Academic literature on the topic 'Islam and state – Arab countries'
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Journal articles on the topic "Islam and state – Arab countries"
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Garipova, Rozaliya. "Shari’a and ‘traditional Tatar Islam’." Anthropological Journal of European Cultures 27, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 105–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/ajec.2018.270116.
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Like all the elites of post-Soviet Muslim countries, the political elite and religious officials in Russia have been in the search of a moderate and strictly national Islamic identity, to keep the Muslim population of Russia separate from Arab or Turkish versions of Islam that could be politicised and thus had the potential to undermine the state structure. ‘Tatar traditional Islam’ emerged through this framework.
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Akbar, Idil. "Khilafah Islamiyah: Antara Konsep dan Realitas Kenegaraan (Republik Islam Iran dan Kerajaan Islam Arab Saudi)." Journal of Government and Civil Society 1, no. 1 (February 22, 2018): 95. http://dx.doi.org/10.31000/jgcs.v1i1.265.
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Khilafah concept became one of the discussions that stick out lately, not least in Indonesia. But how is this concept, especially that applied in the Islamic state? This article presents a comparison of Islamic governmentbased concepts with two different traditions, namely the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The purpose of this paper is to show the differences between the two concepts as well as to discuss how the implementation carried out in the two countries that use Islam as the basis of the state. Conceptually Saudi Arabia and Iran have differences in the application of the state system and its government. Saudi Arabia with the monarchy concept and Iran with the concept of republic. But the similarity between the two is that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran is not a state that ideally reflects the Khilafah state as established in the state system of the era of Khulafaur Rashidin.Keyword: : Khilafah; Imamah, Saudi Arabia, Iran, State and Islamic Government
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Sa'dudin, Ihsan, and Eka Safitri. "PERKEMBANGAN KONSEP PENDIDIKAN BAHASA ARAB DI ASIA TENGGARA." Lisanan Arabiya: Jurnal Pendidikan Bahasa Arab 3, no. 02 (April 9, 2020): 177–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.32699/liar.v3i2.1201.
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Arabic education is a necessity for people who are Muslim. Islam is spreadthroughout the world including the Southeast Asian region. Southeast Asia, whichincludes the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singaporeand others who have a majority Muslim population. Islam entered the regionpeacefully, making it easier for development and its spread. The development andspread of Islam along with learning Arabic, because Arabic is the language of theMuslim holy book. However, the provision of education and learning in Arabicvaries from country to country even though it is still in one region of SoutheastAsia. The concepts of Arabic language education applied are strongly influencedby the state of government in these countries.
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Putra, Gilang Rizki Aji. "Sistem Peradilan Pada Kerajaan Arab Saudi." ADALAH 6, no. 4 (July 5, 2022): 15–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.15408/adalah.v6i4.26993.
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Judicial bodies in countries exhibit enormous differences and variations. The judicial system and its organization in countries are closely related to the history of the country concerned. The organizational structure of judicial power varies from one country to another. Differences in the composition of judicial power also occur because of the shape of the state, for example in the form of a federation and a royal state. The composition of judicial power in a federal state is reflected in the organizational structure and jurisdiction of the judiciary, such as in Malaysia, while the organizational structure of judicial power in a royal state is reflected in the organizational structure of judicial power, such as in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia's judiciary can be one of the choices of the modern justice system and it is interesting to study because of several things, first of all, Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad SAW. and Islam is a role model for people around the world, but this country has a different government system from other Muslim countries.
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Stepkin, E. A. "On Political Islam in Palestine." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 5(44) (October 28, 2015): 168–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-5-44-168-172.
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Abstract: This article deals with analyzing the place and the political Islam occupies on the Palestinian territories. The author tries to prove that despite the “Arab spring” and growing popularity of Islamism in the neighbor Arab countries its popular support among Palestinians is low. The main reason for this is Israeli total control of political, economic and - partially - social processes taking place in the West Bank. Position of the officials in Ramallah who together with Tel-Aviv strictly contain spread of Islamism throughout the West Bank also has a strong suppressing effect. Central Palestinian leadership may be called one of the few secular political establishments that are still in power in the Arab countries. The main explanation for this is the desire to make a positive effect on the international community, which Palestine totally depends on in political and financial terms. Also one should keep in mind secular beliefs of the current political elite in Palestine. President Mahmoud Abbas with his counterparts from FATAH and PLO represent old type of Arab nationalist politicians, almost all of who were stripped from power after the beginning of “Arab spring” in 2011. Finally, Palestinian society itself still feels united by the idea of national liberation from the Israeli occupation. This helps Palestinians to put aside the issue of religious self-identification. According to the surveys, most of Palestinians still rank their national identity number while describing their identity, while religion comes only second (despite the strong stable tendency for growing Islamization of their views). The only Palestinian enclave where political Islam has gained ground is isolated Gaza Strip. However ruling there “Islamic Resistance Movement” (HAMAS), despite declared anti-Zionism and Islamism, in reality show pragmatic readiness for certain coordination of its actions with Israel and central government in Ramallah. Nowadays one can witness the deepening conflict within the Islamist camp - between HAMAS and more radical Salafists, who support “Islamic State” in Iraq and Syria. In the final end the fate of Political Islam in Palestine will depend on the success of Middle East peace process.
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El-Said, Hamed, and Jane Harrigan. "Globalization, International Finance, and Political Islam in the Arab World." Middle East Journal 60, no. 3 (July 1, 2006): 444–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.3751/60.3.12.
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This article looks at one important aspect of globalization in the Arab World, namely the provision of international finance by the US, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank in support of economic liberalization programs. This flow of international finance has been partly determined by geopolitical factors and in some countries has resulted in a decline in state provision of social welfare, increased poverty, and increased inequality. Not only has this form of globalization been increasingly challenged by Islamist groups, but many such groups have moved in to provide social capital and fill the welfare gap created by the gradual withdrawal of the state from socio-economic affairs. Globalization has thus strengthened the hand of political Islam and undermined the political legitimacy of incumbent regimes.
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Hindi, Dr Hazim Wattam. "Army's division and war methods in the age of fatemi sfate." ALUSTATH JOURNAL FOR HUMAN AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 218, no. 2 (November 9, 2018): 19–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.36473/ujhss.v218i2.537.
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The subject of the army in the Fatimid period (296-567 AH) from the perspective of the mission in the life of the Arab Islamic state, the era of medieval Islam witnessed the emergence of one of the most powerful countries in the Arab Maghreb, which three centuries ago, presented the finest Islamic systems in all aspects , The Fatimid great state, and the mother is known, the Fatimid state has been subjected to Judean, and denial due to examinations. It consisted of three sections, dealing with human tissues in the Fatimid army.
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SHKVARUN, MAKSIM, and SEJRAN ISKENDEROV. "HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS OF ISLAM IN THE XXI CENTURY." Sociopolitical sciences 10, no. 5 (October 30, 2020): 134–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.33693/2223-0092-2020-10-5-134-140.
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The subject of the research is the degree of influence of Sunni and Shi’ism on political processes in Arab countries. The object of the research is Islam as the legal basis of the state. The authors examine in detail such aspects of the topic as the historical analysis of the origin of Islam, the reasons for the division of Islam into Sunnis and Shiites, a comparative analysis of the two branches of Islam, the peculiarities of the legal schools of Islam, the interaction of Sunnis and Shiites with state power. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of interpretations (kalams) of the Qur’an and Sunnah. The study is fundamental and is aimed at the historical and political analysis of Islam in the XXI century. The relevance of this topic is confirmed by numerous studies of the described problems. The main conclusions of the study are that one of the key problems in the Arab states is the issue of the origin of power, which remains relevant even in the XXI century. The authors’ special contribution to the study of the topic is the hypothesis that the radicalism of Islam is associated with its short history in comparison with Christianity. Thus, Islam in the XXI century. is still at an active stage of formation, which leads to the emergence of Islamic terrorist organizations. The novelty of this scientific study lies in the consideration of historical processes in the political discourse of the XXI century.
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Naumkin, V. V., I. A. Zaripov, V. A. Kuznetsov, and V. V. Orlov. "The strategies of building relations between the State and Islam in Russia and in the Arab World." Minbar. Islamic Studies 14, no. 1 (April 7, 2021): 13–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.31162/2618-9569-2021-14-1-13-49.
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This article is dedicated to the issues of relations between the state and Islam in Arab countries (Algeria, Egypt, Syria) and in Russia in the contemporary era. Despite the fundamental diff erences between political systems and diff erent experiences in relations between the state and religion, all these societies are facing similar threats and challenges in recent years, causing certain parallels between policies towards Islam. This work is based on both published materials and around 20 interviews with experts, politicians and religious leaders from the researched countries recorded by the authors. The research allowed to defi ne common and diff erent traits of implemented political strategies, made it possible to show the infl uence of such processes as securitization of religion administrating, growing individualization of faith practicing, integration of religious institutions in the civil society structures on the transformation of StateIslam relationship models.
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الشيبة, فكري منصور محمد. "Meanings and Implications of Civil State from an Islamic Perspective." Journal of Social Studies 24, no. 4 (March 4, 2019): 119–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.20428/jss.v24i4.1479.
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This study aimed to assess the term ‘civil state‘ by considering its origin, concept, as well as its most important principles. The focus was also to see the term’s consistency or inconsistency with the religion of Islam, or «whether the state in Islam is civil or religious». The study used the inductive descriptive method through tracking some Islamic evidence and contemporary jurisprudence opinions in this regard. The study pointed out that Islam started the notion of civil state long time ago before the Western civilization by calling for most of the essence of such principles called for by the West , although sometimes these principles are loosely used by the West. Also, sometimes western principles are not practiced in reality. However, most of them do not contradict the purposes of Islamic law if not called for by the Islam itself. In addition, Islam does not stop Muslims from benefiting from the civilization and cultural experiences of others, as long as that is in compliance with Islamic laws, and is intended to achieve the interests and progress of society. It is also possible to apply such experiences in our Islamic countries under the Islamic laws instead of indulging in a vicious circle of different ideological and sectarian conflicts that imposed heavy losses to the nation. The study concluded that there is no religious state «theocracy» of the Western meaning in Islam. The concept of ‘state’ in Islam is civil in terms of authority, religious in terms of legislation; or it is civil with religious reference. The study also indicated some obstacles and difficulties that hinder the application of such systems in our Arab and Islamic countries. Keywords: Civil state, Civil state in Islam, Islam’s view of civil state.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Islam and state – Arab countries"
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Al-Olimat, Muhamad S. (Muhamad Salim). "The State of Democracy in the Arab World." Thesis, University of North Texas, 1995. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc279024/.
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This comparative study assesses the state of democracy and examines the process of democratization in the Arab World between the years 1980-1993. It addresses shortcomings in the mainstream democracy literature that excluded the Arab World from the global democratic revolution on political cultural grounds. To fulfil the objectives of this study, I employ both the qualitative and quantitative research approaches to test a number of hypothesized relationships. I hypothesize that transition to democracy is negatively associated with economic development, militarism, U.S. foreign policy, the political economy of oil, and dependency. I contend that emerging civil society institutions so far have had no significant effect on democratization in the Arab World. Finally, I hypothesize that the level of democracy in the Arab World is influenced greatly by the issue of civil rights. In order to investigate the hypothesized relationships, the following data sets have been used: Gastil's Freedom House Data set, "Repression and Freedom in the 1980s" data set, and Vanhanen's 1990 data set. The findings of this study support the aforementioned hypothesized relationships. I find that Arab countries, in general have made modest progress toward democracy, making the Arab World part of the global revolution.
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Eraikat, Abdul K. "Education in the Arab-Islamic world." Thesis, Edith Cowan University, Research Online, Perth, Western Australia, 2008. https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/243.
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Education in the Arab countries is discussed in the light of ongoing international educational reform. It is argued that education in the Arab/Muslim world faces serious problems. Educational reform cannot be achieved in isolation; it has to be part of a full scale reform that tackles social, economic and cultural issues. It is contended that cultural values, economic, social and political factors in the Arab/Muslim societies have contributed a great deal to the backwardness of education within Arab/Muslim societies. Questions such as whether Arabs/ Muslims could cope with the new trends in education, and whether they would be able to respond to the new ICT revolution and globalisation are addressed. It is also argued that Arabs/Muslims respond to globalisation and ICT in different ways each according to their perspective. This paper explores in detail the factors that shape education in the Arab world. It also attempts to shed light on relations between Arabs/Muslims and the West, considering how they have understood or misunderstood each other throughout the course of history. It is argued here that globalisation has been understood as Westernisation in the Arab/Islamic world due to a long history of mistrust and misunderstanding between the two. However, before undertaking this exploration, a brief summary of the historical background of Arabs I Muslims is provided.
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Jones, Kevin Wampler. "The Arab Quest for Modernity: Universal Impulses vs. State Development." Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University, 2007. https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/2113.
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The Arab Middle East began indigenous nation building relatively late in the twentieth century. Issues of legitimacy, identity, and conflicts with the West have plagued Arab nations. Arab states have espoused universal ideologies as solutions to the problems of Arab nation building.
The two ideologies of Pan-Arabism and Islamic modernism provided universal solutions to the Arab states. Both Pan-Arabism and Islamic modernism gained validity in political polemics aimed against colonialism, imperialism, Zionism, and the West. Both ideologies promised simple solutions to complex questions of building modern Arab society. Irrespective of ideology, Arab states have always acted in self-interest to perceived external threats. The West has perpetuated universal solutions to Arab nation building through continued intervention in the Middle East. The Arabs perpetuated universal solutions to Arab- nation building as panacea to the problems of becoming modern nations.
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Badaro, Samer A. "The Islamic revolution of Syria (1979-1982) : class relations, sectarianism, and socio-political culture in a national progressive state." Connect to resource, 1987. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1144850076.
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Carroll, Will. "Hamas and the Arab state a transnational terrorist social movement's impact on regimes in the Middle East /." Diss., Connect to the thesis, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10066/728.
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Kostrzebski, Edward W. "The shadow of Muhammed : developing a charismatic leadership model for the Islamic world." Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2002. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion-image/02Jun%5FKostrzebski.pdf.
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Alkhezaimy, Ahmed Ali. "The rule of law debate in the Arab countries : the case of the UAE constitution beyond the polarity of either modernity or Islam." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.498229.
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Karim, Karim H. (Karim Haiderali) 1956. "Constructions of the Islamic peril in English-language Canadian print media : discourses on power and violence." Thesis, McGill University, 1996. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=42064.
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This is an inquiry into cultural constructions of "Islamic violence" in dominant Northern discourses. Mainstream Canadian journalism's participation in these discourses is analyzed within the context of its cultural and structural integration into global media networks. Media materials are scrutinized using critical discourse, dramatistic, and ritual analysis methodologies. The thesis follows Hamid Mowlana's suggestion that inquiries into international communication flows should move beyond traditional paradigms of inter-national relations (in which nation-states are the primary objects of study) to consider intra- and transnational participants as well.Borrowing from Jacques Ellul, this study examines the importance of myth as a fundamental basis of communication. However, unlike Ellul, it also explores alternatives to the operations of dominant communication structures. Edward Said's critique of Orientalism informs the analysis of Northern portrayals of Muslim societies; but the dissertation attempts to avoid overstating the Orientalist discourses' hegemony by proposing a model of competition among dominant, oppositional and alternative discourses on "Islam."
Mainstream media's adherence to dominant technological myths and their general reticence about the structural and direct violence of elite states are examined. Distinct similarities are found between the utopic orientations and technical operations of dominant Northern and Muslim discourses, as well as in Jewish, Christian and Muslim conceptions of holy/just war. The proliferation of contemporary Northern images about "Islam" are traced historically to four primary stereotypes about Muslims.
Examinations of the supposedly objective and secularist media reportage on terrorism show differences in portrayal according to the perpetrators' religions. Analyses of the coverage of wars involving peoples of Muslim backgrounds in the Middle East, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the former USSR demonstrate the tendency of dominant journalistic scripts to attribute diverse political, economic and territorial conflicts to a monolithic "lslam" The dissertation traces how the global media narrative's transformation of Saddam Hussein from an ally of the West to a demonic despot was aided by according him "Islamic" characteristics. It also looks at the emergence of "Islam" as a post-Cold War Other. Lastly, proposals made by scholars and journalists for enhancing inter-cultural communication between Northern and Muslim societies are considered.
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Wehbe, Rabih. "Islam et Chiisme politique." Thesis, Lyon, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018LYSE2013.
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Dans un essai qui aurait tout aussi bien pu s'intituler « L'islam chiite entre la politique et la religion, le cas du Liban », une analyse de l'islam politique demeure nécessaire pour mettre la lumière sur la différence entre islamisme et religion musulmane. Avec un peu moins de deux milliards de musulmans dans le monde, la religion musulmane est devenue la première religion pratiquée dans le monde actuel. Le dynamique de cette religion a permis la création d'un immense empire aux populations hétérogènes. Ainsi que, la coexistence entre religion et régime politique a provoquée de véritables luttes armées entre les grandes familles politico-religieuses, notamment le sunnisme et le chiisme. Le sunnisme ayant souvent l'étiquette d'orthodoxie a gardé cette aspect alors que le chiisme devint autres chose ce qu'il était à l'origine, lorsqu'on y voyait seulement le parti qui s'était rassemblé autour d'Ali ibn Abî Tâlib, cousin et gendre du prophète Mohammad. Dans ses quelques traitements de la doctrine islamique nous constatons que ces familles politico-religieuses, tant sunnites que chiites, proliférèrent les unes à côté des autres en même temps qu'elles se combattirent et souvent se condamnèrent réciproquement. Ceci est dû au fait qu'en l'islam, il n'y a jamais eu de pouvoir interprétatif qualifié, individuel ou collégial capable de s'imposer sans conteste.L'effondrement de l'Empire Ottoman donna l'occasion à la France et la Grande-Bretagne de partager le monde arabe sur la base des fameux accords Sykes-picot. La France va restructurer les territoires syrien et libanais, elle établit la structure constitutionnelle confessionnelle complexe du Liban, faisant du pays de Cèdre le plus grand laboratoire du communautarisme. Dans le Liban d'après-guerre, le communautarisme va de soi, il reflète l'état de la société et celle de la conciliation entre spécificités confessionnelle et principe fondamental de l'Etat nation. Le communautarisme libanais va évoluer à travers des mutations économiques, sociales et politiques, notamment chez la communauté chiite. Nous présenterons l'évolution de la communauté chiite dans cet environnement, ainsi que le rôle fondamental joué par Moussa el-Sadr dans la libération de la communauté chiite. Son objectif étant une réaction à la conscience politique du «Metwali». Sa première action était la lutte contre les inégalités sociales et devait s'engager avec l'Etat libanais dans une série d'affrontements qui couvraient souvent un aspect spectaculaire: grève générale en 1970, avertissement au gouvernement et à la réunion de 1974 à Baalbeck que Moussa-El -Sadr a annoncé la naissance du mouvement AMAL. Ce mouvement joue un rôle essentiel dans la vie politique libanaise. Enfin, nous consacrons une partie de ce travail à l'émergence d'une milice radicale pro-iranienne chiite, le Hezbollah, qui a pénétré le système politique libanais. Sa place est privilégiée à cause de ses succès dans la résistance contre Israël, de ses actions sociales et humaines et de ses organisations. La timide participation du « parti de Dieu » au parlement libanais constituait un premier pas vers la « libanisation » du parti. En 2012, le parti chiite annonce sa participation aux combats en Syrie à côté de l'armée de Bachar el-Assad, freinant ainsi le processus de libanisation. Le Hezbollah devient un des acteurs incontournables de la géopolitique du Moyen Orient et retourne en force sur la scène politique libanaise pour s'inscrire dans le cadre d'un chiisme politique internationalIn an essay that might as well have been entitled "Shia Islam between politics and religion, the case of Lebanon", an analysis of political Islam remains necessary to shed light on the difference between Islamism and religion Muslim. With just under two billion Muslims in the world, the Muslim religion has become the first religion practiced in the world today.The dynamics of this religion allowed the creation of an immense empire with heterogeneous populations. As well as, the coexistence between religion and political regime provoked real armed struggles between the big politico-religious families, notably Sunnism and Shiism.Sunnism often had the label of orthodoxy, but Shiism became something else that it was originally when one saw only the party that had gathered around Ali ibn Abi. Tâlib, cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Mohammad. In his few treatments of Islamic doctrine we find that these politico-religious families, both Sunni and Shiite, proliferated alongside each other at the same time that they fought each other and often condemned each other. This is due to the fact that in Islam there has never been a qualified, individual or collegiate interpretative power capable of imposing itself unquestionably.The collapse of the Ottoman Empire gave France and Britain the opportunity to share the Arab world on the basis of the famous Sykes-picot agreements. France will restructure the Syrian and Lebanese territories, it establishes the complex confessional constitutional structure of Lebanon, making the country of Cedar the largest laboratory of communitarianism. In post-war Lebanon, communitarianism is self-evident, reflecting the state of society and the reconciliation of confessional specificities with the fundamental principle of the nation-state. Lebanese communitarianism will evolve through economic, social and political changes, especially among the Shia community.We will present the evolution of the Shiite community in this environment, as well as the fundamental role played by Moussa el-Sadr in the liberation of the Shia community. His goal is a reaction to the political conscience of "Metwali". Its first action was the fight against social inequalities and was to engage with the Lebanese State in a series of clashes that often covered a spectacular aspect: general strike in 1970, warning to the government and to the 1974 meeting in Baalbeck that Moussa-El -Sadr announced the birth of the AMAL movement. This movement plays a vital role in Lebanese politics. Finally, we devote part of this work to the emergence of a radical pro-Iranian Shiite militia, Hezbollah, which has penetrated the Lebanese political system. His place is privileged because of his successes in the resistance against Israel, his social and human actions and his organizations. The timid participation of the "party of God" in the Lebanese parliament was a first step towards the "libanization" of the party. In 2012, the Shiite party announced its participation in the fighting in Syria next to the army of Bashar al-Assad, thus curbing the process of Lebanization. Hezbollah becomes one of the key players in the geopolitics of the Middle East and returns in force on the Lebanese political scene to be part of an international political Shiism
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El, Gadhafi Hamida. "La protection constitutionnelle des droits de l'Homme dans le monde arabe : étude comparée (Maroc, Algérie, Tunisie, Égypte)." Thesis, Paris 10, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA100048.
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La protection constitutionnelle des droits de l’homme dans le monde arabe repose sur un processus complexe de démocratisation qui s’est accéléré après le Printemps arabe de 2011. L’émergence des droits de l’Homme s’impose comme un projet politique fort dans tous les pays qui sont l’objet de notre étude (Tunisie, Égypte, Algérie, Maroc) et nous démontre que le concept démocratique, dans son acception universaliste, n’est pas incompatible avec l’Islam. La constitutionnalisation des droits de l’Homme reste un apport majeur des mouvements constitutionnalistes qui ont érigé la constitution au rang de norme suprême de l’État de droit. Malgré l’instrumentalisation des constitutions par les dirigeants arabes et l’utilisation abusive de l’état d’urgence, nous assistons au rôle croissant du juge constitutionnel dans la protection des libertés fondamentales (contrôle constitutionnel) sous l’œil vigilent de la société civile et de la communauté internationaleThe constitutional protection of human rights in the Arab world is based on a complex process of democratization that has accelerated after the Arab Spring of 2011. The emergence of human rights is a strong political project in all the countries that are the subject of our study (Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco) and shows us that the democratic concept, in its universalist sense, is not incompatible with Islam. The constitutionalization of human rights remains a major contribution of the constitutionalist movements that have made the constitution a supreme norm of the rule of law. Despite the instrumentalization of constitutions by Arab leaders and the misuse of the state of emergency, we are witnessing the growing role of the constitutional judge in the protection of fundamental freedoms (constitutional control) under the watchful eye of civil society and international community
Books on the topic "Islam and state – Arab countries"
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Arab nationalism: Between Islam and the nation-state. 3rd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.
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Ghadbian, Najib. Democratization and the Islamist challenge in the Arab world. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1997.
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The Arab world: Society, culture and state. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
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The Arab world: Society, culture, and state. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
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Ayubi, Nazih N. M. Political Islam: Religion and politics in the Arab world. London: Routledge, 1991.
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al- Taḥawwul al-dīmuqrāṭī wa-al-taḥaddī al-Islāmī fī al-ālam al-ʻArabī, 1980-2000. ʻAmmān: Dār al-Manār, 2002.
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Political succession in the Arab world: Constitutions, family loyalties, and Islam. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2009.
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Menschenrecht in arabo-islamischen Staaten: Am Beispiel Ägypten und Sudan. Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1999.
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Sambe, Bakary. Contestations islamisées: Le Sénégal entre diplomatie d'influence et islam politique. Montréal, Québec: Éditions Afrikana, 2018.
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Of empires and citizens: Pro-American democracy or no democracy at all? Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Islam and state – Arab countries"
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Tausch, Arno. "The Empirical Results of Our Empirical Study." In Political Islam and Religiously Motivated Political Extremism, 45–75. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24854-2_5.
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AbstractThe study clearly shows that identification with Turkey and Iran, with a political Islam that also influences elections and results in a theocracy, promotes religious and gender discrimination and advocates an Islamist interpretation of Islam, are very much the most important, interrelated syndromes of political Islam, which together explain more than 50% of the total variance of the 24 model variables used. If the states of Europe want to win the fight against jihadism, they must work closely with the moderate Arab states, such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Arab Gulf states, and be aware that, on a population-weighted basis, 41% of all Arabs now view the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the strongest and most coherent force in political Islam today, negatively or very negatively. According to the data brought to light here, only 7% of people in the Arab world now have a high level of trust in their country's Islamist movement, while 14% have some trust, 19% have little trust, but 60% have no trust. Our overall index—Overcoming political Islam shows that Morocco and Tunisia are the top performers, while Iraq and Sudan bring up the rear. Following an important study by Falco and Rotondi (2016), we also explore the question of whether political Islam is more prevalent or less prevalent among the more than 20% of the Arab population who plan to emigrate in the coming years than among the population as a whole. Far from feeding alarmist horror scenarios, our evaluation shows firstly that Falco and Rotondi (2016) are correct in their thesis that among potential migrants to the West, political Islam is certainly less pronounced than among the Arab population as a whole. On a population-weighted basis, only 13.11% of potential migrants to the West openly state that they trust the country-specific Islamist movement. In the second part of our empirical evaluations, we explore religiously motivated political extremism (RMPE) by international comparison on the basis of the following items of the World Values Survey, which are sparse but nevertheless available on this topic: The proportion of the global population who favour religious authorities in interpreting the law while accepting political violence is alarmingly high in various parts of the world and is raising fears of numerous conflicts in the coming years in an increasingly unstable world system. It amounts to more than half of the adult population in Tajikistan (the international record holder), and Malaysia and some non-Muslim-majority countries. In many countries, including NATO and EU member states, it is an alarming 25–50%, and we mention here the Muslim-majority countries Iraq, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Nigeria and Indonesia. It is 15–25% even in core countries of the Western security architecture, but also in the Muslim-majority countries: Pakistan, Iran and Tunisia. Only in the best-ranked countries, among them the Muslim-majority countries Albania, Egypt, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Jordan, the potentially fatal combination of mixing religion and law and accepting political violence has a relatively small following of less than 15%. In the sense of the theses of the late Harvard economist Alberto Alesina (1957–2020), social trust is an essential general production factor of any social order, and the institutions of national security of the democratic West would do well to make good use of this capital of trust that also exists among Muslims living in the West.
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Tausch, Arno. "Discussion and Conclusions of This Study in the Context of the Empirical Results Obtained." In Political Islam and Religiously Motivated Political Extremism, 77–81. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24854-2_6.
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AbstractWe have emphasised in this chapter that our findings do not fit into any simple political template of thinking that has existed for many years on the topic of “Islam” and “migration”. Our findings show that surveys authoritatively designed by Arab social science clearly measure “political Islam”, but that the phenomenon is less pronounced in the population that says it wants to emigrate to the West than in the Arab population as a whole. We have also clearly pointed out that the RMPE cannot be separated from the climate of lawlessness that many observers unfortunately now see rampant, especially in Western industrialised countries, and secondly, that the drivers of the key variables of the RMPE are rooted in such patterns of thought and values as the demand for a redistributive state, the apolitical young generation, the rejection of the neoliberal market economy, corruption and lawlessness as well as racism and xenophobia. The best blockades against the RMPE are feminism and secularism. An honest examination of the phenomenon of RMPE will also not be able to ignore the fact that especially in Catholic countries, where the decay of traditional values is progressing particularly fast, not only the acceptance of corruption but also of political violence is on the rise again. This problem also arises in countries with a confessional orientation towards Eastern religions. The rejection of free-market competition (competition is harmful) is also clearly linked to a higher acceptance of political violence, according to the World Values Survey. The results of our study on political Islam in the Arab world certainly also have some very shocking aspects that cannot simply be swept under the carpet. Weighted by population, the Arab Barometer data show that more than 70% of Arabs have a (sympathetic) understanding of the anti-American terror that culminated in 9/11 in Manhattan. More than 44% of Arabs favour Sharia with corporal punishment, more than 37% want the rights of non-Muslims in society to be less than those of Muslims, and more than 34% also want Sharia to restrict the rights of women. We finally highlight that following the late Harvard economist Alberto Alesina (1957–2020), social trust is an essential general production factor of any social order, and the institutions of national security of the democratic West would do well to make good use of this capital of trust that also exists among Muslims living in the West.
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Brown, Nathan J. "Constitutionalizing Islam in the Arab World." In Religion, State, and Society, 195–213. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230617865_11.
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Eyadat, Zaid, and Hanadi Riyad. "A Critique of al-Jabri’s Arab Ethical Reason." In Islam, State, and Modernity, 219–47. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59760-1_12.
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Hashas, Mohammed, Zaid Eyadat, and Francesca M. Corrao. "Introduction—Critique and Change: Al-Jabri in Contemporary Arab Thought." In Islam, State, and Modernity, 1–21. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59760-1_1.
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Viersen, Harald. "The Ethical Dialectic in al-Jabri’s “Critique of Arab Reason”." In Islam, State, and Modernity, 249–69. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59760-1_13.
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Hashas, Mohammed. "The Arab Possible State: From al-Tahtawi to al-Jabri." In Islam, State, and Modernity, 271–302. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59760-1_14.
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Barghouti, Abdul Karim, Jamal Daher, and Nadim Mseis. "The Critique of Arab Reason Between al-Jabri and Tarabishi." In Islam, State, and Modernity, 41–64. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59760-1_3.
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Carbone, Kinira Monica. "The Arab Reader by al-Jabri: The Question of Disjunction and Rejunction." In Islam, State, and Modernity, 65–78. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59760-1_4.
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Kersten, Carool. "Al-Jabri in Indonesia: The Critique of Arab Reason Travels to the Lands Below the Winds." In Islam, State, and Modernity, 149–67. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59760-1_8.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Islam and state – Arab countries"
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Samarkandy, Mohammad K. "Communication Satellite System for the Arab State Countries - Arabsat." In 1985 IEEE International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility. IEEE, 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isemc.1985.7566941.
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Guettaoui, Amel, and Ouafi Hadja. "Women’s participation in political life in the Arab states." In Development of legal systems in Russia and foreign countries: problems of theory and practice. ru: Publishing Center RIOR, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.29039/02061-6-93-105.
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The level of political representation of women in different legislative bodies around the world varies greatly. The women in the Arab world, is that as in other areas of the world, have throughout history experienced discrimination and have been subject to restriction of their freedoms and rights. Many of these practices and limitations are based on cultural and emanate from tradition and not from religion as many people supposed, these main constraints that create an obstacle towards women’s rights and liberties are reflected in the participation of women in political life. Although there are differences between the countries, the Arab region in general is noted for the low participation of women in politics. Universal suffrage has become common in most countries, but there are still some Arab women who are denied such rights.
There have been many highly respected female leaders in Arab history, such as Shajar al-Durr (13th century) in Egypt, Queen Orpha (d. 1090) in Yemen. In the modern era there have also been examples of female leadership in Arab countries. However, in Arabic-speaking countries no woman has ever been head of state, although many Arabs remarked on the presence of women such as Jehan Al Sadat, the wife of Anwar El Sadat in Egypt, and Wassila Bourguiba, the wife of Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia, who have strongly influenced their husbands in their dealings with matters of state. Many Arab countries allow women to vote in national elections. The first female Member of Parliament in the Arab world was Rawya Ateya, who was elected in Egypt in 1957. Some countries granted the female franchise in their constitutions following independence, while some extended the franchise to women in later constitutional amendments.
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Traifeh, Hanadi, Raad Bin Tareaf, and Christoph Meinel. "E- Learning Experiences from the Arab World." In 2nd International Conference on Advanced Research in Education. Acavent, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.33422/2nd.educationconf.2019.11.791.
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Although most Arab countries offer free public education, the majority of their educational systems do not prepare students for the labour market or equip them with the skills needed to compete in today’s global society. Teaching methods and techniques do not encourage critical and analytical thinking, and are still teacher-centred instead of being designed with intentional focus on students and learners. E-learning technologies have the potential to address most of these challenges. For example, digital technologies can make education more efficient, scalable and accessible. And with the wide spread of the internet in the region, an increased adoption of e-learning has been witnessed among Arab students and life-long learners. To assess the current state of the e-learning sphere in the Arab world, we conducted a survey to learn more about the digital learning experiences of Arab students. In this paper, we report our findings. Most of the 200 participants who responded to our survey hold a bachelor degree and higher, and claimed to spend more than 4 hours online. However, only 19.5% of all participants have enrolled in an Arabic e-learning program or MOOC, and 70% still prefer to take their courses in English. We also assess the different factors Arab learners take into consideration when joining an online course, and also explore the reasons that lead 80% of participants not to join any online courses. Our observations show that adoption of digital learning in the Arab world is very low but has significant potential for growth. The paper concludes with recommendations on how to spread digital learning in the region.
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Park, Bill. "THE FETHULLAH GÜLEN MOVEMENT AS A TRANSNATIONAL PHENOMENON." In Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/befj6390.
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THE FETHULLAH GÜLEN MOVEMENT AS A TRANSNATIONAL PHENOMENON Bill Park This paper investigates the apparent paradox thrown up by the distinctively Turkish roots and contents of Fethullah Gülen’s philosophy on the one hand, and the movement’s edu- cational activities beyond Turkey and its promotion of interfaith dialogue on the other. It considers how far the movement has been able to transcend its ‘Turkishness’. In the Turkic world, primarily in Central Asia and Azerbaijan, the paper offers an assessment of the extent to which the movement generates an emulative or transformational response, perhaps con- tributing to the emergence of a non-territorial ‘Turkic’ nation or identity. In that context, the paper considers the degree to which the movement can be seen as ‘pan-Turkic’ in terms of its aspirations and effects. Turning to its activities in the non-Turkic world, the paper tries to establish whether the movement should be regarded as a primarily Turkish or primarily Muslim agency, and what kind of impact this creates in host countries. In chiefly Islamic host countries, to what degree is the movement engaged, intentionally or otherwise, in a competition with more radical interpretations of Islam? Or is the movement’s approach to Islam rooted too exclusively in a Turkish context? This leads into a consideration of whether the movement is an agency for a ‘Turkish model’ approach to blending Islam with modernity and democratisation, and whether this suggests either competition or tacit alliance with the Turkish state in this regard. Finally, with respect to interfaith dialogue, is the movement’s contribution seen as narrowly Turkish in its applicability, or as resonating in and of utility to the wider Muslim world?
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Al-Malk, Afnan, Jean-Francois Maystadt, and Maurizio Zanardi. "The Gravity of Distance: Evidence from a Trade Embargo." In Qatar University Annual Research Forum & Exhibition. Qatar University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.29117/quarfe.2021.0171.
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On June 5, 2017, an airspace blockade was imposed on the State of Qatar by four of its neighbors: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. We study the exogenous increase in air transportation costs with non-blockading countries to examine the effect of increased travel distance on bilateral trade. Based on a gravity model estimated with a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood, we find a distance elasticity of trade between -0.3 and -0.5. Our findings revise downwards cross-sectional estimates of the distance elasticity of trade and confirm more recent estimates exploiting similar time-varying shocks to distance.
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Hawamdeh, Hani Awni. "Al Thumama Stadium: Local and Global Architectural Reach." In International Conference on the 4th Game Set and Match (GSM4Q-2019). Qatar University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.29117/gsm4q.2019.0024.
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The world cup stadia have been a constant concern for the hosting countries. Many of them have become a burden on the economies of their countries, only to become white elephants after the tournaments end. Therefore, the core mission of the Supreme Committee for Delivery & Legacy in Qatar was to ensure that the World Cup Stadiums are built with a legacy and to remain functional in the long run, not just as facilities, but as cultural icons. Such efforts have promoted the exercise of stadia building in Qatar as a positive and unique experience. As a firm, we, at Arab Engineering Bureau, are honored to be part of the effort all through the making of Al Thumama Stadium, which will be discussed in this paper. Instead of a white elephant, Al Thumama Stadium is arguably a symbol of the local identity that will become part of the World Cup legacy, whilst being a state-of-the-art facility that plays a vital role in development of its surrounding neighborhood.
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Filip, Schneider. "Etnografický obraz Arabov v Byzancii 10. storočia." In Orientalia antiqua nova XXI. Západočeská univerzita v Plzni, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24132/zcu.2021.10392-97-119.
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Roman historians developed a tradition of placing ethno graphic information into their works. The “Other” was an everyday reality of the Roman state. With its expansion more nations came into its orbit and thus to the attention of its writers. Arabs were among many others whom the Romans confronted. The position of the Arabs changed rapidly since the emergence of Islam in the 7th century. From a peripheral nation they became the major superpower in the East. The Roman/Byzantine perception did change due to various factors, such as the emergence of new religion as well as military expansion of the newly founded Arab state. It was in this period when ethnographic tradition under went a major transformation. Ethnography was in decline with snippets of information throughout literary works instead of vast descriptions of the “Other” as known in antiquity. Merging the snippets, however, a more coher ent image may occur. The aim of this paper is to look on the ethnographic information about Arabs in three literary works of the 10th century Byzantium – the Taktika, De administran do imperio and History of Leo the Deacon. Arabs will be analysed under the scope of elements that affected Byzantine perception on them – religion, military, and ethnic stereotypes. With the analysis I intend not only to gain a more coherent picture about the ethnographic perception of the Arabs in Byzantium, but also the differ ence of the perception among its various social classes.
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شریف اسماعیل, سركوت. "The impact of the foreign relations of the Iraqi state on the Anfal operations, (America) is a model." In Peacebuilding and Genocide Prevention. University of Human Development, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.21928/uhdicpgp/15.
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"The Anfal crime of 1988 was a series of political, military and propaganda campaigns carried out by Saddam's Ba'athist regime against a part of the Kurdish people.In this process, all the means of genocide were used, from killing, slaughter, arrest, expulsion and expulsion to the demolition of houses, burning of fields and gardens and looting of their livestock and belongings. The Ba'ath regime's excuse for this crime was nothing but religious and political propaganda that the Kurdish nation had deviated from Islam and had turned against the state These excuses were to justify his crime because the process was named after a chapter of the Holy Qur'an, which was Anfal. For such a big and heinous crime, of course, you have to make all the internal and external factors available before you start, because without the availability of both factors, it would have been impossible for such a big and important process to succeed Therefore, Saddam's Ba'athist regime had secured international and external factors along with the availability of domestic factors to a good extent, so it carried out the process in such a comprehensive and widespread manner. The United States, which was one of the most powerful and influential countries of the time, had a strong relationship with Saddam and the Iraqi government in all political, military, economic and other aspects The Americans, who served Saddam Hussein's regime in the success of the Anfal process, not only provided military and logistical assistance to the Iraqi government, but also provided intelligence assistance to the regime On the other hand, for the sake of the Ba'ath and Saddam regimes, he had cut off all kinds of cooperation from the Kurds and refused to even welcome the Kurdish representatives when they wanted to convey the truth about the Anfal crime to the US and the world.This was one of the reasons why Saddam's regime was protected from international condemnation and prosecution thanks to its cooperation and strong ties with the Americans."
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Demir, Emre. "THE EMERGENCE OF A NEO-COMMUNITARIAN MOVEMENT IN THE TURKISH DIASPORA IN EUROPE: THE STRATEGIES OF SETTLEMENT AND COMPETITION OF GÜLEN MOVEMENT IN FRANCE AND GERMANY." In Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/bkir8810.
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This paper examines the organisational and discursive strategies of the Gülen movement in France and Germany and its differentiation in Turkish Islam in Europe, with the primary focus on the movement’s educational activities. The paper describes the characteristics of organisational activity among Turkish Muslims in Europe. Then it analyses two mainstream religious-communitarian movements and the contrasting settlement strategies of the “neo- communitarian” Gülen movement. Despite the large Turkish population in western Europe, the movement has been active there for only about ten years – relatively late compared to other Islamic organisations. Mainly, the associational organisation of Turkish Islam in Europe is based on two axes: the construction/ sponsoring of mosques and Qur’anic schools. By contrast, the Gülen movement’s members in Europe, insisting on ‘the great importance of secular education’, do not found or sponsor mosques and Qur’anic schools. Their principal focus is to address the problems of the immi- grant youth population in Europe, with reintegration of Turkish students into the educational system of the host societies as a first goal. On the one hand, as a neo-communitarian religious grouping, they strive for a larger share of the ‘market’ (i.e. more members from among the Turkish diaspora) by offering a fresh religious discourse and new organisational strategies, much as they have done in Turkey. On the other hand, they seek to gain legitimacy in the public sphere in Germany and France by building an educational network in these countries, just as they have done in Central Asia and the Balkans region. Accordingly, a reinvigorated and reorganised community is taking shape in western Europe. This paper examines the organizational and discursive strategies1 of the Gülen movement in France and Germany and it is differentiation in Turkish Islam in Europe. We seek to analyse particularly the educational activities of this movement which appeared in the Islamic scene in Diaspora of Europe for the last 10 years. We focus on the case of Gülen movement because it represents a prime example amongst Islamic movements which seek to reconcile-or ac- commodate- with the secular system in Turkey. In spite of the exclusionary policy of Turkish secular state towards the religious movements, this faith-based social movement achieved to accommodate to the new socio-political conditions of Turkey. Today, for many searchers, Gülen movement brings Islam back to the public sphere by cross-fertilizing Islamic idioms with global discourses on human rights, democracy, and the market economy.2 Indeed, the activities of Gülen movement in the secular context of France and Germany represent an interesting sociological object. Firstly, we will describe the characteristics of organizational ability of Anatolian Islam in Europe. Then we will analyse the mainstream religious-com- munitarian movements (The National Perspective movement and Suleymanci community) and the settlement strategies of the “neo-communitarian”3 Gülen movement in the Turkish Muslim Diaspora. Based on semi-directive interviews with the directors of the learning centres in Germany and France and a 6 month participative observation of Gülen-inspired- activities in Strasbourg; we will try to answer the following questions: How the movement appropriates the “religious” manner and defines it in a secular context regarding to the host/ global society? How the message of Gülen is perceived among his followers and how does it have effect on acts of the Turkish Muslim community? How the movement realises the transmission of communitarian and `religious’ values and-especially-how they compete with other Islamic associations? In order to answer these questions, we will make an analysis which is based on two axes: Firstly, how the movement position within the Turkish-Islamic associational organisation? Secondly, we will try to describe the contact zones between the followers of Gülen and the global society.
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Clement, Victoria. "TURKMENISTAN’S NEW CHALLENGES: CAN STABILITY CO-EXIST WITH REFORM? A STUDY OF GULEN SCHOOLS IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1997-2007." In Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement. Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.55207/ufen2635.
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In the 1990s, Turkmenistan’s government dismantled Soviet educational provision, replacing it with lower quality schooling. The Başkent Foundation schools represent the concerted ef- forts of teachers and sponsors to offer socially conscious education grounded in science and math with an international focus. This case study of the Başkent Foundation schools in Turkmenistan establishes the vitality of Gülen schools outside of the Turkish Republic and their key role in offering Central Asian families an important choice in secular, general education. The paper discusses the appeal of the schools’ curriculum to parents and students, and records a decade-long success both in educating students and in laying the foundations of civil society: in Turkmenistan the Gülen movement offers the only general education outside of state provision and control. This is particularly significant as most scholars deny that there is any semblance of civil society in Turkmenistan. Notes: The author has been conducting interviews and recording the influence of Başkent schools in Turkmenistan since working as Instructor at the International Turkmen-Turk University in 1997. In May 2007 she visited the schools in the capital Ashgabat, and the northern province of Daşoguz, to explore further the contribution Gülen schools are making. The recent death of Turkmenistan’s president will most likely result in major reforms in education. Documentation of how a shift at the centre of state power affects provincial Gülen schools will enrich this conference’s broader discussion of the movement’s social impact. The history of Gülen-inspired schools in Central Asia reveals as much about the Gülen movement as it does about transition in the Muslim world. While acknowledging that transition in the 21st century includes new political and global considerations, it must be viewed in a historical context that illustrates how change, renewal and questioning are longstanding in- herent to Islamic tradition. In the former Soviet Union, the Gülen movement contributed to the Muslim people’s transi- tion out of the communist experience. Since USSR fell in 1991, participants in Fethullah Gülen’s spiritual movement have contributed to its mission by successfully building schools, offering English language courses for adults, and consciously supporting nascent civil so- ciety throughout Eurasia. Not only in Turkic speaking regions, but also as far as Mongolia and Southeast Asia, the so-called “Turkish schools” have succeeded in creating sustainable systems of private schools that offer quality education to ethnically and religiously diverse populations. The model is applicable on the whole; Gülen’s movement has played a vital role in offering Eurasia’s youth an alternative to state-sponsored schooling. Recognition of the broad accomplishments of Gülen schools in Eurasia raises questions about how these schools function on a daily basis and how they have remained successful. What kind of world are they preparing students for? How do the schools differ from traditional Muslim schools (maktabs or madrasas)? Do they offer an alternative to Arab methods of learning? Success in Turkmenistan is especially notable due to the dramatic politicization of education under nationalistic socio-cultural programmes in that Central Asian country. Since the establishment of the first boarding school, named after Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, in 1991 the Gülen schools have prospered despite Turkmenistan’s extreme political conditions and severely weakened social systems. How did this network of foreign schools, connected to a faith-based movement, manage to flourish under Turkmenistan’s capricious dictator- ship? In essence, Gülen-inspired schools have been consistently successful in Turkmenistan because a secular curriculum partnered with a strong moral framework appeals to parents and students without threatening the state. This hypothesis encourages further consideration of the cemaat’s ethos and Gülen’s philosophies such as the imperative of activism (aksiyon), the compatibility of Islam and modernity, and the high value Islamic traditions assign to education. Focusing on this particular set of “Turkish schools” in Turkmenistan provides details and data from which we can consider broader complexities of the movement as a whole. In particular, the study illustrates that current transitions in the Muslim world have long, complex histories that extend beyond today’s immediate questions about Islam, modernity, or extremism.
Reports on the topic "Islam and state – Arab countries"
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HEFNER, Robert. IHSAN ETHICS AND POLITICAL REVITALIZATION Appreciating Muqtedar Khan’s Islam and Good Governance. IIIT, October 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.47816/01.001.20.
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Ours is an age of pervasive political turbulence, and the scale of the challenge requires new thinking on politics as well as public ethics for our world. In Western countries, the specter of Islamophobia, alt-right populism, along with racialized violence has shaken public confidence in long-secure assumptions rooted in democracy, diversity, and citizenship. The tragic denouement of so many of the Arab uprisings together with the ascendance of apocalyptic extremists like Daesh and Boko Haram have caused an even greater sense of alarm in large parts of the Muslim-majority world. It is against this backdrop that M.A. Muqtedar Khan has written a book of breathtaking range and ethical beauty. The author explores the history and sociology of the Muslim world, both classic and contemporary. He does so, however, not merely to chronicle the phases of its development, but to explore just why the message of compassion, mercy, and ethical beauty so prominent in the Quran and Sunna of the Prophet came over time to be displaced by a narrow legalism that emphasized jurisprudence, punishment, and social control. In the modern era, Western Orientalists and Islamists alike have pushed the juridification and interpretive reification of Islamic ethical traditions even further. Each group has asserted that the essence of Islam lies in jurisprudence (fiqh), and both have tended to imagine this legal heritage on the model of Western positive law, according to which law is authorized, codified, and enforced by a leviathan state. “Reification of Shariah and equating of Islam and Shariah has a rather emaciating effect on Islam,” Khan rightly argues. It leads its proponents to overlook “the depth and heights of Islamic faith, mysticism, philosophy or even emotions such as divine love (Muhabba)” (13). As the sociologist of Islamic law, Sami Zubaida, has similarly observed, in all these developments one sees evidence, not of a traditionalist reassertion of Muslim values, but a “triumph of Western models” of religion and state (Zubaida 2003:135). To counteract these impoverishing trends, Khan presents a far-reaching analysis that “seeks to move away from the now failed vision of Islamic states without demanding radical secularization” (2). He does so by positioning himself squarely within the ethical and mystical legacy of the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet. As the book’s title makes clear, the key to this effort of religious recovery is “the cosmology of Ihsan and the worldview of Al-Tasawwuf, the science of Islamic mysticism” (1-2). For Islamist activists whose models of Islam have more to do with contemporary identity politics than a deep reading of Islamic traditions, Khan’s foregrounding of Ihsan may seem unfamiliar or baffling. But one of the many achievements of this book is the skill with which it plumbs the depth of scripture, classical commentaries, and tasawwuf practices to recover and confirm the ethic that lies at their heart. “The Quran promises that God is with those who do beautiful things,” the author reminds us (Khan 2019:1). The concept of Ihsan appears 191 times in 175 verses in the Quran (110). The concept is given its richest elaboration, Khan explains, in the famous hadith of the Angel Gabriel. This tradition recounts that when Gabriel appeared before the Prophet he asked, “What is Ihsan?” Both Gabriel’s question and the Prophet’s response make clear that Ihsan is an ideal at the center of the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet, and that it enjoins “perfection, goodness, to better, to do beautiful things and to do righteous deeds” (3). It is this cosmological ethic that Khan argues must be restored and implemented “to develop a political philosophy … that emphasizes love over law” (2). In its expansive exploration of Islamic ethics and civilization, Khan’s Islam and Good Governance will remind some readers of the late Shahab Ahmed’s remarkable book, What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (Ahmed 2016). Both are works of impressive range and spiritual depth. But whereas Ahmed stood in the humanities wing of Islamic studies, Khan is an intellectual polymath who moves easily across the Islamic sciences, social theory, and comparative politics. He brings the full weight of his effort to conclusion with policy recommendations for how “to combine Sufism with political theory” (6), and to do so in a way that recommends specific “Islamic principles that encourage good governance, and politics in pursuit of goodness” (8).