Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Legal Rationalism'

This thesis investigated the power of framing practices in the context of Australian refugee policies between 1999 and 2003. The analysis identified legal rationalism as an ideological projection by which the Howard government justified its refugee policies to the electorate. That is, legal rationalism manifested itself as an overriding concern with the rules and procedures of the law, without necessarily having concern for consistency or continuity. In its first form, legal rationalism emerged as a

Nesta dissertação pretendo reler o debate entre Ronald Dworkin e o positivismo jurídico. Farei isto sob o prisma da filosofia analítica, especificamente, contextualizando o debate no âmbito de uma discussão travada entre três teorias semânticas específicas: a descricional, o externalismo semântico e o bi-dimensionalismo ambicioso. Há algum tempo Dworkin lançou uma crítica ao positivismo, qual seja, o positivismo jurídico pretende reduzir a forma direito de como as coisas são à conformação puramente descritiva de como o mundo é. Disse, ainda, que somente quando concebido como uma teoria semântica é que o positivismo jurídico tornar-se-ia inteligível. Os posivistas, a seu turno, argumentam que a Jurisprudência analítica é um projeto teórico pelo direito e não pelo significado do termo direito e que, portanto, deveríamos manter separados dois tipos de questionamentos: O que é direito? e O que é direito?. Se tudo correr bem, ao reler o debate entre os positivistas e Ronald Dworkin a partir do instrumental obtido no âmbito da teoria semântica, poderemos perceber que pode ser verdade que o positivismo jurídico, enquanto projeto teórico, é sobre o direito, o referente, e não sobre o direito, o termo; entretanto, a forma pela qual o positivismo concebe o questionamento O que é direito?, ele mesmo, parece acabar por qualificá-lo, num sentido não trivial, como semântico.
I intend to reread the debate between Ronald Dworkin and legal positivism. I will do that through the prism of analytic philosophy, specifically in the context of the debate between three specific semantic theories: descriptional, externalism and the ambitious bidimensionalism. Dworkin criticized legal positivism: the legal positivism aims to reduce the law-way of things to the purely descriptive form of the world. He also said that only when conceived as a semantic theory is that legal positivism would become intelligible. The posivists argue that analytical Jurisprudence is a theoretical project about law and not about the meaning of \"law\", therefore we should keep separated two types of questions: \"What is law?\" and \"What is \'law\'?\". If all goes well, when rereading the debate through the prism of the discussion in the context of semantic theories, we will realize that it may be true that legal positivism is about law, the referent, and not about \"law\". However, the way in which positivism conceives the question \"What is law?\" seems to qualify it as semantic in a nontrivial sense.

The primary objective of this work is to develop the (rationalist) thesis of integrity or the integral view in the realm of legal-political thought. This view consists in the elaboration of the essential-conceptual interdependency of law, the political authority (i.e. the state) and the universal moral standpoint of justice (i.e. the standpoint encapsulated by the idea of human rights in our age) in a way avoiding the shortfalls of legal-moralism illustrated by the natural-law-theories. The rationalist thesis of integrity suggests that the elements within the complex nexus of the law, the state, and justice can neither be divorced from nor be assimilated into each other. This evidently refutes the (positivist) thesis of separation which breaks off the cord between law and the state, on the one hand, and the moral standpoint of justice, on the other hand. However, the thesis of integrity equally opposes the theses of assimilation whereby either law and political authority are assimilated into morality (&ldquo
the moralist-naivety&rdquo
) or law and justice are assimilated into brute political force (&ldquo
the realist-cynicism&rdquo
). In brief, the integral view gives each element its due in the nexus of law, the state and the universal moral idea of justice (i.e. human rights). In this work, this view is strived to be deduced from a comparative critical-examination of three legal-political theories, each of which is taken as representing a particular approach beyond legal-moralism. These are Hans Kelsen&rsquo
s Pure-Theory-of-Law representing the positivist approach, Carl Schmitt&rsquo
s Concrete-Order-Thinking representing the realist approach, and Otfried Hö
ffe&rsquo
s Ethical-Philosophy-of-Law-and-the-State representing the rationalist approach.

Die bisherigen Heranziehungsmodelle der Rechtsökonomik bei der Rechtsanwendung geht vor allem davon aus, dass die Effizienz als Rechtsprinzip in bestimmten Rechtsordnungen inbegriffen ist. Dies schränkt aber die Rolle der Rechtsökonomik für die Rechtsanwendung ein. Da der Rechtsanwender in Deutschland sowohl am geltenden Recht als auch an wissenschaftlichen Gesetzen binden soll, kann die Rechtsökonomik als die im Sinne vom kritischen Rationalismus genannte Wissenschaft zur Erklärung menschlichen Verhaltens unter Berücksichtigung der gegebenen Rechtszuordnungen bezeichnet werden. Daraus ergibt sich, dass die aus der wissenschaftlichen Rechtsökonomik abgeleitete Gesetzmäßigkeit dem Rechtsanwender nachkommen soll, sodass die Rechtsökonomik als Rechtsanwendungsmethode unbeschränkt bei der Rechtsanwendung verwertet werden kann. Bei der Auswahl rechtsdogmatischer Lehrsätze bei der Rechtsanwendung ist das Werturteil unvermeidlich, mithilfe des vom kritischen Rationalismus vertretenen Brückenprinzips und Komparativismus kann die Werturteilproblematik bei der Rechtsanwendung durch die positive Wissenschaft und Rechtsökonomik gelöst werden. Die konkrete Methode zur Auswahl rechtsdogmatischer Lehrsätze ist es, dass durch die positive Rechtsökonomik diese rechtsdogmatische Lehre auszuwählen ist, die im Vergleich mit anderen konkurrierenden Lehren das restriktive Minimum der Transaktionskosten darstellt und somit die faktische Geltung der entsprechenden rechtlichen Regelung unter dem gegebenen Umstand am höchsten verwirklicht.
The previous application models of economics of law in the judicial application assume that efficiency as a legal principle is included in the jurisdiction. However, this limits the role of economics of law in the judicial application. As the legal practitioner in Germany shall obey applicable laws and scientific laws, economics of law can be recognized as a real science in the sense of critical rationalism, explaining the human behavior under the condition of the given legal order. It follows that the regularity derived from the scientific economics of law shall be complied with by the legal practitioner, so that the economics of law can be indefinitely used in the judicial application. By selecting the concrete legal dogmatic doctrines in the judicial application, the value judgement is inevitable. With the help of bridge principle and comparativism of the critical rationalism, the value judgement problem can be resolved through the positive science and the positive economics of law. The concrete method of selecting legal dogmatic doctrines is that the legal dogmatic doctrine, which represents the restrictive minimum of the transaction costs and thus realizes the de facto validity of the relevant legal provisions under the given circumstance in highest grade, shall be selected through the positive economics of law.

RÉSUMÉ Reprenant les trois argumentaires des rapports divergents de la commission le Dain de 1972, soit le moralisme juridique pour le maintien de la prohibition du cannabis, le paternalisme juridique pour la décriminalisation de sa possession simple et le libéralisme juridique pour sa légalisation, cette thèse mobilise ce triptyque inspiré par trois philosophes juridiques à l’aide de l’analyse de contenu afin de voir comment ces arguments se sont manifestés à nouveau dans le processus parlementaire d’adoption du projet de loi C-45 ayant mené à la légalisation du cannabis au Canada. De plus, elle mobilise aussi le concept de la rationalité pénale moderne dans le but de comprendre l’approbation chez les différents acteurs d’avoir recours au pénal dans ce projet de loi en acceptant l’inclusion de deux nouvelles infractions criminelles passibles de 14 ans d’emprisonnement. Ces infractions visent un adulte qui ferait participer un mineur au marché illégal de cannabis, ou encore vendrait ou donnerait du cannabis à un mineur. La clarification de ce paradoxe était importante considérant que ce projet de loi fut essentiellement justifié par ceux qui y étaient favorables sur la volonté de diminuer un recours au droit criminel identifié comme inefficace à la réduction de la consommation du cannabis, tout en créant de nouvelles infractions pénales pour éviter son accès aux mineurs. Les résultats de cette thèse ont démontré que si des philosophies de type moraliste et paternaliste demeurent bien présentes lors des débats parlementaires sur C-45, le libéralisme juridique l’est aussi, mais tend fortement à disparaitre dès qu’arrive la question de la santé et de la sécurité des mineurs. De plus, si la durée des nouvelles peines demeure contestée par certains, il semble qu’en aucun temps le recours au pénal en guise d’outil de gestion de ces infractions ne soit remis en question, ce qui s’est traduit entre autres par l’absence totale de débats en ce qui a trait à l’utilisation d’un mineur dans le marché illégal de cannabis. Ce dernier point pourrait s’expliquer par une volonté de réforme par contraste qui vise une meilleure efficacité du système en place plutôt qu’une réforme générative qui cherche l’innovation et le renouveau, ce qui aurait demandé la remise en question du paradigme dominant sur certaines drogues actuellement illégales, soit la prohibition. ABSTRACT By taking up the three arguments of the divergent reports of the Le Dain Commission of 1972, the legal moralism in favor of the maintenance of the prohibition of cannabis, the legal paternalism for the decriminalization of tis simple possession and the legal liberalism in favor of legalization, this thesis mobilize this triptych inspired by three legal philosophers by using content analysis in parliamentary debates to see how these arguments manifested themselves again in the process of passing Bill C-45 which led to the legalization of cannabis in Canada. Furthermore, it also mobilizes the concept of modern criminal rationality in order to understand the approval for the various actors to use the criminal law in this bill by accepting the inclusion of two new criminal offenses punishable by 14 years of imprisonment. These offenses target an adult who would involve a minor in the illegal cannabis market, or sell or give cannabis to a minor. The clarification of this paradox was important considering that this bill was essentially justified by those who were in favor of reducing the use of criminal law identified as ineffective in reducing the use of cannabis, while creating new offenses to prevent its access from minors. The results of this thesis have shown that while moralistic and paternalistic philosophies remain very much present during parliamentary debates on Bill C-45, legal liberalism is also present, but tends to disappear as soon as the question of health and safety of minors come up. Moreover, while the duration of the new sentences is still disputed by some, it appears that at no time is the use of the criminal law as a tool for managing these offenses is questioned, which has resulted in the total lack of debate regarding the use of a minor in the illegal cannabis market. This last point could be explained by a desire for the adoption of a reform by contrast which aims to improve the effectiveness of the system in place rather than a generative reform that seeks innovation and renewal, which would have asked a questioning of the dominant paradigm on some currently illegal drugs, the prohibition in itself.

This article focuses on the analysis of the literature produced by Robert Alexy, a renowned German jurist, focusing on the concept of fundamental rights, which are, in a constitutional state of law, the ultimate goal of the legal system. Thus, for Alexy the rights of people are not moral, but rather legal. It is in this sense and taking as a starting point the conception of fundamental rights that the author proposes a tentative reading from a moderate realistic perspective of some aspects of the theoretical position of Alexy.
El presente artículo se centra en el análisis de la literatura producida por Robert Alexy, reconocido jurista alemán, centrada en el concepto de los derechos fundamentales los cuales son, en un estado constitucional de derecho, el fin último del ordenamiento jurídico. Así, para Alexy los derechos de las personas no son de tipo moral, sino más bien, jurídico. Es en ese sentido y tomando como premisa de partida la concepción de los derechos fundamentales que la autora propone una lectura tentativa desde una perspectiva realista moderada de algunos aspectos de la posición teórica de Alexy.

A água é um bem essencial à vida. Por meio de sua utilização, a humanidade ao longo dos séculos vem desenvolvendo suas atividades econômicas, sociais e culturais. Mais recentemente a água se torna importante também para manutenção de ecossistemas e da vida, independentemente de estar ligada ao homem. Contudo, a água vem sofrendo duros golpes em sua qualidade e quantidade. O crescimento populacional desorganizado, provocando demandas crescentes por água potável e a poluição hídrica, são fatores que têm contribuído para sua escassez e piora de sua qualidade. A racionalização da utilização dos recursos naturais, passou a ser uma componente aguda na gestão ambiental e, em especial, dos recursos hídricos. Práticas ligadas à reutilização de recursos, como reciclagem de resíduos e reúso de água, cada vez mais ganham a pauta ambiental. O reúso de água se apresenta, assim, como alternativa para minorar a quantidade de água captada e minimizar o descarte de esgotos e efluentes. O reúso pode ocorrer nos vários usos múltiplos de recursos hídricos: abastecimento público, lazer, geração de energia, navegação, afastamento de esgotos, recarga de lençol freático, atividades esportivas, usos urbanos, agricultura e processos industriais. Há riscos na utilização de água de reúso. Há necessidade de regramentos para balizar esses usos e evitar efeitos negativos, em especial à saúde pública. O Direito positivo, por meio do exercício da competência legislativa do Estado, tem contribuição a dar no estabelecimento de regras condicionadoras do reúso. Essas regras devem, antes, estar baseadas em princípios capazes de orientar todo um conjunto de normas, gerais ou específicas, que venham num futuro regular o tema de reúso de água. presente trabalho pretende apontar alguns desses princípios.
Water is an essential asset. The human kind, using it during the last centuries, has been developing many economical, social and cultural activities. Nowadays, water has also become important for the maintenance of life and the ecosystems. 7 Connected or not to mankind. Water is undergoing severe damage, though. The unorganized population growth creates a crescent need for drinking water. On the other hand, the hidrical pollution caused by this uncontrolled growth has also contributed for the lack of amount and quality of the water. The rationalization of the usage of the natural resources has become an important component regarding environmental administration, specially the rationalization of hydrae resources. Practices such as the reutilization, recycling and the reuse of water are being more and more considered. The reuse of water itself is the alternative to reduce the amount of captured water and to minimize the dumping of sewer. The reuse may occur through many different hydria resources public supply, leisure, energy generation, navigation, shoving off the sewer, reloading the ground water, sports activities, urban usage, agricultural and industrial processes. There are some risks in working with the reuse of water, though. There is a need to create rules to establish this use and to avoid the negative effects it may cause, especially regarding the public health. The law, under the competence of the legislative state has to contribute to establish rules to regulate the reuse of water. These rules shall, above all, be based on principles which are capable to guide the whole set of principles, either specific or general, that might regulate the theme of water reuse in the near future. This is the purpose of this work.

A relação entre razão e direito faz parte da tradição do pensamento ocidental. No período moderno, essa relação serviu de base para o surgimento de uma cultura jurídica autônoma, dentro da qual foram elaboradas as idéias de sujeito de direito e sistema jurídico. No entanto, a modernidade também criou condições para o nascimento das chamadas teorias jurídicas, que se constituem como uma nova forma de discurso jurídico, distinta das teorias filosóficas e das dogmáticas jurídicas, por não manifestarem o modelo de racionalidade tradicional, associado à concepção de lei natural. Para compreender a racionalidade nesse novo âmbito do discurso dos juristas, é proposto, nesta tese de doutoramento, um caminho peculiar: por um lado, tomam-se por objeto teorias jurídicas que se tornaram referência no contexto anglo-saxônico, ou seja, fora dos marcos habituais da racionalização na Europa continental moderna; por outro lado, são considerados como fio condutor para esta investigação os enfoques interpretativos construídos como legítimos por essas teorias, em vez de configurar sua racionalidade a partir de divisões escolares ou matrizes epistemológicas. Essa delimitação permite revelar três modelos novos e distintos de racionalidade jurídica, que resultam do desenvolvimento de diferentes concepções de pontos de vista no contexto do debate entre as teorias jurídicas de John Austin, Oliver W. Holmes Jr., Hans Kelsen, Herbert L. A. Hart, Robert Alexy e Ronald Dworkin. Esses três modelos, por sua vez, contribuem para ressaltar os limites heurísticos da contraposição positivismo vs. antipositivismo para tratar da racionalidade no direito contemporâneo.
The relation between reason and law is part of the Western thought tradition. In the modern period, this relation served as basis for the emergence of an autonomous legal culture, within which the ideas of \"subjects of law\" and \"legal system\" were elaborated. However, modernity has also created conditions for the birth of the so-called legal theories, which were constituted as a new form of legal discourse (distinct from the legal dogmatics and philosophical theories of law), for they do not present the traditional model of rationality associated with the conception of natural law. A peculiar method is proposed in this doctoral thesis, in order to understand the rationality in this new sphere of legal discourse: on the one hand, legal theories which have become reference within the Anglo-Saxon world i.e., theories outside the usual landmarks of rationalization in modern continental Europe are taken as object; on the other hand, the interpretive approaches (focuses) formulated as legitimate by these theories are considered as expressions of rationality, instead of rationality as originated from divisions by schools of thought or epistemological matrices. By means of this method, three new distinct models of legal reasoning are revealed. These models are the outcome of different concepts of \"point of view\" which were defended throughout the dialogue which took place between the theories of John Austin, Oliver W. Holmes Jr., Hans Kelsen, Herbert L. A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy. These three models, in turn, contribute to highlighting the heuristic limits of the opposition legal positivism vs. non-positivism in the debate over rationality in contemporary law.

Les questions d’adaptabilité de la démocratie occidentale dans le contexte chinois ont toujours été une préoccupation importante. Cette recherche vise à étudier l’adaptabilité de la démocratie délibérative dans le contexte de la chine en termes de perspective normative. Tout d’abord, on s’est concentré sur la Théorie de discussion de droit et démocratie de Habermas, parce que c’est une des théories normatives de délibération démocratique les plus discutées en Chine aujourd’hui. Compte-tenu de la normativité et de l’idéalité de la théorie de Habermas, la théorie du discours des relations de pouvoir de Foucault est introduite pour illustrer la tension entre différentes théories de discours occidentaux. Puis, afin d’enquêter sur les adaptabilités de ces deux théories du discours dans le contexte chinois et d’équilibrer la tension entre les deux, un autre concept normatif, la rationalité confucéenne, est attirée sur des sources culturelles traditionnelles chinoises. En conséquence, trois dimensions de la théorie du discours, ainsi que les relations entre eux, sont présentés. Certaines descriptions empiriques sur les faits de la Chine historique et politique sont également nécessaires d’utilisation pour expliquer, compléter ou interroger ce cadre théorique. Deux perspectives de tension sont toujours critiques dans toute la recherche : la tension entre universalité et particularité et la tension entre les théories normatives et des faits socio-politiques. Grâce à l’approche des études de texte, ainsi que des études de conception et d’études empirique comme suppléments, la recherche est menée comme suit. Le premier chapitre traite de la tension entre la théorie du discours du droit et de la démocratie de Habermas et les faits sociaux. Le chapitre 2 analyse la tension entre la théorie du discours de Habermas et la théorie du discours de Foucault et plaide en faveur de la remise en question des problèmes de tension. Le troisième chapitre tente de rechercher les ressources dans les cultures politiques traditionnelles chinoises et de proposer une autre théorie normative de discours, la théorie du discours de la rationalité confucéenne, pour équilibrer la tension entre les deux précédentes théories normatives de discours. On fait valoir que le type idéal de rationalité confucéenne (un type normatif de rationalité de valeur) peut être utilisé comme un pont de communication entre les deux théories du discours opposées. Le chapitre 4, par des descriptions empiriques sur l’espace publique et les discussions politiques/juridiques dans la société traditionnelles chinoise, explique la théorie normative proposée au chapitre 3 et tente de réexaminer et de redéfinir les notions d’« espace publique » dans le contexte de la Chine traditionnelle. Enfin, le chapitre 5 se concentre sur les descriptions des discussions politiques et juridiques dans l’espace publique des nouveaux médias de la Chine d’aujourd’hui. C’est une réponse empirique pour toutes les études normatives antérieures, et aussi une enquête sur la tension entre les théories normatives et les expériences sociales. Je soutiens que, en raison des différentes structures cognitives et les différents modes de pensée dans les différentes cultures, il devrait y avoir différents paradigmes normatifs de la démocratie du discours dans les différents contextes culturels, et que la normativité et la réalité sont les deux faces d’une même médaille. Les théories normatives du discours sont des guides pour les pratiques de la démocratie délibérative et les pratiques de la démocratie délibératives peuvent vérifier, compléter ou améliorer les théories normatives du discours. Outre la démonstration des dimensions plurielles de théories du discours, une autre intention pratique de cette thèse est de plaider pour une approche de la démocratie délibérative, qui serait à la fois chinoise et moderne
The adaptability issues of Western democracy in the context of China have always been an important academic concern. This research was intended to study the adaptability of deliberative democracy in the Chinese context in terms of a normative perspective. At the beginning, this research focused on Habermas‘s Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, because it is one of the most discussed normative deliberative democratic theories in China today. Taking into consideration the normativity and ideality of Habermas‘s theory, Foucault‘s discourse theory of power relations is then introduced to illustrate the tensions between different Western discourse theories. In order to investigate the adaptabilities of these two discourse theories in the Chinese context, and to balance the tension between them, another normative concept, namely the Confucian Rationality, is then drawn upon from traditional Chinese cultural sources. Accordingly, these three dimensions of discourse theory, as well as the relations between them, are presented. The employment of some empirical descriptions of certain Chinese historical-political facts is also necessary to explain, to supplement, or to question this theoretic framework. Two tension perspectives are critical throughout the research: the tension between universality and particularity, and the tension between normative theories and social-political facts.Through the approaches of textual studies, aided by conceptual and empirical studies as complements, the research is conducted as following: Chapter 1 discusses the tension between Habermas‘s normative discourse theory of law and democracy and social facts; Chapter 2 analyzes the tension between Habermas‘s discourse theory and Foucault‘s discourse theory of power relations, and proposes to rethink the tension problems. Chapter 3 tries to search for the resources in traditional Chinese political cultures, and to put forward another normative discourse theory- the discourse theory of Confucian rationality- to balance the tension between the foregoing two normative discourse theories. It is argued that an ideal type of Confucian rationality (a kind of normative value rationality) can be used as a bridge between the two opposite discourse theories. Chapter 4 further explains the normative theory that was proposed in Chapter 3, and tries to reexamine and redefine the concepts of ―Public Sphere‖ and ―Deliberative Politics in the context of traditional China through empirical descriptions on the ―Public Sphere‖ and political/legal discussions in traditional Chinese society. Finally,Chapter 5 focuses on the descriptions of the political and legal discussions in China's new media public sphere today. It is an empirical response to all the normative studies mentioned above, and at the same time an investigation on the tensions between the normative theories and the social experiences. We argue that, because of the different cognitive structures and diverse modes of thinking in specific cultures, there should be different normative paradigms of discourse democracy in corresponding cultural contexts. Normativity and reality are the two sides of the same coin. Normative discourse theories serve as the guidance for the practices of deliberative democracy, which can, in its turn, verify, supplement, improve and challenge the normative discourse theories. Apart from demonstrating of the multiple dimensions of discourse theories, another practical intent of this thesis is to promote an approach leading to discourse democracy that would combine elements of both Chinese and modern, consistent with both the fundamental predilections of Chinese civilization, and the practical needs of a modern China

Ao julgarem casos concretos, os juízes consultam e interpretam diversas fontes do direito com o intuito de determinar quais são os elementos jurídicos de decisão relevantes e como eles se aplicam a um determinado caso, apresentando os argumentos que fundamentam sua convicção e revelando uma respectiva racionalidade jurídica. No presente trabalho, pretendemos enfrentar o seguinte problema: pode o direito ser objetivo no sentido de que exista alguma racionalidade jurídica capaz de fornecer uma única resposta correta a um caso? Frente ao problema mais amplo da existência de respostas objetivamente corretas no direito, a pesquisa lança mão de um recorte autoral para estabelecer seu referencial. O interesse foi o de colaborar com o estudo do pensamento de Ronald Dworkin, o qual sustenta a tese de uma única resposta juridicamente correta. Para tanto, busca-se explorar os argumentos do autor a partir de um levantamento bibliográfico em materiais publicados em meios físicos e digitais. Após apontar alguns dos elementos da teoria positivista do direito de Hart que funcionaram como ponto de crítica inicial da perspectiva dworkiniana, divide-se a tese da resposta correta de Dworkin, que é objeto do trabalho, em duas etapas, tomando o texto Objectivity and truth: you\'d better believe it (1996) como marco de divisão. A primeira dessas etapas nos mostra que a tese da resposta correta no âmbito do direito fundamenta-se na concepção do autor acerca deste ser uma prática essencialmente interpretativa, orientada a identificar os valores que melhor justificam a história institucional e moral de uma comunidade. Logo, a resposta correta do ponto de vista jurídico depende da resposta correta do ponto de vista moral. Na segunda etapa, investiga-se a defesa de Dworkin frente aos diferentes ceticismos externos em relação à objetividade da moral, bem como suas ideias a respeito da independência metafísica do valor e a favor de uma epistemologia moral integrada. Ao final dos capítulos de cada etapa, noções críticas são apresentadas com o intuito de auxiliar na reflexão do pensamento do autor.
When judging concrete cases, judges consult and interpret several sources of law in order to determine what are the relevant legal elements of decision and how they apply to a certain case, presenting the arguments that support their conviction and revealing a respective legal rationality. In the present work, we intend to face the following issue: can the law be objective in the sense that there is a legal rationality capable of providing a single right answer to a particular case? Regarding the wider problem of the existence of objectively right answers in law, the research uses an authorial restriction in order to establish it\'s referential. The interest was to collaborate with the study of Ronald Dworkin\'s thought, which contains the one legal right answer thesis. To do so, we seek to explore the author\'s arguments from a bibliographical survey of published materials in print and digital media. After pointing out some of the elements of Hart\'s positivist theory of law that functioned as an initial point for the criticism of dworkinian\'s perspective, Dworkin\'s right answer thesis, that is its work\'s object, is divided in two phases, taking the text Objectivity and truth: you\'d better believe it (1996) as a division mark. The first of these phases shows us that the right answer thesis in legal scope is based on the author\'s conception about law being an essentially interpretative practice, oriented to identify the values that best justify the institutional and moral community history. Therefore, the right answer from a legal point of view depends on the right answer from the moral point of view. In the second phase, it investigates Dworkin\'s defense of different external skepticisms about moral objectivity, as well as his ideas about the metaphysical independence of the value and in favor of an integrated moral epistemology. At the end of each phase chapters, critical notions are introduced with the purpose of exercising the reflection about the author\'s presented thoughts.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
The research presented here will focus on a theoretical horizon of law. More precisely, about the legacy of the analytic philosophy tradition for legal discourse, as is the possibility of building a rational discourse, from modernity. In its origin, the logical-positivist tradition of science, to the analytical philosophies themselves, printed one rationality constraint for the other regional sciences. For this reason, the legal-scientific discourse, for effective compliance with the methodological rigor objective of this tradition, had to produce a postulate for his science, the fundamental norm. In this sense, the fundamental rule is the condition of possibility for determining the feasibility of the methodological axioms legacy by logical-positivist tradition. This is because it was necessary to "neutralize" the legal discourse any metaphysical intrusion (normative/evaluative) of the interior of the science of law system. This process culminated henceforth in normative theories of law. However, the assumption of a formal rationale for the law, contemporary, faces some theoretical cracks, precisely because the logical-positivist tradition of law, for the fulfillment of its methodological axioms, such as the "principle of non-valuation" and dualism Kantian, should assume the legitimacy from the legal domination processes, namely the legality itself, as implementing a valid legal order. The questioning on this theoretical perspective of the right is the complexity of the environmental crisis nowadays. And not only. The formal justification offered by the legal discourse, until then, did not appear to offer reasonable answer about the possibility of rational justification for the rule of law, as is its strictly normative-prescriptive. The size of the "environmental problem", in contemporary times, exposes a very dense evaluative load on the structure of the legal system. The legal standard is through for indefinite legal concepts. This questioning runs, then the description of the legal and formal structure and the possibility of forming a rational legal discourse on the problems made from modernity. Therefore, you need to review, in theory, the legality of the structure and the presumption of legitimacy of legal discourse in this sense.
A pesquisa ora apresentada irá se debruçar sobre um horizonte teórico do direito. Mais precisamente, sobre o legado da tradição da filosofia analítica para o discurso jurídico, no que trata a possibilidade de construção de um discurso racional, a partir da modernidade. Em sua origem, a tradição lógico-positivista das ciências, até as filosofias analíticas, propriamente ditas, imprimiram um constrangimento de racionalidade para as demais ciências regionais. Por esta razão, o discurso jurídico-científico, para o efetivo cumprimento com o rigor metodológico objetivo desta tradição, precisou produzir um postulado para sua ciência, a norma fundamental. Neste sentido, a norma fundamental é condição de possibilidade determinante para a exequibilidade dos axiomas metodológicos legados pela tradição lógico-positivista. Isto porque era preciso “neutralizar” do discurso jurídico qualquer intrusão metafísica (normativa/valorativa) no interior do sistema da ciência do direito. Este processo culminou, doravante, nas teorias normativas do direito. Contudo, a pressuposição de uma racionalidade formal para o direito, na contemporaneidade, enfrenta algumas fissuras teóricas, justamente porque a tradição lógico-positivista do direito, para o cumprimento de seus axiomas metodológicos, tal como o “princípio da não valoração” e do dualismo kantiano, deveria pressupor a legitimidade a partir dos processos de dominação legal, ou seja, da legalidade propriamente dita, enquanto execução de uma ordem jurídica válida. A problematização sobre esta perspectiva teórica do direito ocorre pela complexidade da crise ambiental na contemporaneidade. E não só. A justificativa formal oferecida pelo discurso jurídico, até então, não pareceu oferecer resposta razoável sobre a possibilidade de justificação racional da norma jurídica, no que trata o seu caráter estritamente normativo-prescritivo. A dimensão do “problema ambiental”, na contemporaneidade, expõe uma carga valorativa muito densa sobre a estrutura do ordenamento jurídico. A norma jurídica está atravessa por conceitos jurídicos indeterminados. Esta problematização percorre, então, a descrição da estrutura jurídico-formal e a possibilidade de formação de um discurso jurídico racional, diante dos problemas constituídos a partir da modernidade. Para tanto, será preciso rever, teoricamente, a estrutura de legalidade e a pressuposição de legitimidade do discurso jurídico, neste sentido.

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Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
The transformations through the linguistic turn and hermeneutics, awareness of the interpretative character of knowledge of cultural objects, as in the case of law, and the role of language in human understanding of the world generates a crisis paradigm on how to understand the law and how to operate it. There are theories supporting the linking of law and legal decisions to a question of political morality and a claim to correctness. These transformations in theory of law lead to direct modifications on Constitutionalism. However, performing this requirement of Fulcrum in initial Constitution, compliance with the pretense of correction of the legal decision? If we differ on what's fair or unfair, how to reconcile it with the requirements of legal certainty and the democratic character of our coexistence? This dissertation proposes a contribution to this debate through the study of three contemporary authors: Ronald Dworkin, Robert Alexy, Jürgen Habermas. Study the problems of rationality and the correction of legal decision in the optical of these three authors, so we defend, at the end, the idea of implementation of the Constitution as argumentative venture-discursive and hermeneutical-constructive, tuned to rational agreements shared between human beings in the world of life
Com as transformações operadas através da guinada linguística e hermenêutica, a conscientização do caráter interpretativo do conhecimento de objetos culturais, como é o caso do direito, e do papel da linguagem na compreensão humana de mundo gera uma crise paradigmática sobre o modo de se compreender o direito e de como se operar com ele. Teorias surgem sustentando a vinculação do direito e das decisões jurídicas a uma problemática de moralidade política e a uma pretensão de correção. Essas transformações na teoria do direito conduzem a modificações diretas no Constitucionalismo. Contudo, como executar esta exigência, de fulcro inicial na concretização da Constituição, de cumprimento da pretensão de correção da decisão jurídica? Se divergimos sobre o que é justo ou injusto, como conciliá-la com exigências de segurança jurídica e ao caráter democrático de nossa convivência? A presente dissertação propõe uma contribuição a este debate através do estudo de três autores contemporâneos: Ronald Dworkin, Robert Alexy, Jürgen Habermas. Estuda-se, assim, a problemática da racionalidade e da correção da decisão jurídica nas óticas desses três autores, para, ao fim, defendermos, a ideia de concretização da Constituição como empreendimento argumentativo-discursivo e hermenêutico-construtivo, atento ao compartilhamento intersubjetivo do acordado racionalmente no mundo da vida

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A presente pesquisa tem como objetivo analisar a necessidade e racionalidade da expansão do Direito Penal em face da tutela de novos bens jurídicos. Tal objetivo foi realizado através de um diálogo entre as ideias de Claus Roxin e Gunther Jakobs á respeito dos fundamentos e finalidades do Direito Penal. Segundo Roxin, o Direito Penal deve ser utilizado como forma de proteção dos bens jurídicos essenciais ao pleno desenvolvimento e existência de um Estado. Por outro lado, Gunther Jakobs defende que o Direito Penal tem como finalidade assegurar a vigência da norma. No primeiro capítulo, é abordada a expansão do Direito Penal, seu significado, motivos, efeitos e exemplos concretos, para tanto sendo tratado um estudo com relação à sociedade do risco, à disseminação do medo ante o risco e ao papel da sociedade como propulsora e vítima dessa expansão legiferante. No segundo capítulo existe uma averiguação sobre a racionalidade legislativa criminal deste movimento expansivo, principalmente na fase pré-legislativa em face da disfunção social geradora da expansão penal irrefletida. Para tanto se fez a apresentação de um conceito de racionalidade, sendo realizada ainda uma abordagem sobre as teorias que legitimam a pena e a demonstração de que o movimento expansivo penal vai de encontro aos princípios fundantes do Direito Penal. Princípios como o da intervenção mínima, o da subsidiariedade, princípios isto a partir da criação dos tipos simbólicos e ineficazes e após uma breve análise dos princípios que regem o Direito Penal. No terceiro capítulo há a apresentação do conceito de bens jurídicos como também dos novos bens jurídicos carentes de tutela penal. Ainda que também, uma discussão real á respeito da finalidade do Direito Penal em face da tutela de bens jurídicos, realizando um diálogo entre as teorias funcionalistas de Roxin e Jakobs, ao apresentar o ponto racional de cada uma. O método utilizado é o fenomenológico hermenêutico, e isto através de uma revisão bibliográfica, ao final sendo demonstrado que a função do Direito Penal vai além da proteção dos bens jurídicos ou da vigência da norma, na verdade o Direito Penal sendo considerado como um limite ao arbítrio e como delimitador de um Estado social democrático de Direito.
This research aims to examine the necessity and rationality of the expansion of criminal law in the face of new legal protection of property. This objective will be accomplished by means of a dialogue between the ideas of Claus Roxin and Gunther Jakobs about the fundamentals and purposes of criminal law. According to Roxin, criminal law should be used as a protection of essential interests legal to the full development and existence of a state. On the other hand, Gunther Jakobs argues that the criminal law is intended to ensure the validity of the standard. In the first chapter discussed the expansion of criminal law, its meaning, motives, purposes and concrete examples, for both will be treated based on the society's risk and the spread of fear towards risk and the role of society as a driver and victim of this expansion legislating. In the second chapter will be check the legislative rationality criminal of such expansive movement, especially in the pre-legislative's phase opposite generating social dysfunction thoughtless criminal expansion. A concept of rationality, that will be presented still being made an approach to theories that legitimize the penalty in order to be shown that the criminal expansive movement goes against the founding principles of criminal law, as the minimum intervention, subsidiarity, creating symbolic's and ineffective tupes, after a brief analysis of the principles governing the criminal law. In the third chapter will be presents the concept of good legal, the new poor legal interests of penal law. As also discussed the real purpose of criminal law in the face of the protection of legal interests, performing a dialogue between the functionalist theories by Roxin and Jakobs, presented on the rational point of each. The method used is the phenomenological's hermeneutic through at literature search, the end being shown that the function of criminal law goes beyond protecting legal interests or the validity of the standard, it is actually a limit to the discretion and delimiter of a welfare state democratic rights.

A fundamentação e a correção de decisões jurídicas na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral exigem o cumprimento das regras e formas do discurso jurídico fundado em bases pragmático-universais. As viradas lingüística e pragmática, por obra de Frege, Wittgenstein e Peirce, fundaram os alicerces de uma teoria dos atos de fala, de Austin e Searle, de uma teoria da argumentação, de Toulmin, e de uma teoria comunicativa e discursiva da verdade e correção, em Habermas. A ética procedimentalista e cognitivista habermasiana reconstrói o princípio da universabilidade em trajes discursivos. Alexy enuncia um conceito não-positivista e inclusivo da moral fundamentado na pretensão de correção jurídica e argúi a tese do discurso jurídico como caso especial do discurso prático geral. Uma decisão jurídica correta deve ser justificada com base nas regras e formas da justificação interna e externa do discurso. A fundamentação das decisões por meio de argumentos de princípios coloca a exigência da aplicação do preceito da proporcionalidade. As dogmáticas e jurisprudências alemã e brasileira, na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral, utilizam inicialmente uma fórmula da proibição da arbitrariedade ou correlação lógica, da qual resulta uma vinculação fraca do legislador, e passam a adotar uma fórmula baseada na proporcionalidade, com uma vinculação severa do legislador, especialmente quando há tratamento desigual de indivíduos com características especiais elencadas na Constituição. A racionalidade de uma decisão que se utiliza da estrutura da proporcionalidade depende da justificação externa de cada uma das premissas usadas na justificação interna. Há uma relação necessária entre discurso jurídico, proporcionalidade e dogmáticas dos direitos fundamentais.
The justification and correction of legal decisions in the application of general equality principle demands the fullfilment of rules and forms of legal discourse founded on a universal-pragmatic basis. The linguistic and pragmatic turn, by Frege, Wittgenstein, and Peirce, established the foundations of a theory of speech acts, by Austin and Searle, of a theory of reasoning, by Toulmin, and a communicative and discoursive theory on truth and correctness in Habermas. The habermasian proceduralism and cognitivism ethics reconstructs the principle of universability in discoursive ways. Alexy states a non-positivistic and moral inclusive concept of law grounded in the claim to legal correction and argues that the legal discourse must be understood as a special case of general practical discourse. A correct legal decision must be justified on the rules and forms of internal and external justification of discourse. The justification for the decisions by means of arguments of principle sets the demand of applying the partial requirements of proportionality. German and Brazilian legal theory and jurisprudence, in applying the right to general equality, apply initially a formula of prohibition of arbitrary and correlational logic, where there is a weak attachment of the legislature, and start adopting a formula based on proportionality, where there is severe attachment of the legislature, especially in the case of discrimination against individuals with special features listed in the Constitution. The rationality of a decision which uses the structure of proportionality depends on the external justification of each of the premises used in the internal justification. There is a necessary link between proportionality, legal discourse and fundamental rights legal theory.

Este trabalho trata do papel desempenhado pelo dever de motivação das decisões judiciais na realização do Estado de Direito e, consequentemente, dos princípios da segurança jurídica e do devido processo legal. Partindo de uma concepção fina do Estado de Direito, busca-se demonstrar, inclusive mediante dados históricos, que a motivação das decisões judiciais é fundamental ao controle da atividade jurisdicional, reduzindo o arbítrio e o subjetivismo a que todo exercício de poder está sujeito. Para que a motivação possa desempenhar tal função, deve ser dotada de algumas características essenciais, que incluem: racionalidade, estrutura lógico-argumentativa e natureza declaratória e retrospectiva; cada uma delas estudada especificamente. Em relação à promoção da segurança jurídica, explica-se que apenas decisões motivadas são aptas a gerar precedentes judiciais, cuja observância é fundamental para se proporcionar estabilidade e previsibilidade ao ordenamento jurídico. Além disso, defende-se que as razões dadas pelos órgãos judiciais para a tomada de decisões geram expectativas legítimas no jurisdicionado que devem ser tuteladas.
This essay faces the role performed by obligatory reasoned judgments in the Rule of Law and its consequences to legal certainty and due process of law. Accepting a thin theory of the Rule of Law, the author intends to show, through the appointment of historical facts, that giving reasons for judgments is essential to control the jurisdictional activity and restrict the arbitrary power. Giving reasons, however, shall only attend its expected role if some exigencies are fulfilled, including: rationality, logical-argumentative structure and declaratory and retrospective nature of the reasons given. The author also explains that judgments may not be precedents if they are not reasoned; and following precedents is essential to assure legal certainty. Besides that, it is sustained that reasoned judgments generate legitimate expectations to the citizens that should be protected.

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This work presents an analysis of the interpretation of legal discourse that highlights features of pragmatics, with emphasis on a topical-rhetorical approach of the normative text. The proposed discussion takes into account theoretical features of the pragmatics field, analyzing its presence as one of man´s concerns for a long time. It reveals its characterization and then proceeds with the indication of the essential elements of rhetoric, with Chaïm Perelman, and topic with Theodor Viehweg. The study undertaken in two author´s work stays limited to the exposure of rupture the mathematical logic and the proposition of forming a rationality adequate to law. It also deals with notions related to the communicative situation and the need of proof presentation, as well as the foundation of the philosophy of law as a research basis pointing to a theory of argumentation. Its take the doctrine of discourse to explain its elements and pragmatic functions, transposing it to the legal discourse. There is an Endeavour to report the minimum elements for a definition of legal interpretation, while the main characteristics are emphasized. It goes on dealing with the initial analysis of the presence of legislative intent in the interpretation process, proceeding with the investigation of the relationship of the power of symbolic violence. It establishes the analysis of the rational legislator's construct to give basis to a juridical rationality fit to value the pragmatics aspect of language; it reopens the debate of what one searches in the act of interpreting, between the will of the legislator and of the law. It becomes present the possibility of dealing with such a question pragmactically, without adhering to one or other position, that could be called ideological. In order to make explicit the construction of law pragmatic interpretation, the interpreter proceeds carefully in the analysis of the clarity and doubts of juridical interpretation. Finally, this work presents the technical rules used in law in the search of decidability, explaining the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic nature. The object aimed is the analysis of juridical discourse and language through the explicit option of topic-retoric, in the purpose of giving basis and appealing to the interpretation that takes into account the pragmatic aspect of the language. The chosen method is monographic-descriptive, through the exam of literature and documents. The final part of this work tries to demonstrate the viability and relevance of the inclusion of the pragmatic element as essential to the interpretation of legal texts
Apresenta a análise de uma interpretação do discurso jurídico pondo em relevo os aspectos da pragmática, com destaque para uma abordagem tópica-retórica do texto normativo. A discussão empreendida toma em conta aspectos teóricos do âmbito da pragmática, analisando sua presença como preocupação do homem desde há muito tempo. Para isto apresenta sua caracterização, partindo em seguida para a indicação dos elementos essenciais da retórica, com Chaïm Perelman e da tópica, com Theodor Viehweg. O estudo empreendido no trabalho de ambos é limitado à exposição do rompimento da lógica matemática e proposta de formação de racionalidade adequado ao direito, para o primeiro, e a apresentação de noções situação comunicativa e dever de prova, além da fundamentação da filosofia do direito como investigação de base a apontar uma teoria da argumentação, no segundo. Toma-se a doutrina do discurso para explicitar seus elementos e funções pragmáticas, transpondo-o para o discurso jurídico. Informa os elementos mínimos para uma definição de interpretação jurídica e ressalta-se as suas características principais. Avança na análise inicial da presença da intenção legislativa no processo de interpretação, para em seguida proceder à investigação sobre sua relação com o poder de violência simbólica. Estabelece a análise do constructo do legislador racional para fundamentar uma racionalidade jurídica adequada à valoração do aspecto pragmático da linguagem e reabre a discussão sobre o que se busca quando se interpreta, entre a vontade do legislador e da lei, apresentando a possibilidade de lidar com tal questão pragmaticamente, sem aderir a uma ou outra posição chamada de ideológica. Para explicitar a construção da interpretação pragmática do direito procede-se à análise da clareza e dúvida na interpretação jurídica. Por fim, apresenta as regras técnicas utilizadas no direito para a busca da decidibilidade, explicitando os problemas de ordem sintática, semântica e pragmática. O objetivo é a análise do discurso e linguagem jurídicos através da opção explícita da tópica-retórica, visando a fundamentar e apelar pela interpretação que leve em conta o aspecto pragmático da língua. O método utilizado é o monográfico-descritivo, com análise bibliográfica e documental. Ao final demonstra-se a viabilidade e pertinência da inclusão da pragmática como elemento essencial à interpretação do texto normativo

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This doctoral dissertation aims at checking if the Brazilian Supreme Court uses recurrent paradigms, determined from a specific and defined nucleolus of intelligibility, when judging parts involved in quantifying the tax base of the income tax for legal person. The Constitution through the concept of income, establishes limits to the taxing power which must be observed in order not to risk constitutional violation. To formulate such limits, it is paramount the formulation of a verifying procedure of what income means, to confront it with the standards determined by law. Through the jurisprudence research, structuring and reasoning of judicial theses, we want to investigate if the Supreme Federal Court establishes such limits. This reasoning must be present in decision making paradigms justified by rational criteria and accepted by the judicial community. We refute the structure of rationality which justifies the theory of the national tributary law by pointing out its flaws. We use the Hermeneutic Phenomenology which is the most adequate theory to the application of the institutional regulations and it also allows for the inference of the universal tributary concepts into single concepts. It defines the limits of each individual taxation. From the results of this research the following is justified: when the Supreme Court rejects as several judged antecedents and permits that the income be determined by the legislator, it is not taking into account the formation of a judging paradigm for the evaluation of income. As it states that the legislator has autonomy to determine what tribute income is for the legal person, the Federal Supreme Court renounces the constitutional duty to establish an applicable paradigm to the income evaluation procedure which institutes the limits to the power of tribute. Such renunciation empowers the legislator to institute whatever pleases him or her, removing from the context of the income tax any remains of the existence of the Rule of Law
A presente tese tem como objetivo verificar se a Suprema Corte brasileira adota paradigmas recorrentes determinados, firmados a partir de um núcleo de inteligibilidade específico e definido, quando julga processos de apuração e quantificação da base impositiva do imposto de renda pessoa jurídica. Para formular, em teses paradigmáticas, limites ao poder de tributar, impõe-se a pré-formulação de um procedimento verificatório do que é renda pelo STF, para confrontá-lo com os standards determinados pela lei. Busca-se verificar, pela pesquisa de jurisprudência e pela estruturação e fundamentação das teses jurídicas, se o STF estabelece tais limites e se repousam em paradigmas de decisões, justificados a partir de critérios racionais e aceitos pela comunidade jurídica. Refuta-se a estrutura de racionalidade, que justifica a teoria do direito tributário nacional, apontando suas deficiências e se adota a fenomenologia hermenêutica, que permite a inferência dos conceitos universais tributários em conceitos singulares; possibilitando concretizar os limites constitucionais em cada tributação individual. Pelo resultado da pesquisa justifica-se: o STF ao permitir que a renda seja livremente fixada pelo legislador, não apresenta um paradigma de julgamento em relação a um procedimento de verificação da renda. Portanto, ao afirmar que o legislador tem autonomia para estabelecer o que é renda tributável da pessoa jurídica, a Suprema Corte renunciou tacitamente ao seu dever constitucional, não estabelecendo um paradigma aplicável ao procedimento de apuração da base de cálculo do Imposto de Renda, que institua limites ao poder de tributar. Tal renúncia outorga ao legislador estabelecer o que quiser, removendo do contexto do imposto sobre a renda a existência do Estado de Direito

O objetivo central desta investigação é demonstrar que a ponderação é racional. A proposição normativa particular concreta resultante de um caso de colisão de direitos fundamentais resolvido pela ponderação pode ser justificada racionalmente. O que se pretende sustentar é que o problema não está na ponderação, mas como ela é realizada para solucionar os casos de colisão de direitos fundamentais. A ponderação somente pode pretender racionalidade quando sustentada por razões dadas conforme regras. A proposição decisiva desta investigação é a de que a ponderação, como atividade argumentativa, deve observar as regras da argumentação racional. Essas regras são as regras da argumentação prática geral e da argumentação jurídica, formuladas pela teoria do discurso prático geral e do discurso jurídico. Elas configuram a base das regras próprias da ponderação racional.
The goal of this research is to show that balancing is rational. The particular concrete normative statement resulting from a collision of constitutional rights resolved by balancing can be justified rationally. The aim is to sustain that the problem is not balancing itself, but how it is used to solve the cases of collision of constitutional rights.The balancing can be rational only if supported by reasons given under rules. A crucial proposition of this research is that the balancing, as argumentative activity, must observe the rules of rational legal reasoning. These rules are the rules of the general practice argumentation and the rules of the legal reasoning, raised by the theory of general practical discourse and legal discourse. They make the basis of its own rules of rational balancing.

Cette thèse se veut à la fois critique et pragmatique. Critique de l’histoire récente du Mali lue à l’aune des outils procurés par l’analyse juridique, la sociologie et l’anthropologie du droit. Cette intention critique a conduit à interroger l’histoire du Mali des origines dans une perspective génétique qui a été détaillée dans les prolégomènes. Pragmatique, la thèse formule des propositions rattachées à la situation concrète du Mali, allant dans le sens d’un décloisonnement des consciences et de la restauration des normes constitutives de la République malienne. C’est à la satisfaction de ces deux impératifs que les analyses du langage ont été utiles. Elles ont également permis d’identifier certaines insuffisances de la dogmatique juridique généralement soucieuse de plaquer des concepts préfabriqués sur les réalités africaines, que de saisir au plus près ces réalités avec leurs nuances. Il est donc apparu opportun pour y parvenir de procéder à l’analyse des stratégies des acteurs ordinaires de la société politique malienne. La prise en considération des concepts manipulés par ces derniers explique le recours aux langues autochtones. La première partie de la thèse est consacrée à l’analyse du développement chaotique du Mali après l’abandon du projet des pères de l’indépendance sous la double pression des contraintes économiques et des déterminants culturels. La seconde partie en tire les conséquences du point de vue de la théorie constitutionnelle. C’est la raison pour laquelle la thèse s’achève sur la proposition d’une réforme du système de l’unité africaine inspirée, à l’image de tout ce qui précède, d’un dicton de la langue bambara : « Dormir sur la natte des autres, c’est comme si l’on dormait par terre »
This thesis is both critical and pragmatic. A criticism of Mali’s recent history read in the light of the tools provided by the legal analysis, sociology and anthropology of law. This critical intent led to examine the history of Mali’s origins in a genetic perspective that has been detailed in the prolegomena. Pragmatic, the thesis puts forward proposals related to the concrete situation of Mali, along the lines of a deregulation of consciences and the re-introduction of constitutive standards into the Malian Republic. The language analysis proved valuable in meeting these two requirements. They also enabled to identify some shortcomings in legal dogma generally more anxious to graft prefabricated concepts onto African realities, rather than capture these realities with their nuances as close as possible. It therefore seemed appropriate to analyze the strategies of ordinary actors of the Malian political society. The consideration of the concepts handled by these latter accounts for the use of indigenous languages. The first part of the thesis is devoted to the analysis of Mali’s chaotic development in the aftermath of the relinquishment of the fathers’ project of independence under the double pressure of economic constraints and cultural determinants. The second part draws the relevant consequences from the point of view of constitutional theory. Thus, the thesis concludes with the proposal for reform of the system of African Unity based, upon as all the above, Bambara language’s saying : “Sleeping on the mat of others is like sleeping on the floor

A tese busca identificar os elementos jurídicos e extrajurídicos que interferem sobre o comportamento judicial do Supremo Tribunal Federal. A análise é desenvolvida com base nos seguintes modelos decisórios: o modelo legalista, o modelo ideológico, o modelo institucional e o modelo estratégico de comportamento judicial. Ao longo do trabalho, examina-se a influência do direito, da ideologia, das normas que regem o Judiciário, das regras que regem as decisões colegiadas, do Poder Executivo, do Poder Legislativo, da opinião pública e da imprensa no processo decisório do Supremo Tribunal Federal.
This work aims at identifying legal and non-legal factors that interfere with Brazilian Supreme Court decisions. The analysis is developed with basis on the legal model, on the attitudinal model, on the institutional model and on the strategic model of judicial decision-making. It examines the influence of constitutional law, ideology, collegial process, Executive Power, Legislative Power, public opinion and of the media on Brazilian Supreme Court attitudes.

碩士
輔仁大學
法律學系
108
The purpose of this thesis is attempted to change the current legitimacy judgement and measures of compensate and indemnify which constructed by pan-rational legal though in current force eviction cases by make emotional thought interevent mainstream pan-rational legal thought. This thesis will distinguish and describe the role of emotion and desire. Further, I will figure out that emotion is not just physiological reaction without thinking, but as an empirical judgement form someone’s life experience. There for, emotion as apart of humanity a kind of “affect heuristic” is not totally unreliable, and it is just likes rationality which mainstream suggest is a “deliberation”, both are not perfect. Both should be restricting each other. This thesis will also figure out how emotional orientation of “humanity” of law, law making, legal applicators are blocked in force eviction cases, then cause emotional distress, no matter intentional or not. Indeed, some emotional distress are not serious, but in force eviction cases emotional distress usually cause place attachment deprivation and double alienation, and either may further cause psychological trauma which might eventually cause PTSD. As we know, PTSD is really difficult to recovery. If we would like to avoid it, in this study I suggest that we should put emotional thought in the process of lawmaking and application of law, to reinterpret property right and housing right. Once the possibility of infringement occurs, we should take emotional distress seriously, then to expect the protection of property right and housing right could be more complete by tranced current mainstream rational legal thought.

Dissertação de Mestrado em Direito apresentada à Faculdade de Direito
The object of this study is the unburdening task of the doctrine regarding the jurisprudence, with specific attention to a dimension which conceives the law as argumentation. As specific objectives, we set ourselves to: locate the sources of law, identifying rationality to it presupposed; identify what kind of authority the legal doctrine assumes, and its functions, and then discuss how it operates the unburdening function. Therefore, we went through a literature search in books, scientific journals and Brazilian judicial decisions. The methodology led us to a general approach to issues directly related to the general problem, especially methodological law schools of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the legal rationality in science of law as theoretical, practical and functional, assuming three stages: logical, hermeneutic and empirical, and also a feature of conciliation. With this data, we discussed functions of the doctrine in order to locate the task of allowing the judge not to an exhaustive problematization of all the issues put before him to solve. Focusing on the unburdening task with retaining the theses of ALEXY and the clarifications that form AARNIO and PECZENIK, we justify this study when consider the importance that legal doctrine has as a layer of the juridical system, taken as a practical-argumentatively oriented, and at the same time a system in which the decisor needs, in one hand, to respect time, in an anxious society as the one we are in; and on the other hand, demands respect to the democratic principle who requires that every judicial decision to be rationally grounded when implementing the law.
O objeto desse estudo é a tarefa desoneradora da doutrina em face da jurisprudência, com especial atenção à dimensão que concebe o direito como argumentação. Como objetivos específicos, propõe: localizar a origem da doutrina jurídica; identificar a racionalidade que lhe é pressuposta; identificar que tipo de autoridade a doutrina assume, e as suas funções, para então discorrer sobre como opera a função desoneradora. Para tanto, efetuou-se a pesquisa bibliográfica em livros, manuais, artigos de revista e decisões judiciais brasileiras. A metodologia empregada nos conduziu a uma abordagem geral dos temas diretamente relacionados à problemática geral, em especial, as escolas metodológicas de direito dos séculos XIX e XX, e a racionalidade jurídica implicada na ciência do direito como teórica, prática e funcional, admitindo três momentos: lógico, hermenêutico e empírico, e também uma característica conciliadora. De posse desses dados, ingressamos nas funções da doutrina para localizar a tarefa de afastar do decidente o encargo de problematizar exaustivamente todos os casos jurídicos que soluciona. Centrando-nos na função desoneradora, com arrimo nas teses de ALEXY e nas explicitações que dela fazem AARNIO e PECZENIK, justificamos o tema pelo relevo que tem a doutrina enquanto estrato de um sistema jurídico que se propõe prático-normativamente orientado e que ao mesmo tempo precisa respeitar as constrições de tempo que uma sociedade frenética como a nossa impõe e, de outro lado, o princípio democrático a exigir a fundamentação das decisões jurídicas quando da realização do direito.

碩士
東吳大學
法律學系
95
Taiwan had already implemented the National Health Insurance (NHI) for more than ten years since 1995. The beneficiary of this insurance contains more than 90% of the people and resident of our country. The insurance coverage includes the diagnostic and therapeutic events of most diseases belonging to Western medicine, Chinese medicine, and dental medicine, respectively. In case the beneficiaries encounter illness, injury, or maternity, the contracted medical care institutions shall provide ambulatory or hospital care pursuant to the Medical Benefit Regulations of this insurance. Comprehensive coverage and relative cheap insurance premium make NHI process high satisfaction rate of Taiwanese people and become the model delivering its experience for the countries all over the world. Ironically, it is a nightmare for the contracted medical care institutions that the amount of medical care payment decreases year by year contrasting to the amount of medical care service increases during the same period. The operation conditions of the medical organization drop from ' the reasonable remuneration ' to ' breakeven ' , and then worsen to ' financial deficit '. This result will affect medical quality naturally. The major sufferers are the working right of health care personnel as well as the health right and life right of the assured person who encroach on. To solve the worsening financial condition of NHI, Department of Health, Executive Yuan (Taiwan) and bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI) put out different improvement schemes in different periods, but the result of controlling the cost does not prove effective apparently. Implementing ' global budget ' controls the growth of the hospitalization cost effectively in form finally, but the cost is shifted to contracted medical care institutions in fact. Usually, the contracted medical care institutions quietly bear the scheme BNHI put out ' willfully ' and 'unilaterally' to get a contract with BNHI only. Various kinds of unreasonable payment scheme have induced the results those the contracted medical care institutions could not endure anymore. If this kind of situation continues ceaselessly, the whole systems of NHI will situate on the brink of disintegrates. Competent authority and central government should not gaze at without seeing the fact. It will be the whole people's good fortune, if decision makers can face the fact literally and seek the solution which conforms to the principles of fair and justice. Our government regard people’s health as the state’s responsibility strategically. No matter what government policy discourses, legislative original meaning expounds, lord chancellor explains, experts and scholars state, all esteem the event of national health insurance as ' the public law event '. Therefore, the legislature constitutes the special law, ' National Health Insurance Act ', as a main enactment. All events of national health insurance should be suitable to be applied the legal principle of the public laws, among which the main applicable law is ' National Health Insurance Act '. In National Health Insurance Act, the purpose of implementing, business attribute, compulsion of the rights and obligations, insurance premium pay range, disbursement, punishment nature when violating this law, and remedy, etc, are stipulated in accordance with the legal principle of the public law. But only the financial item, namely ' the medical budget source ' is made in accordance with the legal principle of the private law. Our legislature established such a lawmaking model, which would confer the authority of the state power with immunity from the corresponding obligation. ' Incomplete public law ' legislation model is the main reason that results in financial bankrupt of Taiwan NHI. BNHI utilizes the insurance premium collected from the assured to pay the expense of NHI project which include insurance coverage medical expenses and the expenses of non-NHI events. When the revenue and expenditure of NHI finance are unbalanced and unable to make ends meet, the BNHI can exercise the state power to force the contracted medical care institutions to accept various kinds of so-called special ' schemes of controlling medical cost '. Because both sides are in the relation of the public law agreement, contracted medical care institution is unable to consult in a BNHI with reciprocity negotiation status to seek a payment scheme of medical cost with equality and mutual benefit for the credit side case. In order to solve the financial deterioration of NHI efficiently and authentically, the authority should divide medical care events into two categories by their nature as ' events having public law trait ' and ' events having private law trait ' according to the national financial resources, social welfare and people morals, etc. Furthermore the different traits of medical care events should be covered by the public law and the private law separately. In the meantime, legislature should constitute the law on the basic principle of ' fair, justice, truth ' and make it suitable for use reasonably. The medical care cost of NHI ought to be born fully by the state in accordance with the legal principle of the public law. Our state finance can not take this burden now. If the medical care cost is disbursed by insurance premium that the assured pay in accordance with the legal principle of the private law, the legal relations among BNHI, the assured and contracted medical care institutes shall be regulated by the private contract and be suitable for sue the relevant civil regulations, the regulation of the agreement and insurance regulation. Then, the authority could maintain the normal operation of the NHI system with the sound financial structure. As a result, the working rights of medical care personnel as well as the health rights and life rights of people could obtain essence guarantee. ' National Health Insurance Act ' is a public law stipulated under the state policy that people’s health is the responsibility of country. So, legal relation between BNHI and the contracted medical care institution is the ' public contract '. Because NHI events mostly process private law trait, legal relation between BNHI and the contracted medical care institution should be converted to the ' private contract '. Finally, financial deterioration of NHI could be avoid.