Journal articles on the topic 'Islamisme – Liban'

The article examines and analyzes the spread of Islamism or Political Islam movements in the Greater Mediterranean and their increasing influence on the socio-political situation in 2011-2021. The historical factors, which contributed to the emergence of the hearths of Islamic culture in the countries which entered the Arab Caliphate in the Greater Mediterranean parallel with the Antique centers of European civilization, are retrospectively exposed. The Islamist ideologues called the Ottoman Imperia the heir of the Arab Caliphate. The main doctrinal conceptions of Political Islam and its more influential movement Muslim Brotherhood (forbidden in Russia) are discovered. The factor of the Arab Spring, which considerably influenced the strengthening of the Islamist movements, as well as its continuation of the protests in the Arab countries in 2018-2021, is examined. The main attention is allotted to analyzing the actions of the Islamic movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, and in the Libyan and Syrian conflicts too. The influence of external actors, the most active of which was Turkey, is revealed. The author also analyzes the situation in the Arab-Muslim communities in the European Mediterranean on the example of France, where social-economic problems, aggravated by COVID-19, have contributed to the activation of radical Islamist elements. It is concluded that confronting the Islamist challenge is a complex and controversial task. Its solution depends on both forceful opposition to radical groups and an appropriate foreign policy. An important negative factor is the aggravation of socio-economic problems and crisis phenomena in the institutions of Western democracy, in response to which the ideologues of Islamism preach an alternative world order in the form of an Islamic state. At the moment the Western society and the countries which repeat its liberal model do not give a distinct response to this challenge.

The geopolitical transformations of modern times marked the beginning of the end of French dominance in Western and Central Tropical Africa. The article names the main determinants of the process of degradation of the French model of neo-colonialism. Among these, the author refers to the destruction of Libyan statehood, the ensuing invasion of militants of Islamist associations into the territory of the Sahel and the consolidation of Islamists into the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) unit, the uprising of the Tuareg in northern Mali and the proclamation of the unrecognized state of Azawad in the Sahel, the operation of the French troops “Barkhane” in the territory of the countries of the military-political bloc G5S.According to the author, the failure of operation “Barkhane”, the inability of the French troops to effectively resist Islamic terrorists provoked discontent among the citizens of the CAR, Mali and Burkina Faso. In these African states, coups d’état took place, as a result of which puppet pro-French political elites were removed from power and regimes oriented towards Moscow were established.

This study aims to analyze the competition between pro-Islamist and nationalist militia groups in the control of economic resources and it influences on Libya’s economic growth. The approach used is a qualitative approach. Conflict theory, greed and grievance theory, and economic growth theories are used to analyze Libya's post-revolution political economy. This research shows that the competition between militia groups over economic resources has occurred since the transition period of the Libyan government in 2011 and continues until this writing. Economic resources contested include oil, trade centers, banks, trade routes in country borders, airports, and important positions in government. Conflicting militia groups often use violence to obtain economic and political benefits. This is what creates the complexity of the Libyan political conflict. This research concludes that the political conflicts that are preoccupied with the competition of various internal and external actors to fight over economic resources and power, have a negative influence on economic growth and social life of the Libyan people.

The Libyan Muslim Brotherhood needed to manoeuvre underground for several decades, just as most opposition groups in Libya had to—because of the repression from the Qaddafi regime. In 2012, however, the political wing of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB), the Justice and Construction Party (JCP, sometimes also called the Justice and Development Party) participated in popular elections just shortly after its inception. Seven years later, one can unanimously say that the movement was not able to take power in the country. This paper will analyse the LMB in post-revolutionary Libya by concentrating on the attempts of establishing legitimacy in the political sphere—while continuously being informed by historical influences. Methodologically, the paper examines primary sources, key academic texts but also factors in interview data from semi-structured interviews. Overall, the paper addresses the puzzle of why Libya as a predominantly Sunni, conservative country did not translate into a conservative Sunni movement like the LMB faring well; with that, derailing the impression that the whole region was “going Islamist” after the so-called Arab Spring. The LMB today is still influenced by the historical treatment it received under Qaddafi, which lead it to base itself mostly in exile, hence it struggled to entrench itself in the country. The LMB was pointed towards their opponents’ fearmongering of an alleged Islamist takeover, mostly without addressing self-inflicted wounds, such as their inability to unite or to convince major parts of the population of their political programme.

Since the fall of Gaddafi’s forty-two years of rule, Libya has been facing tremendous challenges of instability and insecurity reflecting and characterized by both a political impasse and a lack of legitimate state institutions. Ad-hoc and non-state formations grew outside the legitimate state boundary and became the real actors, polarizing politics and society while rendering any political dialogue ineffective, especially when confined to exclusionary power-sharing arrangements. Official bodies remain weak and divided, while peripheral actors reject/resist submitting to its authority. While acknowledging that the current Libyan crisis is the product of the interaction of several factors including the Islamists and non-Islamist contestation, regional and tribal dimensions, and foreign interventions, this paper concentrates on the effects of the state approach of the Gaddafi era as well as the failure to adopt and implement reconciliation post the 2011 conflict. Therefore, it is argued that the first step towards realizing peace, security, and development is a departure from the current approach and the necessity of bringing in the real players to agree on a roadmap to reclaim the state by launching state-building processes that have national reconciliation as an essential component at their core. State-building cannot be purely a technical exercise of defining, designing, building, or reforming public institutions, while ignoring reconciliation. No matter how successful such technical state-building processes may be, some parts of the population will remain excluded and major segments of the population are likely to remain highly mistrustful of the (new) state and its institutions. Therefore, addressing this gap is central to a transformative approach to state-building that includes reconciliation in which dealing with the Gaddafi legacy is central to preventing future conflict relapse.

The current study examines the Arab spring uprising consequences in Libya as reflected by CNN within its online news report. The primary goal is to unearth CNN's embedded ideological view concerning the internal conflict in Libya investigating and showing the discoursal positive ''Self'' and negative ''Other'' representations. CNN'S macro and micro structures were analyzed. At the macro level, the semantic macrostructure of CNN's article was summarized to establish its global meaning. At the micro level, the syntactic, lexical and rhetorical structures of CNN's online news article were analyzed to establish its local meaning. Within the ideological analysis, the CNN's online news article was discussed to establish CNN's ideological positive ''Self'' (in-group) and negative ''Other'' (out-group) presentations. In general, the study is an attempt to explain how a single reality-Libyan internal conflict- is viewed and dealt with by CNN. This can be achieved within the framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA). To conduct this qualitative study, the researchers adopted van Dijk's theory of Macrostructures (1980), van Dijk's theory of ideological square (1998) and Wodak's approach of Discourse- historical (2001, 2009). Furthermore, Fairclough's model for media discourse analysis was utilized to organize the analytical process. The study approved that CNN succeeded to reflect its ideological view. It expressed its support to the Libyan government (and its army) presented as the positive "Self" (in-group) and antagonism against Ansar al-Sharia militia (the Islamists) presented as the negative "Other" (out-group).

Nulle part dans le monde arabe les inquiétudes au sujet du changement social et culturel n’ont été aussi passionnément discutées qu’en Arabie saoudite, où la doctrine salafiste du wahhabisme est au coeur du système, en tant que conception sacro sainte de l’authenticité enracinée dans la pureté culturelle et religieuse et la séparation entre hommes et femmes. L’avènement de la « téléréalité » au milieu des années 2000 a réactivé ces débats dans le royaume. Star Academy, notamment, populaire émission de téléréalité en langue arabe, diffusée par satellite depuis le Liban par la Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) depuis décembre 2003, a connu des taux d’audience record et a suscité une intense controverse en Arabie saoudite, vidant les rues des villes et animant les sermons dans les mosquées, les éditoriaux et les débats télévisés. J’ai décrit ailleurs comment cette émission était devenue le champ de bataille entre les radicaux, les conservateurs et les libéraux saoudiens. Cet article décrit les discours, qui se recoupent, des islamistes saoudiens au sujet de la télévision, en mentionnant les diverses rhétoriques de censure et de critique engagée. Il se base pour ce faire sur plusieurs textes primaires, et notamment un sermon qui a connu une grande diffusion, Satan Academy, du cheikh Mohammed Salih Al Mounajid. La manière dont les controverses publiques au sujet de la téléréalité ont cristallisé de nouveaux développements de très anciens débats est donc examinée.

One of the most important goals of Russian foreign policy during Vladimir Putins presidency is to strengthen Russian influence in the Caucasus region and Central Asia, as well as to develop relations with such countries as Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The Russian government has always expressed concern about the so-called color revolutions that took place in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the fact that many of them were supported by Western forces. Russia believes that the events of the Arab Spring are in some way similar to the aforementioned revolutions, and that with the support of the West they could bring Islamists to power, which is a dangerous model not only for the countries of the region and the countries neighboring Russia, but also for Russia itself. For these reasons, in the Syrian conflict, Moscow sought to preserve the Assad regime, because believes that the Western model in solving regional problems can lead to the general chaos, like it was, for example, in the Iraqi and Libyan models. Despite the difficulties faced by government officials in Syria since the beginning of the civil war, and thanks to Russian military assistance and reforms, Syria preserved the legitimate regime and did not allow destroying all state institutions. Participation in the Syrian conflict brought Russia a significant role in the region and allowed it to become a successful mediator in most regional issues, as well as to strengthen its economic and political relations with the most important players in the region, as Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The article analyzes specific elements of the Arab societies’ political life which distinguish it from political relations in the Western nation-states. Admitting the existence of a large number of such kind of elements, the authors focus only on three of them which are related to the sources of power and its distribution. Emphasizing that these elements are deeply rooted into the Arab-Muslim political tradition, so that they have tended to be present throughout the whole Islamic period of the region, the authors find out that each of them has its own medieval countertype. Thus, the article addresses the dichotomy of the supreme power of caliphs and sultans, formed in the IX – XI centuries and manifested today both in Jihadist organizations (i.e. ISIS, Al-Qaeda) and in the political strategies of moderate Islamist movements, such as Tunisian party Al-Nahda. The second example is the urban militias, which are correlated with the medieval phenomenon of «young hero» or «chivalry» communities – fityan. The fityan communities have seven specific traits, which not only are characteristic of the militias, but also demonstrate fundamental difference between the militias and urban criminal groups. Major attention is paid to Libyan militias, which are studied on the materials of field research conducted by one of the authors. Finally, the third element discussed is the particular role of the army and other security forces in the Arab political systems.The authors provide three possible interpretations of all the revealed coincidences. According to the first one, they are presented as aberrations of the researcher’s scientific consciousness, which make them look for historical equivalents to contemporary issues. Second interpretation belongs to the tradition of «the new medievalism». According to it, the described phenomenon is in fact the revival of some medieval practices, caused by the end of the Modernity era. The last interpretation views the analyzed elements as distinctive civilization traits of the Arab world.

This volume, written by scholars in Middle Eastern history, addresses thehistory of charity in the Middle East, including its meanings, conceptions, practical patterns, motivations, and the ways of institutionalization andidentifying its “deserving” beneficiaries throughout the last 14 centuries. Itis addressed to academic readers interested in Middle Eastern history or incharity in a universal sense.One aspect of charity dealt with throughout the book is that of motivation.It turns out that besides adhering to general Islamic principles, motivationsof enhancing one’s prestige and social clout have played an importantrole as well. Michael Bonner points out in his chapter, “Poverty and Charityin the Rise of Islam,” that generosity in pre-Islamic and early IslamicArabia was clearly linked to competition for political and social prestigeamong tribal leaders. However, he does not adequately clarify these practices’role in the emergence of the Islamic charitable tradition. In “Charityand Hospitality,” Miri Shefer describes how prominent individuals in theOttoman Empire enhanced their own prestige by founding hospitalsthrough the establishment of awqaf. Likewise, Ottoman sultan AbdülhamidII sponsored numerous charitable projects in order to enhance his own publicimage as a caring and fatherly benefactor toward his subjects, as NadirÖzbek describes in “Imperial Gifts and Sultanic Legitimation during theLate Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909.”Beth Baron and Kathryn Libal, authors of “Islam, Philanthropy, andPolitical Culture in interwar Egypt,” and of “The Child Question,” respectively,shed light on the emergence in Egypt and Turkey, during the first halfof the twentieth century, of motivations informed by various philanthropists’(either Islamist or secular) ideological commitment to the well-being of thenation as a whole. They also describe how this commitment translated itselfinto civil society activism and public debates in both countries.Another relevant aspect is institutionalization. Possibly, the earliest formof institutionalized charity in Islamic history is the collection and distributionof zakat. Timur Kuran distinguishes, in his “Islamic Redistributionthrough Zakat” (see the section “Instrument of Modern Redistribution?”) the“proceduralist” from the “situationist” approach toward this basic Islamicduty. The former approach denotes a strict application of specific rules fromthe Islamic sources, regardless of the concrete situation at hand, while thesecond refers to a flexible implementation of general religious principlesbased on the current situation ...

The overthrow of M. Gaddafi with the assistance of NATO in October 2011 led to the collapse of the vertical of power and institutions of the state and sentenced Libya to a deep systemic crisis. The article examines the peculiarities and role of the tribal factor in the current events in Libya, a country with deeply divided, multi-composite societies (DDS). It is characterized by tribal, regional, racial and ethnoreligious diversity. With 90% of its population having tribal roots, the number of tribes passes 140. This diversity has left its mark on the course of events, affected the struggle for power. The author sums up the shifts that have taken place in the tribal segment of society in recent decades. The rush of members of different tribes to the city led to their fragmentation, diminution of their former structure. The bonds of kinship, the spirit of solidarity, the traditional behaviour of the tribesmen have been to different extents eroded. However, the influence of a tribe or genus that play the role of a bonding society remains essential. This was especially evident after the advent of dual power in 2014, the author assumes. The two poles of domination – Tripoli and Tobruk are trying to play this card to their advantage. On the other hand, the security vacuum caused by the fall of the regime spontaneously filled forces, including regional tribal groups. The scholar tracks how various tribal councils and other entities here and there take on the functions of maintaining resilience and order, ending infighting, returning hostages, etc. In doing so, they often turn to the traditional usual right – Urf. The author agrees with a number of Libyan scholars and other foreign researchers that there are now some signs of a breeding tribal identity in Libya. At the same time, this process is multi–directional, as in Libya, a country with a deeply divided society, tribes can both engage in conflicts and contribute to their peaceful denouement. The researcher draws attention to the fact that the relationship between tribalism and Islamists is rather contradictory. The latter use to argue that “Islam is the solution to all problems.” But their entry into the arena of politics in Libya after October 2011 did not prevent the de facto collapse of the country and the growth of sectarian standoff. And that according to the author divides society and plays into the hands of certain political forces. In this atmosphere, tribal polarization and the general alienation of society are at risk of growth. The author analyzes the relations between tribal and national identities in a country where the process of consolidation of the population into a single nation has not yet been completed.

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.

Abstract: The so-called Iranian revolutionary youth’s aspirations for martyrdom are not based merely on Islamist doctrines or Islamic ideologies. They readily place all fallen combatants in a ‘martyrdom box’, linking them to Islamic sacrality and claiming they feel martyrs via martyrs’ ghostly whispers. Through ethnographic journeys in Iran, Lebanon and Iraq, I unpack how they craft the ‘martyrdom box’ and communicate with the ghostly whispers. I argue that the Iranian revolutionary youth’s perceptions of martyrdom and militant subjectivities emerge in relation to disbelieving histories that contest the state’s narratives and their mystical relationships with martyrs. This article takes Iranian revolutionary youth as exemplars to explain how individuals implicated in political violence craft acts of ‘knowing’ and render death and dead ‘knowable’. In other words, instead of asking what is known, I proceed by unpacking how what is known becomes real and how the act of knowing contributes to the emergence of reality.Résumé : En Iran les aspirations de la soi-disant jeunesse révolutionnaire pour le martyre ne sont pas basées simplement sur les doctrines islamistes ou les idéologies islamiques. Ces aspirations visent à mettre toutes les personnes qui sont mort au combat dans une “boîte de martyre” afin de les unir au sacré islamique. La jeunesse prétend pouvoir ressentir la présence des martyrs grâce au chuchotement-fantôme. À travers des voyages d’ethnographie en Iran, en Liban, et en Iraq, j’étudie leurs façons de construire la “boîte de martyre” et de communiquer avec le chuchotement-fantôme. L’idée que les jeunes révolutionnaires iraniennes se font de martyre et de militantisme émerge dans le contexte du scepticisme face à l’histoire, ayant comme but de contester les récits de l’état et les relations mystiques avec des martyres. Cet article montre que la jeunesse révolutionnaire en Iran pourrait servir comme modèle pour expliquer comment des individus qui sont impliqués dans des violences politiques se présentent comme artisans-créateurs des “connaissances”. Ils essayent de se rapprocher des morts et de rendre la mort compréhensible. Mon objectif c’est de mettre de côté le questionnement sur la connaissance elle-même, afin d’établir comment la possession des connaissances contribue à l’apparition de la réalité.

AbstractFrom the 1980s, revisionist Sunni Islamist thinkers have engaged in a hermeneutical effort to argue for the full acceptance of non-Muslims as equal political participants and citizens in an Islamic polity. A key text in their argument is the so-called Constitution of Medina, regulating the interaction between the newly arrived followers of Muhammad and the existing tribes in Medina who were either polytheists or Jews. This paper investigates the sira literature of Muslim Brotherhood in order to gauge the degree to which the life of the Prophet has been reinterpreted to enable such novel readings. It analyzes three popular Muslim Brotherhood siras, by the Syrian Mustafa al-Sibai (1960s), the Egyptian Muhammad al-Ghazzali (1980s), and the Libyan Ali al-Sallabi (2000s). The paper detects important developments in these siras’ treatments of Muhammad’s engagement with non-Muslims—including their interpretations of the Constitution of Medina. These developments, however, do not reflect the radical rethinking of civil society and civility found in the abovementioned revisionist Islamist literature; rather, they evince a more classical Islamist interest in the Prophet as a propagator of Islam as a law and system. That said, this sira literature should be viewed as a genre aiming at the ideological education of brotherhood members, rather than the theoretical exploration of political theory.

AbstractOne of the most important developments in modern Islamic missionary activism was the establishment in 1972 of the Libya‐based World Islamic Call Society (WICS, originally the Islamic Call Society) which acted as a leading think tank advocating Muslim unity and Pan‐Arabism throughout the Qaddafi era. Despite the severe challenges facing post‐revolutionary Libya, WICS remains active today, albeit with reduced global visibility. This article demonstrates the ways that WICS's endeavors in publishing were innovative in the Northern African Arabic context, notably when it comes to the al‐Muṣḥaf al‐Jamāhīriyya (1983) and the various Qur'an translations it produced, and argues that its activities are a neglected yet critical aspect of modern Islamic missionary endeavors at the nexus of Pan‐Islamism and Pan‐Arabism. Through exploring WICS's historical background, the individual actors affiliated with it, and its primary publishing projects, the current study sheds light on an overlooked chapter in modern Islamic missionary activity. It also explores the contextual factors that have influenced the success of its Qur'an translations beyond issues of religious identity, offering new insights into the intersection of politics and religion that underlie many modern translations of the Qur'an.

Abstract In 1935, Palestinian newspapers published a forged letter alleged to have been sent from pan-Islamist leader, Shakib Arslan, to the Palestinian leader and Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni. The letter indicated that Husayni and Arslan accepted Italian bribes in exchange for pro-Italian articles in the publications they controlled. Italy was widely despised for its treatment of Libyan Muslims, and so exposing this relationship was expected to be controversial. Amid a national debate about Italy’s imminent invasion of Abyssinia, and its role in the Eastern Mediterranean, Husayni’s Palestinian opponents hoped to embarrass him as a sell-out. Both a government official and national leader, Husayni’s true position came to define the Palestinian debate about the national interest: should Palestinians co-operate with one oppressive empire so as to free themselves from another? Relying on multilingual and multinational archival evidence, this article proves that the letter was indeed forged, but based on real intelligence gathered by Husayni’s Palestinian opponents who sought to damage his reputation. It also shows that British intelligence probably encouraged the forgery, hoping to expose and stem Italian propaganda activity. The scheme backfired and accelerated Italian interference in Palestine. It crystalised Husayni’s popularity, as Palestinians believed he could deliver national liberation. They did not care if Italy was involved. This episode shows that British assessments of ‘factional’ Palestinian politics reflected their shallow understanding of these conflicts. Meanwhile, it also sheds unique light on Palestinian espionage and counterintelligence work, and the way in which it empowered Husayni and Arslan.

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione - 2. La monarchia di Idris Al Senussi e la Costituzione del 1951 - 3. L’Islam nella Libia di Re Idris - 4. Moammar Gheddafi e la Terza Teoria Universale: l’Islam all’interno del “Nuovo” sistema libico - 5. Gheddafi e il movimento islamista - 6. La caduta di Gheddafi, la Dichiarazione Costituzionale del 2011 e l’Islam - 7. L’ultima bozza del 2017 e i contrasti infiniti - 8. Brevi riflessioni. The Constitution and the role of Islam in Libya from independence to the fall of Moammar Gaddafi: origins and perspectives ABSTRACT: This study aims to retrace Libya's constitutional path from Independence, obtained in December 1951, up to the "post-Gaddafi" era, which began with his fall in October 2011 and where the agreement on a new Constitution is still today - after more than ten years - one of the thorniest issues in the construction of a real Libyan State. Particular emphasis will be given to the religious aspect that has characterized the Constitutional Charter of Libya in its short national history and to the religious challenges faced in the different historical phases. The study will be divided into three parts. The first one will try to frame the constitutional discourse in the new independent Libya under the monarchy of King Idris al-Senussi. In the second part, will be addressed to the drastic changes that occurred with Moammar Gaddafi's rise to power. Finally, in the last part will try to draw a picture of what the situation is today and to understand what are actually the obstacles that are holding back an agreement between the rival factions (East and West) on a shared Constitution.

Introduction In any list of dictators and antagonists of the West the name of Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi will always rank highly as one of the most memorable, colourful and mercurial. The roles he played to his fellow Libyans, to regional groupings, to revolutionaries and to the West were complex and nuanced. These various roles developed over time but were all grounded in his self-belief as a messianic revolutionary figure. More importantly, these roles and behaviours that stemmed from them were instrumental in preserving Qaddafi’s rule and thwarting challenges to it. These facets of Qaddafi’s public self accord with the model of “persona” described by Marshall. Whilst the nature of political persona and celebrity in the Western world has been explored by several scholars (for example Street; Wilson), little work has been conducted on the use of persona by non-democratic leaders. This paper examines the aspects of persona exhibited by Colonel Qaddafi and applied during his tenure. In constructing his role as a revolutionary leader, Qaddafi was engaging in a form of public performance aimed at delivering himself to a wider audience. Whether at home or abroad, this persona served the purpose of helping the Libyan leader consolidate his power, stymie political opposition and export his revolutionary ideals. The trajectory of his persona begins in the early days of his coming to power as a charismatic leader during a “time of distress” (Weber) and culminates in his bloody end next to a roadside drainage culvert. In between these points Qaddafi’s persona underwent refinement and reinvention. Coupled with the legacy he left on the Libyan political system, the journey of Muammar Qaddafi’s personas demonstrate how political personality can be the salvation or damnation of an entire state.Qaddafi: The Brotherly RevolutionaryCaptain Muammar Qaddafi came to power in Libya in 1969 at the age of just 27. He was the leader of a group of military officers who overthrew King Idris in a popular and relatively bloodless coup founded on an ideology of post-colonial Arab nationalism and a doing away with the endemic corruption and nepotism that were the hallmarks of the monarchy. With this revolutionary cause in mind and in an early indication that he recognised the power of political image, Qaddafi showed restraint in adopting the trappings of office. His modest promotion to the rank of Colonel was an obvious example of this, and despite the fact that in practical terms he was the supreme commander of Libya’s armed forces, he resisted the temptation to formally aggrandize himself with military titles for the ensuing 42 years of his rule.High military rank was in a way irrelevant to a man moving to change his persona from army officer to messianic national leader. Switching away from a reliance on military hierarchy as a basis for his authority allowed Qaddafi to re-cast himself as a leader with a broader mission. He began to utilise titles such as “Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council” (RCC) and “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution.” The persona on display here was one of detached impartiality and almost reluctant leadership. There was the suggestion that Qaddafi was not really acting as a head of state, but merely an ordinary Libyan who, through popular acclaim, was being begged to lead his people. The attraction of this persona remained until the bitter end for Qaddafi, with his professed inability to step aside from a leadership role he insisted he did not formally occupy. This accords with the contention of Weber, who describes how an individual favoured with charisma can step forward at a time of crisis to complete a “mission.” Once in a position of authority, perpetuating that role of leadership and acclamation can become the mission itself:The holder, of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission. His success determines whether he finds them. His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent. If they recognize him, he is their master—so long as he knows how to maintain recognition through ‘proving’ himself. But he does not derive his ‘right’ from their will, in the manner of an election. Rather, the reverse holds: it is the duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their charismatically qualified leader. (Weber 266-7)As his rule extended across the decades, Qaddafi fostered his revolutionary credentials via a typical cult of personality approach. His image appeared on everything from postage stamps to watches, bags, posters and billboards. Quotations from the Brother Leader were set to music and broadcast as pop songs. “Spontaneous” rallies of support would occur when crowds of loyalists would congregate to hear the Brotherly Leader speak. Although Qaddafi publicly claimed he did not like this level of public adoration he accepted it because the people wanted to adore him. It was widely known however that many of these crowds were paid to attend these rallies (Blundy and Lycett 16).Qaddafi: The Philosopher In developing his persona as a guide and a man who was sharing his natural gifts with the people, Qaddafi developed a post-colonial philosophy he called “Third Universal Theory.” This was published in volumes collectively known as The Green Book. This was mandatory reading for every Libyan and contained a distillation of Qaddafi’s thoughts and opinions on everything from sports to politics to religion to the differences between men and women. Whilst it may be tempting for outsiders to dismiss these writings as the scribbling of a dictator, the legacy of Qaddafi’s persona as political philosopher is worthy of some examination. For in offering his revelations to the Libyan people, Qaddafi extended his mandate beyond leader of a revolution and into the territory of “messianic reformer of a nation.”The Green Book was a three-part series. The first instalment was written in 1975 and focuses on the “problem of democracy” where Qaddafi proposes direct democracy as the best option for a progressive nation. The second instalment, published in 1977, focuses on economics and expounds socialism as the solution to all fiscal woes. (Direct popular action here was evidenced in the RCC making rental of real estate illegal, meaning that all tenants in the country suddenly found themselves granted ownership of the property they were occupying!) The final chapter, published in 1981, proposes the Third Universal Theory where Qaddafi outlines his unique solution for implementing direct democracy and socialism. Qaddafi coined a new term for his Islamically-inspired socialist utopia: Jamahiriya. This was defined as being a “state of the masses” and formed the blueprint for Libyan society which Qaddafi subsequently imposed.This model of direct democracy was part of the charismatic conceit Qaddafi cultivated: that the Libyan people were their own leaders and his role was merely as a benevolent agent acceding to their wishes. However the implementation of the Jamahiriya was anything but benevolent and its legacy has crippled post-Qaddafi Libya. Under this system, Libyans did have some control over their affairs at a very local level. Beyond this, an increasingly complex series of committees and regional groupings, over which the RCC had the right of veto, diluted the participation of ordinary citizens and their ability to coalesce around any individual leader. The banning of standard avenues of political organisation, such as parties and unions, coupled with a ruthless police state that detained and executed anyone offering even a hint of political dissent served to snuff out any opposition before it had a chance to gather pace. The result was that there were no Libyans with enough leadership experience or public profile to take over when Qaddafi was ousted in 2011.Qaddafi: The Liberator In a further plank of his revolutionary persona Qaddafi turned to the world beyond Libya to offer his brotherly guidance. This saw him champion any cause that claimed to be a liberation or resistance movement struggling against the shackles of colonialism. He tended to favour groups that had ideologies aligned with his own, namely Arab unity and the elimination of Israel, but ultimately was not consistent in this regard. Aside from Palestinian nationalists, financial support was offered to groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines), Umkhonto we Sizwe (South Africa), ETA (Spain), the Polisario Front (Western Sahara), and even separatist indigenous Australians. This policy of backing revolutionary groups was certainly a projection of his persona as a charismatic enabler of the revolutionary mission. However, the reception of this mission in the wider world formed the basis for the image that Qaddafi most commonly occupied in Western eyes.In 1979 the ongoing Libyan support for groups pursuing violent action against Israel and the West saw the country designated a State-Sponsor of Terror by the US Department of State. Diplomatic relations between the two nations were severed and did not resume until 2004. At this point Qaddafi seemed to adopt a persona of “opponent of the West,” ostensibly on behalf of the world’s downtrodden colonial peoples. The support for revolutionary groups was changing to a more active use of them to strike at Western interests. At the same time Qaddafi stepped up his rhetoric against America and Britain, positioning himself as a champion of the Arab world, as the one leader who had the courage of his convictions and the only one who was squarely on the side of the ordinary citizenry (in contrast to other, more compliant Arab rulers). Here again there is evidence of the charismatic revolutionary persona, reluctantly taking up the burden of leadership on behalf of his brothers.Whatever his ideals, the result was that Qaddafi and his state became the focus of increasing Western ire. A series of incidents between the US and Libya in international waters added to the friction, as did Libyan orchestrated terror attacks in Berlin, Rome and Vienna. At the height of this tension in 1986, American aircraft bombed targets in Libya, narrowly missing Qaddafi himself. This role as public enemy of America led to Qaddafi being characterised by President Ronald Reagan (no stranger to the use of persona himself) as the “mad dog of the Middle East” and a “squalid criminal.” The enmity of the West made life difficult for ordinary Libyans dealing with crippling sanctions, but for Qaddafi, it helped bolster his persona as a committed revolutionary.Qaddafi: Leader of the Arab and African Worlds Related to his early revolutionary ideologies were Qaddafi’s aspirations as a pan-national leader. Inspired by Egypt’s Gamel Abdul Nasser from a young age, the ideals of pan-Arab unity were always a cornerstone of Qaddafi’s beliefs. It is not therefore surprising that he developed ambitions of being the person to bring about and “guide” that unity. Once again the Weberian description of the charismatic leader is relevant, particularly the notion that such leadership does not respect conventional boundaries of functional jurisdictions or local bailiwicks; in this case, state boundaries.During the 1970s Qaddafi was involved in numerous attempts to broker Arab unions between Libya and states such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. All of these failed to materialise once the exact details of the mergers began to be discussed, in particular who would assume the mantle of leadership in these super-states. In line with his persona as the rightly-guided revolutionary, Qaddafi consistently blamed the failure of these unions on the other parties, souring his relationship with his fellow Arab leaders. His hardline stance on Israel also put him at odds with those peers more determined to find a compromise. Following the assassination of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat in 1981 Qaddafi praised the act as justified because of Sadat’s signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel.Having given up on the hope of achieving pan-Arab Unity, Qaddafi sought to position himself as a leader of the African bloc. In 2009 he became Chairperson of the African Union and took to having himself introduced as “The King of Kings of Africa.” The level of dysfunction of the African Union was no less than that of the Arab League and Qaddafi’s grandiose plans for becoming the President of the United States of Africa failed to materialise.In both his pan-Arab and pan-Africa ambitions, we see a persona of Qaddafi that aims at leadership beyond his own state. Whilst there may be delusions of grandeur apparent in the practicalities of these goals, this image was nevertheless something that Qaddafi used to leverage the next phase of his political transformation.Qaddafi: The Post-9/11 Statesman However much he might be seen as erratic, Qaddafi’s innate intelligence could result in a political astuteness lacking in many of his Arab peers. Following the events of 11 September 2001, Qaddafi was the first international leader to condemn the attacks on America and pledge support in the War on Terror and the extermination of al-Qaeda. Despite his history as a supporter of terrorism overseas, Qaddafi had a long history of repressing it at home, just as with any other form of political opposition. The pan-Islamism of al-Qaeda was anathema to his key ideologies of direct democracy (guided by himself). This meant the United States and Libya were now finally on the same team. As part of this post-9/11 sniffing of the wind, Qaddafi abandoned his fledgling Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program and finally agreed to pay reparations to the families of the victims of the Pan Am 107 flight downed over Lockerbie in 1987.This shift in Qaddafi’s policy did not altogether dispel his persona of brotherly leadership amongst African nations. As a bloc leader and an example of the possibility of ‘coming in from the cold’, Qaddafi and Libya were reintegrated into the world community. This included giving a speech at the United Nations in 2009. This event did little to add to his reputation as a statesman in the West. Given a 15-minute slot, the Libyan leader delivered a rambling address over 90 minutes long, which included him tearing up a copy of the UN Charter and turning his back to the audience whilst continuing to speak.Qaddafi: The Clown From the Western point of view, performances like this painted Qaddafi’s behaviour as increasingly bizarre. Particularly after Libya’s rapprochement with the West, the label of threatening terrorist supporter faded and was replaced with something along the lines of a harmless clown prince. Tales of the Libyan leader’s coterie of virgin female bodyguards were the subject of ridicule, as was his ardour for US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Perhaps this behaviour was indicative of a leader increasingly divorced from reality. Surrounded by sycophants dependent on his regard for their tenure or physical survival, as well as Western leaders eager to contrast his amiability with that of Saddam Hussein, nobody was prepared to draw attention to the emperor’s new clothes.Indeed, elaborate and outlandish clothing played an increasing role in Qaddafi’s persona as the decades went on. His simple revolutionary fatigues of the early years were superseded by a vast array of military uniforms heavily decorated with medals and emblems; traditional African, Arab or Bedouin robes depending on the occasion; and in later years a penchant for outfits that included images of the African continent or pictures of dead martyrs. (In 2009 Vanity Fair did a tongue-in-cheek article on the fashion of Colonel Qaddafi entitled Dictator Chic: Colonel Qaddafi—A Life in Fashion. This spawned a number of similar features including one in TIME Magazine entitled Gaddafi Fashion: The Emperor Had Some Crazy Clothes.)The Bedouin theme was an aspect of persona that Qaddafi cultivated as an ascetic “man of the people” throughout his leadership. Despite having many palaces available he habitually slept in an elaborate tent, according once again with Weber’s description of the charismatic leader as one who eschews methodical material gain. This predisposition served him well in the 1986 United States bombing, when his residence in a military barracks was demolished, but Qaddafi escaped unscathed as he was in his tent at the time. He regularly entertained foreign dignitaries in tents when they visited Libya and he took one when travelling abroad, including pitching it in the gardens of a Parisian hotel during a state visit in 2007. (A request to camp in New York’s Central Park for his UN visit in 2009 was denied; “Inside the Tents of Muammar Gaddafi”).The role of such a clown was unlikely to have been an aim for Qaddafi, but was instead the product of his own increasing isolation. It will likely be his most enduring character in the Western memory of his rule. It should be noted though that clowns and fools do not maintain an iron grip on power for over 40 years.The Legacy of Qaddafi’s Many Personas Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was a clever and complex leader who exhibited many variations of persona during his four decades of rule. These personas were generally facets of the same core self-belief of a charismatic leader, but could be conflicting, and often confusing, to observers. His eccentricities often hid a layer of deeper cunning and ambition, but ultimately led to his marginalisation and an impression by world leaders that he was untrustworthy.His erratic performance at the UN in 2009 perhaps typifies the end stages of Qaddafi’s leadership: a man increasingly disconnected from his people and the realities of what was going on around him. His insistence that the 2011 Libyan revolution was variously a colonial or terrorist inspired piece of theatre belied the deep resentment of his rule. His role as opponent of the Western and Arab worlds alike meant that he was unsupported in his attempts to deal with the uprising. Indeed, the West’s rapid willingness to use their airpower was instrumental in speeding on the rebel forces.What cannot be disputed is the chaotic legacy this charismatic figure left for his country. Since the uprising climaxed in his on-camera lynching in October 2011, Libya has been plunged in to turmoil and shows no signs of this abating. One of the central reasons for this chaos is that Qaddafi’s supremacy, his political philosophies, and his use of messianic persona left Libya completely unprepared for rule by any other party.This ensuing chaos has been a cruel, if ironic, proof of Qaddafi’s own conceit: Libya could not survive without him.References Al-Gathafi, Muammar. The Green Book: The Solution to the Problem of Democracy; The Solution to the Economic Problem; The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory. 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