Log in

Relevant bibliographies by topics / Justification of punishment / Journal articles

Journal articles on the topic 'Justification of punishment'

To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Justification of punishment.

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 25 April 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Justification of punishment.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Cogley, Zac. "FORTIFYING THE SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION OF PUNISHMENT." Public Affairs Quarterly 31, no. 4 (October 1, 2017): 325–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/44732801.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract David Boonin has recently advanced several challenges to the self-defense justification of punishment. Boonin argues that the self-defense justification of punishment justifies punishing the innocent, justifies disproportionate punishment, cannot account for mitigating excuses, and does not justify intentionally harming offenders as we do when we punish them. In this paper, I argue that the self-defense justification, suitably understood, can avoid all of these problems. To help demonstrate the self-defense theory’s attraction, I also develop some contrasts between the self-defense justification, Warren Quinn’s better-known "auto-retaliator" argument, and desert-based justifications of punishment. In sum, I show that the self-defense justification of punishment is more resilient than commonly supposed and deserves to be taken seriously as a justification of punishment.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Berman, Mitchell N. "Punishment and Justification." Ethics 118, no. 2 (January 2008): 258–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/527424.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Jacobs, Jonathan. "Luck and Retribution." Philosophy 74, no. 4 (October 1999): 535–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819199000662.

Full text

Abstract:

The main claims are the following. (1) If we keep before us the distinction between the justification of punishment and its aims, we see that retribution is not an aim of punishment, and that there is a central place for retributivist considerations in the justification of punishment. (2) Justifications based upon aims or consequentialist considerations suffer from a serious epistemic vulnerability not shared by retributivism. (3) There are ethically sound sentiments that underwrite retributivist justification, and it would be a mistake to redeploy those sentiments. (4) The ethical authority of those sentiments justifies punitive sanction. (5) Retributivist justification is compatible with consequentialist aims.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Candra, Marli. "The Penology of Islamic Criminal Law: Reintroduction of Islamic Penology." AL-'ADALAH 15, no. 2 (January 24, 2019): 345. http://dx.doi.org/10.24042/adalah.v15i2.2783.

Full text

Abstract:

The justification for punishment is an interesting topic and undying debate among the scholars. Those who in favor of traditional approach would state that punishment is retributive in nature, whereas the opposite party would declare that punishment is for future benefits either particularly for offender or society in general. In this article, the researcher will elaborate the penological approach of punishment in Islamic criminal law. This study applies a comparative analysis based on the qualitative approach to compare the concept of punishment and its justification in the modern penology as well as in Islamic perspective. The study finds out that the justification for punishment in Islam, which is mainly contained in the hudûd and qishâsh offenses, does not deviate from what is understood by modern penology. Islamic law provides harsher punishment for serious offenses, but at the same time, it also prescribes ways on how to reduce such punishments.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Xiao, Erte, and Fangfang Tan. "Justification and Legitimate Punishment." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 170, no. 1 (2014): 168. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245614x13817353577439.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

Hallich, Oliver. "Strafe als Vergeltung: Plädoyer für einen hermeneutischen Retributivismus." Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 75, no. 3 (August 15, 2021): 383–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.3196/004433021833548688.

Full text

Abstract:

Retributivism is usually taken to be a theory of the justification of punishment. In this contribution, I develop an alternative understanding of retributivism. Rather than as a theory of the justification of punishment, I propose to regard it as a hermeneutic theory, i.e.a theory about how we understand (some) punishments. I start with an explanation of what "hermeneutical retributivism" is (1). In what follows, I examine the ramifications of this view (2). It leads to a different assessment of the relation between retributive theories and prevention theories (2.1) and of the relation between punishments and non-punitive mea- sures such as preventive custody (2.2). It also leads to a reconceptualisation of the problem of the justification of punishments (2.3). Some concluding remarks summarize the arguments in favor of hermeneutical retributivism (3).

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

du Bois-Pedain, Antje. "Hegel and the Justification of Real-world Penal Sanctions." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 29, no. 1 (February 2016): 37–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.2.

Full text

Abstract:

This article revisits Hegel’s writings on punishment to reconstruct from them a justification for the imposition of real-world penal sanctions. Tracing Hegel’s argumentative path from a bare retributive principle to his mature justification of state punishment, it argues that Hegel offers us convincing reasons for endorsing, in broad shape, the distinctive penal institutions and practices of a modern nation-state. Hegel is also right to stress that punishment is – not merely conceptually, but also in the reality of our social world – a recognition of an offender’s status as a bearer of rights and participant in a system of mutual recognition that allows us to collectively build and maintain an order of freedom. This understanding of punishment sets significant limits to punishment’s permissible forms, particularly – but not only – with regard to the death penalty. By focusing on what it means to honour an offender through punishment and by drawing attention to what legal punishment has in common with reactions to transgressions by the will more generally, I question whether the infliction of penal suffering can, as such, be a legitimate aim of penal agents. In conclusion, I argue that only a commitment to penal minimalism, developable from Hegel’s thought, can give those subjected to real-world penal sanctions a complete answer to the question why they should accept their punishment as justified.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

Duff, Antony. "Retributive Punishment — Ideals and Actualities." Israel Law Review 25, no. 3-4 (1991): 422–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700010529.

Full text

Abstract:

A consequentialist holds that systems of criminal punishment must be justified, if they can be justified at all, by their consequential benefits. It is a contingent fact, if it is a fact at all, that these benefits are most efficiently attained by a system of punishment, and by punishments which ordinary moralists would regard as just; and a thorough-going consequentialist must be ready in principle to justify punishments which many would condemn as unjust. A retributivist, on the other hand, insists that the justice of a system or instance of punishment is essential to its justification; and that the demands of justice cannot be reduced to those of consequential utility.Retributivist accounts of punishment come in a variety of forms: we must distinguish those who insist only that guilt is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition of justified punishment from those who insist that punishment must be fully justified by reference to a past offence; and amongst the latter we find various accounts of how it is that an offence justifies or requires punishment. But essential to any retributivist account is the claim that an adequate justification of punishment must cite not, or not only, its consequential benefits, but its relationship to a past offence: it is a non-consequentialist requirement of justice that punishment must be of an offender, for an offence; that only the guilty may be punished, and that the severity of their punishments should be limited, if not completely determined, by the seriousness of the offences for which they are punished.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

Marmor, Andrei. "Right-Based Justification of Punishment." Israel Law Review 22, no. 1 (1987): 97–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700011249.

Full text

Abstract:

The deontological justification of punishment is generally associated with the notion of “retributive justice”. This notion, however, underlies only one of two distinct approaches by which one may attempt to justify punishment within deontological morality. According to this, the classical approach, punishment is to be regarded as an end in itself, intrinsically valuable, from the moral point of view. According to other deontological views, however, punishment has only instrumental value – not, as in consequentialism, in the maximization of some general social good, but in the maintenance and equal distribution of basic individual rights. Borrowing Dworkin's terminology, this view can be called a “right-based” conception of punishment.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Scheid, Don E. "Constructing a Theory of Punishment, Desert, and the Distribution of Punishments." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 10, no. 2 (July 1997): 441–506. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900001594.

Full text

Abstract:

Punishment, by definition, involves the intentional imposition of some deprivation or suffering on individuals against their wills. On any moral view, there is a very strong presumption against doing this to people; so, if a society has an institution of punishment, some justification is needed. On the face of things, such an institution would seem to be an evil. What, then, is the justification for punishment? And once this question has been raised, related questions arise. Who should be punished and how severely? And what principle or principles should we use when setting up sentencing guidelines? Any adequate theory of punishment must provide some guidance, some useful headings, even if not a detailed chart, for answering these questions, among others.In this paper, I outline a theory of punishment that I believe best answers these sorts of questions. Inevitably, some parts are far sketchier than others; but within the general outline, the major focus is on the concept of desert and on the application of desert principles in determining the just allotment of punishments. This leads to a framework for constructing a crimes/punishments schedule for sentencing. Along the way, a number of lesser issues are discussed as well.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Yost, Benjamin S. "Kant's Justification of the Death Penalty Reconsidered." Kantian Review 15, no. 2 (July 2010): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400002417.

Full text

Abstract:

It is hard to know what to think about Kant's ‘passionate sermons’ on capital punishment. Kant clearly feels that it is one of the most important punishments in the state's arsenal. But his vehement insistence on the necessity of execution strikes many readers as philosophically suspect. Critics argue that Kant's embrace of the death penalty is incompatible with, or at least not required by, the fundamental tenets of his moral and legal philosophy (Schwarzschild 1985; Merle 2000; Potter 2002; Hill 2003). These arguments typically employ one of two strategies. The first is to deny that execution is required by retribution in even a prima facie sense; arguments along this line typically question the coherence of Kant's doctrine of the ius talionis (Sarver 1997). The second is to show that there are inviolable moral principles that render the death penalty illegitimate; this criticism typically appeals to the value of human dignity or the right to life (Radin 1980; Pugsley 1981; Schwarzschild 1985; Merle 2000; Potter 2002). There is a third strategy that could be used to criticize Kant, although it is not aimed at him specifcally. This strategy invokes legal principles of fairness or due process. It asserts that, regardless of capital punishment's moral appropriateness or legitimacy, capital punishment is unjust due to the fallibility of legal actors and institutions (Nathanson 2001). Someone adopting the third strategy might claim that, while Kant's justifcation may be acceptable in principle, it fails to justify the death penalty in the world we live in.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Chau, Peter. "Bennett’s Expressive Justification of Punishment." Criminal Law and Philosophy 11, no. 4 (May 4, 2016): 661–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-016-9394-5.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Hoekema, David A. "Trust and Obey: Toward a New Theory of Punishment." Israel Law Review 25, no. 3-4 (1991): 332–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700010451.

Full text

Abstract:

An impartial observer reviewing the Anglo-American philosophical writings of recent decades on the question of the justification of punishment would very likely label the contest, thus far, a draw. Three major justifications have been put forward as principles constitutive of fairness in punishment, and none can be said to have routed its rivals.Some modern writers have written forcefully in defence of the rehabilitative justification of punishment — or, more precisely, the replacement of punishment with a system of judicially mandated therapy for criminals. This substitution, however, has been tellingly criticized as demeaning to offenders, violative of individuals' moral rights, and liable to abuse as a pretext for suppression of unpopular ideas. Others have sought to justify punishment on the basis of the societal need to deter crime. But deterrence seems at the same time too severe and too lenient a basis for punishment. Draconian penalties for minor offences and exemplary punishment of the innocent would meet the requirements of deterrence if they proved effective in preventing future crimes; yet offences whose nature or whose pattern of occurrence makes effective deterrence impossible should go unpunished, on this view.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Gur-Arye, Miriam. "The Justification of Punishment: A Comment on Retribution and Deterrence." Israel Law Review 25, no. 3-4 (1991): 452–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700010530.

Full text

Abstract:

In this comment I wish to defend Antony Duff's final conclusion; namely, that punishment is to be seen as a deterrent system constrained by requirements of justice. I shall do this, however, mainly by using John Kleinig's arguments. My aim is to show that although Kleinig himself rejects deterrence as part of punishment's justification, some of his arguments can best be defended if deterrence is taken into account. In the final section of the comment I shall return to Duff's arguments in this context, but only in order to raise some doubts as to their underlying assumption.Before doing so, let me compare, briefly, Duff's and Kleinig's attitudes which seem to be relevant to the purpose of this comment.Both Kleinig and Duff believe that, ideally, punishment is to be justified by retributive considerations. According to Kleinig, even in such an imperfect society as ours, punishment should still remain retributive.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Ginter, Jaan. "The Survival of Retributivism in our Modern Knowledge-based World." Juridica International 25 (November 5, 2017): 100. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/ji.2017.25.11.

Full text

Abstract:

The article discusses the development of theories of punishment in modern, more and more knowledge-based society. Are any changes foreseeable in how we rationalise expending scarce public resources on inflicting grievances on those fellow members of our society who have behaved in a manner not approved by general society? Adherents to retributivism strive to justify criminal punishment by simply referring to the punishment as the consequence that the criminal plainly deserves and stating that there is no need to present any utilitarian justifications for applying punishments. There is already mounting evidence from research suggesting that certain objective circumstances cause predisposition of certain persons to commit crimes, and some research suggests that there are several treatments that may in some cases be more suitable in place of criminal punishments. The paper presents an attempt to appraise whether these novel approaches leave any room for retributivist ideas. The article suggests that the more the science is able to understand why certain persons commit criminal offences and is able to find opportunities to treat these conditions, the less need there will be to think of punishments as just deserts, as what simply must be applied, without looking for any other utilitarian justification.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Yankah, Ekow N. "The Right to Reintegration." New Criminal Law Review 23, no. 1 (2020): 74–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2020.23.1.74.

Full text

Abstract:

“Western” democracies take an uneven view of the state’s role in reintegrating the incarcerated following punishment. Particularly in the United States, where retributivism remains punishment’s dominant justification, questions of punishment center on how wrongdoers ought to suffer for transgressions. Thus, reintegrative programs are viewed as a question of policy preference for various jurisdictions, and a question of grace for the state. A republican political theory, centered on our civic bonds, emphasizes different commitments. On this view, punishment is justified where a citizen attacks another in ways that deny their civic equality and undermine our ability to maintain a common civic life. But the same justification that requires protecting civic equality through punishment compels the state to reintegrate offenders after punishment; the right to punish and the obligation to reintegrate are complementary political duties. As such, reintegrative policies are not merely the state’s choice but rather a state duty and an offender’s right. This article explores the obligations the state owes ex-felons in reintegrating them into civic society across a range of political and civic rights. It also addresses reintegration’s important role in ameliorating the racial scars of American criminal punishment.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

Knowles, Dudley. "Hegel on the Justification of Punishment." Proceedings of the Hegel Society of America 15 (2001): 125–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/hsaproceedings2001157.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Philips, Michael. "The Justification of Punishment and the Justification of Political Authority." Law and Philosophy 5, no. 3 (December 1986): 393. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3504766.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Kolber, Adam J. "UNINTENTIONAL PUNISHMENT." Legal Theory 18, no. 1 (February 14, 2012): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325211000218.

Full text

Abstract:

Criminal law theorists overwhelmingly agree that for some conduct to constitute punishment, it must be imposed intentionally. Some retributivists have argued that because punishment consists only of intentional inflictions, theories of punishment can ignore the merely foreseen hardships of prison, such as the mental and emotional distress inmates experience. Though such distress is foreseen, it is not intended, and so it is technically not punishment. In this essay, I explain why theories of punishment must pay close attention to the unintentional burdens of punishment. In two very important contexts—punishment measurement and justification—we use the term “punishment” to capture not only intentional harsh treatment but certain unintentional harsh treatment as well. This means that the widely accepted view that punishment is an intentional infliction requires substantial caveats. It also means that any purported justification of punishment that addresses only the intentional infliction of punishment is woefully incomplete.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Weijers, Ido. "Punishment and Upbringing: Considerations for an educative justification of punishment." Journal of Moral Education 29, no. 1 (March 2000): 61–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/030572400102934.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Md Asri, Muhammad Hameedullah, and Md Khalil Ruslan. "THE CRIME OF HIRABAH: APPROACH, JUSTIFICATION AND SIGNIFICANCE." Jurnal Syariah 28, no. 3 (December 31, 2020): 383–416. http://dx.doi.org/10.22452/js.vol28no3.3.

Full text

Abstract:

The punishment for ḥirābah as a ḥadd crime has been prescribed by the Lawmaker in the Qurʻān, in Chapter al-Mā’idah, 33. The provision stipulates four types of punishment, namely; execution, cutting off of hands and feet, crucifixion and banishment. Despite ḥirābah being a serious crime and the only ḥadd crime with four punishments, al-Mā’idah 33 is completely silent about the meaning of ḥirābah, its constituent elements, modes of crime and conditions. This has led the crime being approached either through a restrictive or a permissive manner by Muslim scholars. The objective of this paper is to study the concept of ḥirābah from both perspectives, their justifications and significant impacts on possible application of Islamic criminal law on the subject. This is carried out through careful examination of literature contributed by both classical and modern times. The findings of the study suggest that the restrictive approach considers ḥirābah to be a crime of highway robbery – grave theft – while the permissive approach does not stipulate any particular designation to the crime. Ḥirābah to the latter is of an unlimited crime. Their justifications range from textual to contextual analyzes, application of qiyās and other principles of Islamic jurisprudence. The significant impacts of both approaches are seen on the possible application of ḥirābah; either being a strict or a flexible form of crime, a limited or an unlimited with specified or unspecified types of punishment, involving the application of two witnesses or otherwise and the effect of repentance.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Cragg, Wesley. "H.L.A. Hart and the Justification of Punishment." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 5, no. 1 (January 1992): 43–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900000825.

Full text

Abstract:

Historically, discussions of the morality of punishment have been dominated by the conviction that punishment is an inescapable feature of social life. Thus it is widely believed that laws will not be respected unless those who break them are punished. Yet another view deeply entrenched is that avoiding or mitigating pain and suffering ought to be a fundamental goal of civilized societies. These two convictions are in obvious tension. Punishment requires the deliberated infliction of pain or suffering. How then can it be justified?

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Reitan, Eric. "Punishment and Community: The Reintegrative Theory of Punishment." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 1 (March 1996): 57–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1996.10717444.

Full text

Abstract:

There seems to be nearly universal agreement that society cannot do without some form of criminal punishment. At the same time, it is generally acknowledged that punishment, involving as it does the imposition of hardship and suffering, stands in need of justification. What form such a justification should take, however, is a matter of considerable contention, in part because of basic theoretical disagreements on the nature of moral obligation, and in part because of disagreements concerning the nature and purpose of criminal punishment itself.These disagreements have given rise to a number of rival ‘theories’ of punishment - rival accounts of the purposes of punishment and the conditions which justify it. The traditional theories can be broadly categorized as deterrence theories, incapacitation theories, retributive theories, and rehabilitative theories (broadly conceived to include moral education theories). My purpose here is to contribute to this discussion on punishment by introducing a largely overlooked theory of punishment, one whose outlines can be found in the writings of Simone Wei!, but which has yet to be fully developed and discussed. This theory, which I call the ‘reintegrative theory,’ has, I believe, a number of advantages over more traditional theories of punishment.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Whiteley, Diane. "The victim and the justification of punishment." Criminal Justice Ethics 17, no. 2 (June 1998): 42–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0731129x.1998.9992057.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Engen, Andy. "Communication, Expression, and the Justification of Punishment." ATHENS JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES & ARTS 1, no. 4 (September 30, 2014): 299–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.30958/ajha.1-4-2.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Magill, Kevin. "The idea of a justification for punishment." Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1, no. 1 (March 1998): 86–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698239808403230.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Nelkin, Dana Kay. "Duties, Desert, and the Justification of Punishment." Criminal Law and Philosophy 13, no. 3 (July 16, 2018): 425–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-018-9475-8.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Mungan, Murat C. "A behavioral justification for escalating punishment schemes." International Review of Law and Economics 37 (March 2014): 189–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2013.10.002.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Nicholson, Peter. "Comment on Gorner." Kantian Review 4 (March 2000): 131–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400000546.

Full text

Abstract:

In his incisive and provocative analysis, ‘The place of punishment in Kant's Rechtslehre’, Paul Gorner discusses many aspects of Kant's position. I concentrate on his main contention:Kant's justification of judicial punishment simply does not fit the account of right he gives in the Rechtslehre. According to this account the only justification for coercion is that it constitutes a ‘hindering of a hindrance’ to freedom. But there is no way in which this requires punishment to be retributive.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Petrovici, Iasmina, and Ivan Dean. "Capital Punishment Between Suppression of Life and Ethical Justification." Postmodern Openings 11, no. 4 (2020): 309–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.18662/po/11.4/237.

Full text

Abstract:

Is the capital punishment a solution? Can a basis for rejecting or justifying it be established? How should and how can a criminal be punished? Can the capital punishment be replaced by another type of punishment? Is this really a cruel, violent and unusual punishment? Questions like the previous ones, to which, of course, many others can be added, cannot be avoided once the still controversial issue of capital punishment has been addressed, being considered a major infringement of human rights. Uncomfortable and complex, sensitive and profound, it appears, first and foremost, as a fundamental theme for philosophical reflection and not only, being of a special significance to the applied ethics, as it is a point of contention that concerns life itself. The importance of this theme is conferred in particular by the fact that it deals with different aspects regarding the suppression of a person's life in a legal, deliberate and justified way, an obvious importance by the very purpose of this punishment. From a compositional point of view, we have structured the present study in such a way as to include, using the critical dimension, the highlighting of some of the relevant philosophical perspectives that are subsumed to the topic, and which can still be an argument, at least an ethical one, against the application of capital punishment. At the end of the study, we sketched some current distinctive reflections, pointing out an argument in favour of one's own choice on the subject of the study, not necessarily considering that this is not a solution, but also that an ultimate basis cannot be established to support it.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Gorner, Paul. "The Place of Punishment in Kant's Rechtslehre." Kantian Review 4 (March 2000): 121–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415400000534.

Full text

Abstract:

If Kant had never written the section of the Rechtslehre on punishment we would still have known from the Critique of Practical Reason that he held a strongly retributive view of punishment. But it is not a view which we could have inferred from the rest of the Rechtslehre. Despite its intuitive appeal, Kant's justification of judicial punishment simply does not fit the account of right he gives in the Rechtslehre. According to this account the only justification for coercion is that it constitutes a ‘hindering of a hindrance’ to freedom. But there is no way in which this requires punishment to be retributive.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Budic, Marina. "Kant's retributivism and the death penalty." Theoria, Beograd 60, no. 3 (2017): 130–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1703130b.

Full text

Abstract:

The paper deals with Kant's notion of punishment in general, as well as one specific form of punishment, namely, the death penalty. In the first part of the article we will exmine, Kant's views on punishment as well as an extent to which it is retributive. According to Kant's view, offenders should be punished exclusively for having committed an offense (retribution), and proportionally to the crime commited (ius talionis). In recent literature, there are interpretations that indicate Kant's criminal theory is not completely retributive, but rather combined, so that it contains elements of retribution and intimation. If we clearly outline the goal, justification and extent of punishment, the purpose and justification of forming the state (time and punishment), we will make sure that these interpretations are incorrect. The paper shows that Kant retribution determines the goal and justification of punishment, that the reason and justification of the state (and punishment) is the achievement of justice, that is, the preservation of individual freedoms of citizens on an equal footing, while the control of crime should be understood as the achievement of this goal. Also, one needs to bear in mind the distinction between the factual and the normative level - Kant claims that a person should be punished exclusively for having committed the offense, although her punishment simultaneously intimidates or deters the offense of another citizens, which is a factual claim. The theory of punishment prescribes the goal and justification of punishment, which falls within the normative domain, and in Kant?s opinion, it is fundamentally retributive. It is also necessary to take into account another distinction that Kant introduces, which is the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal spheres of existence. Justice is a noumen or an idea, that the state pursues to achieve, while it is realized or made into a phenomenon when the state applies laws and penalties in a particular community. Intimidation or control of crime is part of the realization of justice in the empirical world. The second part deals with Kant's affirmation of the death penalty, objections to this affirmation, and ultimately, an alternative to this punishment is proposed. The alternative to the death penalty stems from incoherence in the application of the ius talionis principle. That could be one Kantian approach to punishment. A lifetime imprisonment argument avoids the objection of irreversibility of punishment (the argument from the irrevocability of the death penalty) and is in line with the basic principles of Kant's ethics.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Lorca, Rocio. "The Presumption of Punishment: A Critical Review of its Early Modern Origins." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 29, no. 2 (July 26, 2016): 385–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.17.

Full text

Abstract:

Our conversations about punishment have been constrained by the presumption that crimes ought to be punished. This presumption does not entail that crimes must be punished, but rather that punishment occurs as a natural response to wrongdoing instead of as a conventional creation. As a consequence, the challenges for punishment’s justification have been reduced to the problems of purpose, opportunity and form, leaving unaddressed the question of the authority of a certain polity to impose this form of treatment on a given individual. In order to present and criticize this presumption, the article traces its origins by revisiting the debate about the nature of punishment that took place during the emergence of liberal political philosophy. After evaluating the main arguments of this debate the article concludes by arguing that liberal theories of punishment should give up this presumption.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

STERBA, JAMES P. "SOFT DETERMINISM, INDETERMBMISM AND THE JUSTIFICATION FOR PUNISHMENT." Metaphilosophy 17, no. 1 (January 1986): 52–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.1986.tb00844.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Wood, D. "Retribution, Crime Reduction and the Justification of Punishment." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 22, no. 2 (June 1, 2002): 301–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/22.2.301.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Durham, Alexis M. "The Privatization Of Punishment: Justification, Expectations, And Experience." Criminal Justice Policy Review 3, no. 1 (March 1989): 048–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/088740348900300103.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Stichter, Matt K. "Rescuing Fair-Play as a Justification for Punishment." Res Publica 16, no. 1 (February 2010): 73–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11158-010-9119-x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Rich, Sylvia. "Corporate Criminals and Punishment Theory." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 29, no. 1 (February 2016): 97–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.4.

Full text

Abstract:

Corporations are subject to criminal law and sentencing provisions in most legal jurisdictions in the world. This article considers how leading punishment theories apply to corporations. Corporations are, this article argues, group agents with the capacity to make moral judgments. It follows from this that retributivism, the dominant theory of punishment for moral agents, ought to be understood as a component justification of corporate punishment. However, a more fundamental problem arises in the attempt to apply punishment theory to corporations: punishment involves suffering, and corporations cannot suffer in the relevant sense. This means that corporations cannot be punished, though they can be harmed. I explore the possibilities of simply abandoning the word ‘punishment’ and creating sentences that are not at the same time punishments. This has the drawback of limiting what the criminal law can accomplish when it comes to addressing corporate malfeasance. I find that at least one practical consequence for corporate sentencing follows from this theoretical distinction: sentencers have more legitimate authority to raise upper limits for sentences for corporations than they do for individuals, though there are still principles that dictate the need for upper limits. Despite the impossibility of true punishment, the theories of retributivism, deterrence and rehabilitation are still relevant when sentencing corporations.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Rodogno, Raffaele. "GUILT, ANGER, AND RETRIBUTION." Legal Theory 16, no. 1 (March 2010): 59–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325210000066.

Full text

Abstract:

This article focuses primarily on the emotion of guilt as providing a justification for retributive legal punishment. In particular, I challenge the claim according to which guilt can function as part of our epistemic justification of positive retributivism, that is, the view that wrongdoing is both necessary and sufficient to justify punishment. I show that the argument to this conclusion rests on two premises: (1) to feel guilty typically involves the judgment that one deserves punishment; and (2) those who feel guilty after wrongdoing are more virtuous (or less vicious) than those who do not. I shall argue that premise (1) is false on both empirical and conceptual grounds and that there are no particularly good grounds supporting this premise (2). Finally, I consider and reject the claim that anger, as opposed to guilt, can afford the type of epistemic justification needed by positive retributivism.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Fraser, Chris. "The Mozi and Just War Theory in Pre-Han Thought." Journal of Chinese Military History 5, no. 2 (November 21, 2016): 135–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22127453-12341300.

Full text

Abstract:

TheMozipresents one of history’s earliest discussions of the justification for war.Moziand his followers held that although unprovoked aggression is always unjustified, defensive war and punitive aggression may sometimes be warranted. However, their criteria of just war are so stringent as to permit only defensive war, rendering offensive, punitive war nearly impossible to justify. The article reviews discussions of just war in theMoziand other pre-Han texts and discusses howThe Annals of Lü Buweipresents a conception of “righteous arms” as an alternative to the Mohist privileging of defensive over offensive war. I argue that, with minor refinements, the Mohist view answers theAnnals’ criticisms while underscoring problems concerning the justification of aggression that theAnnalsoverlooks. The article highlights how features of early Chinese justifications for war—most importantly, the analogy between just war and criminal punishment—raise deep problems for the justification of aggression.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Levanon, Liat. "Personhood, Equality, and a Possible Justification for Criminal Punishment." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 27, no. 2 (July 2014): 439–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900006421.

Full text

Abstract:

The article examines the relationship between a wrongdoer and his victim. Based on this examination, a justification for criminal punishment is proposed. It is argued that crime violates the a priori equality of constituent boundaries and of infinite human value between the wrongdoer and the victim. Criminal punishment re-equalizes respective boundaries and infinite human value. To develop this argument, the article observes how subject-subject boundaries are essential for the formation of separateness between subjects - separateness which is recognized and acknowledged by them in a cooperative process. The article further discusses the value of boundaries and the significance of their a priori equality in every human relationship. It then shows how crime, which is intrusion of the victim’s boundaries, works to demolish the victim’s self-recognizing separateness and hence to create inequality in the parties’ value. Last, the article demonstrates that only punishment can reset the relationship between the parties and re-equate their (still infinite) human value in the relationship.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Kershnar, Stephen. "The Justification of Deserved Punishment Via General Moral Principles." Southern Journal of Philosophy 33, no. 4 (December 1995): 461–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1995.tb00755.x.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Johnson, Jane. "Revisiting Kantian Retributivism to Construct a Justification of Punishment." Criminal Law and Philosophy 2, no. 3 (July 19, 2008): 291–307. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-008-9052-7.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Gubin, Valery D., and Elena N. Nekrasova. "JUSTIFICATION OF EVIL." RSUH/RGGU Bulletin. Series Philosophy. Social Studies. Art Studies, no. 3 (2020): 10–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2073-6401-2020-3-10-23.

Full text

Abstract:

The article considers philosophical aspects in the issue of evil, its genesis and principal ontological issues: the good and evil balance, the absoluteness and relativity of evil in history and culture, evil and transcendence, evil and God, evil as a paradox of human existence, evil as a punishment for man and as a possibility salvation. In their analysis, the authors proceed from the assumption that good and evil are the extreme that are unattainable for an ordinary person. Good and evil are the phenomena of life, living only in a special state – that of tension, despair, pity, hatred. Without that transcending (to God or the devil), good and evil are just abstractions. To be evil means to have the opportunity and power to raise oneself to the demonic level or sink into the abyss of the animal state. To be kind means to be holy, at least a very living person, in whom there is no carrion

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Blumoff, Theodore Y. "Justifying Punishment." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 14, no. 2 (July 2001): 161–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900000473.

Full text

Abstract:

Our reactions to actual crime-disbelief about the act committed, anger at the hurt caused, a desire to get even, and fear for ourselves and our children-arrive in an indecipherable rush of emotion. We perceive strong, intuitive, and sometimes oppositional reactions at once. So it is little wonder that no single traditional moral justification for punishment is satisfactory. Traditional theories, both retributive and utilitarian, are grounded in a priori truths that ignore the convergence of the theoretical, the practical and the emotional that gives rise to the need to punish. In their stead, we should embrace an advertently pragmatic theoretical approach, which recognize the primary need to protect ourselves against danger, but looks as well to providing reformation wherever possible. Such an approach does not ignore the traditional rationales. To eschew retribution entirely is to deny a deeply-rooted moral intuition and forego efforts to tame it. To jettison utility is to condemn the victim and community to perpetual fear; just to the extent that retributive impulses, by any name, undermine necessary forward-looking concerns about our future's safety, they poorly serve our needs, which include service to the victim, the community and the offender.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Schrödter, Mark. "Sind Strafen pädagogisch legitimierbar?" Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik 94, no. 2 (July 4, 2018): 313–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/25890581-09402010.

Full text

Abstract:

Is Punishment in Education Justified? The Case of Excessive ExerciseIf punishment is defined narrowly as authoritative deprivations for failures by retribution and reprobation, punishment and education are irreconcilable. However, punishment in this sense is rarely endorsed by teachers or youth workers. An exception is the use of excessive exercise, especially push-ups, common in competitive sports, the classroom, some sports oriented residential child care facilities and in combat training of the army. It is shown, that these are not examples of punishment in the narrow sense, but penalties, which follow a different logic and require different strategies of justification.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

Pihler, Stanko. "Delegitimation of death penalty." Glasnik Advokatske komore Vojvodine 71, no. 12 (1999): 331–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/gakv9910331p.

Full text

Abstract:

The author analyzes three basic problems involved in each type of punishment and thus in the death penalty as well: content (definition) of punishment, justification (legitimating) of punishment and purpose (aim) of punishment. He points out that there is a striking lack of criticism towards the death penalty and lack of knowledge of problems related to this type of punishment. He considers that death penalty is not legitimate and that a community which has no other way of resolving moral problems of its members is just as problematic as the one that has no other means for maintaining criminality at a supportable level.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

MUAYGIL, RUAIM. "The Role of Physicians in State-Sponsored Corporal Punishment." Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 25, no. 3 (June 27, 2016): 479–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180116000128.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract:The question of whether there is justification for physicians to participate in state-sanctioned corporal punishment has prompted long and heated debates around the world. Several recent and high-profile sentences requiring physician assistance have brought the conversation to Saudi Arabia. Whether a physician is asked to participate actively or to assess prisoners’ ability to withstand this form of punishment, can there be an ethical justification for medical training and skills being put toward these purposes? The aim of this article is to examine aspects of Islamic law along with the different professional and religious obligations of Saudi Arabian physicians, and how these elements may inform the debate.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Ellis, Anthony. "Punishment and the Principle of Fair Play." Utilitas 9, no. 1 (March 1997): 81–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820800005148.

Full text

Abstract:

What I call the Just Distribution theory of punishment holds that the justification of punishment is that it rectifies the social distribution of benefits and burdens which has been upset by the offender. I argue that a recent version of this theory is no more viable than earlier versions. Like them, it fails in its avowed intention to deliver fundamental intuitions about crime and punishment. The root problem is its foundation in Hart's Principle of Fair Play, a foundation which, I argue, is inappropriate for a theory of punishment.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Al-Hakim, Mohamad, and Susan Dimock. "Hate as an Aggravating Factor in Sentencing." New Criminal Law Review 15, no. 4 (2012): 572–611. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2012.15.4.572.

Full text

Abstract:

Our principal concern in this paper is with the accusation that hate crime legislation violates the principle of proportionality and related principles of just sentencing, such as parity, fair notice, and representative labelling. We argue that most attempts to reconcile enhanced punishment for hate crimes with the principle of proportionality fail. More specifically, it seems that any argument that tries to justify hate crime legislation on the grounds that such crimes are more serious because their consequential harms are worse or their perpetrators are more culpable than their nonhateful counterparts will fail, and thus enhanced punishment will violate the principle of proportionality. Given the seeming irreconcilable tension between proportionality and hate crime legislation, we turn to consideration of hybrid theories of punishment that permit deviations from strict proportionality when needed to serve other important and legitimate purposes of sentencing. We argue that even if such hybrid theories can justify the enhanced punishments for hate crimes, existing theories cannot provide any principled limit on the extent from which proportionality can be deviated. We suggest such a limit and provide a principled justification for it.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!