Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Ireland – Foreign relations – European Economic Community countries'

This work is concerned with the demise of ‘British race patriotism’ in Australian political culture in the late 19505 and early 1960s. The organic ideal of British racial community was a founding ideological pillar of Australian nationality for much of this century, yet the declining relevance of these ideas, and the emergence of a more limited, exclusive conception of Australian ‘community’ has not been adequately addressed in the existing historical literature. In many respects, the waning appeal of ‘Britishness’ in Australia was a gradual and piecemeal process, but at the level of Australian political culture the shifts in outlook and assumptions occurred surprisingly rapidly, and converged largely around a single key event; namely, the first British application for membership of the European Economic Community in the years 1961 to 1963. The Macmillan Govemment’s painful choice between the discordant communities of ‘Europe’ and the ‘the British race’ provoked a crisis of British race patriotism in Australia, and prompted long overdue reflection, discussion and debate about the changing determinants of Australian nationhood in the post-war world. This occurred, not under the impetus of an instinctive dawning of an innate and assertive Australian nationalism as is often suggested, but in reaction to the demise of British race patriotism as a viable and credible framework for the ordering of Australian loyalties, priorities and policies. In the case of Britain's EEC membership application, it is significant that the revision of sentimental assumptions took place after it had become painfully self-evident that the United Kingdom was determined to pursue national interests and a national destiny that could no longer be reconciled with the traditional conception of organic Anglo-Australian community. The tensions and contradictions between ‘sentiment’ and 'self—interest‘, long inherent in Australia's political and economic ties to Great Britain, imploded under the impetus of the Macmillan Government's EEC aspirations. Before any limited. sovereign, national community could become fully imaginable in Australian political culture, it was a necessary precondition that the wider sense of British racial community should become ‘unimaginable’.

On 10 May 1994 the European Union offeredSouth Africa a package of measures to ... send a strong political signal to the incoming govemment and to the South African population, thus proving its firm determination to support the transition towards democracy and its willingness to contribute to the reconstruction and economic development of South Africa after the elections. This package consisted of two parts: 1. A series of short term implementations to take place with immediate effect to help South Africa's development and transition, and 2. An offer to negotiate a comprehensive long-term relationship with South Africa should the new government so request. South Africa accepted the European Union's offer to negotiate a long-term relationship, and in response requested membership of the structure governing the Union's relations with the rest of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and some countries in the Caribbean and Pacific, namely the Lomé Convention. Due to various incompatibilities South Africa was not allowed to join this organisation. In its place the European Union offered to negotiate an agreement with South Africa that would lead to a Free Trade Area. This agreement was in keeping with the rules as laid down by the World Trade Organisation. It envisaged the lowering of tariffs and trade barriers between the Union and South Africa over a period not exceeding 12 years, allowing for asymmetry in terms of time constraints in implementation only. South Africa saw this type of agreement as inconsistent with the desire expressed by the European Union to support the countries development and the integration of the Southern African region. In its place South Africa proposed a new concept in trade agreement, this concept, known as the Trade and Development Agreement, embodied both trade liberalisation and support for development. This agreement would introduce a new paradigm of thought to govern trade between developed countries and developing countries within the World Trade Organisation's rules. This paper explores the events that unfolded in these negotiations. It attempts to discover whether, in the current global environment, it is possible, or beneficial, for the developed world to act in an altruistic manner towards another state in order to assist its development.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2004.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: One of the most notable features of the relations between the European Union and SADC is the current reconfiguration of their trading architecture as encapsulated in the Cotonou Agreement. Such a process of change can be shown to have inevitably been the result of policy shifts, which are salient characteristics of a global political economy, whose ontology is embedded theoretically in neo-liberalism. Nevertheless, any process of change in the structure of global trading relations has the logical outcome of systemically imposing either challenges or opportunities, and in some cases both, on the participants of that structure. This study represents a scholarly attempt at creating a lucid and descriptive embodiment of the challenges and opportunities involved for SADC in the negotiation and implementation of a Regional Economic Partnership Agreement (REPA) with the European Union. These challenges and opportunities, obligatory within a REPA framework are theoretically pronounced in as far as they shape the political economy of regional integration in SADe. The process of negotiating such a multifaceted agreement with a sophisticated partner, calls for institutional and negotiating capacity. Undoubtedly, such capacity is beyond the membership of SADe. The point is also emphasized that the process of trade liberalization, ingrained in a REPA will create a complex and difficult interface with the current SADC initiatives underway to deepen regional integration. Tellingly, these would contradict the cautious developmental and bottom up approach taken by SADC in its drive for regional integration. Conversely, this study concedes that a REPA with the EU holds a number of novel opportunities for SADC because such a process would provide scope for the fundamental restructuring of the SADC economies. The competitive pressures through decreased levels of protection within a REPA can create an upward convergence of low performing industries in the region. These, amongst others are important aspects if the political economy of SADC is to move into a virtuous cycle of deeper integration and ultimate insertion in the global economy.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Een van die mees opvallende kenmerke van verhoudinge tussen die Europese Unie (EU) en Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelingsgemeenskap (SAOG) is die huidige rekonjigurasie van handelsbetrekkinge, soos vervat in die Cotonou Ooreenkoms. Hierdie proses is die onafwendbare gevolg van beleidsveranderinge in die internasionale politieke ekonomie, met 'n. ontologie wat teoreties in neo-liberalisme gewortel is. Sodanige veranderinge in die struktuur van internasionale handelsverhoudinge. bied uitdagings sowel as geleenthede, en soms beide, aan deelnemers van sodanige struktuur. Hierdie studie is 'n akademiese poging om 'n helder en deskriptiewe blik te werp op die uitdagings en geleenthede vir die SAOG met betrekking tot die onderhandeling en implimentering van die Regionale Ekonomiese Venootskapsooreenkoms (REVO) met die EU Hierdie uitdagings en geleenthede, wat verpligtend is binne die REVO struktuur, is teoreties belangrik in soverre as wat dit die politeke ekonomie van regionale integrasie in SADC beinvloed. Die onderhandelingsproses van so 'n komplekse dokument met gesofistikeerde vennote vereis intitusionele en onderhandelingskapasiteit. Hierdie kapasiteit is nie in SAOG te vinde nie. Die punt word ook benadruk dat die proses van handelsliberalisering, wat deel uitmaak van REVO, botsend kan wees met SAOG inisiatiewe om regionale integrasie te versterk. In essensie sal dit die huiwerige ontwikkelings en 'onder na ba' benadering, wat die SAOG tans volg, weerspreek. Aan die ander kant, gee die studie toe dat 'n REVO met die EU 'n hele aantal voordele inhou, aangesien so 'n proses momentum kan voorsien vir verreikende herstrukturering van SAOG ekonomieë. Die kompeterende druk a.g. v. 'n afname in beskermingsvlakke onder die REVO, kan lei tot 'n opwaartse neiging onder tradisionele swakpresterende nywerhede in die streek. Hierdie is onder andere belangrike aspekte wat SADC in gedagte moet hou, ten einde deel te word van die deugsame kringloop van dieper integrasie, en uiteindelike deelwording van die internasionale ekonomie.

The decade of the 1960s was a period of significant evolution in the foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Ireland. On 31 July 1961, Ireland applied for membership of the European Community. That application was vetoed in January 1963 by the French President, Charles de Gaulle. Nevertheless, it was an indication of the growing "Europeanisation" of Irish foreign policy, which was secured in May 1967 in a renewed and ultimately successful application by Ireland for membership of the Common Market. Because of the overlapping interests of the European Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), however, these initiatives towards integration with Western Europe posed a dilemma for the decision-makers in Dublin given that, in the Irish context, foreign policy was predicated on neutrality. Since Ireland's admission to the United Nations (UN) in 1955 and especially from the reinstatement of Frank Aiken as Minister for External Affairs in 1957, the diplomatic component of Ireland's neutrality was defined largely by its UN policy. Ireland's continued attachment to neutrality, despite its application for European Community membership, caused significant frustration to the governments of the member-states, especially France under de Gaulle, and was seen to be an obstacle to Ireland's accession. These concerns were communicated explicitly to Dublin, along with the view that Ireland needed to demonstrate a greater propensity to support Western interests on major international issues. Pressure of this kind had dissuaded other European neutrals (Austria, Finland, Malta and Sweden) from pursuing membership of the European Community until 1995 - after the Cold War had ended - but it did not deter the Irish. Despite the pressure from the European Community, Irish policy continued to be characterised by neutrality and, almost invariably, conflict with French UN policy. This included, amongst other matters, policy in relation to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the financing of peacekeeping, the Vietnam War, representation of China at the UN, and various decolonization problems in Southern Africa. This insulation of Ireland's foreign policy from the imperatives of the application for membership of the European Community was largely the product of the fragmentation of decision-making in the formulation of Irish diplomacy. This research project takes a unique perspective on the topic by focusing, in particular, on the period 1965 to 1972 and, also, breaks further new ground in utilizing documentary material only recently released by the National Archives in Dublin, the University College Dublin Archives, the Public Record Office, London, and the UN Archives in New York, along with published diplomatic records and secondary sources. Consequently, it offers an original contribution to our understanding of Irish foreign policy in this crucial period of its development and the capacity of the Irish Government to reconcile the two fundamental and apparently conflicting pillars of its foreign policy - neutrality and membership of the European Community.

The decade of the 1960s was a period of significant evolution in the foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Ireland. On 31 July 1961, Ireland applied for membership of the European Community. That application was vetoed in January 1963 by the French President, Charles de Gaulle. Nevertheless, it was an indication of the growing "Europeanisation" of Irish foreign policy, which was secured in May 1967 in a renewed and ultimately successful application by Ireland for membership of the Common Market. Because of the overlapping interests of the European Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), however, these initiatives towards integration with Western Europe posed a dilemma for the decision-makers in Dublin given that, in the Irish context, foreign policy was predicated on neutrality. Since Ireland's admission to the United Nations (UN) in 1955 and especially from the reinstatement of Frank Aiken as Minister for External Affairs in 1957, the diplomatic component of Ireland's neutrality was defined largely by its UN policy. Ireland's continued attachment to neutrality, despite its application for European Community membership, caused significant frustration to the governments of the member-states, especially France under de Gaulle, and was seen to be an obstacle to Ireland's accession. These concerns were communicated explicitly to Dublin, along with the view that Ireland needed to demonstrate a greater propensity to support Western interests on major international issues. Pressure of this kind had dissuaded other European neutrals (Austria, Finland, Malta and Sweden) from pursuing membership of the European Community until 1995 - after the Cold War had ended - but it did not deter the Irish. Despite the pressure from the European Community, Irish policy continued to be characterised by neutrality and, almost invariably, conflict with French UN policy. This included, amongst other matters, policy in relation to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the financing of peacekeeping, the Vietnam War, representation of China at the UN, and various decolonization problems in Southern Africa. This insulation of Ireland's foreign policy from the imperatives of the application for membership of the European Community was largely the product of the fragmentation of decision-making in the formulation of Irish diplomacy. This research project takes a unique perspective on the topic by focusing, in particular, on the period 1965 to 1972 and, also, breaks further new ground in utilizing documentary material only recently released by the National Archives in Dublin, the University College Dublin Archives, the Public Record Office, London, and the UN Archives in New York, along with published diplomatic records and secondary sources. Consequently, it offers an original contribution to our understanding of Irish foreign policy in this crucial period of its development and the capacity of the Irish Government to reconcile the two fundamental and apparently conflicting pillars of its foreign policy - neutrality and membership of the European Community.

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Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009.
Europe and Africa share a long history that is characterized both by oppression and development. The relationship between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries is a particularly important aspect of EU development cooperation policy. The developmental history between the EU and Africa started with the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969, which were replaced by the Lomé Convention. Unfortunately, the favourable terms and preferential access for the ACP countries to Europe failed and the Lomé Convention was replaced by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in 2000. As a result of a WTO-waiver, the discriminatory non-reciprocal trade preferences, which were previously enjoyed under the Lomé Convention, continued until December 2007. The Cotonou Agreement points out that these trade preferences will be replaced by joint WTOcompatible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). During the EPA negotiations, the EU preferred to negotiate on a regional basis instead of negotiating with the ACP as a whole or with individual countries. Consequently, Sub-Saharan Africa formed two negotiation groups; the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) EPA group and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA group, represented by the five Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries, together with Mozambique and Angola. Although Southern Africa is the region that leads the continent; from an economic perspective, the Southern African states show considerable disparities. Due to the economic differences between South Africa and the BLNS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland), the interests of the individual SACU countries are diverse and often contradictory, which resulted in complicated EPA negotiations. However, maintaining a favourable long-term trading relationship with the EU is of great importance to the economic and political well-being of the SADC, since the EU is the main trading partner of most African countries. By December 2007, an interim EPA (IEPA) was initialled by the BLNS countries as a result of the pressure to fall back to the unfavourable Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Due to the bilateral Trade Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) that is in force between South Africa and the EU, South Africa was not negatively influenced by the expiry of the WTO-waiver. The EPA will have a negative impact on regional integration within SADC and will promote distinction within the regional economic communities. Duty free, quota free access was offered to the BLNS countries, but the EU did not extend this offer to South Africa because of the developmental status of the country and the pre-existing TDCA. Consequently, South Africa will be required to export at higher prices and will experience increased competition within the region. The downside of the removal of import tariffs for the BLNS countries is that government revenues will decrease, which might result in income losses and will accentuate poverty. The standstill-clause of the IEPA prevents the SACU countries from diversifying economically and from developing new industries. The Most- Favoured Nation clause primarily impacts negatively on South Africa, since it prevents South Africa from negotiating freely with other countries such as Brazil and China. Furthermore, the strict intellectual property rules of the IEPA undermine access to knowledge and hereby fail to support innovation. The content of a chapter on liberalization of services, that will be included in the full EPA, is still being negotiated. Liberalization of services might lead to more foreign investments in the BLNS countries, as a result of which the quality of services will increase, leading to better education, infrastructure and more job opportunities. However, foreign companies will gain power at the expense of African governments and companies. South Africa is the main supplier of services in the BLNS countries and will therefore be confronted with economic losses when the services sector is liberalized. From an economic nationalist perspective, the EU included numerous provisions in the IEPA that were not necessary for WTO compatibility. However, the EU is aware of the importance of trade agreements for the BLNS countries and found itself in the position to do so to fulfil its own interests. By making use of the expiry date of the WTO waiver; the IEPA was initialled by the BLNS countries within a relatively short period of time. South Africa, in its own national interests, opposed the provisions of the IEPA, which has led to the negotiations deadlock. Because of the economic power and negotiating tactics of the EU and the selfinterested attitude of South Africa in this respect, regional integration is undermined and the poorest countries are once again the worst off. Although Economic Partnership Agreements have to be established, the partnership-pillar is, in my opinion, hard to find.

Defence date: 11 November 1999
Examining board: Prof. Richard Griffiths, Rijksuniversiteit, Leiden (supervisor) ; Prof. Dermot Keogh, University College, Cork (co-supervisor) ; Prof. Brigid Laffan, University College, Dublin ; Prof. Alan Milward, European University Institute, Florence
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017

Defence date: 2 October 1991
Examining Board: Prof. Gerard Braunthal, University of Massachussetts at Amherst ; Prof. Roger Morgan, European University Institute, supervisor ; Simon Nuttall, Director, Commission of the European Communities ; Rüdiger Freiherr von Wechmar, Ambassador a.D., MEP ; Prof. Dr. Werner Weidenfeld, University of Mainz, co-supervisor
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017

Defence date: 20 February 2009
Examining Board: Prof. Pascaline Winand (EUI/Monash University, Supervisor); Prof. N. Piers Ludlow (London School of Economics, Co-supervisor); Prof. Kiran Klaus Patel (EUI); Prof. Jan van der Harst (University of Groningen)
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
The thesis examines how the European Commission responded to the challenges posed by Britain’s and Ireland’s attempts to join the European Economic Community (EEC) between 1958 and 1972.1 The part played by the Commission in the enlargement process of the 1960s is one that has received little critical attention by scholars dealing with the history of European integration. Each chapter examines the enlargement question largely from the Commission’s perspective intertwined with British and Irish views. It therefore moves beyond the more traditional focus of scholarly research that has to date been almost exclusively based around national accounts of how the Community went from six to nine members in January 1973. This dissertation aims, in part, to fill this void in the history of the early years of the EEC.

Defence date: 29 April 2016
Examining Board: Professor Federico Romero (European University Institute EUI); Professor Youssef Cassis (European University Institute, EUI); Doctor N. Piers Ludlow (London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE); Doctor Morten Rasmussen (University of Copenhagen).
Awarded the Prize for the 'Best Thesis in EU Integration' at the European University Institute conferring ceremony on 9 June 2017
September 25, 1972, marked the end of the most bitterly fought political struggle of Norwegian postwar history. With a slight majority, those opposed to membership in the European Community (EC) prevailed in a popular referendum. With the Norwegian 'no', the date also marked the first non-enlargement of the EC. This thesis investigates how a group of diplomats – who worked throughout the 1960s and early 1970s to negotiate a Norwegian EC membership – became Europeans. Being a European meant developing an emotional and professional conviction that membership in the EC was a good thing in itself. But it also entailed a certain displacement: who the Europeans were and how they worked with the EC-case was determined by their in-betweenness. The study of who the Europeans were, and how they worked with the EC-case, is structured around a three-level analysis: 1)The anthropo-institutional investigation 2)The discursive framework, and 3)The study of the Europeans' diplomatic practice regarding the EC-case. The Europeans profoundly shaped Norwegian European policy between 1960 and 1972, helping to redirect the Norwegian postwar foreign policy in quite a fundamental way, and also changed the Community itself. The Europeans were forged into a community and received their political potency/weakness from their in-betweenness: both professionally and personally invested in the membership issue, their actions lay between traditional diplomacy and politics, their ideas, practices and spaces were constituted between 'Europe' and 'Norway' in multiple ways, and their ultimate task remained to bridge the division between the two entities. In brevity, the thesis tells the story of a handful of Norwegian diplomats that became passionately pro-European in the 1960s, and who worked to get Norway on the inside of the EC – a failed elite, shaped in the middle, which nonetheless made a lasting, yet untold, mark on Norway, Europe and the diplomatic trade.