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Journal articles on the topic 'Judicial committee'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 August 2024

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1

Suparto, Suparto. "Kontroversi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Membatalkan Kewenangan Komisi Yudisial Melakukan Rekrutmen Terhadap Hakim." SASI 26, no. 2 (June 4, 2020): 266. http://dx.doi.org/10.47268/sasi.v26i2.252.

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The Supreme Court conducted a selection of judges without the involvement of the Judiciary Committee. The Judiciary Committee deemed the recruitment was violating the law since it was not involving them in the process. While the Supreme Court viewed that the implementation guidelines for the mutual regulation of the Judiciary Committee and Supreme Court was yet to be existed, while the need for fresh judges was deemed as urgent at that time. Based on that premise, the Supreme Court conducted the recruitment and appointment of judges, several supreme court judges and registrars were conducting a judicial review on the Law No. 49 of 2009, Law No. 50 of 2009, and Law No. 51 of 2009.The Constitutional Court granted their plea with Stipulation No. 43/PUU-XIII/2015.One of the points of considerations of the constitutional judges was the involvement of Judiciary Committee on the recruitment of judges was deemed to disrupt the independency of the Supreme Court. Actually, the involvement of the Judiciary Committee in the selection of judges will not intrude the independency of the judicial power or the judge itself. The independency of judges will be disrupted if the Judiciary Committee is intervening with the technical aspect of judicial power which includescross-examination, trial, and the verdict on a case.

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2

Nadler, Daniel. "An Opportune Moment: The Judicial Appointment Reforms and the Judicial Credentials Demanded by the Charter." Constitutional Forum / Forum constitutionnel 15, no. 1, 2 & 3 (July 24, 2011): 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.21991/c98675.

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In 2005, Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler proposed and tabled in Parliament a number of reforms to the federal judicial appointment process. These reforms were designed to increase the transparency and enhance the accountability of the procedures by which judges are appointed to federally operated Canadian courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada. Included in the reform package was a Code of Ethics for members of the judicial appointment committees, as well as a directive to publish on an annual basis the identity of the members of the judicial appointment committees, the number of total applications for judicial office, and the number of that total that have been recommended or highly recommended by the committee. Crucially, a set of guidelines for the operation of the judicial appointment committees was provided, which outlined the overriding principles that committee members were to consider during the appointment advisory process.

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3

Lurie, Guy. "Appointing Arab Judges to the Courts in Israel, 1948–1969." Israel Studies Review 34, no. 1 (March 1, 2019): 47–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/isr.2019.340104.

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This article unveils a virtually unknown chapter in the history of judicial diversity in Israel. During its first 20 years of existence, between 1948 and 1968, only three Arab judges were appointed. Then, within two years, between 1968 and 1969, Israel appointed three additional Arab judges. Two interconnected changes account for this small increase in judicial diversity. First, in the 1960s, the Arab legal elite began to exert pressure on Israeli officials to appoint Arab judges. Second, perhaps partly due to this pressure, the Judicial Selection Committee made having a diverse judiciary a top priority. This historical example teaches us that without outside pressure, the Judicial Selection Committee does not look on diversity as an important consideration, using the merit system of appointment as an excuse for its failure. Indeed, up to the present day, the Israeli judiciary has relatively few Arab judges.

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4

Miller, Mark C. "The Senate Judiciary Committee's Relationship with the Federal Courts." British Journal of American Legal Studies 10, no. 3 (December 1, 2021): 409–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/bjals-2021-0012.

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Abstract This Article examines the general relationship between the Senate Judiciary Committee and the federal courts using a historical institutionalist analysis. The Senate Judiciary Committee, often known as the “Committee of Lawyers”, has adopted a very lawyer-like decision making process and style. This Article considers whether the large number of lawyers who sit on it serves to protect the federal courts from institutional attacks; it explores how the Committee can influence the number of judges sitting on any given federal court and help determine the boundaries of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Article explores why the Senate Judiciary Committee often serves as a graveyard for court-curbing proposals approved by the House Judiciary Committee or even the full House. The main focus of the Article is on how the Committee chair has considerable influence on the court-Congress relationship, although the chair must function within the overall decision-making culture of the Senate as a whole. It notes various chairs have approached the Blue Slip process for judicial nominees very differently, depending in part on whether the White House and the Senate are controlled by the same political party. Finally, the Article discusses how the Committee attracts ideologically extreme members of both parties and how this ideological polarization affects the Committee's interactions with the federal judiciary. The Article also provides some comparisons with the House Judiciary Committee on these issues.

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5

Giménez Gluck, David. "El gobierno del poder judicial y la separación de poderes en la nueva constitución británica = Government of the judiciary and separation of powers in the new U.K. Constitution." Teoría y Realidad Constitucional, no. 34 (July 1, 2014): 447. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/trc.34.2014.14071.

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Este artículo analiza la reforma constitucional promovida en Gran Bretaña en 2005, que cambia la relación del Poder Judicial con el resto de los poderes, a través de la actualización de instituciones históricas como el Lord Chancellor y la Comisión de Apelación de la Cámara de los Lores, que pasa a ser el Tribunal Supremo de Gran Bretaña, y la sustracción al Poder Ejecutivo de algunas funciones de gobierno del Poder Judicial, como los nombramientos judiciales o el régimen disciplinario, que pasa a compartir con agencias independientes.This article analyses the constitutional reform passed in Britain in 2005, which changes the relations between the judiciary and the other powers of the State, updating historic institutions as Lord Chancellor or the Appellate Committee of The House of Lords -that became the U.K. Supreme Court-, and passing functions, as judicial appointments or judicial discipline, from the Executive Power to independent Agencies.

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6

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 53, no. 4 (November 1989): 466–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201838905300405.

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7

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 57, no. 1 (February 1993): 79–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839305700105.

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8

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 57, no. 2 (May 1993): 178–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839305700207.

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9

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 57, no. 3 (August 1993): 279–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839305700305.

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10

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 57, no. 4 (November 1993): 376–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839305700406.

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11

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 58, no. 4 (November 1994): 382–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839405800404.

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12

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 59, no. 1 (February 1995): 79–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839505900105.

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13

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 59, no. 2 (May 1995): 181–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839505900204.

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14

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 59, no. 3 (August 1995): 283–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839505900305.

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15

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 60, no. 1 (February 1996): 75–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839606000105.

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16

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 60, no. 2 (May 1996): 182–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839606000205.

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17

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 60, no. 3 (August 1996): 304–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839606000306.

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18

Coutts, JA. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 61, no. 3 (August 1997): 313–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839706100305.

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19

Coutts, JA. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 62, no. 1 (February 1998): 86–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839806200106.

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20

Coutts, JA. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 62, no. 2 (April 1998): 162–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839806200204.

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21

Coutts, JA. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 62, no. 3 (June 1998): 256–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839806200305.

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22

Coutts, JA. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 62, no. 4 (August 1998): 350–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839806200405.

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23

Coutts, JA. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 62, no. 5 (October 1998): 458–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839806200506.

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24

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 63, no. 2 (April 1999): 151–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839906300205.

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25

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 63, no. 4 (August 1999): 362–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201839906300405.

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26

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 64, no. 2 (April 2000): 205–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201830006400206.

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27

Coutts, JA. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 64, no. 3 (June 2000): 317–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201830006400306.

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28

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 64, no. 4 (August 2000): 390–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201830006400406.

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29

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 64, no. 5 (October 2000): 495–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201830006400505.

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30

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 64, no. 6 (December 2000): 589–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201830006400606.

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31

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 65, no. 1 (February 2001): 63–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201830106500105.

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32

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 65, no. 4 (August 2001): 331–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201830106500406.

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33

Coutts, J. A. "Judicial Committee of the Privy Council." Journal of Criminal Law 65, no. 5 (October 2001): 414–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002201830106500505.

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34

Lawlor, Andrea, and Erin Crandall. "Questioning Judges with a Questionable Process: An Analysis of Committee Appearances by Canadian Supreme Court Candidates." Canadian Journal of Political Science 48, no. 4 (December 2015): 863–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423915000530.

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AbstractIn 2006, the Canadian government introduced a new component to its process of selecting Supreme Court justices, a review committee composed of members of Parliament. Tasked with interviewing justices prior to their appointment to the bench, the committee met four times, interviewing only five of the eight judicial candidates appointed to the bench before the Conservative government announced the committee's termination in 2014. This study offers the first comprehensive analysis of the performance of this ad hoc judicial review committee. Using an original dataset, we find that MPs asked little by way of probing questions, such as those related to policy or a candidate's previous jurisprudence. However, we do find some evidence that the hearing process was used to further the political aims of the participating political parties.

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35

Krikorian, Jacqueline D. "British Imperial Politics and Judicial Independence: The Judicial Committee's Decision in the Canadian Case Nadan v. The King." Canadian Journal of Political Science 33, no. 2 (June 2000): 291–332. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900000111.

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Traditionally, Canadian commentary on the Judicial Committee has focused on the effect or impact of the imperial tribunal's decisions on the nature of Canadian federalism. Numerous studies have examined the issue of whether or not the Judicial Committee strengthened the powers of provincial governments at the expense of the federal government by misinterpreting the Constitution Act, 1867 and by ignoring the intentions of the fathers of Confederation who sought to create a strong centralized government. The Canadian preoccupation with the merits of this debate has led one distinguished political scientist, David E. Smith, to suggest that “perhaps too much” has been written about the Judicial Committee. The literature examining the relationship between the Judicial Committee and Canada has not, however, addressed the significance of the imperial context in which the tribunal's decisions were written. The Judicial Committee was not only the final appellate body for Canada but was also responsible for hearing disputes from other parts of the Empire. Decisions written for one Dominion or colony could have profound legal and political effects on another.

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36

Masterman, Roger. "The constitutional influence of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the UK apex court: institutional proximity and jurisprudential divergence?" Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 71, no. 2 (August 14, 2020): 285–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v71i2.320.

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It is often claimed that the constitutional role of the UK’s apex court is enriched as a result of the experiences of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as interpreter of constitutions within its overseas jurisdiction. This paper considers the relationship between the House of Lords/UK Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee and its effect on the importation of external influences into the UK’s legal system(s), further seeking to assess how far the jurisprudence of the Judicial Committee has influenced constitutional decision-making in the UK apex court. While ad hoc citation of Privy Council authorities in House of Lords/Supreme Court decisions is relatively commonplace, a post-1998 enthusiasm for reliance on Judicial Committee authority – relating to (i) a ‘generous and purposive’ approach to constitutional interpretation and (ii) supporting the developing domestic test for proportionality – quickly faded. Both areas are illustrative of a diminishing reliance on Judicial Committee authority, but reveal divergent approaches to constitutional borrowing as the UK apex court has incrementally mapped the contours of an autochthonous constitutionalism while simultaneously recognising the trans-jurisdictional qualities of the proportionality test.

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37

Richardson, Ivor LM. "The Privy Council as the Final Court for the British Empire." Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 43, no. 1 (June 1, 2012): 103. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v43i1.5048.

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After introductory comments on how the Judicial Committee functioned as the final court for the British Empire for over a century, this article discusses a range of highly unusual cases from India, Canada and New Zealand. The aim is to give something of the flavour of the Judicial Committee's work and its impact on local courts. The final section of the paper suggests conclusions that can be drawn from that survey.

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38

LI, Dejia. "The Path Selection of the Chinese Judges’ Disciplinary System Reform." East Asian Policy 10, no. 04 (October 2018): 116–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930518000429.

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The reform of the judicial disciplinary system is an important part of China’s judicial reform. The purpose of the Disciplinary Committee for Judges and Prosecutors is to re-establish the judicial disciplinary system, including specific procedures, such as producing evidence, making arguments and statements, to protect the professional rights of judicial personnel. This article examines the main models of the extraterritorial judicial disciplinary system, and analyses the trend and characteristics of current judges’ disciplinary system reform. The reform’s largest problem lies in the positioning of the judges’ disciplinary committee and the distribution of judge’s disciplinary power which need to be clearly defined.

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39

Samvel, Gor. "Non-Judicial, Advisory, Yet Impactful? The Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee as a Gateway to Environmental Justice." Transnational Environmental Law 9, no. 2 (April 30, 2020): 211–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2047102519000426.

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AbstractIn accordance with Article 15 of the Aarhus Convention, the first meeting of the parties to this Convention established a non-judicial and consultative Compliance Committee to consider, among other matters, individual cases concerning compliance by parties with their obligations. The Committee is traditionally viewed as a non-judicial, soft mechanism and its rulings as non-binding, soft law. In recent years, however, to support the claim that rulings of the Committee have an impact and legal effects, some scholars have departed from the traditional perspective and characterized the Committee as a more judicialized mechanism, which issues legally binding rulings.This characterization assumes a correlation between judicialization and binding effect on the one hand, and legal effect on the other. The latter claim, however, has not been supported by a systematic assessment of the impact of the Committee's rulings on domestic practice. Against this background, the article assesses the impact of Article 9-related rulings of the Committee, issued between 2004 and 2012, on national legal orders. The assessment reveals that in fewer than 41% of the cases parties recorded some degree of compliance with the rulings of the Committee, whereas in 59% they recorded no progress. The quantitative assessment and respective qualitative insights, among other factors, suggest that the normative character of the Committee and its rulings play an auxiliary role in the process of ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Aarhus Convention. The decision of parties to comply is determined typically by the substance of the rulings as they stand in relation to domestic circumstances rather than by the institutional features of the Committee and binding effect of its rulings.

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40

O’Neill, Aidan. "Judicial Politics and the Judicial Committee: The Devolution Jurisprudence of the Privy Council." Modern Law Review 64, no. 4 (July 2001): 603–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.00341.

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41

Rodley, Nigel. "The Singarasa Case: Quis custodiet … ? A Test for the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct." Israel Law Review 41, no. 3 (2008): 500–521. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700000340.

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This Essay considers the 2006 Sri Lankan Supreme Court case, Singarasa v. Attorney General, which declared unconstitutional the state's eight-year-old accession to the Protocol permitting the Human Rights Committee to examine complaints of violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It places the decision in the context of the Committee's earlier findings of Covenant violations by Sri Lanka resulting from actions by the Court. This forms the basis of a discussion of problems of identifying questionable judicial conduct and the relevance of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct.

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42

Ghosh, Yashomati. "Indian Judiciary: An Analysis of the Cyclic Syndrome of Delay, Arrears and Pendency." Asian Journal of Legal Education 5, no. 1 (December 19, 2017): 21–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2322005817733566.

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India has been experiencing docket explosion and the problem of huge arrears of pending cases for the past seventy years. At present there are more than 22 million cases pending in various courts across the country. The large number of pending cases has crippled the efficient working of the judiciary and had adversely affected the right of the citizens to timely delivery of justice. In this paper a comprehensive analysis of the state of Indian judiciary has been made. The various factors which have attributed to docket explosion and arrears have been discussed by looking into various government and judicial reports, starting from the Arrears Committee Report of 1949 to the Supreme Court Report on Access to Justice (2016). The paper further discusses the challenges and impediments faced in dealing with the burdens of pendency and arrears, and analyses the recommendations of the various committee reports relating to judicial reforms. The article critically analyses the various procedural, legal and infrastructural reforms introduced in the recent past to bring about substantive judicial reforms, however these efforts have largely been piecemeal in nature. In addition the difference of perception between the judiciary and the government regarding the right solution has further aggravated the crisis. In this context the harmonious functioning of the three organs of the state and honest commitment of all the important stakeholders such as the Bar Council, the members of the legal profession and litigants holds the key to resolve the cyclic syndrome of delay, arrears and pendency.

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43

Pennington-Benton, Rowan, and Hafsah Masood. "The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council – Contribution to Judicial Review and Public Law." Judicial Review 23, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 65–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10854681.2018.1452686.

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44

Vaughan, Frederick. "Critics of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: The New Orthodoxy and an Alternative Explanation." Canadian Journal of Political Science 19, no. 3 (September 1986): 495–519. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900054536.

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AbstractBy way of a critical assessment of the leading authorities on the critics of the Judicial Committee, this article argues that the proper appreciation of what the law lords did to the terms of the BNA Act can be found in an understanding of their perception of their unique function. Supporters of the Judicial Committee's decentralization of the terms of the British North America Act have tended to rely on either G. P. Browne's book on the subject or Alan Cairns's article in this Journal (4 [1971], 301–45). The purpose of this article is to challenge those authorities and offer an alternative explanation.

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45

Russell, Peter H. "Comment on “Critics of the Judicial Committee: The New Orthodoxy and an Alternative Explanation”." Canadian Journal of Political Science 19, no. 3 (September 1986): 531–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000842390005455x.

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I appreciate the opportunity Professor Vaughan's article provides to clarify some of my thoughts on the Judicial Committee and constitutional interpretation.Vaughan and I are in agreement on two broad points. First, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council read a theory of classical federalism into the BNA Act. This theory of divided sovereignty was expressed most clearly by Lord Watson in the Maritime Bank case. Secondly, the BNA Act's treatment of federalism is highly centralist, both in the division of powers and in the federal government's imperial powers over provincial governments. Both these points are contained in the following passage from my introduction: “In their anxiety to preserve a division of powers appropriate for “classical federalism” and thereby resist the strongly centralizing tendencies of the constitutional text, the Judicial Committee developed an acute sensitivity to the competing claims of the provinces and the federal government.” I think Professor Vaughan would agree with that statement.

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46

Timilsina, Krishna Prasad. "Problems and Prospects of Local Judicial Committee in Nepal." Journal of Political Science 20 (October 4, 2020): 124–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/jps.v20i0.31798.

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Decentralization and local governance is the base of grassroot democracy, giving strong foundation of democracy at nation. Local governments are the closest unit of people. Constitution of Nepal acknowledges that executive legislative and judicial bodies may be formed at the local level. Constitution provides to consolidate socialism-oriented federal democratic republic governance right from the local level as per the principle of the rule of law and sustainable development through proportionally inclusive and just distribution of the fruits of democracy, and to make necessary provisions in relation to the operation of the local government to institutionalize the legislative, executive and judicial practice at the local level by consolidating local government through development of local leadership. This article aims at examining current provision of judicial power in local government of Nepal, its service delivery status, analyzing challenges of justice delivery. To draw the conclusion in this study descriptive analytical and content analysis method has been used and information has been taken from secondary method.

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47

Kupchenko, Konstantin, and Nikolay Fedoskin. "TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE SMOLENSK REGION (1917–1922)." Izvestia of Smolensk State University, no. 1 (49) (May 26, 2020): 165–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.35785/2072-9464-2020-49-1-165-175.

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The article analyzes the results of the state policy implementation withing the formation and development of the Soviet judicial system on the example of Smolensk Governoral Court. The authors set the goal, based on the analysis of sources not introduced into a wide scientific circulation, primarily stored at the State Archive of the Smolensk Region to restore the history of the creation and operation of justice institutions in the Smolensk region in the 1918s–1923s. The source base of the study was composed of documents stored at Smolensk State Regional Archive, materials on the history of the judiciary, statistical materials of the period under the study, documents on the history of the party-state bodies of the Smolensk region. The article studies current office documentation of both the higher and regional state bodies (Workers 'and Peasants' Government, People's Commissariat of Justice, Smolensk Governoral Executive Committee) and local authorities (Smolensk Council of Working People's Deputies, Executive Committee of Smolensk Governoral Council of Workers, Peasants' and Red Army Deputies), as well as Smolensk Governoral Court. The authors analyze the Soviet experience in the formation and development of judicial bodies under specific historical conditions; they consider transformations in the judicial system of the Smolensk Governorate in the 1917s–1922s, as well as the formation of Smolensk Governoral Court. The article studies legal foundations of the Soviet judicial system formation, characterizes processes of creating a judicial apparatus in the first years of Soviet power and analyzes activities of Smolensk Governoral Court during its formation. The authors reveal the essence, degree of efficiency, concrete results, political and socio-economic consequences, positive and negative lessons from the Soviet judicial system existed in Russia. The authors assume that the development of new legislation system in the 1920s was caused by the need to reform legal sources as the main means of socialism building. The authors conclude that the transformation of the Soviet judicial system completed the transition from the principle of «revolutionary expediency» to the principle of «revolutionary legality».

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48

McCormick, Peter. "JUDGING SELECTION: APPOINTING CANADIAN JUDGES." Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 30, no. 2 (October 1, 2012): 39. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/wyaj.v30i2.4368.

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Since the 1970s, the appointment of trial judges in Canada has generally involved an arms-length committee of professionals, although the structure of these committees and their role in the process has varied from province to province, as well as evolving over time. Yet these “new” structures and “new” processes did not prevent a major judicial appointment scandal in the province of Quebec in 2010, culminating in the formation of the Bastarache Committee to recommend changes. This paper summarizes the forty-year history of Canadian judicial appointment committees, identifies the major challenges that face those committees, and suggests the basic values toward which reforms to the appointment process might be directed.Depuis les années 1970, la nomination des juges de première instance au Canada a généralement mis à contribution un comité de professionnels indépendants, bien que la structure de ce comité et son rôle dans le processus de nomination aient varié d’une province à l’autre et évolué avec le temps. Ces « nouvelles » structures et « nouveaux » processus n’ont certes pas empêché l’éclatement du scandale sur la nomination des juges au Québec en 2010. Ce scandale a donné lieu à la formation de la Commission Bastarache qui avait notamment le mandat de recommander des changements. La présent document résume les quarante ans d’histoire des comités canadiens de nomination des juges, recense les principaux défis que ces comités doivent relever, et propose les valeurs fondamentales qui devraient inspirer les réformes du processus de nomination.

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Wang, Shucheng. "The Judicial Document as Informal State Law: Judicial Lawmaking in China’s Courts." Modern China 48, no. 3 (April 18, 2022): 617–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00977004221079528.

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Judicial documents, which interpret statutory laws and make new rules for adjudication, have become a robust basis for judicial decision making in China. This article examines why and how, with no explicit congressional delegation, the practice of producing judicial documents has become embedded in the adjudication of China’s courts; how judges can effectively refer to judicial documents during adjudication; and the extent to which judicial documents have enabled subnational courts, under the dual leadership of superior courts and the local Party committee, to efficiently and effectively respond to subnational diversity and differences in local politics. It proposes the theory that this judicial lawmaking practice exists in a “twilight zone” between legal and illegal and examines why it is suitable for maintaining the political resilience of China’s authoritarian regime.

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De, Rohit. "“A Peripatetic World Court” Cosmopolitan Courts, Nationalist Judges and the Indian Appeal to the Privy Council." Law and History Review 32, no. 4 (October 14, 2014): 821–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0738248014000455.

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In early 1943, Lord Wilfred Green, the Master of Rolls and the head of the Chancery Division of the British judiciary, authored a secret memorandum proposing that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council become a “peripatetic court” that would travel throughout the British Empire. This article explores the origins and politics of this proposal to provide a critical re-description of the role of the Privy Council and the circulation of law within the British Empire.

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