Journal articles on the topic 'Japan – Foreign public opinion, American'
To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Japan – Foreign public opinion, American.
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Japan – Foreign public opinion, American.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Muir-Harmony, Teasel. "The Limits of U.S. Science Diplomacy in the Space Age." Pacific Historical Review 88, no. 4 (2019): 590–618. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/phr.2019.88.4.590.
Full textAbstract:
A moon rock, resting on a pedestal in the American Pavilion at the 1970 Osaka World Exposition, became the latest trophy for the United States in its fierce space race with the Soviet Union. The exhibit was part of a broader approach to U.S. diplomacy in this period, where science and technology, or in this case a scientific specimen, were deployed to spread Western democratic values, win over international public opinion, and counter anti-American sentiment. But the moon rock’s physical resemblance to earth rocks prompted a broader discussion among Japanese audiences at the Expo about the aims of U.S. scientific and technological progress, and the practicality and applicability of American cultural norms to Japanese visions of modernity. By considering what happens when a scientific specimen travels outside of the laboratory context, outside the world of scientists, and into the world of foreign relations, this article investigates the complicated dynamics of science, material culture, and power during this critical juncture in the United States’ engagement with Japan.
2
Zvobgo, Kelebogile. "Human Rights versus National Interests: Shifting US Public Attitudes on the International Criminal Court." International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 4 (August 13, 2019): 1065–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz056.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract The United States—an architect of international criminal tribunals in the twentieth century—has since moderated its involvement in international justice. Striking to many observers is the United States’ failure to join the International Criminal Court—the institutional successor to the tribunals the nation helped install in Germany, Japan, the Balkans, and Rwanda. Interestingly, the US public’s support of the ICC increases yearly despite the government’s ambivalence about, and even hostility toward, the Court. Drawing on the US foreign policy public opinion literature, I theorize that human rights frames increase support for joining the ICC among Americans, whereas national interest frames decrease support. I administer an online survey experiment to evaluate these expectations and find consistent support. I additionally test hypotheses from the framing literature in American politics regarding the effect of exposure to two competing frames. I find that participants exposed to competing frames hold more moderate positions than participants exposed to a single frame but differ appreciably from the control group. Crucially, I find that participants’ beliefs about international organizations’ effectiveness and impartiality are equally, if not more, salient than the treatments. Thus, the ICC may be able to mobilize support and pressure policy change by demonstrating effectiveness and impartiality.
3
Nelidov, V. V. "The “Nixon China Shock” in the Mirror of Japanese Domestic Politics." MGIMO Review of International Relations 12, no. 6 (January 1, 2020): 61–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2019-6-69-61-77.
Full textAbstract:
The “Nixon China Shock” (the July 15, 1971 statement by the U.S. President R. Nixon about the recent trip of his National Security Advisor H. Kissinger to the PRC and about the President’s upcoming visit there) became one of the pivotal points in the history of Japanese foreign policy and contributed to Tokyo becoming more independent from Washington in its diplomatic course. Using the case of Japan’s reaction to this event, the article explores the characteristic features of the foreign policy making process in post-war Japan and demonstrates the considerable influence of these features on the character of Japanese foreign policy of the so-called “1955 System” period (the prolonged and continuous dominance of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party in 1955-93). The paper shows the decentralization of the foreign policy making process, expressed in the limited ability of the Prime Minister to determine foreign policy, the presence of considerable internal contradictions in the MoFA of Japan, the factionalism of the ruling party, and the high degree of dependency of the government’s policy course on the public opinion. It proves that these factors were one of the reasons for Japan’s political leadership avoiding decisive actions to normalize relations with the PRC before the “Nixon shock”, cautious that it might damage its relations with the U.S. and unable to discern the signs of upcoming U.S.-Chinese détente, and after this event, vice versa, making every effort to normalize its relations with Beijing as soon as possible, reaching this goal even before their American partners did. Given the historical importance of the “1955 System” for contemporary Japanese politics, the article’s conclusions are significant for the understanding of the logic of Japan’s domestic politics and foreign policy of the entire post-war period.Author declares the absence of conflict of interests.
4
Luzyanin, S. G. "Russian-Japanese relations and the Chinese factor: Evolution and transformation (2012–2022)." Japanese Studies in Russia, no. 4 (January 5, 2023): 75–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.55105/2500-2872-2022-4-75-89.
Full textAbstract:
The election of V.V. Putin for a new presidential term in 2012 and his further foreign policy initiatives affected the intensification of Russia’s foreign policy in general, as well as its Japanese direction. The article attempts to highlight the development of Russian-Japanese relations in the period of 2012–2022, including the phase of aggravation of relations after the start of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine on February 24, 2022 and Japan’s accession to the US anti-Russian sanctions, as well as the role and influence of China on the bilateral Russian-Japanese format, the East Asian region, the specifics of Chinese-American relations in the context of the “trade war” in the Japanese dimension, etc. Based on the published works of leading Russian experts, the author examines the dynamics of mutual perception of the images of Russia and Japan at the level of Russian and Japanese public opinion. Particular attention is paid to the study of the evolution of Russian-Japanese trade and economic, military-political, energy, Arctic, and humanitarian contacts. The paper traces the features of Russian, Japanese and Chinese motivations regarding regional security issues, attitudes towards the Ukrainian events, including the Russian special military operation, Moscow’s reaction to anti-Russian sanctions, towards the pressure from the United States and their allies. In general, the problem of the evolution of the notional triangle “Russia – Japan – China” at the present stage, the deformation of its key elements and the prospects for further development are formulated.The author focuses on the coverage of Russian-Japanese contacts in the areas of regional security before and after February 24, 2022, including the South Kuril options, as well as the analysis of hidden possible Japanese political motivations during the rule of Shinzō Abe regarding the problems of the deepening of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership and the projections of this partnership on the security of Japan and the Japanese-American military-political alliance. An important aspect of the work is the coverage of the dynamics of the Russian-Japanese political relations in the light of the Russian leadership designating Japan as an “unfriendly state” and the further development of bilateral Russian-Japanese and Russian-Chinese models of interaction in the Asia-Pacific region.
5
Powlick, Philip J., and Andrew Z. Katz. "Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus." Mershon International Studies Review 42, no. 1 (May 1998): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/254443.
Full text
6
Grose, Peter, and John E. Rielly. "American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1987." Foreign Affairs 65, no. 5 (1987): 1105. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20043230.
Full text
7
TOMZ, MICHAEL, and JESSICA L. P. WEEKS. "Public Opinion and Foreign Electoral Intervention." American Political Science Review 114, no. 3 (April 14, 2020): 856–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055420000064.
Full textAbstract:
Foreign electoral intervention is an increasingly important tool for influencing politics in other countries, yet we know little about when citizens would tolerate or condemn foreign efforts to sway elections. In this article, we use experiments to study American public reactions to revelations of foreign electoral intervention. We find that even modest forms of intervention polarize the public along partisan lines. Americans are more likely to condemn foreign involvement, lose faith in democracy, and seek retaliation when a foreign power sides with the opposition, than when a foreign power aids their own party. At the same time, Americans reject military responses to electoral attacks on the United States, even when their own political party is targeted. Our findings suggest that electoral interference can divide and weaken an adversary without provoking the level of public demand for retaliation typically triggered by conventional military attacks.
8
Smith, Gaaddis, and Eugene R. Wittkopf. "Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 70, no. 3 (1991): 169. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20044851.
Full text
9
Russett, Bruce, and Eugene R. Wittkopf. "Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy." Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 3 (1991): 511. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2151745.
Full text
10
HU, Shaohua. "American Public Opinion and Cross-strait Relations." East Asian Policy 11, no. 04 (October 2019): 88–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930519000394.
Full textAbstract:
Amid the improved official relationship between Washington and Taipei, this article investigates the relationship between American public opinion and cross-strait relations. It introduces different types of surveys and polls related to the issue; examines the causes for the American public’s lack of attention to cross-strait relations; and discusses the interplay between public opinion and foreign policy, especially in the event of an armed conflict along the strait.
11
Lee, Hak-Seon. "Inequality and U.S. Public Opinion on Foreign Aid." World Affairs 182, no. 3 (August 8, 2019): 273–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0043820019862268.
Full textAbstract:
I investigate how the level of inequality affects American public opinion on foreign aid. As the level of inequality increases across the United States, the majority of the public will be more likely to demand the government implement policies that should ameliorate severe inequality in society. Assuming that government resources are limited, a greater level of inequality in American society may weaken public support for foreign aid because the public may prioritize providing social safety nets and welfare programs in domestic milieu over granting foreign aid to developing countries. In addition, as inequality widens, the public may perceive economic globalization as one of the main causes of inequality; thus, their overall support for globalization will decline. As a result, American support for global engagement will be negatively affected, and public support for foreign aid may decrease. An empirical test using public opinion data in 50 U.S. states since the 1980s confirms my theory: widening inequality both across states and within a given state does weaken public support for U.S. foreign aid.
12
TURES, JOHN. "The Democracy-Promotion Gap in American Public Opinion." Journal of American Studies 41, no. 3 (October 24, 2007): 557–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021875807003994.
Full textAbstract:
United States foreign-policymakers have enthusiastically backed policies of promoting democracy abroad. But do the American people support these plans? Evidence from polls reveals that while people generally like the idea of exporting freedom, they do not view it as a top priority. Other concepts such as political and economic security are valued more by the American public. Backing for democracy promotion also seems to be waning in recent years. I examine these issues and offer possible reasons for this “gap” in response to democracy promotion among American people. I also explain the implications of these findings for America's foreign policy, including the types of government the US appears to support in the wake of military operations. I conclude with an examination of why the policy of democracy promotion has not been more popular with the American people, evaluating competing arguments that the policy is flawed, as opposed to simply a case of poor public relations.
13
Lee, Hak-Seon. "Inward Foreign Direct Investment and U.S. Public Opinion on Immigration." World Affairs 181, no. 2 (June 2018): 181–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0043820018791645.
Full textAbstract:
I investigate how the direct investment of foreign firms in the United States affects public opinion on immigration. On one hand, when foreign firms invest in the United States, local residents may have job opportunities and a better understanding of foreign cultures following social and work-related interactions with foreign employees at multinationals. As a result, American workers may have a positive attitude toward immigration. On the other hand, when local residents see foreign investment as a foreign acquisition of American assets, or if they experience any unpleasant interactions with foreign nationals at multinationals, foreign investment may result in a negative impact on public perception on immigration. My empirical test of inward investment’s impact on public opinion demonstrates the aforementioned contrasting impacts: While more local employees working at foreign multinationals lead to positive sentiments on immigration, the existence of more local affiliates of foreign firms has a negative impact on public opinion of immigration.
14
Powlick, Philip J. "The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials." International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 4 (December 1995): 427. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2600801.
Full text
15
LEVERING, RALPH B. "Public Opinion, Foreign Policy, and American Politics since the 1960s." Diplomatic History 13, no. 3 (July 1989): 383–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1989.tb00062.x.
Full text
16
Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor. "Intervention and Intransitivity: Public Opinion, Social Choice, and the Use of Military Force Abroad." World Politics 47, no. 4 (July 1995): 534–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887100015203.
Full textAbstract:
This article argues that the problems identified in the literature on public choice should critically affect our research on public opinion and our understanding of the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. While a robust literature has emerged around social choice issues in political science, there has been remarkably little appreciation for these problems in the literature on public opinion in general and on public opinion and foreign policy in particular. The potential importance of social choice problems for understanding the nature and role of public opinion in foreign policy making is demonstrated through an examination of American public attitudes about military intervention abroad. In particular, drawing on several common descriptions of the underlying dimensionality of public attitudes on major foreign policy issues, it is shown that there may be important intransitivities in the ordering of public preferences at the aggregate level on policy choices such as those considered by American decision makers in the period leading up to the Gulf War. Without new approaches to public-opinion polling that take these problems into consideration, it will be difficult to make credible claims about the role of public opinion in theforeignpolicy process.
17
Schier, Stephen E., and Andrew Kaufman. "American Foreign Policy Opinion in 2004: Exploring Underlying Beliefs." American Review of Politics 27 (January 1, 2007): 295–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.15763/issn.2374-7781.2007.27.0.295-317.
Full textAbstract:
This analysis identifies some underlying foreign policy beliefs of Americans in 2004 and explores the impact of those beliefs upon attitudes about specific foreign policies. We find, following Wittkopf (1986, 1987, 1990), that there remains a coherence to American mass foreign policy opinion. Americans can be described as clustering into four belief sets about foreign policy— accommodationists, internationalists, isolationists and hardliners. Further, these beliefs explain variation in public responses regarding specific foreign policies, such as the proper U.S. role in world affairs, the choice of multilateral or unilateral approaches, and support of increased defense spending.
18
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies." World Politics 43, no. 4 (July 1991): 479–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010534.
Full textAbstract:
The paper discusses the role of public opinion in the foreign policy-making process of liberal democracies. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, public opinion matters. However, the impact of public opinion is determined not so much by the specific issues involved or by the particular pattern of public attitudes as by the domestic structure and the coalition-building processes among the elites in the respective country. The paper analyzes the public impact on the foreign policy-making process in four liberal democracies with distinct domestic structures: the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan. Under the same international conditions and despite similar patterns of public attitudes, variances in foreign policy outcomes nevertheless occur; these have to be explained by differences in political institutions, policy networks, and societal structures. Thus, the four countries responded differently to Soviet policies during the 1980s despite more or less comparable trends in mass public opinion.
19
Graber, Doris A. "Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy.Eugene R. Wittkopf." Journal of Politics 54, no. 1 (February 1992): 317–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2131675.
Full text
20
Clinton, David. "The Distinction between Foreign Policy and Diplomacy in American International Thought and Practice." Hague Journal of Diplomacy 6, no. 3-4 (March 21, 2011): 261–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187119111x583950.
Full textAbstract:
Throughout his writings, Harold Nicolson advocates a distinction between ‘policy’ (to be subject to democratic control) and ‘negotiation’ (to remain the province of professional diplomatists), preferring to separate these two quite different activities, rather than lumping them together under the general term ‘diplomacy’ (an intermingling that he found conceptually muddled and politically impossible to sustain once general public opinion becomes politically mobilized). Nicholas Murray Butler and George Kennan, who may be taken as representing idealist and realist American opinion in the twentieth century, found themselves at one in rejecting Nicolson’s distinction. Butler believed that the progressive enlightenment of public opinion, resulting in the attainment of the ‘international mind’, would improve both the formulation of policy and the conduct of negotiations; Kennan deprecated public opinion, at least in the United States, as irredeemably clumsy and ill-informed, and was convinced that this domestic political force would not be satisfied with directing policy, but would insist on interfering with negotiation as well. Across the board, American opinion seems to be hostile to Nicolson’s differentiation. This rejection of Nicolson’s view illustrates a more general influence of distinctively American thinking about international relations on American attitudes towards, and expectations of, diplomacy.
21
Kitagawa, Risa, and Jonathan A. Chu. "The Impact of Political Apologies on Public Opinion." World Politics 73, no. 3 (June 9, 2021): 441–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887121000083.
Full textAbstract:
ABSTRACTApology diplomacy promises to assuage historical grievances held by foreign publics, yet in practice appears to ignite domestic backlash, raising questions about its efficacy. This article develops a theory of how political apologies affect public approval of an apologizing government across domestic and foreign contexts. The authors test its implications using large-scale survey experiments in Japan and the United States. In the surveys, the authors present vignettes about World War II grievances and randomize the nature of a government apology. They find that apology-making, both as statements acknowledging wrongdoing and as expressions of remorse, boosts approval in the recipient state. But in the apologizing state, backlash is likely among individuals with strong hierarchical group dispositions—manifested as nationalism, social-dominance orientation, and conservatism—and among those who do not consider the recipient a strategically important partner. This microlevel evidence reveals how leaders face a crucial trade-off between improving support abroad and risking backlash at home, with implications for the study of diplomatic communication and transitional justice.
22
Cavari, A. "Religious Beliefs, Elite Polarization, and Public Opinion on Foreign Policy: The Partisan Gap in American Public Opinion Toward Israel." International Journal of Public Opinion Research 25, no. 1 (January 27, 2012): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edr053.
Full text
23
KABASHIMA, IKUO. "Opinion Polls in 2003." Japanese Journal of Political Science 4, no. 2 (November 2003): 357–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109903001191.
Full textAbstract:
On 26 April 2001, Junichiro Koizumi emerged as the new prime minister of Japan, representing the public's desire for economic recovery through fundamental structural change in Japanese politics. More than two years have passed since then, and Japan has seen neither significant economic revival nor major changes in its political and administrative structures. People's expectation and faith in this henjin (“weirdo” as labeled by Former Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka) prime minister for rescuing Japan's economy has been greatly undermined as Japan's unemployment rate stays high and stock prices low. Japanese banks are performing poorly as usual, and bad loans seem to never go away or decrease in amount. Despite these seemingly critical shortcomings, however, Prime Minister Koizumi and his administration have maintained a high approval rate from the public.
24
Gravelle, Timothy B. "Love Thy Neighbo(u)r? Political Attitudes, Proximity and the Mutual Perceptions of the Canadian and American Publics." Canadian Journal of Political Science 47, no. 1 (March 2014): 135–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423914000171.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThere has been renewed interest in recent years in both the foreign perceptions of the United States as well as the foreign policy attitudes of the American public. In this light, it is interesting to observe that there is a substantial body of research on Canadian public opinion toward the United States but relatively little on American public opinion toward Canada. Further, most literature neglects the effect of spatial proximity to the other country on perceptions. This article addresses both shortcomings in the literature. It investigates the mutual perceptions of the Canadian and American publics drawing on public opinion data from both Canada and the US. The explanation of attitudes toward the other country has three main foci: the roles of political party identification and political ideology; the role of spatial proximity to the Canada–US border; and the interactive relationship between political attitudes and border proximity.
25
Reilly, James. "A Wave to Worry About? Public opinion, foreign policy and China's anti-Japan protests." Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 86 (October 4, 2013): 197–215. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.832519.
Full text
26
Powlick, Philip J. "The Attitudinal Bases for Responsiveness to Public Opinion among American Foreign Policy Officials." Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 4 (December 1991): 611–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002791035004003.
Full text
27
Akami, Tomoko. "The Emergence of International Public Opinion and the Origins of Public Diplomacy in Japan in the Inter-War Period." Hague Journal of Diplomacy 3, no. 2 (2008): 99–128. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187119108x323664.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThis article argues that what we now call public diplomacy emerged in the mid- to late 1930s in the case of Japan. It questions the notion that public diplomacy is new in contrast to 'traditional' diplomacy. It also questions the conventional understanding of Japan's diplomatic isolationism of the 1930s. The article argues that as a result of greater mass political participation, the idea of 'international public opinion' emerged as a new norm in inter-war international politics. States increasingly regarded news and cultural activities as crucial resources of their soft power for winning this international public opinion. Responding to technological developments in communications, they developed a more systematic approach to propaganda in order to utilize these resources in mainstream foreign policy. Even in the age of the socalled rise of nationalism and diplomatic isolationism, Japan could neither afford not to respond to other states' actions nor to ignore international public opinion. In the diplomatic crises of the 1930s, Japan began to coordinate news and cultural propaganda activities, and integrated them into a broader propaganda scheme. Here we see the origin of what is now called public diplomacy. This modern and internationalist thinking then prepared the institutional base for wartime propaganda.
28
Bobrow, Davis B., and Mark A. Boyer. "Public Opinion and International Policy Choices: Global Commitments for Japan and Its Peers?" Japanese Journal of Political Science 2, no. 1 (May 2001): 67–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109901000147.
Full textAbstract:
To understand the prospects for global order and progress in the coming years, we explore the joint implications of three premises: (1) states advantaged by the current international order have stakes in its regularity and predictability, and thus in moving to counter or prevent threats to those stakes; (2) along impure public and club goods lines, they are more likely to make efforts to do so when some private or club benefits result; and (3) public opinion provides a bounded policy acceptance envelope offering incentives and disincentives to national political elites to act as envisioned by the first two premises. We present a mosaic of public opinion in major OECD countries (the US, Japan, and major EU members) on three policy areas – foreign aid, UN peace-keeping operations, and environmental quality – that contain international public goods elements. Actual contribution tendencies in those areas found in our previous work largely conform to the public opinion patterns reported here. Within the limits of available data, domestic political incentives as represented by public opinion warrant neither extreme optimism nor pessimism about the prospects for continuing contributions by OECD states to sustaining orderly functioning of the current world system.
29
Sagan, Scott D., and Benjamin A. Valentino. "Weighing Lives in War: How National Identity Influences American Public Opinion about Foreign Civilian and Compatriot Fatalities." Journal of Global Security Studies 5, no. 1 (December 4, 2019): 25–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz047.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This article explores how the American public weighs tradeoffs between foreign and compatriot fatalities during war. This focus provides an important window into the meaning and significance of citizenship and national identity and, in turn, the most fateful consequences of inclusion and exclusion in the international context. To examine these attitudes, we conducted an original survey experiment asking subjects to consider a fictional US military operation in Afghanistan. We find that: (1) Americans are significantly more willing to accept the collateral deaths of foreign civilians as compared to American civilians in operations aiming to destroy important military targets; (2) Americans are less willing to risk the lives of American soldiers to minimize collateral harm to foreign civilians as compared to American civilians; (3) Americans who express relatively more favorable views of the United States compared to other nations are more willing to accept foreign collateral deaths in US military operations; and (4) Americans are more willing to accept Afghan civilian collateral deaths than those of citizens from a neutral state, such as India. Many Americans recognize that placing a much higher value on compatriot lives over foreign lives is morally problematic, but choose to do so anyway.
30
Taylor, Samantha A. "Reciprocal Influence: Public Opinion and Presidential Elections on American Foreign Policy—and Vice Versa." Presidential Studies Quarterly 49, no. 3 (July 2019): 736–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/psq.12582.
Full text
31
Tarzi, Shah M. "The Trump Divide and Partisan Attitudes Regarding US Foreign Policy: Select Theoretical and Empirical Observations." International Studies 56, no. 1 (January 2019): 46–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020881718824488.
Full textAbstract:
This article presents select data, recent trends and empirical analysis concerning American voters’ attitudes on American foreign policy in the Trump era. Accordingly, it addresses several vital questions: (a) whether and to what extent Trump Republicans hold views that are distinct from non-Trump Republicans and from average US voters?; (b) how widespread is support for President Trump’s foreign policy?; and (c) whether partisanship has intensified? Importantly, the study deduces preliminary theoretical observations and highlights select new pathways for future research. The key findings of the article are: (a) Trump supporters hold distinct views from the general public; (b) President Trump’s positions are not popular; (c) partisanship has intensified under Trump; (d) on the broad contours of American foreign policy, the American public, including the non-Trump Republicans, express noteworthy continuity, stability and support in spite of a deeply polarizing American president. The article offers select theoretical insights, including recognition of the role of core value in ordering belief systems, thereby offering a modicum of internal coherence, stability and structure to foreign policy views of American mass public, thus transcending the traditional Almond–Lippmann theoretical consensus regarding the content of American public opinion.
32
Lotchin, Roger W. "A Research Report." Southern California Quarterly 97, no. 4 (2015): 399–417. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ucpsocal.2015.97.4.399.
Full textAbstract:
Public opinion polls taken between 1939 and 1945 questioned Americans’ attitudes toward Japan and Germany and toward the people of Japan and Japanese Americans. The polls’ quantified responses provide previously overlooked data that should be taken into account by scholars of Japanese American and World War II history.
33
SHIRK, SUSAN L. "Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China." Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (March 14, 2007): 43–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109907002472.
Full textAbstract:
China has undergone a media revolution that has transformed the domestic context for making foreign policy as well as domestic policy. The commercialization of the mass media has changed the way leaders and publics interact in the process of making foreign policy. As they compete with one another, the new media naturally try to appeal to the tastes of their potential audiences. Editors make choices about which stories to cover based on their judgments about which ones will resonate best with audiences. In China today, that means a lot of stories about Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, the topics that are the objects of Chinese popular nationalism. The publicity given these topics makes them domestic political issues because they are potential focal points for elite dis-agreement and mass collective action, and thereby constrains the way China' leaders and diplomats deal with them. Even relatively minor events involving China' relations with Japan, Taiwan, or the United States become big news, and therefore relations with these three governments must be carefully handled by the politicians in the Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee. Because of the Internet, it is impossible for Party censors to screen out news from Japan, Taiwan or the United States that might upset the public. Common knowledge of such news forces officials to react to every slight, no matter how small. Foreign policy makers feel especially constrained by nationalist public opinion when it comes to its diplomacy with Japan. Media marketization and the Internet have helped make Japan China' most emotionally charged international relationship.
34
Heffington, Colton, Brandon Beomseob Park, and Laron K. Williams. "The “Most Important Problem” Dataset (MIPD): a new dataset on American issue importance." Conflict Management and Peace Science 36, no. 3 (March 31, 2017): 312–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0738894217691463.
Full textAbstract:
This article introduces the Most Important Problem Dataset (MIPD). The MIPD provides individual-level responses by Americans to “most important problem” questions from 1939 to 2015 coded into 58 different problem categories. The MIPD also contains individual-level information on demographics, economic evaluations, partisan preferences, approval and party competencies. This dataset can help answer questions about how the public prioritizes all problems, domestic and foreign, and we demonstrate how these data can shed light on how circumstances influence foreign policy attentiveness. Our exploratory analysis of foreign policy issue attention reveals some notable patterns about foreign policy public opinion. First, foreign policy issues rarely eclipse economic issues on the public’s problem agenda, so efforts to shift attention from poor economic performance to foreign policy via diversionary maneuvers are unlikely to be successful in the long term. Second, we find no evidence that partisan preferences—whether characterized as partisan identification or ideology—motivate partisans to prioritize different problems owing to perceptions of issue ownership. Instead, Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, respond in similar fashions to shifting domestic and international conditions.
35
CUMINGS, BRUCE. "Still the American Century." Review of International Studies 25, no. 5 (December 1999): 271–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210599002715.
Full textAbstract:
At the inception of the twenty-first century—not to mention the next millennium—books on ‘the American Century’ proliferate monthly, if not daily. We now have The American Century Dictionary, The American Century Thesaurus, and even The American Century Cookbook; perhaps the American Century baseball cap or cologne is not far behind. With one or two exceptions, the authors celebrate the unipolar pre-eminence and comprehensive economic advantage that the United States now enjoys. Surveys of public opinion show that most people agree: the American wave appears to be surging just as the year 2000 beckons. Unemployment and inflation are both at twenty-year lows, sending economists (who say you can't get lows for both at the same time) back to the drawing board. The stock market roars past the magic 10,000 mark, and the monster federal budget deficit of a decade ago miraculously metamorphoses into a surplus that may soon reach upwards of $1 trillion. Meanwhile President William Jefferson Clinton, not long after a humiliating impeachment, is rated in 1999 as the best of all postwar presidents in conducting foreign policy (a dizzying ascent from eighth place in 1994), according to a nationwide poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. This surprising result might also, of course, bespeak inattention: when asked to name the two or three most important foreign policy issues facing the US, fully 21 per cent of the public couldn't think of one (they answered ‘don't know’), and a mere seven per cent thought foreign policy issues were important to the nation. But who cares, when all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds?
36
Hogan, J. Michael. "Public opinion and American foreign policy: The case of illusory support for the Panama Canal treaties." Quarterly Journal of Speech 71, no. 3 (August 1985): 302–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00335638509383738.
Full text
37
PARMARA, INDERJEET. "Engineering consent: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the mobilization of American public opinion, 1939–1945." Review of International Studies 26, no. 1 (January 2000): 35–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500000358.
Full textAbstract:
The role of private organizations and think tanks in the United States have been well documented. The Council on Foreign Relations in particular has been much discussed—less so, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This article seeks to fill that gap by exploring its influence on American public opinion during World War II. Based upon archival research, the essay examines the background of the key members of the Endowment, their outlook and the impact their work had in shaping US attitudes. Using Gramsci's notion of an ‘historic bloc’ wedded to the insights of the ‘corporatist’ school of American foreign relations, the conclusion reached is that the organization—along with other key bodies situated at the interface between the private and public spheres—played a not inconsiderable part in educating Americans for internationalism before the end of the war and the onset of the Cold War two years later.
38
Allani, Samira. "Confrontational Argumentative Strategies in the Discourse of Foreign Policy Experts." Research in Language 17, no. 1 (March 30, 2019): 39–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/rela-2019-0004.
Full textAbstract:
The aim of this study is to explore the discursive practices of foreign policy experts. While policy decisions involving war and peace keep people alarmed all over the globe, most of these decisions are shaped by policy experts who work on influencing public opinion through the media (Manheim, 2011). This study adopts a critical discursive stance and uses argumentation analysis to examine the ideological backdrop to the discourse of thirty opinion articles authored by American foreign policy experts in print media. Drawing on the Pragma-dialectical method of augmentation analysis (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004), and more particularly on its notion of strategic maneuvering, the analysis examines the confrontational strategies used by this group of experts and attempts to determine the rhetorical goals pursued by these strategic maneuvers.
39
Milner, Helen V., and Dustin H. Tingley. "Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy." International Organization 65, no. 1 (January 2011): 37–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818310000317.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractIn this article we bring together opposing international relations theories to better understand U.S. foreign policy, in particular foreign trade and aid. Using votes in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1979–2004, we explore different theoretical predictions about preferences for foreign economic policy. We assess the impact of domestic factors, namely political economy and ideological preferences, versus foreign policy pressures. Our three main results highlight the differential effect of these factors in the two issue areas. First, aid preferences are as affected by domestic political economy factors as are trade preferences. Second, trade preferences, but not economic aid ones, are shaped by the president's foreign policy concerns; for economic aid, domestic political economy factors matter more than foreign policy ones. Third, aid preferences are shaped more by ideological factors than are trade ones, but ideology plays a different substantive role in each. Different constituencies support aid and trade. This finding has implications for foreign policy substitutability, “the internationalist coalition” in U.S. foreign policy, “statist” theories of foreign policy, and the connection between public opinion and legislative voting.
40
Rosenbluth, Frances, Jun Saito, and Annalisa Zinn. "America's Policy toward East Asia: How It Looks from Japan." Asian Survey 47, no. 4 (July 2007): 584–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2007.47.4.584.
Full textAbstract:
Despite the unpopularity in Japan of American military unilateralism, Japan has continued to support U.S. actions abroad in order to bolster the bilateral security alliance. Public support in Japan for an active foreign policy reflects realist thinking there about new international threats, as well as changes in domestic politics that shape the public's response to those threats.
41
Lewis, Jeff. "Propagating Terror: 9/11 and the Mediation of War." Media International Australia 104, no. 1 (August 2002): 80–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1329878x0210400110.
Full textAbstract:
Academic and public analysis of the media's performance during the 9/11 and Afghanistan wars are critically influenced by the specific ideological perspective of the analyst. Those commentators who support the reprisal attacks against bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the Taliban tend to commend the media, identifying a substantial confluence between state interests, public opinion and media reporting. Alternatively, commentators such as Noam Chomsky who are highly critical of American foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, see the media as representing a pernicious conduit which allows state and military hegemonies to oppress and manipulate public opinion. The role of the media in reporting war and terrorism needs to be considered in terms of processes of cultural construction and representation. As we approach the anniversary of 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’, we need to understand that government foreign policy, public opinion and military action are all shaped through specific kinds of mediated discourse. Our role as media analysts is to expose these discourses in terms of those complex historical and cultural conditions which have served to generate a violence of this proportion.
42
Tomz, Michael, and Jessica L. P. Weeks. "Military Alliances and Public Support for War." International Studies Quarterly 65, no. 3 (February 25, 2021): 811–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab015.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract How do military alliances affect public support for war to defend victims of aggression? We offer the first experimental evidence on this fundamental question. Our experiments revealed that alliance commitments greatly increased the American public's willingness to intervene abroad. Alliances shaped public opinion by increasing public fears about the reputational costs of nonintervention and by heightening the perceived moral obligation to intervene out of concerns for fairness and loyalty. Finally, although alliances swayed public opinion across a wide range of circumstances, they made the biggest difference when the costs of intervention were high, the stakes of intervention were low, and the country needing aid was not a democracy. Thus, alliances can create pressure for war even when honoring the commitment would be extremely inconvenient, which could help explain why democratic allies tend to be so reliable. These findings shed new light on the consequences of alliances and other international legal commitments, the role of morality in foreign policy, and ongoing debates about domestic audience costs.
43
Erskine, Kristopher C. "“American Public Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics: The Genesis of the China Lobby in the United States, and how Missionaries Shifted American Foreign Policy between 1938 and 1941”." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 25, no. 1 (March 15, 2018): 33–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-02501003.
Full textAbstract:
The China Lobby in the United States attracted much scholarly attention after 1945, yet it found its footing in the late 1930s and played a critical role in re-shaping American public opinion prior to World War ii. Historians have devoted relatively little time to investigating this earlier period. The overwhelming majority of China’s lobbyists during these early years were American missionaries who the Chinese government often funded and managed. This article examines the role of two of those missionaries—Frank and Harry Price—and their American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression. It relies on research in Taiwan, China, and in archives across the United States. The author also has interviewed members of the Price family, as well as former associates of Frank Price in the United States, Taiwan, and China. The evidence this article presents demonstrates that while difficult to quantify, the Price brothers played a crucial role in helping to re-shape American public opinion about China between 1938 and 1941.
44
Scotto, Thomas J., Jason Reifler, David Hudson, and Jennifer vanHeerde-Hudson. "We Spend How Much? Misperceptions, Innumeracy, and Support for the Foreign Aid in the United States and Great Britain." Journal of Experimental Political Science 4, no. 2 (2017): 119–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/xps.2017.6.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractMajorities of citizens in high-income countries often oppose foreign aid spending. One popular explanation is that the public overestimates the percentage and amount of taxpayer funds that goes toward overseas aid. Does expressing aid flows in dollar and/or percentage terms shift public opinion toward aid? We report the results of an experiment examining differences in support for aid spending as a function of the information American and British respondents receive about foreign aid spending. In both nations, providing respondents with information about foreign aid spending as a percentage of the national budget significantly reduces support for cuts. The findings suggest that support for aid can be increased, but significant opposition to aid spending remains.
45
Marson, Ana Carolina. "The press and Brazilian Foreign Policy: Brazil’s participation at the 1962 Punta del Este Conference." Brazilian Journal of International Relations 9, no. 2 (September 7, 2020): 348–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/2237-7743.2020.v9n2.p348-373.
Full textAbstract:
This paper seeks to comprehend how a portion of the Brazilian public opinion, specifically the press, understood Brazil’s participation in the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in January 1962 – the Punta del Este Conference. This was a decisive meeting since it culminated in the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS), because of the pressure exerted by the United States. Brazil distinguished itself for leading a group of countries against Cuba’s expulsion, based on the principle of self-determination and non-intervention. Although some authors believe the Punta del Este Conference to be the first event to massively mobilize the Brazilian public opinion around a foreign policy issue, they are not clear about what they understand as the concept of public opinion or how it positioned itself about Brazil’s participation in the Conference. Thus, this paper focuses on the coverage of three newspapers of national circulation (Jornal do Brasil, O Estado de São Paulo and Última Hora) between November 1961 and March 1962 to understand, through a content analysis method, how the press evaluated Brazil’s participation in the Punta del Este Conference. The results point to a bigger support of the Brazilian position and the Independent Foreign Policy.
Recebido em: Agosto/2019.
Aprovado em: julho/2020.
46
Artamonova, U. "History Rhymes Itself: U.S. Public Diplomacy as a Tool for “Political Warfare”." World Economy and International Relations 66, no. 11 (2022): 41–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2022-66-11-41-49.
Full textAbstract:
In 2022, the tension between Russia and the U.S. has reached a new high. This trend has been especially noticeable in the information space: influencing public opinion of each other’s populations as well as of global community. Focusing on the concept of “political warfare” (POLWAR), the author analyzes the circumstances of its last notable emergence in the discourse among the American expert community and political elites – the start of the Cold War. The article discovers that American approach to the POLWAR in the first decades of confrontation with the USSR was reactive and even defensive, since the USSR did already have a successful experience of projecting influence on the global public opinion, effectively winning hearts and minds of foreign populations and thus presenting a threat to the newly constructed liberal world order. Hence, the U.S. governments proceeded to a gradual establishment of what later will be called the American “public diplomacy” (PD), including the development of relative legislation, institutes, etc. Thus, the article concludes that PD as a political practice may be considered a product of the Cold War in general and POLWAR in particular, which explains why the American PD has been in systemic crisis since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, studying the latest changes in the U.S. legislation and institutes related to public diplomacy, the author suggests that those events were once again the reaction of the U.S. to the Russian policies which were considered a challenge to the “rule-based world order”. Those steps, however, have been too inconsequent to bring the American PD into the most effective mode. That is why in the POLWAR that started in 2022, the American side fluctuates towards reactive and defensive tactic, mostly focusing on stopping Russian information campaigns influencing the population of the U.S., whereas control over the global public opinion remains second priority and public opinion of Russians is not being considered at all within the framework of this new approach of the U. S. Aside from that the creation of Disinformation Board and introduction of the concept of “domestic PD” likely indicate the desire to boost the public diplomacy resources that are not currently adequate for POLWAR offensive via discovering new talents and ideas among motivated Americans.
47
Nadtochey, Yuriy. "The Impact of the Korean and Vietnam Wars on US Foreign and Domestic Politicy." Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, no. 2 (2022): 108. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013038640014886-2.
Full textAbstract:
The article compares the two most significant military conflicts of the Cold War era, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, in terms of their impact on US domestic and foreign policy. To this end, they are analysed on eight key parameters (objectives of the war, changes in foreign policy concepts, economic consequences of the war, public opinion, etc.). Unlike numerous studies on the impact of the US on Asian regions and nations, the main thrust of this study is to focus on the reverse impact of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, namely on the ways these conflicts affected the domestic affairs of the US and altered its foreign policy behaviour. The empirical base for the study encompasses declassified White House and Pentagon papers, memoirs of American presidents, public opinion polls, as well as extensive research literature. The authors conclude that, although the war on the Korean Peninsula was one of the hottest points of the Cold War and had a serious impact on the social and political life of the country, it has in fact turned out to be a “forgotten” event in American history. By contrast, the Vietnam War, although it had a significant impact on the public consciousness of Americans, was on the whole largely a local conflict, failed to substantially change the international situation, and could not impede the policy of détente in international relations, which was essential for both the USA and the USSR.
48
Munayyer, Yousef. "Crisis Moments." Journal of Palestine Studies 44, no. 1 (2014): 97–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2014.44.1.97.
Full textAbstract:
Discourse and public opinion on the question of Palestine—and every other issue for that matter—are largely shaped by the mainstream media. Palestine remains remote for the average American consumer of information who is generally less concerned with foreign affairs than with the domestic issues that directly impact daily life. In moments of crisis, however, media coverage of Palestine increases significantly, sometimes to the point of saturation. Such “crisis moments,” despite being few and far between, can have a significant and lasting impact on shaping public opinion, rendering it critically important to understand and analyze the coverage of Israel's latest assault on Gaza—as well as the discourse surrounding the issue.
49
Fordham, Benjamin O., and Katja B. Kleinberg. "Too Pacifist in Peace, Too Bellicose in War: Political Information and Foreign Policy Opinion." Journal of Conflict Resolution 64, no. 10 (March 29, 2020): 1828–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002720912818.
Full textAbstract:
Scholars of public opinion and foreign policy recognize that the general public is poorly informed about international affairs, but they disagree about whether and how this fact affects the policies that it will support. Some argue that the lack of information has little effect, at least in the aggregate, while others hold that political information mediates attention to elite cues. We investigate a third line of argument in which political information has a direct effect on the policy options individuals support. Low levels of political information give rise to a pattern of complacency toward likely international threats in times of relative peace and a contrasting tendency to support violent and aggressive policy options during war or acute crises. We test this argument using survey data from two relevant historical settings: the American entry into World War II and the response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
50
Feinstein, Yuval. "The Rise and Decline of “Gender Gaps” in Support for Military Action: United States, 1986–2011." Politics & Gender 13, no. 04 (November 2, 2017): 618–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x17000228.
Full textAbstract:
In the past several decades, many scholars of public opinion in the United States have argued that American women are less likely than American men to endorse military action as a means to deal with international problems. Evidence for this “gender gap” has been found in studies of public opinion during major international conflicts (Bendyna et al. 1996; Wilcox, Ferrara, and Allsop 1993), as well as studies of longitudinal trends that examined pooled data sets from multiple conflict periods (Berinsky 2009; Burris 2008; Fite, Genest, and Wilcox 1990; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Researchers sometimes view men's generally greater rates of support for military actions as part of a more general “gender gap” phenomenon in U.S. politics, but the cumulative evidence has suggested that foreign policy issues and questions of peace/war generate the widest and most consistent gender gaps (see Holsti 2004, 209–10 for a review).