rise of a (now) well-established topos in European constitutional legal literature will be carried out on the basis of jurists’ interpretive and constructive trends, explicitly or implicitly relating to this idea of a dialogue between judges.
The research is organized and divided into three different parts. The first part, which corresponds to the first chapter, is dedicated to a general, albeit brief, review of the different legal fields where the concept of dialogue is used (or has been used). This operation allows to draw some distinction between different forms of “dialogue”, such as a judicial dialogue within the legal order, a transnational judicial dialogue, and, lastly, a judicial dialogue in the European constitutional order.
The second part, which is the core of the analysis, consists of three chapters. The first one deals with the relationship between the European Union’s Court of Justice and the Italian domestic judicial authorities (mainly the Italian Constitutional Court); the second one addresses the relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and the Italian domestic judicial authorities (mainly the Italian Constitutional Court); the last one concerns itself with the relationship between the European Union’s Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.
The third and final part aims to provide some conclusive remarks on the judicial dialogue in the European constitutional space, on the basis of the analysis carried out in the second part of this dissertation.
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Gavião, Filho Anizio Pires. "Colisão de direitos fundamentais, argumentação e ponderação." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/88482.
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O objetivo central desta investigação é demonstrar que a ponderação é racional. A proposição normativa particular concreta resultante de um caso de colisão de direitos fundamentais resolvido pela ponderação pode ser justificada racionalmente. O que se pretende sustentar é que o problema não está na ponderação, mas como ela é realizada para solucionar os casos de colisão de direitos fundamentais. A ponderação somente pode pretender racionalidade quando sustentada por razões dadas conforme regras. A proposição decisiva desta investigação é a de que a ponderação, como atividade argumentativa, deve observar as regras da argumentação racional. Essas regras são as regras da argumentação prática geral e da argumentação jurídica, formuladas pela teoria do discurso prático geral e do discurso jurídico. Elas configuram a base das regras próprias da ponderação racional.The goal of this research is to show that balancing is rational. The particular concrete normative statement resulting from a collision of constitutional rights resolved by balancing can be justified rationally. The aim is to sustain that the problem is not balancing itself, but how it is used to solve the cases of collision of constitutional rights.The balancing can be rational only if supported by reasons given under rules. A crucial proposition of this research is that the balancing, as argumentative activity, must observe the rules of rational legal reasoning. These rules are the rules of the general practice argumentation and the rules of the legal reasoning, raised by the theory of general practical discourse and legal discourse. They make the basis of its own rules of rational balancing.
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Delanlssays, Thomas. "La motivation des décisions juridictionnelles du Conseil d’Etat." Thesis, Lille 2, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017LIL20018.
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Cette étude se donne pour ambition de saisir et de comprendre ce qu’est la motivation des décisions juridictionnelles du Conseil d’État, au demeurant souvent critiquée. Notion fondamentale en droit processuel, la motivation est un discours argumentatif, expression d’une technique juridique, à savoir un discours visant à justifier au plan juridique et factuel la décision à travers un raisonnement afin de persuader l’auditoire. Ainsi faudra-t-il analyser à la fois son architecture et ses fonctions dans une perspective dynamique. En tout état de cause, on constate,depuis au moins le début du XXIe siècle, une certaine évolution de la motivation. Ce phénomène résulte, notamment, de l’européanisation et de la complexité normatives, de la protection renforcée des droits fondamentaux, des exigences de sécurité juridique ou encore de la volonté du Conseil d’État de promouvoir une politique communicationnelle afin de légitimer son action. L’étude implique de revisiter certaines thématiques traditionnelles, en particulier le syllogismejudiciaire, l’argumentation, l’interprétation, le style de la motivation ou encore le pouvoir normatif jurisprudentiel pour constater et mesurer cette évolutionThe aim of this research is to tackle and understand the Conseil d’Etat’s court’s decisions motivation which are often criticised. Fundamental notion in procedural law, motivation is an argumentative discourse expressing a jurisdictional technique but moreover it is specifically a discourse trying trough a legal reasoning to justify a decision in order to convince the audience. Thus we shall have to analyse its architecture and its functions in a dynamic perspective. Either way we can note that since the beginning of the 21st century the court’s motivation has evolved.This phenomenon is the result of the Europeanization and the complexity of the normative production and is also due to enhanced protection of the fundamental rights, legal certainty and the Conseil d’Etat’s wish to promote a communicational policy in order to legitimise its action. This research entails to revisit certain traditional topics such as jurisdictional syllogism, argumentation, interpretation, the motivation’s style or the normative jurisprudential power to both note and measure this evolution
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Tamouza, Ahlem. "Les cultures dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme." Thesis, Paris 3, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019PA030024.
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La diversité culturelle interétatique ainsi que diverses cultures nationales et sociétales sont régulièrement invoquées par la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme. Un constat de récurrence et de diversité des références aux cultures dans la jurisprudence européenne conduit à poser la question de savoir comment la Cour utilise les cultures dans l’exercice de son office. L’objectif est donc de découvrir, à partir d’une analyse de discours, les contours et la raison d’être d’« usages des cultures » en droit européen des droits de l’Homme. Divers usages peuvent, d’abord, être relevés. Par exemple, la Cour prend en compte des intérêts culturels sociétaux, interprète la Convention à la lumière de la culture sociétale, ou encore mobilise les cultures pour justifier certains choix juridictionnels. Bien que divers et inconstants, les usages identifiés ont pour caractéristique de s’écarter d’une méthode de contrôle habituelle. Ils viseraient le prononcé d’un choix intermédiaire ou d’une solution qui n’auraient pu être présentés à l’issue d’un raisonnement habituel. S’ils semblent, de ce fait, opportunistes et procéder de l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire, les usages des cultures ont cependant la particularité de pouvoir renforcer la motivation des jugements – et ainsi de compenser le manque en légitimité qu’un choix discrétionnaire entrainerait. Une certaine valeur argumentative peut, en effet, être reconnue aux références aux et à la prise en compte des cultures. Finalement constitutif de l’exercice de l’office du juge, le recours aux cultures est apparu utile dans le contrôle juridictionnel et opportun au regard de la réception des jugements rendus par la CourThe inter-State cultural diversity as well as the various national and societal cultures are regularly invoked by the European Court of Human Rights. The diversity and the recurrence of the references to cultures in the legal precedents lead to the question of how the Court uses national and societal cultures in the exercise of its function. Thus, the purpose is to shed light on the characteristics and the raison d’être of the “uses of cultures” in European human rights law. First, a discourse analysis unveils a variety of uses in the Court’s reasoning. For instance, it shows the Court takes into account cultural interests, interprets the Convention in the light of the cultural context, and invokes cultures to account for its own decisions. Secondly, the common feature of the diverse uses of cultures appears to be their exceptional nature. While using cultures, the Court does not follow a usual method of monitoring. Hence, it uses cultures exceptionally to deliver a decision different from the one that would have been taken following a regular reasoning. In that respect, the uses of cultures appear to stem from the exercise of a discretionary power that can be regarded as a threat to the European judge’s legitimacy. However, the references to and the consideration of cultures display the special capacity of having an argumentative power. Initially considered as a component of the Court’s reasoning, the uses of cultures ultimately deem to be relevant in the motivation of the Court’s discretionary decisions
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Goltzberg, Stefan. "Théorie bidimensionnelle de l'argumentation: définition, présomption et argument à fortiori." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/209921.
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La thèse propose une nouvelle théorie de l’argumentation – bidimensionnelle – reposant sur deux paramètres :la force et l’orientation. Quatre types de marqueurs sont identifiés, articulés autour de ces deux paramètres. Le chapitre 1 porte sur le réductionnisme topique :la théorie selon laquelle tous les arguments sont défaisables, c’est-à-dire réfutables.
Le chapitre 2 retrace l’histoire du réductionnisme logique :la théorie selon laquelle tous les arguments valides sont indéfaisables. L’argument étudié est la définition.
Le chapitre 3 présente la théorie bidimensionnelle, qui explique à la fois les arguments défaisables et indéfaisables.
Les chapitre 3 et 4 sont une application de la théorie bidimensionnelle de l’argumentation.
Le chapitre 4 étudie l’argument appelé présomption.
Le chapitre 5 offre un traitement nouveau de l’argument a fortiori.
Doctorat en Philosophie
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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Cunha, Guilherme Cardoso Antunes da. "Do modelo de regras à prática interpretativa: o romance em cadeia como condição de possibilidade para respostas adequadas ao direito." Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2018. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/7634.
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A presente pesquisa tem como objetivo investigar a relação da aplicação de padrões decisórios, na prática jurisdicional, com a implementação de respostas adequadas ao Direito. Especificamente, analisar um modelo interpretativo para a aplicação dos padrões decisórios no Brasil e à luz das diretrizes trazidas pelo Código de Processo Civil de 2015. Para tanto, se estudará, em um primeiro momento, o modelo interpretativo do positivismo jurídico e a decisão do juiz como ato de vontade; em seguida, como esse modelo pode ser superado e, assim, chegar-se a uma prática jurisdicional que busque a implementação de respostas adequadas ao Direito. Nestas circunstâncias, se analisará o papel das cortes judiciais. Depois, será analisada a relação entre a evolução das tradições da common law e da civil law com a evolução do Estado de Direito – foco nos últimos dois séculos, relacionando os compromissos das duas tradições jurídicas com as fontes do Direito e com os modelos de interpretação. O objetivo é demonstrar que o Direito deve ser, no Estado Democrático de Direito, fruto de uma atitude interpretativa do intérprete. Ato contínuo, se investigará a influência da fundamentação da decisão na aplicação dos padrões decisórios para que, após, se possa analisar quais seus elementos vinculantes. Por fim, se analisará o modelo interpretativo para uma adequada aplicação dos padrões decisórios na prática jurisdicional brasileira como condição de possibilidade para respostas adequadas ao Direito. Diante da investigação deste presente trabalho, concluiu-se que o problema não está na autoridade dos padrões decisórios, mas em como os padrões decisórios são aplicados, pois os elementos vinculantes dos padrões decisórios são as teses jurídicas fixadas na fundamentação. É preciso, no Estado Democrático de Direito, uma prática jurisdicional por uma atitude interpretativa intersubjetiva em romance em cadeia, sempre mediante uma fundamentação qualificada, a fim de alcançar respostas adequadas ao Direito.
The present research aims to investigate the relation of the application of decision-making standards, in the jurisdictional practice, with the implementation of adequate responses to the Law. Specifically, to analyze an interpretive model for the application of decision-making standards in Brazil and in the light of the guidelines brought by the Code of Civil Procedure of 2015. To do so, we will first study the interpretive model of legal positivism and the decision of the judge as an act of will; then, how this model can be overcome and thus reach a jurisdictional practice that seeks to implement adequate responses to the law. In these circumstances, the role of the courts will be analyzed. Then, the relationship between the evolution of common law and civil law traditions and the evolution of the rule of law in the last two centuries will be analyzed, linking the commitments of the two legal traditions with the sources of law and with models of interpretation. The objective is to demonstrate that the Law must be, in the Democratic State of Law, the result of an interpretative attitude of the interpreter. Then, the influence of decision-making in the application of decision-making standards will be investigated so that, afterwards, it can be analyzed its binding elements. Finally, the interpretative model will be analyzed for an adequate application of the decision standards in the Brazilian jurisdictional practice as a condition for the possibility of adequate responses to the Law. In the face of the investigation of this present work, it was concluded that the problem is not in the authority of the decision-making standards, but in how the decision-making standards are applied, because the binding elements of the decision-making standards are the legal theses fixed in the reasoning. It is necessary, in the Democratic State of Law, a jurisdictional practice for an intersubjective interpretive attitude in a chain novel, always through a qualified foundation, in order to achieve adequate answers to the Law.
La presente investigación tiene como objetivo investigar la relación de la aplicación de los patrones decisorios con la implementación de respuestas correctas al Derecho. Más específicamente, analizar un modelo interpretativo para la aplicación de los patrones decisorios en Brasil y desde las directrices traídas por el Codigo de Proceso Civil de 2015. Para tanto, se estudiará, en un primero momento, el modelo interpretativo de lo positivismo legal e la decisión judicial como acto de voluntad; en seguida, como este modelo puede ser superado y, así, se obtener una práctica jurisdiccional en búsqueda de la implementación de respuestas correctas al Derecho. En estas circunstancias, se analizará el papel de las curtes judiciarias; después, la relación entre la evolución de las tradiciones de common law y de civil law con la evolución del Estado de Derecho – foco en los dos últimos siglos, relacionando los compromisos de las dos tradiciones con las fuentes del Derecho y los modelos de interpretación. El objetivo es demonstrar que el Derecho, en un Estado Democrático de Derecho, es resultado de una actitud interpretativa del intérprete. Acto continuo, se investigará la influencia de la fundamentación de la decisión en la aplicación de los patrones decisorios para investigar cual son los elementos obligatorios. Por fin, se analizará un modelo interpretativo para una adecuada aplicación de los patrones decisorios en la práctica jurisdiccional brasileña como condición de posibilidad para respuestas correctas al Derecho. Desde la presente investigación, se ha concluido que el problema no está en la autoridad de los patrones decisorios, más en como los patrones decisorios son aplicados, porque sus elementos obligatorios son las tesis jurídicas fijo en la fundamentación. Es necesario, en el Estado Democrático de Derecho, una práctica jurisdiccional de actitud interpretativa intersubjetiva en romance en cadena, siempre mediante una fundamentación calificado, para alcanzar respuestas correctas.