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Journal articles on the topic 'Korean chaebols'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 11 February 2022

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1

Park, Hong Y., Geon-Cheol Shin, and Sung Hahn Suh. "Advantages And Shortcomings Of Korean Chaebols." International Business & Economics Research Journal (IBER) 15, no. 3 (May 2, 2016): 97–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/iber.v15i3.9674.

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The prevalent form of business organizations in Korea is a chaebol. The chaebol is a diversified conglomerate. This paper addresses the following issues concerning Korean chaebols: 1) reasons for diversification, 2) advantages and shortcomings of chaebols, 3) issues facing Korean chaebols, and 4) chaebols’ managing the crisis and making reforms. We found that Korean chaebols managed to learn from the economic crisis and made successful reforms.

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2

Joe, Denis Yongmin, Jiyoung Lee, and Frederick Dongchuhl Oh. "Do Korean chaebols practice noblesse oblige? Evidence from their CSR activities." Economics and Business Letters 10, no. 1 (February 21, 2021): 45–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.17811/ebl.10.1.2021.45-57.

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This study analyzes the corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities of the Korean chaebols to establish whether these firms engage in social duties and practice noblesse oblige. To measure the extent of the CSR activities, we use the index of the Korean Economic Justice Institute (KEJI) from 2005 to 2017. We find that the level of the CSR activity among chaebol firms with weak governance is low. Moreover, we show that chaebol firms with credit rating concerns reduce their CSR activities. Overall, our results indicate that Korean chaebols tend to neglect the CSR activities.

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3

Hong, Youngeun, Taewoo Kim, and Jongkook Park. "The Differential Choice Of Chaebol In Earnings Management." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 31, no. 5 (September 4, 2015): 1909. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v31i5.9409.

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This study examines the methods of the differential choice of Korean chaebol in earnings management. Consistent with our prediction, we find a negative association between chaebols ownership and accrual-based earnings management, whereas there is no clear difference between chaebols ownership and real-based earnings management. Furthermore, we find evidence that chaebols exhibit a strongly positive relationship with overproduction-based real activities manipulation, indicating that chaebols prefer overproduction as a method of real earnings management. From additional analyses, we also find that abnormal cash flow from operations is negatively associated with suspect chaebol firm-years that just met zero.

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4

Kim, Youn-Suk, and Hyeng Keun Koo. "Restructuring R&D: The case of Korea." Human Systems Management 20, no. 1 (April 24, 2001): 63–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/hsm-2001-20109.

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In this paper we study the changing pattern of Korean Research and Development (R&D) after the IMF crisis. We contend that the focus has changed from government and chaebol-initiated R&D to small business and university-initiated R&D. This transition resulted from various reasons: (1) financial difficulty caused upon big chaebols by the IMF crisis, (2) the government's emphasis on nurturing high-technology venture businesses, (3) the government's initiative to start Brain Korea 21 (BK21) projects. We evaluate this transition from the real options view of R&D.

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Noh, Grimm. "Strategic Decoupling in Korean Business Groups: Ambiguous Identity as a Strategy in Chaebol Groups." Sustainability 11, no. 9 (May 3, 2019): 2561. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11092561.

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I examine how firms affiliated with Korean business groups utilize decoupling of the stated business area and actual business activities to maintain the economic sustainability of their organizations. In examining the strategic sources of decoupling, I focus on the idiosyncratic nature of Korean business groups, otherwise known as chaebols. I suggest that decoupling of the stated and actual business areas of a chaebol affiliate is affected positively by the number of regulations in the industry, positively by the relative resource endowment of the affiliate within the chaebol, and negatively by the affiliate’s niche overlap with other affiliates. However, the negative effect of niche overlap was moderated by the affiliate’s relative resource endowment.

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Shin, Choong Ho, Hyejin Cho, and Myeong Hyeon Cho. "Analysis Of Family Business Group Succession: Comparative Case Study On Six Korean Chaebols." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 36, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 29–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v36i1.10328.

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A chaebol is a Korean business group with a unique organizational structure in which both ownership and control rights held by a family. As their production accounts for nearly fifty percent of Korea’s GDP and their power in the labor market, it is important to analyze the succession of chaebols, which is closely related to the sustainability of the business. This paper analyzes the six Korean chaebols’ successions to increase our understanding of the processes and outcomes of the family succession. Specifically, we employ the three-circle model, i.e., the ownership, family, and business system, to conduct a comparative case study. Our analysis suggests that succession that involves a large size of succession concentrated to only one successor and restructuring of business portfolio experiences higher post- performance. Also, the level of conflicts in the succession process was not found to have an effect on performance. Overall, our findings imply that the succession is a period available to the company to set a right course of actions for improving competitiveness.

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7

Sunghoon Hong. "Exit Behaviors of Foreign Operations of Korean Chaebols and Non-Chaebols." Journal of Convergence Information Technology 8, no. 12 (July 31, 2013): 408–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.4156/jcit.vol8.issue12.50.

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8

Yoon, Bohyun, Jeong Lee, and Ryan Byun. "Does ESG Performance Enhance Firm Value? Evidence from Korea." Sustainability 10, no. 10 (October 11, 2018): 3635. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su10103635.

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We analyze whether a firm’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) plays a significant role in promoting its market value in an emerging market, namely Korea. We employ environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) scores to evaluate CSR performances and examine their effect on firm valuation. We find that CSR practices positively and significantly affect a firm’s market, in line with previous studies on developed countries. However, its impact on share prices can differ according to firm characteristics. For firms in environmentally sensitive industries, the value-creating effect of CSR is lesser than for firms that do not belong to sensitive industries. Specifically, corporate governance practice negatively influences the firm value of environmentally sensitive firms. Further, governance practice significantly promotes market value only for chaebols, while investors do not significantly value governance practice carried out by other firms. This finding suggests the value-enhancing effects of governance structure reformation in the former. This work mainly contributes to the literature by verifying a positive CSR-valuation relationship in emerging markets, which provides substantial policy and welfare implications in markets where governments play a major role in promoting CSR. A stronger valuation effect of CSR in chaebols may present economic background for the intervention of the Korean government in the reformation of chaebol.

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9

Powell, K. Skylar, and Eunah Lim. "Nonroutine CEO Turnover in Korean Chaebols." Journal of Asia-Pacific Business 10, no. 2 (May 14, 2009): 146–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10599230902885655.

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10

Lee, Sang M., Sangjin Yoo, and Tosca M. Lee. "Korean chaebols: Corporate values and strategies." Organizational Dynamics 19, no. 4 (March 1991): 36–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0090-2616(91)90052-b.

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11

Min, Bryan, and Dong-Jae Kim. "Corporate Governance Change and Management Performance: An Exploratory Study of A Korean Company - Mando Corporation." Journal of International Business and Economy 8, no. 2 (December 1, 2007): 68–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.51240/jibe.2007.2.5.

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Triggered by the Asian financial crisis in 1997, corporate governance has become an important topic for many Korean companies. Particularly, Korea‟s large family-owned conglomerates, chaebols, went through significant changes in terms of corporate governance. There has been a widely held belief that the lack of proper corporate governance in Korean companies, notably chaebols, forces them to suffer from low performance. Changes in corporate governance, therefore, is expected to enhance company performance. This paper is an exploratory study to address this issue. Specifically, it has an indepth look at the case of Mando Corporation to show how corporate governance improved management performance in terms of increasing shareholder value. The roles of the board of directors, large shareholders, and professional managers are explained and contrasted in the context of rapidly evolving dynamics of changes in the corporate governance of the company.

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12

Woo, Youngshin, Wooseok Choi, Insik Min, and Mugoan Jeong. "Korean Business Groups and Performance of Group-Affiliated Professional Sport Teams: Focusing on the Asian Financial Crisis." Sustainability 12, no. 17 (August 25, 2020): 6888. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12176888.

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This study examines the impact of Korean business groups, chaebols, on the sporting performance of their affiliated professional sports teams using game data from 1983 to 2013. We investigated whether or not chaebol ownership of professional sports teams is more efficient than non-chaebol ownership in achieving athletic success on the field of play. Our empirical evidence found that the chaebol-affiliated teams are more likely to be the league winners or finalists than non-chaebol teams are. We also tested the relationship between the financial crisis in the wider economy that deflates firm resources and athletic outcomes in the affiliated teams. In the tests, which divide the sample period into three 10-year periods, the results of two sub-samples (1983–1993 and 2004–2013) were in line with previous results. We, however, identified an exception when chaebol teams did not play in more final matches of a league between 1994 and 2003, the time interval that includes the period of drastic restructuring of business groups during the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

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13

Yoo, Sangjin, and Sang M. Lee. "Management Style and Practice of Korean Chaebols." California Management Review 29, no. 4 (July 1987): 95–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/41162133.

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14

Moskalev, Sviatoslav, and Seung Chan Park. "South Korean Chaebols and Value-Based Management." Journal of Business Ethics 92, no. 1 (June 10, 2009): 49–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-009-0138-5.

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15

Albrecht, Chad, Chad Turnbull, Yingying Zhang, and Christopher J. Skousen. "The relationship between South Korean chaebols and fraud." Management Research Review 33, no. 3 (March 26, 2010): 257–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/01409171011030408.

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16

Lee, Ji Suk, and Shan Yue Jin. "Tunneling through Intragroup Transactions: Evidence from Korean Chaebols." International Journal of Smart Business and Technology 7, no. 1 (May 31, 2019): 57–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.21742/ijsbt.2019.7.1.06.

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17

Sig Choi, Du, Paul Michell, and Dayananda Palihawadana. "Exploring the components of success for the Korean chaebols." Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing 23, no. 5 (June 13, 2008): 311–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/08858620810881584.

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18

Choi, Daeheon, Paul Moon Sub Choi, Joung Hwa Choi, and Chune Young Chung. "Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from the Role of the Largest Institutional Blockholders in the Korean Market." Sustainability 12, no. 4 (February 24, 2020): 1680. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12041680.

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This study investigates the monitoring effectiveness of the largest institutional blockholder in Korea, the Korean National Pension Service (KNPS), on firms’ engagement in corporate social responsibility (CSR). We use a large, unique sample from Korea, where the financial market is primarily characterized by chaebols. We show that lagged KNPS blockholdings do not significantly influence investee firms’ concurrent CSR indexes. This result indicates that even the largest institutional blockholder in Korea does not actively engage in firms’ CSR initiatives to enhance their long-term performance and prosperity. Overall, our results suggest that institutional investors should more actively serve as an effective corporate governance mechanism in emerging Asian markets, where companies aim to be profitable and long-term corporate governance is very important.

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19

Lee, Yong-Shik. "South Korean Economy at the Crossroads: Structure Issues under External Pressure – An Essay from a Law and Development Perspective." Law and Development Review 12, no. 3 (October 25, 2019): 865–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ldr-2019-0063.

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Abstract South Korea is one of the most successful economic development cases in history. This country, stricken with crushing poverty and torn by a disastrous war two generations ago, rose from the ashes of the war and underwent unprecedented economic development for over three decades. By the mid-1990s, South Korea had built an advanced economy with world-class industries and also achieved a liberal democracy based on the rule of law. Since its 1997 financial crisis, however, Korea’s economic growth has been continually slowing down with widening income gaps among its populations. The Korean economy has also faced increasing external pressure, which has recently been dramatized by Japan’s export restraint measures on some of the key materials used to produce semiconductors, one of the most important export products for the Korean economy. This note discusses structural issues in the Korean economy, such as its over-dependency on a small number of conglomerates (“chaebols”) and the weakness of its SMEs, which cause the Korean economy to slow down and render the economy vulnerable to external pressure. This note examines these issues from a legal and institutional perspective and offers proposals to remedy some of the problems in the Korean economy.

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20

Shin, Hyun-Han, and Young S. Park. "Financing constraints and internal capital markets: Evidence from Korean `chaebols'." Journal of Corporate Finance 5, no. 2 (June 1999): 169–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0929-1199(99)00002-4.

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21

Joe, Denis Yongmin, and Frederick Dongchuhl Oh. "Spillover Effects Within Business Groups: The Case of Korean Chaebols." Management Science 64, no. 3 (March 2018): 1396–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2596.

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22

Milliman, John F., Yong-Min Kim, and Mary Ann Von Glinow. "Hierarchical advancement in Korean chaebols: A model and research agenda." Human Resource Management Review 3, no. 4 (December 1993): 293–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/1053-4822(93)90003-m.

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23

Jung, Young Hoon, Zhu Zhu, and Huy Will Nguyen. "Revisiting foreign market entry motivations: the case of Korean commercial banks." Cross Cultural & Strategic Management 28, no. 4 (July 14, 2021): 760–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ccsm-05-2020-0113.

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PurposeThis study examines what motivates firms to go and remain abroad despite uncertain profit potential. In a departure from probing traditional market-seeking, profit-driven motives, the authors explore how domestically driven, sociocultural motivations may shape the foreign market entry decisions of Korean commercial banks (KCBs). The authors argue that, due to the power imbalance between KCBs and their chaebol clients within the historical and cultural contexts of their relationships, KCBs' foreign market entries may depend more on their clients' presence in these markets than on their profit potential.Design/methodology/approachThe authors focus on the foreign market entries of KCBs and their client firms. Using the data of 8 KCBs and their client firms belonging to the 60 business groups (chaebols) of Korea, the authors analyze 6,577 observations involving the dyadic relationship between a KCB and its client firm in 15 host countries from 2005 to 2014.FindingsThe authors find that the number of clients' subsidiaries operating in foreign markets may increase the likelihood of KCBs entering these markets. Moreover, when KCBs earn more domestic profit from client firms, the potential Korean market in the host country is greater, and the institutional distance between the host country and Korea is smaller.Practical implicationsIn addition to the critical role of a bank-centered financing system in advancing a developing country and its firms, the authors’ findings suggest that firms should pay attention to the local diaspora and the institutional distance between the host and home countries in order to manage power-imbalanced relationships and make them sustainable.Originality/valueThe study contributes to the literature on foreign market entry by demonstrating how the home country's sociocultural factors may worsen the power imbalance, thereby pushing firms to make seemingly irrational decisions to go and stay abroad. That is, KCBs' foreign operations may be a way of seeking relational benefits with client firms, which would serve as a source of long-term domestic market profits. The authors’ findings thus highlight the need to consider how sociocultural factors may also shape firms' decision-making in their international business.

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24

Kim, Hanjoon. "Searching for an Optimal Level of Cash Holdings for Korean Chaebols." Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society 16, no. 10 (October 31, 2015): 7118–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.5762/kais.2015.16.10.7118.

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25

MIN, BYUNG S. "CHANGING PATTERN OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCING IN THE KOREAN CHAEBOLS." Economic Papers: A journal of applied economics and policy 26, no. 3 (September 2007): 211–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1759-3441.2007.tb00431.x.

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26

Joe, Denis Yongmin, Frederick Dongchuhl Oh, and Cheolbeom Park. "Control-ownership disparity and stock market Predictability: Evidence from Korean chaebols." Finance Research Letters 27 (December 2018): 6–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2018.01.003.

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27

Minetti, Raoul, and Sung-Guan Yun. "Institutions, Bailout Policies, and Bank Loan Contracting: Evidence from Korean Chaebols." Review of Finance 19, no. 6 (January 6, 2015): 2223–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfu053.

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28

Almeida, Heitor, Sang Yong Park, Marti G. Subrahmanyam, and Daniel Wolfenzon. "The structure and formation of business groups: Evidence from Korean chaebols." Journal of Financial Economics 99, no. 2 (February 2011): 447–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.017.

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29

Oh, Hyun Min, Sam Bock Park, and Hee Young Ma. "Corporate Sustainability Management, Earnings Transparency, and Chaebols." Sustainability 12, no. 10 (May 21, 2020): 4222. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12104222.

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This study examines the association of corporate sustainability management with earnings transparency. Based on previous studies that indicate that sustainability management activities reduce earnings management and corporate risk and increase a firm’s value, this study predicts that the firms with effective sustainability management will have a high earnings transparency. In addition, this study examines the differential effect of corporate sustainability management on earnings transparency according to whether or not a firm belongs to a chaebol. We use Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) ratings of the Korean Corporate Governance Service (KCGS) as a proxy for corporate sustainability management and apply the method of Cheng and Subramanyam (2008) to measure earnings transparency. The empirical results show that there is a significant positive relationship between corporate sustainability management and earnings transparency. Furthermore, the association between corporate sustainability management and earnings transparency is more negative for firms belonging to a chaebol. These results indirectly show that firms belonging to a chaebol have a lower level of information asymmetry than firms not belonging to a chaebol. This study focuses on corporate sustainability management as a determinant of earnings transparency, and is useful for examining the effect of belonging to a chaebol on the relationship between sustainability management and earnings transparency. Our results are expected to provide important implications not only for managers, but also for investors and regulators.

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30

Lee, Ji-Hwan. "Managing Diversified Firms through Socio-Cultural Mechanisms: A Focus on Korean Chaebols." management revu 18, no. 1 (2007): 23–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0935-9915-2007-1-23.

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31

Kock, Carl J., Ki-Hoon Lee, Byung Min, and Bum-Jin Park. ""Principal-Principal Problems and Social Governance: Korean Firms, Chaebols and ‘Social Tunneling’"." Academy of Management Proceedings 2016, no. 1 (January 2016): 14720. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2016.14720abstract.

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32

Youm, Yoona, and Jennifer J. Griffin. "CSR Programs in South Korean Firms: The Influence of Chaebols and CEOs." Academy of Management Proceedings 2016, no. 1 (January 2016): 15056. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2016.15056abstract.

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33

Dong-Woon Kim. "Korean Chaebols and the Holding Company System - The Case of SK Group -." Review of Business History 25, no. 2 (June 2010): 43–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.22629/kabh.2010.25.2.002.

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34

Gyuyoung Hwang and B A. "CEO Overconfidence and Dividend Policy : Evidence from Korean Large Business Group (Chaebols)." Review of Financial Information Studies 7, no. 1 (February 2018): 61–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.35214/rfis.7.1.201802.003.

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35

Park, Chan-Kyoo, Cheolwoo Lee, and Jin Q. Jeon. "Centrality and corporate governance decisions of Korean chaebols: A social network approach." Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 62 (September 2020): 101390. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2020.101390.

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36

Bae, Sung C., Taek Ho Kwon, and Jang W. Lee. "Does corporate diversification by business groups create value? Evidence from Korean chaebols." Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 19, no. 5 (November 2011): 535–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2011.04.001.

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37

Park, Young-Ryeol, Jeoung Yul Lee, and Sunghoon Hong. "Location Decision of Korean Manufacturing FDI: A Comparison between KoreanChaebolsand Non-Chaebols." Global Economic Review 40, no. 1 (March 2011): 123–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1226508x.2011.559332.

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BAEK, JAE-SEUNG, JUN-KOO KANG, and INMOO LEE. "Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols." Journal of Finance 61, no. 5 (September 19, 2006): 2415–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01062.x.

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Dong-Woon Kim. "Korean Chaebols and the Holding Company System: Major Trends and Characteristics, 2001-2011." Review of Business History 28, no. 2 (June 2013): 5–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.22629/kabh.2013.28.2.001.

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Kim, Han-Joon. "Financial Leverage of Korean Business Conglomerates "Chaebols" in the Post-Asian Financial Crisis." Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society 12, no. 2 (February 28, 2011): 699–711. http://dx.doi.org/10.5762/kais.2011.12.2.699.

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Ferris, Stephen P., Kenneth A. Kim, and Pattanaporn Kitsabunnarat. "The costs (and benefits?) of diversified business groups: The case of Korean chaebols." Journal of Banking & Finance 27, no. 2 (February 2003): 251–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4266(01)00248-5.

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Lee, Ji-Hwan, and Ajai S. Gaur. "Managing multi-business firms: A comparison between Korean chaebols and diversified U.S. firms." Journal of World Business 48, no. 4 (October 2013): 443–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2012.09.001.

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Kim, Joohyeon, and Sangin Park. "Deregulation of Holding Companies in 2007 and the Unrelated Diversification of Korean Chaebols." Korean Journal of Public Administration 58, no. 1 (March 31, 2020): 163–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.24145/kjpa.58.1.6.

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44

Choi, Daeheon, Paul Moon Sub Choi, Joung Hwa Choi, and Chune Young Chung. "Does Sustainable Corporate Governance Enhance Accounting Practice? Evidence from the Korean Market." Sustainability 12, no. 7 (March 25, 2020): 2585. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su12072585.

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As corporate sustainability continues to improve and enhance the principles of good corporate governance, firms are exerting increasing efforts in terms of transparency and public disclosure. Transparency efforts provide information to the general public on the relationship between corporate governance and improved sustainability. The better informed shareholders are about the connection between corporate governance and sustainability, the more apparent the relationship will become over time. Prior studies assume that blockholders engage in active institutional monitoring by intervening directly in firms’ operations. In contrast, we argue that passive institutional monitoring is a more feasible governance mechanism in the Korean market owing to the market’s unique features (i.e., chaebols and pressure sensitivity). In particular, focusing on the blockholdings of the Korean National Pension Service (KNPS), we study the impact of passive monitoring on firms’ earnings quality, represented by earnings persistence, value relevance, and timeliness. The empirical evidence shows that KNPS blockholdings have a positive and significant impact on corporate earnings quality, indicating that passive blockholder monitoring is a more efficient channel for improving earnings quality in South Korea. Our results may be generalized to other emerging markets in which a few entities with concentrated economic power engender pressure-sensitive corporate landscapes for sustainability.

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45

Shin, Ilhang, and Sorah Park. "The impact of labor unions on corporate tax avoidance: evidence from Korea." Problems and Perspectives in Management 18, no. 2 (May 15, 2020): 114–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.18(2).2020.11.

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This study examines the effect of labor unions on corporate tax avoidance activities. Labor union is an important stakeholder in terms of corporate governance; thus, managers may engage in certain accounting choices that reflect union members’ position to improve the relation with labor union. This paper empirically investigates whether managers engage in tax avoidance activities to secure financial resources for workers’ pay when the negotiation power of labor unions is higher. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of firms listed in the Korean stock market from 2001 to 2008. The authors find that companies, where labor unions are organized, have a significantly higher level of tax avoidance activities. Also, the authors attempt to examine the effect of labor unions’ bargaining power on tax avoidance. While the union membership ratio is not significantly related to tax avoidance, labor unions that belong to upper-level labor organizations significantly affect the increasing tax avoidance activity, on average. Moreover, companies that join an aggressive labor organization (‘Minju’ Federation) show a significantly higher level of tax avoidance activity, compared to those joining a moderate labor organization (‘Hanguk’ Federation). Furthermore, the authors show that such an effect of labor unions on tax avoidance is significant for companies, which are not affiliated with large business groups (‘chaebols’). This result suggests that chaebol group management is not under pressure to negotiate with union members due to higher reputation costs. The findings of this paper offer academic and practical implications that capital market participants need to understand labor unions’ effect on management’s accounting choices.

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Jegers, Marc, Kooyul Jung, and Byungmo Kim. "The Difference Between Measuring Internal Funds Allocations in Groups and in Diversified Firms." Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 10, no. 03 (September 2007): 341–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219091507001100.

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Dependent variables used by Kim, Jung and Kim (2005) to assess the effect of the ownership structure of Korean chaebols on internal funds allocations are a priori misspecified in the context of their research, as they were designed to be applied when studying diversified firms and not groups consisting of legally independent entities. The conditions under which this misspecification has no effect on their conclusions are discussed. Re-analyzing their data with a more appropriate internal funds allocation variable leaves their conclusion on the presence of tunnelling effects intact, though it paints a partly different picture of internal allocations as such.

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Ivanova, S. V., and A. V. Latyshov. "New Globalization as an Exogenous Factor in the Formation of the Foreign Trade Policy of the Republic of Korea." Vestnik of the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, no. 6 (December 18, 2018): 214–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.21686/2413-2829-2018-6-214-223.

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The article reveals the content of the "new globalization" concept and characterizes the readiness of the Republic of Korea (RK) for a new technological order. Based on the analysis of the values of different indicators (KOF Index of Globalization, Digital Evolution Index, Digital Adoption Index and a number of others), the conclusion about the high dynamics of Korean society integration into the new global economy is made. South Korea is among the leading countries in terms of digital implementation in business and public administration. The country has a well-established system of e-government, which, among other things, allows it to export the system to other countries of the world. The procedure of customs clearance of goods has been optimized, the "single window" technology has been introduced, public procurement is carried out only through electronic bidding. The traditional close relationship between the state and the chaebols makes it possible to successfully transfer the policy of digitalization into business practices. As a result, digitalization has a positive impact on the development of Korean foreign trade: on the one hand, it allows to increase exports due to the growth of goods and services of the IT sector and related industries, and on the other hand - to reduce the time and money spent on logistics, customs clearance and on the interaction between government agencies.

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Ryu, Hae-Young, Soo-Joon Chae, and Moon-Kyung Cho. "The Control–Ownership Wedge and Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from Korean Business Groups (Chaebols)." GLOBAL BUSINESS FINANCE REVIEW 22, no. 4 (October 30, 2017): 15–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.17549/gbfr.2017.22.4.15.

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Byun, Hee Sub, Ji Hye Lee, and Kyung Suh Park. "Product Market Competition and the Ownership Choice of Business Groups: Evidence from Korean Chaebols." Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 54, no. 1 (November 8, 2017): 100–131. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1540496x.2016.1240675.

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Ryu, Haeyoung, and Soo-Joon Chae. "Family Firms, Chaebol Affiliations, and Corporate Social Responsibility." Sustainability 13, no. 6 (March 10, 2021): 3016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su13063016.

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This study analyzes the corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities of family-owned firms by investigating public companies in Korea. By nature of their governance structures, which are aligned with the interests of their shareholders and management, family firms are managed from a long-term perspective based on a sense of ownership. While CSR implementation entails investment costs, it ultimately increases firm value by enhancing the firm’s reputation and brand image. As such, family firms are expected to be more active than non-family firms regarding CSR investments. We conducted an empirical analysis based on the Korean Economic Justice Institute Index (KEJI Index) from the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice and found that family firms’ CSR scores were higher than those of non-family firms. This indicates that family firms are relatively more active in their CSR activities, as they are managed from a long-term viewpoint. However, family firms classified as large-scale corporate groups (chaebols) had lower CSR activity levels. This is because when family firms are classified as corporate groups, they can enjoy monopolistic market positioning through their subsidiaries, and are thus more likely to utilize the resources originally required for CSR in other projects that conform to the pursuit of firm interests.

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