Academic literature on the topic 'James stanley'

Drawing upon Stanley Cavell’s concept of the comedy of remarriage and Alain Badiou’s event theory, this essay argues that, in James Joyce’s Ulysses, Molly Bloom’s love-event is necessarily missed the first time, but it is reasserted in a final repetition, after the initial misrecognition of infidelity.

Bearing in mind the dramatic impact of radioastronomy upon our knowledge of the Universe during the years after World War II, it is remarkable that the seminal discovery of radio emission from our galaxy by Karl Jansky in the USA in 1931 attracted so little attention from the astronomical community at that time. It was, in fact, the radio amateur Grote Reber, of Wheaton, Illinois, and not the professionals, who first followed up Jansky's discovery. Designing his own radio telescopes, the first of which were unsuitable because the wavelengths were too short, Reber persevered until, in 1941, he successfully performed surveys of the distribution of radio noise intensity across the sky that indicated a strong concentration towards the galactic centre. In this country the key figure was J.S. Hey, who was engaged in wartime operational research concerned with anti-aircraft radar when, in February 1942, radar stations along the south coast of England were seriously affected by radio interference of unknown origin. From the direction of the interfering signals Hey concluded that the Sun must be responsible, so he contacted the Royal Greenwich Observatory and was informed that a large sunspot group was near the centre of the solar disc. He correctly deduced that some kind of disturbance in the solar atmosphere must have generated the radio signals, but this remained a wartime secret until the cessation of hostilities. Returning to his discovery in 1946, when the Sun was again active, Hey and his team made more detailed observations and showed that the intense bursts of radiation were often associated with solar flares. In the same year, while following up the work of Jansky and Reber, Hey noticed that radiation from the direction of the constellation Cygnus often showed fluctuations of intensity on a time-scale of a few seconds. With his experience of solar radiation, Hey deduced that a discrete source must have been responsible and more were soon located by other groups. Initially called radio stars, but later found to be supernova remnants, normal galaxies and new types of galaxy located near, or beyond, the limits of optical telescopes, Hey's discovery initiated an era of research that transformed observational astronomy. Such was the pace and excitement of this period that the significance of Hey's pioneering contributions tended to be overlooked. He was not proposed for Fellowship of The Royal Society until 1978, and he was elected in the same year.

There is no neutral generic epistemic state which it makes sense to ascribe to an inquirer in respect of each and every putative truth on which an inquirer relies. The term ‘belief’ does not signify such a state. Rather, such a state is an invention of epistemology itself. ‘Belief’ is a term used within our epistemic practice to mark epistemic positions evaluatively. More specifically, ‘belief’ is used to signal epistemic risk or a lack of demonstrability and is not a sub- category or more fundamental state than knowledge, but rather an alternative characterisation to it. In this thesis, I argue that this is a deep insight which has been overlooked in the epistemological thought of William James. I contend that it is of profound significance to our contemporary understanding of epistemic practice, which tends to remain beholden to the flawed conception of belief which this insight allows us to reject. It is powerfully expressed in what James describes as his sermon on the justification of faith – 'The Will to Believe'. The lecture has often been dismissed as an irresponsible licensing of wishful thinking. However, I argue that the account of inquiry which James offers provides a radically different and more illuminating picture of the character and extent of the possibility of a rational endorsement of our shared epistemic practice (in the face of our sceptical and dogmatic inclinations) from that which has held currency in traditional epistemology. This thesis examines the significance of James’ arguments in relation to his broader philosophy and his role, alongside Peirce and Dewey, in the birth of pragmatist thinking. I show how James’ approach reflects a commitment to understanding inquiry in terms of an embodied perspective and that the significance of this approach remains unappreciated. I argue that 'The Will to Believe' presents a unique insight into the concept of belief itself which the traditional view of belief in epistemology as a basic and generic epistemic state is incapable of accommodating. I further trace the implications of this insight through the development of pragmatically oriented philosophy of language in C20th, showing how it enhances our understanding of our epistemic language and practice. 'The Will to Believe' has been much maligned in its attempt to provide a defence of religious faith on the basis of the positive practical consequences of believing which may flow therefrom. I suspect that, at least in part, it is this subject matter which has made its deeper criticism of a flawed epistemological picture inaccessible to many readers. I will examine how the lecture represented the culmination of a line of thinking which James had developed for some time, which reflects a working out of his conviction that epistemology must represent the inquirer as an active participant in (and therefore as a part of) the world. In doing so, I will engage with certain misunderstandings and misinformation concerning the relation between James’ arguments there and his debates with other pragmatists and particularly Peirce. This will illuminate both a greater affinity between their positions than is often realised, but also the importance of James’ arguments to the potential for pragmatist thought to be applied outside of the rather narrow scope of application of the scientific method which Peirce emphasises and thereby to be of relevance to our everyday epistemic engagements. This will lead us to the questions of the extent to which a rational vindication of the bases of inquiry itself is possible and the relevance of that possibility to our understanding of our epistemic practice. I will compare Peirce’s account of inquiry with James’ arguments, understanding both of them as a response to scepticism conceived of in different ways. Where Peirce focuses on repudiating a Cartesian argument from the dubitability of the external world, rejecting the need for a foundational underpinning to our scientific understanding thereof, James perceives the greater threat as residing in Pyrrhonism and the spectre of a lack of rational justification more generally within our epistemic lives. In examining early pragmatist epistemological thought, I will also engage with a more contemporary Kantian inspired reading of the pragmatist understanding of inquiry which emphasises the extent to which the significance of our practices of inquiry is shaped by our responses to the possibilities of scepticism and dogmatism. I show how James’ concern with self-authorising our position in life as meaningful is a significant further development of this insight. Further, I argue that James’ insights have been misunderstood in contemporary literature, which has failed to engage with his discussion of scepticism, and I show that 'The Will to Believe' represents a significant development in thinking about a Pyrrhonist challenge to our epistemic practice. While James likewise recognises two different modes of responsiveness to the world, unlike Pyrrhonists he does not attempt to categorise these into two different levels or spheres of responsiveness and thus avoids positing an unrevisable ‘natural’ basis for action which is insensitive to reason. James provides a distinctive response to the threat of an equipollence of reasons which arises not as an abstract general phenomenon in respect of any attempt to support actions by reasons, but rather in particular practical contexts under the exigencies of needing to act immediately. I show how James’ identification of two different kinds of epistemic relation to a putative truth and the different modes of epistemic assessment associated therewith provides a unique understanding of our epistemic responsibilities which illuminates the relevance of scepticism as a threat to successful practical action in our lives. I then examine how 'The Will to Believe' relates to James’ broader pragmatism. I engage with the reading of James offered by Hilary Putnam, which I critique as representative of a common misunderstanding of James’ pragmatism. I show how a sensitive understanding of James’ pragmatic theory of truth and its conception of the relationship between meaning (construed both narrowly as linguistic meaning and broadly as the significance of action) and the practical outcomes of our worldly engagements enriches the arguments made in 'The Will to Believe'. I argue that James’ insistence that the normative claim which truths have on us is grounded in practical outcomes illuminates how the questions raised in 'The Will to Believe' reflect the significance of motivated perspectives on the concepts of truth and evidence and their normative hold over us, which James identifies as conflicting tendencies within human nature. In turn, this connection between motivation and truth lays the groundwork for the rejection of what I have described as the traditional conception of belief as a generic state. I consider and critique this traditional model and its significance through the lens of contemporary pragmatically minded work in the philosophy of language. I emphasise the importance of intersubjectivity in James’ thought and build upon more recent work on the notion of second personal space and normative relations therein. This concludes with an account of the term ‘belief’ which understands it as marking what I call ‘epistemic risk’ and hence playing an evaluative role within our epistemic practice, rather than designating a fundamental or neutral epistemic state which operates as a component or basis for knowledge. Thus, I conclude that James’ rejection of the notion that epistemic states exist on a single continuum of justification constitutes a crucial development in our understanding of epistemic practice by undercutting this false picture and opening the possibility of a rational consideration of the significance of the interested way we deploy these epistemic concepts. Rejecting the traditional epistemological picture allows for a deeper critique of our intersubjective epistemic behaviour by recognising the difficulties involved in the existence and apprehension of limits to rational determination. I argue that calling something a belief is not ordinarily a neutral epistemic ascription in the way epistemology has imagined. Rather, to call something a belief is in many cases to cast doubt on it implicitly, or to refuse to take full responsibility for it, or otherwise marks a lack of demonstrability. In all cases, this language is used in contrast to the language of knowledge, designating an alternative to knowledge marked by a different kind of evaluation of an epistemic situation. Consequently, belief should not be thought of as a component of knowledge, as it often has been in epistemology. I argue that this problem arises because epistemology attempts to attribute epistemic states neutrally but with full generality, such that an agent’s epistemic outlook can be described in terms of a set of beliefs which can then be evaluated in a disinterested way. Instead, I argue that it only makes sense to attribute epistemic states in terms of the distinction to which James draws our attention, which means that attributing them necessarily both involves and communicates evaluation on our part. Finally, I compare these insights and James’ arguments to the work of Stanley Cavell, whose understanding of scepticism evinces deep similarities to James’ thought. I examine the role of epistemology’s distorted notions of belief and knowledge in the production of scepticism itself. I thus compare Cavell’s understanding of the implicit constraints which exist upon our linguistic practice to the connection which James highlights between motivation and possibilities of meaning. I examine Cavell’s insights concerning the constraints on the sceptic’s ability to mean things by their non-standard use of the term ‘know’ and show how similar insights apply to the role of the concept of ‘belief’ in scepticism, which I argue also takes on a non- standard role in sceptical language. I suggest that both James' and Cavell’s perspectives can benefit from engagement with one another and illuminate this through a consideration of the role which the idea of a further or higher perspective which undercuts our practice has in external world scepticism. I suggest that the significance of this perspective is recognised by both James and Cavell in different ways, but that a fuller characterisation of it illuminates the significance of scepticism within our lives and is thus essential to understanding our response to it. Here I will suggest that James’ perspective may be more helpful to the treatment of this as a genuinely intersubjective problem to which we can respond collectively, whilst Cavell’s perspective is at times perhaps overly conservative in its view of such possibilities. Here, James’ pluralism reflects a concerted attempt to work out the possibilities for such a collective response and thus lays the groundwork for a social epistemological interrogation of our capacity for rational self-authorisation. I conclude by noting how, in this context, James’ rejection of a single continuum of justification for epistemic states offers a significant contribution to conceptual resources for non-ideal epistemological theory.

This thesis provides an examination into the primary features in the theology of one of the turn of the century's leading evangelical theologians, Stanley J. Grenz. It begins by establishing the controversial nature of Grenz's project within evangelical theology, and how his aims were misread by a number of evangelical scholars. It then argues that the primary feature in his writings was the doctrine of the Trinity, giving shape to his methodology, theology, and ethical engagement. Accordingly, this thesis identifies the most significant features he adopted and adapted from Wolfhart Pannenberg, whose influence on Grenz is readily seen. These features include not only how Grenz derived particular methodological aspects from Pannenberg (chap. 2), but also those related to the shape of his trinitarian theology itself (chap. 3). Next, while realizing that Grenz's new-found emphasis on a trinitarian project was not placed on a tabula rasa, a wider account of his trinitarian background is considered (chap. 4), as is the particular developmental shape of his doctrine of the Trinity itself (chap. 5). Following this, an examination is made into how Grenz accessed this doctrine of the Trinity, through the imago Dei concept, informed by a theological hermeneutic, theological exegesis, and weaved through the traditional systematic loci (chap. 6). Finally, the shape of his trinitarian ethical work is considered in light of the overall coherence of his body of writings, both in its early form as a Christian ethic as well as in the test-cases that were part of his engagement (chap. 7). This is followed by a summary of the reception of Grenz's project, which is deemed consistent with his aims of being both a distinctly evangelical and trinitarian theologian.

Ethnographic collections in western museums such as the Royal Albert Memorial Museum (RAMM) carry many meanings, but by definition, they represent an intercultural encounter. This history of this encounter is often lost, overlooked, or obscured, and yet it has bearing on how the objects in the collection have been interpreted and understood. This thesis uncovers the hidden history of one particular collection in the RAMM and examines the multiple meanings that have been attributed to the objects in the collection over time. The Richard Dennett Collection was made in Africa in the years when European powers began to colonise the Congo basin. Richard Edward Dennett (1857-1921) worked as a trader in the Lower Congo between 1879 and 1902. The collection was accessioned by the RAMM in 1889. The research contextualises the collection by making a close analysis of primary source material which was produced by the collector and by his contemporaries, and includes publications, correspondence, photographs and illustrations which have been studied in museums and archives in Europe and North America. Dennett was personally involved with key events in the colonial history of this part of Africa but he also studied the indigenous BaKongo community, recording his observations about their political and material culture. As a result he became involved in the institutions of anthropology and folklore in Britain which were attempting to explain, classify and interpret such cultures. Through examining Dennett’s history this research has been able to explore the Congo context, the indigenous society, and those European institutions which collected and interpreted BaKongo collections. The research has added considerably to the museum’s knowledge about this collection and its collector, and the study responds to the practical imperative implicit in a Collaborative Doctoral Project, by proposing a small temporary exhibition in the RAMM to explore these histories and meanings. In making this proposal the research considers the current curatorial debate concerning responsible approaches to colonial collections, and assesses some of the strategies that are being employed in museums today.

Doctor Educationis
This thesis will investigate the narrative approach to moral formation by comparing the narrative paradigm as espoused by James H. Cone and Stanley Hauerwas and will apply the findings to post-Apartheid South Africa. I am interested in the extent to which the principles of modernity forms part of the society and the shaping of morality, yet the thesis does not focus on modernity, but on narrative as ideal ethical framework for moral formation. This thesis will look at community, narrative and agency through Stanley Hauerwas’ notion of virtue and James H. Cone’s views of black theology and oppression as means for narrative informed moral formation. This thesis is divided into three major parts. First; an investigation into narrative which includes the arguments made against modernity, narrative and history as it pertains to moral formation and how narrative is understood. Second; James H. Cone and Stanley Hauerwas’ views on narrative and moral formation followed by closer look at Cone and Hauerwas and the critiques of their views. Third; contextualising the findings in a South African context by using the findings in conjunction with South African scholars. The aims are to investigate if moral reform is possible by means of narrative ethics through justice; by means of reconciliation and transformation.

This dissertation examines the theological diversity that is currently developing within North American evangelicalism due to the growing influence of postmodernism and the resulting postconservative shift in evangelical thought. Chapter 1 begins with an initial assessment of the historical background and intellectual landscape behind the postmodern setting as well as the reasons why many evangelicals, such as Stanley J. Grenz and Kevin J. Vanhoozer, have chosen to adopt postconservative approaches to theological method. Chapter 2 then moves to a critical analysis of these two theologians by first treating the work of Stanley Grenz. This segment evaluates his proposals regarding theological method by outlining the primary ideas and factors that lead to his version of a postmodern evangelical theology. Chapter 3 subsequently offers a survey of the contrasting ideas of Kevin J. Vanhoozer. Here again, the tracing of Vanhoozer's distinct rendition of postconservatism is done by examining the major factors that are prominent within his work. Chapter 4 then provides evaluations of the strengths and weaknesses of Grenz's and Vanhoozer's thought as well as points of comparison and contrast between them. In the end, it is argued that while both thinkers share several mutual criticisms of conservative evangelicalism, Grenz's expression of postconservatism is noticeably different from Vanhoozer's. Specifically, it is shown that Grenz clearly advocates a kind of postmodern postconservatism, which entails modifications in theological method as well certain doctrinal commitments intrinsic to historic evangelicalism. Juxtaposed to Grenz, it also is argued that Vanhoozer provides a more confessional model of postconservatism because his recommendations for a new methodology still remain loyal to certain theological commitments that Grenz would deem as non-essential to the evangelical theology. Chapter 5 finally assesses the potential future effects that certain kinds of postconservative thought could have in evangelical circles. Likewise, several key elements regarding theological method that still require further attention in light of the development of postconservatism are also highlighted and discussed.
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The early stages of my research had focussed on the general idea of place as landscape in painting, centering on the Warlpiri country of the Central Desert. This perspective on place was quickly challenged by ideas of, experiences in and responses to those places I then visited as part of this research. My research eventually became an investigation into the language of painting, informed by ideas and different cultural forms and resulting in a one that has reconstructed my practice. I have explored how the contemporary language of abstract painting can engage with the experience of different cultural contexts both western and indigenous, specifically in the areas of visual art and music. Western artists I have considered are Paul Klee and Piet Mondrian, Ellsworth Kelly, Richard Long, Yves Klein, Tim Johnson and Jan Riske: the indigenous artists considered are the Martumili women of Punmu, Joe Japanangka James, Shorty Jangala and Lady Nungurrayi Robinson. My conversation has evolved using newfound elements extending and deepening my painting practice. My research has been enriched by fieldwork experiences ranging from a retrospective of Piet Mondrian’s painting in Den Hague, attending the Women’s Law and Culture Week in the Northern Territory and music performances such as John Luther Adams composition Inuksuit and Morton Feldman’s Patterns in a Chromatic Field. My early readings were very much centred on the writings of anthropologists such as Nancy Munn, Diana James, Christine Watson, Francois Dussart and Yasmine Musharbash as they provided important context to my visits to Yuendumu and my fieldwork at the Women’s Law and Culture Week. In reflecting on my practice I have been influenced and informed by writers such as Terry Smith and his revisiting of contemporaneity and connectivity in the global community; by Yve-Alain Bois’ essay on Mondrian’s painting, The Iconoclast and Maurice Merleau-Ponty regarding phenomenology and perception. Finally, The Grid as a Checkpoint of Modernity by Margarita Tupitsyn helped refine my focus, appearing to encapsulate much of what I had been thinking. I have come to recognise the phenomenological experience as key to all my responses both as observer and as artist. In particular, the aspect of my research focussing on the cultural forms of Central Desert communities, specifically painting and the performance of songs has had an expansive effect on my thinking and studio processes, contributing to a re-invention of my painting as an abstract artist.

AbstractNon-solar research at the Radiophysics Laboratory (RP) was launched in September 1946 when Joe Pawsey (1908–1962) tried unsuccessfully to observe the enigmatic ‘radio star’ in Cygnus that the British team of Stanley Hey (1909–2000, Fig. 4.1), John Parsons and James Phillips (1946) had announced in the 17 August issue of Nature. Two months later, John Bolton (1922–1993; Fig. 4.2) and research assistant Bruce Slee (1924–2016) were at Dover Heights trying to observe the Sun at 60 MHz. When it insisted on remaining inactive they decided to use their 2-Yagi antenna in sea interferometer mode to search for radio emission from other types of objects. Neither had a background in astronomy, and their astronomical knowledge and resources were virtually non-existent. Bolton (1982: 349) later described how they used the Russell, Duggan and Stewart book Astronomy to “… hazard guesses as to which types of objects might emit copious amounts of radio emission …” and Norton’s Star Atlas “… to find the position of the brightest candidate in each class.”

Abstract In his essay “The Thought of Movies,” Stanley Cavell quotes a famous passage from Henry James’s essay “The Art of Fiction”: The passage speaks of “a rather tantalising monition” and is itself “rather tantalis ing”: “feeling life,” James says, “in general so completely”; “you are well on the way to knowing”; “this cluster of gifts may almost be said”; “Try to be one of the people” [my emphases]-the aspiring novice is kept aspiring. Finding one’s experience (or not being lost to it)-corning toward it without any necessary completions-is something Cavell, like James, is tactfully alive to. When he writes of himself-”! had come to count on myself as one of the people willing not to be lost to his or to her experience”2-his “willing” expresses more than an inclination. It expresses a continuing aspiration.

Abstract In the philosophical landscape of most English-speaking philosophers, American philosophy does not exist, certainly not in the way that Greek philosophy or even post-Kantian German philosophy exists: as a tradition of thought important for much of subsequent philosophy, in which certain founding thinkers (Socrates, Plato, Kant, Hegel) set the terms for continuing discussion. The minority of professional philosophers who study or continue “American philosophy” tend to see a distinctive American tradition emerging in the writings of the pragmatists and other professional philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: C. S. Peirce, William James, Josiah Royce, George Santayana, G. H. Mead, John Dewey. It is a mark of Stanley Cavell’s originality, if also of his isolation from much of professional philosophy, that he falls into neither of these two camps. For although he seeks to “inherit” an undiscovered tradition of American thought, it is not Peirce, James, and Dewey to whom he attends, but Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau-figures whose status even as philosophers is not secure, and who have been neglected not only by Anglo-American analytic philosophers but for the most part by students of “classical American philosophy.”‘ Cavell speaks of the repression of Emerson and Thoreau by American culture generally.

Abstract The relation between religion and mental health has long been a topic of debate among psychologists. Some of the most famous names in psychological history have taken a stance on this issue. Sigmund Freud, G. Stanley Hall, B. F. Skinner, Carl Rogers, Carl Jung, and many others had much to say, both pro and con. In addition, William James (1902) noted that there are both healthy and unhealthy ways of being religious, and Gordon Allport (1950) stated that the way one is religious may have mental health implications.