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Academic literature on the topic 'Justification of induction'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 18 May 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Justification of induction"

1

Sterkenburg, Tom F. "THE META-INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTION." Episteme 17, no. 4 (2019): 519–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.52.

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ABSTRACTI evaluate Schurz's proposed meta-inductive justification of induction, a refinement of Reichenbach's pragmatic justification that rests on results from the machine learning branch of prediction with expert advice.My conclusion is that the argument, suitably explicated, comes remarkably close to its grand aim: an actual justification of induction. This finding, however, is subject to two main qualifications, and still disregards one important challenge.The first qualification concerns the empirical success of induction. Even though, I argue, Schurz's argument does not need to spell out what inductive method actually consists in, it does need to postulate that there is something like the inductive or scientific prediction strategy that has so far been significantly more successful than alternative approaches. The second qualification concerns the difference between having a justification for inductive method and for sticking with induction for now. Schurz's argument can only provide the latter. Finally, the remaining challenge concerns the pool of alternative strategies, and the relevant notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality that features in the analytic step of Schurz's argument. Building on the work done here, I will argue in a follow-up paper that the argument needs a stronger dynamic notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality.

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2

Jacquette, Dale. "How (Not) to Justify Induction." KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 1, no. 24 (2011): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2011-012402.

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Abstract A conceptual analysis of the problem of induction suggests that the difficulty of justifying probabilistic reasoning depends on a mistaken comparison between deductive and inductive inference. Inductive reasoning is accordingly thought to stand in need of special justification because it does not measure up to the standard of conditional absolute certainty guaranteed by deductive validity. When comparison is made, however, it appears that deductive reasoning is subject to a counterpart argument that is just as threatening to the justification of deductive as to inductive inference. Trying to explain induction in such a way that it satisfies a special justificatory requirement in contrast with deduction is therefore not the way to justify induction. An alternative approach is sought in a style of justification developed by Aristotle for the law of noncontradiction and by Kant for the conclusions of transcendental reasoning that with variations can be used to justify both deduction and induction. This strategy upholds a principle when the principle must be presupposed even to raise doubts about the principle's justification.

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3

Rosenkrantz, R. D. "The Justification of Induction." Philosophy of Science 59, no. 4 (1992): 527–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/289693.

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4

Chihara, Charles S. "Horwich's justification of induction." Philosophical Studies 48, no. 1 (1985): 107–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00372411.

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5

Nedeljković, Mitar. "The problem of justifying inductive reasoning." Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Pristini 51, no. 2 (2021): 387–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/zrffp51-30620.

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In this paper, the author considers the classical strategies of defense from Hume's argument against induction, and assesses the extent to which they were found to be successful. Synthetic, linguistic, a priori, pragmatic, and inductive strategies of defending induction are considered, as well as the question of the extent to which the justification of induction is a problem for grounding scientific knowledge. A new argument is introduced for the a priori justification of induction, as well as a critique of the synthetic and inductive defenses of induction by Black and Jacquette.

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6

Nielsen, Michael. "A new justification of induction." Metascience 29, no. 2 (2020): 209–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-020-00522-2.

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7

Schurz, Gerhard. "Meta-Induction and Social Epistemology: Computer Simulations of Prediction Games." Episteme 6, no. 2 (2009): 200–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/e1742360009000641.

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ABSTRACTThe justification of induction is of central significance for cross-cultural social epistemology. Different ‘epistemological cultures’ do not only differ in their beliefs, but also in their belief-forming methods and evaluation standards. For an objective comparison of different methods and standards, one needs (meta-)induction over past successes. A notorious obstacle to the problem of justifying induction lies in the fact that the success of object-inductive prediction methods (i.e., methods applied at the level of events) can neither be shown to be universally reliable (Hume's insight) nor to be universally optimal. My proposal towards a solution of the problem of induction is meta-induction. The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods that are accessible to her. By means of mathematical analysis and computer simulations of prediction games I show that there exist meta-inductive prediction strategies whose success is universally optimal among all accessible prediction strategies, modulo a small short-run loss. The proposed justification of meta-induction is mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world. In the final section I draw conclusions about the significance of meta-induction for the social spread of knowledge and the cultural evolution of cognition, and I relate my results to other simulation results which utilize meta-inductive learning mechanisms.

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8

Nelson, John O. "Induction: A Non-Sceptical Humean Solution." Philosophy 67, no. 261 (1992): 307–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100040432.

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Pre-analytically at least some of our inductions seem to be possessed of rational justification. This comment would apply, for instance, to my present induction, ‘If that climber high on the Flatirons falls he will be killed,’ not to mention such more momentous inductions as, ‘If a full-scale nuclear war breaks out there will be greater destruction than in World War II.’ Notoriously, however, a few Humean reflections seem to strip even the most plausible of our inductions of all possible rational justification, leaving them mere bare psychological faits accomplis: in effect, section V of the Enquiry's ‘Sceptical Solution of these Doubts.’

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9

Brueckner, Anthony. "Bonjour’s a Priori Justification of Induction." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82, no. 1 (2001): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00115.

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10

Campbell, Scott, and James Franklin. "Randomness and the Justification of Induction." Synthese 138, no. 1 (2004): 79–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:synt.0000012206.01154.c7.

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