Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Jurisprudence and legal interpretation'
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Donayre, Lobo Gabriel. "The Legal Interpretation: Proposals for its Application in Tax Law." Derecho & Sociedad, 2015. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/118642.
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The first half of this report contains the concept of interpretation and its relationship with the written language. In addition, it proposes how the ambiguity of the language is one of the main problems for legal interpretation. The second half of this report establishes which components of the legal interpretation are, from a theoretical perspective –according to doctrine and practice– following jurisprudence, criteria and methods of interpretation allowed in Law. This part also proposes a route for the legal interpretation in Tax Law. The third part of this report contains the interpretation of two resolutions from the Tax Court following the described route.En la primera parte del artículo se determina el concepto de interpretación y su relación con el lenguaje escrito. Asimismo, se plantea la ambigüedad como uno de los principales problemas que se presenta en la comprensión del lenguaje escrito, así como en la interpretación jurídica. En la segunda parte del artículo se plasman los componentes de la interpretación jurídica, desarrollando desde un punto de vista teórico-doctrinario y práctico-jurisprudencial, los criterios y métodos de interpretación admitidos por el Derecho. Asimismo, se propone un itinerario para la interpretación en el Derecho Tributario. En la tercera parte se desarrolla la interpretación de dos resoluciones del Tribunal Fiscal, utilizando el itinerario propuesto.
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Deagon, Alex. "The Contours of Truth: Using Christian Theology and Philosophy to Construct a Jurisprudence of Truth." Thesis, Griffith University, 2015. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/110544/2/110544.pdf.
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This thesis proposes that the modern Western legal system contains secularised or otherwise distorted Christian theology as an integral part of its conceptual foundation. It argues that this secularisation has led to legal violence in the form of antagonism between the members of the legal community, and alienation of the individuals in the community from each other and the state. In order to establish a peaceful system of law and mitigate this violence, the thesis contends that these distorted concepts ought to be identified and returned to their ‘orthodox’ understandings. In particular, the Christian ideas of truth, faith and reason require analysis in a jurisprudential context. To this end, the thesis engages the work of John Milbank and attempts to articulate a particular conception of the relationship between truth, faith and reason – one which will be conducive to the construction of a legal community characterised by peace rather than violence.
The introductory chapter summarises the thesis and its methodology, and positions the thesis in its relevant jurisprudential, philosophical and theological context. The first chapter of the thesis more specifically structures the content by reviewing and critiquing John Milbank’s work in terms of constructing working definitions of truth, faith and reason. Having proposed these, chapter two examines and extends Milbank’s theological critique of science, exposing the secularisation of ‘scientific’ reason and its divorce from ‘Christian’ faith which forms the foundation for ‘modern’ (secular) thinking. With an analysis of Jacques Derrida in chapter three, the thesis proceeds to explain how faith and reason are reconciled in Christian theology, allowing the development of a ‘post-modern’ theology with the view of producing peace rather than violence.
Chapter four adopts this postmodern theology, tracing the genealogy of secularisation and violence in the development of law and the modern legal community. This shows the contingent nature of the secular legal system and creates a space for it to be redeemed and made peaceful. Chapter five commences the process of articulating this Christian idea of a peaceful legal community through the revelation of theological truth by reading law and truth in the trial of Christ, arguing for a system which embraces a loving mutual trust rather than a calculating drive for decision or finality. Chapter six contends that trust in the face of the mysterious divine is in fact the desirable Christian legacy, one which is nevertheless materialised and accessible through Christ’s resurrection, and makes possible eternal life beyond the constraints of violence. The resurrection instantiates the Pauline law to love your neighbour as yourself, and chapter seven explores the nature of this theological truth, and argues that its application to the modern legal system will allow a love beyond law which produces a peaceful community.
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Peyser, Nell. "Liberal and Conservative Jurisprudence on the Contemporary Supreme Court: An Analysis of Substantive Due Process Interpretation." Oberlin College Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=oberlin1305309468.
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Stobbs, Nigel. "Mainstreaming therapeutic jurisprudence and the adversarial paradigm—incommensurability and the possibility of a shared disciplinary matrix." Thesis, Bond University, 2013. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/63846/1/Stobbs_Thesis_Submit_PhD_2013.pdf.
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Problem-solving courts appear to achieve outcomes that are not common in mainstream courts. There are increasing calls for the adoption of more therapeutic and problem-solving practices by mainstream judges in civil and criminal courts in a number of jurisdictions, most notably in the United States and Australia. Currently, a judge who sets out to exercise a significant therapeutic function is likely to be doing so in a specialist court or jurisdiction, outside the mainstream court system, and arguably, outside the adversarial paradigm itself. To some extent, this work is tolerated but marginalised.
However, do therapeutic and problem-solving functions have the potential to help define, rather than simply complement, the role of judicial officers? The core question addressed in this thesis is whether the judicial role could evolve to be not just less adversarial, but fundamentally non-adversarial. In other words, could we see—or are we seeing—a juristic paradigm shift not just in the colloquial, casual sense of the word, but in the strong, worldview changing sense meant by Thomas Kuhn?
This thesis examines the current relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence in the context of Kuhn’s conception of the transition from periods of ‘normal science’, through periods of anomaly and disciplinary crises to paradigm shifts. It considers whether therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism are incommensurable in the Kuhnian sense, and if so, what this means for the relationship between the two, and for the agenda to mainstream therapeutic jurisprudence.
The thesis asserts that Kuhnian incommensurability is, in fact, a characteristic of the relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence, but that the possibility of a therapeutic paradigm shift in law can be reconciled with many adversarial and due process principles by relating this incommensurability to a broader disciplinary matrix.
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Blanc-Fily, Charlotte. "Les valeurs dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme : Essai critique sur l'interprétation axiologique du juge européen." Thesis, Montpellier 1, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014MON10022/document.
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Partout présentes au cœur de la jurisprudence européenne des droits de l'homme, les valeurs fondamentales des sociétés démocratiques constituent un sujet d'étude pertinent pour apprécier dans quelle mesure ces valeurs sont mobilisées et si elles participent d'une interprétation axiologique de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. Simple rappel rhétorique ou véritable outil argumentatif, le recours aux valeurs dans la jurisprudence de la Cour EDH mérite ainsi d'être analysé au travers du prisme de l'interprétation de la Convention. A côté de l'interprétation téléologique, des interprétations évolutive et consensuelle, aucune étude n'a jusqu'alors recherché à systématiser la référence aux valeurs des sociétés démocratiques pour tenter d'en déduire une interprétation axiologique. Mais alors que le juge européen multiplie les références aux valeurs dans ses décisions, il y a néanmoins lieu de constater que l'utilisation de ces valeurs est concurrencée par d'autres politiques jurisprudentielles plus contemporaines et soucieuses des attentes actuelles des populations, de la revendication libertaire individualiste de plus en plus prégnante, et du nécessaire respect du principe de subsidiarité. Phénomènes qui s'accommodent difficilement d'une protection conservatrice de valeurs communes aux Etats parties à la Convention européenne des droits de l'hommeEverywhere in the legal precedents of the European court of human rights (ECHR), fundamental values of democratic societies are a relevant study subject to understand in which part the values are used and if they participate of a specific interpretation of the European convention based on axioms defense's. Simple rhetoric use or true argumentative tool, values resort's in the legal precedents of the ECHR need to be appreciated as an isolate interpretation method. Next to teleologic, evolutive, and consensual interpretative methods, none study try until then to systematize the resort of fundamental values of democratic societies by the judge and deduct of the European court case law the existence of a specific interpretation based on values defense's. If the European judge multiplies the resorts of values in case law, we have to notice that utilization of values competes with others interpretative methods, more contemporary, and respectful of actual societal expectations, individual claims and to enforce the subsidiarity principle. All social facts and jurisdictional necessities which are difficult to conciliate with requirement of a conservative protection of common values of the contracting States
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Tamouza, Ahlem. "Les cultures dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme." Thesis, Paris 3, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019PA030024.
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La diversité culturelle interétatique ainsi que diverses cultures nationales et sociétales sont régulièrement invoquées par la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme. Un constat de récurrence et de diversité des références aux cultures dans la jurisprudence européenne conduit à poser la question de savoir comment la Cour utilise les cultures dans l’exercice de son office. L’objectif est donc de découvrir, à partir d’une analyse de discours, les contours et la raison d’être d’« usages des cultures » en droit européen des droits de l’Homme. Divers usages peuvent, d’abord, être relevés. Par exemple, la Cour prend en compte des intérêts culturels sociétaux, interprète la Convention à la lumière de la culture sociétale, ou encore mobilise les cultures pour justifier certains choix juridictionnels. Bien que divers et inconstants, les usages identifiés ont pour caractéristique de s’écarter d’une méthode de contrôle habituelle. Ils viseraient le prononcé d’un choix intermédiaire ou d’une solution qui n’auraient pu être présentés à l’issue d’un raisonnement habituel. S’ils semblent, de ce fait, opportunistes et procéder de l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire, les usages des cultures ont cependant la particularité de pouvoir renforcer la motivation des jugements – et ainsi de compenser le manque en légitimité qu’un choix discrétionnaire entrainerait. Une certaine valeur argumentative peut, en effet, être reconnue aux références aux et à la prise en compte des cultures. Finalement constitutif de l’exercice de l’office du juge, le recours aux cultures est apparu utile dans le contrôle juridictionnel et opportun au regard de la réception des jugements rendus par la CourThe inter-State cultural diversity as well as the various national and societal cultures are regularly invoked by the European Court of Human Rights. The diversity and the recurrence of the references to cultures in the legal precedents lead to the question of how the Court uses national and societal cultures in the exercise of its function. Thus, the purpose is to shed light on the characteristics and the raison d’être of the “uses of cultures” in European human rights law. First, a discourse analysis unveils a variety of uses in the Court’s reasoning. For instance, it shows the Court takes into account cultural interests, interprets the Convention in the light of the cultural context, and invokes cultures to account for its own decisions. Secondly, the common feature of the diverse uses of cultures appears to be their exceptional nature. While using cultures, the Court does not follow a usual method of monitoring. Hence, it uses cultures exceptionally to deliver a decision different from the one that would have been taken following a regular reasoning. In that respect, the uses of cultures appear to stem from the exercise of a discretionary power that can be regarded as a threat to the European judge’s legitimacy. However, the references to and the consideration of cultures display the special capacity of having an argumentative power. Initially considered as a component of the Court’s reasoning, the uses of cultures ultimately deem to be relevant in the motivation of the Court’s discretionary decisions
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Delanlssays, Thomas. "La motivation des décisions juridictionnelles du Conseil d’Etat." Thesis, Lille 2, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017LIL20018.
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Cette étude se donne pour ambition de saisir et de comprendre ce qu’est la motivation des décisions juridictionnelles du Conseil d’État, au demeurant souvent critiquée. Notion fondamentale en droit processuel, la motivation est un discours argumentatif, expression d’une technique juridique, à savoir un discours visant à justifier au plan juridique et factuel la décision à travers un raisonnement afin de persuader l’auditoire. Ainsi faudra-t-il analyser à la fois son architecture et ses fonctions dans une perspective dynamique. En tout état de cause, on constate,depuis au moins le début du XXIe siècle, une certaine évolution de la motivation. Ce phénomène résulte, notamment, de l’européanisation et de la complexité normatives, de la protection renforcée des droits fondamentaux, des exigences de sécurité juridique ou encore de la volonté du Conseil d’État de promouvoir une politique communicationnelle afin de légitimer son action. L’étude implique de revisiter certaines thématiques traditionnelles, en particulier le syllogismejudiciaire, l’argumentation, l’interprétation, le style de la motivation ou encore le pouvoir normatif jurisprudentiel pour constater et mesurer cette évolutionThe aim of this research is to tackle and understand the Conseil d’Etat’s court’s decisions motivation which are often criticised. Fundamental notion in procedural law, motivation is an argumentative discourse expressing a jurisdictional technique but moreover it is specifically a discourse trying trough a legal reasoning to justify a decision in order to convince the audience. Thus we shall have to analyse its architecture and its functions in a dynamic perspective. Either way we can note that since the beginning of the 21st century the court’s motivation has evolved.This phenomenon is the result of the Europeanization and the complexity of the normative production and is also due to enhanced protection of the fundamental rights, legal certainty and the Conseil d’Etat’s wish to promote a communicational policy in order to legitimise its action. This research entails to revisit certain traditional topics such as jurisdictional syllogism, argumentation, interpretation, the motivation’s style or the normative jurisprudential power to both note and measure this evolution
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Basset, Antoine. "Pour en finir avec l'interprétation : usages des techniques d'interprétation dans les jurisprudences constitutionnelles française et allemande." Thesis, Paris 10, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA100146/document.
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Les problèmes que pose, traditionnellement, la notion d'interprétation en droit (l'idéologie du juge comme bouche de la loi) sont encore multipliés lorsque l'on se place au niveau constitutionnel : ce qui est généralement considéré comme les techniques permettant de garantir la juridicité des interprétations de la loi exposent d'autant plus visiblement leurs lacunes, qu'il n'existe plus de norme supérieure donnant l'apparence de les garantir. En théorie, certains courants ont cherché, après Kelsen, à fonder rationnellement l'interprétation, afin de pouvoir juger de sa vérité. A chaque fois, cependant, il leur a été nécessaire de se rattacher à des éléments externes en droit et dont le caractère de vérité pouvait, de plus, être contesté. A l'opposé, le réalisme juridique se contente d'affirmer le pouvoir créateur du juge, et sa liberté d'interprétation ; ce faisant, pourtant, il ne peut pas rendre compte du processus interprétatif en fait (comment le juge décide-t-il lorsqu'il n'a pas de préjugé ?). La thèse cherchera donc, au moyen d'une étude empirique, à dégager des éléments qui pourraient servir de futurs développements théoriques sur la question de l'interprétation. Pour ce faire, elle mettra en œuvre des outils tirés des sciences littéraire, linguistique et sociologique et construira à partir de là une perspective autre que celle généralement proposée par les travaux sur l’interprétation. Afin d’asseoir plus solidement ses développements, ce travail adopte une méthode comparatiste (France – Allemagne) : les deux cours, fort éloignées à l'origine, mais en train de se rapprocher, ne peuvent manquer d'offrir les tensions nécessairesWhen one admits with legal realism that methods of interpretation cannot give the one good answer to a juridical case, and thus cannot assure that the judge is bound to the limits the separation of powers imposes on him, it becomes possible to change the perspective on these techniques. They now can be regarded as revealing the institutional constraints which affect the judge. The first part of this dissertation examines how the judge is writing the constitution. Based on G. Genette’s theories on hypertextuality (hypertextualité) it is possible to describe two different types of interpretation (imitation and transposition). The different interpretational choices made by the French and German judges seem to confirm the general impressions: the German Federal constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has a bigger power on shaping the constitution than the French Conseil constitutionnel. The second chapter demonstrates how this difference has a bearing on the two court’s institutional actions. The German judge is more straightforward when it comes to dealing with the legislator, deliberately using the instruments his position as a constitutional judge are offering. The French judge, on the other hand, seems more reluctant in this respect. Vis-à-vis the other judges, the constitutional judge (supported by more direct means of action, such as the constitutional complaint) can take a more and more preponderant position, corresponding to his understanding of the constitution. In France however, the lack of constraining procedures between the different courts results in a system of negotiations – oftentimes to redound to the normal judge’s advantage. Both constitutional courts are exposed to a similar constraint (the articulation between existing juridical system and the system of the constitution). The methods of interpretation are useful to them in order to bring different answers
Einmal angenommen, wie im Legal realism, dass die Auslegungsmethoden nicht zur einzigen richtigen Lösung eines Falles führen und daher nicht für die richterliche Beachtung der von einem System der Gewaltenteilung gesetzten Schranken bürgen können, wird ein Perspektivenwechsel möglich und aufschlussreich. Somit können die Auslegungsmethoden als Ausdruck der institutionellen Zwänge, denen die Richter ausgesetzt sind, betrachtet werden. Der erste Teil dieser Dissertation beschäftigt sich damit, wie die Verfassung durch den Richter geschrieben wird. Anhand der von G. Genette entwickelten Hypertextualitätstheorie werden zwei allgemeine Auslegungsmodelle (Mimesis und Übertragung) ausgearbeitet. Dabei wird gezeigt, dass der vom deutschen und französischen Richter jeweils unterschiedlich gewählte Pfad einen ersten Eindruck bestätigt: das Bundesverfassungsgericht ist mächtiger wenn es darum geht, die Verfassung zu gestalten. Gleichzeitig hat jener Unterschied eine spürbare Wirkung auf das institutionelle Handeln der Gerichte, worauf im zweiten Teil der Arbeit eingegangen wird. Dem Gesetzgeber gegenüber wagt das deutsche Gericht mehr und ist freimütiger als das französische Gericht mit den ihm (als Verfassungsgericht) genauso wie seinem Homolog in Paris zur Verfügung stehenden Instrumenten. Auch nimmt er in seinen Beziehungen zu den anderen Richtern er eine fast überragende Stellung ein (was Verfahren wie die Verfassungsbeschwerde erleichtern), die seinem Verständnis des Grundgesetzes entspricht. Im Gegenteil dazu führt in Frankreich die strenge Trennung zwischen den drei hohen Gerichten zu einem System der Verhandlung, meistens zugunsten des Fachrichters. Anhand der Auslegungsarbeit beantworten somit beide Gerichte die Frage der Eingliederung der herkömmlichen Rechtsordnung und der Verfassungsordnung unterschiedlich
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Cimardi, Cláudia Aparecida. "A jurisprudência uniforme como elemento estruturante do sistema jurídico brasileiro." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2014. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/6364.
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Previous issue date: 2014-02-18This thesis aims to analyze the current role of jurisprudence in the face of Brazilian legal system. First, the historical aspects that led to the evolution of the concept of legal system were presented. From these considerations, the following approaches were conducted: (i) historical delineation of the development of law enforcement, especially in the Civil Law legal system, showing how mass society demanded that the Brazilian legislator implanted new trial procedural techniques; (ii) presentation of the concepts of jurisprudence and judicial precedents to the Brazilian legal system; (iii) demonstration of need for the jurisprudence to be dedicated to standardization, function to be exercised by superior courts (Supreme Justice Court and Supreme Federal Court; (iv) demonstration that the performance of this function results a paradigm for future trials and, therefore, comply with the ideals of stability and predictability of the legal system; (v) exposure that uniform jurisprudence of higher courts can and must undergo changes, being inadmissible sudden and unjustified changes; (vi) demonstration of the importance of judicial precedents in the Brazilian legal system, as conductors of uniform jurisprudence; (vii) exposure of standardization techniques of jurisprudence governed by civil process, and (viii) new discipline of the subject, presented in the Draft ot Civil Process Law. As a result of the research, it was found that uniform jurisprudence of higher courts integrates the meaning of rules, reason why it is the structuring element of the legal system, hence it should be observed in future trials, throughout society and the Administration. We sought, therefore, to develop a methodical study, based on extensive local and foreign literature, which intended to establish a current legal framework of the uniform jurisprudence of higher courts and techniques for jurisprudence standardization
Esta tese tem como objetivo principal analisar o atual papel da jurisprudência em face do sistema jurídico brasileiro. Primeiramente, foram apresentados os aspectos históricos que resultaram na evolução do conceito de sistema jurídico. A partir de tais considerações, foram realizadas as seguintes abordagens: (i) delineamento histórico do desenvolvimento da aplicação do direito em concreto, especialmente no sistema jurídico do civil Law, evidenciando como a sociedade de massa exigiu que o legislador brasileiro implantasse novas técnicas processuais de julgamento; (ii) exposição dos conceitos de jurisprudência e precedentes judiciais para o sistema jurídico brasileiro; (iii) demonstração da necessidade de a jurisprudência ser vocacionada à uniformização, função a ser desempenhada pelos tribunais superiores (Superior Tribunal de Justiça e Supremo Tribunal Federal; (iv) demonstração de que a jurisprudência uniforme resulta em paradigma de julgamentos futuros e, por essa razão, cumprir com os ideais da previsibilidade e estabilidade do sistema jurídico; (v) exposição de que a jurisprudência uniforme dos tribunais superiores podem e devem sofrer mudanças, sendo inadmissíveis as transformações bruscas e injustificadas; (vi) demonstração da importância dos precedentes judiciais no sistema jurídico brasileiro, como condutores da jurisprudência uniforme; (vii) exposição das técnicas de uniformização de jurisprudência disciplinadas pelo processo civil; e (viii) nova disciplina do tema, apresentada no Projeto de Código de Processo Civil. Como resultado da pesquisa, constatou-se que a jurisprudência uniforme dos tribunais superiores integra o sentido das normas, razão pela qual é elemento estruturante do sistema jurídico e, por isso, deve ser observada em julgamentos futuros, por toda a sociedade e pela Administração. Buscou-se, assim, elaborar um trabalho metódico, baseado em ampla bibliografia nacional e estrangeira, que pretendeu estabelecer o enquadramento jurídico atual da jurisprudência uniforme dos tribunais superiores e das técnicas de uniformização de jurisprudência
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Marmor, Andrei. "Interpretation and legal theory /." Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1992. http://www.gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/recht/toc/277092086.pdf.
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Stavropoulos, Nicolas E. "Objectivity in legal interpretation." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.334241.
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Marmor, Andrei. "Interpretation in legal theory." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.386453.
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Scott, Allison W. "Legal Interpretation: Taking Words Seriously." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2011. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/112.
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Eleftheriadis, Pavlos. "A theory of legal rights." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.360732.
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Rosén, Anna, and Gruner Veronica Jorméus. "Article 98 Agreements: Legal or Not?" Thesis, Örebro University, Department of Behavioural, Social and Legal Sciences, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-1603.
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Mitrophanous, Eleni. "Constructive interpretation : Dworkin on interpretation as a method for understanding law." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.285251.
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McCoubrey, Hilaire. "The obligation to obey in legal theory : towards a contextual approach." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.280262.
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De, Villiers Isolde. "South African legal culture in a transformative context." Diss., Pretoria ; [s.n.], 2009. http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-09272009-155336/.
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Al-Amiri, Rashed Saud. "Legal maxims in Islamic jurisprudence: their history, character and significance." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.493969.
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Vannatta, Seth Corwin. "Rethinking Legal Pragmatism: A Philosophical Approach." OpenSIUC, 2010. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/127.
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In "Rethinking Legal Pragmatism: A Philosophical Approach," I take issue with the position of Judge Richard A. Posner, a contemporary spokesperson for legal pragmatism and the law and economics movement. Posner holds that academic philosophy and philosophical pragmatism in particular has no role to play in legal pragmatism as it manifests itself in the process of adjudication and the process of legal scholarship. By redefining philosophy functionally, as opposed to merely sociologically, I illustrate a threefold function of philosophy corresponding to the roles it plays in legal pragmatism. I show the methodological function of philosophy using C.S. Peirce's logic and epistemology, the critical function of philosophy using the insights of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s legal theory, and the normative function of philosophy, using John Dewey's illustration of continuity among moral, aesthetic, practical, and intellectual inquiries. By illustrating the insights of classical American pragmatism to Judge Posner, I show the normative dimensions of the use of history in adjudication and legal scholarship, which prescribe that we narrow the gap between theory and practice in the way we use history. By undermining the strict dichotomy Posner has erected between philosophy and law and between theory and practice, I cultivate a more productive dialogue between law and philosophy, prescribing a broad vision of normativity, allowing for intelligent social growth, and the reconstruction of ends.
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Wentzel, Moeain. "A cultural interpretation of Shāfiʻī's legal doctrine." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17958.
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Bibliography: p. 98-100.This study examines the cultural implications of the methodology followed by Muhammed b Idris al-Shāfiʻī in the process of Islamic legalism. With reference to Clifford Geertz's model of religion as a cultural system, Shāfiʻī's methodology is presented as a process which expresses a certain cultural reality. That reality expresses an interrelationship between a world view- the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammed, and a social context of legal differences. The cultural significance of this interrelationship facilitates the extension of the religious experience beyond the ritual itself and thereby influences the life of society, their ethos. As consequences of a cultural process, rituals such as the salah and fasting emerge as environs which reflects a particular social context and expresses a physiological realty- the world view. The concept of intention (niyyah), an important principle in Shāfiʻī 's legal thought, is shown to enhance the interrelationship between the world view and the social context. A sociological discourse is propagated rather than a purely legal dicta in order to portray Shāfiʻī as a theologian whose specific style and methodology have been motivated by a specific social ideal. This ideal represents Shāfiʻī 's ideas of the social composition and structure of the ideal Islamic ummah (community) under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammed. In support of this hypothesis, Shāfiʻī is located within a socio-historical context which shaped and influenced his legal thoughts. Shown to be motivated by a cultural reality rather than mere legal differences with his earlier contemporaries, Shāfiʻī 's ideas express the ideal to experience the aura of the ummah who was once led by the Prophet Mohammed. Shāfiʻī 's systemisation of the legal process and his unique conception of the Sunnah are presented here as a means whereby Shāfiʻī sought that physiological reconciliation with the Prophet and his ideal ummah. His legal principles within this system become symbols which had a specific function- to motivate people to experience a realty in which their actions are modeled on a world view, the ' tradition or Sunnah of the Prophet.
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Popple, James David, and james@popple net. "SHYSTER: A Pragmatic Legal Expert System." The Australian National University. Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology, 1993. http://thesis.anu.edu.au./public/adt-ANU20020609.233848.
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Most legal expert systems attempt to implement complex models of legal reasoning. Yet the utility of a legal expert system lies not in the extent to which it simulates a lawyer's approach to a legal problem, but in the quality of its predictions and of its arguments. A complex model of legal reasoning is not necessary: a successful legal expert system can be based upon a simplified model of legal reasoning. ¶
Some researchers have based their systems upon a jurisprudential approach to the law, yet lawyers are patently able to operate without any jurisprudential insight. A useful legal expert system should be capable of producing advice similar to that which one might get from a lawyer, so it should operate at the same pragmatic level of abstraction as does a lawyer - not at the more philosophical level of jurisprudence. ¶
A legal expert system called SHYSTER has been developed to demonstrate that a useful legal expert system can be based upon a pragmatic approach to the law. SHYSTER has a simple representation structure which simplifies the problem of knowledge acquisition. Yet this structure is complex enough for SHYSTER to produce useful advice. ¶
SHYSTER is a case-based legal expert system (although it has been designed so that it can be linked with a rule-based system to form a hybrid legal expert system). Its advice is based upon an examination of, and an argument about, the similarities and differences between cases. SHYSTER attempts to model the way in which lawyers argue with cases, but it does not attempt to model the way in which lawyers decide which cases to use in those arguments. Instead, it employs statistical techniques to quantify the similarity between cases. It decides which cases to use in argument, and what prediction it will make, on the basis of that similarity measure. ¶
SHYSTER is of a general design: it provides advice in areas of case law that have been specified by a legal expert using a specification language. Four different, and disparate, areas of law have been specified for SHYSTER, and its operation has been tested in each of those legal domains. ¶
Testing of SHYSTER in these four domains indicates that it is exceptionally good at predicting results, and fairly good at choosing cases with which to construct its arguments. SHYSTER demonstrates the viability of a pragmatic approach to legal expert system design.
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Dordelli, Rosales Nelson Richard. "Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court of Venezuela." Thèse, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/26250.
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The prime focus of this dissertation consists in exploring constitutional jurisprudence in the Supreme Court of Venezuela over the last five decades, making use of arguments drawn from Venezuelan history and the existing jurisprudential approaches to theories about the general character of law as integrated in numerous public law cases. This study offers a new approach, one that focuses on ensuring that fundamental constitutional principles are aligned with the concrete objectives (purposes) that the Constitution sets out to achieve. This account is developed through a theoretical framework comprising of: I. A historical overview from independence (1811) to democratization (1947 and beyond), emphasizing the fundamentals of the Constitutions of 1961 and 1999, to portray a vivid and accurate picture of the origins of Venezuela’s constitutional democracy; II. A survey, of constitutional cases that illustrates the evolution of the Venezuelan constitutional jurisprudence under the overt or subliminal use of certain default legal theories, namely, legal positivism in the era of the 1961 Constitution, legal realism and Ronald Dworkin’s adjudication theory in the era of the 1999 Constitution III. An insightful discussion of the main arguments of Ronald Dworkin’s principled theory and Justice Aharon Barak’s purposive theory, in an effort to build theorectical support, which links the various points of their respective theories in order to articulate one in the context of the Venezuelan jurisprudence; IV An original attempt to build a theoretical approach based on the Venezuelan constitutional system, history, culture, and identity to bring together the priorities of formalism, particularly the written principles of the Constitution and the priorities of functionalism and social welfare. This is to ensure that the Supreme Court decides accordingly with the constitutional principles as much as their underlying purposes to provide solutions to legal conundrums.
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Bengoetxea, Joxerramon. "Interpretation and justification : the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/23717.
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Russell, Debra L. "Interpreting in legal contexts, consecutive and simultaneous interpretation." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp02/NQ54808.pdf.
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RIBEIRO, SILVIA DA COSTA PINTO. "CONTRIBUTIONS OF PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO THE LEGAL INTERPRETATION." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2010. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=18271@1.
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Esta dissertação tem como objeto a análise da pragmática da conversação
aplicada ao Direito, especialmente a decorrente da teoria griceana. Segundo Paul
Grice, a compreensão num discurso comum decorre do princípio cooperativo,
segundo o qual falante e ouvinte buscam eficiência na comunicação e, por isso,
atendem a certas regras de conduta, denominadas máximas conversacionais.
Vendo a atividade jurídica como um diálogo num contexto específico, que é o
contexto legal, e considerando o legislador como falante e o Judiciário e a
sociedade como ouvintes entende-se que a aplicação da Teoria da Conversação
Griceana, com as ressalvas decorrentes das diferenças entre o discurso normal e o
discurso jurídico, é instrumento eficiente na busca de racionalidade na
interpretação, através de métodos pragmáticos, especialmente, na medida em que
se reconhece a insuficiência dos métodos de interpretação legal. Num debate entre
correntes denominadas textualista e intencionalista evidenciam-se a
dificuldade de mensurar o papel do texto, da intenção do legislador e da
compreensão do aplicador da norma para, diante da obrigatoriedade da atividade
interpretativa, explicitar métodos objetivos que evitem abusos e imprimam
racionalidade e controlabilidade à interpretação. De tudo, tem-se que com a
interpretação pragmática e a correta utilização do significado do falante para fins
de compreensão do melhor sentido da norma, cada geração poderá dar sua própria
resposta ao problema fundamental da interpretação jurídica de acordo com suas
necessidades e valores, sem, no entanto, se afastar de um padrão de racionalidade
que garanta ao sistema normativo estabilidade pautada em segurança jurídica e
inovação pautada em objetividade.This dissertation aims to analyze the pragmatic of law-applied conversation, especially the one derived from the Gricean theory. Paul Grice has stated that comprehension in ordinary discourse results from the cooperative principle, according to which speaker and listener seek communication efficiency, and, therefore, follow certain behavior rules called conversational maxims. If the juridical activity is seen as a context-specific dialogue happening within the legal context, and if the legislator is the speaker and the judiciary and society are the listeners, then the application of the Gricean Conversation Theory, with the proviso due to the differences between ordinary and juridical discourses, is an efficient tool to seek the rationality of interpretation, through pragmatic methods, especially when the insufficiency of the methods of legal interpretation is taken into account. In a debate between the textualist and intentionalist currents, it is made clear the difficulty to measure the role of the text, the legislator`s intention, and the comprehension of the norm enforcer to, faced with the compulsoriness of the interpretative activity, explicate objective methods that avoid abuse and provide rationality and controllability to interpretation. With pragmatic interpretation and correct use of the speaker`s meaning to comprehend the best sense of the norm, each generation will be able to respond to the fundamental issue of juridical interpretation according to its own needs and values, although not ignoring a rationality pattern that provides the normative system with stability, grounded on juridical safety, and innovation, grounded on objectivity.
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Bergeron, Gregory Michael. "On how the debate about what is law should proceed in the face of the methodology conflict in jurisprudence." Texas A&M University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/85953.
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This thesis focuses on the contemporary literature in Anglo-American analytic
jurisprudence that takes answering the question â what is law?â as the primary goal.
Agreement about what is lawâ that is, agreement about which theory of law is accurate and
adequateâ is necessary to achieve the primary goal. Theorists have come to acknowledge
that no such agreement exists due to their disagreements over two subjects: (S1) what is law
and (S2) what methodology theorists should follow to produce an accurate and adequate
theory of law. I refer to theoristsâ disagreement about S2 as the methodology conflict.
Today, theorists advance towards the primary goal in two different directions: directly or
indirectly. The direct course labors to accomplish agreement about which theory of law is
accurate and adequate. The indirect course toils to accomplish agreement about which
methodology a theory of law should satisfy to be accurate and adequate, before advancing to
the direct course. If one course is the correct or best way to achieve the primary goal, it is
imprudent for theorists to continue to work towards the same goal in separate directions.
How, then, should theorists proceed? Answering this question, loosely put, is the main
objective of this thesis. I argue that theorists must resolve the methodology conflict first to be able to
achieve the primary goal of jurisprudence (i.e., to reach a common answer to the question
â what is law?â ). I reveal that the methodology conflict poses a serious problem for theorists
working to reach an agreement about S1: namely, theorists cannot agree about which legal
theory is accurate and adequate unless they agree about which methodology a legal theory
should satisfy to be accurate and adequate. Next, I settle the methodology conflict. I show
that a particular synthesis of the current two approaches to resolve theoristsâ disagreement
about S2 â imperialism and relativismâ provides a way out of the methodology conflict. I
explain that the solution to the methodology conflict is a reasonable four-step examination
process that enables theorists to engage in meaningful debate about S1 and S2 and work
more successfully towards achieving the primary goal.
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Ulfström, Heléne. "Legal Technical Assistance in Failed States : Successful methods of law and development?" Thesis, Örebro University, Department of Behavioural, Social and Legal Sciences, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-4860.
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Lim, Chin Leng. "Studies in comparative jurisprudence and analytical philosophy : international law, legal discourse and legal conflicts of political self-determination." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.296206.
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Poggi, Francesca. "General Jurisprudence as analysis of the fundamental theoretical concepts of legal system." Derecho & Sociedad, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/119019.
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This essay proposes a conception of the general jurisprudence as a conceptual analysis aiming at inquiring the fundamental theoretical concepts of a given legal system. The author clarifies her proposal by analysing its key-terms, and, in particular, by explaining what should be the object of the general jurisprudence, in which sense it should be said “general”, what should be its methods, its epistemic status and its relations with related disciplines.En este ensayo, la autora propone una concepción de la teoría general del derecho como análisis de los conceptos teóricos fundamentales de un ordenamiento jurídico. Tal concepción, que no se pretende exclusiva, si no que bien puede convivir con enfoques diferentes y diferentes modos de entender la disciplina, está articulada por medio de un análisis del significado atribuido a sus términos-clave, mediante el cual se intenta mostrar cómo ésta conciba al objeto de la teoría general del derecho, su carácter de generalidad, su estatus epistemológico y sus relaciones con las disciplinas afines.
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Roumeliotis, Michael D. "The jurisprudence of 'ordinary language' : a study of epistemology in legal theory." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/20156.
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Part 1: The distinction between a social rule and convergence of behaviour does not depict the internal point of view regarding behaviour in traditional rural social groups. Nor does it depict how people actually behave. It is ideological, contingent on the modern era and the emancipation of the individual. It is a matter of the theorist's presuming a logic, a form of life, that stipulates what may count as a reason for action. Part 2: Linguistic jurisprudence, as ordinary language philosophy that it is, does not expect, regarding the conceptual, to find a reality independent of society and the happenstance of society's language. In a positivist fashion, it merely describes social reality. The distinctions it comes up with (and so the one Part 1 was about) are factual instead, part of the logic/ form of life of modern Western society. - Yet social reality is complex and many sided, not a coherent theory. Existing assumptions/distinctions in social reality/ language are contradictory and interminable. - Linguistic jurisprudence is not concerned with all assumptions that may exist as possibilities, only with the typical ones that form the network of assumptions, which communication presupposes. - There are many languages not one. Communication exists no more, even if Oxonian armchair philosophy keeps taking it for granted. - Communicating is not presupposing rules. It is changing them, adjusting them to the people we encounter. We are both the same and different, there are both many and one languages. It is all a matter of what we choose to see. The positive reality of any given aggregate will entail an infinite number of communities/ societies, and corresponding languages, along with their negations. Uncommitted description cannot take place (is interminable) without the adoption by the theorist of a logic, which cannot be found in the external reality to be described. Part 3: Language is not a matter of uncommitted observation of social practice, but rules in our minds. The theorist is not reporting social groups' languages, but examining his own.
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Al-Ghazawi, Loai Azmi. "The legal status of Jerusalem in Islamic Fiqh (jurisprudence) and international law." Thesis, Glasgow Caledonian University, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.340613.
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Schmeiser, Susan Rebecca. "Ungovernable selves : the psychoanalytic in legal culture /." View online version; access limited to Brown University users, 2002. http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3050965.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Brown University, 2002.Available in film copy from University Microfilms International. Vita. Thesis advisor: Ellen Rooney. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.
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Barradas, de Freitas Raquel. "Explaining meaning : towards a minimalist account of legal interpretation." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:6660c431-e278-4a42-9e3d-ca43893fcf31.
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To interpret is to seek understanding. This formulation hides as much as it reveals and I propose to unpack it. I argue that interpreting is only a part of what legal theorists and practitioners do. In Part I, I attempt an ‘in vitro’ analysis and present the bare concept of interpretation: interpretation is an activity that needs an object; interpreting is reasoning about meaning when there is a possibility of mistake about that meaning. Part II focuses on two domains of interpretation: musical performance and adjudication. I rely on Joseph Raz’s account of interpretation as explanation or display and identify the former domain as a paradigm of display and the latter as a paradigm of explanation. Both are examples of interpretation for others and involve a claim to theoretical authority on the part of interpreters. But, unlike musicians- who interpret only works of music- judges interpret a great variety of objects. Musical interpretation is identified by its object, whereas legal interpretation is not. Legal interpretation is explanation of legal meaning. I then discuss the tenets of the minimalist view of legal interpretation: (i) legal rules are not interpretable and legal texts are not primary objects of legal interpretation; (ii) there is a difference between interpretative authority (a form of theoretical authority) and legal authority (a form of practical authority) and interpretative conclusions can be theoretically authoritative without being exclusionary reasons for action; (iii) Interpreting and adjudicating are different activities. Interpretation explains, adjudication resolves. Legal interpreters do not produce legal rules: they are required to be guided by them.
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Camarão, Felipe Costa. "A MUDANÇA DE JURISPRUDÊNCIA NO (E PELO) SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL DESDE 2008: a necessidade de estabilização das decisões judiciais a partir da segurança jurídica e do direito como integridade." Universidade Federal do Maranhão, 2014. http://tedebc.ufma.br:8080/jspui/handle/tede/658.
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Previous issue date: 2014-05-30This work aims to study the compatibility of the principle of legal certainty and confidence in the actions of the state with the change of law in the Supreme Court since 2008. Examines hermeneutics, interpretation and legal constitutional control, with emphasis on social change and its impact on constitutional practice carried out by the Supreme Court. Exposes and defends the use of Philosophical Hermeneutics. Deals with the relationship between constitutional interpretation and change, emphasizing the need to recognize the constitutional changes by evolving case law. Explains the current syncretism in control of constitutionality in Brazil and critically shows the institute of modulating the effects of the decisions of the Supreme Court. Analyzes the principle of legal certainty and the confidence of citizens in government actions as a limit to jurisprudential change based in the doctrine of Ronald Dworkin. On this aspect, seeks to demonstrate the advantage of using a consistent doctrine in Brazil of judicial precedents, especially if related to law as integrity in Ronald Dworkin s optical. Reflects on the relationship between change in case law, legal security and development, seeking to identify the theory of Dworkin's integrity as a possibility of ensuring legal certainty through the stability of judicial decisions. Shows that the change of law (between the analyzed period) can serve as a prerequisite for modulating the effects of the decisions of the Supreme Court, from two different aspects. Highlights aspects of changing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court as a standard for modulating the effects of the decision from the trial court itself. Finally, it describes and examines critically the current understanding of the Supreme Court regarding the change of the sedimented others Courts jurisprudence. It concludes with the need for adoption in Brazil of the theory of law with integrity and that the judges of the Supreme Court should make precedents like writing a novel in chapters, or in other words, they must look to the future without forgetting the past; changing position when the case avidly changes in society, but always building rational, articulated in an integrated manner and preserving legal certainty, stability and prediction of judgments or at least it s essentials fundamentals.
Este trabalho visa a estudar a compatibilidade do princípio da segurança jurídica e da confiança dos cidadãos nas ações do Estado com a mudança de jurisprudência no Supremo Tribunal Federal desde o ano de 2008. Examina a hermenêutica, a interpretação jurídica e o controle de constitucionalidade, com ênfase nas transformações sociais e suas repercussões na prática constitucional levada a efeito pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal. Expõe e defende a utilização da Hermenêutica Filosófica. Trata sobre a relação entre interpretação e a mutação constitucional, destacando necessidade de se reconhecer as transformações constitucionais pela evolução da jurisprudência. Explica o sincretismo atual no controle de constitucionalidade no Brasil e apresenta de forma crítica o instituto da modulação dos efeitos das decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Analisa o princípio da segurança jurídica e da confiança do cidadão nas ações governamentais como limite à mudança de jurisprudência e trata sobre a previsibilidade das decisões judiciais a partir da doutrina de Ronald Dworkin. Sobre este aspecto, procura demonstrar a vantagem de se utilizar no Brasil uma doutrina consistente de precedentes judiciais, notadamente se relacionada com o Direito como integridade na ótica de Ronald Dworkin. Tece considerações sobre a relação entre mudança de jurisprudência, segurança jurídica e desenvolvimento, buscando apontar a teoria da integridade de Dworkin como possibilidade de garantia da segurança jurídica por meio da estabilidade das decisões judiciais. Demonstra que a mudança de jurisprudência, dentro do marco temporal proposto (a partir de 2008), pode servir como requisito para modulação dos efeitos das decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal, a partir de duas diferentes vertentes. Evidencia os aspectos da mudança de jurisprudência do próprio Supremo Tribunal Federal como critério para modulação dos efeitos da decisão, a partir de julgados do próprio tribunal. Por fim, descreve e estuda de forma crítica o atual entendimento do STF quanto à mudança de jurisprudência sedimentada das cortes infraconstitucionais. Conclui pela necessidade de adoção no Brasil da teoria do Direito com integridade, devendo os Ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal julgar e construir os precedentes como se estivem a escrever um romance em capítulos, ou seja, olhando para o futuro, sem esquecer o passado; mudando de posição quando for o caso de acompanhar as mudanças da sociedade, mas sempre construindo justificativas racionais, articuladas de forma integrada e preservando a segurança jurídica, a estabilidade e a previsão dos julgamentos ou pelos menos de seus fundamentos.
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Lobban, Michael John Warrender. "The development of common law theory : English jurisprudence c. 1760- c. 1830." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.330033.
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Melville, L. W. "Precedent and statutory interpretation in practice." Thesis, University of Essex, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.371183.
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Lu, Xiaojie. "Legal effects of WTO agreements in domestic legal orders : from direct application to consistent interpretation /." Göttingen : Sierke, 2008. http://d-nb.info/99053958X/04.
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Voyatzis, Hernandez Xochiquetzal Panagia. "Changing hearts and minds in Mexico : a cognitive-jurisprudential approach to legal education reform in a legal system in transition." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/16443.
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The starting assumption of this thesis is that to fully understand legal practices – including legal reasoning – we need to get a grasp of the complex body of knowledge into which they are immersed. Legal studies have often assumed that legal knowledge can be reduced to the knowledge of legal rules. This research departs from this perspective and argues for an understanding of legal knowledge that includes the complex set of conceptual, procedural and affective considerations which shape legal practices in general, and legal reasoning in particular. Herein we argue that not only legal knowledge is wider than the knowledge of rules, but that there are also some aspects of legal practice that cannot be properly addressed by explicitly drafted legal rules. We purport to build such an account upon epistemologically-informed comparative legal perspectives and insights of the cognitive sciences, by way of discussing a particular factual problem. The case to be studied in this thesis is the apparent loss of certainty in Mexican legal practice, when legal professionals engage in precedent-based reasoning. The situation, which was first reported in 2006, has remained broadly unexplored, and by default has been reputed as a problem concerning the set of explicit rules that regulate the system of legal precedents in that national context. We argue that the situation cannot be fully comprehended and remedied if we exclusively focus on the dimension of legal rules, but that it would be better understood if we direct our attention to the deeper knowledge structures in which that practice is immersed. This thesis builds a case for a broadened approach to legal knowledge by unveiling the historically built knowledge structures in which the Mexican understanding of precedents is embedded. As we shall see, this particular framework has acted as a deterrent to precedent-based reasoning, as accounted by a set of theories of law and legal reasoning. By focusing on the several processes of legal change and the collateral epistemic revisions that Mexican legal professionals seem to be experiencing for the past decades, this thesis argues that changing deeply embedded knowledge structures is a difficult task that needs to be supported by revising the processes of knowledge construction, and most importantly legal education.
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Shaleh, Ahmad Syukri. "Ibn Taymiyya's concept of istiḥsān : an understanding of legal reasoning in Islamic jurisprudence." Thesis, McGill University, 1995. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=23241.
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This thesis studies the theory of istihsan, an aspect of Islamic legal reasoning, as a method for ascertaining the legal norm in cases where qiyas dictates an overly strict ruling. The study primarily focuses on the concept presented by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), a prominent Muslim theologian, philosopher, sufi and outstanding jurist. Placed in the context of later development, Ibn Taymiyya's theory proposes both a criticism and reformulation of the Hanafi school's perception of istihsan. Having observed previous formulations, Ibn Taymiyya sees this theory as being understood as an arbitrary contradiction to qiyas. Although attempts to redefine the theory, through rigorous definition and well-calculated application were conducted by later Hanafi jurists, criticism from other schoools continued unabated. To this effect, Ibn Taymiyya's contribution emerges as an alternative solution. In order to fully understand istihsan, Ibn Taymiyya contends that one must determine particularization of the cause (takhsid s al-'illa). By doing this, istihsan and qiyas can be easily distinguished. He, thus, perceives istihsan as takhsid s al-'illa. Unlike the Hanafis, Ibn Taymiyya does not juxtapose istihsan against qiyas sahid h. He argues that if there is a contradiction, it must be proved by a decisive descrepancy (farq mu'aththir) provided by the law giver. Furthermore, when qiyas produces an unsatisfactory legal norm, takhsid s al-'illa represents a viable alternative. Above all, Ibn Taymiyya contends that istihsan must be supported by the revealed texts, consensus or necessity.
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Jolly, Simon. "The jury as legal ideology : a jurisprudence of the control of the jury." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.363613.
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Petoussi, Vassiliki Jr. "From Reified Abstractions to Situated Contexts: Feminist Jurisprudence, Paradigm Shift and Legal Change." Diss., Virginia Tech, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/30306.
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This study addresses the extent to which feminist jurisprudence literature has developed the potential to initiate a legal paradigm shift leading to legal and consequent social change that would alleviate gender inequality. Drawing upon Kuhn's (1970) and Stacey and Thorne's (1985) arguments, I theorized that for a paradigm shift centered upon women and women's experiences to occur, feminist jurisprudence, particularly second- and third-phase feminist jurisprudence, needs to be incorporated into, and accepted by the mainstream. Through quantitative analysis I evaluated, first, the publication and citation patterns and the diffusion of feminist jurisprudence litearature as evidenced in articles published between the years 1983 and 1994 in legal journals assigned impact factors by the Social Science Citation Index. Second, using content analysis, I classified feminist jurisprudence articles published in the subfields of family and penal law --theorized to differ in degree of androcentrism-- according to the three phases of feminist jurisprudence theory. My quantitative analysis showed that the number of feminist jurisprudence articles published in mainstream legal journals is increasing over time. Further, feminist jurisprudence articles published in legal journals with higher impact factors tend to receive larger numbers of citations than articles published in journals with lower impact factors. Finally, although the overall impact factor of journals publishing feminist jurisprudence articles is declining, feminist jurisprudence literature is present among a wide spectrum of legal specializations. My qualitative analysis showed that there was an equivalent number of family and penal law articles which exhibited second- and third-phase characteristics. However, family law articles tended to cover a wider range of topics than penal law articles. Furthermore, family law scholars were more likely than penal law scholars to address issues of differences among women and feminists, thus, exhibiting third-phase characteristics. In constrast, penal law scholars tended to focus upon differences between feminists and non-feminists and the practical difficulties resulting from the structure, organization and practitioners of the criminal justice. Overall, my analysis showed that feminist jurisprudence appears to have developed the potential to initiate a paradigm shift within the legal discipline. However, in addition to feminist theorizing, feminist activism is important for the realization of legal and social changes that will alleviate gender inequality.Ph. D.
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Bengoetxea, Joxerramon. "The legal reasoning of the European court of justice : towards a European jurisprudence /." Oxford : Clarendon press, 1993. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb373946877.
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Sannerholm, [Zajac-Sannerholm] Richard. "Legal, Judicial and Administrative Reforms in Post-Conflict Societies: Beyond the Rule of Law Template." Örebro universitet, Akademin för juridik, psykologi och socialt arbete, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:oru:diva-5910.
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A common position adopted by the international community is that establishing the rule of law after violent internal conflict is an essential prerequisite in the transition from war to peace. In practical terms, this often translates into projects and programmes directed at the criminal justice sector. Rarely is rule of law acknowledged in relation to administrative law, public governance and economic management. This has several negative effects, particularly in societies where public mismanagement, bad economic governance and corruption run high, and especially if one considers these issues as constituting a large part of the reason for state ‘failure’. But, a new trend is now vaguely discernible in the practice of the international actors involved in rebuilding war-shattered societies that gives priority to the rule of law in relation to public sector reform. Liberia provides, in this regard, an illustrative example through the agreement between the Transitional National Government of Liberia and donor agencies, where international experts will have co-signing authority over a number of budgetary issues, and where national judicial institutions will be strengthened in order to combat arbitrary governance and corruption.
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Glahn, Jason C. "Is hard positivism too hard to swallow? /." free to MU campus, to others for purchase, 2004. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/mo/fullcit?p1426061.
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Gledhill, Paul J. R. "The development of systematic thought in early Mālikī jurisprudence, 8th-9th Centuries A.D." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:7278e711-57fc-4596-a2b3-82ebfa4fa039.
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By the eleventh century, the conduct of jurisprudence in the Mālikī school of law – one of four that would survive in Sunni Islam – was predicated on a legal system that comprised a particular set of sources: mainly, the positive legal rules posited by Mālik b. Anas (d. 179/795) and a few of his subsequent adherents, and ḥadīth and Qur᾽an. The structure of the legal system was one in which these sources were conceived to cohere analogically. By analogy, they could be correlated to each other and thereby systematically rationalized, and new rules to govern new cases generated from, and added to, them. This study recovers the antecedents of that system and describes the main stages of the process by which Mālikī jurisprudence acquired the systematic character of its classical form. It provides a re-assessment of Mālik’s own jurisprudence and of the role of precedent and ḥadīth in the Medinese tradition, arguing that the origins of systematic thought in the Mālikī tradition are to be sought in Mālik’s retrospective rationalizations by analogy of rules pronounced nonetheless from arbitrary considerations. I distinguish the mode of analogy that Mālik employed to this effect (tashbīh) from that which his Iraqi contemporaries and the later classical schools employed ostensibly to derive rules from sources ab initio (qiyās). Mālik, I contend, in fact opposed qiyās because it threatened to undermine the sufficiency of juristic discretion by imposing systematic constraints on the personal reasoning of authoritative arbiters. I show how subsequently the Mudawwanah, a work compiled by Mālik’s ninth-century followers in the Islamic West, promoted the formation of a legal system by subjecting Mālik’s teaching and his students’ ramifications of it to a Ḥanafite design by which they became susceptible of analysis along analogical lines. The system implicit in the Mudawwanah is structurally but not yet materially classical. It remained for the Western Mālikīyah, through their encounters in the East with Shāfi῾ite legal theory in the later tenth century, to absorb into the fabric of their system, which so far comprised only the positive rules of the tradition itself, the revealed sources from which, by qiyās, al-Shāfi῾ī (d. 204/820) in the early ninth century had insisted the law be derived. As background to this theory of systematization, I also address inter alia the following questions, which bear in one way or another on our appreciation of Mālik’s jurisprudence and/or the extent to which we may suppose it to be accessible in the recensions of the Muwaṭṭa᾽: the transmission of the vulgate in ninth-century Andalus; the reception of Mālik’s doctrine in Iraq (as perceived through the Muwaṭṭa᾽ of al-Shaybānī – in particular, the editorial principles that informed its composition – and the Ḥujjah ῾alá ahl al-Madīnah); other recensions and the possibilities for a chronology of Muwaṭṭa᾽āt; representation of Mālik’s doctrine in the Ikhtilāf Mālik wa-al-Shāfi῾ī; the way in which Mālik transmitted the Muwaṭṭa᾽ as an explanation of variation between its recensions.
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Englund, Anna. "The Legal Value of Changes in the OECD Commentary." Thesis, Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-270.
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In 1993, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) formed a Working Group to study the application of the OECD Model Tax Convention (OECD MTC) to partnerships, trusts, and other non-corporate entities. In Issues in International Taxation no 6 – The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships (OECD Report), different cases involving the issues relating to the taxation of partnerships are discussed. In dealing with these cases the CFA tried to develop general principles. There are several issues involved when discussing the taxation of partnerships. Depending on the circumstances in the actual case different tax issues arise.
The OECD Report resulted almost exclusively in making changes in the commentary to the OECD MTC (OECD Commentary) and not in the OECD MTC itself. The only change made in the OECD MTC itself is found in article 23 OECD MTC. The changes made in the OECD Commentary are of two different categories: a) changes that are a direct consequence of the changes in the articles themselves in the OECD MTC, and b) changes that are neither clarifications nor amendments to unchanged articles in the OECD MTC. It is important to make this difference in classification since different consequences are at hand for the OECD Member States (OECD MS).
Bilateral tax treaties are part of public international law and therefore, their interpretation is governed by the Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties (VCLT). Articles 31-33 VCLT are relevant for treaty interpretation. Since the CFA adopted the above-mentioned method, it is important to analyse if the OECD Commentary and changes made to it can be used as a legal means of interpretation according to the VCLT. It must be determined what legal value the OECD Commentary and the implemented changes have upon the parties to the bilateral treaties in force.
The determination of the legal value of the OECD Commentary is an important issue and well discussed in the literature. Since the legal status of the OECD Commentary is debated, it is even more important to discuss the consequences of changes made in the OECD Commentary. The OECD Report has been chosen since this is a good example of resolving tax issues by making changes in the OECD Commentary rather than amending the OECD MTC itself.
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Schaffner, Tobias Gregor. "The search for the starting point of practical legal philosophy : the recovery of the political common good." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2014. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.708414.
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Kirchner, Andree. "Maritime arrest : a legal reflection on the international arrest conventions and on domestic law in Germany and Sweden." Thesis, Stockholm University, Department of Law, 2001. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-739.
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Moles, R. N. "Definition and rule in jurisprudence : a critique of H.L.A. Hart's response to John Austin." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.370587.
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