Journal articles: 'Knowability'

1

Wójcik, Arkadiusz. "The Knowability Paradox and Unsuccessful Updates." Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 62, no. 1 (June 1, 2020): 53–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/slgr-2020-0013.

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Abstract In this paper we undertake an analysis of the knowability paradox in the light of modal epistemic logics and of the phenomena of unsuccessful updates. The knowability paradox stems from the Church-Fitch observation that the plausible knowability principle, according to which all truths are knowable, yields the unacceptable conclusion that all truths are known. We show that the phenomenon of an unsuccessful update is the reason for the paradox arising. Based on this diagnosis, we propose a restriction on the knowability principle which resolves the paradox.

2

Williamson, Timothy. "Knowability and Constructivism." Philosophical Quarterly 38, no. 153 (October 1988): 422. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219707.

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Jago, M. "Closure on knowability." Analysis 70, no. 4 (August 24, 2010): 648–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anq067.

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Chalmers, D. J. "Actuality and knowability." Analysis 71, no. 3 (May 18, 2011): 411–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr038.

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Douven, Igor. "The Knowability Paradox." Ars Disputandi 6, no. 1 (January 2006): 163–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15665399.2006.10819919.

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Williamson, Timothy. "Definiteness and Knowability." Southern Journal of Philosophy 33, S1 (March 1995): 171–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1995.tb00769.x.

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7

DeVidi, David, and Tim Kenyon. "Analogues of Knowability." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81, no. 4 (December 2003): 481–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713659757.

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Hand, Michael, and Jonathan L. Kvanvig. "Tennant on knowability." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 4 (December 1999): 422–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409912349191.

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Heylen, Jan, and Felipe Morales Carbonell. "Concepts of Knowability." Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso, no. 23 (December 26, 2023): 287–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.22370/rhv2023iss23pp287-308.

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Many philosophical discussions hinge on the concept of knowability. For example, there is a blooming literature on the so-called paradox of knowability. How to understand this notion, however? In this paper, we examine several approaches to the notion: the naive approach to take knowability as the possibility to know, the counterfactual approach endorsed by Edgington (1985) and Schlöder (2019) , approaches based on the notion of a capacity or ability to know (Fara 2010, Humphreys 2011), and finally, approaches that make use of the resources of dynamic epistemic logic (van Benthem 2004, Holliday 2017).

10

Murzi, Julien. "Knowability and bivalence: intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability." Philosophical Studies 149, no. 2 (February 19, 2009): 269–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9349-y.

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11

Chiffi, Daniele, and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen. "From Knowability to Conjecturability." Contemporary Pragmatism 17, no. 2-3 (July 31, 2020): 205–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01701160.

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Arguments from knowability have largely been concerned with cases for and against realism, or truth as an epistemic vs. non-epistemic concept. This article proposes bringing Peirce’s pragmaticism, called here ‘action-first’ epistemology, to bear on the issue. It is shown that a notion weaker than knowability, namely conjecturability, is epistemologically a better-suited notion to describe an essential component of scientific inquiry. Moreover, unlike knowability, conjecturability does not suffer from paradoxes. Given fundamental uncertainty that permeates inquiry, knowability and what Peirce took to be ‘perfect knowledge’ lose their appeal in epistemology of science. From the points of view of the logic for pragmatics and the modal translations given in this article, conjecturability and pragmaticism provide an enriched epistemology for scientific practices that can accommodate both epistemic and non-epistemic values.

12

KOOI, BARTELD. "THE AMBIGUITY OF KNOWABILITY." Review of Symbolic Logic 9, no. 3 (June 14, 2016): 421–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755020315000416.

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AbstractIn this paper it is shown that the Verification Thesis (all truths are knowable) is only susceptible to Fitch’s Paradox if one conflates the de re and de dicto interpretation of knowability. A formalisation shows that if one treats knowability as a complex second-order predicate, then the paradox falls apart.

13

Saramifar, Younes. "The Shadows of Knowability." Critical Survey 30, no. 4 (December 1, 2018): 67–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/cs.2018.300406.

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The torch of ember and its puzzling knowability are my exemplars, serving to open the binary of opacity and transparency in narrativity. I highlight inadequacies in the binary of opacity and transparency by examining the works of Peter Lamarque and Clare Birchall on matters of narrative and secrecy. I will try to see how one can think about opacity/transparency through the lenses of speculative realism and object-oriented philosophy. I do so by drawing examples from memories of the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1989) and explaining how the language of remembering becomes the realm of a tension between presence and absentia, between the unsaid within the said. I explore how memory-as-narrative and narrative-as-memory sustain the potentiality that eludes Orwellian newspeak.

14

Kenyon, Tim. "Truth, Knowability, and Neutrality." Nous 33, no. 1 (March 1999): 103–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00144.

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15

Percival, P. "Fitch and intuitionistic knowability." Analysis 50, no. 3 (June 1, 1990): 182–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/50.3.182.

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16

Ong, Aihwa. "Landscapes of (un)knowability." Dialogues in Human Geography 8, no. 3 (November 2018): 351–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2043820617744974.

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17

Jenkins, Carrie S. "Review: The Knowability Paradox." Mind 115, no. 460 (October 1, 2006): 1141–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzl1141.

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18

Hand, M. "Knowability and Epistemic Truth." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81, no. 2 (June 2003): 216–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713659633.

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19

De Vidi, David, and Graham Solomon. "Knowability and intuitionistic logic." Philosophia 28, no. 1-4 (June 2001): 319–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02379783.

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20

EDGINGTON, DOROTHY. "The Paradox of Knowability." Mind XCIV, no. 376 (1985): 557–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/xciv.376.557.

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21

Hand, Michael. "Antirealism and universal knowability." Synthese 173, no. 1 (October 13, 2009): 25–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9674-x.

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22

Fuhrmann, André. "Knowability as potential knowledge." Synthese 191, no. 7 (September 21, 2013): 1627–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0340-y.

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23

Chase, James, and Penelope Rush. "Factivity, consistency and knowability." Synthese 195, no. 2 (November 10, 2016): 899–918. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1253-3.

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24

Zardini, Elia. "Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge. A Classical Solution to the Paradox of Knowability." THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30, no. 3 (November 12, 2015): 365–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.14668.

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After introducing semantic anti-realism and the paradox of knowability, the paper offers a reconstruction of the anti-realist argument from the theory of understanding. The proposed reconstruction validates an unrestricted principle to the effect that truth requires the existence of a certain kind of “demonstration”. The paper shows that the principle fails to imply the problematic instances of the original unrestricted knowability principle but that the overall view still has unrestricted epistemic consequences. Appealing precisely to the paradox of knowability, the paper also argues, against BHK semantics, for the non-constructive character of the demonstrations envisaged by anti-realists, and contends that, in such a setting, one of the most natural arguments in favour of a revision of classical logic loses all its force.

25

D'Alfonso, Nicola. "Analytic and synthetic based on the paradox of knowability." Principia: an international journal of epistemology 23, no. 1 (August 26, 2019): 79–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n1p79.

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The purpose of this paper is to show how the paradox of knowability loses its paradoxical character when we correctly interpret one of its premises. It is then shown how this new interpretation can be used to logically define analytical and synthetic truths. In this way, the paradox of knowability is traced back to the harmless affirmation that, in order to know every proposition with certainty, there must be no propositions whose truth is synthetic.

26

Freund, Max A. "Consideraciones lógico-epistémicas relativas a una forma de conceptualismo ramificado." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 23, no. 69 (December 13, 1991): 3–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1991.810.

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An intuitive interpretation of constructive knowability is first developed. Then, an epistemic second order logical system (which formalizes logical aspects of the interpretation) is constructed. A proof of the relative consistency of such a system is offered. Next, a formal system of intensional arithmetic (whose logical basis is the aforementioned second order system) is stated. It is proved that such a formal system of intensional arithmetic entails a theorem, whose content would show possible limitations to constructive knowability.

27

Rosenkranz, Sven. "Knowability, Closure, and Anti-Realism." Dialectica 62, no. 1 (December 18, 2007): 59–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01129.x.

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28

Liu, Sebastian. "(Un)knowability and knowledge iteration." Analysis 80, no. 3 (February 24, 2020): 474–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz072.

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Abstract The KK principle states that knowing entails knowing that one knows. This historically popular principle has fallen out of favour among many contemporary philosophers in light of putative counterexamples. Recently, some have defended more palatable versions of KK by weakening the principle. These revisions remain faithful to their predecessor in spirit while escaping crucial objections. This paper examines the prospects of such a strategy. It is argued that revisions of the original principle can be captured by a generalized knowledge iteration principle, Weak-KK, which states that knowing entails the possibility of knowing that one knows. But Weak-KK is vulnerable to an unknowability result and therefore must be rejected. The arguments here suggest that retreating to weaker iteration principles is not an option for the KK enthusiast.

29

Conley, Donovan. "Slavery, experiential gaps, and knowability." Review of Communication 3, no. 1 (January 2003): 13–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1835859032000084106.

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30

WILLIAMSON, TIMOTHY. "On the Paradox of Knowability." Mind XCVI, no. 382 (1987): 256–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/xcvi.382.256.

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31

Salerno, Joe. "Introduction to knowability and beyond." Synthese 173, no. 1 (October 15, 2009): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9680-z.

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32

Artemov, Sergei, and Tudor Protopopescu. "Discovering knowability: a semantic analysis." Synthese 190, no. 16 (August 28, 2012): 3349–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0168-x.

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33

Palczewski, Rafał. "Distributed Knowability and Fitch’s Paradox." Studia Logica 86, no. 3 (September 18, 2007): 455–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9070-9.

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34

Dorst, Kevin. "Abominable KK Failures." Mind 128, no. 512 (January 16, 2019): 1227–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy067.

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Abstract KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though it’s unpopular, a flurry of considerations has recently emerged in its favour. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of KK will lead to the knowability and assertability of abominable indicative conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know it, p’. Such conditionals are manifestly not assertable—a fact that KK defenders can easily explain. I survey a variety of KK-denying responses and find them wanting. Those who object to the knowability of such conditionals must either (i) deny the possibility of harmony between knowledge and belief, or (ii) deny well-supported connections between conditional and unconditional attitudes. Meanwhile, those who grant knowability owe us an explanation of such conditionals’ unassertability—yet no successful explanations are on offer. Upshot: we have new evidence for KK.

35

Hållander, Marie. "Exemplets didaktik." Speki. Nordic Philosophy and Education Review 1, no. 1 (February 9, 2024): 18–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5617/speki.10302.

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This article is a philosophical investigation of the example's function as a didactic practice. In teaching, it is common to use examples to concretize, clarify and give students a knowability of the taught content, but this knowability also implies something. But this knowability also means something specific. The article specifically discusses religious education and religious diversity in a Swedish school context. In the article I argue, drawing on Giorgio Agamben's understanding of the example, how the example stands for itself, but which also, in its specificity and singularity, moves towards what is visible next to it. The example and its knowledge have a movement between two singularities – and not as a movement between a part and the whole, i.e., not between the particular and the general. It creates something, Agamben writes, which not only involves methodology (and subject didactic questions) but also ontology. The article argues that the use of examples in teaching has the potential to function as a didactic strategy, which also can have implications for students' subjectivity. Overall, the article is a theoretical contribution which show how the use of examples in teaching has the potential to function as a vital didactic strategy within teaching.

36

Shaffer, Michael. "The Paradox of Knowability and Factivity." Polish Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 1 (2014): 85–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pjphil2014816.

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37

Weiss, Bernhard. "Truth and the Enigma of Knowability." Dialectica 61, no. 4 (December 6, 2007): 521–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01125.x.

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38

Sober, Elliott, and Mike Steel. "Time and Knowability in Evolutionary Processes." Philosophy of Science 81, no. 4 (October 2014): 558–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/677954.

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39

Costa-Leite, Alexandre. "New Essays on the Knowability Paradox." International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25, no. 2 (June 2011): 194–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2011.574865.

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40

Stjernberg, Fredrik. "The Knowability Paradox - By Jonathan Kvanvig." Theoria 74, no. 3 (September 20, 2008): 255–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2008.00022.x.

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41

Bjerring, Jens Christian. "New Essays on the Knowability Paradox." History and Philosophy of Logic 33, no. 1 (February 2012): 101–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2011.615473.

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42

Freitag, Wolfgang. "Epistemic Contextualism and the Knowability Problem." Acta Analytica 26, no. 3 (January 29, 2011): 273–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-010-0112-y.

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43

D’Agostini, Franca. "Knowability and Other Onto-theological Paradoxes." Logica Universalis 13, no. 4 (November 2019): 577–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11787-019-00237-x.

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44

Fara, Michael. "Knowability and the capacity to know." Synthese 173, no. 1 (October 22, 2009): 53–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9676-8.

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45

Kvanvig, Jonathan. "The incarnation and the knowability paradox." Synthese 173, no. 1 (October 8, 2009): 89–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9678-6.

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46

Fuhrmann, André. "Erratum to: Knowability as potential knowledge." Synthese 191, no. 7 (April 1, 2014): 1649. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0359-0.

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47

Hudson, Robert G. "Faint-hearted Anti-realism and Knowability." Philosophia 37, no. 3 (December 4, 2008): 511–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9174-0.

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48

Jespersen, Bjørn, and Massimiliano Carrara. "Impossible Events and the Knowability Paradox." Organon F 30, no. 1 (February 28, 2023): 53–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30104.

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49

Hamawaki, Arata. "In Search of the Plain and the Philosophical." International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4, no. 3-4 (October 8, 2014): 189–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22105700-04031162.

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In this paper, I take up Thompson Clarke’s distinction between “philosophical” and “plain” ways of understanding a question that could be expressed with the words, “how do you know…?” Clarke argues that this distinction has two important implications. First, philosophical skepticism would stand in an “indirect” relation with its “plain” counterparts, so that what the philosopher is examining is not, as it might initially seem, a plain claim to know, but rather what Clarke calls “philosophical common sense.” Second, if philosophical common sense is intelligible then it cannot be defended: philosophical skepticism would be unavoidable. For Clarke philosophical common sense is intelligible, only if our “conceptual human constitution” is of the “standard type,” and our “conceptual human constitution” is of the “standard type” only if the concepts of dreaming and waking do not have a “knowability requirement” built into them. I defend the claim that these concepts have a “knowability requirement” by tracing the “knowability requirement” to the nature of judgment itself: in particular to what I describe as the priority of the first-person point of view in the constitution of states of judgment. If this is right, the only intelligible questions of the form “how do you know…?” are of the plain variety, and any satisfying treatment of skepticism would have to forego a defense of “philosophical common sense.”

50

Marton, Peter. "Verificationists Versus Realists: The Battle Over Knowability." Synthese 151, no. 1 (July 2006): 81–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6269-4.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Knowability'

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