Academic literature on the topic 'Juries; Criminal Trials; Jury-centric approach'

The debate surrounding the utility of trial by jury is as relevant as ever. Much criticism of the ability of jurors to carry out their task was brought to the fore following the highly publicised Pryce trial and the comments from Sweeney J indicating a fundamental problem in jurors' understanding of their role. Furthermore, media attention surrounding a steady stream of cases involving juror misconduct has called into question whether jury trial can survive in its current form. This article recognises that although juries are not a normative part of a fair trial, they do have considerable value in enhancing public confidence in the fairness of the criminal process, particularly through the perception of impartiality. If public support is lost, then the value of jury might be lost with it. Whilst the Law Commission is rightly considering how jurors might be more prepared in advance to carry out their role effectively, this article considers the current judicial approach to dealing with the practical issue of juror impropriety once it has occurred. Through looking at a series of trial and appeal cases it can be seen that a framework has developed which seeks to ensure that trials are derailed rarely whilst the impartiality of the jury is safeguarded. It is maintained that in emphasising both actual and apparent impartiality the vital element of public confidence in the existing process can be preserved.

The article is devoted to integrated research of key milestones of criminological and criminal procedure aspects of knowing the personality of the defendant and to the identification of the existing problem of harmonizing these types of cognitive activities in the administration of justice. The authors stress the differences between the criminological and the criminal procedure interpretations of the personality of the defendant, which are also manifested in the interpretation of its structure. It is shown that the factor integrating the knowledge of the personality of the defendant during judicial proceedings is the inseparable unity of this knowledge with the process of proving. The limits of knowing the personality of the defendant in criminal proceedings are directly dependent on forms of knowing and vary under the influence of their differentiation. The article presents three levels of knowing the personality of the defendant in justice in the criminological and criminal procedure aspects: extended (proceedings in cases of minors and cases on using compulsory medical measures); ordinary (cases prosecuted in general and special procedures); differentiated (cases tried by juries). It is pointed out that the personality of the criminal is most thoroughly examined at the extended and ordinary levels of knowing, which is caused by the contents of the general and the special objects of proof, as well as the absence of any legislative limitations on the objects and means of proving the above-mentioned circumstances. Most problems connected with the limits of knowing the personality of the criminal arise when a case is tried by a jury, which is caused by the bifurcation of the object of this study on the conducted inquiry with or without the participation of the jury. Having chosen the substantive approach to solving this problem, the legislators identified the limits of knowing the personality of the defendant with the limits of the sphere (object) of the cognitive competence of jurors, and other information on the personality of the defendant is studied after the verdict. The authors analyze the problems of correlation between the criminological and criminal procedure aspects of knowing the personality of the defendant in trials by jury: the effectiveness of a substantive limitation of studying personal characteristics of the defendant by jurors and the opportunity to examine the facts pointing at the insanity of the defendant with the participation of jurors. The authors also describe the specific features of examining the personality of the defendant in the USA and in Austria. They conclude that it is necessary to widen the scope of examining the personality of the defendant in trials by jury.

The article is devoted to the research and analysis of the institute of jury trial in Ukraine. One of the main tasks of the article is to study the procedure for reviewing criminal proceedings by a jury, which is established by the legislation of Ukraine, as well as to identify the shortcomings of the existing model and consider the proposed changes. The relevance of this study lies primarily in the fact that the institution of the jury remained one of the few institutions that have not undergone reforms and revisions during its existence, although there is an objective need for this. According to the author, the main problem of the existing model of this institution is outdated regulation and its inefficiency. In addition, the use of juries is currently too limited. The author studies the existing models of jury trials in the world, establishes the model used in Ukraine, analyzes in detail the procedure for approving lists of citizens - potential jurors and their selection for the trial, the rights and responsibilities of jurors, existing restrictions, the procedure for jurors. At the same time, the shortcomings of the existing system are considered, the main problems are identified, and ways to solve them are proposed. A systematic approach to the implementation of changes in the procedure for training and selection of jurors, their responsibilities, as well as in the system of the institute itself. Bills on making changes to the existing system are analyzed. It turns out that the modern jury system really needs to be reformed. At the same time, it was noted that the usual copying of foreign experience and legislation, which is not adapted to Ukrainian realities, will have a negative effect. Moreover, in addition to regulatory improvements, it is necessary to pay attention to building a positive image of the institution and involving as many citizens as possible in the implementation of the functions of the jury, including through the introduction of additional social guarantees for active citizens.

This paper examines the use of juries in criminal cases in Canada and the United States. It is part of a larger study of the administration of criminal justice in Niagara County, Ontario and Niagara County, New York. The basic question examined is why persons accused of serious crimes in the United States usually select a jury, whereas persons in similar circumstances in Canada normally select trial by a judge alone. An investigation of this question will enable us to see some significant differences between the administration of criminal justice in the United States and Canada. It will also show how changes in specific procedural rules may affect other practices. There is a complex interplay between procedural rules. The paper concludes by showing that the widespread use of juries in the United States is consistent with the more populist grass-roots approach in American society which tends to distrust government, compared with the traditional respect for authority, including the authority of judges, in Canada.

If the accused pleads not guilty, then, unless the prosecution chooses to offer no evidence, a trial must be held. There are now limited exceptions to the general rule that trial on indictment must be by judge and jury (see Chapter 19). Subject to those exceptional situations, a jury must be empanelled (or, more colloquially, sworn in). The law concerning juries is contained chiefly in the Juries Act 1974, which is denoted in the remainder of this Chapter by the letters JA. The relevant procedure is covered in CrimPR, rr 25.6 to 25.8 and 26.1 to 26.5. Further guidance is to be found in Criminal Practice Directions VI Part 26. Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2019 D13 and D19 covers the law relating to juries in detail.

This chapter traces the origins and development of the civil law legal tradition, which assigns to judges only a mechanical, highly constrained form of decision-making. The civil law legal tradition is characterized globally by a historical reliance on Roman law; a modern rationalist code and no body of judge-made case law under the code; textualism and formalism; and the absence of jury trial and an inquisitorial approach to civil and criminal procedure. The civil law tradition allows judicial review, which has been seen as being inherently political, to be exercised soley by a separate institution, called a Constitutional Court, which alone interprets and enforces the Constitution and which is de facto the most important court in the country, even though de jure there are coequal courts of cassation and councils of state. Traditionally, judges received little social deference and were low on the hierarchy of status in civil law countries, whereas scholars and codifiers came first. The civil law legal tradition conceives of the separation of powers in a very wooden, ahistorical way that precludes judges from ever making policy by deciding administrative law and constitutional law cases. It was therefore necessary to create powerful constitutional courts as a specially chosen fourth branch of government in order for judicial review to work in civil law countries. The chapter conclude by looking at the court systems in civil law countries, which typically have three supreme courts: 1) a constitutional court; 2) a court of cassation; and 3) a council of state.