Journal articles on the topic 'Juror beliefs'
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1
Leverick, Fiona. "What do we know about rape myths and juror decision making?" International Journal of Evidence & Proof 24, no. 3 (May 8, 2020): 255–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1365712720923157.
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This paper presents overwhelming evidence that prejudicial and false beliefs held by jurors about rape affect their evaluation of the evidence and their decision making in rape cases. The paper draws together for the first time the available evidence from both quantitative and qualitative studies (most of which are not found in law journals, but rather in scientific outlets, most commonly those focusing on experimental psychology). The quantitative research demonstrates that mock jurors’ scores on so-called ‘rape myth scales’ are significant predictors of their judgments about responsibility, blame and (most importantly) verdict. The qualitative research indicates that jurors frequently express problematic views about how ‘real’ rape victims would behave and what ‘real’ rape looks like during mock jury deliberations and that even those who score relatively low on abstract rape myth scales can express prejudicial beliefs when deliberating in a particular case. The studies vary in terms of their realism, but it is important to note that some of the studies reported here were highly realistic trial reconstructions, involving representative samples of jurors drawn from the community, live trial reconstructions, evidence-in-chief and cross-examination, accurate legal directions and deliberation in groups. The review concludes by examining the evidence on whether juror education—whether in the form of judicial directions or expert evidence—might be effective in addressing problematic attitudes.
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Costanzo, Mark, Netta Shaked-Schroer, and Katherine Vinson. "Juror Beliefs About Police Interrogations, False Confessions, and Expert Testimony." Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 7, no. 2 (June 2010): 231–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-1461.2010.01177.x.
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Schuller, Regina A., Blake M. McKimmie, Barbara M. Masser, and Marc A. Klippenstine. "Judgments of Sexual Assault: The Impact of Complainant Emotional Demeanor, Gender, and Victim Stereotypes." New Criminal Law Review 13, no. 4 (2010): 759–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2010.13.4.759.
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Te sexual assault victim "who comes to the attention of the authorities has her victimization measured against the current rape mythologies" (R v. Seaboyer, 1991). Tis is particularly troubling given that lay beliefs regarding the crime of sexual assault are at odds with the data documenting the circumstances surrounding actual rape. Research has consistently demonstrated that lay people (hence, jurors) will question the validity of a sexual assault claim and judge the victim more harshly, if the circumstances surrounding the assault and/or the characteristics and actions of the sexual assault complainant do not comport with people's expectations about the event. In this paper we report the results of a juror simulation that examines the impact of victim's postassault emotional demeanor on judgments, in the context of independent manipulations of gender stereotypicality and victim stereotypicality. Results revealed that the complainant's emotional display had a powerful impact on participants' judgments, with the claim viewed as more valid when the complainant was portrayed as tearful/upset as opposed to calm/controlled, but only when the complainant was portrayed as gender stereotypic.
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Pfeifer, Jeffrey E., and James R. P. Ogloff. "MOCK JUROR RATINGS OF GUILT IN CANADA: MODERN RACISM AND ETHNIC HERITAGE." Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal 31, no. 3 (January 1, 2003): 301–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2003.31.3.301.
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This research investigated whether the prejudicial attitudes of mock jurors in Canada produce criminal sanction disparities similar to those reported by research in the United States. In order to investigate this hypothesis, English Canadian participants read a transcript of a sexual assault trial that varied the ethnic background of both the victim and the defendant (i.e., English, French or Native Canadian). Participants were then asked to rate the guilt of the defendant in two ways: (1) on a 7-point bipolar scale in accordance with their personal beliefs (i.e., Subjective Guilt Rating), and (2) on a dichotomous scale (guilty/not guilty) in accor- dance with judicial instructions (i.e., Legal Standard Guilt Rating). Participants were also asked to rate the victim and defendant on a number of personality traits. Results indicate that participants asked to rate the degree of guilt of the defendant according to the Subjective Guilt Rating found him more guilty if he was French, or Native Canadian as opposed to English Canadian. These prejudicial ratings, however, dissipated when participants were asked to rate the guilt of the defendant according to the Legal Standard Guilt Rating that included jury instructions. This apparent paradox in results is discussed in terms of modern racism theory.
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Chapdelaine, Andrea, and Sean F. Griffin. "Beliefs of Guilt and Recommended Sentence as a Function of Juror Bias in the O. J. Simpson Trial." Journal of Social Issues 53, no. 3 (April 9, 2010): 477–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1997.tb02123.x.
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Tomei, Jenna, Robert J. Cramer, Marcus T. Boccaccini, and Nancy Ryba Panza. "The Gay Panic Defense: Legal Defense Strategy or Reinforcement of Homophobia in Court?" Journal of Interpersonal Violence 35, no. 21-22 (June 14, 2017): 4239–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260517713713.
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Gay panic refers to a heterosexual man violently responding to unwanted sexual advances from a gay man. In court, the defendant may argue he was provoked or temporarily insane. This study utilized 352 jury-eligible citizens to assess differences across mediums of gay panic. Participants were asked to read vignettes depicting a control, gay panic as provocation, or gay panic as insanity condition and provide verdicts and ratings of blame and responsibility. Participants also completed measures assessing political orientation and homonegativity. Data were analyzed via a MANCOVA, a chi-square goodness-of-fit test, and general linear modeling. Verdicts, victim blame, and ratings of responsibility differed across vignette conditions, with an observed leniency effect when gay panic was claimed in either context. Homonegativity also exacerbated patterns of prodefendant views, as participants higher in homonegativity assigned higher victim blame, lower defendant responsibility, and more lenient verdicts in the gay panic conditions. The effect of political orientation was nuanced, as only republicans in the provocation condition followed the anticipated pattern in rendering more lenient verdicts. Results provide additional support for the notion gay panic defenses may be, in part, fueled by political beliefs and prejudicial beliefs against persons of sexual minority status. Drawing from a justification–suppression model, it may be that in cases of gay panic, a context is created in which prejudiced ideologies can be openly expressed via leniency on the defendant. Implications may be relevant to future criminal law policies and practices, particularly advocacy and policy efforts, judicial training, and trial consultation to attorneys for juror selection and development of trial strategy.
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Angelone, D. J., Damon Mitchell, and Danielle Smith. "The Influence of Gender Ideology, Victim Resistance, and Spiking a Drink on Acquaintance Rape Attributions." Journal of Interpersonal Violence 33, no. 20 (February 24, 2016): 3186–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886260516635318.
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The current study examined observer’s attributions about the victim and perpetrator of an alleged acquaintance rape. Participants included 504 college students from a public university in the northeastern United States who read a brief crime report and completed a series of questionnaires for course credit. While men tended to attribute more blame to the victim than women, gender ideology emerged as a stronger predictor of rape attributions, and some types of sexist beliefs were associated with greater victim blaming and others with less victim blaming. Endorsement of hostile sexism, rape myths, and heterosexual intimacy was generally associated with the attribution of greater victim culpability, as well as less perpetrator culpability, perpetrator criminality, and victim credibility. However, complementary gender differentiation was associated with greater perpetrator culpability and criminality, while protective paternalism was associated with greater victim credibility. Observers attributed lower victim culpability and greater perpetrator criminality when the victim’s drink was spiked, and attributed greater perpetrator culpability when the victim verbally resisted the perpetrator’s advances. Given the implications that observer attitudes can have on professional and personal support for survivors, as well as juror decision making, the ongoing examination of the complex interplay between the person and situational factors affecting attributions of rape is essential. Sexual assault prevention programs may also benefit from a psychoeducational component that targets reducing traditional gender ideology.
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Poulson, Ronald L., Henry Brown, Michael J. Brondino, and Ronald L. Braithwaite. "Relations among Mock Jurors' Attitudes, Trial Evidence, and Their Selections of an Insanity Defense Verdict: A Path Analytic Approach." Psychological Reports 82, no. 1 (February 1998): 3–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1998.82.1.3.
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This study examined an important question relevant to the domain of the insanity defense: What are the interrelationships among important evidential and attitudinal factors which influence how jurors decide their final verdicts? To answer this question, a mock trial in which the insanity defense was argued was presented to 224 college undergraduates by means of an audiotape and slide show. Following the presentation, participants were asked to answer a series of questions regarding the trial. A path model was specified with four evidential factors as endogenous variables, i.e., evaluation of the defendant's mental status, belief that the defendant could be rehabilitated, beliefs regarding the accuracy of the expert witnesses, and mock-jurors' predeliberation verdicts. In addition, three attitudinal factors were specified as exogenous variables, i.e., attitudes toward the insanity defense, attitudes towards due process vs crime control, and attitudes towards the death penalty. The path model was consistent with previous literature, suggesting that jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty and the insanity defense had a direct effect on how they evaluated the accuracy of the expert testimony and their evaluation of the defendant's over-all mental status. In turn, mock jurors' evaluations of the defendant's mental status had a direct effect on their selections of verdict. Importantly, mock jurors' evaluations of the evidential factors, particularly the mental status of the defendant, were a stronger predictor of their selections of verdict than were their initial attitudes.
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Paolo, Marianna Di, and Georgia Green. "Jurors' Beliefs about the Interpretation of Speaking Style." American Speech 65, no. 4 (1990): 304. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/455506.
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Spanos, Nicholas P., Bryan Myers, Susan C. Dubreuil, and Anne E. Pawlak. "The Effects of Polygraph Evidence and Eyewitness Testimony on the Beliefs and Decisions of Mock Jurors." Imagination, Cognition and Personality 12, no. 2 (October 1992): 103–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/1ab2-3wlx-bfy1-8ycp.
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Mock jurors heard one of four versions of a murder trial and then deliberated in small groups to a verdict. Half the juries heard a trial in which an eyewitness identified the defendant as the murderer and half heard a trial in which a polygraph expert testified that the defendant responded deceptively when denying the crime. These two factors were completely crossed in a 2 × 2 (eyewitness/no eyewitness x polygraph/no polygraph) design. Jurors exposed to the eyewitness testimony believed more strongly in the defendant's guilt and voted guilty more frequently than did those not exposed to eyewitness testimony. Eyewitness testimony also enhanced the degree to which jurors believed that other pieces of evidence indicated that the defendant was guilty. Polygraph evidence exerted no significant effects either on jurors' beliefs or on their verdicts.
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Riggsby, Andrew M. "Did the Romans Believe in Their Verdicts?" Rhetorica 15, no. 3 (1997): 235–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/rh.1997.15.3.235.
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Abstract: The purpose of the Roman indicia publica (as described by legal, rhetorical, and philosophical texts and even the name of the institution) was to determine whether or not defendants had violated the various “criminal” statutes which established them. Cicero's reports of the outcome of real cases suggest a popular expectation that jurors ordinarily attempted to carry out this task. The proliferation of distinct formal charges over time and the existence of jokes about orators fooling jurors confirm this suggestion. We are thus discouraged from imagining collusion between parties and jurors in which the formal charge is understood by all to be a pretext for a competition of oratorical skill or social standing. Roman jurors wanted to believe in their verdicts. Advocates, of course, did not simply tell the truth. Rather, they responded to popular expectations by going out of their way to emphasize the (purported) truth of their speeches.
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Denault, Vincent, Norah E. Dunbar, and Pierrich Plusquellec. "The detection of deception during trials: Ignoring the nonverbal communication of witnesses is not the solution—A response to Vrij and Turgeon (2018)." International Journal of Evidence & Proof 24, no. 1 (May 29, 2019): 3–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1365712719851133.
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In their paper ‘Evaluating credibility of witnesses—Are we instructing jurors on invalid factors?’, Vrij and Turgeon (2018) argue that jurors should be advised not to consider demeanour when trying to evaluate if witnesses are honest or dishonest because of ‘overwhelming scientific evidence’. However, in this response, we contend that substantial empirical scientific studies on nonverbal communication alongside the limitations of deception detection research, as cited by Vrij and Turgeon (2018), undermine their overall argument. While jurors should be warned about erroneous beliefs and dubious concepts on human communication, jurors should also be advised to consider demeanour as a way of enriching their overall understanding of witnesses and their verbal testimony.
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Schuller, Regina A., and Patricia A. Hastings. "Complainant Sexual History Evidence: Its Impact on Mock Jurors' Decisions." Psychology of Women Quarterly 26, no. 3 (September 2002): 252–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1471-6402.00064.
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The current study examined the impact of complainant sexual history evidence on mock jurors' judgements in a sexual assault trial. One hundred and sixty-nine undergraduates listened to an audiotape of a sexual assault trial in which the sexual history between the complainant and defendant was systematically varied to include either sexual intercourse, kissing and petting, or no history information. The effectiveness of judicial limiting instructions that accompany the introduction of sexual history evidence at trial was also examined. Compared to the control condition, those who heard evidence involving prior sexual intercourse between the complainant and defendant were less likely to find the complainant credible, more likely to find her blameworthy, and more likely to believe she consented. The information failed, however, to influence participants' judgements about the defendant's belief in consent. As well, the presence of limiting instructions did little to curb the prejudicial influence of this information.
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Lupia, Arthur, Adam Seth Levine, and Natasha Zharinova. "When Should Political Scientists Use the Self-Confirming Equilibrium Concept? Benefits, Costs, and an Application to Jury Theorems." Political Analysis 18, no. 1 (2010): 103–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpp026.
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Many claims about political behavior are based on implicit assumptions about how people think. One such assumption, that political actors use identical conjectures when assessing others' strategies, is nested within applications of widely used game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. When empirical findings call this assumption into question, the self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) concept provides an alternate criterion for theoretical claims. We examine applications of SCE to political science. Our main example focuses on the claim of Feddersen and Pesendorfer that unanimity rule can lead juries to convict innocent defendants (1998. Convicting the innocent: The inferiority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting.American Political Science Review92:23–35). We show that the claim depends on the assumption that jurors have identical beliefs about one another's types and identical conjectures about one another's strategies. When jurors' beliefs and conjectures vary in ways documented by empirical jury research, fewer false convictions can occur in equilibrium. The SCE concept can confer inferential advantages when actors have different beliefs and conjectures about one another.
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Lindsay, R. C. L., Gary L. Wells, and Fergus J. O'Connor. "Mock-juror belief of accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses: A replication and extension." Law and Human Behavior 13, no. 3 (1989): 333–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01067033.
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Warner, Kate, Caroline Spiranovic, Arie Freiberg, and Julia Davis. "Mandatory sentencing? Use [with] discretion." Alternative Law Journal 43, no. 4 (December 2018): 289–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1037969x18793967.
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When asked about sentencing discretion and mandatory sentences, jurors participating in the Victorian Jury Sentencing Study expressed strong support for sentencing discretion and weak support for mandatory sentences despite a belief by jurors that, in general, sentences are too lenient. This strengthens the argument that polls that pose a general question about mandatory sentences or sentencing severity divorced from the context of a specific case are an inadequate and misleading measure of public opinion.
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Russell, Brenda L., Laurie Ragatz, and Shane Kraus. "Self-Defense and Legal Decision Making: The Role of Defendant and Victim Gender and Gender-Neutral Expert Testimony of the Battered Partner’s Syndrome." Partner Abuse 1, no. 4 (October 2010): 399–419. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/1946-6560.1.4.399.
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This study investigated the influence of defendant characteristics, expert testimony, self-defense elements, and battered partner attributes on conviction in a homicide trial. An online sample of 442 U.S. mock jurors evaluated a self-defense scenario, provided a verdict, and answered questions pertaining to defendant culpability, legal elements, and battered partner attributes. Results showed that heterosexual female defendants were most likely to meet legal requirements of self-defense. Female participants were more likely to believe that heterosexual female defendants exhibited attributes associated with the battered partner’s syndrome (i.e., suffered from abuse and learned helplessness). Male participants were less likely to believe that homosexual male defendants suffered from attributes associated with the syndrome. There were no effects of expert testimony on the battered partner’s syndrome. Logistic regression analysis indicated that self-defense legal elements and belief that the defendant should have left the abusive relationship predicted greater likelihood of conviction. Limitations and implications for jury selection and attorney arguments are discussed.
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Westen, Peter, and Eric Ow. "Reaching Agreement on When Jurors Must Agree." New Criminal Law Review 10, no. 2 (2007): 153–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2007.10.2.153.
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Most criminal statutes are drafted in such a manner that they can be violated in one or more alternative ways, such as statutes that make it an offense to buy or sell controlled substances. Moreover, even where statutes contain single elements, the prosecution may offer evidence of alternative ways in which a defendant allegedly violated those single elements, such as evidence that a defendant either used a screwdriver or used a crowbar to break and enter a dwelling. In all such cases, therefore, the constitutional question arises, "When, if ever, must jurors agree on which alternative means defendants used to commit alleged offenses?" The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed this question twice, ruling for the prosecution in 1991 (Schad v. Arizona), and for the defense in 1999 (Richardson v. United States). In doing so, a total of twelve Justices produced a total of five opinions that agree on one thing but disagree about nearly everything else. The twelve Justices who participated in the two cases agreed that that the Constitution sometimes does and sometimes does not require that jurors concur on how offenses are committed. However, the Justices disagreed about when jurors are constitutionally required to concur, and where the requirement is located in the Constitution. With respect to when, Justices variously search for answers in the antiquity statutes; the form in which statutes are drafted; the motives of legislators who enacted the statutes; and the manner in which defendants are alleged to have committed offenses. With respect to where, Justices variously look for answers in Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to jury trial; Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment presumptions of innocence; and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process limits on the power of states to define criminal offenses. We argue that the Justices disagree for the same reason that their various proposals founder. They are looking for answers in the wrong places. Jurors are, indeed, sometimes required to concur on the means by which defendants allegedly commit offenses——and sometimes not. The determining factor, however, is the shape of the prosecution's proof at the close of evidence, regardless of the statute under which the evidence arises. In all cases in which a defendant is alleged to have committed an offense by one or another, or all, of multiple means, judges must decide if there is sufficient evidence by which individual jurors can find beyond a reasonable doubt that, if the defendant did not commit the alleged offense by one of the alleged means, he must have committed it by another of the alleged means. If such evidence is lacking, judges must instruct jurors that they cannot convict without agreeing on which means the defendant used. If such evidence is present, jurors may convict if, as among the various alleged means, one particular means exists that each juror believes beyond a reasonable doubt is either the very means the defendant used or the means (or among the means) he must have used if he did not use any of the other alleged means. These requirements are, indeed, constitutional in nature, but not by virtue of originating in Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to trial by jury. They are constitutional by virtue of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment requirement that no person shall be convicted of a criminal offense unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court can correct its course without overruling either Schad or Richardson. All the Court requires is a trial record that puts the matter into issue——that is, a prosecutor or defense attorney who is astute enough to realize that his client may benefit from such a jury instruction, and a lower court or opposing party that refuses to accept it.
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Neal, Tess M. S., Ashley Christiansen, Brian H. Bornstein, and Timothy R. Robicheaux. "The effects of mock jurors' beliefs about eyewitness performance on trial judgments." Psychology, Crime & Law 18, no. 1 (January 2012): 49–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1068316x.2011.587815.
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Bandt-Law, Bryn, and Daniel Krauss. "The effect of mortality salience on death penalty sentencing decisions when the defendant is severely mentally ill." Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research 9, no. 2 (April 10, 2017): 141–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jacpr-04-2016-0225.
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Purpose Mortality is a salient factor during capital sentencing. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role death plays in jurors’ decisions when sentencing a severely mentally ill defendant who is subject to possible discrimination in a capital trial because of that status. Design/methodology/approach The current experiment measured venire jurors’ (n=133) mental illness dangerousness beliefs, and then experimentally manipulated type of mortality salience (dual-focused: participants who contemplated their own mortality and were exposed to trial-related death references vs trial focused: only exposed to death references) and the type of defendant (severely mentally ill vs neutral) accused of a capital offense. Findings Mock jurors perceived mental illness to be an important mitigating factor when dual (i.e. self) focused mortality (DFM) salience was induced, whereas participants only exposed to trial-related death references considered mental illness to be an aggravating factor in sentencing and were more likely to evidence stereotype adherence toward the defendant. Practical implications The implications of the authors’ findings are problematic for the current legal system. During the majority of capital sentencing, jurors will only be exposed to trial-related death references, as individuals in the trial-focused mortality condition were. The findings suggest that these jurors are likely to engage in discriminatory stereotypes that do not consider fair process when making sentencing decisions. This research also suggests that mortality salience may be able to increase jurors’ attention to such concerns in a trial scenario even when negative mental illness stereotypes are present. Originality/value Research builds on existing terror management theory and offers a more nuanced perspective of how focusing on one’s own death can affect jurors’ reliance on stereotypes and lead to inappropriate decisions. Mortality salience can lead to decisions based upon procedural fairness when stereotypes and mortality salience are both present.
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Godsey, Mark A., and Marie Alou. "She Blinded Me With Science: Wrongful Convictions and the “Reverse CSI-Effect”." Texas Wesleyan Law Review 17, no. 4 (July 2011): 481–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.37419/twlr.v17.i4.4.
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Part I of this Essay explores the problem of "junk science" in this country that has led to a plethora of wrongful convictions of the innocent. In this Part, I suggest that, contrary to the beliefs of many CSIwatching jurors, the state of forensics in this country is far from how it is portrayed by Hollywood. Part II then discusses my anecdotal experience with cases in which jurors, who, while seemingly unaware of the problems that have been documented in this country with junk science, have convicted defendants on little more than what many in my field know to be highly questionable forensic testimony. I ponder whether CSI-type shows have contributed to jurors' over-reliance on forensic testimony that is, in reality, often quite dubious and offer my anecdotal experience, which suggests that they have. In conclusion, I call for further research of these issues before we definitively assert that CSI-type shows damage the prosecution the most, damage innocent defendants the most, or equally impact both sides of the adversarial system.
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Arehart-Treichel, Joan. "Jurors Reveal Which Experts They're Most Apt to Believe." Psychiatric News 44, no. 12 (June 19, 2009): 4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1176/pn.44.12.0004a.
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Camilletti, Catherine R., and Matthew H. Scullin. "Attorney and lay beliefs about factors affecting jurors' perceptions of juvenile offender culpability." Psychology, Crime & Law 18, no. 1 (January 2012): 113–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1068316x.2011.613390.
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Coughlan, Peter J. "In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting." American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (June 2000): 375–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586018.
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The requirement of unanimous jury verdicts in criminal trials is widely believed to reduce the likelihood of convicting the innocent. This belief depends largely upon the assumption that jurors will vote nonstrategically based on their impression of the trial evidence. Recent literature, however, has questioned this assumption, and Feddersen and Pesendorfer propose a model in which it is never a Nash equilibrium for jurors to vote nonstrategically under unanimity rule, and equilibrium behavior produces higher probabilities of both convicting the innocent and acquitting the guilty under unanimity rule than under numerous alternatives. I extend this work by incorporating two additional features of actual jury procedure: the possibility of mistrial and communication among jurors. Under each circumstance, I demonstrate that nonstrategic voting is a Nash equilibrium under fairly general conditions and that unanimity performs better than any alternative rule in minimizing probability of trial error and maximizing expected utility.
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Atiq, Emad H. "How Folk Beliefs about Free Will Influence Sentencing." New Criminal Law Review 16, no. 3 (2013): 449–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2013.16.3.449.
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Do recent results in neuroscience and psychology that portray our choices as predetermined threaten to undermine the assumptions about “free will” that drive criminal law? This article answers in the affirmative, and offers a novel argument for the transformative import of modern science. It also explains why a revision in the law’s assumptions is morally desirable. Problematic assumptions about free will have a role to play in criminal law not because they underlie substantive legal doctrine or retributive theory, but because everyday actors in the sentencing process are authorized to make irreducibly moral determinations outside of the ordinary doctrinal framework. Jurors, judges, and legislators are each required, at key points in the sentencing process, to make moral judgments that cannot be reached without reference to the person’s own understanding of free will. As a result, sentencing actors give legal effect to widely held folk beliefs about free will—beliefs that the evidence suggests are both scientifically suspect and morally distorting. The relevant beliefs make adjudicators less likely to attend to the underlying causes of crime, such as social deprivation—a tendency that biases adjudicators against relevant arguments for mitigation in sentencing. Modern science could have an important corrective effect in this context.
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Luginbuhl, James, and Kathi Middendorf. "Death penalty beliefs and jurors' responses to aggravating and mitigating circumstances in capital trials." Law and Human Behavior 12, no. 3 (1988): 263–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01044384.
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Spanos, Nicholas P., Susan C. Dubreuil, and Maxwell I. Gwynn. "The Effects of Expert Testimony concerning Rape on the Verdicts and Beliefs of Mock Jurors." Imagination, Cognition and Personality 11, no. 1 (September 1991): 37–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/0vfg-0dvl-tgq8-bjff.
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Kaiser, Cheryl R., and Victor D. Quintanilla. "Access to Counsel." Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1, no. 1 (October 2014): 95–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2372732214548429.
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Employment discrimination claimants in general, and racial minority claimants in particular, disproportionately lack access to legal counsel. When employment discrimination claimants lack counsel, they typically abandon their claims, or if they pursue their claims, they do so pro se (without counsel), a strategy that is seldom successful in court. Access to counsel is, hence, a decisive component in whether employment discrimination victims realize the potential of civil rights enforcement. Psychological science analyzes access to counsel by identifying psychological barriers—such as threatened social identity, mistrust in legal authorities, and fear of repercussions—that prevent employment discrimination victims from pursuing counsel. The analysis also identifies how cultural beliefs and practices concerning justice—such as meritocracy beliefs, perceived post-racialism, and organizational diversity initiatives—shape how judges, jurors, and lay people think about discrimination. Furthermore, counsels’ perceptions of other’s beliefs about discrimination shape their assessed likelihood of prevailing. These psychological barriers intersect with structural barriers to shape counsels’ evaluation of each case’s likely financial viability, which can prevent counsel from accepting cases that they otherwise deem meritorious. Policy can help those who experience employment discrimination obtain legal representation and meaningful redress for civil rights violations.
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Johnston, Alexandrea, Daniel Ambrosini, and Bruno Losier. "Impact of the Illusory Truth Effect and Location of Testimony in Juror Deliberations." International Journal of Risk and Recovery 4, no. 2 (May 5, 2021): 18–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.15173/ijrr.v4i1.4339.
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The illusory truth effect (ITE) is the tendency to believe false information as being accurate after it has been presented repeatedly over time. ITE has been shown to hold true in many different contexts; however, there have been no studies that examine the influence of ITE in jurors’ deliberation. Given the importance of weighing legally relevant facts in the decision-making process, and the potential influence of ITE, this study examined whether the repetition of key evidence in testimony matters in this context. This study also examined whether critical information would be influenced by the location of ITE. In that context, jurors may process critical information differently when introducing ITE early (i.e., primacy effect) or later (i.e., recency effect) in the vignette of a murder case. To examine this effect, 100 participants were recruited and asked to read a vignette where pertinent evidence related to a murder was strategically repeated throughout the case narrative. Participants were assigned to one of four groups: control; ITE throughout vignette; ITE at the beginning of vignette; and ITE at the end of vignette. After reading the vignette, participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire and provide a final decision about various aspects of the case. Results revealed that repetition of pertinent evidence matters. The placement of evidence also has the potential to influence jurors’ perceptions of certain case relevant details. These findings suggest that within a sensitive legal context, such as jurors weighing evidence of an accused’s culpability, ITE could alter one’s perception of the facts.
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Schuller, Regina A., Vicki L. Smith, and James M. Olson. "Jurors' Decisions in Trials of Battered Women Who Kill: The Role of Prior Beliefs and Expert Testimony1." Journal of Applied Social Psychology 24, no. 4 (February 1994): 316–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1994.tb00585.x.
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Cheng, Le. "Gauging court adjudication: Qualification and quantification." International Journal of Legal Discourse 4, no. 2 (February 25, 2020): 123–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ijld-2019-2019.
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AbstractIn common law jurisdictions, the notion of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is frequently related to notions such as the belief or certainty of a judge or a juror about reality. The notion of balance of probabilities is however related to likelihood or probability. In the present study, we link belief and proof by introducing the notion of epistemic modality, which is concerned with the speaker’s belief in propositional probability. The variation in the orientation of epistemic modality helps to integrate the two levels of proof and bridge the apparent test gap between them. The notion of relevance is further introduced in order to clarify the nature of legal proof by taking rape cases as example. This study also provides an integrated model to improve but diversify the expressions in terms of the burden of proof. For most courts, court judgments are processed only according to the general case data, procedural context; such kinds of fact-based information processing and information retrieval seldom help the court to make its decision unless with tremendous and repetitious work. For the consistency and efficiency of court adjudication, it is suggested in the present study that a Knowledge Management (KM) model mainly based on elements and factors which decide or affect the criminal liability. Such a KM model provides an overall framework, though non-exhaustive, and therefore makes court adjudication within narrow discretion and achieves the maximum justice.
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Zhao, Jun, and Christabel L. Rogalin. "Heinous Crime or Unfortunate Incident: Does Gender Matter?" Social Psychology Quarterly 80, no. 4 (October 27, 2017): 330–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0190272517728923.
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This study replicates and extends earlier investigations of emotional displays of an offender influencing jurors’ sentencing judgments through identity inference. Prior studies of this phenomenon used only male perpetrators. However, culturally shared beliefs about emotion are strongly gendered. Thus, we investigate how the perpetrator’s gender moderates the relationship between emotional displays and sentencing. Results replicate results of previous studies—this time, for both men and women. Furthermore, the effect of a perpetrator’s emotional display of distress on observers’ judgment of criminal identity is stronger for male than female perpetrators. We introduce the concept of the emotion-display premium to account for the greater benefits males receive for their display of particular emotions and discuss the implications of these results for social psychology and the sociology of emotions.
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Magnussen, Svein, Annika Melinder, Ulf Stridbeck, and Abid Q. Raja. "Beliefs about factors affecting the Reliability of eyewitness testimony: A Comparison of judges, jurors and the general public." Applied Cognitive Psychology 24, no. 1 (January 2010): 122–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/acp.1550.
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Pantazi, Myrto, Olivier Klein, and Mikhail Kissine. "Is justice blind or myopic? An examination of the effects of meta-cognitive myopia and truth bias on mock jurors and judges." Judgment and Decision Making 15, no. 2 (March 2020): 214–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1930297500007361.
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AbstractPrevious studies have shown that people are truth-biased in that they tend to believe the information they receive, even if it is clearly flagged as false. The truth bias has been recently proposed to be an instance of meta-cognitive myopia, that is, of a generalized human insensitivity towards the quality and correctness of the information available in the environment. In two studies we tested whether meta-cognitive myopia and the ensuing truth bias may operate in a courtroom setting. Based on a well-established paradigm in the truth-bias literature, we asked mock jurors (Study 1) and professional judges (Study 2) to read two crime reports containing aggravating or mitigating information that was explicitly flagged as false. Our findings suggest that jurors and judges are truth-biased, as their decisions and memory about the cases were affected by the false information. We discuss the implications of the potential operation of the truth bias in the courtroom, in the light of the literature on inadmissible and discredible evidence, and make some policy suggestions.
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Kebbell, Mark R., Graham F. Wagstaff, and Dawn Preece. "The effect of belief that testimony was elicited with a cognitive interview on jurors' judgments of guilt." Psychology, Crime & Law 4, no. 1 (January 1998): 17–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10683169808401744.
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Brink, William D., Lorraine S. Lee, and Jonathan S. Pyzoha. "Values of Participants in Behavioral Accounting Research: A Comparison of the M-Turk Population to a Nationally Representative Sample." Behavioral Research in Accounting 31, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 97–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/bria-52103.
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ABSTRACT The external validity of conclusions from behavioral accounting experiments is in part dependent upon the representativeness of the sample compared to the population of interest. Researchers are beginning to leverage the availability of workers via online labor markets, such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk (M-Turk), as proxies for the general population (e.g., investors, jurors, and taxpayers). Using over 200 values-based items from the World Values Survey (WVS), the purpose of the current study is to explore whether U.S. M-Turk workers' values are similar to those of the U.S. population. Results show for the majority of items collected, M-Turk participants' values are significantly different from the WVS participants (e.g., values related to trust, ethics, religious beliefs, and politics). We present select items and themes representing values shown to influence judgments in prior research and discuss how those values may affect inferences of behavioral accounting researchers. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
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Schmidt, Jaime J. "Perceived Auditor Independence and Audit Litigation: The Role of Nonaudit Services Fees." Accounting Review 87, no. 3 (January 1, 2012): 1033–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-10217.
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ABSTRACT This study investigates whether audit litigants act as if they believe jurors will associate auditor-provided nonaudit services (NAS) with impaired auditor independence, and thus substandard auditor performance. Using GAAP-based financial statement restatements disclosed from 2001–2007 as an indicator for audit failure, I find that the amount of NAS fees and the ratio of NAS fees to total fees is positively associated with the likelihood that a restatement results in audit litigation. I also find that when plaintiff attorneys argue that auditor independence was impaired due to dependence on client fees and, in particular, NAS fees, restatement-related audit litigation is more likely to result in an auditor settlement and a larger amount of settlement. These results suggest that audit litigants act as if they believe NAS fees will strengthen the case against the auditor, and thus affect the court resolution if the lawsuit is taken to verdict. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the study.
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Hall, Stuart G. "Patristics and Reform: Thomas Rattray and The Ancient Liturgy of the Church of Jerusalem." Studies in Church History 35 (1999): 240–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0424208400014066.
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In reforming Christian worship radical change often follows from the attempt to restore what was ancient. Nowhere is this more clear than among the liturgical scholars of the early seventeenth century, when advances in critical scholarship made it possible for some to believe they could restore the Church’s worship to that of apostolic times. This is well illustrated in the work of Thomas Rattray (1684-1743), a Scot of great learning, and among Scottish Episcopalians of lasting influence. Rattray was a Non-juror, one of those expelled or withdrawn from the churches of England and Scotland after 1689 for refusing obedience to the new regime. They pinned their hopes, and the survival of what they perceived as the true Catholic Faith, on the Roman Catholic House of Stuart in exile in France. Their hopes perished in blood on the field of Culloden in 1746. That was three years after Rattray’s death. The Episcopalians hold Rattray’s name in honour, both because of the part he played in fixing their Church’s constitution, and because of one book of learning and ingenuity, called The Ancient Liturgy of the Church of Jerusalem.
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Mooney, Robyn. "Personality, belief in a just world, and attitudes toward criminal responsibility defenses: a preliminary study." Journal of Criminological Research, Policy and Practice 5, no. 1 (February 28, 2019): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jcrpp-09-2017-0028.
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Purpose In Canada, if it can be proven that a defendant was suffering from a mental disorder at the time they committed an offense, they can be found Not Criminally Responsible on Account of Mental Disorder (NCRMD). These cases are often decided by jury. The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of the dark triad (DT), social dominance orientation (SDO) and belief in a just world (BJW) on undergraduate students’ attitudes toward the NCRMD defense. Design/methodology/approach A total of 421 undergraduate students completed questionnaires measuring SDO and the DT. After being primed for high, low or neutral BJW, they indicated their attitudes toward NCRMD. Findings The BJW manipulation had no effect on attitudes. High-SDO/DT participants held less favorable attitudes toward NCRMD than participants who scored low on these variables, F(1, 420)=20.65, p<0.01, η p 2 = 0.05 . Psychology and criminology students had significantly more favorable attitudes toward NCRMD than business students. Practical implications This study can be helpful in improving jury impartiality in trials involving mental illness and criminal responsibility; assessment of SDO and the DT; awareness of career roles relating to insanity defense bias; and improving the voir dire process. Originality/value The results of this study may be used to improve the voir dire process in trials involving the issue of mental illness and criminal responsibility and to preserve the impartiality of the jurors selected for these trials.
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Blandón-Gitlin, Iris, Katheryn Sperry, and Richard Leo. "Jurors believe interrogation tactics are not likely to elicit false confessions: will expert witness testimony inform them otherwise?" Psychology, Crime & Law 17, no. 3 (March 2011): 239–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10683160903113699.
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DeKay, Michael L. "The Difference between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of Proof." Law & Social Inquiry 21, no. 01 (1996): 95–132. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.1996.tb00013.x.
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Statements regarding the ratio of erroneous acquittals to erroneous convictions are often thought to have clear implications for standards of proof. For example, Blackstone's comment that “it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer’ is believed by many to imply a precise numerical value for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, jurors should vote to convict only if they are at least 91 % certain of the defendant's guilt. Unfortunately, the belief that this decision threshold will lead to the desired ratio of judicial errors is simply incorrect. Depending on (a) the accuracy with which juries discriminate between truly innocent and truly guilty defendants and (b) the proportion of defendants who are truly guilty, this probabilistic standard of proof may lead to any ratio of judicial errors, including those favoring conviction of the innocent over acquittal of the guilty. Although standards of proof cannot be equated with error ratios in a simple manner, the problem lies not with probabilistic decision thresholds but with the desire to achieve a certain error ratio.
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Sreenivasan, Govind P. "Prosecuting Injuries in Early Modern Germany (ca. 1550–1650)." Central European History 47, no. 3 (September 2014): 544–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938914001642.
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On Saturday, September 4, 1610, an urgent message arrived at the criminal court (Zentgericht) of Remlingen from the nearby rural market of Neubrunn: a dangerous criminal by the name of Georg Schmid, alias “Baker Georg,” had been apprehended the previous day, and the officials of the Zentgericht should come and get him. The chief magistrate (Zentgraf) Johann Müller, together with the court clerk and one of the jurors, accordingly rode out to Neubrunn, where the prisoner was handed over, but with the condition, as Müller subsequently reported,that if the prisoner should be released alive, and if he should cause any harm to any members of the community of Neubrunn in either the village [itself] or its fields, that they would in every case seek to recover these [damages] from the Remlingen Zentgericht, and moreover, that if they had reason to believe that the evildoer would [in fact] escape in this way, they would prefer that he die in prison.
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Kadane, Joseph B., and Jonathan J. Koehler. "Certainty & Uncertainty in Reporting Fingerprint Evidence." Daedalus 147, no. 4 (October 2018): 119–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00524.
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Everyone knows that fingerprint evidence can be extremely incriminating. What is less clear is whether the way that a fingerprint examiner describes that evidence influences the weight lay jurors assign to it. This essay describes an experiment testing how lay people respond to different presentations of fingerprint evidence in a hypothetical criminal case. We find that people attach more weight to the evidence when the fingerprint examiner indicates that he believes or knows that the defendant is the source of the print. When the examiner offers a weaker, but more scientifically justifiable, conclusion, the evidence is given less weight. However, people do not value the evidence any more or less when the examiner uses very strong language to indicate that the defendant is the source of the print versus weaker source identification language. We also find that cross-examination designed to highlight weaknesses in the fingerprint evidence has no impact regardless of which type of conclusion the examiner offers. We conclude by considering implications for ongoing reform efforts.
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Ubel, Peter A., Mark D. Spranca, Michael L. Dekay, John C. Hershey, and David A. Asch. "Public Preferences for Prevention versus Cure: What if an Ounce of Prevention is Worth Only an Ounce of Cure?" Medical Decision Making 18, no. 2 (January 1998): 141–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0272989x9801800202.
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Background. The belief that small preventive efforts bring large benefits may explain why many people say they value prevention above all other types of health care. However, it often takes a great deal of preventive medicine to prevent a bad outcome. This study explores whether people value prevention or cure more when each brings the same magnitude of benefit and examines whether preferences for prevention or cure vary according to the severity of the disability of the patients who can receive the preventive or curative intervention. Methods. 289 prospective jurors were presented with a policy dilemma involving how best to allocate funds to benefit people with varying levels of disability. Each project was said to influence the functional ability of 100 nursing home residents, either by improving their level of function or by preventing their level of function from declining. Results. When given a choice between preventive and curative interventions, more subjects preferred the preventive intervention (37% vs 21%, p = 0.002). However, when the strength of people's preferences was taken into account, the preference for preventive interventions was not statistically significant (p = 0.135). With both preventive and curative interventions, the subjects preferred helping patients with more severe disabilities (p < 0.005 for both comparisons). This preference for helping more severely disabled patients did not differ for prevention and cure (p = 0.663). Conclusion. When the magnitude of benefit was held constant, the subjects slightly preferred prevention over cure. In addition, they preferred directing limited resources toward those with greater disabilities, regardless of whether those resources were targeted toward prevention or cure. These findings suggest that previously stated preferences for prevention over cure may result from a belief that small efforts at prevention will be repaid by large reductions in the later need for cure.
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Berezow, Alex. "California's Glyphosate Judgement – Emotion, Bad Science and Greed Win the Day." Outlooks on Pest Management 29, no. 5 (October 1, 2018): 204–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1564/v29_oct_04.
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Jurors in California have awarded $289 million to a man who claimed that his cancer was due to Monsanto's herbicide glyphosate, even though that is biologically impossible. Even the judge acknowledged that there was no evidence of harm. Yet, trial lawyers manipulated a jury's emotions and the public's misunderstanding of science to score another jackpot verdict. The plaintiff, Dewayne Johnson, claims that glyphosate gave him non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, a cancer that occurs when the immune system goes awry. There are three major problems with this claim. First, as stated above, glyphosate does not cause cancer because it does not harm humans. It is an herbicide, so it is only toxic to plants. There is no known biological mechanism by which glyphosate could cause cancer, therefore its carcinogenicity is not even theoretically possible. That is why there is not a single reputable public health agency that believes glyphosate causes cancer. The US Environmental Protection Agency, the World Health Organization, and the European Food Safety Authority all reject claims of any link. The only organization of note that rejects this scientific consensus is a group within the World Health Organization called the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC). Contrary to all evidence, the group insists that glyphosate causes cancer – along with bacon and hot water. The truth is that IARC is a fringe outlier, staunchly ideological rather than scientific, and rife with financial conflicts of interest. Christopher Portier, a special adviser to the IARC working group that examined glyphosate, was also working for the activist organization the Environmental Defense Fund and received $160,000 from trial lawyers who stood to profit handsomely if IARC declared glyphosate a carcinogen because they could file suits in lawsuit-happy California. IARC's credibility has been so thoroughly shattered that Congress recently pulled its funding. Secondly, although the root cause of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma is unknown, that does not mean its etiology is completely open to speculation. Lymphomas originate from white blood cells, so scientists believe that autoimmune disease or chronic infections play a role. Just because the plaintiff's attorneys can fool a jury into believing that glyphosate causes non-Hodgkin's lymphoma does not mean there is any scientific evidence – and there is not. Thirdly, glyphosate has been off-patent for 18 years, and about 40% of the world's glyphosate is made in China. So, why pick on Monsanto when several different companies could have supplied the glyphosate the plaintiff used?
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Rutt, Deborah, and Kathyrn Mueller. "A Trial Consultant's View of the Medical Expert Witness." Guides Newsletter 18, no. 4 (July 1, 2013): 7–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/amaguidesnewsletters.2013.julaug03.
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Abstract Physicians who use the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides) often serve as medical expert witnesses. In workers’ compensation cases, the expert may appear in front of a judge or hearing officer; in personal injury and other cases, the physician may testify by deposition or in court before a judge with or without a jury. This article discusses why medical expert witnesses are needed, what they do, and how they can help or hurt a case. Whether it is rendered by a judge or jury, the final opinions rely on laypersons’ understanding of medical issues. Medical expert testimony extracts from the intricacies of the medical literature those facts the trier of fact needs to understand; highlights the medical facts pertinent to decision making; and explains both these in terms that are understandable to a layperson, thereby enabling the judge or jury to render well-informed opinions. For expert witnesses, communication is everything, including nonverbal communication that critically determines if judges and, particularly, jurors believe a witness. To these ends, an expert medical witnesses should know the case; be objective; be a good teacher; state opinions clearly; testify with appropriate professional demeanor; communicate well, both verbally and nonverbally; in verbal communications, explain medical terms and procedures so listeners can understand the case; and avoid medical jargon, finding fault or blaming, becoming argumentative, or appearing arrogant.
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Kolber, Adam J. "Line Drawing in the Dark." Theoretical Inquiries in Law 22, no. 1 (January 1, 2021): 111–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/til-2021-0006.
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Abstract The law inevitably draws lines. These lines distinguish, for example, whether certain conduct reflects ordinary recklessness constituting manslaughter or more extreme recklessness constituting murder. There is no way to meaningfully draw such lines, however, absent shared ways of representing amounts of recklessness or at least knowledge of the consequences of drawing lines in particular places. Yet legal actors frequently draw lines in the dark, establishing cutoffs along a spectrum with little or none of the information required to do so in a way that suits the law’s goals. For example, jurors must decide whether some conduct constitutes extreme recklessness without knowing prior precedent nor the sentencing consequences of drawing cutoffs in particular places. Judges and lawyers cite line drawing precedents from other jurisdictions without considering whether the lines drawn in prior cases had the same consequences as those in the case at bar. And scholars argue about how to classify conduct without making clear what consequences they believe ought to attach once the classification is made, leaving it hard to tell when scholars have substantive or simply superficial disagreements. In this Article, I discuss some line drawing problems and briefly suggest ways we can add meaning to cutoffs. More generally, I argue, we can “smooth” certain features of the law to both reduce our vulnerability to line drawing in the dark and improve the fit between the law and what our best theories of law recommend. Even when we cannot easily smooth the law, thinking about the law in a smoother fashion can help reduce the jurisprudential pathologies I describe.
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Sherwin, Brie. "Anatomy of a Conspiracy Theory." Texas A&M Law Review 8, no. 3 (May 2021): 537–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.37419/lr.v8.i3.3.
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With COVID-19, we are facing the most serious public health threat of our lifetime. Now, more than ever, we need experts and sound scientific advice to guide critical decision-making during the pandemic. With conspiracy theories and other similar rhetorical weapons being used to discredit our scientific experts, we face a myriad of misinformation, mistruths, and all-out attacks on our experts, breeding distrust between the public and the policymakers leading the fight against the pandemic. As President Trump took office, scientists were routinely denigrated and isolated. Furthermore, science denialism has permeated its way up to the highest levels of government, resulting in disastrous public policy decisions that have been detrimental to environmental and public health. Funding was cut for much-needed research on zoonotic-borne diseases, the U.S. government pulled its support from the Paris Climate Agreement in 2017, and well-respected scientists were removed from various advisory roles in agencies. Until the COVID-19 pandemic, many of these decisions went unnoticed by the general public. But, in courtrooms over the past thirty years, judges have recognized the danger of fake experts and acted as gatekeepers to ensure that experts are credible and that science is reliable. The use of Daubert in the courtroom has provided judges with a tool for allowing expert testimony that has met certain indicia of reliability, so jurors can focus on making factual determinations instead of judging whether the sources of the expertise should be trusted. Without a similar gatekeeping function in society, citizens must make those determinations on their own. Scientists and advocates of science should employ their own rhetorical methods to restore the credibility and importance of science in protecting our environment and now our health. Change can only truly come from the ground up. Citizens must actually believe that the climate is changing; they must believe that the health advice they are receiving from public health experts is accurate and trustworthy enough to follow. It is time to put science first—we can only do that if we stop science denialism in its tracks and restore resources and trust in our scientific community.
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Perlin, Michael L. ""Infinity Goes up on Trial": Sanism, Pretextuality, and the Representation of Defendants with Mental Disabilities." QUT Law Review 16, no. 3 (December 13, 2016): 106. http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/qutlr.v16i3.689.
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<p><em>I begin by sharing a bit about my past. Before I became a professor, I spent 13 years as a lawyer representing persons with mental disabilities, including three years in which my focus was primarily on such individuals charged with crime. In this role, when I was Deputy Public Defender in Mercer County (Trenton) NJ, I represented several hundred individuals at the maximum security hospital for the criminally insane in New Jersey, both in individual cases, and in a class action that implemented the then-recent US Supreme Court case of Jackson v Indiana, that had declared unconstitutional state policy that allowed for the indefinite commitment of pre-trial detainees in maximum security forensic facilities if it were unlikely he would regain his capacity to stand trial in the ‘foreseeable future.’</em></p><p><em>I continued to represent this population for a decade in my later positions as Director of the NJ Division of Mental Health Advocacy and Special Counsel to the NJ Public Advocate. Also, as a Public Defender, I represented at trial many defendants who were incompetent to stand trial, and others who, although competent, pled not guilty by reason of insanity. Finally, during the time that I directed the Federal Litigation Clinic at New York Law School, I filed a brief on behalf of appellant in Ake v Oklahoma, on the right of an indigent defendant to an independent psychiatrist to aid in the presentation of an insanity defence. I have appeared in courts at every level from police court to the US Supreme Court, in the latter ‘second-seating’ Strickland v Washington. I raise all this not to offer a short form of my biography, but to underscore that this article draws on my experiences of years in trial courts and appellate courts as well as from decades of teaching and of writing books and articles about the relationship between mental disability and the criminal trial process. And it was those experiences that have formed my opinions and my thoughts about how society’s views of mental disability have poisoned the criminal justice system, all leading directly to this paper, that will mostly be about what I call ‘sanism’ and what I call ‘pretextuality’. The paper will also consider how these factors drive the behaviour of judges, jurors, prosecutors, witnesses, and defence lawyers, whenever a person with a mental disability is charged with crime, and about a potential remedy that might help eradicate this poison.</em></p><p><em><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;"><span style="font-size: medium;">It is essential that lawyers representing criminal defendants with mental disabilities understand the meanings and contexts of sanism </span><span style="font-size: medium;">and </span><span style="font-size: medium;">pretextuality </span></span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: medium;">and to show how these two factors infect all aspects of the criminal process, and offer some thoughts as to how they may be remediated. </span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: medium;">I believe – and I have been doing this work for over 40 years – that an understanding of these two factors is absolutely essential to any understanding of how our criminal justice system works in the context of this population, and how it is essential that criminal defence lawyers be in the front lines of those seeking to eradicate the contamination of these poisons from our system.</span></em></p><p><em><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></em></p><p><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: medium;">*Please note this is an invited paper - ie. not peer reviewed*</span><em><span style="font-family: Times New Roman; font-size: medium;"><br /></span></em></p><p> </p>
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Azevedo, Mário Luiz Neves de. "Bem público, teoria do capital humano e mercadorização da educação: aproximações conceituais e uma apresentação introdutória sobre "público" nas Declarações da CRES-2008 e CRES-2018 (Public good, human capital theory and commodification of education)." Revista Eletrônica de Educação 13, no. 3 (September 2, 2019): 873. http://dx.doi.org/10.14244/198271993591.
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The purpose of this article is to analyze the so-called human capital theory and to clarify the concept of public good, as well as the frequency of the expression "public" in the Declarations adopted at the Regional Conferences of Higher Education in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008 and 2018. For this, in methodological terms, this article analyzes documents from certain International Organizations (UNESCO, World Bank and OECD) and seeks theoretical support in Reinhart Koselleck's History of Concepts and other authors such as Roger Dale, Susan Robertson, Bob Jessop, Stephen Gill, Paul Samuelson , Karl Polanyi and Pierre Bourdieu.ResumoO presente artigo tem o objetivo de analisar a chamada teoria do capital humano e precisar o conceito de bem público, bem como a frequência da expressão “público” nas Declarações aprovadas nas Conferências Regionais de Educação Superior na América Latina e Caribe, em 2008 e 2018. Para isto, em termos metodológicos, o presente artigo analisa documentos de determinadas Organizações Internacionais (UNESCO, Banco Mundial e OCDE) e busca apoio na História dos Conceitos de Reinhart Koselleck e em autores como Roger Dale, Bob Jessop, Stephen Gill, Paul Samuelson, Karl Polanyi, Pierre Bourdieu.Keywords: Public good, Human capital theory, Commodification, Education, CRES 2008 and CRES 2018.Palavras-chave: Bem público, Teoria do capital humano, Mercadorização, Educação, CRES 2008 e CRES 2018.ReferencesALVES, Giovanni. O que é o precariado? Blog da Boitempo. Extraído de <https://blogdaboitempo.com.br/2013/07/22/o-que-e-o-precariado/>, 22 Jul 2013, acesso em 28 fev 2019.ARENDT, Hannah. A crise na educação. In: Entre o passado e o futuro. Tradução: Mauro W. Barbosa de Almeida. 3ª reimpressão da 5ª ed. de 2000. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2005.AUDITORIA CIDADÃ DA DÍVIDA. Dividômetro: quanto pagamos (juros e amortizações) – dívida pública federal. Auditoria Cidadã da Dívída. 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