Journal articles: 'Jiang Zemin era'

1

Pye, Lucian W., and Willy Wo-Lap Lam. "The Era of Jiang Zemin." Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (1999): 147. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20049426.

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Bachman, David. "Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite. Bruce GilleyThe Era of Jiang Zemin. Willy Wo-Lap Lam." China Journal 45 (January 2001): 187–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3182393.

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Marinelli, Maurizio. "Jiang Zemin's Discourse on Intellectuals: The Political Use of Formalised Language and the Conundrum of Stability." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 42, no. 2 (June 2013): 111–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261304200205.

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This article focuses on the specific forms of power that are embodied in the properties and functions of formalised language, as it was used by Jiang Zemin in crucial political documents on the Party's policy towards intellectuals. This inquiry illuminates various possibilities for the normalisation and inculcation of formalised language in the understudied decade of the 1990s, when the mantra “without stability, nothing can be achieved” became a tautology. The internal constitution of the selected texts is examined with an eye to the dialogic interaction with the production and reception of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping's political discourses on intellectuals (Mao 1942; Deng 1978). The analysis of language practices and discursive formations in a comparative perspective sheds light on the respective socio-political and historical contexts. It also reveals the extreme involution-devolution of formalised language in the Jiang Zemin era, when “preserving stability” was reaffirmed as a crucial concern of the Party leadership with the ultimate aim of preserving its monopoly of power.

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Inmo Sung. "The changes of civil-military relations in China since Jiang Zemin era." Korean Journal of Military Art and Science 70, no. 1 (February 2014): 51–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.31066/kjmas.2014.70.1.003.

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Scobell, Andrew. "Playing To Win: Chinese Army Building in the Era of Jiang Zemin." Asian Perspective 25, no. 1 (2001): 73–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/apr.2001.0033.

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Baehr, P. R. (Peter R. ). "Deng's Generation: Young Intellectuals in 1980s China, and: Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite, and: The Era of Jiang Zemin (review)." China Review International 7, no. 1 (2000): 7–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cri.2000.0001.

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Goldman, Merle. "Politically-Engaged Intellectuals in the 1990s." China Quarterly 159 (September 1999): 700–711. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000003441.

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Although dissident intellectuals and students continued to be persecuted in the post-Mao Zedong regimes of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, China's intellectuals were no longer denigrated as a class, harassed, suppressed, imprisoned and persecuted to death as they had been during the Mao era. Like the 19th-century self-strengtheners, Deng and his appointed successors regarded intellectuals as essential to achieve their goal of economic modernization and make China once again “rich and powerful.” Those intellectuals involved in the sciences, technology and economics in particular enjoyed elite status as advisers to the government, similar to that which intellectuals had enjoyed throughout most of Chinese history until the 1949 revolution.

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Narayanan, Raviprasad. "IV Book Reviews : WILLY WO-LAP LAM, The Era of Jiang Zemin. Singapore, Prentice-Hall, 1999, 452 pp." China Report 37, no. 1 (February 2001): 121–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000944550103700108.

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Leung, Beatrice. "China's Religious Freedom Policy: The Art of Managing Religious Activity." China Quarterly 184 (December 2005): 894–913. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030574100500055x.

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This article examines how the policy of “religious freedom” has been used to enable the CCP to retain institutional and ideological control over the religious sector of Chinese society. In particular, it looks at how the clash between religious and communist ideologies has evolved, first in the Maoist period and then in the context of reform and openness with the attendant growth of materialism and social change since 1978. A softening in the control of religion to encourage national reconstruction and foreign investment led to a proliferation of religious activity that alarmed Party leaders and triggered a tightening of ideological control and important changes in religious policy. The new policy of “accommodation” and emphasis on “legality” became the watchwords of the Jiang Zemin era. With further development they remain important in the new regime of Hu Jintao.

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Phillips, Michael R., and Veronica Pearson. "Future Opportunities and Challenges for the Development of Psychiatric Rehabilitation in China." British Journal of Psychiatry 165, S24 (August 1994): 128–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/s0007125000293094.

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The models of psychiatric rehabilitation described in this supplement evolved in response to a change in the official attitude to the disabled and to the provision of welfare services that has arisen since the start of China's reform era in 1978. The traditional ‘residual’ welfare that provided the minimum services needed to prevent social unrest (Chan & Chow, 1992) has been transformed into a pro-active form of welfare that identifies disadvantaged and disabled persons in the community and provides them with support and rehabilitation. Perhaps the most dramatic indication of the new status of the disabled in China is that the opening ceremony of the Second National Congress of the China Disabled Persons' Federation on 6 October 1993 was held in Beijing's Great Hall of the People, and President Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng and “all China's top Party and government leaders” were in attendance (Liang, 1993).

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Dahana, Abdullah, Kelly Rosalin, and Melani Wiannastiti. "in Search of Leaders with Chinesecharacteristics: A Reflection of Indonesia's 2014 General Election." Humaniora 7, no. 2 (April 30, 2016): 251. http://dx.doi.org/10.21512/humaniora.v7i2.3528.

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Article dealt with the questions of leadership transition in post–Mao Zedong/Deng Xiaoping era. During the time of Mao and Deng, factionalism played important roles in all segments of Chinese politics, including the election of a leader. After Mao and Deng, although factionalism persisted, it did not become contradiction, but rather it created a situation in which factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cooperated in all aspects of Chinese politics. The main objective of this research was the perpetuation of the party’s grip on political power . The article also dealt with the questions of recruiting and educating party cadres. Career paths of three post-Deng Chinese leaders, i.e., Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping were also explored to explain the period they reached their peak of their careers by blood and sweat. This article finds that it cannot be denied that what is happening in China now in the area of leadership is using a system of a political dynasty.

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LIN, SHYH-CHYANG. "A Study of Career Networks and the Geographical Characteristics of CCP's Top Political and Military Positions." Japanese Journal of Political Science 18, no. 2 (May 9, 2017): 336–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109917000056.

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AbstractThis research study attempts to map out the career network of selected members from the Politburo and Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), by adopting social network analysis techniques, calculating various network indices, and quantifying the value and importance of each position. The purpose of this research is to uncover the crucial positions leading to the CCP's political and military power center, as well as to how these positions interrelate. The results show the following. First, in the Jiang Zemin era (Jiang's era), Politburo members were mainly promoted from the central party committee or Central Government. Secondly, in the Hu Jintao era (Hu's era), key members from administrative regions started to step into the power center. Third, in the era of Xi Jinping (Xi's era), most Politburo members were promoted directly from administrative regions, especially from the coastal areas, such as Shanghai and Guangdong province. The research also indicates that being a military commander for Military Regions appears to provide experience necessary for promotion, whilst being an officer at the central military departments, such as a (Deputy) Chief General of Staff or Commander of Armed Services, is considered a major stepping stone. Although the succession trend defined by the innovative analysis of this research might not match the fixed model used by the CCP for its succession plan, under the circumstances of probable further institutionalization of the CCP, a quantified analysis of network position could be considered a more promising method of prediction.

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Howell, Jude, and Jane Duckett. "Reassessing the Hu–Wen Era: A Golden Age or Lost Decade for Social Policy in China?" China Quarterly 237 (December 3, 2018): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741018001200.

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AbstractThe Hu–Wen era has been characterized as a “lost decade” for economic and political reform, but a “golden era” in terms of economic growth and political stability. Yet, relatively little attention has been paid to the social policies introduced during Hu and Wen's decade in power. These important policies, however, abolished agricultural taxes, extended health insurance, pensions and income support to almost all rural as well as urban residents, and built a civic welfare infrastructure to address migrants’ grievances. These policies, some of which were developed under the preceding Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji leadership, were introduced for a complex mix of reasons. Their aim was not only to reduce inequalities but also to stimulate domestic consumption and sustain economic growth, offset the effects of China's entry to the WTO and the global recession of 2008, and maintain social stability. They were the product of domestic bureaucratic politics and experimentation. They were also strongly influenced by China's integration into the international economy, as well as by international governmental and non-governmental organizations and the ideas they introduced into China's domestic policy networks. Although Hu–Wen era social policy reforms had only limited effects on reducing income inequality and involved complex politics, they did establish for the first time entitlements to social security and safety nets for all China's population.

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Bhattacharya, Abanti. "Chinese Nationalism Under Xi Jinping Revisited." India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 75, no. 2 (June 2019): 245–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0974928419841789.

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In China, nationalism that took root in the era of globalization under the third-generation leadership of Jiang Zemin is principally meant to address the internal threats challenging party legitimacy and stability and not to resist the foreign enemies, as was the goal in the twentieth century. This is because internal stability is considered prerequisite to harness the potentials of globalization. Paradoxically therefore, nationalism and globalization, that are antithetical forces, go hand in hand in China. Under the current leadership, both the forces of nationalism and globalization are underscored in Xi Jinping’s dream project- the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Notably, the success of BRI is contingent on the persistence of globalization externally. But the rising trends of de-globalization in the West do not augur well for the BRI that has been envisaged to not only meet the demands of a slowing economy but to expand China’s global footprints, and thereby, fulfil the China Dream. Therefore, a sense of insecurity pervades Chinese nationalism. This ‘insecure’ nationalism under Xi Jinping is engendering a belligerent turn to Chinese foreign policy.

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BRØDSGAARD, KJELD ERIK, and NIS HØYRUP CHRISTENSEN. "The 19th Party Congress: Personnel Changes and Policy Guidelines." Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (January 18, 2018): 79–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v35i2.5447.

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The 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in BeijingOctober 18-24 2017. Leading up to the congress there was intense speculation concerning the new line-up of the most important leadership bodies of the CPC: the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee. Would the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) continue to consist of seven members, or would it be expanded to nine members, as was the case during Jiang Zemin's era, or would it instead be reduced to five members, as was the case during the late 1980s? Would unwritten rules such as '68 down, 67 up' be observed? Or would veteran leaders such as Wang Qishan (69) continue to serve on the committee? Would Xi Jinping pack the Politburo and the PSC with his own close allies, or would he try to achieve a factional balance observing the interests of former leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao? There was also much speculation concerning Xi Jinping's status. Would the 'Chairman of Everything' have hisname and thought written into the CPC Constitution alongside that of MaoZedong and Deng Xiaoping and ahead of his two immediate predecessors?Xi Jinping's report to the Party congress was also awaited with muchinterest. Such a report is usually a long document setting out the Party'spriorities and policy objectives for the next five-year period. Would XiJinping's report signal new policy initiatives, and would it outline strategicguidelines reaching beyond 2022? This article examines these questionsand assesses the future impact of the Party congress on Chinese politics.

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서상민. "A Analysis of Research Trends on “Korea-China relations” in China: A Comparison of ‘Keyword-Network’ Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao Era." JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES ll, no. 56 (June 2017): 151–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.26585/chlab.2017..56.007.

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17

Feng, Qingxiang. "The Historical Evolution and Practical Experience of the Central Government's Strategy of Governing Hong Kong." International Journal of Social Science Studies 8, no. 6 (October 28, 2020): 114. http://dx.doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v8i6.5062.

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The central government's strategy of governing Hong Kong is the policy and strategy used by the central government to govern Hong Kong, which as a whole reflects the central government's institutional arrangements, power and responsibility relations, policy trends and governance goals for Hong Kong. As a dynamic historical category, the central government's strategy of governing Hong Kong has gone through the arduous exploration of several generations of communists and accumulated rich practical experience, providing a direction guide for the development of "One country, Two systems". Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong’s strategy of “temporarily not intervening Hong Kong” has been embodied in the policy of “long-term planning and full utilization” of governing Hong Kong, which has important historical reference significance. Deng Xiaoping inherited and developed Mao Zedong's strategic thinking on the peaceful reunification of the country and put forward the scientific concept of "One country, Two systems", which was successfully applied in Hong Kong. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao further enriched and developed the policy of "One Country, Two Systems", opening a new chapter in Hong Kong's development. Xi Jinping did not forget the original intention of "One Country, Two Systems" and led the central government's strategy of governing Hong Kong into a new era.

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18

Meyer, David, Victor C. Shih, and Jonghyuk Lee. "FACTIONS OF DIFFERENT STRIPES: GAUGING THE RECRUITMENT LOGICS OF FACTIONS IN THE REFORM PERIOD." Journal of East Asian Studies 16, no. 1 (March 2016): 43–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jea.2015.5.

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AbstractThe literature on faction suggests that patrons in the party may recruit faction members on the basis of a broad range of shared traits and experience. Some scholars argue reasonably that with increasing specialization of officials, factions are increasingly dominated by those with shared work experience in a set of bureaucracies. Although this trend may be true in general, senior leaders may still recruit those with whom they share birth place and school ties into their factions. To investigate this, we first derive four reasonable ways of measuring factional ties as suggested by the literature. We then explore the factional recruitment strategy pursued by each reform-era (1978–present) party secretary generals of the CCP by evaluating the measures of factional ties which predicted their clients’ promotions to full Central Committee membership. Our results show that Hu Yaobang, Jiang Zemin, and Xi Jinping pursued broadly based factional recruitment strategies, while Hu Jintao recruited faction members mainly from work colleagues. We further uncover signs that the party institutions may allow deposed secretary generals some measure of influence over promotions even after their political demise. At the same time, strict retirement rules on lower level officials gave rise to a cohort effect that gave the general secretary greater influence over the promotion of alternate Central Committee members to the full Central Committee during their first term than in subsequent terms.

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19

Góralczyk, Bogdan. "Era Jiang Zemina." Azja-Pacyfik 4, no. 1 (December 31, 2001): 269–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ap200119.

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20

Rothacher, A. "Damage Control. The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era by Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (eds), Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003 ISBN 981-210-251-5, 383 pages, S$ 39." Asia Europe Journal 4, no. 2 (March 25, 2006): 305–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10308-006-0050-x.

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21

Choi, Eun Kyong, John Wagner Givens, and Andrew MacDonald. "From Power Balance to Dominant Faction in Xi Jinping's China." China Quarterly, June 21, 2021, 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741021000473.

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Abstract Many China watchers argue that Xi Jinping has concentrated power in his own hands in a manner unprecedented since the death of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. This article tests the extent of Xi's power consolidation by comparing the strength of his faction during his time in power to similar periods under his two immediate predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Furthermore, we investigate whether a dominant faction is emerging under Xi Jinping, replacing the power balancing between factions that was the norm throughout the reform era. Analysing factional affiliations of Chinese leaders in the top four ranks, we find that Xi has formed a dominant faction. Through statistical analysis of the promotion chances of provincial leaders, we find that Xi has been unusually successful when compared to previous leaders at promoting his clients. This suggests that Xi has boosted the power of his faction by elevating provincial leaders to an extent not seen since the death of Mao and Deng.

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Mijares, VVctor. "El Auge de China y su Incidencia en la Seguridad del Noreste Asiitico en la Era de Jiang Zemin (The Rise of China and Its Incidence on the Northeast Asia Security in Jiang Zemin's Era)." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2986968.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Jiang Zemin era'

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