Academic literature on the topic 'Kantian Moral Philosophy'
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Journal articles on the topic "Kantian Moral Philosophy"
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Xu, Bowen. "Autonomy and Moral Emotion A Response to the Conciliatory Proposition of Kant`s Morality." Communications in Humanities Research 7, no. 1 (October 31, 2023): 31–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2753-7064/7/20230755.
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German philosopher Kant, in his moral philosophy, made a clear distinction between categorical imperative and hypothetical imperative. Under his three propositions of morality, Kant argued that only actions motivated by maxims (or moral principles) rather than any other emotional feelings could produce moral worth. Since then, the criticism from Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and a series of reconciling propositions from other later scholars such as Paten, Henson towards such Kantian dichotomy have never ended. This sets the main focus of my article.The article is divided into three parts: the first part expounds the content and ethical basis of Kantian philosophy by explaining the epistemological gap between noumenon and phenomenon. The second part focuses on four different reconciling propositions proposed by Paton, Henson, Herman, and Allison as well as their shared issue: they all try to revise the conclusion within Kantian philosophy in a theory of motivation outside the Kantian philosophy. By tracing back to the three propositions and the relationship between autonomy and heteronomy, the last part offers the articles own argument: though Kant denies emotion as a motivation to produce moral worth, he does not exclude it from the inevitable concomitant from phenomena.
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Saturnino, Antonio Frederico. "O Problema da Fraqueza da Vontade na Filosofia Prática Kantiana." Analytica - Revista de Filosofia 21, no. 1 (March 20, 2018): 123–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.35920/arf.v21i1.16233.
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Resumo: O objetivo do presente artigo é analisar o problema da fraqueza da vontade no quadro conceitual da filosofia moral kantiana. A fim de realçar uma característica da filosofia kantiana relevante para a posição conceitual do problema, servimo-nos do contraste com as análises de Donald Davidson sobre o fenômeno da fraqueza da vontade. Depois de evidenciado o modo como o fenômeno pode ser admitido no sistema kantiano, procuramos defender uma hipótese quanto ao modo como ele poderia ser aí explicado. Trata-se da hipótese de que uma derivação desatenta e negligente a partir da Lei Moral poderia tornar compreensíveis os diversos estágios da maldade em sentido amplo do ser humano, e de que os dois primeiros estágios poderiam ser considerados correspondentes ao fenômeno usualmente chamado de fraqueza da vontade.Abstract: The aim of the present paper is to examine the problem of weakness of will in the conceptual framework of Kantian's moral philosophy. In order to present a feature of Kantian's philosophy which is important for the theoretical placing of the problem, I draw on the contrast with Davidson's analyses of the phenomenon of weakness of will. After indicating the way in which the phenomenon can be admitted in the Kantian system, I try to defend a hypothesis about the way in which it could be explained in this system. It is the hypothesis that an inattentive and negligent derivation from the Moral Law could explain the different stages of the evilness in broad sense of the human being, and that the two first stages can be judged correspondent to the phenomenon usually called weakness of will.
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Smyth, Nicholas. "Integration and authority: rescuing the ‘one thought too many’ problem." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48, no. 6 (December 2018): 812–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1415105.
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AbstractFour decades ago, Bernard Williams accused Kantian moral theory of providing agents with ‘one thought too many’. The general consensus among contemporary Kantians is that this objection has been decisively answered. In this paper, I reconstruct the problem, showing that Williams was not principally concerned with how agents are to think in emergency situations, but rather with how moral theories are to be integrated into recognizably human lives. I show that various Kantian responses to Williams provide inadequate materials for solving this ‘integration problem’, and that they are correspondingly ill-positioned to account for the authority of morality, as Williams suspected all along.
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Stark, Susan. "A Change of Heart: Moral Emotions, Transformation, and Moral Virtue." Journal of Moral Philosophy 1, no. 1 (2004): 31–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/174046810400100105.
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AbstractInspired in part by a renewed attention to Aristotle's moral philosophy, philosophers have acknowledged the important role of the emotions in morality. Nonetheless, precisely how emotions matter to morality has remained contentious. Aristotelians claim that moral virtue is constituted by correct action and correct emotion. But Kantians seem to require solely that agents do morally correct actions out of respect for the moral law. There is a crucial philosophical disagreement between the Aristotelian and Kantian moral outlooks: namely, is feeling the correct emotions necessary to virtue or is it an optional extra, which is permitted but not required. I argue that there are good reasons for siding with the Aristotelians: virtuous agents must experience the emotions appropriate to their situations. Moral virtue requires a change of heart.
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Reath, Andrews. "Kantian Constructivism and Kantian Constitutivism: Some Reflections." Kant Yearbook 14, no. 1 (September 28, 2022): 45–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kantyb-2022-0003.
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Abstract Is moral constructivism an account of the basis of the content of morality or of its authority? In fact, different writers have understood constructivism to be addressing different issues. In this paper I argue that Kant should be understood as a constructivist about the content of morality – or better about a limited set of general substantive principles – and as a constititutivist about its authority. After some general remarks in Section 1 about contemporary discussions of constructivism, in Section 2 I discuss Rawls’s understanding of Kant’s constructivism; Rawls takes Kantian constructivism to be a view about the content of morality. In Section 3, I give an overview of Kant’s moral conception as constructivist about the content of morality and as constitutivist about its authority. In Section 4 I address a worry whether certain features of Kant’s constitutivism rest his constructivism on a realist foundation, arguing that they do not.
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AJEI, Martin Odei, and Katrin A. FLIKSCHUH. "Kantian ethics and African philosophy." Estudos Kantianos [EK] 9, no. 2 (January 19, 2022): 117–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2318-0501.2021.v9n2.p117.
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African philosophers have long engaged with Kant’s practical philosophy. Since the 1980s, much of this engagement has been with Kant’s anthropology of race and its role in the theoretical foundations of racism and European colonization. Our paper departs from this latter orientation by examining Ghanaian philosophical reflections on the Categorical Imperative, which Kant sets out as the supreme principle of practical reason. We assess this critique, and conclude that while the Ghanaian philosophers accept several aspects of Kantian ethics, they depart from Kant’s idealist metaphysics and associated dualistic conception of human nature. More specifically, while the Ghanaian philosophers accept Kant’s universalizability demands in relation to moral judgement, they also make a sustained case, contra Kant, in favour of the role of the emotions in moral motivation. The paper thus contributes to broader efforts underway to enrich the discourse on the reception of Kant’s philosophy in the global south.
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Flikschuh, Katrin. "Kant’s Contextualism." Kantian Review 23, no. 4 (November 21, 2018): 555–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415418000407.
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AbstractThis article builds on David Velleman’s recent work on moral relativism to argue that Kant’s account of moral judgement is best read in a contextualist manner. More specifically, I argue that while for Kant the form of moral judgement is invariant, substantive moral judgements are nonetheless context-dependent. The same form of moral willing can give rise to divergent substantive judgements. To some limited extent, Kantian contextualism is a development out of Rawlsian constructivism. Yet while for constructivists the primary concern is with the derivation of generally valid principles of morality, Velleman’s Kant-inspired form of moral relativism demonstrates the indispensability to a Kantian approach of indexical reasons for action. I argue in turn that Velleman’s focus on the indexical nature of reasons for action must be supplemented by an account of agential reflexivity. The latter divides Kantian contextualism from Kantian relativism.
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Moore, A. W. "A Kantian View of Moral Luck." Philosophy 65, no. 253 (July 1990): 297–321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100057624.
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Some of the most interesting questions about Kant, and more particularly about his moral philosophy, arise when he is placed alongside the giants of antiquity. Where does he come together with Plato? Where with Aristotle? Where does he diverge from each?He comes together with Plato in a shared conception of Ideas. When he first outlines how he is using the term ‘Idea’ in the Critique of Pure Reason, he insists that he is using it in none other than its original Platonic sense; and he explains away certain discrepancies with the comment:It is by no means unusual… to find that we understand [an author] better than he has understood himself. As he has not sufficiently determined his concept, he has sometimes spoken… in opposition to his own intention.
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Hill, Thomas E. "A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules." Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 285. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214249.
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Dmitrieva, Nina A. "Polemics and Popularisation: Aspects of Kant’s Early Reception in Russia." Voprosy Filosofii, no. 12 (2022): 105–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2022-12-105-113.
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The reception of Kant’s philosophy in Russia at the beginning of the 19th century was focused mainly on religious and ethical issues, although it did not exclude theoretical and cognitive questions. The search for textbooks that would adequately and at the same time comprehensibly introduce students and the educated public to the basic ideas of the Kantian philosophical system led two professors at Kazan University, Alexander S. Loubkin and Petr S. Kondyrev, to the textbook on philosophy for beginners by Friedrich Wilhelm Daniel Snell, the German Kantian philosopher, pedagogue and populariser. The work they did in preparing the Russian edition of that textbook was not confined to translation, although the translation of the philosophical text itself required scrupulous terminological work, since there were as yet no equivalents for many philosophical terms in Russian. Each of the translators provided parts of the textbook with their own explanations and additions, with the parts on moral philosophy and philosophy of religion attracting the most interest and polemical objections. Loubkin’s criticism of Snell and thus in most cases of Kant concerns such key concepts and provisions of Kantian practical philosophy as practical reason, the end of moral acts, the distinction between thing and person, the categorical imperative, the feeling of respect for the moral law and others. The real stumbling block for Loubkin was Kant’s solution to the problem of the relation between religion and morality and his choice of a foundation for morality. Loubkin suggests that the moral is grounded in religion and proposes as the criterion of morality the correspondence of an act to the Divine Will.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Kantian Moral Philosophy"
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Walsh, John. "The Fate of Kantian Freedom: the Kant-Reinhold Controversy." Scholar Commons, 2018. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/7714.
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This dissertation examines the relation of Kant’s theory of free will to that of K.L. Reinhold. I argue that Reinhold’s theory addresses several problems raised in the reception of Kant’s practical philosophy, particularly the problem of accounting for free immoral acts. Focusing on Reinhold’s account of free will as a condition for the conceivability of the moral law shows that the historical focus on Reinhold’s break from Kant’s own account and his alleged reliance on facts of consciousness obscures Reinhold’s decidedly ‘Kantian’ argument. This approach provides a new foundation for free will and demonstrates the significance of Reinhold’s practical philosophy as an attempted corrective to Kant.
Chapter 1 examines the influence of Rehberg, Ulrich, and Schmid on Kant’s and Reinhold’s respective theories of free will. Chapter 2 investigates the epistemic foundation of Reinhold’s theory of free will and, contrary to the dominant view in scholarship, argues that his account is not based merely on facts of consciousness. Chapter 3 illuminates a tension between the phenomenology of moral agency and Kant’s account of free agency. It is argued that while Kant talks about overcoming inclinations and adopting maxims by virtue of their lawful form, which would seemingly have to take place at the phenomenal level and be available to consciousness, Kant’s account of free agency is restricted to the noumenal, which precludes availability to consciousness. Reinhold’s theory of free will avoids this tension by positing consciousness of possible courses of action as a necessary condition for self-determination to one such action. Chapter 4 discusses the relation of Reinhold’s theory of free will to Kant’s Religion, a text that Reinhold uses as a basis for his charge that Kant’s theory is either “unintelligible” or “untenable.” I argue that although Reinhold fundamentally misunderstands Kant’s doctrine of supreme maxim adoption, Reinhold is correct in his assertion that Kant is committed to the thesis that the free spontaneity of the power of choice is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Chapter 5 explicates the Kant-Reinhold Controversy to argue that given Kant’s own commitment to the conditions for moral responsibility, Reinhold was ultimately correct that free will ought to be defined as choosing for or against the moral law.
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Duffy, Simon J. "An intuitionist response to moral scepticism : a critique of Mackie's scepticism, and an alternative proposal combining Ross's intuitionism with a Kantian epistemology." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1724.
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This thesis sets out an argument in defence of moral objectivism. It takes Mackie as the critic of objectivism and it ends by proposing that the best defence of objectivism may be found in what I shall call Kantian intuitionism, which brings together elements of the intuitionism of Ross and a Kantian epistemology. The argument is fundamentally transcendental in form and it proceeds by first setting out what we intuitively believe, rejecting the sceptical attacks on those beliefs, and by then proposing a theory that can legitimize what we already do believe. Chapter One sets out our intuitive understanding of morality: (1) that morality is cognitive, moral beliefs can be true or false; (2) that morality is real, we do not construct it; (3) that morality is rational, we can learn about it by rational investigation; and (4) that morality places us under an absolute constraint. The chapter ends by clarifying the nature of that absolute demand and by arguing that the critical idea within morality is the idea of duty. In Chapter Two Mackie’s sceptical attack on objectivism is examined. Four key arguments are identified: (1) that moral beliefs are relative to bfferent agents; (2) that morality is based upon on non-rational causes; (3) that the idea of moral properties or entities is too queer to be sustainable; and (4) that moral objectivism involves queer epistemological commitments. Essentially all of these arguments are shown to be ambiguous; however it is proposed that Mackie has an underlying epistemological and metaphysical theory, scientific empiricism, which is (a) hostile to objectivism and (b) a theory that many find attractive for reasons that are independent of morality. Chapter Three explores the nature of moral rationality and whether scientific empiricism can use the idea of reflective equilibrium to offer a reasonable account of moral rationality. It concludes that, while reflective equilibrium is a useful account of moral rationality, it cannot be effectively reconciled with scientific empiricism. In order to function effectively as a rational process, reflective equilibrium must be rationally constrained by our moral judgements and our moral principles. Chapter Four begins the process of exploring some alternative epistemologies and argues that the only account that remains true to objectivism and the needs of reflective equilibrium is the account of intuitionism proposed by Ross. However this account can be developed further by drawing upon number of Kantian ideas and using them to supplement Ross ’ s intuitionism. So Chapter Five draws upon a number of Kant's ideas, most notably some key notions from the Critique of Judgement. These ideas are: (1) that we possess a rational will that is subject to the Moral law and determined by practical reason; (2) that we possess a faculty of judgement which enables us to become aware of moral properties and (3) that these two faculties together with the third faculty of thought can function to constitute the moral understanding. Using these ideas the thesis explores whether they can serve to explain how intuitions can be rational and how objectivism can be justified.
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Miller, Maggie. "A Preference for Freedom: Kantian Implications for an Incompatibilist Will and Practical Accountability." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1228.
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This thesis aims to provide a coherent account of free will and practical grounds to prefer it. Its goal is to develop a pragmatic understanding of agency by which to hold individuals morally accountable. The paper begins with a critique of P.F. Strawson, whose seminal paper “Freedom and Resentment” bypasses the question of free will altogether in its claims about morality. Subsequently, it proceeds to a defense of incompatibilism that traces an argument through the existing literature. From this position, it claims that neither Strawson nor traditional compatibilists can provide an account of morality that is reliable or well enough defined to play the role required of it.
Instead of being left with hard determinism, however, Kant opens the door to a metaphysics that exists outside of our epistemological limits. Rather then derive an account based on this metaphysics, the necessary characteristics of a free will are derived from an account of morality and proven to be possible using Kantian epistemology. The paper concludes by positing three distinct reasons to prefer a free will framework to a deterministic framework, provided our inability to answer the question empirically. These draw on Pascal’s Wager, William James’ “The Will to Believe,” and inference to the best explanation.
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Crews-Anderson, Timothy Alan. "The Impossibility of Evil Qua Evil: Kantian Limitations on Human Immorality." unrestricted, 2006. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-07212006-172111/.
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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2006.Title from title screen. Melissa Merritt, committee chair; Andrew Altman, Andrew J. Cohen, committee members. Electronic text (44 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Apr. 19, 2007. Includes bibliographical references.
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Jamader, Sahabuddin Ahamed. "Relation between ethics of duty and ethics of virtue : a critical study." Thesis, University of North Bengal, 2022. http://ir.nbu.ac.in/handle/123456789/4805.
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Coqueiro, Itanielson Sampaio. "Moralidade e felicidade: uma análise da teleologia moral kantiana." www.teses.ufc.br, 2011. http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/6526.
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COQUEIRO, Itanielson Sampaio. Moralidade e felicidade: uma análise da teleologia moral kantiana. 2011. 141f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2011.Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-07T17:33:15Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2011-DIS-ISCOQUEIRO.pdf: 1154397 bytes, checksum: 012bdca7761d8256e5e9e7679b2c4173 (MD5)
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O presente texto faz uma analisa da teleologia moral kantiana enfatizando a relação existente entre moralidade e felicidade. Destaca-se a importância que tem a felicidade na consecução do Soberano Bem que é, por sua vez, a harmonia existente naquela relação. Além disso, afirma que em tal relação a moralidade tem a primazia sobre a felicidade, não sendo esta, portanto, o bem supremo de todo e qualquer agir humano, como pensara Aristóteles. O presente trabalho está dividido em três momentos. Por tal sistemática, busca-se delimitar o próprio objeto de estudo, com o fito de não se adentrar em problemas, que por si só, são passíveis de trabalhos específicos, como a história e a própria religião. E enfatiza-se a relação Natureza e Liberdade na qual destacamos que a filosofia prática de Kant está alicerçada no chão de sua filosofia teórica. E tal alicerce afirma que a ação humana, ação do sujeito que se pretende valorado enquanto um ser moral, não tem como princípio e fundamento, uma lei de natureza, visto que esta mesma exige o efeito sempre que for dada a causa. No segundo momento, intitulado Moralidade e Liberdade, destaca-se os principais conceitos da filosofia prática de Kant com o objetivo claro de demonstrar que sem liberdade não há moralidade. Já no terceiro capítulo, intitulado Moralidade e Felicidade, analisa-se o télos da moral kantiana. Para isso, percorre-se o caminho que o próprio filósofo fizera em suas obras básicas de ética, Crítica da Razão Prática, Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes, Metafísica dos Costumes especificamente a Introdução e a segunda parte do texto intitulado Doutrina da Virtude e A Religião nos Limites da Simples Razão. Tal caminho nos faz perceber a religião como o fim ao qual a moral nos conduz necessariamente. Agora, abordando as questões metodológicas de nossa pesquisa destaca-se que o presente trabalho fora realizado, neste aspecto específico, em três momentos. Primeiramente realizou-se o estudo sistemático das obras clássicas, do filósofo em questão já citadas, realizando-se anotações, fichamentos e resumos; no segundo momento fez-se a pesquisa bibliográfica acerca da literatura secundária ou dos comentadores do referido filósofo; após tal processo de levantamento e pesquisa bibliográfica adentramos, já no terceiro momento, na construção deste texto dissertativo, que agora vos apresentamos.
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Ruas, Gonçalo Nunes Barrilaro. "Moral e política: o princípio da autonomia e o reino dos fins na Filosofia Kantiana." Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-01072015-135433/.
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O estudo do princípio da autonomia, conceito central na filosofia moral de Kant, permite compreender a origem da lei moral. A fórmula da autonomia prescreve que a lei moral é fruto da vontade e não depende de fatores externos: nós somos colegisladores de uma lei a que nos submetemos. A tese da unidade do imperativo categórico assevera que o imperativo categórico é uno e apenas um. Portanto, ao aplicar-se o imperativo categórico na política através da fórmula da lei universal estáse efetivamente a aplicar o princípio supremo da moralidade num contexto sócio político. A fórmula do reino dos fins faz com que esta associação seja mais presente, principalmente através da analogia entre súditos e soberanos de uma lei moral, que na política se dá através da relação entre chefe de Estado e cidadãos. Com o conceito de \'reino dos fins\' dá-se um passo em frente e a ideia de co-legislação é aplicada, segundo cremos, por um processo sócio-político na Paz Perpétua. Por sua vez, expõese o pensamento de vários autores que interpretam conceitos morais de um ponto de vista político. No entanto, nos afastamos dessa interpretação por reconhecermos que na Filosofia Moral kantiana não existe uma evidência suficiente para essa asserção. A relação é, por isso, inversa à proposta pela tradição construtivista: a moralidade está presente na Filosofia Política. Ela pode, com efeito, coincidir completamente com a política quando se trata dos princípios fundamentais da política. Ou pode servir como um impedimento a certas ações que, embora não sejam de teor moral, estejam em contradição com ela. Tal como acontece com os imperativos hipotéticos. A razão prudencial, pragmática ou técnica, deve dobrar seus joelhos perante a razão prática pura. Propõe-se, assim, um paralelo com conceitos desenvolvidos na Paz Perpétua, designadamente com a ideia de um modo de governo republicano (constituição republicana), onde os seus membros têm de participar de uma legislação, e com o político moral, considerado o agente responsável por aplicar a moral (razão prática pura).The study of the principle of autonomy, a central concept in Kant\'s moral philosophy, allow us to understand the origin of the moral law. The formula of autonomy dictates that the moral law is the result of the will and does not depend on external factors: we are co-legislators of a law that we submit to ourselves. The thesis of the unity of the categorical imperative asserts that the categorical imperative is one and only one. Therefore, when applying the categorical imperative in politics through the formula of universal law is being effectively applied by the supreme principle of morality in a sociopolitical context. The formula of the kingdom of ends makes this association more present, mainly through the analogy between sovereigns and subjects of a moral law, which in politics is through the relationship between the head of state and citizens. With the concept of \'kingdom of ends\' a step ahead is done and the idea of co-legislation is applied, giving us, we believe, by a socio-political process in the Perpetual Peace. In turn, we expose the thought of many authors who interpret moral concepts from a political point of view. However, we drifted apart this interpretation because we recognize that in Kant\'s Moral Philosophy there isn\'t a strong evidence for this assertion. The relationship is, therefore, reverse to the proposal by the Constructivist tradition: the morality is present in Political Philosophy. It may, in fact, match completely with the politics when it comes to the fundamental principles of politics. Or can serve as a constraint to certain actions that, while not of moral content, are in contradiction with it. As occurs with the hypothetical imperatives. The prudential reason, pragmatic or technical, should double their \'knees\' before the pure practical reason. Therefore we propose a parallel with concepts developed in Perpetual Peace, namely the idea of a republican form of government (republican constitution), where its members have to participate in a common legislation, and the moral politician, considered the agent responsible for applying morale (pure practical reason).
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Lima, Francisco Jozivan Guedes de. "O PROJETO KANTIANO PARA A PAZ PERPÃTUA: PRESSUPOSTOS MORAIS, JURÃDICOS E POLÃTICOS." Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2012. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=7072.
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CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeiÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel SuperiorEsta pesquisa pretende investigar o projeto kantiano Para a paz perpÃtua a partir de seus pressupostos morais jurÃdicos e polÃticos Na concepÃÃo de Kant a paz perpÃtua à um ideal inatingÃvel mas os princÃpios fundamentais dirigidos à aproximaÃÃo desse ideal sÃo historicamente possÃveis Semelhante aos indivÃduos os Estados nas suas relaÃÃes recÃprocas devem adentrar numa condiÃÃo jurÃdica Problemas em torno da provisoriedade da propriedade da liberdade e da violÃncia nÃo serÃo resolvidos enquanto o direito nÃo for estabelecido tambÃm no nÃvel internacional e cosmopolita Para o filÃsofo de KÃnigsberg a constituiÃÃo de cada Estado deve ser republicana porque no republicanismo a decisÃo sobre a guerra à uma prerrogativa do cidadÃo O Estado republicano pensado por Kant nÃo pode forÃar os cidadÃos a entrar numa guerra Os cidadÃos optam pela paz porque nÃo querem perder sua vida liberdade seguranÃa propriedade e seus direitos No direito cosmopolita Kant critica os abusos dos Estados colonialistas e acentua a necessidade do respeito ao direito dos povos QuestÃes fundamentais que afetam as relaÃÃes internacionais contemporÃneas tais como tratados de paz esfera pÃblica exÃrcitos permanentes direito de intromissÃo cosmopolitismo e dentre outras direito dos povos serÃo tratadas nessa pesquisa Metodologicamente a pesquisa està dividida em duas partes uma concernente aos pressupostos do projeto kantiano para a paz perpÃtua e outra que investiga o prÃprio projeto em si a partir das temÃticas fundamentais que estÃo inseridas nos artigos preliminares nos artigos definitivos nos suplementos e apÃndices
This research aims to investigate the kantian project Toward Perpetual Peace from its moral juridical and political presuppositions In Kantâs conception peace is an ideal unattainable but the fundamental principles directed to the approximation this ideal are historically possible Similar to individuals States in their mutual relations should to enter into a juridical condition Problems about the transitoriness of property freedom and violence will not be resolved unless the law be established also on the international and cosmopolitan level For the philosopher of KÃnigsberg the constitution of each State must be republican because in the republicanism the decision on war is a prerogative of the citizens The Republican State thought by Kant can not force citizens go to war The citizens opt for peace because they donât want to lose their life liberty security property and their rights In cosmopolitan law Kant criticizes the abuses of colonialism and accentuates the need of the respect to the right of the peoples Questions that deal with contemporary international relations such as peace treaties sovereignty public sphere Standing Armies right of interference cosmopolitanism and among others law of peoples will be addressed in this research Methodologically the research is divided into two parts one concerning to presuppositions of the Kantian project to perpetual peace and another that investigates the project itself starting the fundamental themes that are inserted in the preliminary articles in the definitive articles in the supplements and appendices
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Beaulieu, Anick. "Dialogue et philosophies : l'exemple du débat sur le fondement de la morale entre le déontologisme kantien et l'utilitarisme de John Stuart Mill." Master's thesis, Université Laval, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/43696.
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La communication, souvent considérée de nos jours comme une solution à plusieurs problèmes philosophiques, constitue pourtant elle-même un problème de taille en philosophie. Les philosophes peuvent-ils se comprendre entre eux ou sont-ils condamnés pour toujours à travailler seuls? Quand on observe de plus près les «oppositions» philosophiques, même les plus connues, on constate qu'on ne peut pas parler de rencontre avec exactitude. Ce mémoire analyse plus spécialement sous cet aspect le conflit sur le fondement de la morale qui oppose traditionnellement déontologistes et conséquentialistes, où l'on pourra apprécier l'asymétrie des deux systèmes notamment en ce qui concerne la question de l'universalité du fondement et celle de l'autonomie de la morale. Cependant, l'étude des philosophes passés et présents constituant également un dialogue entre philosophes, toute conclusion déplorant l'état du dialogue entre les philosophes ne saurait être prise totalement au sérieux.
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Jiang, Wei-Yi, and 江威儀. "On Suicide from A View of Kantian Moral Philosophy." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/13228374084960908370.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
哲學研究所
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Kantian ethics is a moral theory based on the fundamental spirit of Kant and critical reading of his text. This thesis at first shows the meaning of the concept of Kantian ethics and the necessity and the probable contribution of applicatory problems such as suicide for the construction of a moral theory through a critic of Allen Wood. Secondly, this thesis has discusses three interpretations of categorical imperative described by Christine Korsgaard and takes them as the basis of the evaluation of suicide. Then, this thesis tries to define suicide and tests the Kant’s arguments against suicide, then provides its own version of evaluation of suicide. In the end, this article shows the modification to Kant proposed by contemporary scholars and points out the reasons why they may not be proper modification of Kant’s theory.
Books on the topic "Kantian Moral Philosophy"
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Autonomy and sympathy: A post-Kantian moral image. Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 2005.
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Fairbanks, Sandra Jane. Kantian moral theory and the destruction of the self. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2000.
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Perfecting virtue: New essays on Kantian ethics and virtue ethics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
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Etica e diritto in Kant: Un'interpretazione comprensiva della morale kantiana. Pisa: ETS, 2011.
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Rotella, Ivan. La galassia filosofica freudiana: Freud e i filosofi alla luce della eredità morale kantiana. Roma: Aracne editrice S.r.l., 2014.
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The Kantian sublime: From morality to art. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.
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The Discourse of Universalism, Moral Relativism & Utilitarianism. Idea Books, 2022.
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Fairbanks, Sandra. Kantian Moral Theory and the Destruction of the Self. Westview Press, 2000.
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Ware, Owen. Fichte's Moral Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190086596.001.0001.
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This book develops and defends a new interpretation of Fichte’s moral philosophy as an ethics of wholeness. While virtually forgotten for most of the twentieth century, Fichte’s System of Ethics (1798) is now recognized by scholars as a masterpiece in the history of post-Kantian philosophy and a key text for understanding the work of later German idealist thinkers. This book provides a careful examination of the intellectual context in which Fichte’s moral philosophy evolved and of the specific arguments he offers in response to Kant and his immediate successors. A distinctive feature of the study is a focus on the foundational concepts of Fichte’s ethics—freedom, morality, feeling, conscience, community—and their connection to his novel but largely misunderstood theory of drives. By way of conclusion, the book shows that what appears to be two conflicting commitments in Fichte’s ethics, a commitment to the feelings of one’s conscience and a commitment to engage in open dialogue with others, are two aspects of his theory of moral perfection. The result is a fresh understanding of Fichte’s System of Ethics as offering a compelling resolution to the personal and interpersonal dimensions of moral life.
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Fairbanks, Sandra Jane. Kantian Moral Theory and the Destruction of the Self. Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Kantian Moral Philosophy"
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Smith, Paul. "Kantian Moral Philosophy." In Moral and Political Philosophy, 167–84. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-59394-7_11.
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Rohlf, Michael. "Contemporary Kantian Moral Philosophy." In The Palgrave Kant Handbook, 791–813. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-54656-2_34.
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Donagan, Alan. "The Relation of Moral Theory to Moral Judgments: A Kantian Review." In Philosophy and Medicine, 171–92. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2715-5_13.
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Steigleder, Klaus. "Kantian Moral Philosophy, Universality, and Business Legitimacy." In Handbook of Business Legitimacy, 1–19. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68845-9_52-1.
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Steigleder, Klaus. "Kantian Moral Philosophy, Universality, and Business Legitimacy." In Handbook of Business Legitimacy, 101–19. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14622-1_52.
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Geml, Gabriele. "Joseph Schreyvogel – Kantian Moral Philosophy as the Art of Living." In Detours, 303–12. Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.14220/9783737004817.303.
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Timmermann, Jens. "Limiting Freedom: On the Free Choice of Ends in Kantian Moral Philosophy." In Law and Peace in Kant’s Philosophy, 427–38. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110210347.3.427.
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Mahoney, Jon. "Rules of Moral Salience and the Problem of Rigorism in Kantian Ethics." In Law and Peace in Kant’s Philosophy, 631–42. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110210347.5.631.
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Aylsworth, Timothy, and Clinton Castro. "The Duty to Promote Digital Minimalism in Ourselves." In Kantian Ethics and the Attention Economy, 115–41. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45638-1_4.
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AbstractIn the 1950s, duties to the self became unpopular in mainstream moral philosophy. We explain why some ethicists became skeptical of them, and we present Kant’s position on duties to oneself. Kantian moral philosophers have long maintained the existence of duties to oneself. After presenting this historical backdrop, we then provide our definition of digital minimalism; we understand this as a virtue—a robust disposition to do what is morally required. Given the conclusions of the last two chapters (viz. that autonomy matters morally and that mobile devices undermine autonomy), we argue that you have a moral duty to protect your autonomy from this threat. We define digital minimalism as the disposition to use mobile devices for a reasonable amount of time in light of your chosen ends. We conclude by showing how this duty fits in within the broader taxonomy of Kant’s ethical duties. In our view, the duty to be a digital minimalist is an imperfect duty because it is a duty to promote an obligatory end (one’s own perfection).
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Hughes, Rebecca, and Kieron O’Hara. "John Cheever’s The Swimmer and the Abstract Standpoint of Kantian Moral Philosophy." In The Ethics in Literature, 101–15. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-27361-4_7.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Kantian Moral Philosophy"
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Lúcia de Paula Oliveira, Maria. "Compatibility of the moral foundation of Law in Kant with the theory of reflective judgment and the Kantian theory of revolution." In XXVI World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Initia Via, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.17931/ivr2013_sws59_01.
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