Journal articles on the topic 'Kantian Moral Philosophy'
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Xu, Bowen. "Autonomy and Moral Emotion A Response to the Conciliatory Proposition of Kant`s Morality." Communications in Humanities Research 7, no. 1 (October 31, 2023): 31–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2753-7064/7/20230755.
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German philosopher Kant, in his moral philosophy, made a clear distinction between categorical imperative and hypothetical imperative. Under his three propositions of morality, Kant argued that only actions motivated by maxims (or moral principles) rather than any other emotional feelings could produce moral worth. Since then, the criticism from Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and a series of reconciling propositions from other later scholars such as Paten, Henson towards such Kantian dichotomy have never ended. This sets the main focus of my article.The article is divided into three parts: the first part expounds the content and ethical basis of Kantian philosophy by explaining the epistemological gap between noumenon and phenomenon. The second part focuses on four different reconciling propositions proposed by Paton, Henson, Herman, and Allison as well as their shared issue: they all try to revise the conclusion within Kantian philosophy in a theory of motivation outside the Kantian philosophy. By tracing back to the three propositions and the relationship between autonomy and heteronomy, the last part offers the articles own argument: though Kant denies emotion as a motivation to produce moral worth, he does not exclude it from the inevitable concomitant from phenomena.
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Saturnino, Antonio Frederico. "O Problema da Fraqueza da Vontade na Filosofia Prática Kantiana." Analytica - Revista de Filosofia 21, no. 1 (March 20, 2018): 123–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.35920/arf.v21i1.16233.
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Resumo: O objetivo do presente artigo é analisar o problema da fraqueza da vontade no quadro conceitual da filosofia moral kantiana. A fim de realçar uma característica da filosofia kantiana relevante para a posição conceitual do problema, servimo-nos do contraste com as análises de Donald Davidson sobre o fenômeno da fraqueza da vontade. Depois de evidenciado o modo como o fenômeno pode ser admitido no sistema kantiano, procuramos defender uma hipótese quanto ao modo como ele poderia ser aí explicado. Trata-se da hipótese de que uma derivação desatenta e negligente a partir da Lei Moral poderia tornar compreensíveis os diversos estágios da maldade em sentido amplo do ser humano, e de que os dois primeiros estágios poderiam ser considerados correspondentes ao fenômeno usualmente chamado de fraqueza da vontade.Abstract: The aim of the present paper is to examine the problem of weakness of will in the conceptual framework of Kantian's moral philosophy. In order to present a feature of Kantian's philosophy which is important for the theoretical placing of the problem, I draw on the contrast with Davidson's analyses of the phenomenon of weakness of will. After indicating the way in which the phenomenon can be admitted in the Kantian system, I try to defend a hypothesis about the way in which it could be explained in this system. It is the hypothesis that an inattentive and negligent derivation from the Moral Law could explain the different stages of the evilness in broad sense of the human being, and that the two first stages can be judged correspondent to the phenomenon usually called weakness of will.
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Smyth, Nicholas. "Integration and authority: rescuing the ‘one thought too many’ problem." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 6 (December 2018): 812–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1415105.
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AbstractFour decades ago, Bernard Williams accused Kantian moral theory of providing agents with ‘one thought too many’. The general consensus among contemporary Kantians is that this objection has been decisively answered. In this paper, I reconstruct the problem, showing that Williams was not principally concerned with how agents are to think in emergency situations, but rather with how moral theories are to be integrated into recognizably human lives. I show that various Kantian responses to Williams provide inadequate materials for solving this ‘integration problem’, and that they are correspondingly ill-positioned to account for the authority of morality, as Williams suspected all along.
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Stark, Susan. "A Change of Heart: Moral Emotions, Transformation, and Moral Virtue." Journal of Moral Philosophy 1, no. 1 (2004): 31–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/174046810400100105.
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AbstractInspired in part by a renewed attention to Aristotle's moral philosophy, philosophers have acknowledged the important role of the emotions in morality. Nonetheless, precisely how emotions matter to morality has remained contentious. Aristotelians claim that moral virtue is constituted by correct action and correct emotion. But Kantians seem to require solely that agents do morally correct actions out of respect for the moral law. There is a crucial philosophical disagreement between the Aristotelian and Kantian moral outlooks: namely, is feeling the correct emotions necessary to virtue or is it an optional extra, which is permitted but not required. I argue that there are good reasons for siding with the Aristotelians: virtuous agents must experience the emotions appropriate to their situations. Moral virtue requires a change of heart.
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Reath, Andrews. "Kantian Constructivism and Kantian Constitutivism: Some Reflections." Kant Yearbook 14, no. 1 (September 28, 2022): 45–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2022-0003.
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Abstract Is moral constructivism an account of the basis of the content of morality or of its authority? In fact, different writers have understood constructivism to be addressing different issues. In this paper I argue that Kant should be understood as a constructivist about the content of morality – or better about a limited set of general substantive principles – and as a constititutivist about its authority. After some general remarks in Section 1 about contemporary discussions of constructivism, in Section 2 I discuss Rawls’s understanding of Kant’s constructivism; Rawls takes Kantian constructivism to be a view about the content of morality. In Section 3, I give an overview of Kant’s moral conception as constructivist about the content of morality and as constitutivist about its authority. In Section 4 I address a worry whether certain features of Kant’s constitutivism rest his constructivism on a realist foundation, arguing that they do not.
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AJEI, Martin Odei, and Katrin A. FLIKSCHUH. "Kantian ethics and African philosophy." Estudos Kantianos [EK] 9, no. 2 (January 19, 2022): 117–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2021.v9n2.p117.
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African philosophers have long engaged with Kant’s practical philosophy. Since the 1980s, much of this engagement has been with Kant’s anthropology of race and its role in the theoretical foundations of racism and European colonization. Our paper departs from this latter orientation by examining Ghanaian philosophical reflections on the Categorical Imperative, which Kant sets out as the supreme principle of practical reason. We assess this critique, and conclude that while the Ghanaian philosophers accept several aspects of Kantian ethics, they depart from Kant’s idealist metaphysics and associated dualistic conception of human nature. More specifically, while the Ghanaian philosophers accept Kant’s universalizability demands in relation to moral judgement, they also make a sustained case, contra Kant, in favour of the role of the emotions in moral motivation. The paper thus contributes to broader efforts underway to enrich the discourse on the reception of Kant’s philosophy in the global south.
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Flikschuh, Katrin. "Kant’s Contextualism." Kantian Review 23, no. 4 (November 21, 2018): 555–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415418000407.
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AbstractThis article builds on David Velleman’s recent work on moral relativism to argue that Kant’s account of moral judgement is best read in a contextualist manner. More specifically, I argue that while for Kant the form of moral judgement is invariant, substantive moral judgements are nonetheless context-dependent. The same form of moral willing can give rise to divergent substantive judgements. To some limited extent, Kantian contextualism is a development out of Rawlsian constructivism. Yet while for constructivists the primary concern is with the derivation of generally valid principles of morality, Velleman’s Kant-inspired form of moral relativism demonstrates the indispensability to a Kantian approach of indexical reasons for action. I argue in turn that Velleman’s focus on the indexical nature of reasons for action must be supplemented by an account of agential reflexivity. The latter divides Kantian contextualism from Kantian relativism.
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Moore, A. W. "A Kantian View of Moral Luck." Philosophy 65, no. 253 (July 1990): 297–321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100057624.
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Some of the most interesting questions about Kant, and more particularly about his moral philosophy, arise when he is placed alongside the giants of antiquity. Where does he come together with Plato? Where with Aristotle? Where does he diverge from each?He comes together with Plato in a shared conception of Ideas. When he first outlines how he is using the term ‘Idea’ in the Critique of Pure Reason, he insists that he is using it in none other than its original Platonic sense; and he explains away certain discrepancies with the comment:It is by no means unusual… to find that we understand [an author] better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken… in opposition to his own intention.
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Hill, Thomas E. "A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules." Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 285. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214249.
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Dmitrieva, Nina A. "Polemics and Popularisation: Aspects of Kant’s Early Reception in Russia." Voprosy Filosofii, no. 12 (2022): 105–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2022-12-105-113.
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The reception of Kant’s philosophy in Russia at the beginning of the 19th century was focused mainly on religious and ethical issues, although it did not exclude theoretical and cognitive questions. The search for textbooks that would adequately and at the same time comprehensibly introduce students and the educated public to the basic ideas of the Kantian philosophical system led two professors at Kazan University, Alexander S. Loubkin and Petr S. Kondyrev, to the textbook on philosophy for beginners by Friedrich Wilhelm Daniel Snell, the German Kantian philosopher, pedagogue and populariser. The work they did in preparing the Russian edition of that textbook was not confined to translation, although the translation of the philosophical text itself required scrupulous terminological work, since there were as yet no equivalents for many philosophical terms in Russian. Each of the translators provided parts of the textbook with their own explanations and additions, with the parts on moral philosophy and philosophy of religion attracting the most interest and polemical objections. Loubkin’s criticism of Snell and thus in most cases of Kant concerns such key concepts and provisions of Kantian practical philosophy as practical reason, the end of moral acts, the distinction between thing and person, the categorical imperative, the feeling of respect for the moral law and others. The real stumbling block for Loubkin was Kant’s solution to the problem of the relation between religion and morality and his choice of a foundation for morality. Loubkin suggests that the moral is grounded in religion and proposes as the criterion of morality the correspondence of an act to the Divine Will.
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JOHNSTON, JAMES SCOTT. "Moral Law and Moral Education: Defending Kantian Autonomy." Journal of Philosophy of Education 41, no. 2 (May 2007): 233–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.2007.00555.x.
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Bramer, Marilea. "The Importance of Personal Relationships in Kantian Moral Theory: A Reply to Care Ethics." Hypatia 25, no. 1 (2010): 121–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2009.01087.x.
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Care ethicists have long insisted that Kantian moral theory fails to capture the partiality that ought to be present in our personal relationships. In her most recent book, Virginia Held claims that, unlike impartial moral theories, care ethics guides us in how we should act toward friends and family. Because these actions are performed out of care, they have moral value for a care ethicist. The same actions, Held claims, would not have moral worth for a Kantian because of the requirement of impartiality. Although Kantian moral theory is an impartial theory, I argue that the categorical imperative in the Formulation of Humanity as an End and the duty of respect require that we give special treatment to friends and family because of their relationships with us. Therefore, this treatment does have moral value for a Kantian.
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Hernandez, Jill Graper. "Impermissibility and Kantian Moral Worth." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13, no. 4 (October 3, 2009): 403–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9206-2.
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Lara, Amy. "Some Apparent Obstacles to Developing a Kantian Virtue Theory." Análisis Filosófico 30, no. 2 (November 1, 2010): 187–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.36446/af.2010.129.
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Several neo-Kantians have questioned the standard deontological interpretation of Kant's ethical theory. They have also responded to charges of rationalism and rigorism by emphasizing the role of virtues and emotions in Kant's view. However, none have defended a fully virtue theoretic interpretation of Kant's theory. I claim that virtue theory has much to offer Kantians, but that resistance to developing a Kantian virtue theory rests on faulty assumptions about virtue theory. In this paper I clear away three apparent obstacles to developing a Kantian virtue theory. The first regards his account of the virtues, which I argue is tangential to the issue of whether he can be interpreted as a virtue theorist. The second is Kant's codification of moral principles, which I argue is compatible with virtue theory. The third is the apparent explanatory primacy of the Categorical Imperative, which I argue is not fully supported by the textual evidence.
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Vujošević, Marijana. "Kant’s Conception of Moral Strength." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50, no. 4 (January 22, 2020): 539–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.49.
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AbstractMost scholars assume that Kantian moral strength is needed only when it comes to following maxims. However, accounts based on this assumption can be challenged by Kant’s claim that virtue, as moral strength of the human will, can never become a habit because its maxims must be freely adopted in new situations. Even some accounts that are not based on this assumption fail to meet this challenge. By drawing on my interpretation of the Kantian capacity for self-control, I propose a twofold account of moral strength that can accommodate Kant’s point that maxims of virtue must always be freely adopted.
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Surprenant, Chris W. "Cultivating Virtue: Moral Progress and the Kantian State." Kantian Review 12, no. 1 (March 2007): 90–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400000820.
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After examining the ethical and political writings of Immanuel Kant, one finds an apparent paradox in his philosophy as his perfectionist moral teachings appear to be linked to his anti-perfectionist political theory. Specifically, he writes that the perfection of moral character can only take place for an individual who is inside of civil society, a condition where no laws may legitimately be implemented expressly for the purpose of trying to make individuals moral. Kant believes that living in civil society is a necessary condition for an individual to refine his talents and reason completely, a process required by morality. I believe, however, that the connection between his moral and political theory runs much deeper than simply facilitating the refinement of talents. Kant's moral theory focuses on an individual's cultivation of virtue, but this cultivation cannot be most satisfactorily completed unless that individual is a member of civil society. Put differently, civil society plays a necessary role in cultivating an individual's character so that he is able to act from maxims consistent with the moral law, out of the respect for the law itself. However, because he believes that civic laws primarily intended to encourage moral cultivation cannot be implemented legitimately, it seems curious that this condition should play such a significant role in Kant's moral philosophy. Through this examination of Kant's moral and political theory, it will be shown that Kant's political society establishes a condition necessary for an individual's complete cultivation of virtue, not by implementing laws that make men moral but by weakening the forces of heteronomy, thereby removing barriers to moral action.
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Manna, Riya, and Rajakishore Nath. "Kantian Moral Agency and the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence." Problemos 100 (October 15, 2021): 139–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/problemos.100.11.
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This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial intelligence (AI). Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘freedom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ through ‘happiness’ as the end. Lastly, we argue that the Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ do not belong to any deterministic model of ‘agency’ as these are sacrosanct systems. The conclusion narrates the non-feasibility of Kantian AI agents from the genuine Kantian ethical outset, offering a utility-based Kantian ethical performer instead.
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Hill, Thomas E. "Assessing Moral Rules: Utilitarian and Kantian Perspectives." Philosophical Issues 15, no. 1 (October 2005): 158–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-6077.2005.00059.x.
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Scholten, Matthé. "Schizophrenia and Moral Responsibility: A Kantian Essay." Philosophia 44, no. 1 (February 15, 2016): 205–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9685-4.
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Bakhurst, David. "Categorical Moral Requirements." Kantian journal 41, no. 1 (2022): 40–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2022-1-2.
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This paper defends the doctrine that moral requirements are categorical in nature. My point of departure is John McDowell’s 1978 essay, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?”, in which McDowell argues, against Philippa Foot, that moral reasons are not conditional upon agents’ desires and are, in a certain sense, inescapable. After expounding McDowell’s view, exploring his idea that moral requirements “silence” other considerations and discussing its particularist ethos, I address an objection that moral reasons, as McDowell conceives them, are fundamentally incomplete in ways only a full-bloodedly Kantian appeal to pure practical reason can remedy. I conclude that the objection fails: ordinary moral reasons do not stand in need of a grounding in Reason. There is no prospect of deriving them from a supreme principle of morality or other canons of rationality. Ordinary reasons are sufficient in themselves, though their significance can be elucidated and illuminated by various strategies — some broadly Aristotelian, some drawing inspiration from Kant’s formula of humanity — in ways that can strengthen and vindicate them. Notwithstanding the failure of the objection, I conclude by reflecting on how Kantian insights can yet play a significant role in a McDowellian view of moral deliberation and moral education.
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Thomason, Krista K. "Shame and Contempt in Kant's Moral Theory." Kantian Review 18, no. 2 (June 4, 2013): 221–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s136941541300006x.
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AbstractAttitudes like shame and contempt seem to be at odds with basic tenets of Kantian moral theory. I argue on the contrary that both attitudes play a central role in Kantian morality. Shame and contempt are attitudes that protect our love of honour, or the esteem we have for ourselves as moral persons. The question arises: how are these attitudes compatible with Kant's claim that all persons deserve respect? I argue that the proper object of shame and contempt is not the humanity within a person, but rather her self-conceit, or the false esteem that competes with love of honour.
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Maliks, Reidar. "Kant, the State, and Revolution." Kantian Review 18, no. 1 (February 4, 2013): 29–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415412000271.
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AbstractThis paper argues that, although no resistance or revolution is permitted in the Kantian state, very tyrannical regimes must not be obeyed because they do not qualify as states. The essay shows how a state ceases to be a state, argues that persons have a moral responsibility to judge about it and defends the compatibility of this with Kantian authority. The reconstructed Kantian view has implications for how we conceive authority and obligation. It calls for a morally demanding definition of the state and asserts that the primary personal responsibility is not to evaluate the morality of every single law but to evaluate the moral standing of the polity.
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Hill, Thomas E. "Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Constructivism." Social Philosophy and Policy 18, no. 2 (2001): 300–329. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500002995.
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Epistemology, as I understand it, is a branch of philosophy especially concerned with general questions about how we can know various things or at least justify our beliefs about them. It questions what counts as evidence and what are reasonable sources of doubt. Traditionally, episte-mology focuses on pervasive and apparently basic assumptions covering a wide range of claims to knowledge or justified belief rather than very specific, practical puzzles. For example, traditional epistemologists ask “How do we know there are material objects?” and not “How do you know which are the female beetles?” Similarly, moral epistemology, as I understand it, is concerned with general questions about how we can know or justify our beliefs about moral matters. Its focus, again, is on quite general, pervasive, and apparently basic assumptions about what counts as evidence, what are reasonable sources of doubt, and what are the appropriate procedures for justifying particular moral claims.
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Ginther, Logan. "Kantian Objectivism and Subject-Relative Well-Being." Dialogue 61, no. 3 (December 2022): 407–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217322000269.
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AbstractWhen discussing well-being, subject-relative concerns are intuitively important ones. In this article, I argue that Immanuel Kant's theory of well-being can be satisfactorily subject-relative, despite his emphasis on objective moral well-being. Because the specifics of agents’ situations affect agents’ moral endowments, duties regarding moral well-being can be altered for subject-relative reasons. When it comes to thinking about the well-being of others, the important Kantian notion of respect for rational agents ensures that this will be decidedly subject-relative, too, and, what is more, that this will be aimed specifically at natural well-being (happiness).
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Ballet, Jerôme, and Patrick Jolivet. "A Propos de l'Économie Kantienne." Social Science Information 42, no. 2 (June 2003): 185–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0539018403042002002.
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Kantian moral philosophy has become a reference sometimes invoked in economics as an example of a solution to the problem of co-ordinating agents. The present article provides a critical overview of the literature. Kantian economics refers to a set of principles that are more or less related to Kant's moral philosophy. The first in the set is the principle of generalization. It is the foundation of an ordinary Kantism. The distinction between the principle of generalization and the principle of reciprocity underscores the importance of the principle of unconditionality. Finally, the notion of commitment is closer to this philosophy, but used in a broader sense. It can give rise to different interpretations.
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Moyar, Dean. "Unstable Autonomy: Conscience and Judgment in Kant's Moral Philosophy." Journal of Moral Philosophy 5, no. 3 (2008): 327–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552408x369709.
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AbstractIn this paper I argue that Kant's claims about conscience in his moral writings of the 1790s reveal a fundamental instability in his moral philosophy. The central issue is the relationship between the moral law as the form of universality and the judgment of individuals about specific cases. Against Thomas Hill's claim that Kant has only a limited role for conscience, I argue that conscience has a comprehensive role in Kantian deliberation. I unpack the claims about conscience in the Metaphysics of Morals to show that they describe conscience as both a basic act of self-consciousness and as an all-things-considered judgment. I outline the role of conscience in moral motivation, and argue that taken together Kant's writings about conscience reveal a way to rethink Kant's conception of the Fact of Reason.
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O’Hagan, Emer. "Moral Self-Knowledge in Kantian Ethics." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12, no. 5 (June 4, 2009): 525–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-009-9181-7.
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Brusotti, Marco. "Die Autonomie des ,souveränen Individuums‘ in Nietzsches Genealogie der Moral." Nietzsche-Studien 48, no. 1 (November 1, 2019): 26–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nietzstu-2019-0003.
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Abstract The second essay of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals introduces the ‘sovereign individual’ as ‘responsible’, ‘autonomous’ and ‘free’. Does this affirmative use of moral terminology reveal an unexpected affinity between Nietzsche’s thought and philosophical modernity? In the last decades, this issue has been at the heart of a vast and controversial debate. My analysis shows that, rather than throwing light on Nietzsche’s general position, the specific use of Kantian terms in this passage of GM is due to a polemical intention. Implicitly, Nietzsche rejects Eduard von Hartmann’s criticism of the ‘absolute sovereignty of the individual’. The author of the Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins (1879) sees the most radical herald of this ‘sovereignty’ in Max Stirner. From Nietzsche’s point of view, Hartmann’s rejection and Stirner’s affirmation share a reductive conception of ‘sovereignty’. Reinterpreting and ‘revaluing’ Kant’s moral terminology, Nietzsche aims to give an interpretation of individual sovereignty that is at the same time antithetical to Stirner’s and wholly at odds with Hartmann’s ethical views. In showing this, the paper gives a new answer to an old question; for already in the 1890s, Hartmann himself, accusing Nietzsche of plagiarizing Stirner, raised the issue of the historical relationship between the two philosophers. More generally, the paper shows that Nietzsche employs a specific textual strategy, which consists in taking Kantian terms in an ‘anti-Kantian’ sense and systematically cultivating the art of using ‘a moral formula in a supramoral sense’.
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Woo, Jaeha. "On the Need for Distinctive Christian Moral Psychologies." Forum Philosophicum 28, no. 1 (June 22, 2023): 149–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2023.2801.08.
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I show how those with Kantian habits of mind—those committed to maintaining certain kinds of universality in ethics—can still get involved in the project of securing the distinctiveness of Christian ethics by highlighting parts of his moral philosophy that are amenable to this project. I first describe the interaction among James Gustafson, Stanley Hauerwas, and Samuel Wells surrounding the issue of the distinctiveness of Christian ethics, to explain why Kant is generally understood as the opponent of this project in this discourse. Then I lay out his discussions of how his moral argument for postulating divine existence can have beneficial moral-psychological results, and of how we can find moral satisfaction, the sense of pleasure in our moral strivings, as two elements in his moral philosophy that can be turned into a distinctively Christian ethics with revisions that should be allowed within the broad confines of Kantian moral philosophy. I also point out that his own answer to the question of moral satisfaction is already distinctively Christian, in that it is inspired by the Christian tenets of the imputation of righteousness and the assurance of salvation.
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LOUDEN, ROBERT B. "Kantian Moral Humility: Between Aristotle and Paul." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75, no. 3 (November 2007): 632–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00098.x.
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Cadilha, Susana, and Francisco Lisboa. "Vulnerabilities in Kantian Constructivism: Why they Matter for Objective Normativity." Kant Yearbook 14, no. 1 (September 28, 2022): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2022-0001.
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Abstract In section 1 we present moral constructivism as a metaphysical project which grounds moral norms in the attitude of valuing by rational agents. In section 2 we establish that Kantian Constructivism – opposed to Humean Constructivism – seeks objective and universal moral norms through a process of rational construction and ratification of norms that does not draw on any kind of subjective attitude of valuing. In section 3 we explore whether Kant is a moral constructivist or moral realist, arguing that he might be read as a proto-moral constructivist whose formulas impose standards of correctness upon our moral judgments, from which we formulate moral norms as necessary facts of reason. In section 4 we argue that: 1) vulnerabilities have moral relevance which adds merit to the project of finding objective moral norms, and 2) the inclusion of vulnerabilities as empirical contingencies is compatible with Kantian Constructivism. We do so by considering vulnerabilities a constitutive aspect of finite rational agents which must, therefore, be implied and considered in the process of moral construction.
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Gauthier, Jeffrey A. "Schiller's Critique of Kant's Moral Psychology: Reconciling Practical Reason and an Ethics of Virtue." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27, no. 4 (December 1997): 513–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1997.10717484.
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Mention of the name of Friedrich Schiller among both critics and defenders of Kant's moral philosophy has most often been with reference to the well known quip:“Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure.Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person.““Sure, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely,And then with aversion to do what your duty enjoins you.''This attention, however, has served to obscure the fact that Schiller truly intended his remark as a joke, representing a serious, if understandable, misinterpretation of Kantian morality. Though Schiller's various attempts to articulate a theory of moral motivation include important divergences from Kant's account, they represent a response to a set of problems that arise in the context of Kantian moral theory. As such, they may be of greatest interest to moralists who are working within the Kantian tradition. In this paper, I clarify certain points of Schiller's critique of Kant's account of moral motivation and place them in the context of his broader project of reconciling Kantianism and an ethics of virtue.
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Perov, Vadim Yu. "Kantian moral universalism, the “Enlightenment Project” and experimental ethics." SHS Web of Conferences 161 (2023): 03006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202316103006.
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The main ideas of Kant’s moral philosophy were embodied in what can be called the “Enlightenment Project”. Kant’s calls for freedom, nti-paternalism and the requirement of abandonment of concern for moral behaviour are associated with ethical ideas of autonomy, the categorical imperative, negative and positive freedom, the universality of morality in relation to the human being as a rational actor etc. These ideas are consistent with the ideals of the “Enlightenment Project”. The following ideals can be distinguished: 1) the ideal of classical scientific rationality; 2) the idea of “pure reason”; 3) free, equal and autonomous individuals; 4) moral universalism; 5) the creation of a united human civilisation; 6) the ideals of moral progress and universal happiness. In contemporary philosophy and ethics the main objects of criticism are the ideals of a free and autonomous individual, as well as ideas about the possibility of the existence of universal morality. In the context of the discussion of the possibility of the existenceof rationally justified universal morality and the existing moral pluralism, the results of the experimental on-line research of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) – “Moral Machine” – are interesting. The analysis of the results of this study shows the possibility of the existence of different types of rational universality (scientific-epistemological and moral). But while scientific universality requires theoretical unity of empirical data, moral universality firstly allows pluralism of norms and values and, secondly, requires a generalised normative regulation ofempirical moral diversity.
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Timmermann, Jens. "Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 95, no. 1 (January 2013): 36–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/agph-2013-0002.
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Abstract: This paper explores the possibility of moral conflict in Kant’s ethics. An analysis of the only explicit discussion of the topic in his published writings confirms that there is no room for genuine moral dilemmas. Conflict is limited to nonconclusive ‘grounds’ of obligation. They arise only in the sphere of ethical duty and, though defeasible, ought to be construed as the result of valid arguments an agent correctly judges to apply in the situation at hand. While it is difficult to determine in theory what makes some of them stronger than others, these ‘grounds’ can account for practical residue in conflict cases and for a plausible form of agent regret. The principle that ‘ought implies can’ survives intact.
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Jay, Christopher. "The Kantian Moral Hazard Argument for religious fictionalism." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75, no. 3 (November 10, 2013): 207–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-013-9435-0.
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Hill, Thomas E. "MORAL CONSTRUCTION AS A TASK: SOURCES AND LIMITS." Social Philosophy and Policy 25, no. 1 (December 20, 2007): 214–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052508080084.
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This essay first distinguishes different questions regarding moral objectivity and relativism and then sketches a broadly Kantian position on two of these questions. First, how, if at all, can we derive, justify, or support specific moral principles and judgments from more basic moral standards and values? Second, how, if at all, can the basic standards such as my broadly Kantian perspective, be defended? Regarding the first question, the broadly Kantian position is that from ideas in Kant's later formulations of the Categorical Imperative, especially human dignity and rational autonomous law-making, we can develop an appropriate moral perspective for identifying and supporting more specific principles. Both the deliberative perspective and the derivative principles can be viewed as “constructed,” but in different senses. In response to the second question, the essay examines two of Kant's strategies for defending his basic perspective and the important background of his arguments against previous moral theories.
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Micic, Stefan. "The question of personal identity: Kant and Kantian perspectives." Theoria, Beograd 66, no. 2 (2023): 17–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2302017m.
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In this paper, we will be examining the question of personal identity in the context of Immanuel Kant?s philosophy, as well as among contemporary Kantian thinkers such as Christine Korsgaard. Our investigation will focus primarily on those aspects of the issue that are relevant to moral philosophy. While some may believe that personal identity is not a primary concern of philosophy, or that it does not merit extensive discussion, we argue that it is indeed a significant philosophical question, particularly in the context of moral philosophy. Our inquiry will begin with Kant?s theoretical philosophy, specifically his transcendental deduction of categories and his treatment of paralogisms, as we aim to gain a deeper understanding of Kant?s views on personal identity. Following our analysis of the relevant parts of Kant?s work, we will then turn to the contemporary Kantian thinker Kristin Korsgaard, who has offered critiques of Derek Parfit?s understanding of personal identity.
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Shi, Weimin. "A Curious Case of Cultural Encounter: The Appropriation of Kant’s Philosophy through Contemporary Neo-Confucianism." Culture and Dialogue 10, no. 2 (November 29, 2022): 129–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24683949-12340122.
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Abstract In this paper, Mou Zongsan’s (牟宗三, 1909–1995 CE) Kantian interpretation of Confucianism will be surveyed with a focus on Mou’s ideas of moral metaphysics and autonomy. After a brief account of the development of Confucianism up to the Song dynasty (960–1279 CE) and Ming dynasty (1368–1644 CE) (§1) and some initial attempts to articulate Confucian ideas in terms of Western philosophy (§2), Mou’s Kantian interpretation of Confucianism will be presented in §3 and criticized in §4. It is argued that Mou uses the Kantian dichotomy of autonomy and heteronomy to describe the traditional rivalry between two primary schools of Neo-Confucianism. While Mou neglects Kant’s claim that the autonomy of the will gives the principle by means of which it is to determine the content of the moral law, he appeals to Kant’s idea that human beings as free agents are members of the intelligible world to propose a Confucian moral metaphysics. In §5, Mou’s Confucianism’s metaphysical and religious characteristics are further criticized.
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Nuyen, A. T. "The Heart of the Kantian Moral Agent." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69, no. 1 (1995): 51–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq19956912.
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Bai, Tongdong. "Between and beyond Consequentialism and Deontology: Reflections on Mencius’ Moral Philosophy." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 49, no. 4 (December 28, 2022): 373–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-12340080.
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Abstract Mencius’s account of the yi-li (righteousness-benefit) distinction is important in his moral philosophy, and is often compared with consequentialism or deontology in Western moral philosophy. After showing the problems with a naïve deontological reading and a sophisticated consequentialist reading of Mencius, I will argue that both a really sophisticated consequentialist reading and a non-Kantian deontological reading are more defensible. But they couldn’t address the inequality hidden in Mencius’s moral philosophy, making a Nietzschean reading possible. However, Mencius embraced compassion as a key virtue, which Nietzsche would reject. Mencius’s moral philosophy is doubly bifurcated and different from consequentialism, deontology, and also Nietzsche’s philosophy.
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Palatnik, Nataliya. "Kantian Agents and their Significant Others." Kantian Review 23, no. 2 (May 16, 2018): 285–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415418000067.
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AbstractCritics of Kant’s moral philosophy often object that his emphasis on individual autonomy makes him unable to account for our ‘second-personal’ or ‘bipolar’ duties. These are duties we owe to other people rather than duties we have with respect to them – as we might have duties with respect to the environment or works of art. With a recent and novel formulation of this objection as my foil, I argue that the apparent force of the ‘bipolarity’ objections rests on a failure to appreciate Kant’s inherently practical approach to ethics. On the positive side, reflection on criticisms of Kant’s treatment of ‘bipolar’ normativity helps to shed new light on his conception of practical agency and its place in his system of morals.
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Lima, Erick C. de. "CRÍTICA DA MORAL DEONTOLÓGICA NO JOVEM HEGEL." Síntese: Revista de Filosofia 35, no. 113 (April 6, 2010): 361. http://dx.doi.org/10.20911/21769389v35n113p361-380/2008.
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A freqüência com que a crítica hegeliana ao suposto formalismo da ética kantiana tem retornado em diversas ramificações da discussão éticopolítica contemporânea, em especial a partir da década de 1970, cria um ensejo oportuno para um reexame da primeira tentativa de Hegel de “superar” a filosofia prática de Kant: o programa arquitetado em Frankfurt, baseado no conceito de amor e que, graças a este embasamento, realça o sentido “comunitário” da Aufhebung do ponto de vista moral na “eticidade”. Pretende-se aqui, primeiramente, resgatar aspectos gerais da relação entre as investigações do jovem Hegel e a crítica ao idealismo kantiano-fichteano. Em seguida, partido do arcabouço geral da interpretação hegeliana do cristianismo, a intenção é interpretar a crítica da moral deontológica a partir do conceito de amor em Geist des Christentums.Abstract: With the profound renewal of political philosophy that happened since the 1970s, the objection of “empty formalism” directed by Hegel against Kant’s moral theory has been returning to the contemporary philosophical debate over the moral foundations of the political community. This fact raises interest in Hegel’s first attempt to overcome Kant’s practical philosophy: the project of a radical critique of deontological ethics that he planned in Frankfurt and was based on the concept of love, whose inherently intersubjective character underlines the social significance of what Hegel later conceived as the Aufhebung of the moral point of view in ethical life. Firstly, this paper aims to outline Hegel’s early critique of the Kantian-Fichtean idealism in the light of his historical philosophical investigations in Tübingen, Bern and Frankfurt. The second part is an attempt to reexamine the relationship between Hegel’s conception of love and his critique of deontological morality, as it is presented in Geist des Christentums.
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Kushner, Stanislav. "Ethical and legal doctrines in Russian neo-Kantianism (P.I. Novgorodtsev and B.A. Kistyakovsky)." Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 2, no. 3 (2021): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s271326680018217-8.
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The article is devoted to the analysis of the legal theories of P.I. Novgorodtsev and B.A. Kistyakovsky, based on the moral philosophy of I. Kant in comparison with the psychological theory of law of L.I. Petrazhitsky. The unity of the positions of Novgorodtsev and Kistyakovsky in focusing on the ethical aspects of law, as well as highlighting morality as the highest principle, is revealed. Attention is paid to the disclosure of neo-Kantian motives in the philosophy of law and in the context of the development of the theory of natural law in Russia. The main content of the article is a consistent analysis of Novgorodtsevʼs ideas in their dynamics, compared with the neo-Kantian philosophy of law of Kistyakovsky. It is emphasized that the psychological theory of the source of Petrazhitskyʼs legal relations is in the same intention of thought with the motives of the Russian neo-Kantians, which allows them to be compared in the history of the development of the Russian theory of law. The modern scientific literature is analyzed in order to identify the problem of comparing different approaches in the history of Russian philosophy of law, in which German transcendental philosophy is one of the key foundations. The question of the independence of Russian scientists in the construction of ethical and legal doctrines is actualized, but, at the same time, a single motive is emphasized with the Kantian provision on the need to establish a general civil society on the principles of a developed system of rules and norms.
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Sobarzo Morales, Mario. "La inflexión de la voluntad: Kant – Arendt." Hermenéutica Intercultural, no. 18-19 (March 24, 2014): 72. http://dx.doi.org/10.29344/07196504.18-19.555.
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Resumen:En el presente artículo, a partir de la tematización del problema de lavoluntad y sus implicancias en la determinación del juicio moral, se sitúaa Kant como un autor privilegiado para pensar la política. Esto, pues según Hannah Arendt, Kant fue el único entre los grandes pensadores que no tuvo inclinación a obnubilarse teórica ni prácticamente con latiranía.El título de esta ponencia y su epígrafe hacen alusión al problemade la voluntad y su manifestación en la temporalidad humana: el aquíy ahora latino “hic et nunc”. A partir de esta temática se despliega unatriple inflexión de la voluntad que termina en el rechazo kantiano de la política entendida como ejercicio de la prudencia, reemplazándola porun imperativo de la voluntad autodeterminada racionalmente. Este concepto llegaría a ser central en las futuras corrientes filosófico-políticas quesustentan su accionar en la deliberación y la racionalidad comunicativa.Palabras clave: Filosofía política – voluntad – autoritarismo – imperativos kantianos – juicio.Abstract:This article, from its transformation into a subject matter, the problem of will and its consequences in the determination of moral judgment sets Kant as a privileged author in politics thinking. This is due to, according Hannah Arendt, Kant was the only one among the great thinkers that had no intention to feel dazzle, neither theoretically nor practically, with tyranny. The title of this paper and its epigraph refer to the problem of will and its expression in human temporality: the latin here and now “hic et nunc”. From this subject is figured out a triple inflection of will that ends at Kantian rejection to politics, understood as the exercise of prudence; replacing it by a rational self-determined will imperative. This concept would be essential in future philosophic-politic trends that sustain their action in the deliberation and communicative rationality.Keywords: Politic philosophy – will – authoritarianism – Kantian impe- ratives – judgment
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Werner, Preston J. "How Naive Is Contentful Moral Perception?" Philosophies 8, no. 3 (May 31, 2023): 49. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8030049.
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According to contentful moral perception (CMP), moral properties can be perceived in the same sense as tables, tigers, and tomatoes. Recently, Heather Logue (2012) has distinguished between two potential ways of perceiving a property. A Kantian Property (KP) in perception is one in which a perceiver’s access involves a detection of the property via a representational vehicle. A Berkeleyan Property (BP) in perception is one in which a perceiver’s access to the property involves that property as partly constitutive of the experience itself. In this paper, I set aside generalized arguments in favor of one view or another, and instead ask whether proponents of CMP have reasons to understand moral perception as Kantian or Berkeleyan. I explore three possible explanatory differences—(a) explaining the intrinsic motivating force of moral perceptions, (b) providing a metasemantics for moral properties, and (c) providing an epistemology of the normative authority of moral properties.
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Timmermann, Jens. "Simplicity and Authority: Reflections on Theory and Practice in Kant's Moral Philosophy." Journal of Moral Philosophy 4, no. 2 (2007): 167–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1740468107079248.
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AbstractWhat is the proper task of Kantian ethical theory? This paper seeks to answer this question with reference to Kant's reply to Christian Garve in Section I of his 1793 essay on Theory and Practice. Kant reasserts the distinctness and natural authority of our consciousness of the moral law. Every mature human being is a moral professional—even philosophers like Garve, if only they forget about their ill-conceived ethical systems and listen to the voice of pure practical reason. Normative theory, Kant argues, cannot be refuted with reference to alleged experience. It is the proper task of the moral philosopher to emphasize this fact. The paper also discusses Kant's attempts to clarify his moral psychology, philosophy of value and conception of the highest good in the course of replying to Garve's challenge.
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Noreikaitė, Aistė. "Between Kantian Rationalism and Moral Mysticism: The Search for the Grounding of Morality in the Philosophy of A. Jokubaitis." Politologija, no. 97 (May 19, 2020): 73–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/polit.2020.97.3.
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Although it is common to associate the thought of A. Jokubaitis with political philosophy, this article argues that his texts also allow us to talk about a specific moral philosophy of A. Jokubaitis. At the center of it we find an attempt to articulate and discuss the grounding ideas of morality. The article argues that the first two ideas – an idea of unconditional character of morality and an idea of ontological grounding – are related to Kant’s influence on A. Jokubaitis philosophy. These two ideas allow us to explain morality as an autonomous part of reality, which is different from the empirical one but nonetheless real. This part of reality is grounded in the first-person perspective of a moral subject and can be characterized by implicit normativity and unconditionality. The first-person perspective structures a radically different relation to our reality, which allows us to be agents, not simply spectators. Such an interpretation of Kant allows to associate A. Jokubaitis with his contemporary Kantians, such as Ch. Korsgaard, B. Herman, O. O’Neill, and A. Reath. However, the third idea, the one of a person, which becomes more visible in his book Politinis idiotas, transcends the Kantian conception of practical reason and encourages to perceive morality and its grounding in a much wider context. The concept of a person allows A. Jokubaitis to distance himself from Kantian rationalism and integrate social and mystical aspects of morality, which he has always found important.
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Bonadyseva, Polina R. "The Ethics of the Categorical Imperative. Lossky under the Influence of Kant." Kantian journal 41, no. 4 (2022): 60–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2022-4-3.
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The Russian intuitivist philosopher Nikolay Lossky repeatedly admitted Kant’s substantial formative influence on him as a scholar. Moreover, Lossky was a disciple of the Russian Kantian Aleksander Vvedensky, and was one of the most successful translators of the first Critique. However, his own philosophical project is rather the opposite of the critical programme. While in the framework of Lossky’s epistemology the specificities of his reading of Kant have received a fair amount of attention in Russian scholarship, in the ethical field the Russian philosopher’s comments on Kant have passed largely unnoticed. My task is to reveal the link between Kant’s practical philosophy and Lossky’s ethics. A demonstration of the degree of Kant’s influence in this field will enlarge and concretise the current thinking about Lossky’s perception of Kant. We are looking at a whole range of parallels and borrowings. My comparative analysis focuses on the following aspects: 1) definition and uses of the term “categorical imperative”, 2) free will as the condition of the possibility of moral action, 3) the cause of moral evil, 4) the role of the idea of God in ethics. As a result, I reveal how Lossky used elements of Kant’s practical philosophy as conceptual, terminological and rhetorical resources in his theonomic ethics, and how the Russian philosopher interpreted them in line with his own doctrine. I argue that Lossky’s use of the Kantian moral terminology is incautious and debatable and point out several intersections of ethical argumentations in the light of its projection on radically different ontological and epistemological principles.
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Gilabert, Pablo. "Kantian Dignity and Marxian Socialism." Kantian Review 22, no. 4 (November 29, 2017): 553–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415417000279.
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AbstractThis article offers an account of human dignity based on a discussion of Kant’s moral and political philosophy and then shows its relevance for articulating and developing in a fresh way some normative dimensions of Marx’s critique of capitalism as involving exploitation, domination and alienation, and the view of socialism as involving a combination of freedom and solidarity. What is advanced here is not Kant’s own conception of dignity, but an account that partly builds on that conception and partly criticizes it. The same is the case with the account of socialism in relation to Marx’s work. As articulated, Kantian dignity and Marxian socialism turn out to be quite appealing and mutually supportive.
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FRIERSON, PATRICK. "The Moral Philosophy of Maria Montessori." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7, no. 2 (2021): 133–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.41.
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AbstractThis paper lays out the moral theory of philosopher and educator Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Based on a moral epistemology wherein moral concepts are grounded in a well-cultivated moral sense, Montessori develops a threefold account of moral life. She starts with an account of character as an ideal of individual self-perfection through concentrated attention on effortful work. She shows how respect for others grows from and supplements individual character, and she further develops a notion of social solidarity that goes beyond cooperation toward shared agency. Partly because she attends to children's ethical lives, Montessori highlights how character, respect, and solidarity all appear first as prereflective, embodied orientations of agency. Full moral virtue takes up prereflective orientations reflectively and extends them through moral concepts. Overall, Montessori's ethic improves on features similar to some in Nietzschean, Kantian, Hegelian, or Aristotelian ethical theories while situating these within a developmental and perfectionist ethics.