Relevant bibliographies by topics / Investment games

Academic literature on the topic 'Investment games'

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Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Investment games"

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Edmunds, Gillette. "Investment Games." Transactional Analysis Journal 33, no. 1 (January 2003): 68–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/036215370303300110.

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Smit, Han T. J., and Lenos Trigeorgis. "Flexibility and Games in Strategic Investment." Multinational Finance Journal 14, no. 1/2 (June 1, 2010): 125–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.17578/14-1/2-4.

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FLÅM, S. D., and Y. M. ERMOLIEV. "Investment, uncertainty, and production games." Environment and Development Economics 14, no. 1 (February 2009): 51–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x08004579.

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ABSTRACTThis paper explores a few cooperative aspects of investments in uncertain, real options. By hypothesis some production commitments, factors, or quotas are transferable. Cases in point include energy supply, emission of pollutants, and harvest of renewable resources. Of particular interest are technologies or projects that provide anti-correlated returns. Any such project stabilizes the aggregate proceeds. Therefore, given widespread risk aversion, a project of this sort merits a bonus. The setting is formalized as a two-stage, stochastic, production game. Absent economies of scale, such games are quite tractable in analysis, computation, and realization. A core imputation comes in terms of shadow prices that equilibrate competitive, endogenous markets. Such prices emerge as optimal dual solutions to coordinated production programs, featuring pooled commitments, or resources. Alternatively, the prices could result from repeated exchange.
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Leung, Chi Man, and Yue Kuen Kwok. "Patent-investment games under asymmetric information." European Journal of Operational Research 223, no. 2 (December 2012): 441–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.06.033.

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Suttinon, Pongsak, Asif Mumtaz Bhatti, and Seigo Nasu. "Option Games in Water Infrastructure Investment." Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management 138, no. 3 (May 2012): 268–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(asce)wr.1943-5452.0000168.

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Chen, Xin, and Zhisong Chen. "Cost allocation of capacity investment games." Naval Research Logistics (NRL) 60, no. 6 (August 5, 2013): 512–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/nav.21549.

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Anderson, Steven T., Daniel Friedman, and Ryan Oprea. "Preemption Games: Theory and Experiment." American Economic Review 100, no. 4 (September 1, 2010): 1778–803. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1778.

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Several impatient investors with private costs Ci face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor i to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, V-Ci. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. A laboratory experiment confirms the model's main qualitative predictions: competition drastically lowers the value at which investment occurs; usually the lowest-cost investor preempts the other investors; observed investment patterns in competition (unlike monopoly) are quite insensitive to changes in the Brownian parameters. Support is more qualified for the prediction that markups decline with cost. (JEL C73, D44, D82, G31)
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Larson, Nathan. "Strategic Delay in Global Games." B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 16, no. 1 (January 1, 2016): 83–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2014-0062.

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AbstractWe study strategic uncertainty in an investment coordination game when players have the option to delay acting. Absent the option to delay, the global games literature shows that efficient equilibrium outcomes are possible only when they are also risk dominant. In contrast, we show that when delay is not too costly, strategic uncertainty can encourage delay in such a way that efficient investment occurs whenever it is “worth waiting for.”
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Smit, Han T. J., and Lenos Trigeorgis. "Valuing Infrastructure Investment: An Option Games Approach." California Management Review 51, no. 2 (January 2009): 79–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/41166481.

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Wintein, Stefan, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx, and Marieke Quant. "Multiple Fund Investment Situations and Related Games." Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 63, no. 3 (March 30, 2006): 413–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00186-006-0060-x.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Investment games"

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Lau, Wing Yan. "Two-person games on strategies of irreversible investment /." View Abstract or Full-Text, 2003. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?MATH%202003%20LAUW.

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Kao, Jennifer L. "Noncooperative games of information sharing and investment : theories and applications." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/30823.

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The thesis considers the effects of public policy with respect to disclosure on rivalrous competition in duopolies. Principal contributions to the stochastic oligopoly theories of information sharing include imbedding an investment stage in the standard noncooperative two-stage information sharing/output (pricing) games under a wide range of assumptions about effects of investment or distributions of returns, and investigating the extent to which altering the usual preference assumption to allow risk aversion may affect information choice. At an information sharing level, it is established that, besides being sensitive to the type of competition and the nature of information asymmetries, as previously reported in the literature, private incentives to disclose also depend importantly on both the impact of investment and risk preferences. In this regard, equilibrium levels of investment are shown to be affected nontrivially by variance effects from investment, risk attitude of decision makers, as well as the type of industry rivalry. Also characterized are the welfare orderings obtained as a consequence of these varying disclosure effects on the decisions and hence profits of competing firms. If alternative accounting practices are distinguishable along the informativeness dimension, then, at an abstract level, the analysis can be seen as approaching the study of many accounting issues from a distinctly different perspective than the familiar tax or wealth transfer viewpoints. The principal contributions to the accounting literature include identifying the impact of disclosure rules or rule changes on industry, consumers, and society as a whole, and offering insights to the accounting policy makers concerning the results of disclosure regulation.
Business, Sauder School of
Graduate
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Karlsson, Jennie. "Support in Strategic Investment Decisions : Using Option Games in an Uncertain and Competitive Environment." Thesis, Blekinge Tekniska Högskola, Institutionen för industriell ekonomi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:bth-17328.

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Fagart, Thomas. "Dynamic imperfect competition and irreversible investment." Thesis, Paris 1, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016PA01E023.

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Cette thèse analyse le rôle de l'irréversibilité de l'investissement sur la concurrence dynamique. Elle est composée de quatre articles théoriques et d'une introduction générale. Le deuxième chapitre s'intéresse à la possibilité de préemption en investissement irréversible, concurrence imparfaite et évolution de la demande aléatoire. Il montre qu'il n'y a pas de préemption sans sauts de demande. En effet, la linéarité des coûts d'investissement crée une incitation pour les entreprises à investir aussi vite que possible. Dès lors, il ne peut y avoir de préemption en l'absence d'évolution de la demande. Le troisième chapitre étudie la dynamique de la répartition de capacités au sein de l'oligopole, lorsque l'investissement est irréversible, la concurrence imparfaite et la demande aléatoire. Il montre que la dynamique de l'investissement a une propriété d'efficacité, et qu'une asymétrie entre capacité initiale peut se conserver à court terme, mais disparait à long terme. Le quatrième chapitre analyse les décisions d'investissement d'un duopole quand chaque entreprise peut investir dans deux types de capacités différentes. L'une des capacités permet de produire à un coût marginal plus faible, mais est plus chère à l'achat. Les entreprises sont contraintes financièrement en première période. A cause de cela, les entreprises peuvent utiliser les deux types de capacités en même temps, et il y a une possibilité de préemption. De plus, l'augmentation du prix de la capacité inefficace peut renforcer son utilisation. Le dernier chapitre étudie l'impact de l'irréversibilité de l'investissement sur la possibilité de collusion. L'irréversibilité de l'investissement réduit la profitabilité de la déviation de court terme, l'entreprise qui dévie ayant besoin d'augmenter sa capacité, mais crée aussi une incitation de long terme. En effet, l'investissement réalisé par l'entreprise qui dévie l'engage à un certain niveau de capacité dans le futur, permettant de préempter l'entreprise concurrente. A cause de cet effet de préemption, plus les entreprises sont patientes, plus la collusion peut être difficile à soutenir
This thesis studies the role of the irreversibility of investment on the dynamic imperfect competition. It is composed of four theoretical articles and a general introduction. The second chapter studies the role of demand evolution on the possibility of preemption under irreversible investment under imperfect competition. It shows there is no possibility of preemption when there is no jump of demand. Indeed, the linearity of investment cost creates no incentive for the firms to delay investment. When there is no demand evolution, this prevents preemption. The third chapter focuses on the dynamics of firms' capacity when the irreversibility of investment is partial. It shows that the investment dynamics exhibits an efficiency property, and that some initial asymmetry in capacity can be preserved in the short run, but disappears in the long run. The fourth chapter considers the investment choice of firms when there are two different productive capacities embodying different types of technology. One technology permits to produce at a lower marginal cost but the purchasing price of the capacity using this technology is higher. Due to the presence of a financial constraint, firms use different technologies at the same time, and a preemption equilibrium appears. Finally, this paper presents a counter intuitive policy result: an increase in the price of one of the capacities may increase its utilization. The last chapter studies the impact of the irreversibility of investment on collusion possibility. The irreversibility of investment reduces the profitability of short run deviation, as the deviating firm has to invest in order to increase its capacity, and it creates a long run effect. lndeed, once the deviating firr has invested, it is committed toits new capacity. The deviation may thus lead to a preemption of the punishing firm. This preemption effect can make collusion harder to sustain for more patient firms
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Olsson, Jessica, and Malin Wallvik. "Hantering av osäkerhet i strategiska investeringar : en kvalitativ undersökning på SME-företag i nordöstra Skåne." Thesis, Högskolan Kristianstad, Sektionen för hälsa och samhälle, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hkr:diva-11111.

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De flesta företag strävar i huvudsak efter att maximera värdet av sitt företag och ett sätt att öka värdet av företaget kan vara att genomföra investeringar. En viktig faktor för att lyckas med sina investeringar är att skapa en strategi och att följa denna är avgörande för att nå dit man vill. Strategier kan utformas på olika sätt, men gemensamt för alla strategier är att de måste hantera osäkerhet. Syftet med denna uppsats är att undersöka vad små- och medelstora företag upplever som osäkerhet vid investeringar samt hur företagen hanterar dessa. Valet av små- och medelstora företag grundar sig på att den största delen av tidigare forskning inom detta ämne är gjord på stora företag.   Forskningsstrategin för denna studie är explorativ, eftersom vi strävar efter att öka förståelsen kring ett delvis outforskat område. Vi har valt att avgränsa urvalet till företag inom industrisektorn i nordöstra Skåne. Studien utgörs av en kvalitativ metod, där djupgående intervjuer har genomförts med sex respondenter på olika företag. Tillsammans med respondenternas åsikter och tidigare forskning görs tolkningar av materialet vilket bidrar till skapande av slutsatser. De främsta slutsatserna som kan dras från denna uppsats är att osäkerhet vid investeringar hanteras väldigt olika beroende på företag, trots att de är verksamma inom samma sektor. Företagen använder olika typer av strategier för att hantera vad de upplever som osäkerhet, vissa i större utsträckning än andra.  Med denna uppsats önskar vi öka förståelsen för vilka osäkerheter som finns vid investeringar samt för hur denna osäkerhet kan hanteras. Vår intension är att små och medelstora företag ska, med hjälp av denna studie, kunna känna sig säkrare i sina investeringsbeslut i framtiden. Säkrare beslut leder till minskad osäkerhet och därmed ökar chanserna för lönsamma investeringar.
Most companies’ main goal is to maximize the value of their company and one way to increase the value of the company can be to invest. An important factor in order to succeed with an investment is to create a strategy and stick to it. Strategies can be structured in different ways, but what they all have in common is the need to manage uncertainties. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate what kind of uncertainty small- and medium sized enterprises experience when they invest, as well as how they manage this. Our selection of small- and medium sized enterprises is based on the fact that the majority of previous research within this particular subject investigates large companies. The research strategy in this thesis is mainly exploratory, since our goal is to increase the knowledge within this partly unexplored subject. We chose to narrow our selection down to companies within the industrial sector in the North East of Skåne. This thesis consists of a qualitative method, where in-depth interviews were conducted with six respondents from different companies. Together with the opinions from the respondents and previous research, interpretations were made which made it possible to create conclusions. The primary conclusion to be drawn from this thesis is that investment uncertainty can be managed in different ways depending on the company, even though the companies are operating within the same sector. The companies use different types of strategies in order to manage what they experience as uncertainty, although some of them use the strategies more than others. We wish to increase the understanding and the knowledge of existing uncertainties as well as how to manage these. Our intension is to help small- and medium sized enterprises feel more secure about their investment decisions in the future.  Safer decision-making results in reduced uncertainty thus increase the chances of making profitable investments.
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Koop, Matthew. "Mega Event Organizing Committees: Investment in Anti-Doping Personnel." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/34208.

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Peer reviewed literature currently provides little knowledge of how to recruit and train Doping Control Officers (DCOs) for Mega Sport Events. This study adds to the existing body of literature on creating knowledge transfer and legacy for future Mega Event Organizing Committees. A phenomenological designed study was conducted through the use of a qualitative on-line survey during the 2015 Toronto Pan American Games. A survey response rate of 58% was achieved. Survey responses by DCOs were analyzed using inductive coding to identify four main themes; i) DCO motivations, ii) training program design, iii) engagement and support, and iv) barriers to participation in the results. Recommendations include using mixed methods for future studies, provide DCOs with training and evaluation opportunities prior to the Mega Sport Event, and developing mentorship opportunities during games operations. Additional research is needed to create greater understanding of DCO motivations and perceptions beyond this study.
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Ivanov, Asen Vasilev. "Essays in behavioral economics in the context of strategic interaction." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1179515760.

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Le, Mai, and Sara Eriksson. "Investeringsbeslut i komplexa projekt : Fallstudie - Överdäckning av centralstationsområdet." Thesis, KTH, Fastigheter och byggande, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-254738.

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Vid investeringar i komplexa projekt finns det många aspekter att ta hänsyn till och det finns många metoder för att kunna utvärdera dessa investeringar. Komplexa projekt som en överdäckning där nya ytor tillskapas och befintliga trafikleder byggs över genererar fler nyttor än bara ekonomiska. Vid investeringsbeslut är det därav av stor vikt att kunna värdera investeringen med hänsyn till de aspekter som är av intresse.Samhällsekonomisk analys är en metod som ofta förekommer vid investeringsbeslut där fler än bara ekonomiska aspekter ska inkluderas. Metoden är välkänd och förekommer både i den akademiska sfären men används även praktiskt bland företag. En annan metod, option games är en nyare metod där förankring finns i teorin men inte har tillämpats i lika hög grad i praktiken.Syftet med detta arbete är att jämföra två metoder, samhällsekonomisk analys och option games. Detta för att bedöma vilken av metoderna som lämpar sig bäst vid investeringsbeslut i komplexa projekt. De två metoderna kommer att utvärderas med hjälp av tre valda bedömningskriterier. Metoderna utvärderas på hur väl de tar hänsyn till antaganden och indata, deras applicerbarhet i den aktuella fallstudien och slutligen hur omfattande metoden är. Arbetet är genomfört som en fallstudie och har applicerats på överdäckningen av Stockholms centralstation.Resultatet visar att samhällsekonomisk analys överlag är bättre än option games som metod för att generera beslutsunderlag för investeringar vid komplexa projekt. Dock finns det aspekter som option games tar hänsyn till men som saknas i den samhällsekonomiska analysen. Känslighetsanalysen pekar ut kalkylräntan som den viktigaste parameter i de båda metoderna.
There are many aspects to consider when investing in complex projects and there exist several methods to evaluate those investments. Complex projects such as a decking over existing thoroughfares engender new areas that generate more utility than just economic. Therefore it is of great importance in case of investment decisions to evaluate the investment with regards to the aspects of interest.Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) is a method used in contexts where more than just the economic aspects are included in the investment decision. The method is well-known and appears in both the academic field and practical at companies. A different method, Option Games is newer and so far mainly applied theoretical and not used in daily practice yet.The aim with this paper is to compare the two methods, Cost Benefit Analysis and Option Games. The goal is to assess which of the two methods best includes the aspects of interest when considering investment decisions for complex projects. The methods will be evaluated based on three selected criteria. Firstly, assumptions and inputs of the two methods. Secondly, their applicability in the current case study and finally the scope of the methods. The paper is conducted as a case study applied on the planned over decking of Stockholm Central station.The result indicates Cost Benefit Analysis to be the preferable method compared to Option Games. Cost Benefit Analysis generates a better foundation when investing in complex projects. Nevertheless, Option Games does regard some aspects that are not considered in the Cost Benefit Analysis method. The most important parameter for both methods is the discount rate in relation to the implemented sensitivity analysis.
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Reis, Gelson Antonio de Paula. "Modelo Matemático de Análise de Investimentos para um Jogo de Empresas." Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, 2006. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/8402.

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This work has as objective to adapt a mathematical model of analysis of investments for use in games of companies. The development of this proposal is an application of financial the determinísticos methods of economic engineering VPL, TIR and Payback, identifying the economic and financial viability of the simulated enterprises and standing out the methodology of the games of companies and the exercise of the process of decision taking, comparing the analysis projected in the beginning of the game with the results accomplished in the end of the game. Its accomplishment was accomplished with the exploitation of data generated for the pupils of disciplines of games of companies of the Program of After-graduation of the Engineering of Production of the Federal University of Saint Maria
Este trabalho tem como objetivo adaptar um modelo matemático de análise de investimentos para uso em jogos de empresas. O desenvolvimento desta proposta é uma aplicação dos métodos determinísticos financeiros da engenharia econômica VPL, TIR e Payback, identificando a viabilidade econômica e financeira dos empreendimentos simulados e ressaltando a metodologia dos jogos de empresas e o exercício do processo de tomada de decisão, comparando a análise projetada no início do jogo com os resultados realizados no final do jogo. A sua realização efetivou-se com o aproveitamento de dados gerados pelos alunos da disciplina de jogos de empresa do Programa de Pós-graduação da Engenharia de Produção- PPGEP da Universidade Federal de Santa Maria-UFSM
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Moura, Rui Jorge Caruço Barroso de. "Opções e jogos: intersecção das opções reais com a teoria de jogos na modelação dinâmica de investimentos em ambiente de incerteza e competitividade." Doctoral thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/10401.

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Doutoramento em Gestão.
A teoria de finanças empresariais estabelece que urn investimento deve ser realizado quando o seu Valor Actualizado Liquido for positivo. Ao considerar a decisão de investimento em termos de agora ou nunca, esta regra ignora a opção de adiar o investimento. Entretanto, a análise de opções reais - baseada na analogia entre a oportunidade de investimento em activos reais e os instrumentos financeiros derivados - melhorou, consideravelmente, o nosso entendimento sobre as decisões de investimento em ambiente de incerteza. Contudo, a maioria dos modelos de opções reais assume que as oportunidades se desenvolvem em ambientes monopolistas. 0 nosso trabalho analisa o efeito quer do valor da opção de espera quer do valor estratégico do investimento nos timings de investimento num cenário de duopólio - com empresas idênticas e inicialmente inactivas -, combinando a análise de opções reais com a teoria de jogos, "Opções e Jogos". Na presente tese, estabelecemos as funções-valor e as regras óptimas de investimento de urn novo modelo que incorpora, atraves de urn Movimento Geométrico Browniano, a incerteza associada à evolução do valor do projecto bern como a incerteza associada à chegada de novas oportunidades - recorrendo a urn processo de Poisson - e ainda interacções estratégicas.
Traditional corporate finance theory states that an investment project should be undertaken whenever its Net Present Value is greater than zero. This is generally incorrect since it considers only a now-or-never decision and ignores the value of the "option" to delay the investment. The real options literature has improved our understanding of investment problems under uncertainty. This literature stresses the similarity between a financial call option and the opportunity to invest in a real asset. However, most of the real options models assume implicitly a monopoly setting. One of our concerns consists in working out the joint effects of the value of the option to wait and the strategic value of investment, on the firms' timing on investment, in a duopoly setting, by combining game-theoretic and real options methods, Option Games. In our work we derive the strategic value functions and optimal investment rules of a new model, focused on specific and innovative settings regarding the evolution of the opportunity value, through a Geometric Brownian Motion, and the uncertainty related to the arrival of new opportunities - through a Poisson process - and the incorporation of strategic interactions.
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Books on the topic "Investment games"

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Nodgaard, Ulrik. Option games: Applications to investment timing. [s.l.]: typescript, 1995.

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Smit, Han T. J. Strategic investment: Real options and games. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.

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Lenos, Trigeorgis, ed. Strategic investment: Real options and games. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.

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Lenos, Trigeorgis, ed. Competitive strategy: Options and games. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2011.

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Ward, Vicky. The devil's casino: Friendship, betrayal, and the high-stakes games played inside Lehman Brothers. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2010.

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The science of winning: A random walk along the road to investment riches. 2nd ed. Harpenden: Oldcastle, 1995.

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Ward, Vicky. The devil's casino: Friendship, betrayal, and the high-stakes games played inside Lehman Brothers. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons, 2010.

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The devil's casino: Friendship, betrayal, and the high-stakes games played inside Lehman Brothers. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons, 2010.

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Zachary, Hesselbaum, ed. Cruising though retirement: A road map to protect you from Wallstreet games, ruinous healthcare costs and a government gone wild. 2nd ed. Tarentum, Penn: Word Association Publishers, 2015.

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Moore, Geoffrey A. The gorilla game: An investor's guide to picking winners in high technology. Oxford: Capstone, 1998.

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Book chapters on the topic "Investment games"

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Dockner, Engelbert J., and Kazuo Nishimura. "Dynamic Investment Games." In Optimization, Dynamics, and Economic Analysis, 214–25. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57684-3_18.

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Larsen, Kim G., Simon Laursen, and Jiří Srba. "Action Investment Energy Games." In Mathematical and Engineering Methods in Computer Science, 155–67. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36046-6_15.

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Arrow, Kenneth J. "Entry, productivity, and investment." In Markets, Games, and Organizations, 49–58. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24784-5_4.

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Cole, Harold L., George J. Mailath, and Andrew Postlewaite. "Investment and concern for relative position." In Markets, Games, and Organizations, 115–35. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24784-5_8.

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Dawid, Herbert, and Benteng Zou. "Strategies of Foreign Direct Investment in the Presence of Technological Spillovers." In Dynamic Games in Economics, 115–33. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54248-0_6.

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Watanabe, Takahiro. "Strategic Information Revelation Through Real Options in Investment Games." In Dynamics, Games and Science I, 769–84. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11456-4_51.

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Duarte, Isabel, Diogo Pinheiro, Alberto A. Pinto, and Stanley R. Pliska. "An Overview of Optimal Life Insurance Purchase, Consumption and Investment Problems." In Dynamics, Games and Science I, 271–86. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11456-4_18.

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Ben Brahim, Mouna. "Multi-Decision Players in R&D Investment Games." In Multiple Criteria Decision Making, 219–41. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68876-3_10.

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Zhao, Yuhan, Yunfei Ge, and Quanyan Zhu. "Combating Ransomware in Internet of Things: A Games-in-Games Approach for Cross-Layer Cyber Defense and Security Investment." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 208–28. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90370-1_12.

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Barcelona, Ricardo G. "Option Games Rivals Play." In Energy Investments, 151–74. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59139-5_7.

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Conference papers on the topic "Investment games"

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Miura-Ko, R. Ann, Benjamin Yolken, Nicholas Bambos, and John Mitchell. "Security investment games of interdependent organizations." In 2008 46th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing. IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/allerton.2008.4797564.

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Tziralis, G., A. Tolis, I. Tatsiopoulos, and K. G. Aravossis. "Economic aspects and the sustainability impact of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games." In ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND INVESTMENT ASSESSMENT 2006. Southampton, UK: WIT Press, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.2495/eeia060031.

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Yu Dongping. "Study of strategic investment option asymmetric exercise games equilibrium." In 2008 Chinese Control and Decision Conference (CCDC). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ccdc.2008.4597833.

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Lopez, Sonia B., Gabriel F. Baum, Fernando G. Olsina, Gerardo A. Blanco, and Christian Rehtanz. "Option games applied for investment in power generation capacity." In 2017 IEEE Manchester PowerTech. IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ptc.2017.7981085.

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Theodorou, Andreas, Bryn Bandt-Law, and Joanna J. Bryson. "The Sustainability Game: AI Technology as an Intervention for Public Understanding of Cooperative Investment." In 2019 IEEE Conference on Games (CoG). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cig.2019.8848058.

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Chen, Yiling, Biaoshuai Tao, and Fang-Yi Yu. "Cooperation in Threshold Public Projects with Binary Actions." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/15.

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When can cooperation arise from self-interested decisions in public goods games? And how can we help agents to act cooperatively? We examine these classical questions in a pivotal participation game, a variant of public good games, where heterogeneous agents make binary participation decisions on contributing their endowments, and the public project succeeds when it has enough contributions. We prove it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a cooperative Nash equilibrium such that the project succeeds. We demonstrate that the decision problem becomes easy if agents are homogeneous enough. We then propose two algorithms to help cooperation in the game. Our first algorithm adds an external investment to the public project, and our second algorithm uses matching funds. We show the cost to induce a cooperative Nash equilibrium is near-optimal for both algorithms. Finally, the cost of matching funds can always be smaller than the cost of adding an external investment. Intuitively, matching funds provide a greater incentive for cooperation than adding an external investment does.
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Wang, Haiyan. "Decomposition of Public Project Investment Based on Multi-Player Cooperative Games." In 2008 International Seminar on Future Information Technology and Management Engineering (FITME). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/fitme.2008.117.

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Yu, Sixie, David Kempe, and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. "Altruism Design in Networked Public Goods Games." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/69.

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Many collective decision-making settings feature a strategic tension between agents acting out of individual self-interest and promoting a common good. These include wearing face masks during a pandemic, voting, and vaccination. Networked public goods games capture this tension, with networks encoding strategic interdependence among agents. Conventional models of public goods games posit solely individual self-interest as a motivation, even though altruistic motivations have long been known to play a significant role in agents' decisions. We introduce a novel extension of public goods games to account for altruistic motivations by adding a term in the utility function that incorporates the perceived benefits an agent obtains from the welfare of others, mediated by an altruism graph. Most importantly, we view altruism not as immutable, but rather as a lever for promoting the common good. Our central algorithmic question then revolves around the computational complexity of modifying the altruism network to achieve desired public goods game investment profiles. We first show that the problem can be solved using linear programming when a principal can fractionally modify the altruism network. While the problem becomes in general intractable if the principal's actions are all-or-nothing, we exhibit several tractable special cases.
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Feng, Xue, Yanling Zhang, and Long Wang. "Coevolutionary dynamics of initial investment and reciprocation rate in continuous public goods games." In 2016 35th Chinese Control Conference (CCC). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/chicc.2016.7555001.

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Gorelik, Victor, and Tatiana Zolotova. "Stochastic Principles of Optimality in Games with Nature and Their Application in Investment Management." In 2021 14th International Conference Management of large-scale system development (MLSD). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mlsd52249.2021.9600220.

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Reports on the topic "Investment games"

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Ramachandran, Sivananth. Fun and Games: Investment Gamification and Implications for Capital Markets. CFA Institute, November 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.56227/22.1.17.

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Gamification and other behavioral techniques have many positive uses, such as education, but these methods could also be exploited to promote excessive trading. This paper analyzes the main issues and recommends reforms to prevent abuses.
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van der Maden, Edwin, Edmond Ringo, and Eunice Likoko. Scoping study on fruits and vegetables; results from Tanzania : an assessment of investment opportunities for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation opportunities for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The Hague: Wageningen Economic Research, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18174/553598.

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Hengsdijk, Huib, Yared Sertse, Sihin Tesfaye, and Eunice Likoko. Scoping study on fruits and vegetables; results from Ethiopia : an assessment of investment opportunities for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation opportunities for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The Hague: Wageningen Economic Research, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18174/553043.

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Dijkxhoorn, Youri, Jimi Talabi, and Likoko Eunice. Scoping study on fruits and vegetables; results from Nigeria : An assessment of investment opportunities for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The Hague: Wageningen Economic Research, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18174/554350.

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Guo, Xuezhen, Thomas Tichar, Balraj Sikka, Agarwal Bhoormal, Kumar Gesh, Narula Sapna, Kumar Anand, and Singh Kshyama. Scoping study on fruits and vegetables; results from India : An assessment of investment opportunities for the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The Hague: Wageningen Economic Research, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18174/552208.

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Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage Game Changers: A Compendium of Technologies and Enablers. Asian Development Bank, February 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.22617/tcs210260.

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This compendium showcases new and innovative low carbon technologies that have potential to be deployed in Asia and the Pacific. It features 10 technologies for capturing, utilizing, or storing carbon dioxide. The key aspects of these technologies are discussed together with their advantages and status of development and commercialization. The compendium aims to contribute to low carbon development in the region by promoting further research, innovation, and investment in emerging technologies.
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A decade of science support in the sagebrush biome (NOTE: to be released late September 2021). Natural Resources Conservation Service, September 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.32747/2021.7488985.

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Working Lands for Wildlife (WLFW) invests in science to proactively target conservation investments and quantify outcomes. This report summarizes more than a decade of WLFW science’s current understanding of identified sagebrush biome threats on western working rangelands and how best to address them through voluntary conservation actions. More than 350 plant and animal species are benefitting from this conservation, notably sage grouse, sagebrush songbirds, and migratory big game populations. 61 peer-reviewed publications are referenced in the report that are helping guide targeted conservation of the sage brush biome, conserve core areas, along with scientifically quantifying outcomes.
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