Books: 'Investor firms'

1

Pinkowitz, Lee. Do firms in countries with poor protection of investor rights hold more cash? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003.

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2

Harris, Andrea. Comparative financial performance analysis of Canadian co-operatives, investor-owned firms, and industry norms. Saskatoon: Centre for the Study of Co-operatives, University of Saskatchewan, 1996.

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3

Hubbard, R. Glenn. Benefits of control, managerial ownership, and the stock returns of acquiring firms. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1995.

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4

Srinivasan, R. The cost of debt and the risk-adjusted discount rate for owner cash-flows: Co-operatives vs. investor-owned firms. Bangalore: Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, 2007.

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5

Impavido, Gregorio. Institutional investors, stock markets and firms information disclosure. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics, 1998.

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6

Vigna, Stefano Della. Investor inattention, firm reaction, and Friday earnings announcements. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005.

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7

Vigna, Stefano Della. Investor inattention, firm reaction, and Friday earnings announcements. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005.

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8

The embedded firm: Corporate governance, labor, and finance capitalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

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9

Jovanovic, Boyan. When should firms invest in old capital? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008.

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10

Schijndel, Geert-Jan C. Th. van. Dynamic firm and investor behaviour under progressive personal taxation. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1988.

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11

van Schijndel, Geert-Jan C. Th. Dynamic Firm and Investor Behaviour under Progressive Personal Taxation. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-46637-3.

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12

Leuz, Christian. Do foreigners invest less in poorly governed firms? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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13

Leuz, Christian. Do foreigners invest less in poorly governed firms? Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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14

Murray, Gordon. Managing investors' risk in venture capital financed, new technology based firms. York: ESRC Risk & Human Behaviour Programme, 1995.

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15

G, Martin Peter. The investor's guide to fidelity funds. New York: Wiley, 1989.

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16

Richard, Simmons. Buffett step-by-step: An investor's workbook : learn to analyze and apply the techniques of the master investor. London: Financial Times Pitman, 1999.

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17

Becker, Bo. Does shareholder proxy access improve firm value: Evidence from the business roundtable challenge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, 2010.

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18

Buckley, Peter J. Foreign direct investment by smaller UK firms: The success and failure of first-time investors abroad. 2nd ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988.

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19

Tse, Kit Yee. How ECRM helps online securities firms to keep online investors from the experience of Hong Kong. Oxford: Oxford Brookes University, 2003.

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20

Buckley, Peter J., Gerald D. Newbould, and Jane C. Thurwell. Foreign Direct Investment by Smaller UK Firms: The Success and Failure of First-Time Investors Abroad. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08231-5.

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21

Hoesch, Donata. Foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern Europe: Do mainly small firms invest? München: Ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 1998.

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22

Office, United States Government Accountability. Corporate shareholder meetings: Issues relating to firms that advise institutional investors on proxy voting : report to congressional requesters. Washington, DC: GAO, 2007.

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23

Stealing the market: How the giant brokerage firms, with help from the SEC, stole the stock market from investors. New York, NY: Basic Books, 1992.

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24

Mario, Miscali, ed. I signori del rating: Conflitti di interesse e relazioni pericolose delle tre agenzie più temute dalla finanza globale. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2012.

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25

Sherri, Pickinpaugh, ed. Fidelity select money: The complete investor's guide to track and improve Fidelity select mutual fund performance. Shrewsbury, Mass: ATL Press, 1997.

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26

United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. The effects of the global crossing bankruptcy on investors, markets and employees: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, second session, March 21, 2002. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2002.

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27

Vietnam. Pháp luật vè̂ tài chính đó̂i với các đơn vị có vó̂n đà̂u tư nước ngoài ở Việt Nam =: Financial law on firms with foreign invested capitals in Vietnam. [TP. Hò̂ Chí Minh]: Nhà xuá̂t bản Thành phó̂ Hò̂ Chí Minh, 1994.

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28

St John, Taylor. The Rise of Investor-State Arbitration. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198789918.001.0001.

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Today, investor–state arbitration embodies the worst fears of those concerned about runaway globalization—a far cry from its framers’ intentions. Why did governments create a special legal system in which foreign investors can bring cases directly against states? This book takes readers through the key decisions that created investor–state arbitration, drawing on internal documents from several governments and extensive interviews to illustrate the politics behind this new legal system. The corporations and law firms that dominate investor–state arbitration today were not present at its creation. In fact, there was almost no lobbying from investors. Nor did powerful states have a strong preference for it. Nor was it created because there was evidence that it facilitates investment—there was no such evidence. International officials with peacebuilding and development aims drove the rise of investor–state arbitration. This book puts forward a new historical institutionalist explanation to illuminate how the actions of these officials kicked off a process of gradual institutional development. While these officials anticipated many developments, including an enormous caseload from investment treaties, over time this institutional framework they created has been put to new purposes by different actors. Institutions do not determine the purposes to which they may be put, and this book’s analysis illustrates how unintended consequences emerge and why institutions persist regardless.

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29

George, Walker, Purves Robert, and Blair Michael. Part II Financial Services Regulation, 15 Financial Regulation in Commercial Disputes. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198793809.003.0015.

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This chapter examines the causes of action available to investors through the civil courts to resolve disputes with financial services firms. Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), persons in their capacity as an investor have a range of statutory protections, for example where an investor has cause for complaint against a firm as to the very wisdom of entering into an agreement for a particular financial product. Complaints may be resolved through the Financial Ombudsman Service or, where the firm is impecunious, referred to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Alternatively, an investor may seek a remedy through the civil courts. The chapter considers the relevant provisions of Part 1 (Statutory Causes of Action) and Part 2 (Causes of Action in Common Law) of FSMA, focusing on the right of the investor to claim for breach of contract, tort of negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.

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30

St John, Taylor. Why is Exit So Hard? Positive Feedback and Institutional Persistence. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198789918.003.0009.

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Chapter eight analyzes why institutions persist, even when they generate unintended consequences for the states that created them. The chapter sets out a typology of possible actions that governments can take to exit from investor–state arbitration. To date, governments have engaged in remarkably little exit. The second section explores how positive feedback has created a new constituency of law firms and investors with an interest in arbitration and therefore has led to a new politics of ISDS. The third section discusses other types of feedback that have stabilized and developed a dense web of commitments enshrining investor–state arbitration. The fourth section observes that over time, competitive dynamics emerged and define investor–state arbitration today: competition between law firms, arbitration organizations, and even jurisdictions hoping to host arbitrations makes exit and reform more difficult. The barriers to exit may be highest for capacity-constrained states.

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31

Guthrie, Graeme. A gadfly in the ointment. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190641184.003.0001.

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Modern corporations are characterized by the separation of ownership and control, with individual investors spreading their wealth over a large number of separate firms. This allows specialist managers to use their skills to run firms and individual investors to enjoy the benefits of diversifying the risks they face. Shareholders are able to influence the way firms are run by sponsoring proposals that are put to a shareholder vote, but few do so because they cannot share the costs of monitoring management with other shareholders and they must share the benefits with them. This chapter explains the source and consequences of the resulting free-rider problem using the example of gadfly investor Evelyn Y. Davis who, because of the personal benefits she earned from monitoring, spent decades creating havoc at firms’ annual shareholder meetings.

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32

Danny, Busch. Part II Investment Firms and Investment Services, 9 Agency and Principal Dealing under MiFID I and MiFID II. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198767671.003.0009.

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This chapter examines whether allowing the extent of the protection afforded to an investor under MiFID to be largely dependent on the distinction between dealing on own account on the one hand and trading on behalf of the client (and other forms of investment service) on the other is justified. The author submits that it is not. The distinction between dealing on own account and trading on behalf of the client is tenuous, arbitrary and easy to manipulate. According to the author, MiFID II provides no practicable criterion either, and resorts to the artifice of reclassifying certain types of dealing on own account as acting on behalf of the client. Finally, both the UK Government and the Dutch Supreme Court take the view that duties of care must also apply where an investment firm acts solely as an investor’s contractual counterparty.

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33

Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore., ed. The cost of debt and the risk-adjusted discount rate for owner cash-flows: Co-operatives vs. investor-owned firms. Bangalore: Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, 2007.

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34

Danny, Busch. Part II Investment Firms and Investment Services, 5 Product Governance and Product Intervention under MiFID II/MiFIR. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198767671.003.0005.

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This chapter analyses the product governance and product intervention rules introduced by MiFID II/MiFIR. It argues that the combination of these two approaches designed to exclude harmful products from the market is a major step forward in investor protection. However, complying with product governance rules will entail costs for the firms concerned. They will have to put in place the requisite internal procedures and there will be a statutory duty for the firm developing the product and the firm distributing it to exchange a considerable volume of information. All in all, the author believes that these extra costs are acceptable; and are dwarfed by the social costs of marketing harmful financial products. The author argues that MiFID II’s introduction of product governance rules and product intervention rules is common sense. It would be naive to think that product governance rules could in practice guarantee that harmful products are no longer marketed.

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35

Venture Capital Investors and Portfolio Firms. now publishers Inc, 2013.

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36

Danny, Busch, and Louisse Marije. Part II Investment Firms and Investment Services, 10 MiFID II/MiFIR’s Regime for Third-Country Firms. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198767671.003.0010.

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This chapter examines the scope of MiFID II/MiFIR’s regime for third-country firms. It explains MiFIR’s regime for third-country firms and MiFID II’s regime for third-country firms. It discusses the friction between both regimes in case a third-country firm provides investment services to eligible counterparties, professional clients, and retail investors. Next, it takes a detailed look at the initiative test. The conclusion sets out the provisions of MiFID II/MiFIR’s third-country regime.

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37

Investor Exits, Innovation, and Entrepreneurial Firm Growth. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.17226/12811.

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38

Styhre, Alexander. Corporate Governance, The Firm and Investor Capitalism. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781785364020.

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39

Barbiero, Francesca, Philipp-Bastian Brutscher, Atanas Kolev, Alexander Popov, and Marcin Wolski. Misallocation of Investment in Europe. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815815.003.0003.

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Using a pan-European, firm-bank matched data set, we find weak evidence of investment misallocation in Europe. Firms with higher debt overhangs invest significantly less, in particular in sectors that are facing good global growth opportunities. We also find that firms with higher debt overhangs are more likely to invest if they borrow from undercapitalized banks, and this effect is particularly strong in industries facing good global growth opportunities, suggesting a misallocation of investment associated with ‘zombie lending’. Our results are consistent with theories of investment misallocation due to agency problems at firms and at banks.

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40

Cumming, Douglas, ed. The Oxford Handbook of IPOs. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190614577.001.0001.

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Firms generally begin as privately owned entities. When they grow large enough, the decision to go public and its consequences are among the most crucial times in a firm’s life cycle. The first time a firm is a reporting issuer gives rise to tremendous responsibilities about disclosing public information and accountability to a wide array of retail shareholders and institutional investors. Initial public offerings (IPOs) offer tremendous opportunities to raise capital. The economic and legal landscape for IPOs has been rapidly evolving across countries. There have been fewer IPOs in the United States in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 financial crisis and associated regulatory reforms that began in 2002. In 1980–2000, an average of 310 firms went public every year, while in 2001–2014 an average of 110 firms went public every year. At the same time, there are so many firms that seek an IPO in China that there has been a massive waiting list of hundreds of firms in recent years. Some countries are promoting small junior stock exchanges to go public early, and even crowdfunding to avoid any prospectus disclosure. Financial regulation of analysts and investment banks has been evolving in ways that drastically impact the economics of going public—in some countries, such as the United States, drastically increasing the minimum size of a company before it can expect to go public. This Handbook not only systematically and comprehensively consolidates a large body of literature on IPOs, but provides a foundation for future debates and inquiry.

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41

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Advisory Group on Investment. Plenary Meeting and Centre for Co-operation with the Economies in Transition., eds. Small firms as foreign investors: case studies from transition economies. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996.

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42

Filatotchev, Igor. Private Equity Investors, Corporate Governance, and Performance of Ipo Firms. Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195391589.013.0017.

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43

Geert-Jan C. Th van Schijndel. Dynamic Firm and Investor Behaviour Under Progressive Personal Taxation. Brand: Springer, 1988.

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44

Bianchi, Marcello, Carmine Di Noia, and Matteo Gargantini. The EU Securities Law Framework for SMEs. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815815.003.0014.

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This chapter claims that the current EU securities and financial law falls short of delivering a satisfactory equilibrium between investor protection and limitation of issuer costs and may squeeze too many firms out of the market for both debt and equity capital. Based on the assumption that market participants are sometimes better suited to deciding how best to protect their own interests, the chapter submits a set of proposals largely based on optional rules that, we believe, could improve the quality of EU regulation. In contrast with the current regime, those options would be available irrespective of the trading venue where the relevant SME securities are traded, but they should also be allocated in a way that ensures sufficient standardization exists when needed. Matters covered by our proposal include takeovers, major shareholding disclosure, corporate governance statements, ongoing issuer disclosure duties, and prospectuses.

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45

Gordon, Jeffrey N. Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and Governance. Edited by Jeffrey N. Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.013.2.

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This chapter discusses the question of “convergence or persistence” in corporate law and governance. It first considers efforts to measure convergence directly by focusing on the evolution of law-on-the-books governance provisions before analyzing capital market evidence on convergence, with particular emphasis on capital market indicators such as the decline in “cross-listings” onto US stock exchanges by firms from jurisdictions with weaker investor protection and the increase in initial public offerings (IPOs) on emerging market stock markets. The chapter proceeds by reviewing evidence of divergence, especially “divergence within convergence,” and the failure of the European Union to produce more convergent corporate governance. It also looks at the “End of History” debate over whether corporate governance has converged on a “shareholder value” model and concludes by asking whether “stability” will become a general objective of corporate governance convergence.

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46

What Every Fidelity Investor Needs to Know. Wiley, 2006.

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47

Nielsen, Kasper Meisner. Direct Investments in Private Firms by Institutional Investors: Issues And Evidence. Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195391589.013.0003.

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48

Fernandes, Nuno. Sovereign Wealth Funds. Edited by Douglas Cumming, Geoffrey Wood, Igor Filatotchev, and Juliane Reinecke. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198754800.013.29.

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This chapter examines investments of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in publicly traded firms, focusing on how these investments impact firms, and the potential channels through which their effects materialize. Using data that includes SWF holdings in 8,000 firms in 58 countries, we find that SWF investments have a positive effect on firm valuations and operating performance. The results are not driven by any particular SWF and are stronger for foreign SWF holdings. Additionally, we find evidence that after a large investment by SWFs, firms have better monitoring, expand their international operations, and are able to raise more capital as a consequence of the SWF investment. In terms of determinants of their holdings, we find that SWFs prefer large and profitable firms that enjoy significant external visibility. Additionally, they tend not to invest heavily in firms in high-tech industries or those operating in areas involving intensive research and development.

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49

Jonathan, Bonnitcha, Skovgaard Poulsen Lauge N, and Waibel Michael. 5 The Microeconomics of Investment Treaties. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198719540.003.0005.

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This chapter surveys the impact of investment treaties on decision-making at the firm and government levels. The focus is on whether investment treaties’ influence on the decisions of firms and states leads to improvements in efficiency. The first section examines the ‘hold-up’ problem, which provides the most influential and coherent microeconomic justification for the inclusion of investment protection provisions in investment treaties. The second section explores the problem of ‘fiscal illusion’ in host state decision-making, which could result in ‘over-regulation’ of foreign investment in the absence of an investment treaty. The third section considers whether investment treaties solve problems of discrimination against foreign investors, as well as the possibility that investment treaties lead to discrimination in favour of foreign investors.

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50

Paolo, Giudici. Part II Investment Firms and Investment Services, 6 Independent Financial Advice. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198767671.003.0006.

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The quickest policy indication for increasing households’ trust in financial markets, to the benefit of the economic system, seems to be the offer of professional financial advice on affordable terms. The problem is how to convince investors to pay for advice, and how to protect investors who do not want to pay for advice from conflicted advice and from hard sell under the guise of personal recommendation—an area where MiFID I has not performed well. MiFID II’s answer is to pose a new set of information duties on financial advisors with the clear intention of nudging investors towards independent, fee-only advice. The intention is good. However, the new regime raises many important issues, including the ambiguity of the ‘independent’ suit, the interaction between the product governance regime and the suitability assessment, the regulatory inconsistency that it is emerging between investment advice and portfolio management, and the potential costs of the written statement of suitability.

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Books on the topic 'Investor firms'

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