Journal articles on the topic 'Labelled deductive system'

This paper informally outlines a Labelled Deductive System for on-line language processing. Interpretation of a string is modelled as a composite lexically driven process of type deduction over labelled premises forming locally discrete databases, with rules of database inference then dictating their mode of combination. The particular LDS methodology is illustrated by a unified account of the interaction of wh-dependency and anaphora resolution, the so-called ‘cross-over’ phenomenon, currently acknowledged to resist a unified explanation. The shift of perspective this analysis requires is that interpretation is defined as a proof structure for labelled deduction, and assignment of such structure to a string is a dynamic left-right process in which linearity considerations are ineliminable.

AbstractLogical inferentialism claims that the meaning of the logical constants should be given, not model-theoretically, but by the rules of inference of a suitable calculus. It has been claimed that certain proof-theoretical systems, most particularly, labelled deductive systems for modal logic, are unsuitable, on the grounds that they are semantically polluted and suffer from an untoward intrusion of semantics into syntax. The charge is shown to be mistaken. It is argued on inferentialist grounds that labelled deductive systems are as syntactically pure as any formal system in which the rules define the meanings of the logical constants.

Abstract Labelled proof theory has been famously successful for modal logics by mimicking their relational semantics within deductive systems. Simpson in particular designed a framework to study a variety of intuitionistic modal logics integrating a binary relation symbol in the syntax. In this paper, we present a labelled sequent system for intuitionistic modal logics such that there is not only one but two relation symbols appearing in sequents: one for the accessibility relation associated with the Kripke semantics for normal modal logics and one for the pre-order relation associated with the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic. This puts our system in close correspondence with the standard birelational Kripke semantics for intuitionistic modal logics. As a consequence, it can be extended with arbitrary intuitionistic Scott–Lemmon axioms. We show soundness and completeness, together with an internal cut elimination proof, encompassing a wider array of intuitionistic modal logics than any existing labelled system.

AbstractA deductive system for Lewis counterfactuals is presented, based directly on the influential generalisation of relational semantics through ternary similarity relations introduced by Lewis. This deductive system builds on a method of enriching the syntax of sequent calculus by labels for possible worlds. The resulting labelled sequent calculus is shown to be equivalent to the axiomatic system VC of Lewis. It is further shown to have the structural properties that are needed for an analytic proof system that supports root-first proof search. Completeness of the calculus is proved in a direct way, such that for any given sequent either a formal derivation or a countermodel is provided; it is also shown how finite countermodels for unprovable sequents can be extracted from failed proof search, by which the completeness proof turns into a proof of decidability.

Algebraic transition systems are extended from labeled transition systems by allowing transitions labeled by algebraic equations for modeling more complex systems in detail. We present a deductive approach for specifying and verifying algebraic transition systems. We modify the standard dynamic logic by introducing algebraic equations into modalities. Algebraic transition systems are embedded in modalities of logic formulas which specify properties of algebraic transition systems. The semantics of modalities and formulas is defined with solutions of algebraic equations. A proof system for this logic is constructed to verify properties of algebraic transition systems. The proof system combines with inference rules decision procedures on the theory of polynomial ideals to reduce a proof-search problem to an algebraic computation problem. The proof system proves to be sound but inherently incomplete. Finally, a typical example illustrates that reasoning about algebraic transition systems with our approach is feasible.

Public announcement logic is a logic that studies epistemic updates. In this paper, we propose a sound and complete labelled natural deduction system for public announcement logic with the common knowledge operator (PAC). The completeness of the proposed system is proved indirectly through a Hilbert calculus for PAC known to be complete and sound. We conclude with several discussions regarding the system including some problems of the system in attaining normalisation and subformula property.

Abstract This paper proposes natural deduction systems for the representation of inferences in which several agents participate in deriving conclusions about what they believe or know, where belief and knowledge are understood in an intuitionistic sense. Multi-agent derivations in these systems may involve relatively complex belief (resp. knowledge) constructions which may include forms of nested, reciprocal, shared, distributed or universal belief/knowledge as well as attitudes de dicto/re/se. The systems consist of two main components: multi-agent belief bases which assign to each agent a subatomic system that represents the agent’s beliefs concerning atomic sentences and a set of multi-agent labelled rules for logically compound formulae. Derivations in these systems normalize. Moreover, normal derivations possess the subexpression property (a refinement of the subformula property) which makes them fully analytic. Relying on the normalization result, a proof-theoretic approach to the semantics of the intensional operators for intuitionistic belief/knowledge is presented which explains their meaning entirely by appeal to the structure of derivations. Importantly, this proof-theoretic semantics is autarkic with respect to its foundations as the systems (unlike, e.g. external/labelled proof systems which internalize possible worlds truth conditions) are not defined on the basis of a possible worlds semantics. Detailed applications to a logical puzzle (McCarthy’s three wise men puzzle) and to a semantical difficulty (Geach’s problem of intentional identity), respectively, illustrate the systems. The paper also provides comparisons with other approaches to intuitionistic belief/knowledge and multi-agent natural deduction.

Abstract This article concerns the treatment of propositional quantification in a framework of labelled natural deduction for modal logic developed by Basin, Matthews and Viganò. We provide a detailed analysis of a basic calculus that can be used for a proof-theoretic rendering of minimal normal multimodal systems with quantification over stable domains of propositions. Furthermore, we consider variations of the basic calculus obtained via relational theories and domain theories allowing for quantification over possibly unstable domains of propositions. The main result of the article is that fragments of the labelled calculi not exploiting reductio ad absurdum enjoy the Church–Rosser property and the strong normalization property; such result is obtained by combining Girard’s method of reducibility candidates and labelled languages of lambda calculus codifying the structure of modal proofs.

ABSTRACT Music-theoretical writings from the 13th to the 15th centuries maintained a basic distinction between two types of major sixth, customarily labeled hexachordum and deductio (or proprietas). The term hexachordum, more frequently called tonus (or semitonus) cum diapente, designated the interval of a major of minor sixth, frequently expressed by pitch letters only (such as G-e and A-F) and discussed independently of Guidonian solmization. On the other hand, proprietas and deductio indicated a ““virtual segment”” (the set of six syllables ut-la) that could be employed for the purpose of sight singing. Neither set challenged the conceptual primacy of the seven claves, expressed by the letters A-G. Hexachordum was routinely described as a portion of the octave, and the late-medieval notion of proprietas still reflected the principle of octave duplication, which had regulated musical practice since pre-Guidonian times. The ““two-tier”” model of diatonic space encountered in medieval music theory, based on the superimposition of Guido's six syllables onto the seven pitch letters, came to an end in the late 15th century, when authors such as Ramos de Pareja and Franchino Gafori began describing the Guidonian deductio——which they called hexachordum——as the primary mode of organization of the gamut that had superseded the Greek tetrachordum.

В статье рассмотрена классификация образов и характеризующих их признаков, опираясь на которую построено два вида структурированного описания различных объектов и живых существ (субъектов), которые могут находиться в проблемной среде и использоваться автономной интеллектуальной мобильной системой в соответствии с ее функциональным назначением. Первый вид предложенного структурированного описания типовых элементов представления знаний автономных интеллектуальных мобильных систем определяется деревом, позволяющим организовать индуктивный вывод в процессе идентификации отдельных объектов и субъектов проблемной среды и на этой основе установить класс, род, вид и индивидуум, к которым они относятся. Второй вид структурированного эталонного описания индивидуумов представляет собой помеченный гиперграф, сложные вершины которого определяются структурными элементами объектов и субъектов проблемной среды, а также характерными для них признаками и количественными оценками, позволяющими интеллектуальной системе организовать на их основе выбор результативных действий в процессе планирования целенаправленной деятельности в априори неописанных условиях функционирования. Сочетание обеих типовых структур модели представления знаний обеспечивает автономным интеллектуальным мобильным системам возможность организации дедуктивного вывода и позволяет на этой основе обобщить и пополнить знания об отдельных объектах и субъектах, находящихся в проблемной среде. Это в свою очередь дает возможность расширить класс решаемых интеллектуальными системами задач в процессе планирования целенаправленной деятельности в априори неописанных проблемных средах. Предложен принцип построения импликативных решающих правил, позволяющих автономным интеллектуальным мобильным системам организовать принятие приближенных решений и на этой основе осуществить вывод правдоподобных умозаключений, связанных с идентификацией различных объектов и субъектов, наблюдаемых в априори неописанных условиях проблемной среды. Определена основная проблема дальнейшего развития предложенного способа структурированного описания объектов и субъектов проблемной среды в модели представления знаний автономных интеллектуальных мобильных систем, которая связана с необходимостью разработки эффективных инструментальных средств автоматического построения гиперграфов, характеризующих структуру и признаки индивидуумов, находящихся в текущих условиях функционирования. The article considers the classification problem of patterns and features that characterize them, based on which two types of structured descriptions of various objects and living beings (subjects) of a problematic environment are built, which can be used by an autonomous intelligent mobile system in accordance with its functional purpose. The first type of the proposed structured description of the typical elements of knowledge representation of autonomous intelligent mobile systems is determined by a tree that allows organizing inductive inference in the process of identifying individual objects and subjects of the problematic environment and, on this basis, establishing the class, genus, species, and individuals to which they belong. The second type of a structured reference description of individuals is a labeled hypergraph, the complex vertices of which are determined by the structural elements of objects and subjects of the problematic environment, as well as their characteristic features and quantitative estimates, which allow the intelligent system to organize on their basis the choice of effective actions in the process of planning a goal-seeking activity in a priori undescribed operating conditions. The combination of both typical structures of the knowledge representation model provides autonomous intelligent mobile systems with the ability to organize deductive inference and, on its basis, generalize and replenish their knowledge about individual objects and subjects in a problematic environment. This, in turn, makes it possible to expand the class of tasks solved by intelligent systems in the process of planning goal-directed activities in a priori undescribed problematic environments. The principle of constructing implicative decision rules is proposed, which allow autonomous intelligent mobile systems to organize the adoption of approximate decisions and, on this basis, to draw plausible conclusions related to the identification of various objects and subjects observed in a priori undescribed conditions of the problematic environment. The main problem of further development of the proposed method for the structured description of objects and subjects of the problematic environment in the knowledge representation model of autonomous intelligent mobile systems is determined, which is associated with the need to develop effective tools for automatically constructing hypergraphs characterizing the structure and features of individuals in the current operating conditions.

This paper is about non-labelled proof-systems for hybrid logic, that is, proof-systems where arbitrary formulas can occur, not just satisfaction statements. We give an overview of such proof-systems, focusing on analytic systems: Natural deduction systems, Gentzen sequent systems and tableau systems. We point out major results and we discuss a couple of striking facts, in particular that non-labelled hybrid-logical natural deduction systems are analytic, but this is not proved in the usual way via step-by-step normalization of derivations.

Abstract Background Efforts to generate evidence for implementation strategies are frustrated by insufficient description. The Expert Recommendations for Implementing Change (ERIC) compilation names and defines implementation strategies; however, further work is needed to describe the actions involved. One potentially complementary taxonomy is the behaviour change techniques (BCT) taxonomy. We aimed to examine the extent and nature of the overlap between these taxonomies. Methods Definitions and descriptions of 73 strategies in the ERIC compilation were analysed. First, each description was deductively coded using the BCT taxonomy. Second, a typology was developed to categorise the extent of overlap between ERIC strategies and BCTs. Third, three implementation scientists independently rated their level of agreement with the categorisation and BCT coding. Finally, discrepancies were settled through online consensus discussions. Additional patterns of complementarity between ERIC strategies and BCTs were labelled thematically. Descriptive statistics summarise the frequency of coded BCTs and the number of strategies mapped to each of the categories of the typology. Results Across the 73 strategies, 41/93 BCTs (44%) were coded, with ‘restructuring the social environment’ as the most frequently coded (n=18 strategies, 25%). There was direct overlap between one strategy (change physical structure and equipment) and one BCT (‘restructuring physical environment’). Most strategy descriptions (n=64) had BCTs that were clearly indicated (n=18), and others where BCTs were probable but not explicitly described (n=31) or indicated multiple types of overlap (n=15). For some strategies, the presence of additional BCTs was dependent on the form of delivery. Some strategies served as examples of broad BCTs operationalised for implementation. For eight strategies, there were no BCTs indicated, or they did not appear to focus on changing behaviour. These strategies reflected preparatory stages and targeted collective cognition at the system level rather than behaviour change at the service delivery level. Conclusions This study demonstrates how the ERIC compilation and BCT taxonomy can be integrated to specify active ingredients, providing an opportunity to better understand mechanisms of action. Our results highlight complementarity rather than redundancy. More efforts to integrate these or other taxonomies will aid strategy developers and build links between existing silos in implementation science.

Jessica craned her head to take in the imposing, stone building, then lowered her gaze to the gold-plated sign at the base of the steps. “Institute of Methodology”, it read. Inside the heavy iron doors, a woman sat at a desk, her face devoid of expression. “Subject area?” asked the woman. “Uhmm, feminism ... and fiction, I think.” “Turn right.” “Do you have a map?” “No.” “How am I meant to find things?” “Each has their own method; it’s not up to us to prescribe that.” Jessica sighed, readjusted her handbag and turned right. A corridor stretched out before her. She set off, her stiletto boots echoing on the hard wooden floor. The first door she arrived at had the words “Deleuze and Guattari” positioned squarely in the middle. She hesitated, then turned the doorknob. The room was white and empty. A male voice issued from somewhere but she couldn’t tell the direction from which it came. It droned on, with some inflection, but there was no way of knowing where the sentences started and finished. She picked out a few words: a thousand plateaus, becoming, burrowing, but couldn’t piece them into anything meaningful. She backed out of the room, frowning, and asked me, How am I going to learn anything if they only have these voices? I can’t lipread them. And how can I produce something factual if I haven’t heard it all? I might make stuff up. You always make things up anyway. After the barrier of disembodied sound, the silence of the corridor was soothing. Jessica always had difficulty with hearing men’s voices, for their registers were lower. Sometimes, she wondered if this was the reason she’d become interested in feminism: women were simply easier to understand. The next door was labelled “Facets of Phenomenology.” After that was “Post-It Notes and Poststructuralism”, “Interpretation of Geometric Design”, “Knitting Class” and “Cyberspace and Geography.” None of these were very helpful. She wanted something on bodies and writing. She walked on. It was, she soon realised, so terribly easy to lose one’s way. The corridors continued. She turned right most of the time, and occasionally left. Her arches began to ache. After a while she came to the conclusion that she had no idea of where she was. Immediately, a bird appeared and dived down her throat. Trapped, it thudded against her ribs. Breathe, I told her. Breathe. She put a hand out to the wall. Outside another door she heard, a voice with a distinct Australian accent. She checked the label on the door. “Fictocriticism,” it read. The door opened. The bird climbed out of her chest and flew away. A young woman stood before her, wearing bright red lipstick. “We saw your shadow beneath the door.” She pointed to Jessica’s feet. “We don’t like barriers, so come in.” The room was airy and brilliantly lit, with a high ceiling patterned with pressed metal vines and flowers. A man and a handful of women sat at a table covered with papers, bottles of wine, brie, sundried tomatoes and crackers. “Wine?” asked the woman, a bottle in her hand. “It’s from Margaret River.” “Oh yes, please.” Jessica pulled out a chair from the table. The people’s faces looked friendly. “What brings you here?” The woman with red lipstick asked, handing her a glass. “I’m trying to find a writing style that’s comfortable for me to use. I just can’t relate to abstract texts, like those by Deleuze and Guattari.” Jessica eyed the cheese platter on the table. She was hungry. “Help yourself,” said the man. Jessica picked up the cheese knife and a cracker. “You’d like my essay, then, ‘Me and My Shadow.’” It was an older woman speaking, with soft grey hair and luminous eyes. “In it I assert that Guattari’s Molecular Revolution is distancing and, she pushed the pile of paper napkins towards Jessica, ‘totally abstract and impersonal. Though the author uses the first person (‘The distinction I am proposing’, ‘I want therefore to make it clear’), it quickly became clear to me that he had no interest whatsoever in the personal, or in concrete situations as I understand them – a specific person, a specific machine, somewhere in time and space, with something on his/her mind, real noises, smells, aches and pains” (131). Jessica thought about the first room, where Deleuze’s and Guattari’s voices had seemed to issue from nowhere. “Of course,” she said. “If my comprehension comes from reading faces and bodies, it follows that those writers who evince themselves in the text will be the ones that appeal to me.” The rest of the table was silent. “I’m deaf,” Jessica explained. “I’ve no hearing in my left ear and half in my right, but people don’t know until I tell them.” “I’d never have guessed,” said the woman with red lipstick. “I’m good at faking it,” Jessica replied wryly. “It seems to me that, if I only hear some things and make the rest up, then my writing should reflect that.” “We might be able to help you — we write about, and in the style of, fictocriticism.” Two women were talking at once. It was difficult to tell who was saying what. “But what is it?” Jessica asked. “That’s a problematic question. It resists definition, you see, for the form it takes varies according to the writer.” She glanced from one woman to the other. It was hard to keep up. They went on, “Fictocriticism might most usefully be defined as hybridised writing that moves between the poles of fiction (‘invention’/‘speculation’) and criticism (‘deduction’/‘explication’), of subjectivity (‘interiority’) and objectivity (‘exteriority’). It is writing that brings the ‘creative’ and the ‘critical’ together – not simply in the sense of placing them side by side, but in the sense of mutating both, of bringing a spotlight to bear upon the known forms in order to make them ‘say’ something else” (Kerr and Nettlebeck 3). “It began to incorporate narratives and styles that wrote against omniscience in favour of fragmentary, personal perspectives.” Concentrating on cutting and spreading her brie, Jessica couldn’t see who had said this. She looked up, trying to see who had spoken. “In addition,” said a young, slim woman, “The use of autobiographical elements in ficto-criticism that include the body and personal details … realises a subjectivity that is quite different from the controlling academic critical subject with their voice from on high” (Flavell 77). Jessica bit into her cracker. The brie was creamy, but rather too strong. She piled sundried tomatoes onto it. “It is of course, a capacious category,” the man added, “as it must be if it is inspired by the materials and situation at hand. One might urge the interested writer not to feel that their practice has to conform to one or another model, but to have the confidence that the problem characterising the situation before them will surprise them into changing their practices. Like all literature, fictocriticism experiments with ways of being in the world, with forms of subjectivity if you like” (Muecke 15). Jessica nodded, her mouth full of biscuit and brie. Oil dripped from the tomatoes down her fingers. “Yes,” it was the two women in their duet, “in fictocritical writings the ‘distance’ of the theorist/critic collides with the ‘interiority’ of the author. In other words, the identity of the author is very much at issue. This is not to say that an ‘identity’ declares itself strictly in terms of the lived experience of the individual, but it does declare itself as a politic to be viewed, reviewed, contested, and above all engaged with” (Kerr and Nettlebeck 3). “That makes sense,” Jessica thought aloud. “Everything I write is an amalgam of fact and fiction, because I hear some things and make the rest up. Deafness influences the way I process and write about the world, so it seems I can’t avoid my body when I write.” She lifted a napkin from the pile and wiped her oily fingers. “Yet, to use a language of the body, or écriture féminine, is also to run the risk of essentialism, of assuming that, for example when we write long, silky sentences, we are saying that this is how every woman would write. It’s also true that, when writing, we don’t have to be limited to our own bodies – we can go beyond them.” She paused, thinking. “It’s been said that sign language is a form of écriture féminine, for a person who signs literally writes with their hands. Where are my notes?” She ferreted through her handbag, pushing aside tubes of lip gloss and hand cream, a bus pass and mirror, and extracted some folded pieces of paper. “Here, H-Dirksen L. Bauman comments on the possibilites of écriture féminine for the disabled, writing that, The project of recognizing Deaf identity bears similarities to the feminist project of re-gaining a ‘body of one’s own’ through linguistic and literary practices. Sign, in a more graphic way, perhaps, than l’écriture féminine is a ‘writing of/on the body.’ The relation between Sign and l’écriture féminine raises questions that could have interesting implications for feminist performance. Does the antiphonocetric nature of Sign offer a means of averting these essentializing tendency of l’écriture féminine? Does the four-dimensional space of performance offer ways of deconstructing phallogocentric linear discourse? (359) “As Sign is a writing by the body, it could be argued that each body produces an original language. I think it’s this, rather than antiphonocentrism — that is, refusing to privilege speech over writing, as has been the tradition — that represents the destabilising effects of Sign.” “Here’s Jamming the Machinery.” The slim woman pushed a book towards Jessica. “It’s about contemporary Australian écriture féminine.” Jessica opened the covers and began reading: As a counter-strategy, écriture féminine, it is argued, is theoretically sourced in the bodies of women. Here, the body represents one aspect of what it ‘means’ to be a woman, but of course our bodies are infinitely variable as are our socio-historical relations and the way that we live through and make meaning of our particular bodies. Texts, however, are produced through the lived practices of being socially positioned as (among other things) women, so those effects will be inscribed in actively inventing ways for women to speak and write about ourselves as women, rather than through the narrative machinery of patriarchy (Bartlett 1-2). I agree with that, Jessica mused to herself. Even if, on paper, écriture féminine does run the risk of essentialism, it’s still a useful strategy, so long as one remains attentive to the specificity of each individual body. She looked up. The conversation was becoming loud, joyful and boisterous. It was turning into a party. Sadly, she stood. “I’d like to stay, but I have to keep thinking.” She pushed in her chair. “Thank you for your ideas.” “Goodbye and good luck!” they chorused, and replenished their wine glasses. Outside, it was getting dark. She trailed her fingers along the wall for balance. Her sight orientated her; without it, she was liable to fall over, particularly in stilettos. Seeing a movement near the ceiling, Jessica stopped and peered upwards. Dragons! she cried. Sitting in the rafters were three small, pearly white dragons, their scaly hides gleaming in the darkness. Here, she called, stretching out a hand. One dropped, swooping, and landed on her wrist, its talons gripping her arm. Ouch! It looked at her curiously with its small gold eyes, then stretched its wings proudly. Dark blue veins ran across the soft membrane. You’re not very cuddly, she told it, but you are exquisite. Tell me, are you real? For an answer, it leaned over and gently nipped her thumb, drawing blood. Its tail swished like a cat’s in a frisky mood. Stop making things up, I scolded her. This is supposed to be serious. Abruptly, the dragon sprang from her wrist, winging gracefully back to the ceiling. Jessica rubbed her arm and continued, feeling ripples of unevenly applied paint beneath her fingertips. Let me pose a question, I suggested: if a fairy godmother offered you your hearing, would you take it? Well, deafness has made me who I am— You mean, an opinionated, obnoxious, feminist thinker and writer? Yes, exactly. So perhaps I wouldn’t take it. And where would you be without silence, which has given you the space in which to think, and which has shaped you as a writer? Without silence, you wouldn’t have turned to words. Hmmm, yes. She slowed. It’s awfully dark in here now. And quiet. For deaf people, silence has often been yoked together with negative connotations – it’s a cave, a prison, a tomb. Sometimes it can feel like this, but, as you know, at other times it’s liberating. You don’t have to listen to someone yakking on their mobile phone on the bus, nor overhear your flatmate having loud sex in the room above; you can simply switch off your hearing aid and keep reading your book, or thinking your thoughts. In a somewhat similar situation, Stephen Hawking, the theoretical physicist, has said that ‘his disability has given him the advantage of having more time to think,’ although Susan Wendell points out that he is only able to do this ‘because of the help of his family, three nurses, a graduate student who travels with him to maintain his computer-communications systems’ – resources which are unavailable to many disabled people” (109). Thus although disability has been largely theorised as lack, it would seem that the contrary is the case: disability brings with it a wealth of possibility. Jessica slowed, feeling vibrations in the wall and beneath our feet. Her heartbeat quickened. Maybe it’s music. It’s not. It’s irregular. Then we heard the sound, like distant thunder. Get back against the wall, I ordered her. Seconds later a crowd of creatures ran past, rattling the floorboards. They were so black we couldn’t see them. What was that? she asked. They smelled like horses. Musky, but sharp too. Let’s get moving. And I told you to stop making things up. I didn’t make that up! she protested. Her pulse was still rapid, so I kept talking to distract her. The difficulty is to avoid referring to the disabled person as having lost something. Of course, you can lose your hearing, but you gain infinitely more in other ways – your senses of touch, taste, smell and sight are augmented. In the current climate of thinking, this is easier said than done. Lennard Davis indicates with distaste that discussions of disability stop theorists in their tracks. Disability, as it has been formulated, is a construct that is defined by lack. Rather than face this ragged imaged [of the disabled individual], the critic turns to the fluids of sexuality, the gloss of lubrication, the glossary of the body as text, the heteroglossia of the intertext, the glossolalia of the schizophrenic. But almost never the body of the differently abled (5). Theorists of disability consistently point out that, if more effort and energy were directed towards the philosophical implications of the disabled body, a wealth of new material and ideas would emerge that would shatter existing presumptions about the corporeal. For example, there are still immense possibilities thrown up by theorising a jouissance, or pleasure, in the disabled body. As Susan Wendell points out, “paraplegics and quadriplegics have revolutionary things to teach us about the possibilities of sexuality which contradict patriarchal culture’s obsessions with the genitals” (120). Thus if there were more of a focus on the positive aspects of disability and on promoting the understanding that disability is not about lack, people could see how it fosters creativity and imagination. Jessica saw with relief that there was a large bay window at the end of a corridor, looking out onto the Institute’s grounds. She collapsed onto the bench beneath it, which was layered with cushions. The last of the sun was fading and the grass refracted a golden sheen. She unzipped her boots and swung her legs onto the bench. Leaning her head back against the wall, she remembered a day at primary school when she was eleven. She sat on the blue seat beneath the Jacaranda tree, a book open in her lap. It was lunchtime, the sun was warm and purple Jacaranda blossoms lay scattered at her feet, some squidged wetly into the cement. She looked up from the book to watch her classmates playing soccer on the field, shouting and calling. She would have joined them, except that of late she had felt awkwardness, where before she had been blithe. She, who was so used to scrambling over the delightful hardness of wool bales in the shearing shed, who ran up and down the banks of creeks and crawled into ti trees, flakes of bark sticking to her jumper, had gradually, insidiously, learnt a consciousness of her body. She was not like them. We were silent. The electric lights on the walls of the building came on, illuminating sections of the stonework. At the time, she hated being isolated, but it forced to look at the world differently. Spending so much time on her own also taught her to listen to me, her imagination, and because of that her writing flourished. There was a flutter in the hallway. The tiny dragon had returned. It braked in the air, circled, and floated gently onto her skirt. Was this your doing? She asked me suspiciously. Maybe. She held out her palm. The dragon jumped into it, squeaking, its tail whipping lazily. Jessica smiled. References Bartlett, Alison. Jamming the Machinery: Contemporary Australian Women’s Writing. Toowoomba: Association for the Study of Australian Literature, 1998. Bauman, H-Dirksen L. “Toward a Poetics of Vision, Space and the Body.” The Disability Studies Reader. Ed. Lennard J. Davis. Hoboken: Routledge, 2006. 355-366. Davis, Lennard J. Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body. London: Verso, 1995. Flavell, Helen. Writing-Between: Australian and Canadian Ficto-Criticism. Ph.D. Thesis. Murdoch University, 2004. Gibbs, Anna. “Writing and the Flesh of Others.” Australian Feminist Studies 18 (2003): 309–319. Kerr, Heather, and Amanda Nettlebeck. “Notes Towards an Introduction.” The Space Between: Australian Women Writing Fictocriticism. Ed. Heather Kerr and Amanda Nettlebeck. Nedlands: U of Western Australia P, 1998. 1-18. Muecke, Stephen. Joe in the Andamans: And Other Fictocritical Stories. Erskineville: Local Consumption Publications, 2008. Tompkins, Jane. “Me and My Shadow.” Gender and Theory: Dialogues on Feminist Criticism. Ed. Linda Kauffman. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. 121-139. Wendell, Susan. “Towards a Feminist Theory of Disability.” Hypatia 4 (1989): 104–124.