Academic literature on the topic 'Jurisprudence and legal interpretation'
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Journal articles on the topic "Jurisprudence and legal interpretation"
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Gbade, Akinrinmade. "Statutory Interpretation: Whither Nigerian Jurisprudence?" AGOGO: Journal of Humanities 9 (September 2, 2020): 67–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.46881/ajh.v9i0.249.
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The application of the principles of statutory interpretation cuts across every area of legal practice. This position attests to the importance of the principle of statutory interpretation to legal practice. However, legal curriculum in Nigeria and in most common law countries both at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels has failed to give this area of law the prominence it deserved in their respective law curriculla. Aside from this, the continued classification of the various rules of interpretation as distinct/separate rules of interpretation makes this field of study unintelligible and difficult to comprehend because of the complexity of words. In addition, each of the principal rules of statutory interpretation has inherent shortcomings, which has led to delay in judicial administration and caused injustice. Consequently, this paper reiterates the need to play emphasis on this area of study in law curriculum, ex-rays the current rules of statutory interpretation as applicable in Nigeria, and draws inspiration from the practice in English and Indian jurisdictions. It also advocates that resort should be had to the purposive approach which is a harmonization of the principal rules of statutory interpretation subject to emerging realities of justice and developments in order to ensure that the end of justice are appropriately served.
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Mikhailov, Anton Mikhailovich. "Interpretation of jurisprudence and law in the doctrine of T. E. Holland." Право и политика, no. 12 (December 2021): 46–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0706.2021.12.37185.
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The subject of this research is the legal doctrine of the leading representative of English legal positivism of the last quarter of the XIX – first third of the XX centuries of Thomas Erskine Holland. The article is dedicated to examination of the two key aspects of his concept – comprehension of the nature of jurisprudence as a science, and law as a type of social norm. Leaning on the classic work of the British jurist “The Elements of Jurisprudence” (1880), the author defines the understanding of jurisprudence and law, reveals the historical-cultural meaning of Holland's legal doctrine for the subsequent development of English jurisprudence. Methodological framework is comprised of the historical approach, elements of biographical approach, techniques and procedures of legal hermeneutics, rules and techniques of formal logic, and elements of comparative-legal method. The scientific novelty lies in the fact that this article is first within Russian legal science to conduct the concept analysis of the key theoretical-legal definitions (jurisprudence and law) of T. Holland’s doctrine, as well as reveal the ideological interrelation between the views of the British jurist and the founders of analytical jurisprudence. The author also substantiates the position, according to which Holland's approach towards comprehension of the nature of jurisprudence as a science can be defined as dogmatic. T. Holland's contribution to the development of legal positivism consists in argumentation of the formal and analytical nature of legal science, as well as in carrying out gradual differentiation of positive law from natural and social norms, and analysis of the crucial theoretical concepts of legal science.
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Amiraghdam, Rima, Gholam Ali Seifi Zeinab, Ali Zare, and Mohsen Ghasemi. "The Role of Jurisprudence in the Interpretation of the Law and Its Conformity with the Realities in the Law of Iran and France." Journal of Politics and Law 9, no. 8 (September 29, 2016): 57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v9n8p57.
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The jurisprudence position difference in common law systems and the written law among the sources of law requires the study of the jurisprudence role in the interpretation of the law, and its adaptation to the realities of society. In Iranian law, jurisprudence means identical judgments of prosecutors from additional resources and commentary, and accepting the fact that, it could create a legal rule seems unlikely. In France, with the approval of the separation of powers and criticizing the classical doctrine, it seemed unlikely, the jurisprudence has a legislative role, however, such an idea has been expanded with all law branches and it seems to be a balance between resources related to legislate on the one hand and jurisprudence, on the other hand. Since, the rules express the general rules and it is impossible to predict the detail in the legislative practically, it is jurisprudence that could provide interpretations consistent with realities and social requirements of the law, in a complementary and commentary role. In this paper, the relationship between jurisprudence and interpretation of the law, especially in cases where we face with the need to interpret the law and the effectiveness of position on the interpretation of the law and its adaptation with the realities of society by jurisprudence will be discussed. These matters are examined with the descriptive analysis method that shows the importance of them in highlighting the role of jurisprudence in the legal system.
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Moath Alnaief and Kotb Rissouni. "A Critical Analysis of the Claim that Absolute Juristic Interpretation (Ijtihād) Has Ended." Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization 12, no. 2 (October 11, 2022): 28–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.32350/jitc.122.03.
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This article critically analyzes the dominant opinion prevailing regarding the foundation of Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) which states that absolute independent juristic interpretation (al-ijtihād al-muṭlaq al-mustaqill) is no longer possible. Therefore, based on the belief that this level of interpretation requires the creation of a unique method for deriving legal rules (istinbāṭ), a method that arguably ended with the founders of the primary schools of law. This research inspects a new interpretive method which was not developed by late scholars. Consequently, the article uses legal reasoning as an interpretive method to criticize the previous opinions regarding Islamic Jurisprudence by using both textual and rational evidence. For instance, the preservation of religion and the continued renewal of convenient sources requires scholars to reach the highest level of interpretation (ijtihād). In addition, a connection to the legal reality of the time and rulings were necessary to adapt them, an issue dependent upon direct derivation of rulings from religious texts or the freedom to implement secondary forms of evidence. Therefore, this research concludes that the founders of the traditional law schools did not develop their foundations independently. Instead, they did so through constructive investigation and analysis. Their interpretations conformed to the Prophet’s (SAW) Companions. Such a process continued and future independent scholars followed their footsteps. In addition, the legal reality in every age saw the rise of individuals who positively impacted the renewal of the foundations of jurisprudence by interpreting Prophetic hadīth which required advanced interpretative skills.
Keywords: Absolute Ijtihād, Ijtihād, Islamic law, Independent juristic reasoning, Madhāhib
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Zirk-Sadowski, Marek. "Problemy wyboru pomiędzy konkurującymi modelami wykładni prawa." Przegląd Prawa i Administracji 104 (October 19, 2016): 155–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/0137-1134.104.10.
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PROBLEMS OF CHOICE BETWEEN COMPETING MODELS OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWThe plurality of theories of legal interpretation is well described in the legal literature. According to the author, the choice between the models of interpretation has to be based on the thesis that the full conception of the legal interpretation includes three levels of reflection: firstly, epistemology established for the theory of the interpretation, secondly, determining the relation between the theory of the interpretation and interpretative doctrine ius interpretandi and thirdly, structure of the theory of the interpretation which is a result of methodological solutions accepted by the type of jurisprudence. The paper has been devoted to discussing these three problems.
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Frolova, Elizaveta A. "V.S. Gruzdev. Realism in jurisprudence: theoretical, methodological and historical aspects." Gosudarstvo i pravo, no. 5 (2022): 181. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s102694520019746-1.
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In the review of V.S. Gruzdev’s monograph “Realism in jurisprudence: theoretical, methodological and historical aspects” it is noted that the research of the author of the reviewed work seems to be in demand by modern philosophy and jurisprudence. The purpose of this monograph is to study on the basis of original texts the main directions of legal realism as a paradigm of legal understanding in the context of its genesis, typology, main interpretations and directions of development, to show its evolution and interpretation. To achieve it, the author solves a number of theoretical, methodological and methodical tasks: generalizes approaches in domestic and foreign literature to the interpretation and justification of realism as a theoretical and methodological attitude and method of cognition of law; identifies the main directions of evolution and typology of conceptual legal realism; explores the concept of activity as a semantic characteristic of legal practice; analyzes the most significant trends in the evolution of legal realism in the history of Western European and Scandinavian legal thought; explores the specifics of American legal realism; determines the role of realism among the dominants in the history of Russian legal thought. The issues raised in the monograph and their presentation are of interest for further scientific research in the field of theory, Philosophy and Sociology of Law, history of political and legal doctrines, history and methodology of legal science.
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Łakomy, Jakub. "Critical Jurisprudence of Duncan Kennedy and the Status of the Theory of Legal Interpretation." Krytyka Prawa 12, no. 3 (September 15, 2020): 70–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.7206/kp.2080-1084.396.
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KUGLE, SCOTT ALAN. "Framed, Blamed and Renamed: The Recasting of Islamic Jurisprudence in Colonial South Asia." Modern Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (April 2001): 257–313. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x01002013.
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A system should be formed, which shall preserve as much as possible can be done, their institutions and laws to the natives of Hindoostan, and attemper them with the mild spirit of British government.—John BruceJurisprudence is the nexus where authoritative texts, cultural assumptions, and political expediency come together during a crisis. It is therefore not so much a thing or a system as it is an experience, an interpretative experience. Yet the practice of jurisprudence is very different from other types of interpretation because it is also an exertion of power. A legal interpretation is a decision which mobilizes coercive forces to immediately solidify the interpretation into a social reality. The administrative structure of courts and the legal rhetoric that flows through them disguise jurisprudence as ‘a system’ rather than revealing its nature as an interpretative experience; this disguise serves to heighten the authority of these exercises of power and to limit the ability to contest them to specialists.
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TARAN, P. E., and A. D. STRUNSKIY. "THE IDEA OF LAW AND ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF INTERPRETATION OF LAW: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GERMAN LEGAL DOCTRINE IN THE 19TH — THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY." Actual Problems of Russian Law, no. 5 (June 18, 2019): 11–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.17803/1994-1471.2019.102.5.011-023.
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The article is devoted to the analysis of theoretical provisions of the main schools of German jurisprudence in the 19th — the first half of the 20th century in the context of legal consciousness and interpretation of law. The article determines the main theoretical premises of such important academic areas as: the Historical School of Law, Jurisprudence of Concepts, Jurisprudence of Interests, the School of Free Law, Legal Positivism and Neo-Cantianism. The author considers scientific works of the main representatives of these schools. The development of concepts of law and interpretation of law in the German legal doctrine demonstrates the connection of the doctrine of interpretation with the idea of law and real legal life. The historical period under consideration witnessed the work of many outstanding lawyers whose teachings had an impact not only on the legal science of many countries of Europe and Russia, but also on the legal doctrine of individual States belonging to the Anglo-Saxon legal family. Despite the different nature of their teachings, there is a link between the idea of law and their approach to the interpretation of legal provisions. This interaction is also inverse, many scholars have solved the problem of the essence of law by resorting to interpretive procedures. Tendencies similar to the tendencies typical for the German legal doctrine have found support both in the judicial practice of German courts and in the practice of the higher courts of the European Union. The article concludes that further development of the doctrine of interpretation of law requires not only the development of the methodology of interpretation of law, but also further developmentss in the philosophy of law.
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Szudejko, Piotr. "Selected issues of legal interpretation in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court." Polish Law Review 2, no. 1 (December 31, 2016): 87–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/24509841.1232095.
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The ongoing dispute in Poland for the position in the political system and the functioning of the Constitutional Court is highlighting the problems of the legal interpretation, conducted by this body.The aim of the article is to analyze selected problems signaled in the public discourse: the acting of the Constitutional Court as a judge in its own case and the use of dynamic and static methods of legal interpretation.The basis for deliberation is a description of the functions exercised by the Constitutional Court, including interference function, as well as the basic classification of legal interpretation, with particular emphasis on dynamic and static interpretation. On this background, an analysis of the admissibility and the consequences of the use of these methods of interpretation in the jurisprudence of the Court was presented.Moreover, the principle nemo judex in causa sua was presented, including the description of its role in the Polish legal system as well as permitted exceptions.The result of the study was the observation that the legal provisions do not define acceptable methods of interpretation, which means that the entity that is performing legal interpretation has the discretion in choosing the appropriate method. At the same time the thesis has been proposed, that the use of a dynamic interpretation of constitutional models should be considered an exception, justified by the occurrence of significant socio-economic changes.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Jurisprudence and legal interpretation"
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Donayre, Lobo Gabriel. "The Legal Interpretation: Proposals for its Application in Tax Law." Derecho & Sociedad, 2015. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/118642.
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The first half of this report contains the concept of interpretation and its relationship with the written language. In addition, it proposes how the ambiguity of the language is one of the main problems for legal interpretation. The second half of this report establishes which components of the legal interpretation are, from a theoretical perspective –according to doctrine and practice– following jurisprudence, criteria and methods of interpretation allowed in Law. This part also proposes a route for the legal interpretation in Tax Law. The third part of this report contains the interpretation of two resolutions from the Tax Court following the described route.En la primera parte del artículo se determina el concepto de interpretación y su relación con el lenguaje escrito. Asimismo, se plantea la ambigüedad como uno de los principales problemas que se presenta en la comprensión del lenguaje escrito, así como en la interpretación jurídica. En la segunda parte del artículo se plasman los componentes de la interpretación jurídica, desarrollando desde un punto de vista teórico-doctrinario y práctico-jurisprudencial, los criterios y métodos de interpretación admitidos por el Derecho. Asimismo, se propone un itinerario para la interpretación en el Derecho Tributario. En la tercera parte se desarrolla la interpretación de dos resoluciones del Tribunal Fiscal, utilizando el itinerario propuesto.
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Deagon, Alex. "The Contours of Truth: Using Christian Theology and Philosophy to Construct a Jurisprudence of Truth." Thesis, Griffith University, 2015. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/110544/2/110544.pdf.
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This thesis proposes that the modern Western legal system contains secularised or otherwise distorted Christian theology as an integral part of its conceptual foundation. It argues that this secularisation has led to legal violence in the form of antagonism between the members of the legal community, and alienation of the individuals in the community from each other and the state. In order to establish a peaceful system of law and mitigate this violence, the thesis contends that these distorted concepts ought to be identified and returned to their ‘orthodox’ understandings. In particular, the Christian ideas of truth, faith and reason require analysis in a jurisprudential context. To this end, the thesis engages the work of John Milbank and attempts to articulate a particular conception of the relationship between truth, faith and reason – one which will be conducive to the construction of a legal community characterised by peace rather than violence.
The introductory chapter summarises the thesis and its methodology, and positions the thesis in its relevant jurisprudential, philosophical and theological context. The first chapter of the thesis more specifically structures the content by reviewing and critiquing John Milbank’s work in terms of constructing working definitions of truth, faith and reason. Having proposed these, chapter two examines and extends Milbank’s theological critique of science, exposing the secularisation of ‘scientific’ reason and its divorce from ‘Christian’ faith which forms the foundation for ‘modern’ (secular) thinking. With an analysis of Jacques Derrida in chapter three, the thesis proceeds to explain how faith and reason are reconciled in Christian theology, allowing the development of a ‘post-modern’ theology with the view of producing peace rather than violence.
Chapter four adopts this postmodern theology, tracing the genealogy of secularisation and violence in the development of law and the modern legal community. This shows the contingent nature of the secular legal system and creates a space for it to be redeemed and made peaceful. Chapter five commences the process of articulating this Christian idea of a peaceful legal community through the revelation of theological truth by reading law and truth in the trial of Christ, arguing for a system which embraces a loving mutual trust rather than a calculating drive for decision or finality. Chapter six contends that trust in the face of the mysterious divine is in fact the desirable Christian legacy, one which is nevertheless materialised and accessible through Christ’s resurrection, and makes possible eternal life beyond the constraints of violence. The resurrection instantiates the Pauline law to love your neighbour as yourself, and chapter seven explores the nature of this theological truth, and argues that its application to the modern legal system will allow a love beyond law which produces a peaceful community.
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Peyser, Nell. "Liberal and Conservative Jurisprudence on the Contemporary Supreme Court: An Analysis of Substantive Due Process Interpretation." Oberlin College Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=oberlin1305309468.
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Stobbs, Nigel. "Mainstreaming therapeutic jurisprudence and the adversarial paradigm—incommensurability and the possibility of a shared disciplinary matrix." Thesis, Bond University, 2013. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/63846/1/Stobbs_Thesis_Submit_PhD_2013.pdf.
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Problem-solving courts appear to achieve outcomes that are not common in mainstream courts. There are increasing calls for the adoption of more therapeutic and problem-solving practices by mainstream judges in civil and criminal courts in a number of jurisdictions, most notably in the United States and Australia. Currently, a judge who sets out to exercise a significant therapeutic function is likely to be doing so in a specialist court or jurisdiction, outside the mainstream court system, and arguably, outside the adversarial paradigm itself. To some extent, this work is tolerated but marginalised.
However, do therapeutic and problem-solving functions have the potential to help define, rather than simply complement, the role of judicial officers? The core question addressed in this thesis is whether the judicial role could evolve to be not just less adversarial, but fundamentally non-adversarial. In other words, could we see—or are we seeing—a juristic paradigm shift not just in the colloquial, casual sense of the word, but in the strong, worldview changing sense meant by Thomas Kuhn?
This thesis examines the current relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence in the context of Kuhn’s conception of the transition from periods of ‘normal science’, through periods of anomaly and disciplinary crises to paradigm shifts. It considers whether therapeutic jurisprudence and adversarialism are incommensurable in the Kuhnian sense, and if so, what this means for the relationship between the two, and for the agenda to mainstream therapeutic jurisprudence.
The thesis asserts that Kuhnian incommensurability is, in fact, a characteristic of the relationship between adversarialism and therapeutic jurisprudence, but that the possibility of a therapeutic paradigm shift in law can be reconciled with many adversarial and due process principles by relating this incommensurability to a broader disciplinary matrix.
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Blanc-Fily, Charlotte. "Les valeurs dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme : Essai critique sur l'interprétation axiologique du juge européen." Thesis, Montpellier 1, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014MON10022/document.
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Partout présentes au cœur de la jurisprudence européenne des droits de l'homme, les valeurs fondamentales des sociétés démocratiques constituent un sujet d'étude pertinent pour apprécier dans quelle mesure ces valeurs sont mobilisées et si elles participent d'une interprétation axiologique de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. Simple rappel rhétorique ou véritable outil argumentatif, le recours aux valeurs dans la jurisprudence de la Cour EDH mérite ainsi d'être analysé au travers du prisme de l'interprétation de la Convention. A côté de l'interprétation téléologique, des interprétations évolutive et consensuelle, aucune étude n'a jusqu'alors recherché à systématiser la référence aux valeurs des sociétés démocratiques pour tenter d'en déduire une interprétation axiologique. Mais alors que le juge européen multiplie les références aux valeurs dans ses décisions, il y a néanmoins lieu de constater que l'utilisation de ces valeurs est concurrencée par d'autres politiques jurisprudentielles plus contemporaines et soucieuses des attentes actuelles des populations, de la revendication libertaire individualiste de plus en plus prégnante, et du nécessaire respect du principe de subsidiarité. Phénomènes qui s'accommodent difficilement d'une protection conservatrice de valeurs communes aux Etats parties à la Convention européenne des droits de l'hommeEverywhere in the legal precedents of the European court of human rights (ECHR), fundamental values of democratic societies are a relevant study subject to understand in which part the values are used and if they participate of a specific interpretation of the European convention based on axioms defense's. Simple rhetoric use or true argumentative tool, values resort's in the legal precedents of the ECHR need to be appreciated as an isolate interpretation method. Next to teleologic, evolutive, and consensual interpretative methods, none study try until then to systematize the resort of fundamental values of democratic societies by the judge and deduct of the European court case law the existence of a specific interpretation based on values defense's. If the European judge multiplies the resorts of values in case law, we have to notice that utilization of values competes with others interpretative methods, more contemporary, and respectful of actual societal expectations, individual claims and to enforce the subsidiarity principle. All social facts and jurisdictional necessities which are difficult to conciliate with requirement of a conservative protection of common values of the contracting States
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Tamouza, Ahlem. "Les cultures dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme." Thesis, Paris 3, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019PA030024.
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La diversité culturelle interétatique ainsi que diverses cultures nationales et sociétales sont régulièrement invoquées par la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme. Un constat de récurrence et de diversité des références aux cultures dans la jurisprudence européenne conduit à poser la question de savoir comment la Cour utilise les cultures dans l’exercice de son office. L’objectif est donc de découvrir, à partir d’une analyse de discours, les contours et la raison d’être d’« usages des cultures » en droit européen des droits de l’Homme. Divers usages peuvent, d’abord, être relevés. Par exemple, la Cour prend en compte des intérêts culturels sociétaux, interprète la Convention à la lumière de la culture sociétale, ou encore mobilise les cultures pour justifier certains choix juridictionnels. Bien que divers et inconstants, les usages identifiés ont pour caractéristique de s’écarter d’une méthode de contrôle habituelle. Ils viseraient le prononcé d’un choix intermédiaire ou d’une solution qui n’auraient pu être présentés à l’issue d’un raisonnement habituel. S’ils semblent, de ce fait, opportunistes et procéder de l’exercice d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire, les usages des cultures ont cependant la particularité de pouvoir renforcer la motivation des jugements – et ainsi de compenser le manque en légitimité qu’un choix discrétionnaire entrainerait. Une certaine valeur argumentative peut, en effet, être reconnue aux références aux et à la prise en compte des cultures. Finalement constitutif de l’exercice de l’office du juge, le recours aux cultures est apparu utile dans le contrôle juridictionnel et opportun au regard de la réception des jugements rendus par la CourThe inter-State cultural diversity as well as the various national and societal cultures are regularly invoked by the European Court of Human Rights. The diversity and the recurrence of the references to cultures in the legal precedents lead to the question of how the Court uses national and societal cultures in the exercise of its function. Thus, the purpose is to shed light on the characteristics and the raison d’être of the “uses of cultures” in European human rights law. First, a discourse analysis unveils a variety of uses in the Court’s reasoning. For instance, it shows the Court takes into account cultural interests, interprets the Convention in the light of the cultural context, and invokes cultures to account for its own decisions. Secondly, the common feature of the diverse uses of cultures appears to be their exceptional nature. While using cultures, the Court does not follow a usual method of monitoring. Hence, it uses cultures exceptionally to deliver a decision different from the one that would have been taken following a regular reasoning. In that respect, the uses of cultures appear to stem from the exercise of a discretionary power that can be regarded as a threat to the European judge’s legitimacy. However, the references to and the consideration of cultures display the special capacity of having an argumentative power. Initially considered as a component of the Court’s reasoning, the uses of cultures ultimately deem to be relevant in the motivation of the Court’s discretionary decisions
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Delanlssays, Thomas. "La motivation des décisions juridictionnelles du Conseil d’Etat." Thesis, Lille 2, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017LIL20018.
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Cette étude se donne pour ambition de saisir et de comprendre ce qu’est la motivation des décisions juridictionnelles du Conseil d’État, au demeurant souvent critiquée. Notion fondamentale en droit processuel, la motivation est un discours argumentatif, expression d’une technique juridique, à savoir un discours visant à justifier au plan juridique et factuel la décision à travers un raisonnement afin de persuader l’auditoire. Ainsi faudra-t-il analyser à la fois son architecture et ses fonctions dans une perspective dynamique. En tout état de cause, on constate,depuis au moins le début du XXIe siècle, une certaine évolution de la motivation. Ce phénomène résulte, notamment, de l’européanisation et de la complexité normatives, de la protection renforcée des droits fondamentaux, des exigences de sécurité juridique ou encore de la volonté du Conseil d’État de promouvoir une politique communicationnelle afin de légitimer son action. L’étude implique de revisiter certaines thématiques traditionnelles, en particulier le syllogismejudiciaire, l’argumentation, l’interprétation, le style de la motivation ou encore le pouvoir normatif jurisprudentiel pour constater et mesurer cette évolutionThe aim of this research is to tackle and understand the Conseil d’Etat’s court’s decisions motivation which are often criticised. Fundamental notion in procedural law, motivation is an argumentative discourse expressing a jurisdictional technique but moreover it is specifically a discourse trying trough a legal reasoning to justify a decision in order to convince the audience. Thus we shall have to analyse its architecture and its functions in a dynamic perspective. Either way we can note that since the beginning of the 21st century the court’s motivation has evolved.This phenomenon is the result of the Europeanization and the complexity of the normative production and is also due to enhanced protection of the fundamental rights, legal certainty and the Conseil d’Etat’s wish to promote a communicational policy in order to legitimise its action. This research entails to revisit certain traditional topics such as jurisdictional syllogism, argumentation, interpretation, the motivation’s style or the normative jurisprudential power to both note and measure this evolution
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Basset, Antoine. "Pour en finir avec l'interprétation : usages des techniques d'interprétation dans les jurisprudences constitutionnelles française et allemande." Thesis, Paris 10, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA100146/document.
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Les problèmes que pose, traditionnellement, la notion d'interprétation en droit (l'idéologie du juge comme bouche de la loi) sont encore multipliés lorsque l'on se place au niveau constitutionnel : ce qui est généralement considéré comme les techniques permettant de garantir la juridicité des interprétations de la loi exposent d'autant plus visiblement leurs lacunes, qu'il n'existe plus de norme supérieure donnant l'apparence de les garantir. En théorie, certains courants ont cherché, après Kelsen, à fonder rationnellement l'interprétation, afin de pouvoir juger de sa vérité. A chaque fois, cependant, il leur a été nécessaire de se rattacher à des éléments externes en droit et dont le caractère de vérité pouvait, de plus, être contesté. A l'opposé, le réalisme juridique se contente d'affirmer le pouvoir créateur du juge, et sa liberté d'interprétation ; ce faisant, pourtant, il ne peut pas rendre compte du processus interprétatif en fait (comment le juge décide-t-il lorsqu'il n'a pas de préjugé ?). La thèse cherchera donc, au moyen d'une étude empirique, à dégager des éléments qui pourraient servir de futurs développements théoriques sur la question de l'interprétation. Pour ce faire, elle mettra en œuvre des outils tirés des sciences littéraire, linguistique et sociologique et construira à partir de là une perspective autre que celle généralement proposée par les travaux sur l’interprétation. Afin d’asseoir plus solidement ses développements, ce travail adopte une méthode comparatiste (France – Allemagne) : les deux cours, fort éloignées à l'origine, mais en train de se rapprocher, ne peuvent manquer d'offrir les tensions nécessairesWhen one admits with legal realism that methods of interpretation cannot give the one good answer to a juridical case, and thus cannot assure that the judge is bound to the limits the separation of powers imposes on him, it becomes possible to change the perspective on these techniques. They now can be regarded as revealing the institutional constraints which affect the judge. The first part of this dissertation examines how the judge is writing the constitution. Based on G. Genette’s theories on hypertextuality (hypertextualité) it is possible to describe two different types of interpretation (imitation and transposition). The different interpretational choices made by the French and German judges seem to confirm the general impressions: the German Federal constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has a bigger power on shaping the constitution than the French Conseil constitutionnel. The second chapter demonstrates how this difference has a bearing on the two court’s institutional actions. The German judge is more straightforward when it comes to dealing with the legislator, deliberately using the instruments his position as a constitutional judge are offering. The French judge, on the other hand, seems more reluctant in this respect. Vis-à-vis the other judges, the constitutional judge (supported by more direct means of action, such as the constitutional complaint) can take a more and more preponderant position, corresponding to his understanding of the constitution. In France however, the lack of constraining procedures between the different courts results in a system of negotiations – oftentimes to redound to the normal judge’s advantage. Both constitutional courts are exposed to a similar constraint (the articulation between existing juridical system and the system of the constitution). The methods of interpretation are useful to them in order to bring different answers
Einmal angenommen, wie im Legal realism, dass die Auslegungsmethoden nicht zur einzigen richtigen Lösung eines Falles führen und daher nicht für die richterliche Beachtung der von einem System der Gewaltenteilung gesetzten Schranken bürgen können, wird ein Perspektivenwechsel möglich und aufschlussreich. Somit können die Auslegungsmethoden als Ausdruck der institutionellen Zwänge, denen die Richter ausgesetzt sind, betrachtet werden. Der erste Teil dieser Dissertation beschäftigt sich damit, wie die Verfassung durch den Richter geschrieben wird. Anhand der von G. Genette entwickelten Hypertextualitätstheorie werden zwei allgemeine Auslegungsmodelle (Mimesis und Übertragung) ausgearbeitet. Dabei wird gezeigt, dass der vom deutschen und französischen Richter jeweils unterschiedlich gewählte Pfad einen ersten Eindruck bestätigt: das Bundesverfassungsgericht ist mächtiger wenn es darum geht, die Verfassung zu gestalten. Gleichzeitig hat jener Unterschied eine spürbare Wirkung auf das institutionelle Handeln der Gerichte, worauf im zweiten Teil der Arbeit eingegangen wird. Dem Gesetzgeber gegenüber wagt das deutsche Gericht mehr und ist freimütiger als das französische Gericht mit den ihm (als Verfassungsgericht) genauso wie seinem Homolog in Paris zur Verfügung stehenden Instrumenten. Auch nimmt er in seinen Beziehungen zu den anderen Richtern er eine fast überragende Stellung ein (was Verfahren wie die Verfassungsbeschwerde erleichtern), die seinem Verständnis des Grundgesetzes entspricht. Im Gegenteil dazu führt in Frankreich die strenge Trennung zwischen den drei hohen Gerichten zu einem System der Verhandlung, meistens zugunsten des Fachrichters. Anhand der Auslegungsarbeit beantworten somit beide Gerichte die Frage der Eingliederung der herkömmlichen Rechtsordnung und der Verfassungsordnung unterschiedlich
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Cimardi, Cláudia Aparecida. "A jurisprudência uniforme como elemento estruturante do sistema jurídico brasileiro." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2014. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/6364.
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Previous issue date: 2014-02-18This thesis aims to analyze the current role of jurisprudence in the face of Brazilian legal system. First, the historical aspects that led to the evolution of the concept of legal system were presented. From these considerations, the following approaches were conducted: (i) historical delineation of the development of law enforcement, especially in the Civil Law legal system, showing how mass society demanded that the Brazilian legislator implanted new trial procedural techniques; (ii) presentation of the concepts of jurisprudence and judicial precedents to the Brazilian legal system; (iii) demonstration of need for the jurisprudence to be dedicated to standardization, function to be exercised by superior courts (Supreme Justice Court and Supreme Federal Court; (iv) demonstration that the performance of this function results a paradigm for future trials and, therefore, comply with the ideals of stability and predictability of the legal system; (v) exposure that uniform jurisprudence of higher courts can and must undergo changes, being inadmissible sudden and unjustified changes; (vi) demonstration of the importance of judicial precedents in the Brazilian legal system, as conductors of uniform jurisprudence; (vii) exposure of standardization techniques of jurisprudence governed by civil process, and (viii) new discipline of the subject, presented in the Draft ot Civil Process Law. As a result of the research, it was found that uniform jurisprudence of higher courts integrates the meaning of rules, reason why it is the structuring element of the legal system, hence it should be observed in future trials, throughout society and the Administration. We sought, therefore, to develop a methodical study, based on extensive local and foreign literature, which intended to establish a current legal framework of the uniform jurisprudence of higher courts and techniques for jurisprudence standardization
Esta tese tem como objetivo principal analisar o atual papel da jurisprudência em face do sistema jurídico brasileiro. Primeiramente, foram apresentados os aspectos históricos que resultaram na evolução do conceito de sistema jurídico. A partir de tais considerações, foram realizadas as seguintes abordagens: (i) delineamento histórico do desenvolvimento da aplicação do direito em concreto, especialmente no sistema jurídico do civil Law, evidenciando como a sociedade de massa exigiu que o legislador brasileiro implantasse novas técnicas processuais de julgamento; (ii) exposição dos conceitos de jurisprudência e precedentes judiciais para o sistema jurídico brasileiro; (iii) demonstração da necessidade de a jurisprudência ser vocacionada à uniformização, função a ser desempenhada pelos tribunais superiores (Superior Tribunal de Justiça e Supremo Tribunal Federal; (iv) demonstração de que a jurisprudência uniforme resulta em paradigma de julgamentos futuros e, por essa razão, cumprir com os ideais da previsibilidade e estabilidade do sistema jurídico; (v) exposição de que a jurisprudência uniforme dos tribunais superiores podem e devem sofrer mudanças, sendo inadmissíveis as transformações bruscas e injustificadas; (vi) demonstração da importância dos precedentes judiciais no sistema jurídico brasileiro, como condutores da jurisprudência uniforme; (vii) exposição das técnicas de uniformização de jurisprudência disciplinadas pelo processo civil; e (viii) nova disciplina do tema, apresentada no Projeto de Código de Processo Civil. Como resultado da pesquisa, constatou-se que a jurisprudência uniforme dos tribunais superiores integra o sentido das normas, razão pela qual é elemento estruturante do sistema jurídico e, por isso, deve ser observada em julgamentos futuros, por toda a sociedade e pela Administração. Buscou-se, assim, elaborar um trabalho metódico, baseado em ampla bibliografia nacional e estrangeira, que pretendeu estabelecer o enquadramento jurídico atual da jurisprudência uniforme dos tribunais superiores e das técnicas de uniformização de jurisprudência
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Marmor, Andrei. "Interpretation and legal theory /." Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1992. http://www.gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/recht/toc/277092086.pdf.
Full textBooks on the topic "Jurisprudence and legal interpretation"
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Interpretation and legal theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
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Larry, Alexander. Legal rules and legal reasoning. Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2000.
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Moreso, Josep J. Legal indeterminacy and constitutional interpretation. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998.
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Simonds, Roger. Rational individualism: The perennial philosophy of legal interpretation. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995.
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Interpretations of legal history. Holmes Beach, Fla: Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, 1986.
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Levi, Edward Hirsch. An introduction to legal reasoning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.
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Jørgensen, Stig. Fragments of legal cognition. Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 1988.
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Phillimore, John George. Principles and maxims of jurisprudence. Union, N.J: Lawbook Exchange, 2001.
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Ávila, Humberto Bergmann. Theory of legal principles. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007.
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The concise dictionary of medical-legal terms: A general guide to interpretation and usage. New York: Parthenon Pub., 1998.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Jurisprudence and legal interpretation"
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Broeżk, Bartosz. "Legal Interpretation and Coherence." In Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence, 113–22. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6110-0_5.
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Postema, Gerald J. "Positivism Challenged: Interpretation, Integrity, and Law." In A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, 401–56. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8960-1_9.
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Veitch, Scott, Emilios Christodoulidis, and Marco Goldoni. "Legal pluralism." In Jurisprudence, 282–89. Third edition. | Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, [2018]: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315795997-25.
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Veitch, Scott, Emilios Christodoulidis, and Marco Goldoni. "Legal institutionalism." In Jurisprudence, 290–98. Third edition. | Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, [2018]: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315795997-26.
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Veitch, Scott, Emilios Christodoulidis, and Marco Goldoni. "The turn to interpretation." In Jurisprudence, 182–92. Third edition. | Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, [2018]: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315795997-17.
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Veitch, Scott, Emilios Christodoulidis, and Marco Goldoni. "The politics of legal reasoning." In Jurisprudence, 193–204. Third edition. | Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, [2018]: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315795997-18.
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Cotterrell, Roger. "Transnational Legal Authority." In Sociological Jurisprudence, 122–39. Abingdon, Oxon [UK] ; New York : Routledge, 2017.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315167527-9.
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Goodrich, Peter. "Rhetoric as Jurisprudence." In Legal Discourse, 85–124. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11283-8_5.
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Goodrich, Peter. "Rhetoric as Jurisprudence." In Legal Discourse, 85–124. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08818-8_5.
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Weeramantry, C. G. "Some Basic Islamic Legal Ideas." In Islamic Jurisprudence, 59–93. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19456-8_5.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Jurisprudence and legal interpretation"
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Kukharenko, Vladislav. "DEBATABLE ASPECTS OF THE DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT OF “NATURAL MONOPOLIES” IN THE LEGAL FIELD." In Current problems of jurisprudence. ru: Publishing Center RIOR, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.29039/02058-6/205-211.
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The article reveals the theoretical problems of defining the concept of “natural monopolies”, based on a comparison of economic and legal approaches to the interpretation of the analyzed category, and reveals its inconsistent understanding in the current legislation of the Russian Federation. In the article, by means of a detailed analysis of the provisions of Laws No. 135-FZ and No. 147-FZ, the illegality of attributing the legislation on natural monopolies to the antimonopoly legislation is determined. On the basis of the obtained data, the legal meaning of the concept of “natural monopolies” is formulated, which can contribute to the modernization of the system of their functioning, increase the efficiency of work, and improve the current legislation.
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Kozar, Vladimir. "NIŠTAVOST VALUTNE KLAUZULE – OGRANIČENjE SLOBODE PRUŽANjA FINANSIJSKIH USLUGA I NARUŠAVANjE PRAVNE SIGURNOSTI." In XV Majsko savetovanje: Sloboda pružanja usluga i pravna sigurnost. University of Kragujevac, Faculty of Law, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.46793/xvmajsko.217k.
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The paper presents the legal provisions, the views of jurisprudence, as the opinion of the legal science, about the validity of the currency clause in the loan agreements. It is explained that the foreign currency clause is a foreign currency obligation of the borrower. The paper analyzes the uneven practice of domestic courts. Particular attention was paid to the Legal Interpretation of the Civil Department of the Supreme Court of Cassation on the validity of a foreign currency clause in a loan agreement in Swiss francs and a conversion of debt into the euro. It was pointed out the legal consequences of the nullity of this contractual provision. The ineffectiveness of the essential provision of the contract leads to a violation of the principle in favorem contractus. The author considers that the conversion according to the exchange rate that was valid at the time of the conclusion of the contract is a measure with a retroactive effect, which is contrary to the principle of legal certainty.
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Rittossa, Dalida. "THE INSTITUTE OF VULNERABILITY IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC: ALL SHADES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SPECTRUM." In EU 2021 – The future of the EU in and after the pandemic. Faculty of Law, Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.25234/eclic/18354.
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The vulnerability thesis is one of the most important legal concepts in contemporary legal theory. Apart from being studied by legal scholars, the notion of vulnerability has been embodied in concrete legal rules and transferred to national case law allowing courts to set its boundaries by the power of judicial interpretation. Even though it would be hard to contest Schroeder and Gefenas’s statement that it is not necessary for an academic to say what vulnerability is because common sense dictates the existence of it, recent scholarly analysis clearly shows that the concept itself has become intolerably vague and slippery. More precisely, it is not quite clear what the essence of vulnerability is and what the effects of its gradation as well as repercussions are on other constitutional institutes across the human rights spectrum. The noted vagueness poses a great concern, particularly in the time of COVID-19, the greatest social stressor that humanity has faced in recent months. The COVID-19 crisis has had untold consequences on our health, mental well-being, educational growth, and economic stability. In order for the state to bear the COVID-19 social burden and adequately protect the vulnerable, it is of the utmost importance to set clear guidance for the interpretation and implementation of the vulnerability concept. Seeking to contribute to literature on these issues, the author brings light to constitutional and criminal legal standards on vulnerability set within the current jurisprudence and doctrine. Bearing in mind the influence of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, the ECtHR or the Court) on developments in human rights law, 196 judgments related to vulnerability have been retrieved from the HUDOC database using a keywords search strategy. The quantitative analysis was supplemented with more in-depth qualitative linguistic research of the Court’s reasoning in cases concerning vulnerable children, persons suffering from mental illness and victims of family violence. Although the vulnerability reasoning has considerably expended their rights within the ambit of the Convention, the analysis has shown that inconsistencies and ambiguities emerge around the formulation of the applicant’s vulnerability and its gradation with respect to positive obligations. The full creative and transformative potential of the institute of vulnerability is yet to be realized.
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Baeva, D. S. "Mediation as a legal way to resolve disputes arising from land legal relations." In Scientific trends: Jurisprudence. ЦНК МОАН, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.18411/spc-20-06-2020-03.
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Kukharev, Alexander, and Alexander Rusu. "LEGAL SKETCH «THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LEGAL EXCUSES AND PROVERBS OF ANCIENT ROME AS A MEANS OF LEGAL PROPAGANDA ABOUT LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND CULTURE»." In Current problems of jurisprudence. ru: Publishing Center RIOR, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.29039/02032-6/136-141.
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This article discusses adaptation of the norms and ideals of Roman law to modern legal culture, the basis of Roman legal relations, which is the basis of modern law-making. It is important to learn how the culture of the law of ancient Rome influenced the formation of modern law of the digital age. The purpose of writing the paper was to highlight the influence of the legal culture of ancient Rome on modern reality.
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Smirnov, O. V. "Legal process and procedure: concept, essence, differences." In Scientific trends: Jurisprudence. L-Journal, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.18411/spc-20-08-2020-03.
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Chernysheva, Kristina. "LEGAL METHODS OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION." In Current problems of jurisprudence. ru: Publishing Center RIOR, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.29039/02032-6/178-185.
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This scientific article is aimed at analyzing changes in the current legislation of the Russian Federation in the field of prevention of domestic violence. Attention is drawn to the need of developing a unified program to counteract domestic violence, including measures aimed at rehabilitation and assistance to victims of such violence.
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Ferreira da Cunha, Paulo. "Lusophone jurisprudence in Iberoamerican legal philosophy." In XXVI World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Initia Via, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.17931/ivr2013_sws57_01.
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Ilyin, Innokentiy. "Legal systems of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea (South Korea): comparative legal analysis." In Current problems of jurisprudence. ru: Publishing Center RIOR, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.29039/02058-6/155-161.
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This article analyzes the legal systems of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, more widely known under the unofficial name of South Korea. Various factors that influenced the development of the legal systems of these states are considered. At the same time, the author gives specific examples of legislation of the two Korean states that differ in their respective branches. In conclusion, the author draws conclusions corresponding to the study.
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Kosorukova, Irina. "Causes FOR EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL LIABILITY AND PUNISHMENT." In Current problems of jurisprudence. ru: Publishing Center RIOR, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.29039/02058-6/199-204.
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The article provides a general overview of such legal aspects as exemption from administrative responsibility and criminal punishment. Since the Russian Federation is a state governed by the rule of law, in which legal institutions must fully protect the rights and freedoms of citizens, it is necessary to try to study this issue so that it is possible to propose new or alternative solutions to the problems that exist today. Namely, the gaps in the legislation.
Reports on the topic "Jurisprudence and legal interpretation"
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Lewis, Dustin, Gabriella Blum, and Naz Modirzadeh. Indefinite War: Unsettled International Law on the End of Armed Conflict. Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, February 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.54813/yrjv6070.
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Can we say, definitively, when an armed conflict no longer exists under international law? The short, unsatisfying answer is sometimes: it is clear when some conflicts terminate as a matter of international law, but a decisive determination eludes many others. The lack of fully-settled guidance often matters significantly. That is because international law tolerates, for the most part, far less violent harm, devastation, and suppression in situations other than armed conflicts. Thus, certain measures governed by the laws and customs of war—including killing and capturing the enemy, destroying and seizing enemy property, and occupying foreign territory, all on a possibly large scale—would usually constitute grave violations of peacetime law. This Legal Briefing details the legal considerations and analyzes the implications of that lack of settled guidance. It delves into the myriad (and often-inconsistent) provisions in treaty law, customary law, and relevant jurisprudence that purport to govern the end of war. Alongside the doctrinal analysis, this Briefing considers the changing concept of war and of what constitutes its end; evaluates diverse interests at stake in the continuation or close of conflict; and contextualizes the essentially political work of those who design the law. In all, this Legal Briefing reveals that international law, as it now stands, provides insufficient guidance to precisely discern the end of many armed conflicts as a factual matter (when has the war ended?), as a normative matter (when should the war end?), and as a legal matter (when does the international-legal framework of armed conflict cease to apply in relation to the war?). The current plurality of legal concepts of armed conflict, the sparsity of IHL provisions that instruct the end of application, and the inconsistency among such provisions thwart uniform regulation and frustrate the formulation of a comprehensive notion of when wars can, should, and do end. Fleshing out the criteria for the end of war is a considerable challenge. Clearly, many of the problems identified in this Briefing are first and foremost strategic and political. Yet, as part of a broader effort to strengthen international law’s claim to guide behavior in relation to war and protect affected populations, international lawyers must address the current confusion and inconsistencies that so often surround the end of armed conflict.
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HEFNER, Robert. IHSAN ETHICS AND POLITICAL REVITALIZATION Appreciating Muqtedar Khan’s Islam and Good Governance. IIIT, October 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.47816/01.001.20.
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Ours is an age of pervasive political turbulence, and the scale of the challenge requires new thinking on politics as well as public ethics for our world. In Western countries, the specter of Islamophobia, alt-right populism, along with racialized violence has shaken public confidence in long-secure assumptions rooted in democracy, diversity, and citizenship. The tragic denouement of so many of the Arab uprisings together with the ascendance of apocalyptic extremists like Daesh and Boko Haram have caused an even greater sense of alarm in large parts of the Muslim-majority world. It is against this backdrop that M.A. Muqtedar Khan has written a book of breathtaking range and ethical beauty. The author explores the history and sociology of the Muslim world, both classic and contemporary. He does so, however, not merely to chronicle the phases of its development, but to explore just why the message of compassion, mercy, and ethical beauty so prominent in the Quran and Sunna of the Prophet came over time to be displaced by a narrow legalism that emphasized jurisprudence, punishment, and social control. In the modern era, Western Orientalists and Islamists alike have pushed the juridification and interpretive reification of Islamic ethical traditions even further. Each group has asserted that the essence of Islam lies in jurisprudence (fiqh), and both have tended to imagine this legal heritage on the model of Western positive law, according to which law is authorized, codified, and enforced by a leviathan state. “Reification of Shariah and equating of Islam and Shariah has a rather emaciating effect on Islam,” Khan rightly argues. It leads its proponents to overlook “the depth and heights of Islamic faith, mysticism, philosophy or even emotions such as divine love (Muhabba)” (13). As the sociologist of Islamic law, Sami Zubaida, has similarly observed, in all these developments one sees evidence, not of a traditionalist reassertion of Muslim values, but a “triumph of Western models” of religion and state (Zubaida 2003:135). To counteract these impoverishing trends, Khan presents a far-reaching analysis that “seeks to move away from the now failed vision of Islamic states without demanding radical secularization” (2). He does so by positioning himself squarely within the ethical and mystical legacy of the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet. As the book’s title makes clear, the key to this effort of religious recovery is “the cosmology of Ihsan and the worldview of Al-Tasawwuf, the science of Islamic mysticism” (1-2). For Islamist activists whose models of Islam have more to do with contemporary identity politics than a deep reading of Islamic traditions, Khan’s foregrounding of Ihsan may seem unfamiliar or baffling. But one of the many achievements of this book is the skill with which it plumbs the depth of scripture, classical commentaries, and tasawwuf practices to recover and confirm the ethic that lies at their heart. “The Quran promises that God is with those who do beautiful things,” the author reminds us (Khan 2019:1). The concept of Ihsan appears 191 times in 175 verses in the Quran (110). The concept is given its richest elaboration, Khan explains, in the famous hadith of the Angel Gabriel. This tradition recounts that when Gabriel appeared before the Prophet he asked, “What is Ihsan?” Both Gabriel’s question and the Prophet’s response make clear that Ihsan is an ideal at the center of the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet, and that it enjoins “perfection, goodness, to better, to do beautiful things and to do righteous deeds” (3). It is this cosmological ethic that Khan argues must be restored and implemented “to develop a political philosophy … that emphasizes love over law” (2). In its expansive exploration of Islamic ethics and civilization, Khan’s Islam and Good Governance will remind some readers of the late Shahab Ahmed’s remarkable book, What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (Ahmed 2016). Both are works of impressive range and spiritual depth. But whereas Ahmed stood in the humanities wing of Islamic studies, Khan is an intellectual polymath who moves easily across the Islamic sciences, social theory, and comparative politics. He brings the full weight of his effort to conclusion with policy recommendations for how “to combine Sufism with political theory” (6), and to do so in a way that recommends specific “Islamic principles that encourage good governance, and politics in pursuit of goodness” (8).
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Lewis, Dustin, Radhika Kapoor, and Naz Modirzadeh. Advancing Humanitarian Commitments in Connection with Countering Terrorism: Exploring a Foundational Reframing concerning the Security Council. Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict, December 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.54813/uzav2714.
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The imperative to provide humanitarian and medical services on an urgent basis in armed conflicts is anchored in moral tenets, shared values, and international rules. States spend tens of billions of dollars each year to help implement humanitarian programs in conflicts across the world. Yet, in practice, counterterrorism objectives increasingly prevail over humanitarian concerns, often resulting in devastating effects for civilian populations in need of aid and protection in war. Not least, confusion and misapprehensions about the power and authority of States relative to the United Nations Security Council to set policy preferences and configure legal obligations contribute significantly to this trajectory. In this guide for States, we present a framework to reconfigure relations between these core commitments by assessing the counterterrorism architecture through the lens of impartial humanitarianism. We aim in particular to provide an evidence base and analytical frame for States to better grasp key legal and policy issues related to upholding respect for principled humanitarian action in connection with carrying out the Security Council’s counterterrorism decisions. We do so because the lack of knowledge regarding interpretation and implementation of counterterrorism resolutions matters for the coherence, integrity, and comprehensiveness of humanitarian policymaking and protection of the humanitarian imperative. In addition to analyzing foundational concerns and evaluating discernible behaviors and attitudes, we identify avenues that States may take to help achieve pro-humanitarian objectives. We also endeavor to help disseminate indications of, and catalyze, States’ legally relevant positions and practices on these issues. In section 1, we introduce the guide’s impetus, objectives, target audience, and structure. We also describe the methods that we relied on and articulate definitions for key terms. In section 2, we introduce key legal actors, sources of law, and the notion of international legal responsibility, as well as the relations between international and national law. Notably, Security Council resolutions require incorporation into national law in order to become effective and enforceable by internal administrative and judicial authorities. In section 3, we explain international legal rules relevant to advancing the humanitarian imperative and upholding respect for principled humanitarian action, and we sketch the corresponding roles of humanitarian policies, programs, and donor practices. International humanitarian law (IHL) seeks to ensure — for people who are not, or are no longer, actively participating in hostilities and whose needs are unmet — certain essential supplies, as well as medical care and attention for the wounded and sick. States have also developed and implemented a range of humanitarian policy frameworks to administer principled humanitarian action effectively. Further, States may rely on a number of channels to hold other international actors to account for safeguarding the humanitarian imperative. In section 4, we set out key theoretical and doctrinal elements related to accepting and carrying out the Security Council’s decisions. Decisions of the Security Council may contain (binding) obligations, (non-binding) recommendations, or a combination of the two. UN members are obliged to carry out the Council’s decisions. Member States retain considerable interpretive latitude to implement counterterrorism resolutions. With respect to advancing the humanitarian imperative, we argue that IHL should represent a legal floor for interpreting the Security Council’s decisions and recommendations. In section 5, we describe relevant conduct of the Security Council and States. Under the Resolution 1267 (1999), Resolution 1989 (2011), and Resolution 2253 (2015) line of resolutions, the Security Council has established targeted sanctions as counterterrorism measures. Under the Resolution 1373 (2001) line of resolutions, the Security Council has adopted quasi-“legislative” requirements for how States must counter terrorism in their national systems. Implementation of these sets of resolutions may adversely affect principled humanitarian action in several ways. Meanwhile, for its part, the Security Council has sought to restrict the margin of appreciation of States to determine how to implement these decisions. Yet international law does not demand that these resolutions be interpreted and implemented at the national level by elevating security rationales over policy preferences for principled humanitarian action. Indeed, not least where other fields of international law, such as IHL, may be implicated, States retain significant discretion to interpret and implement these counterterrorism decisions in a manner that advances the humanitarian imperative. States have espoused a range of views on the intersections between safeguarding principled humanitarian action and countering terrorism. Some voice robust support for such action in relation to counterterrorism contexts. A handful call for a “balancing” of the concerns. And some frame respect for the humanitarian imperative in terms of not contradicting counterterrorism objectives. In terms of measures, we identify five categories of potentially relevant national counterterrorism approaches: measures to prevent and suppress support to the people and entities involved in terrorist acts; actions to implement targeted sanctions; measures to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism; measures to prohibit or restrict terrorism-related travel; and measures that criminalize or impede medical care. Further, through a number of “control dials” that we detect, States calibrate the functional relations between respect for principled humanitarian action and countering terrorism. The bulk of the identified counterterrorism measures and related “control dials” suggests that, to date, States have by and large not prioritized advancing respect for the humanitarian imperative at the national level. Finally, in section 6, we conclude by enumerating core questions that a State may answer to help formulate and instantiate its values, policy commitments, and legal positions to secure respect for principled humanitarian action in relation to counterterrorism contexts.
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Synchak, Bohdan. Freedom of choice and freedom of action in the Ukrainian media. Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, February 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.30970/vjo.2022.51.11400.
Full textAbstract:
The article talks about the philosophical foundations that characterize the mechanism of internal inducement to action. As an academic, constitutional, and socio-ideological concept, the boundaries of freedom are outlined, which are displayed in the field of modern media space. The term «freedom» is considered as several philosophical concepts that formed the basis of the modern interpretation of this concept. The totality of its meanings is generalized into one that is adapted for the modern system. Parallels are drawn between the interaction of the concept of user freedom with the plane of domestic mass media because despite, the fact that consciousness is knowledge, the incoming information directly affects the individual and collective consciousness. Using the example of the most popular digital platforms, the components of the impact on users and the legal aspect of their implementation are analyzed. When considering the issues of freedom of choice and freedom of action on the Internet, special attention is paid to methods of collecting and processing information, in particular, the limitations and possibilities of digital programs-algorithms of the popular search engine Google. The types of personal information collected by Google about the user are classified and the possible mechanisms of influence on personal choice and access to information on the Internet are characterized. The article analyzes the constitutional guarantees of freedom and the impact of digital technologies on them. Particular attention is paid to ethics, in particular journalistic, which nominally regulates the limits of the humane, permissible, a / moral (unacceptable/acceptable) in the implementation of professional information activities in the media. Thus, the issue of freedom of choice and freedom of action in the plane of domestic mass media is subject to an objective examination of its components, they are analyzed for a proper constitutionally suitable phenomenon, which must be investigated from the point of view of compliance with human rights and freedoms and professional standards within the media.