Academic literature on the topic 'Islamismic constitution'

From the backwaters of stagnation in democratization, the Arab Spring countries carried the day and became trailblazers to be replicated by activists all over the world. A couple of seasons after the initial revolution/revolt, Egyptians had transformed their political system, written themselves a constitution, and apparently destroyed the same constitution. While all sectors of society played a role in shaping the revolution, the latter has also affected society. Egypt’s 2012 constitution, one of the outcomes of the revolution, captures a moment in the process and also reflects an attempt to install an Islamist ideology in a constitutional democratic form. The constitution’s attempt to negotiate between Shari‘ah and democracy and its outline of a human rights regime make the future of democracy and human rights ambiguous, as the Islamist stance promulgated has yet to be tested in the real world of politics. As it stands today, the constitution is too ambiguous to allow one to draw a clear picture of the future of constitutional practice. What is clear, however, is that the revolution and subsequent constitution have affected the Islamist discourse about democracy and human rights.

From the backwaters of stagnation in democratization, the Arab Spring countries carried the day and became trailblazers to be replicated by activists all over the world. A couple of seasons after the initial revolution/revolt, Egyptians had transformed their political system, written themselves a constitution, and apparently destroyed the same constitution. While all sectors of society played a role in shaping the revolution, the latter has also affected society. Egypt’s 2012 constitution, one of the outcomes of the revolution, captures a moment in the process and also reflects an attempt to install an Islamist ideology in a constitutional democratic form. The constitution’s attempt to negotiate between Shari‘ah and democracy and its outline of a human rights regime make the future of democracy and human rights ambiguous, as the Islamist stance promulgated has yet to be tested in the real world of politics. As it stands today, the constitution is too ambiguous to allow one to draw a clear picture of the future of constitutional practice. What is clear, however, is that the revolution and subsequent constitution have affected the Islamist discourse about democracy and human rights.

Istanbul Think-House (IDE), a self-supported independent research center thatpromotes the free circulation of ideas, analyzed “Islamism in the Post-ArabSpring World” during its October 24-26, 2014, international conference. IstanbulUniversity’s Political Science Faculty Alumni Association and the Associationfor Human Rights and Solidarity with the Oppressed (MAZLUMDER)hosted the event on their premises.In his opening remarks on Friday morning, conference co-chair and IDE’sgeneral coordinator Halil Ibrahim Yenigun (Istanbul Commerce University)introduced IDE and explained its vision of (1) producing and circulating ideaswithout depending on big capital and political power centers and (2) concentratingsolely on the good of humanity, especially that of the subaltern. IDE isthe outgrowth of national conferences on Islamism held during 2012-13, thefirst event of which had sparked an almost year-long debate in Turkey aboutthe revival of Islamism.The morning panel, “New Islamisms,” dealt with with important theoreticalarguments. Gökhan Sümer (University of Essex) began with a central debateon how to reconcile the constitutional system and the Shari‘ah bybroaching such questions as to whether democratic constitutions ensuring thebasic rights and freedoms could have been passed after the Arab Spring andwhat is Islam’s normative status in these new constitutions. He said that such ...

Every modern state stands on the separation of state and religion. Bangladesh was born as a secular state with a full guarantee of the right to freedom of religion. Though it started its journey proclaiming itself as a secular state, some political actors in the later course of history pushed the country into an almost Islamic Republic. This paper attempts to figure out what motivated the political actors to begin Islamizing the state by illustrating the chaos that arose from the constitutional modifications in question. It also argues that the basic structure doctrine and the principles of ‘Lemon Test’ turn the laws in Bangladesh, desecularizing the state, unconstitutional. It unearths the religiousness and secularity that our forefathers practiced in their daily lives long before Islam established itself on this land. It further finds the Constitutional Court of Bangladesh as the last resort to have those black laws declared unconstitutional, applying its supreme judicial review power within the current frameworks and limits of the constitution in reference to the landmark decisions of the American, Indian, and Turkish Constitutional Courts.

Abstrak: Dalam wacana Historiografi nasional Indonesia, Gerakan Kahar Mudzakkar di Sulawesi Selatan merupakan bagian dari gerakan Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) yang berpusat di Jawa Barat, meskipun dalam kenyataannya Kahar telah memulai gerakannya lebih awal sebelum dia memutuskan bergabung dengan DI/TII. Telah banyak tulisan yang membahas gerakan ini. Namun, artikel ini fokus membahas implementasi ideologi Islamisme dalam gerakan Kahar Mudzakkar. Temuan artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa Islam sebagai ideologi gerakan terwujud dalam sebuah konstitusi yang disebut Piagam Makkalua. Dia mulai mengumpulkan pajak, mendirikan organisasi, organisasi pemuda, organisasi kaum perempuan, semua atas nama negara Islam. Kahar juga memberikan penekanan-penekanan pada komunitas penganut kepercayaan lokal dan nasrani sehingga menimbulkan penolakan terhadapnya. Title: Islamism: Ideology of the Kahar Mudzakkar Movement in South Sulawesi 1952-1965 Abstract: In Indonesian national historiography, Kahar Mudzakkar Movement in South Sulawesi is part of the Darul Islam / Islamic Armed Forces of Indonesia (DI/TII) movement based in West Java, although in reality, Kahar had started his movement earlier before he decided to join DI/TII. There have been many writings that discuss this movement. However, this article focuses on discussing the implementation of the ideology of Islamism in the Kahar Mudzakkar movement. the findings of this article show that Islamism as a movement ideology is embodied in a constitution called the Makkalua Charter. He began collecting taxes, establishing organizations, youth organizations, women’s organizations, all in the name of the Islamic state. Kahar also stresses the community of local and Christian believers that causes rejection of it.

The Algerian Constitution of 1989: A Bridge Between Socialism and Islamism? The riots of october 1988, the most violent uprising since independence against FLN-rule, forced president Chadli Bendjedid to accelerate and to extend the constitutional reforms announced earlier. An adaption of the constitutional law to the ongoing economic liberalization-process had become a necessity, but the popular pressure now not only asked economic changes, but also profound political reform. The new constitutional text was rapidly elaborated by a small circle of persons around the President and then submitted directly to a popular referendum. In contradiction with the procedure fixed by the previous constitution, the National Assembly was not involved nor even consulted. The constitution of 1989 generates an entirely new political regime. The word “socialism”, basis of the official doctrine since independence and largely confirmed by the provisions of the constitution of 1976, is banned completely. The new constitution also provides for the political responsibility of the Head of the Government and the members of the Government to the National People’s Assembly, and not any more to the President only. In the chapter on fundamental freedoms and the rights of man, it is explicitly provided that the State guarantees the right to form political associations. This new timorous formulation entails the end of the one-party system and the FLN’s exclusive hold on power. Some basic principles remain: Algeria is still considered a popular democratic state. Islam is the state religion and the official language is Arabic. No reference is made to the Berber language or culture. New is that the exercise of the guaranteed fundamental freedoms and rights can not be submitted any more to the imperatives of a socialist revolution. It is also stated that judges only obey to the law, they are not submitted any more to the revolutionary legality. A Constitutional Council is created to ensure that the constitution is respected but citizens have no right to submit a case, only the President and the President of the Assembly have. The tasks of the army are limited to safeguard the national independence and sovereignty,•the army has no duties any more to safeguard the socialist revolution. The introduction of a responsible Government affects the presidential powers only in a minor way. The President presides over the Council of ministers, where bills are discussed. The President can ask the Assembly for a second reading of a law and this new vote requires a two-thirds majority. Only the President has the initiative for a constitutional revision. The President chairs a number of other councils. Finally the declaration of the state of emergency is depending only on the decision of the President; this attributes him large exceptional powers. Thus, the constitution of 1989 confirms a strong presidential regime but on the other hand it has introduced a real multi-party system in Algeria. More than 20 political parties are recognised. During the local elections of 1990 the ruling FLN was defeated in most places by a massive victory of the islamic fundamentalist party, the FIS. A new electorial law, voted by the - still exclusive FLN - National Assembly beginning 1991, had to ensure a better result for the FLN during the forthcoming first free national elections. In June 1991 violent and even armed protest, organised by the fundamentalists against the law forced president Bendjedid to postpone elections, to declare the state of emergency but also to promise early presidential elections. Meanwhile many fundamentalists, and between them the main party-leaders, were arrested. The army played a crucial role in reestablishing public order and as a consequence gained more importance, but there were no signs that it exceeded its authority. Under present difficulties one wonders whether the constitution of 1989 will help to create a representative democratic multi-partyism, with an equitable liberal economy, whether it will help to open the way for a regime dominated by islamic fundamentalists?

Werner Schiffauer's book, After Islamism: An Ethnography of The Islamic Community Milli Görüş (IGMG), was first published by Suhrkamp Verlag in 2010 and translated to Turkish in 2021. The book consists of seven chapters and aims to give an inside view of experiences and contribute to the ethnography of Islam in Germany. The author conducted several interviews with leading actors and members of the post-Islamist generation, participated in IGMG events, and carried out long-term research between 2000 and 2009. In addition, many documents such as newspapers, interviews, police transcripts, court records, parliamentary minutes, and reports from the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) are used as objects of analysis.

Indonesia is a country with a majority Muslim population that implements a democratic system. Based on this democratic system, non-muslims constitutional systems can coexist and play an active role in carrying out religious values in the public sphere as a very visible feature. Nonetheless, the relationship between Islam and the state in the course of Indonesian history always experiences ups and downs. In one period of Indonesian history, Islamic politics was a peripheral thought and movement and even considered a threat to democracy and the value of modernity, because Islamic groups struggled to maintain the ideology of Islamism with the aim of establishing an Islamic state, or at least implementing a traditional Islamic legal system to a modern Indonesian society. However, as the development of the Islamic world coincided with efforts to democratize the Indonesian state, Islamic politics also changed its direction to adjust to these conditions. Islamic groups become more accommodating to the values of democracy and modernity, without having to leave their Islamic identity. This last phenomenon is known as post-Islamism as a socio-political movement in the life of the nation and state in Indonesia.

Violent Islamism is a modern sociological phenomenon with origins in the crisis of society and the negative consequences of modernity. It sees the society and the modern world steeped in a quagmire with an obscene level of wealth and power in the hands of a few and a large section of society in perpetual strife and suffering. Apart from the West in various other parts of the world there is economic stagnation, many in the society are excluding from resources revenue, and the trade and social networks being disrupted and societies torn apart with the creation of new nation states. The society has huge urban agglomerations and people in millions, especially young men and women, are either unemployed or underemployed and many feel alienated from prosperous way of life enjoyed by the urban elite and uprooted from the social fabric of the society where sense of solidarity has been pilfered away. The crisis needs to be addressed and the imbalance corrected immediately. This paper posits that violent Islamism purports to have a solution which is to totally rearrange the social, economic, and political structures of the society, Islamise the knowledge and civil and economic institutions, and establishment the Caliphate with shari'ah as its constitution. Violent Islamists are only too willing and ready to remake the world and will use any means to achieve this goal even defensive and offensive jihad as a weapon of choice.

Violent Islamism is a modern sociological phenomenon with origins in the crisis of society and the negative consequences of modernity. It sees the society and the modern world steeped in a quagmire with an obscene level of wealth and power in the hands of a few and a large section of society in perpetual strife and suffering. Apart from the West in various other parts of the world there is economic stagnation, many in the society are excluding from resources revenue, and the trade and social networks being disrupted and societies torn apart with the creation of new nation states. The society has huge urban agglomerations and people in millions, especially young men and women, are either unemployed or underemployed and many feel alienated from prosperous way of life enjoyed by the urban elite and uprooted from the social fabric of the society where sense of solidarity has been pilfered away. The crisis needs to be addressed and the imbalance corrected immediately. This paper posits that violent Islamism purports to have a solution which is to totally rearrange the social, economic, and political structures of the society, Islamise the knowledge and civil and economic institutions, and establishment the Caliphate with shari'ah as its constitution. Violent Islamists are only too willing and ready to remake the world and will use any means to achieve this goal even defensive and offensive jihad as a weapon of choice.

Les émeutes qui ont éclaté le 5 octobre 1988 à Alger, suivies d'autres soulèvements dans les plus grandes villes du pays, ont marque un véritable tournant politique dans l'histoire de l'Algérie indépendante. Elles traduisent le cuisant échec de l'état-FLN. Depuis, l'Algérie s'est engagée dans des réformes de grande ampleur, à la fois sur le plan politique et sur le plan institutionnel. L’adoption d'une nouvelle constitution, approuvée par referendum le 23 février 1989, marque la fin d'un système : l'effondrement du parti unique. Elle consacre, pour la première fois, le multipartisme. Le 12 juin 1990, l'Algérie a connu sa première consultation démocratique, le FIS a remporte de manière spectaculaire les élections communales et départementales. Une année et demie plus tard, il remporte largement les élections législatives (premier tour). La prise de pouvoir par les islamistes devenue inéluctable, l'armée intervient pour suspendre le processus démocratique et interdire le FIS. Depuis, le pays est plonge dans un état de violence politique sans précédent. Comment l'Algérie en est arrivée là? Quelles sont les perspectives d'évolution politique, économique et sociale de ce pays en pleine mutation, déchire entre la tentation islamiste et l'aspiration a la démocratie? Ce sont la deux séries de questions qui constituent la problématique de notre travail
The riots which broke out on october 5th 1988 in Algeries, and the following rising-up in other towns of the country showed a real political turning-point in the history of the free Algerian state, right after the failure of FLN state. Then Algeria entered into important reformations in both institutional and political fields. The adoption of a new constitution ratified by referendum on february 23rd 1989 hold the end of the single party and the birth of multipartism. On june 12th 1990, the first democratic vote took place: FIS won on a spectacular way in towns. One year after, it also won parliamentary elections and was therefore to assume power but military intervention stopped the democratic process and banned the fis party. Since that date, political violence has been spread out all over the country. How did Algeria come into such a situation ? Which are the political, economic and social prospects in a country moving between islamistic tentations and democratic willings ?

ABSTRACT UNEASY COEXISTENCE: &ldquo
ISLAMISM VS. REPUBLICANISM&rdquo
DEBATE IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN Arikan, Pinar M. Sc., Department of International Relations Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meliha AltuniSik December 2006, 170 pages The objective of this thesis is to analyze the Islamist and republican features of the political regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It aims to identify the relationship between Islamism and republicanism in terms of institutional and practical means throughout the period since the establishment of the Islamic Republic. It seeks an answer to the question of how the Islamist and republican orientations that built up the political regime and the system of governance in the Islamic Republic of Iran have affected the domestic political and ideological developments. For this aim, firstly, the history of ulama-state relations as well as the history of constitutional tradition in Iran is discussed. Then, the impact of Islamism and republicanism in the process of establishment of the new regime in Iran is examined. Afterwards, the emergence of Islamism and republicanism as indigenous ideological currents and the political groups that appealed to these two orientations are analyzed with special emphasis to the role of Khomeini in this process. In the remaining part, the institutional and practical implications of the coexistence of Islamist and republican orientations are scrutinized during the presidencies of Rafsanjani and Khatami respectively. Finally, this thesis is concluded with an overall assessment of Islamism vs. republicanism debate with reference to the 2005 presidential elections.

Cette thèse tente de vérifier La légitimité et la possibilité de concrétiser un futur gouvernement ou État islamique, par le moyen de mettre en évidence les perceptions des partisans islamistes qui appartiennent aux deux groupes politico-religieux différents, l'un est approuvé par l'Etat tandis que l'autre n’est pas approuvé. Dans le cadre général du socio-cognition et de l'anthropologie, et à la lumière de la présence d'une croyance inévitable et absolu détenu par les partisans islamistes sur l'état islamique, cette thèse étudie la compatibilité des perceptions de ces islamistes avec les concepts largement reconnu comme moderne , incarnés, par exemple, dans la démocratie, la séparation des pouvoirs et les élections. La pertinence de cette étude réside dans l'anticipation de la présence d'un état futur basé sur la loi islamique, et la présence actuelle de certains gouvernements islamiques ou gouvernements dirigés par des islamistes dans le monde arabe se présente comme une preuve d'une telle anticipation. La thèse, par conséquent, adopte une approche pluridisciplinaire fondée, d'abord, sur une partie anthropologique à travers laquelle l'observation des partisans des deux groupes politico-religieux est destinée à retracer la manière dont l'État islamique comme croyance peut être transformée en un projet d'avenir. Deuxièmement, une étude sociocognitive basée sur un questionnaire et des interviews a pour but de mettre en évidence statistique les possibilités de réalisation d'un futur État islamique avec un système constitutionnel moderne où les libertés individuelles et les droits des minorités sont respectés et acceptés. Les deux approches sont utilisés d’une façon complémentaire pour répondre à la question: Est-il possible de concrétiser un futur Etat islamique avec un système constitutionnel moderne généralement fondé sur l'acceptation des droits de l'homme et des libertés, compte tenu de la présence d'une croyance inévitable et absolue à un tel état, adoptée par les partisans de ces mouvements politico-religieux? Les conclusions tirées de cette thèse, qui servent comme une réponse à la question, confirment, à travers les données anthropologiques et statistiques, qu'un Etat islamique moderne est possible dans l'avenir, surtout avec la présence des partisans islamistes qui sont prêts à subir un changement conceptuel en ce qui concerne une partie de leurs croyances. En conséquence, la thèse recommande, surtout par rapport aux groupes politico-religieux non approuvés, de lancer une discussion ouverte et sincère, de la part de l'Etat, en présence des perceptions modérées d'un Etat islamique moderne, détenus par un certain nombre de partisans non-approuvés
The legitimacy and the possibility of concretizing a future Islamic state or government is what this thesis is trying to investigate by means of highlighting perceptions of Islamist partisans belonging to two different politico-religious groups; one is approved by the state whereas the other is not. Within the general framework of socio-cognition and anthropology, and in the light of the presence of an inevitable and absolute belief held by Islamist partisans about the Islamic state, this thesis studies the compatibility of these Islamists’ perceptions with the concepts widely acknowledged as modern, as embodied, for instance, in democracy, separation of powers, elections, partisan multiplicity…The relevance of this study lies in its anticipating the presence of a future state to be based on Islamic law, and the current presence of some Islamic governments or governments led by Islamists, in the Arab world, stand as an evidence to such an anticipation. The thesis, hence, adopts a multidisciplinary approach based on starting, first, with an anthropological ground through which observation of partisans from the two politico-religious groups is meant to trace how the Islamic state as a belief can be transformed into a future project. Second, a socio-cognitive study based on a questionnaire, which is in its turn in the form of an interview, is meant to statically highlight the possibilities of achieving a future Islamic state with a modern constitutional system where individual freedoms and minorities’ rights are respected and accepted. The two approaches are complimentary in the sense of their hunting for an answer to the question: Is it possible to concretize a future Islamic state with a modern constitutional system generally based on acceptance of human rights and freedoms in the light of the presence of an inevitable and absolute belief in such a state, adopted by partisans of these politico-religious movements? The conclusions drawn from this thesis, which serve as an answer to the question, confirm, through the anthropological and statistical data, that a modern Islamic state is possible in the future, especially with the presence of Islamist partisans who are ready to undergo a conceptual change regarding some of their believed-to-be non-modern thoughts. Accordingly, the thesis recommends, especially proportionate to the non-approved politico-religious group, to start an open and sincere discussion, from the part of the state, in the presence of moderate perceptions of a modern Islamic state, held by a number of non-approved partisans

This thesis examines the nature and development of Islamism in Indonesia between 1998 and 2002. The New Order regime (1966-1998) suppressed ideologically driven Islam. Islamic political aspirations for most of this period were channelled mainly through the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan ('United Development Party', PPP). In 1998, many new Islamist parties were established. The most important were Partai Keadilan ('Justice Party', PK) and Partai Bulan Bintang ('Crescent Star Party', PBB). The main support base ofPK was Islamic study groups from state universities. PBB intended to revive the ideals of Masyumi, the country's largest Islamist party of the 1950s. A large part of this study focuses on the political behaviour of PPP, PK and PBB. Much of the scholarly literature on Islamic politics undervalues Islamism's constitutionalism and reformist credentials. At the same time, it is rarely sensitive to the contradictions in Islamist politics and the causes of this. Many scholars approach the subject from a Western liberal point of view. This thesis critiques this literature and advances a more nuanced approach by examining Islamist politics on its own terms. The study gives particular attention to the dynamic between ideological idealism and political pragmatism. It will demonstrate that, for the most part, pragmatism prevailed in Islamist politics. It does not discount ideologically driven motives but holds that these were often subordinate to practical electoral considerations, in particular the need to appear pluralist and reform oriented. It will also point to political strategy as the crucial factor behind Islamism's manifold ambiguities. The thesis also discusses ideological and strategic aspects in the re-formation process of Islamist parties and the downplaying of shari'ah (Islamic law) issues in order to maximise electoral support and the share of power politic.

This chapter explores how the AKP, a party from the same Islamist tradition as the RP, used EU foreign policy as a way to circumvent, and ultimately weaken, domestic obstacles to Ottoman Islamism. This case study traces strong policy commitments to EU membership in the AKP’s first term, with major reforms undertaken particularly in the civil-military and judicial areas. The chapter demonstrates that these reforms were both selective and short-lived, slowing significantly before either the financial crisis or the EU’s freezing of talks, confounding alternative explanations of why Turkey “turned away” from the EU. The chapter demonstrates how, by weakening and reconfiguring the military and the Constitutional Court—the two institutions that removed and then barred the RP from politics—the AKP became free to enact policies prescribed by Ottoman Islamism in the domestic and foreign policy spheres.

This chapter examines the phenomenon of Islamization in Malaysia. The hallmark of Islamism is its ‘quintessentially political agenda’ involving ‘the politicization of Islam through the aligning of structures of governance and society with Islamic strictures’. In contemporary Malaysia, Islamization puts into the spotlight the reconciliation of this phenomenon with the Malaysian Constitution, which was crafted as a governing instrument for a multiracial, multilingual, and multireligious society. The general unease of the non-Muslim segment of Malaysian society was aggravated by a highly publicized pronouncement of Prime Minister Mahathir, on 29 September 2001, that Malaysia was already an Islamic State. The remainder of the chapter discusses controversial episodes that have engendered concern over the Islamization phenomenon and its significance for constitutionalism in Malaysia.

This chapter presents the empirical data collected and analyzed through intertextual analysis to extract competing proposals for Turkish national identity among the country’s population. The analysis includes examination of social and news media sources, interviews, surveys, and archives. The empirical data are also collected from popular culture sources such as novels, television shows, and films to capture vernacular discourse otherwise inaccessible to the researcher. The chapter employs a framework of identity content to parse out the constitutive norms, social purposes, relational meanings, and cognitive worldviews of citizens of Turkey. The four composite proposals that emerge are Republican Nationalism, Pan-Turkic Nationalism, Ottoman Islamism, and Western Liberalism. This process of identity extraction through intertextual analysis lays the groundwork for examining the red lines, or points of intolerability, across competing proposals for Turkey’s national identity.

This chapter analyzes the powerful function in practice of the institutions whose origin and nature are explored in the previous chapter. It conceptualizes institutions that are founded to protect principles related to identity, such as secularism, as institutional obstacles to challenges from supporters of competing identity proposals. The chapter examines the attempts of the explicitly Islamist Welfare Party (RP) to spread Ottoman Islamism in Turkey’s public sphere and to shift the country’s foreign policy toward the Middle East. The chapter then demonstrates how military, judicial, and educational institutions infused with Republican Nationalism functioned to crush the RP’s efforts. It focuses on the experiences of the RP, which was pushed out of power by Turkey’s National Security Council and closed by the Constitutional Court during the February 28 process. These served as lessons from whcih the AKP, whose roots lie in the RP, would learn to circumvent such domestic obstacles and contest Republican Nationalism abroad.

Typically dismissed as the remnants of Ottoman nostalgia, the melancholies intentionally cultivated by contemporary Turkish classical musicians are a fundamental aspect of their subjectivity. Melancholic Modalities is the first in-depth historical and ethnographic study of the affective practices socialized by these musicians who champion, teach, and perform a present-day genre substantially rooted in the musics of the Ottoman court and elite Mevlevi Sufi lodges. Denise Gill analyzes how melancholic music making emerges as reparative, pleasurable, spiritually redeeming, and healing. Focusing on the affective, embodied, and sonic practices of musicians who deploy and circulate melancholy in sound, Gill interrogates the constitutive elements of musicians’ melancholic modalities in the context of emergent neoliberalism, secularism, political Islamism, Sufi devotionals, and the politics of psychological health in Turkey today. In a far-reaching contribution to the study of music, affect, and emotion, Gill develops rhizomatic analyses to allow musicians’ multiple interpretations to be heard. Melancholic Modalities uncovers the processes of subjectivity that render a spectrum of feelings (sensations of pain and ecstasy) and emotions (sadness, grief, joy, pleasure) as correct ways of being in the world for Turkish classical musicians. With her innovative concept of “bi-aurality,” Gill’s book forges new possibilities for the historical and ethnographic analyses of musics and ideologies of listening for music scholars.

Different understandings of European integration, its background and present problems are represented in this book, but they share an emphasis on historical processes, geopolitical dynamics and regional diversity. The introduction surveys approaches to the question of European continuities and discontinuities, before going on to an overview of chapters. The following three contributions deal with long-term perspectives, including the question of Europe as a civilisational entity, the civilisational crisis of the twentieth century, marked by wars and totalitarian regimes, and a comparison of the European Union with the Habsburg Empire, with particular emphasis on similar crisis symptoms. The next three chapters discuss various aspects and contexts of the present crisis. Reflections on the Brexit controversy throw light on a longer history of intra-Union rivalry, enduring disputes and changing external conditions. An analysis of efforts to strengthen the EU’s legal and constitutional framework, and of resistances to them, highlights the unfinished agenda of integration. A closer look at the much-disputed Islamic presence in Europe suggests that an interdependent radicalization of Islamism and the European extreme right is a major factor in current political developments. Three concluding chapters adopt specific regional perspectives. Central and Eastern European countries, especially Poland, are following a path that leads to conflicts with dominant orientations of the EU, but this also raises questions about Europe’s future. The record of Scandinavian policies in relation to Europe exemplifies more general problems faced by peripheral regions. Finally, growing dissonances and divergences within the EU may strengthen the case for Eurasian perspectives.

This book has examined ideological contests in Western history and what they tell us about Islamism's prolonged struggle with secularism. In conclusion, it offers a few suggestions on what the United States ought to do and not to do in the Middle East and what this means for American foreign policy. It argues that the United States simply cannot decide the contest between Islamism and secularism and so should resort to what political scientist Jonathan Monten calls “exemplarism.” The U.S. government should also remember that, although it cannot resolve the Muslims' ideological contest by force, it can influence how Muslims themselves resolve it. This concluding chapter also considers two things that the United States can do to nudge constitutional democracy: to engage in public diplomacy and to remain the attractive society that it always has been—to be true to itself.

This chapter considers the fifth lesson: the winner may be “none of the above.” In the prolonged contest between Muslim secularism and Islamism, a number of questions arise: Will one ideology and regime type eventually win? If so, what will the winner be? Or might there be no winner? Western history shows that transnational ideological contests such as that between secularism and Islamism can end in one of three ways: victory, transcendence, or convergence. The chapter explains each outcome in greater detail by focusing on the triumph of democratic capitalism in the late twentieth century, the Dutch Republic's creation of a tolerant constitutional regime, and the end of monarchism versus republicanism in the 1870s. It suggests that the signs at present point to convergence, a hybrid regime of Islamists and secularists that Westerners may find counterintuitive but that may just work in many Muslim societies.

This chapter considers the second lesson that is relevant to political Islam and secularism today: ideologies are (usually) not monolithic. It first considers the situation in Europe in the early nineteenth century, when European conservatives claimed that the divide between republicanism and constitutional monarchism was a distinction without a difference. It then examines the dilemma faced by the House of Habsburg in Europe during the early seventeenth century: since Protestantism seemed to be polylithic, should they try to exploit divisions among the Protestants? The chapter proceeds by discussing the fault lines separating communists and socialists in the twentieth century before concluding with some reflections on the lessons that can be drawn from Western history for the United States in dealing with Islamists today. It suggests that whether Islamism is monolithic or polylithic is a question that matters, especially for U.S. foreign policy.

Debates over Sudan's future remain vibrant today. New Islamic political movements have emerged as the Islamist project of the regime entered into somewhat of a holding pattern, while the government seeks to form a national consensus that might include other parties, Islamist or not. Indeed, the sentiment expressed by the president that when the South and its diverse peoples seceded the regime would “fix the constitution of Sudan” is a view shared by many who see the separation of the South, and the departure of religious minorities it occasioned, as a means to reinvigorate the Islamic state and not a mark of its failure. This chapter looks back at the era of late Islamism that characterizes the discursive landscape of the Sudan in which the author arrived in 2005 to begin his fieldwork. He claims that we must understand where the Islamist coup began, into what problems it saw itself intervening, what solutions it offered to those problems, and how it recalibrated its vision as a result of realities on the ground.