Journal articles on the topic 'Islamismic constitution'
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1
Ibrahim, Abadir M. "Post-Revolutionary Islamism and the Future of Democracy and Human Rights in Egypt." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 30, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 19–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v30i4.295.
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From the backwaters of stagnation in democratization, the Arab Spring countries carried the day and became trailblazers to be replicated by activists all over the world. A couple of seasons after the initial revolution/revolt, Egyptians had transformed their political system, written themselves a constitution, and apparently destroyed the same constitution. While all sectors of society played a role in shaping the revolution, the latter has also affected society. Egypt’s 2012 constitution, one of the outcomes of the revolution, captures a moment in the process and also reflects an attempt to install an Islamist ideology in a constitutional democratic form. The constitution’s attempt to negotiate between Shari‘ah and democracy and its outline of a human rights regime make the future of democracy and human rights ambiguous, as the Islamist stance promulgated has yet to be tested in the real world of politics. As it stands today, the constitution is too ambiguous to allow one to draw a clear picture of the future of constitutional practice. What is clear, however, is that the revolution and subsequent constitution have affected the Islamist discourse about democracy and human rights.
2
Ibrahim, Abadir M. "Post-Revolutionary Islamism and the Future of Democracy and Human Rights in Egypt." American Journal of Islam and Society 30, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 19–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v30i4.295.
Full textAbstract:
From the backwaters of stagnation in democratization, the Arab Spring countries carried the day and became trailblazers to be replicated by activists all over the world. A couple of seasons after the initial revolution/revolt, Egyptians had transformed their political system, written themselves a constitution, and apparently destroyed the same constitution. While all sectors of society played a role in shaping the revolution, the latter has also affected society. Egypt’s 2012 constitution, one of the outcomes of the revolution, captures a moment in the process and also reflects an attempt to install an Islamist ideology in a constitutional democratic form. The constitution’s attempt to negotiate between Shari‘ah and democracy and its outline of a human rights regime make the future of democracy and human rights ambiguous, as the Islamist stance promulgated has yet to be tested in the real world of politics. As it stands today, the constitution is too ambiguous to allow one to draw a clear picture of the future of constitutional practice. What is clear, however, is that the revolution and subsequent constitution have affected the Islamist discourse about democracy and human rights.
3
Kırkpınar, Büşra. "Islamism in the Post-Arab Spring world." American Journal of Islam and Society 32, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 159–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v32i2.987.
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Istanbul Think-House (IDE), a self-supported independent research center thatpromotes the free circulation of ideas, analyzed “Islamism in the Post-ArabSpring World” during its October 24-26, 2014, international conference. IstanbulUniversity’s Political Science Faculty Alumni Association and the Associationfor Human Rights and Solidarity with the Oppressed (MAZLUMDER)hosted the event on their premises.In his opening remarks on Friday morning, conference co-chair and IDE’sgeneral coordinator Halil Ibrahim Yenigun (Istanbul Commerce University)introduced IDE and explained its vision of (1) producing and circulating ideaswithout depending on big capital and political power centers and (2) concentratingsolely on the good of humanity, especially that of the subaltern. IDE isthe outgrowth of national conferences on Islamism held during 2012-13, thefirst event of which had sparked an almost year-long debate in Turkey aboutthe revival of Islamism.The morning panel, “New Islamisms,” dealt with with important theoreticalarguments. Gökhan Sümer (University of Essex) began with a central debateon how to reconcile the constitutional system and the Shari‘ah bybroaching such questions as to whether democratic constitutions ensuring thebasic rights and freedoms could have been passed after the Arab Spring andwhat is Islam’s normative status in these new constitutions. He said that such ...
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Hossen, Md Ferdows. "Constitutional Chaos in Bangladesh: A Journey from Secularism to Islamism." South Asian Law Review Journal 08 (2022): 95–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.55662/salrj.2022.801.
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Every modern state stands on the separation of state and religion. Bangladesh was born as a secular state with a full guarantee of the right to freedom of religion. Though it started its journey proclaiming itself as a secular state, some political actors in the later course of history pushed the country into an almost Islamic Republic. This paper attempts to figure out what motivated the political actors to begin Islamizing the state by illustrating the chaos that arose from the constitutional modifications in question. It also argues that the basic structure doctrine and the principles of ‘Lemon Test’ turn the laws in Bangladesh, desecularizing the state, unconstitutional. It unearths the religiousness and secularity that our forefathers practiced in their daily lives long before Islam established itself on this land. It further finds the Constitutional Court of Bangladesh as the last resort to have those black laws declared unconstitutional, applying its supreme judicial review power within the current frameworks and limits of the constitution in reference to the landmark decisions of the American, Indian, and Turkish Constitutional Courts.
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Azizah, Nurul. "Islamisme: Ideologi Gerakan Kahar Mudzakkar di Sulawesi Selatan 1952-1965." JURNAL PENELITIAN KEISLAMAN 15, no. 2 (January 22, 2020): 95–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.20414/jpk.v15i2.1585.
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Abstrak: Dalam wacana Historiografi nasional Indonesia, Gerakan Kahar Mudzakkar di Sulawesi Selatan merupakan bagian dari gerakan Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) yang berpusat di Jawa Barat, meskipun dalam kenyataannya Kahar telah memulai gerakannya lebih awal sebelum dia memutuskan bergabung dengan DI/TII. Telah banyak tulisan yang membahas gerakan ini. Namun, artikel ini fokus membahas implementasi ideologi Islamisme dalam gerakan Kahar Mudzakkar. Temuan artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa Islam sebagai ideologi gerakan terwujud dalam sebuah konstitusi yang disebut Piagam Makkalua. Dia mulai mengumpulkan pajak, mendirikan organisasi, organisasi pemuda, organisasi kaum perempuan, semua atas nama negara Islam. Kahar juga memberikan penekanan-penekanan pada komunitas penganut kepercayaan lokal dan nasrani sehingga menimbulkan penolakan terhadapnya.
Title: Islamism: Ideology of the Kahar Mudzakkar Movement in South Sulawesi 1952-1965
Abstract: In Indonesian national historiography, Kahar Mudzakkar Movement in South Sulawesi is part of the Darul Islam / Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia (DI/TII) movement based in West Java, although in reality, Kahar had started his movement earlier before he decided to join DI/TII. There have been many writings that discuss this movement. However, this article focuses on discussing the implementation of the ideology of Islamism in the Kahar Mudzakkar movement. the findings of this article show that Islamism as a movement ideology is embodied in a constitution called the Makkalua Charter. He began collecting taxes, establishing organizations, youth organizations, women’s organizations, all in the name of the Islamic state. Kahar also stresses the community of local and Christian believers that causes rejection of it.
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Beke, Dirk. "La Constitution Algerienne De 1989: Une Passerelle Entre le Socialisme Et L’islamisme?" Afrika Focus 7, no. 3 (January 26, 1991): 241–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2031356x-00703004.
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The Algerian Constitution of 1989: A Bridge Between Socialism and Islamism? The riots of october 1988, the most violent uprising since independence against FLN-rule, forced president Chadli Bendjedid to accelerate and to extend the constitutional reforms announced earlier. An adaption of the constitutional law to the ongoing economic liberalization-process had become a necessity, but the popular pressure now not only asked economic changes, but also profound political reform. The new constitutional text was rapidly elaborated by a small circle of persons around the President and then submitted directly to a popular referendum. In contradiction with the procedure fixed by the previous constitution, the National Assembly was not involved nor even consulted. The constitution of 1989 generates an entirely new political regime. The word “socialism”, basis of the official doctrine since independence and largely confirmed by the provisions of the constitution of 1976, is banned completely. The new constitution also provides for the political responsibility of the Head of the Government and the members of the Government to the National People’s Assembly, and not any more to the President only. In the chapter on fundamental freedoms and the rights of man, it is explicitly provided that the State guarantees the right to form political associations. This new timorous formulation entails the end of the one-party system and the FLN’s exclusive hold on power. Some basic principles remain: Algeria is still considered a popular democratic state. Islam is the state religion and the official language is Arabic. No reference is made to the Berber language or culture. New is that the exercise of the guaranteed fundamental freedoms and rights can not be submitted any more to the imperatives of a socialist revolution. It is also stated that judges only obey to the law, they are not submitted any more to the revolutionary legality. A Constitutional Council is created to ensure that the constitution is respected but citizens have no right to submit a case, only the President and the President of the Assembly have. The tasks of the army are limited to safeguard the national independence and sovereignty,•the army has no duties any more to safeguard the socialist revolution. The introduction of a responsible Government affects the presidential powers only in a minor way. The President presides over the Council of ministers, where bills are discussed. The President can ask the Assembly for a second reading of a law and this new vote requires a two-thirds majority. Only the President has the initiative for a constitutional revision. The President chairs a number of other councils. Finally the declaration of the state of emergency is depending only on the decision of the President; this attributes him large exceptional powers. Thus, the constitution of 1989 confirms a strong presidential regime but on the other hand it has introduced a real multi-party system in Algeria. More than 20 political parties are recognised. During the local elections of 1990 the ruling FLN was defeated in most places by a massive victory of the islamic fundamentalist party, the FIS. A new electorial law, voted by the - still exclusive FLN - National Assembly beginning 1991, had to ensure a better result for the FLN during the forthcoming first free national elections. In June 1991 violent and even armed protest, organised by the fundamentalists against the law forced president Bendjedid to postpone elections, to declare the state of emergency but also to promise early presidential elections. Meanwhile many fundamentalists, and between them the main party-leaders, were arrested. The army played a crucial role in reestablishing public order and as a consequence gained more importance, but there were no signs that it exceeded its authority. Under present difficulties one wonders whether the constitution of 1989 will help to create a representative democratic multi-partyism, with an equitable liberal economy, whether it will help to open the way for a regime dominated by islamic fundamentalists?
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AĞCA-VAROĞLU, F. Güzin. "Nach dem Islamismus: Eine Ethnographie der Islamischen Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş." Turkish Journal of Diaspora Studies 1, no. 2 (September 30, 2021): 157–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.52241/tjds.2021.0028.
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Werner Schiffauer's book, After Islamism: An Ethnography of The Islamic Community Milli Görüş (IGMG), was first published by Suhrkamp Verlag in 2010 and translated to Turkish in 2021. The book consists of seven chapters and aims to give an inside view of experiences and contribute to the ethnography of Islam in Germany. The author conducted several interviews with leading actors and members of the post-Islamist generation, participated in IGMG events, and carried out long-term research between 2000 and 2009. In addition, many documents such as newspapers, interviews, police transcripts, court records, parliamentary minutes, and reports from the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) are used as objects of analysis.
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Maula, Bani Syarif. "Post-Islamisme dan Gerakan Politik Islam Dalam Sistem Demokrasi Indonesia." Al-Daulah: Jurnal Hukum dan Perundangan Islam 9, no. 1 (April 23, 2019): 90–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.15642/ad.2019.9.1.90-116.
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Indonesia is a country with a majority Muslim population that implements a democratic system. Based on this democratic system, non-muslims constitutional systems can coexist and play an active role in carrying out religious values in the public sphere as a very visible feature. Nonetheless, the relationship between Islam and the state in the course of Indonesian history always experiences ups and downs. In one period of Indonesian history, Islamic politics was a peripheral thought and movement and even considered a threat to democracy and the value of modernity, because Islamic groups struggled to maintain the ideology of Islamism with the aim of establishing an Islamic state, or at least implementing a traditional Islamic legal system to a modern Indonesian society. However, as the development of the Islamic world coincided with efforts to democratize the Indonesian state, Islamic politics also changed its direction to adjust to these conditions. Islamic groups become more accommodating to the values of democracy and modernity, without having to leave their Islamic identity. This last phenomenon is known as post-Islamism as a socio-political movement in the life of the nation and state in Indonesia.
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Ali, Jan A., and Anum Sikandar. "Jihad in Violent Islamist Paradigm." Australian Journal of Islamic Studies 5, no. 3 (December 6, 2020): 97–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.55831/ajis.v5i3.317.
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Violent Islamism is a modern sociological phenomenon with origins in the crisis of society and the negative consequences of modernity. It sees the society and the modern world steeped in a quagmire with an obscene level of wealth and power in the hands of a few and a large section of society in perpetual strife and suffering. Apart from the West in various other parts of the world there is economic stagnation, many in the society are excluding from resources revenue, and the trade and social networks being disrupted and societies torn apart with the creation of new nation states. The society has huge urban agglomerations and people in millions, especially young men and women, are either unemployed or underemployed and many feel alienated from prosperous way of life enjoyed by the urban elite and uprooted from the social fabric of the society where sense of solidarity has been pilfered away. The crisis needs to be addressed and the imbalance corrected immediately. This paper posits that violent Islamism purports to have a solution which is to totally rearrange the social, economic, and political structures of the society, Islamise the knowledge and civil and economic institutions, and establishment the Caliphate with shari'ah as its constitution. Violent Islamists are only too willing and ready to remake the world and will use any means to achieve this goal even defensive and offensive jihad as a weapon of choice.
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Ali, Jan A. "Islamic Studies in the Modern World." Australian Journal of Islamic Studies 5, no. 3 (December 6, 2020): 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.55831/ajis.v5i3.305.
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Violent Islamism is a modern sociological phenomenon with origins in the crisis of society and the negative consequences of modernity. It sees the society and the modern world steeped in a quagmire with an obscene level of wealth and power in the hands of a few and a large section of society in perpetual strife and suffering. Apart from the West in various other parts of the world there is economic stagnation, many in the society are excluding from resources revenue, and the trade and social networks being disrupted and societies torn apart with the creation of new nation states. The society has huge urban agglomerations and people in millions, especially young men and women, are either unemployed or underemployed and many feel alienated from prosperous way of life enjoyed by the urban elite and uprooted from the social fabric of the society where sense of solidarity has been pilfered away. The crisis needs to be addressed and the imbalance corrected immediately. This paper posits that violent Islamism purports to have a solution which is to totally rearrange the social, economic, and political structures of the society, Islamise the knowledge and civil and economic institutions, and establishment the Caliphate with shari'ah as its constitution. Violent Islamists are only too willing and ready to remake the world and will use any means to achieve this goal even defensive and offensive jihad as a weapon of choice.
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Czulo, Oliver, Dominic Nyhuis, and Adam Weyell. "Der Einfluss extremistischer Gewaltereignisse auf das Framing von Extremismen auf SPIEGEL Online." Journal für Medienlinguistik 3, no. 1 (October 20, 2020): 14–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.21248/jfml.2020.11.2.
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In this article, we examine the representation of right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and Islamism in the media-public discourse using the example of SPIEGEL Online, one of the leading German media. We derive four central dimensions for the conceptualization of extremisms: ideological foundation, origin of the actors, position towards society and typical actions. We observe the development of the representation of extremisms at potential breakpoints: We investigate the associative framing of the extremisms before and after a prominent extremism-related violent event, namely 9/11, the publication of the NSU scandal and left-wing extremist activities during the G20 summit. We observe changes in framing motivated by the selected events and compare the resulting framing with the current definitions of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, in order to work out possible differences in the conceptualization of extremism variants with potentially different logics of action to be expected from diverging conceptualisations.
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Czulo, Oliver, Dominic Nyhuis, and Adam Weyell. "Der Einfluss extremistischer Gewaltereignisse auf das Framing von Extremismen auf SPIEGEL Online." Journal für Medienlinguistik 3, no. 1 (October 20, 2020): 14–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.21248/jfml.2020.11.2.
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In this article, we examine the representation of right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and Islamism in the media-public discourse using the example of SPIEGEL Online, one of the leading German media. We derive four central dimensions for the conceptualization of extremisms: ideological foundation, origin of the actors, position towards society and typical actions. We observe the development of the representation of extremisms at potential breakpoints: We investigate the associative framing of the extremisms before and after a prominent extremism-related violent event, namely 9/11, the publication of the NSU scandal and left-wing extremist activities during the G20 summit. We observe changes in framing motivated by the selected events and compare the resulting framing with the current definitions of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, in order to work out possible differences in the conceptualization of extremism variants with potentially different logics of action to be expected from diverging conceptualisations.
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Sawani, Youssef Mohamed. "The ‘end of pan-Arabism’ revisited: reflections on the Arab Spring." Contemporary Arab Affairs 5, no. 3 (July 1, 2012): 382–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2012.696785.
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This article draws on implications of the Arab Spring so as to elucidate the dynamics that characterize its revolutions. The analysis builds upon the results of major public opinion surveys conducted in the Arab world, both immediately before and after the Arab Spring, in order to facilitate the identification of developments that shape the relationship between Arabism and Islamism in the context of mass media, the demographic ‘youth bulge’ and Arab ongoing intellectual debates. The argument advanced here is that the Arab Spring consolidates the view that Arabism and Islamism have maintained their position and hold on public opinion and prevailing attitudes as the primary and inseparable trends of Arab thought. The interaction and shifting relative weights of both trends provide the context for the identity, conceptual outlook and reciprocal framework of contemporary Arabs; and the Arab Spring seems only to confirm the two trends as constituting the essential point of reference and departure for Arabs. Within this context and scope of analysis this article traces the emergence of a ‘historical mass’ for change that, coupled with an indelibly engrained link between the two trends is opening up a new conceptual sphere and public space for the emergence of a new Arabism. Such development is also supported by the role of mass media and the thoughtful intellectual contributions that have been advancing a new Arab paradigm which further refutes the ‘End of Arabism’ thesis.
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Chaika, Alexander. "Moral rigorism as the idea of a “terrorist dream”." SHS Web of Conferences 72 (2019): 01017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/20197201017.
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The author describes the trends and reasons for perceiving terrorism as a narrowly criminal politicized community in the article. Terrorism is seen as a political protest, as a form of political activity of a kind of aesthetic color. The author gives a philosophical and cultural assessment of terrorism through a comparison of fascism and "igilism" as a permanent drift from terrorist muscle groups to the creation of a single and homogeneous totalitarian terrorist organization, and later on to a totalitarian-terrorist state implementing a genocide policy. Terrorist activity is compared with moral rigorism, based on the need for liberation from liberal values expressed in modern constitutional law. The idea of a "terrorist dream" is viewed through the prism of such concepts as freedom, happiness, and the ideal in which the myth of "social happiness" is presented as the ideology of modern radical Islamism.
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Tanchum, Micha’el M. "The Constitutional Consequences of the Failure of Intra-religious Accommodation in Pakistan: Implications for Religious Liberty in a Religious Nationalist State." Journal of Law, Religion and State 2, no. 1 (2013): 22–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22124810-00201002.
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This article examines how the failure to defend intra-religious accommodation from sectarian challenges in the public sphere creates structures of political opportunity for religious extremist organizations to exert a constraining influence on positive law-making and individual rights. Through a comparison of the government response to Sunni sectarian agitation during the 1950s and the early 1970s in Pakistan, each time conducted by organizations affiliated with the Deobandi movement (the movement that later created the Taliban in 1994), it will be shown how the failure to uphold intra-religious accommodation impacted the Pakistan’s constitutional development and furthered Pakistan’s shift from liberal democracy to Islamism. The article suggests that a religious discourse of intra-religious accommodation, not a prohibition of religious expression in the public sphere (laïcité), can serve as an important foundation for the development of religious liberty and civil society in newly democratizing Muslim societies.
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Çağatay, Selin. "Women’s Coalitions beyond the Laicism–Islamism Divide in Turkey: Towards an Inclusive Struggle for Gender Equality?" Social Inclusion 6, no. 4 (November 22, 2018): 48–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/si.v6i4.1546.
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In the 2010s in Turkey, the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) authoritarian-populist turn accompanied the institutionalization of political Islam. As laicism was discredited and labeled as an imposed-from-above principle of Western/Kemalist modernity, the notion of equality ceased to inform the state’s gender policies. In response to AKP’s attempts to redefine gender relations through the notions of complementarity and fıtrat (purpose of creation), women across the political spectrum have mobilized for an understanding of gender equality that transcends the laicism–Islamism divide yet maintains secularity as its constitutive principle. Analyzing three recent attempts of women’s coalition-building, this article shows that, first, gender equality activists in the 2010s are renegotiating the border between secularity and piety towards more inclusive understandings of gender equality; and second, that struggles against AKP’s gender politics are fragmented due to different configurations of gender equality and secularity that reflect class and ethnic antagonisms in Turkish society. The article thereby argues for the need to move beyond binary approaches to secularism and religion that have so far dominated the scholarly analysis of women’s activism in both Turkey and the Nordic context.
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Balkιlιç, Özgür, and Deniz Dölek. "Turkish nationalism at its beginning: Analysis of Türk Yurdu, 1913–1918." Nationalities Papers 41, no. 2 (March 2013): 316–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2012.752353.
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Turkish nationalism became an element of the Ottoman political scene in the late nineteenth century. Although its roots can be traced back to the Hamidian period (1876–1909), Turkish nationalism emerged as one of the most important political ideologies during the Constitutional Regime. Wars that the Ottoman State participated in from 1911 to the end of the empire in 1918 resulted in population and land losses. Especially, following the Balkan Wars, most of the lands that were populated by non-Muslim and non-Turkish subjects were lost. Within this context, Turkish nationalism came to be seen as the most dominant ideological tool intended to save the Empire. This article argues that Turkish nationalism emerged as a reactive ideology that addressed Ottomanism and Islamism, which were the two other dominant state ideologies during the late Ottoman State, due to the changing political context. In this article, Türk Yurdu, a well-known and influential periodical, is used as the primary source of reference to demonstrate the basic features of Turkish nationalism in its infancy.
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Vicki Dwi Purnomo and Kelik Endro Suryono. "The Collapse of the New Orde Regime Resulted in Changes in Indonesia's Economic Policy." Jurnal Pengabdian Masyarakat Formosa 1, no. 5 (December 30, 2022): 395–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.55927/jpmf.v1i5.2230.
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The reform era or the post-Suharto era in Indonesia began in 1998, to be precise when President Soeharto resigned on May 21 1998 and was replaced by the then vice president, BJ Habibie . This period was founded bya more open socio-political environment. Issues during this period included the push for democracy and a stronger civilian government, elements of the military trying to maintain influence, growing Islamism in politics and society in general, and demands for greater regional autonomy . The reform process resulted in a higher degree of freedom of speech , in contrast to the widespread censorship during the New Order . As a result, political debate has become more open in the mass media and artistic expression has increased. Events that have shaped Indonesia in this period include a series of terrorist incidents (including the 2002 Bali bombings ) and the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami . Using the knife of deconstruction of critical legal theory and socio-legal methodology with statutory, historical, conceptual and legal political economy approaches, three questions are raised, firstly the role of law in the market reform agenda which underlies the idea of limiting the role of the state in the economy; second, how is the role of the state in the economy being debated in the MPR and; third, what are the implications of the market reform agenda for the results of changes to the economic constitution.
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ROBINSON, FRANCIS. "Islamic Reform and Modernities in South Asia." Modern Asian Studies 42, no. 2-3 (March 2008): 259–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x07002922.
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From the beginning of the Islamic era, Muslim societies have experienced periods of renewal (tajdid). Since the eighteenth century, Muslim societies across the world have been subject to a prolonged and increasingly deeply felt process of renewal. This has been expressed in different ways in different contexts. Amongst political elites with immediate concerns to answer the challenges of the West, it has meant attempts to reshape Islamic knowledge and institutions in the light of Western models, a process described as Islamic modernism. Amongst ‘ulama and sufis, whose social base might lie in urban, commercial or tribal communities, it has meant ‘the reorganisation of communities . . . [or] the reform of individual behavior in terms of fundamental religious principles’, a development known as reformism. These processes have been expressed in movements as different as the Iranian constitutional revolution, thejihadsof West Africa, and the great drives to spread reformed Islamic knowledge in India and Indonesia. In the second half of the twentieth century, the process of renewal mutated to develop a new strand, which claimed that revelation had the right to control all human experiences and that state power must be sought to achieve this end. This is known to many as Islamic fundamentalism, but is usually better understood as Islamism. For the majority of Muslims today, Islamic renewal in some shape or other has helped to mould the inner and outer realities of their lives.
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Wahyudi Joko Santoso, Bernadus, Mohamad Yusuf Ahmad Hasyim, Maria Johana Ari Widayanti, and Eko Widianto. "REPRESENTATION OF SOCIAL ACTORS IN REPUBLIKA.CO.ID AFTER INAUGURATION OF MOCHAMAD IRIAWAN AS ACTING OF WEST JAVA GOVERNOR, INDONESIA." Linguistik Indonesia 40, no. 2 (August 2, 2022): 245–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.26499/li.v40i2.264.
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The purpose of this study is to investigate social actors' representation on the inauguration of Acting Governor in West Java 2018, from Ahmad Heryawan (Aher), representing the Right Islamic Party, to Commissioner General Mochamad Iriawan (Iwan), representing the Nationalist Party, in the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) Theo van Leeuwen model (2008). Method of data collection were the method of reading, namely the intensive and comprehensive reading. We read the social actor’s representations that were represented in mass media online: Republika.co.id during 3 days of news, on 18, 19, and 20 of June 2018 where there was a lot of polemics over the Irawan’s inauguration. The Republika.co.id was more inclined than supported the inauguration, though according to Indonesian Government, it was legal because in that moment Irawan was as Main Secretary of the National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas), not as an active Chief of Police in Special Capital Region, Jakarta. The data were obtained by copying-paste technique. The analytical methods used were descriptions, interpretations, and explanations. The results of the analysis showed that all pro-government social actors, both in government and "outside the government", supported Irawan's inauguration as acting governor of West Java. On the other hand, social actors who did not support the inauguration are reported as social actors who obey the constitution, educate the people, encourage honesty, uphold democracy and so on. That was why, Irawan's inauguration as acting governor in West Java was reported negatively, such as unconstitutional inauguration, fooling people, violating democracy, public deception, and so on. The difference of the social actors’ representation above was undeniable due to differences in the ideology (nationalism versus Islamism) and political interest ahead of the presidential election last year, in 2019. Thus, it proves that the study of CDA perspective can show us the relationship between language use (discourse), ideology, ‘hidden’ power and also discourse and social practice.
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Al-Arian, Abdullah. "Islamist Movements and the Arab Spring." ICR Journal 9, no. 4 (October 16, 2018): 47–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.52282/icr.v9i4.94.
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The Arab uprisings of 2011, popularly known as the Arab Spring, were first initiated by a broad range of movements shaped primarily by a non-ideological sense of civic identity. As the uprisings gained momentum, however, Islamist groups were able to utilise their organisational strength and mobilisation capabilities to position themselves at the centre of this watershed moment in modern Middle Eastern history. This article examines the role Islamism came to play in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, notably in the reformulation of the norms of regional governance as authoritarian rule appeared poised to be replaced by a system rooted in democratic legitimacy, independent institutions, and a redefined relationship between the state and its citizens. The article begins with a consideration of the evolution of political Islam in the Arab world, from its origins as a significant social movement actor to its various attempts at political engagement with the state. The articlethen proceeds to a more explicit examine of both political Islams role in the Arab Spring and its apparent intentions for the post-authoritarian order. It is argued that, since the Arab uprisings took place, many Islamist groups have abandoned abstract slogans in favour of coherent political platforms concerned with, amongst other things, the role of Islam in a revised constitution and determining the powers and responsibilities of state institutions. Looking ahead to long-term trends, the interpretation of Shariah, understanding the nature of the civil state, and the shape of democratic participation appear set to become crucial issues within Islamist discourse. The realities of rule, requiring pragmatism and compromise, will almost certainly challenge the ideological orientation of political Islam in the coming years, as Islamists come to realise that political survival is predicated not on ideological purity but on practical results.
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Wiater, Patricia. "Zur Reversibilität von Rechtsfolgen einer vorsorgenden Sicherheitspolitik." Die Verwaltung 52, no. 3 (July 1, 2019): 359–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.3790/verw.52.3.359.
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Since the terrorist attack on Berlin’s Breitscheidplatz took place in December 2016, German state interior ministries deport potential top terrorists in the accelerated procedure under section 58a Residence Act (AufenthG). As a legal consequence, section 11(5) Residence Act imposes a lifelong entry ban to foreigners who have been deported on the basis of § 58a Residence Act. In defining the requirements for deporting potential top terrorists, the ministries do not refer to the foreseeability of a concrete terrorist attack, but to the risk arising from the person concerned. Consequently, deportation orders can also be issued to persons who, although identifying with radical extremist Islamism, would not have committed terrorist attacks in case they had stayed in Germany. This practice of accepting misjudgements, that is of deporting „the wrong“, for the sake of public security forms part of the broader concept of fighting terrorism pre-emptively. The paper reveals that there is a twofold need for reform of the German lifelong entry ban for potential top-terrorists: It arises, on the one hand, from the fact that section 11 Residence Act violates EU law requirements of the „Return Directive“ and, on the other hand, from the constitutional principle of proportionality. De lege lata, this principle is infringed because the legal consequence of a lifelong entry ban does not mitigate the deliberate acceptance of misjudgements within the framework of section 58a Residence Act. The paper argues that the constitutionality of pre-emptive security policy presupposes that the factual and legal consequences of misjudgements are reversible. As a consequence, the constitutionality of section 11 Residence Act with regards to potential top terrorists depends on setting time limits on entry bans.
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Fadel, Mohammad. "Political Legitimacy, Democracy and Islamic Law: The Place of Self‐Government in Islamic Political Thought." Journal of Islamic Ethics 2, no. 1-2 (November 15, 2018): 59–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24685542-12340015.
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Abstract Contemporary Political Islam, or Islamism, is commonly defined as a movement that seeks to apply the Sharīʿa as the basic law of Muslim states. This suggests that political legitimacy in Islamic thought can be reduced to the conformity of a polity’s actions to a pre-determined body of rules that are supplied by revelation, as supplemented by the interpretations of jurists. Such a demand is reasonably understood to be non-democratic because it includes no room for self-government by making it either redundant, if it produces results that are in conformity with the norms of the Sharīʿa, or contradictory to self-government, if the results of self-government differ from revealed norms. I argue instead that Islamic constitutional theory and political thought provide explicit grounds for self-government based on a conception of the state that is grounded in the ideals of agency and fiduciary duties rather than conformity with the pre-determined substantive norms of revelation simpliciter. On this account, self-government is essential to political legitimacy because the legitimacy of the ruler’s decisions can only be understood from the perspective of whether the people, as the principal who authorized the agent (i.e., the government), approves of the government’s conduct, or can reasonably be understood to approve of the government’s conduct. This has important implications for understanding how a state can, consistent with self-government, incorporate the Sharīʿa and its values in its legislative system. Far from imposing particular outcomes, in most cases, the rules of the Sharīʿa will only present options for how public law may be made, while giving the public the freedom, through the exercise of its collective deliberation, to choose how it operationalizes various provisions and values of the Sharīʿa in positive law in relation to its own determination of its own rational good (maṣlaḥa).
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Bandžović, Sead. "Transformation of the State and Law in Iran after the Iranian Revolutionin 1979." Historijski pogledi 4, no. 5 (May 31, 2021): 146–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.52259/historijskipogledi.2021.4.5.146.
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With the overthrow of the regime of Reza Pahlavi in 1979, the Iranian revolution ended the existence of the 2,500-year-old Persian Empire and built the Islamic Republic of Iran on its foundations. The revolution was the product of three independent social structures that merged at one point. One was the structure of constitutionalism that grew out of a century-long struggle for democracy supported by modernists; the second was Islamism as a movement to set Sharia law as the primary law supported by rural elements in society in response to Western urban elites and accepted by merchants; and the third is the nationalist structure, driven by rage fueled by Iran's long subordination to European powers. The basic principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran, proclaimed by the new constitution from 1979, is the positioning of God as the supreme bearer of people's sovereignty and people who are only marginal representatives of his power on Earth. Ayatollah Homenini, the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution and the Iranian state, in this regard created a thesis about the Islamic State as a political representation, created on the basis of the people's will, in order to enforce God's laws. In practice, such system meant setting up Sharia (religious) laws as the only source of law in regulating social, legal and other relations within the community. A dichotomy has been created in the management of the state, so there are two groups of authorities. The first, the conciliar, consists of the Supreme leader, the Council of Guardians (Shora-ye Negahban-e Qanun-e assassi), the Council of Experts (Majles-e Khobragan Rahbari) and the Judgment Council. The task of these councils is to oversee the activities of all levels of government in order to preserve the unity, sovereignty and integrity of the Iranian political system. The conciliar government supervises and advises the republican part of the government, ie. its legislative, executive and judicial aspects. In addition to conciliar government, there is a republican government that creates laws and political decisions in accordance with religious teachings and under the supervision of theocratic political institutions. All laws and court decisions must be based on the principles of the Qur'an, and their proper interpretation requires an understanding of religious principles. On the basis of the constitution, a special High Judicial Council was established, which amended the pre-revolutionary laws (criminal, commercial, civil and procedural), thus creating the so-called “Transitional law”. The biggest changes affected the area of criminal law, where the principle of talion revenge was introduced (“an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”) and the strict punishment of extramarital relations and same-sex relationships. In the domain of marital and family law, a man is given a number of rights, thus putting the woman, as a marital partner, in a more unequal position. Husbands were facilitated in divorce, temporary marriages with more than one woman were allowed, while on the other hand women were allowed the right to divorce only if it was explicitly allowed by her husband during the marriage. The revolution also introduced new sources in the regulation of legal relations. Thus, by an order of the Supreme Judicial Council of 23 August 1982, judges were ordered to use direct authoritative Islamic texts or sources on which to base their judgments in resolving disputes. Judges are required by this Order to address the Council of Guardians of the Constitution if they cannot determine with certainty whether a regulation is in accordance with Sharia law or not. If the judge does not know which law to apply, he must contact the Office of Ayatollah Khomeini for further instructions. In addition to the internal one, the revolution caused radical changes in the foreign policy field, positioning Iran as an important participant in numerous international processes at the regional and global level.
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Zhigulskaya, Darya. "The “Turkish Ideal” in the Philosophy of Ziya Gökalp." Ideas and Ideals 13, no. 2-2 (June 15, 2021): 340–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.17212/2075-0862-2021-13.2.2-340-350.
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Topic: The philosophy and views on the process of nation building of Ziya Gökalp – the revolutionary ideologist of Turkish nationalism and one of the founding fathers of Kemalism, who played a key role in the articulation of Turkish national identity in the early 20th century. It is hard to overestimate his impact on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: the founder of the Turkish Republic described Gökalp as the “father of my thoughts”. Gökalp’s ideas come together in the concept of the “Turkish ideal” or “mefkure” (Turk. mefkûre). The principle of “mefkure” was subsequently adopted by the majority of nationalist thinkers. Methodology: Contextual analysis of sources on the research topic; historical comparativism; synthesis and generalization of factual material. Results of the study: Ziya Gökalp’s ideas were focused on the transition from the multinational Ottoman state to a national state and the promulgation of the Turkish Republic. They were largely derived from the philosophy of Émile Durkheim, including idealist epistemology, positivist methodology and solidarist corporatism - together known as positivist idealism. Gökalp’s ideas can be summarized as cultural Turkism, ethical Islamism and Durkheimian solidarism. Gökalp succeeded in synthesizing different philosophical approaches, while avoiding eclectic mixing of ideas. Conclusions: Gökalp’s nationalism was heavily influenced by the West, though he tried to withstand this influence. The romantic principle of the “Turkish ideal” largely reiterates the concept of Volksgeist (German: “spirit of the people”) characteristic of German nationalism. Gökalp’s works clearly illustrate one of the key internal problems of Turkish nationalism – the question of how to restore national self-respect, which had been undermined by the prolonged decline of the Ottoman state and its stature in the eyes of the West. Gökalp’s philosophy clearly links the Young Turk ideology with the Atatürk regime. But in the course of his life, Gökalp’s views underwent significant changes, as he gradually turned away from the principles of the 1908-1909 revolution (constitutional monarchy, Ottomanism, Islamic reformism etc.) and laid the theoretical foundations of Kemalism and the modern Turkish state.
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Mostari, Hind Amel. "A sociolinguistic perspective on Arabisation and language use in Algeria." Language Problems and Language Planning 28, no. 1 (June 10, 2004): 25–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/lplp.28.1.04mos.
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The Algerian National Constitution stipulates that Classical Arabic is the only official language of the nation, which is supposedly used by all members of the speech community. French is regarded as a foreign language and is taught starting from the fourth year of the primary level. The Algerian diglossic situation is characterized by the use of Classical Arabic and French as high varieties used in formal and public domains, and colloquial dialects, namely Algerian Arabic and Berber, as low varieties for informal and intimate situations. In public domains, Classical Arabic is present virtually everywhere and used (especially at the written level) in varying degrees. In some domains, such as education or the physical environment, Classical Arabic dominates; in other domains such as the economy, Classical Arabic is used in parallel with French. This linguistic reality is primarily the outcome of many years of intensive campaigns of Arabisation and major political and even financial decisions, beginning right after independence, aimed at promoting the status of Classical Arabic and giving to Algeria its Arabo-Muslim identity. The present paper examines the process and outcomes of Arabisation and its effects on language use, providing a brief historical sketch of the Arabisation process in various domains, including its application in public life, notably in administration, the physical environment and education. The Arabisation process has touched practically all spheres of public life previously characterized by the sole use of the French language. Also discussed is the impact of Arabisation on language use at the institutional and individual levels. The impact of Arabisation has been significant in some domains, namely education and the physical environment, but less evident in others, such as in university studies, especially in scientific and medical departments, where French remains the main medium of instruction and communication. The paper also encompasses a brief survey of the linguistic rights of Berbers under the Arabisation process, and at the same time it also attempts to address the issue of the Arabisation process in relation to other concepts, notably Islam and Islamism; ‘Arabisation’ does not mean ‘Islamisation.’ Finally, the results of the Arabisation campaigns are analyzed and critiqued. Arabisation has faced many criticisms, among them paucity of human and financial means, as well as the lack of a coherent strategy of implementation in which the political and sociolinguistic realities of the Algerian speech community are taken into consideration.
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Barton, Greg, Ihsan Yilmaz, and Nicholas Morieson. "Authoritarianism, Democracy, Islamic Movements and Contestations of Islamic Religious Ideas in Indonesia." Religions 12, no. 8 (August 13, 2021): 641. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel12080641.
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Since independence, Islamic civil society groups and intellectuals have played a vital role in Indonesian politics. This paper seeks to chart the contestation of Islamic religious ideas in Indonesian politics and society throughout the 20th Century, from the declaration of independence in 1945 up until 2001. This paper discusses the social and political influence of, and relationships between, three major Indonesian Islamic intellectual streams: Modernists, Traditionalists, and neo-Modernists. It describes the intellectual roots of each of these Islamic movements, their relationships with the civil Islamic groups Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), their influence upon Indonesian politics, and their interactions with the state. The paper examines the ways in which mainstream Islamic politics in Indonesia, the world’s largest majority Muslim nation, has been shaped by disagreements between modernists and traditionalists, beginning in the early 1950s. Disagreements resulted in a schism within Masyumi, the dominant Islamic party, that saw the traditionalists affiliated with NU leave to establish a separate NU party. Not only did this prevent Masyumi from coming close to garnering a majority of the votes in the 1955 election, but it also contributed to Masyumi veering into Islamism. This conservative turn coincided with elite contestation to define Indonesia as an Islamic state and was a factor in the party antagonizing President Sukarno to the point that he moved to ban it. The banning of Masyumi came as Sukarno imposed ‘guided democracy’ as a soft-authoritarian alternative to democracy and set in train dynamics that facilitated the emergence of military-backed authoritarianism under Suharto. During the four decades in which democracy was suppressed in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, and associated NGOs, activists, and intellectuals were the backbones of civil society. They provided critical support for the non-sectarian principles at the heart of the Indonesian constitution, known as Pancasila. This found the strongest and clearest articulation in the neo-Modernist movement that emerged in the 1980s and synthesized key elements of traditionalist Islamic scholarship and Modernist reformism. Neo-Modernism, which was articulated by leading Islamic intellectual Nurcholish Madjid and Nahdlatul Ulama Chairman Abdurrahman Wahid, presents an open, inclusive, progressive understanding of Islam that is affirming of social pluralism, comfortable with modernity, and stresses the need for tolerance and harmony in inter-communal relations. Its articulation by Wahid, who later became president of Indonesia, contributed to Indonesia’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The vital contribution of neo-Modernist Islam to democracy and reform in Indonesia serves to refute the notion that Islam is incompatible with democracy and pluralism.
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Hirschkind, Charles. "Heresy or Hermeneutics." American Journal of Islam and Society 12, no. 4 (January 1, 1995): 463–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v12i4.2366.
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Islam/IslamismThe debate I shall discuss here arose following Cairo University'sdecision to refuse tenure to a professor of Arabic language and literature,Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, in light of an unfavorable report by the tenurecommittee entrusted to review his scholarly work. Supporters of Abu Zaydquickly brought the case to national attention via the Egyptian press, therebyprecipitating a storm of often shrill writing from all sides of the politicalspectrum, in both the journalistic and academic media. Subsequently,as an Islamist lawyer tried to have Abu Zayd forcibly divorced from hiswife on the grounds that his writings revealed him to be an apostate, theforeign media also picked up the story and transformed the case into aninternational event.In what follows, I will focus on one comer of this debate concerningcontrastive notions of reason and history, issues which, I wish to argue, areimplicated deeply in the forms of political contestation and mobilizationoccurring in Islamic countries today. Such topics seldom appear in discussionsthat take Islamic movements or Islamic revival as their object, anomission perhaps attributable to the conceptual frames informing these discussions.As we may note, the idea of a social movement presupposes aself-constituting subject, independent from both state and tradition: a uni-linear progressive teleology; and a pragmatics of proximate goals, namely,the spatiotemporal plane of universal reason and progressive history, thetemtory of modem humanity. Such an actor must fulfill the Kantiandemand that reason be exercised autonomously and embodied in a sovereignsubject. In contrast, one may argue that the protagonist of a traditionof inquiry founded on a divine text is necessarily a collective subject, onethat seeks to preserve and enhance its own exemplary past. As such, Islamnever satisfies these modem demands and thus must always remain somewhatoutside the movement of history as a lesser form of reasoning. Indeed,the assumption of a fundamental opposition between reason and religion,an assumption that is central to the historical development of both modemconcepts during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, has meant thatinvestigations into the rationalities of religious traditions have rarely beenviewed as essential to the description or explanation of those religions.’Consequently, to pose a question in regard to Islam generally means thatone must either be asking about politics (the not-really-Islam of“Islamism,” or “political Islam”) or about belief, symbols, ritual, and so on,but not about styles of reasoning.We find, for example, that within political economy discussions ofoppositional movements in the Middle East, Islam is viewed generally aslittle more than the culturally preferred idiom through which opposition,be it class or otherwise, may be expressed.* Unquestionably, the best ofthese studies have told us much about the kinds of material conditions andthe specific intersections of capital and power that have enabled, orundermined, arguments, movements, forms of practice, including, amongothers, Islamic ones.’ Founded upon the same set of Enlightenmentassumptions mentioned above, these writings have provided conflictingaccounts of the kinds of modem forces transforming the contemporarypolitical structures of the Middle East but are ill-equipped when it comesto analyzing those dimensions of social and political life rooted in nonwesterntraditions ...
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Beke, Dirk. "The Algerian Constitution of 1989: a Bridge between Socialism and Islamism?" Afrika Focus 7, no. 3 (September 13, 1991). http://dx.doi.org/10.21825/af.v7i3.6120.
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The riots of October 1988, the most violent uprising since independence against FLN-rule, forced president Chadli Bendjedid to accelerate and to extend the constitutional reforms announced earlier. An adaption of the constitutional law to the ongoing economic liberalization-process had become a necessity, but the popular pressure now not only asked economic changes, but also profound political reform. The new constitutional text was rapidly elaborated by a small circle of persons around the President and then submitted directly to a popular referendum. In contradiction with the procedure fixed by the previous constitution, the National Assembly was not involved nor even consulted. The constitution of 1989 generates an entirely new political regime. The word "socialism", basis of the official doctrine since independence and largely confirmed by the provisions of the constitution of 1976, is banned completely. The new constitution also provides for the political responsibility of the Head of the Government and the members of the Government to the National People's Assembly, and not any more to the President only. In the chapter on fundamental freedoms and the rights of man, it is explicitly provided that the State guarantees the right to form political associations. This new timorous formulation entails the end of the one-party system and the FLN's exclusive hold on power.Some basic principles remain: Algeria is still considered a popular democratic state. Islam is the state religion and the official language is Arabic. No reference is made to the Berber language or culture. New is that the exercise of the guaranteed fundamental freedoms and rights can not be submitted any more to the imperatives of a socialist revolution. It is also stated that judges only obey to the law, they are not submitted any more to the revolutionary legality. A Constitutional Council is created to ensure that the constitution is respected but citizens have no right to submit a case, only the President and the President of the Assembly have. The tasks of the army are limited to safeguard the national independence and sovereignty; the army has no duties any more to safeguard the socialist revolution. The introduction of a responsible Government affects the presidential powers only in a minor way. The President presides over the Council of ministers, where bills are discussed. The President can ask the Assembly for a second reading of a law and this new vote requires a two-thirds majority. Only the President has the initiative for a constitutional revision. The President chairs a number of other councils. Finally the declaration of the state of emergency is depending only on the decision of the President; this attributes him large exceptional powers. Thus, the constitution of 1989 confirms a strong presidential regime but on the other hand it has introduced a real multi-party system in Algeria. More than 20 political parties are recognised. During the local elections of1990 the ruling FLN was defeated in most places by a massive victory of the islamic fundamentalist party, the FIS. A new electorial law, voted by the - still exclusive FLN - National Assembly beginning 1991, had to ensure a better result for the FLN during the forthcoming first free national elections. In June 1991 violent and even armed protest, organised by the fundamentalists against the law forced president Bendjedid to postpone elections, to declare the state of emergency but also to promise early presidential elections. Meanwhile many fundamentalists, and between them the main party-leaders, were arrested. The army played a crucial role in re- establishing public order and as a consequence gained more importance, but there were no signs that it exceeded its authority. Under present difficulties one wonders whether the constitution of 1989 will help to create a representative democratic multi-partyism, with an equitable liberal economy, whether it will help to open the way for a regime dominated by islamic fundamentalists?KEY WORDS: Algeria, constitution, internal politics
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GÜNDOĞDU, Şenol. "Turkism criticism of Islamism in the Second Constitutional period." İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, August 12, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.33707/akuiibfd.1118900.
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This study focuses on the relationship between Islamism and Turkism which are two important movements of the Second Constitutional Period, in the context of nation and nationalism concepts. Islamists and Turkists, who gathered around Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad which is the foremost Islamist journal of the period, dissented because of different nationalism mentalities after 1912. The Islamist movement pursues the idea of society in which the Islamic identity is at the forefront for the salvation of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand Turkisim defends idea of salvation in which Muslim identity is a part of Turkishness, but Turkish identity is dominant. Therefore the main reason of the divergency between two movements is the dissociated nation understandings. The focus of this study will be to discuss the Islamist side of the aforementioned divergency. In order to do this, articles in the Sırat-ı Müstakim-Sebilürreşad journal regarding the issue of nation and nationalism were examined within the scope of Turkism criticism. Although the ideology of Islamism, built on the principle of reviving and strengthening Islam, criticizes ethnic nationalisms in particular, in the final analysis, it adopts a nationalist attitude by nationalizing the pre-modern idea of ummah.
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Steuer, Clément. "“Like Sugar in Tea”." Archiv orientální. Supplementa. 12 (December 4, 2020). http://dx.doi.org/10.47979/aror.s.2020.xii.59.
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This article examines how, in a context of conflicting identities and collapsing states throughout the Middle East, the model of an Egyptian nation-state has—conversely—been reinforced during the recent revolutionary and counter-revolutionary waves. At first, the liberation of speech during the “Arab Spring” period of 2011–2013 allowed the public expression of competing models (pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism, Coptic ethno-nationalism, regionalism) of imagined communities. At the same time, however, the national flag became the most widespread symbol of the revolution, appropriated by all the political actors, from the leftists to the Salafis. Since 2013, the expression of diverging conceptions of identity within the political field has become impossible. Thus, the affirmation of alternative models of identity has occasionally taken a violent path, especially in the North-Sinai region, where regionalist feelings meet the pan-Islamism of insurgent jihadi movements. Simultaneously, the state has been trying to co-opt some of the most prominent identities, with a first official recognition of the Nubian culture within the 2014 Constitution, and with the adoption of a quota for Coptic candidates in the Parliament and local councils.