Journal articles on the topic 'Interpersonal conflict Philosophy'
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Laursen, Brett, and W. Andrew Collins. "Interpersonal conflict during adolescence." Psychological Bulletin 115, no. 2 (1994): 197–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.115.2.197.
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Greco Morasso, Sara. "The ontology of conflict." Pragmatics and Cognition 16, no. 3 (September 3, 2008): 540–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.16.3.06gre.
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This paper aims at clarifying the ontology of conflict as a preliminary for constructing a conflict mapping guide (Wehr 1979). After recalling the main definitions elaborated in different disciplines, the meaning of conflict is elicited through semantic analysis based on corpus evidence. Two fundamental meanings emerge: conflict as an interpersonal hostility between two or more human subjects, and conflict as a propositional incompatibility. These two states of affairs are significantly related, because the latter tends to generate the former whenever the incompatible positions are embodied by as many parties who feel personally questioned. The semantic analysis allows to sketch the ontology of the conflictual situation that can serve to generate a conflict mapping guide, and to face several crucial aspects that are relevant both to the study and to the management of conflicts. In the former perspective, it allows for a comparison of the situation of interpersonal conflict with the seemingly similar process of controversy.
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Gielen, Andrea Carlson, Patricia J. O'Campo, Ruth R. Faden, Nancy E. Kass, and Xiaonan Xue. "Interpersonal conflict and physical violence during the childbearing year." Social Science & Medicine 39, no. 6 (September 1994): 781–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0277-9536(94)90039-6.
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Fourlas, George N., and Elena Clare Cuffari. "Enacting Ought: Ethics, Anti-Racism, and Interactional Possibilities." Topoi 41, no. 2 (January 1, 2022): 355–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09783-w.
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AbstractFocusing on political and interpersonal conflict in the U.S., particularly racial conflict, but with an eye to similar conflicts throughout the world, we argue that the enactive approach to mind as life can be elaborated to provide an exigent framework for present social-political problems. An enactive approach fills problematic lacunae in the Western philosophical ethics project by offering radically refigured notions of responsibility and language. The dual enactive, participatory insight is that interactional responsibility is not singular and language is not an individual property or ability, something that someone simply and uniformly 'has' or 'controls'. These points have not been integrated into our self-understanding as moral actors, to everyone’s detriment. We first advocate for adequate appreciation of Colombetti and Torrance’s 2009 suggestion that participatory sense-making necessarily implies shared responsibility for interactional outcomes. We argue that the enactive approach presents open-ended cultivation of virtue as embodied, contextualized, and dynamic know-how and destabilizes an individualist metaphysics. Putting this framework to work, we turn to the interactional challenges of conversations that concern differences and that involve potentially oppositional parties, offering a reading of Claudia Rankine’s Just Us. Finally, we make explicit Rankine’s normative project of mindful navigation of multiple perspectives in an interaction. We abstract three interrelated spheres of participatory intervention: location, language, and labor. These also indicate routes for empirical investigation into complex perspective-taking in dynamic interactions.
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MELNYK, Iryna, Tetyana PETROVA, and Alla KHOPTIAR. "Provocation as a Tool of Language Influence." WISDOM 3, no. 2 (August 15, 2022): 157–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.24234/wisdom.v3i2.645.
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The article aims to study provocation as a particular type of interpersonal communication and a provocateur’s action who intends to obtain (provoke) necessary verbal reaction from the recipient by employing language influence. The provocateur is considered an active speaker whose main task is to plan the communicative process, choose appropriate strategies and tactics, and verbal and nonverbal markers of their realisation to implement effective communication. Provocation can be realised in terms of both communicative conflict and cooperation. Conflict situations involve communicative disharmony, pressure on the recipient, provocateur’s dominance, violating cooperative principles and maxims of communication and politeness principles, and non-cooperative strategies. In contrast, cooperative situations can be regarded as those where communicative balance is maintained, cooperative and politeness principles are followed, and cooperative strategies are applied. Provocation can be effective in both cooperative and non-cooperative implementation
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Oyewale, Ayodele Solomon. "Yorùbá Ethics of Interpersonal Relations in Ọbasá’s Poetry." Yoruba Studies Review 5, no. 1 (December 21, 2021): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.32473/ysr.v5i1.130064.
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In the context of Yorùba interrelation, every human being is involved with ́ a clearly defined tradition laced with mutual benefits. The custom of human interpersonal relationship and the challenges thereof are critical issues in modern Yorùbá society. The themes of Yorùbá ethics as related to interpersonal relation are prominent in Obasa ̣’s poetry. In this essay, we identify and ́ analyze the ethical themes in Obasa ̣’s poetry and compare the poet’s engagement with the Yorùbá philosophy with a view to establish their relevance to the contemporary Yorùbá society.
Wolfgang Iser’s (1996) principle on hermeneutics that “(texts) impacts information to the reader vis-a-vis the reader’s experience” is our model for the analysis of this paper (63). The ethical issues in Obasa’s poetry are anchored ́ to three sociocultural Yoruba concepts: communalism, cultural ideology on salutation, and conflict resolution. Tis paper affirms the poet’s rational reflection on the Yorùbá cultural ideology and pragmatic approach to ethical issues. As I argue in the essay, the poet’s perspectives affirm the basis of Yorùba ethical concepts on communalism and how it portrays human beings ́ as social “animals.”
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Hanna, Karen B. "A Call for Healing: Transphobia, Homophobia, and Historical Trauma in Filipina/o/x American Activist Organizations." Hypatia 32, no. 3 (2017): 696–714. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12342.
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I argue that for those who migrate to other countries for economic survival and political asylum, historical trauma wounds across geographical space. Using the work of David Eng and Nadine Naber on queer and feminist diasporas, I contend that homogeneous discourses of Filipino nationalism simplify and erase transphobia, homophobia, and heterosexism, giving rise to intergenerational conflict and the passing‐on of trauma among activists in the United States. Focusing on Filipina/o/x American activist organizations, I center intergenerational conflict among leaders, highlighting transphobic and homophobic struggles that commonly arise in cisgender women majority spaces. I contextualize these struggles, linking them to traumas inherited through legacies of colonialism, feudalism, imperialism, hetero‐patriarchy, capitalism, and white supremacy. I inquire: how does historical and personal trauma merge and shape activist relationships and conflict, and what are activists doing to disrupt and work through historical trauma? I advocate for a decolonizing approach for “acting out” and “working through” trauma and healing collectively. By exploring conflict in organizations shaped by dominant Filipino nationalist ideologies, I resist romantic notions of the diaspora. Revealing the ways that dominant Filipino nationalism perpetuates a simultaneous erasure of nonnormative histories and bodies and epistemological and interpersonal violence among activists, I reject homogeneous conceptions of nationalism and open up possibilities for decolonial organizing praxis.
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Meagher, Benjamin R., Hanna Gunn, Nathan Sheff, and Daryl R. Van Tongeren. "An Intellectually Humbling Experience: Changes in Interpersonal Perception and Cultural Reasoning across a Five-Week Course." Journal of Psychology and Theology 47, no. 3 (April 2019): 217–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0091647119837010.
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Finding ways to foster intellectual humility (IH)—the willingness to own one’s limitations—is an important goal for facilitating effective learning. We report the results of a longitudinal, quasi-experimental study, conducted across six undergraduate, culturally diverse (58% racial/ethnic minority) introductory philosophy courses, that evaluates how social perceptions and cross-cultural reasoning change following a course on epistemology and social ethics. Critically, we manipulated whether each class received a standardized lesson in IH at the start of the course or not. Participants provided self-ratings of IH, gave round-robin judgments of their classmates, and completed a wise-reasoning writing exercise focusing on a cultural conflict at both the beginning and end of the summer course session. Results revealed no change in self-reported IH, but an increase in perceived peer IH and conscientiousness within classes where IH was taught. Moreover, an analysis of the participants’ writing suggested greater levels of compromise-seeking when dealing with a cultural conflict among the students taught about IH, relative to those in the control classes. This study provides initial insights regarding the relationship between IH and cultural humility, as well as the efficacy of facilitating the development of IH among undergraduate students.
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Smith, Catherine. "Happiness, Competition, and Not Necessarily Arrogance in Kant." Kant-Studien 112, no. 3 (September 1, 2021): 400–425. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kant-2021-0022.
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Abstract Kant held that human beings are competitive and not very good at living together in harmony. He also held that the principle of one’s own happiness is the central opponent of the principle of morality. According to Allen Wood, these claims are related: the competitive tendencies Kant attributes to human nature reveal, according to Wood, that the very shape of our human idea of happiness is derived from a deep-seated arrogance, incompatible with morality. I argue, by contrast, that although Kant’s discussion of human nature reveals that human happiness is complicated by interpersonal comparisons and tensions, these are not immoral (or derived from immorality) and require no claims of innate human arrogance for their explanation. Consequently, these aspects of human nature are not themselves the reason that Kant considers our desire for happiness to be in conflict with our morality.
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Hosmer, LaRue Tone, and Feng Chen. "Ethics and Economics: Growing Opportunities for Joint Research." Business Ethics Quarterly 11, no. 4 (October 2001): 599–622. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3857763.
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A group of economists has recently begun addressing questions at the intersection of ethics and economics. They are preparing new definitions of individual choice that combine self-interest and other-interest, new processes of interpersonal exchange that result in cooperation rather than conflict, and new measures of social well-being that include rights as well as outcomes. This article surveys that work, and suggests areas where conceptual inputs from business ethicists are clearly needed, and where multiple opportunities for interactive research are obviously present.
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Wolfart, Johannes. "Why Was There Even a Reformation in Lindau? The Myth and Mystery of Lindau’s Conflict-Free Reformation." Renaissance and Reformation 40, no. 4 (January 28, 2018): 43–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.33137/rr.v40i4.29268.
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Histories of Lindau emphasize a remarkably conflict-free course of early reform in that particular locale. This view is established and maintained by multiple means, including hyper-credulity towards the peacefulness asserted by local authorities, anachronistic projections of the confessional “compromise” that was the Tetrapolitana back into the 1520s, and a deliberately narrow definition of key subjects, to exclude obvious contrary evidence. While Bernd Moeller has recently remarked that Lindau society was so harmonious that it is surprising there was any Reformation at all, archival sources actually indicate conflict in several areas pertaining to the early Reformation in Lindau, including interpersonal violence over key theological issues, the social conflict of the Peasant’s War, and stark communal divisions over iconoclasm, resulting in the ritual conflict of a feud. This article is both a particular historical corrective and a general historiographical illustration of how mythographic and historiographic modes may be entangled in early Reformation studies.
Les ouvrages d’histoire montrent un début de Réforme remarquablement exempt de conflit dans l’histoire de Lindau. Cette interprétation fut établie et renforcée de plusieurs façons, dont une excessive crédulité envers les assertions de paix faites par les autorités locales, la projection anachronique de l’esprit de compromis confessionnel propre au Tetrapolitana de 1520, ainsi que la restriction délibérée des définitions de certains sujets essentiels, menée afin de réduire les contradictions patentes. Bien que Bernd Moeller ait récemment fait remarquer que la société de Lindau apparaît comme si harmonieuse que l’on peut s’étonner qu’il s’y soit même déroulé une Réforme, les documents d’archives révèlent plutôt l’existence de conflits dans plusieurs secteurs de Lindau au début de la Réforme, conflits prenant la forme, par exemple, de violences entre interlocuteurs lors de discussions sur des questions théologiques centrales, de conflits sociaux participant de la Guerre des Paysans, et de sérieuses divisions marquant la communauté au sujet de l’iconoclasme, ayant pour résultat un échange formel de représailles. Cet article cherche donc à la fois à corriger l’histoire et à mettre en lumière, par ce cas de figure, comment les usages mythographiques et historiographiques s’enchevêtrent et marquent les études des débuts de la Réforme.
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Inoue, Akiomi, and Norito Kawakami. "Interpersonal conflict and depression among Japanese workers with high or low socioeconomic status: Findings from the Japan Work Stress and Health Cohort Study." Social Science & Medicine 71, no. 1 (July 2010): 173–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2010.02.047.
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Aich, Tapas Kumar. "Existential Psychology & Buddha Philosophy: It's Relevance in Nurturing a Healthy Mind." Journal of Psychiatrists' Association of Nepal 3 (January 2, 2015): 22–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/jpan.v3i3.11836.
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The term "existentialism" have been coined by the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel in the mid-1940s and adopted by Jean-Paul Sartre. The label has been applied retrospectively to philosophers like Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers and Søren Kierkegaard and other 19th and 20th century philosophers who, despite profound doctrinal differences, generally held that the focus of philosophical thought should be to deal with the conditions of existence of the individual person and his or her emotions, actions, responsibilities, and thoughts. The early 19th century philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, posthumously regarded as ‘the father of existentialism’, maintained that the individual solely has the responsibilities of giving one's own life meaning and living that life passionately and sincerely, in spite of many existential obstacles and distractions including despair, angst, absurdity, alienation, and boredom. Over the last century, experts have written on many commonalities between Buddhism and various branches of modern western psychology like phenomenological psychology, psychoanalytical psychotherapy, humanistic psychology, cognitive psychology and existential psychology. In comparison to other branches of psychology, less have been studied and talked on the commonalities between Buddhist philosophy and modern existential psychology that have been propagated in the west. Buddha said that the life is ‘suffering’. Existential psychology speaks of ontological anxiety (dread, angst). Buddha said that ‘suffering is due to attachment’. Existential psychology also has some similar concepts. We cling to things in the hopes that they will provide us with a certain benefit. Buddha said that ‘suffering can be extinguished’. The Buddhist concept of nirvana is quite similar to the existentialists' freedom. Freedom has, in fact, been used in Buddhism in the context of freedom from rebirth or freedom from the effects of karma. For the existentialist, freedom is a fact of our being, one which we often ignore. Finally, Buddha says that ‘there is a way to extinguish suffering’. For the existential psychologist, the therapist must take an assertive role in helping the client become aware of the reality of his or her suffering and its roots. As a practising psychiatrist, clinician, therapist we often face patients with symptoms of depression where aetiology is not merely a reactive one, not an interpersonal conflict, not simply a cognitive distortion! Patients mainly present with some form of personal ‘existential crisis’. Unless we understand and address these existential questions, we probably, will fail to alleviate the symptoms of depression, by merely prescribing drugs, in these patients! DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3126/jpan.v3i3.11836
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STRUKOVA, Tetyana, and Borys BRATANICH. "SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE AS A COMPONENT OF THE FELIXOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE CHILD'S SOCIALIZATION." Dnipro Academy of Continuing Education Herald. Series: Philosophy, Pedagogy, Vol. 1 No. 1 (December 20, 2021): 11–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.54891/2786-7005-2021-1-2.
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Summary. The urgency of the problem. It is expedient to talk about the formation of a felixological approach in the study of the child's socialization as a component of social philosophy, philosophy of education and theory of pedagogy, in a broader sense – one of the directions of postmodern philosophical thought. Of particular importance is the philosophical analysis of the communicative component of the felixological approach, which remains on the periphery of research, and which includes research on the role of social intelligence as a mechanism for effective communication in the space of the child's life. The purpose of the study Based on this, the purpose of the study is to determine the role of social intelligence in the felixological interpretation of the process of socialization. Research methods. Theoretical and methodological basis of the analysis of the felixological dimension of socialization and the role of social intelligence in it includes traditional phenomenology, existentialist guidelines, communicative studies, theoretical psychology, philosophical and pedagogical methodology as a representation of philosophical universals in a particular field of knowledge. Results of the research. Our study shows that the use of the felixological approach opens the possibility of a comprehensive and philosophically sound analysis of the process of socialization of the child as a unique socio-cultural phenomenon, the content of which is diverse, subjective and socially determined personality development. of this being. A particularly important area of change is the communicative sphere, given the importance of effective communication for the formation of conflict-free and favorable for the development of the child's space of socialization. Purposeful study of the mechanisms of development of social and communicative competencies of the child shows that among them one of the leading roles is played by social intelligence, the development of which provides effective interpersonal communication in the space of socialization. Social intelligence should be considered the most adequate epresentation of the communicative dimension of the felixological model of child socialization. felixological interpretation of the process of socialization.
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Aliyeva, Gulshan. "Attitudes toward elderly inmates in correctional facilities." International Journal of Social Sciences 11, no. 2 (September 21, 2022): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.52950/ss.2022.11.2.000.
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Objective: Psychological well-being and mental health of elderly inmates are investigated by international organization, committees and researchers. One of the main factors that influence their quality of life, daily mood and well-being is interpersonal relationship. Numerous empirical data confirm the importance of interpersonal relationship and attitudes toward aging. An attitude can be defined as an evaluation of a stimulus as reflected in our cognitive, emotional and behavioral responses to the problem (Fiske &Taylor, 1991). In the field of geriatric psychology, research has focused on the problem of interpersonal relationship between elderly people and workers in prison environment. Prison officers are responsible for the safety and security of the prison facility (Bezerra et al., 2016), for supporting offender rehabilitation efforts and for managing organizational demands (Schaufeli & Peeters, 2000). Despite their importance to the running of the prison system, the health and wellbeing of prison officers remains poor. Hypotheses: H0: There isn’t any correlation between the social support inmates have, and their quality of life H1: The more social support correlate the higher level of inmates’ quality of life Methods: The systematic review of research and policy papers, articles that published on interpersonal relationship between elderly inmates and officers in correctional facilities, also effective programs outcomes were conducted. The main symptoms of the problem were measured with special checklist and questionnaires. Results: The elderly inmates experience emotional instability; tendency to self-accusations; anxiety-depressive response; low tolerance for frustration; mistrust and heightened criticism of others; intra and interpersonal conflict. A systematic approach in psychological work with elderly prisoners, also officers allows for the transition from a symptomatic to a personality-oriented level of psychological impact. Psychological emotional support can renew their hope on life, influence positive outcomes of the support program. According to the results of repeated psychological research, the patient's condition was characterized by positive dynamics: the level of psychological distress and the intensity of psychological distress significantly decreased, the general internality of the personality increased, as well as the subjective assessment of personal well-being. Conclusion: It is necessary to focus the attention of specialists on the advisability of using psycho-educational programs in a prison environment, providing information about the aging dynamically. Such programs, used at the initial stages of work with patients, contribute to the creation of motivation for personal psychotherapy and significantly increase its effectiveness.
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Brent, Robert L. "The Changing Role and Responsibilities of Chairmen in Clinical Academic Departments: The Transition From Autocracy." Pediatrics 90, no. 1 (July 1, 1992): 50–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1542/peds.90.1.50.
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There is considerable literature dealing with the responsibilities of clinical department chairmen, which primarily emphasizes the importance of developing a sound and facilitating administration. This is dependent on the hiring of appropriate support personnel, developing a representative committee structure, being available to the faculty for their needs, and establishing departmental guidelines, procedures, and policies that apply equally to everyone. Nascent chairmen have an extensive literature available to them concerning academic administration, but a chairman's success is primarily dependent on the possession or development of certain interpersonal skills. Developing a concern and interest in the faculty and staff will come naturally to some and may have to be learned by others. A chairman can attempt to create an excellent esprit de corps by introducing a departmental philosophy that is perceived by the faculty to be supportive. Qualities of the chairman that convey this philosophy are fairness, integrity, compassion, confidentiality, effectiveness, judiciousness, and the willingness to exert considerable effort and time in obtaining recognition and rewards for the faculty. Some of the most difficult tasks for a chairman are (1) the prioritization of his or her responsibilities and activities, (2) representing both the university and the department when their goals appear to conflict, (3) recognizing that an autocratic chairman may administer the department with less difficulty and even appear to have more respect than a democratic chairman, (4) learning to expect less accolades and appreciation from faculty than the clinical chairmen of yesteryear, and (5) resisting the commitment of valuable time to negotiations or battles that cannot be won or to activities that do not benefit the department or the university. There are more than 25 areas of responsibility that are mentioned in this paper. Only a few of them are discussed in any detail. There are many positive aspects of the role of chairmanship. As the years go by, the position becomes easier and more enjoyable and represents the most rewarding and fulfilling position in the medical administration hierarchy. It offers the individual an unusual degree of independence and autonomy not available in any of the other administrative positions in medicine, while still permitting involvement in the scholarly and clinical pursuits of academic medicine and the development of future clinicians and academicians.
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Van Staden, Werdie. "CULTURE IN PERSON- AND PEOPLE-CENTERED HEALTH CARE." International Journal of Person Centered Medicine 10, no. 1 (September 8, 2022): 69–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5750/ijpcm.v10i1.1050.
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Background: Person- and people-centered medicine (PCM) underscores the importance of accounting for culture and cultural values.
Objective: The objective of this article is to clarify the concept of culture and describe misleading or faulty ways of understanding this concept in averting blind-spots for culture in person- and people-centered health care.
Method: Drawing on the conceptualization of PCM, the philosophy of values, values-based Practice, and principles of anthropology, misleading or faulty ways of understanding the concept of culture are identified by meeting criteria of conflation, confusing contingency as if necessity, being too narrow, or contracting blind-spots.
Results: Six ways of understanding the concept of culture are identified that may undermine person-centered practice. These may be corrected by understanding culture as necessarily constituted by a set of shared practices underpinned by values. So understood, this clarifies the distinction between culture and group identity, and that: subcultures and counter-cultures are proper cultures; symbols, language, and geographic locality are contingent qualities of culture; culture is subject to change and not fixed by history or an individual’s group identity; and that culture is readily ascribed to others/foreigners owing to blind-spots for one’s own culture.
Conclusion: By averting too narrow an understanding of culture and overcoming one’s blind-spot for one’s own cultural values, the clinician may recognize and account for culture and cultural values in person-centered health care. When the differences in cultural values bring about conflict or potential alienation in the interpersonal relationship, the differences need to be subjected practically to a process of dissensual decision-making, accounting for the uncommon ground within a safe space created by common ground and consensus.
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Cázares Blanco, Rocío. "El impacto del duelo anticipado en las actitudes reactivas de sanción." Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 47, no. 1 (February 2, 2022): 213–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/resf.69122.
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El duelo anticipado es un tema al que la filosofía ha prestado muy poca atención, a diferencia de lo que ocurre con el duelo que sigue a la muerte. Una peculiaridad obvia del primero es que sucede mientras todavía existe una relación interpersonal entre el doliente y aquel por quien se duele. En este artículo examino el impacto que el duelo anticipado puede tener en dicha relación, particularmente con respecto a las actitudes reactivas de sanción, propias del conflicto interpersonal.
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Marciante, Nunzia. "Communication disorders, interpersonal conflicts and sexual dysfunctions." Pragmatics and Cognition 23, no. 3 (December 31, 2016): 501–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.23.3.11mar.
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The aim of this article is to analyze the effects of comunication, conflicts, and body language on sexual dysfunctions. As explained in the work of Merleau Ponty, the everyday experience goes through the body and communicates its being in the world through external stimuli, generating emotions and developing affectivity. In this perspective, the sexuality is something more than a set of biological mechanism. Simultaneous, experiencing of conflicting feelings and emotions, such as anger, may affect the body sexual response, such as vaginism and dyspareunia. One of the most important purpose of Sex Therapy is the integration of all the contributing professional and academic disciplines both from the points of view of research and clinical practice. This perspective requires a change in the attitude of the disciplines in recognising the importance of the integrated study of sexuality for the future happines of human beings and the implications for society.
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SEGEV, RE'EM. "Hierarchical Consequentialism." Utilitas 22, no. 3 (July 30, 2010): 309–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820810000221.
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The article considers a hierarchical theory that combines concern for two values: individual well-being – as a fundamental, first-order value – and (distributive) fairness – as a high-order value whose exclusive function is to complete the value of individual well-being by resolving internal clashes within it that occur in interpersonal conflicts. The argument for this unique conception of high-order fairness is that fairness is morally significant in itself only regarding what matters – individual well-being – and when it matters – in interpersonal conflicts in which constitutive aspects of individual well-being clash. Consequently, the proposed theory is not exposed to the claim that fairness comes at the expense of welfare. This theory is considered within a consequential framework, based on the standard version and, alternatively, on a novel interpretation of consequentialism. Thus, it refutes the claim that consequentialism does not take the distinction between persons seriously.
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Connell, Sophia M. "IX—Nurture and Parenting in Aristotelian Ethics." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119, no. 2 (July 1, 2019): 179–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aoz008.
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Abstract For Aristotle, in making the deliberate choice to incorporate the extensive requirements of the young into the aims of one’s life, people realize their own good. In this paper I will argue that this is a promising way to think about the ethics of care and parenting. Modern theories, which focus on duty and obligation, direct our attention to conflicts of interests in our caring activities. Aristotle’s explanation, in contrast, explains how nurturing others not only develops a core part of the self but also leads to an appreciation of the value of interpersonal relationships.
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Plata-Pineda, Oswaldo Juan. "Una respuesta basada en la armonización ética al problema de la reconciliación." Co-herencia 18, no. 34 (June 2, 2021): 89–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.17230/co-herencia.18.34.4.
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La reconciliación suele ser definida como el proceso de restablecimiento de las relaciones que un conflicto ha perturbado. Esta perturbación ha sido asociada por la convención académica a la guerra o a la dictadura y analizada en la perspectiva de generar las condiciones para construir sostenidamente la paz. En el presente estudio, ofrezco una respuesta al problema de reconciliación que, con fundamento en la noción de armonización ética, aporta una solución plausible a los conflictos que tienen lugar en contextos de transición institucional (en el marco de un proceso de construcción de paz) y en contextos interpersonales. Así, la respuesta basada en la armonización ética sostiene que es posible restablecer las relaciones después de un conflicto si los conjuntos de creencias enfrentados son armonizados por medio de un juicio en situación (sabiduría práctica) orientado a la materialización del objetivo ético -con y para otro- en instituciones justas.
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Bruckner, Donald W. "PRUDENCE AND JUSTICE." Economics and Philosophy 20, no. 1 (April 2004): 35–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267104001257.
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Whereas principles of justice adjudicate interpersonal conflicts, principles of prudence adjudicate intrapersonal conflicts – i.e., conflicts between the preferences an individual has now and the preferences he will have later. On a contractarian approach, principles of justice can be theoretically grounded in a hypothetical agreement in an appropriately specified pre-moral situation in which those persons with conflicting claims have representatives pushing for their claims. Similarly, I claim, principles of prudence can be grounded in a hypothetical agreement in an appropriately specified pre-prudential situation in which those temporal parts of a person with conflicting claims have representatives as advocates of their claims. During the course of developing the prudential contractarian methodology, I consider a dispute between those who would see principles of justice as the outcome of a choice (e.g., Rawls) and others (e.g., Gauthier) who argue for viewing principles of justice as the outcome of a bargain. I contend that the reasons I adduce in favor of viewing principles of prudence as the outcome of a choice weigh equally in favor of viewing principles of justice as the outcome of a bargain.
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Fredriksen, Lill Tove. "The art of hinting and allusions in Sámi literature: a reading of Jovnna-Ánde Vest’s novel trilogy Árbbolaččat." AlterNative: An International Journal of Indigenous Peoples 17, no. 1 (March 2021): 15–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1177180121996311.
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Various means for levels of hinting at things or making allusions in the interaction between people are part of traditional Sámi knowledge and communication, aesthetics and interpersonal communication. A reading of the novel trilogy Árbbolaččat ( The Heirs) (1997–2005), written by the Sámi novelist Jovnna-Ánde Vest, shows how the use of hinting and allusions is depicted as birgengoansta (coping skills), an essential art to master in the life of a small community, as a way to deliver a message in a softer tone rather than saying things directly and as a way to avoid conflicts. I especially emphasize the contextual part of the yoik tradition (the ancient Sámi chanting tradition) and how it has functioned as a social device in the Sámi community. It explains the individual’s place within the community, and what people’s worldview and life philosophy tell us about life in a small Sámi village.
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Livernois, Rebecca. "Regretful Decisions and Climate Change." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48, no. 2 (November 24, 2017): 168–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393117741335.
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Climate change has made pressing the question of why we do little to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. By analogy to the puzzle of the self-torturer, I argue that even if interpersonal and intergenerational conflicts of interest were resolved, we may still end up in a regretful environmental state when we aim to maximize our net benefit derived from polluting activities. This is because a rational agent with transitive preferences making climate change decisions faces incentives to over-pollute. This is caused by the presence of marginal costs that are uninformative of well-being in an uncertain and intertemporal decision problem.
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Ningsih, Tri Wahyu Retno, and Farah Nasya Adani. "INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION PATTERNS AND COMMUNICATION BARIERS TO ROLEPLAY COUPLES ON SOCIAL MEDIA." Journal of Digital Media Communication 1, no. 1 (2022): 40–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.35760/dimedcom.2022.v1i1.6539.
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This study aimed to find patterns of interpersonal communication and communication barriers that occur in role-play pairs on Twitter. This study uses a qualitative descriptive research method. The research informants were three pairs of role players. The results showed that three patterns of interpersonal communication occurred between the pair of role players, namely primary communication patterns, secondary communication patterns, and circular communication patterns. In interpersonal communication between the pair of role players, obstacles were found, namely misunderstandings in interpreting the message content, conflicts in relationships, obstacles caused by the network, and obstacles caused by the busyness of role-play players.
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Warren, Danielle E. "The Persistence of Organizational Deviance: When Informal Sanctioning Systems Undermine Formal Sanctioning Systems." Business Ethics Quarterly 29, no. 1 (November 5, 2018): 55–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/beq.2018.15.
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ABSTRACT:Organizations adopt formal sanctioning systems to deter ethical violations, but the formal systems’ effectiveness may be undermined by informal sanctioning systems which promote violations. I conducted an ethnographic study of six trading crowds on two financial exchanges to understand how informal and formal sanctioning systems, which are grounded in different interpretations of equity, interact to affect trader deviance from rules established by the financial exchange (exchange deviance). To deter informal trader norms that conflict with exchange rules, the exchanges formally prohibit traders’ informal sanctions. The exchanges, however, underestimate traders’ informal sanctions related to ostracism and social rejection, which are not only difficult for the exchanges to detect, but also interpersonally hurtful and harmful to trader performance. Consequently, the traders’ informal social sanctions lead to secondary sanctions from trading firms. Ultimately, the informal sanctioning system evades the formal sanctioning system by exploiting what the exchanges deem to be minor rule violations.
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Redin, Dmitriy. "History through Personality: the Anatomy of one Denunciation." ISTORIYA 13, no. 5 (115) (2022): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207987840021552-6.
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In science, including historical science, there is no single and exhaustive definition of the concept of “personality”. The latter is not infrequently interpreted in close relationship with high morality, as something belonging to an elite culture, loaded with positive connotations. At the same time, a more axiologically neutral interpretation of the individual “as a receptacle of the socio-cultural system of his time” (A. Ya. Gurevich), as “an individual in his social quality” (D. V. Panchenko) is also widely used. It is in this vein that the author of the article analyzes the actions of one of the “ordinary personalities” of the beginning of the 18th century — a small Tula industrialist S. D. Evtifyev. The denunciation he wrote to Senator Prince G. I. Volkonsky in 1712 turns out, despite the small volume, to be an extremely capacious document in content. It does not just reveal the mechanisms of avoiding customs taxation or the details of solving interpersonal conflicts, but allows through the actions of individuals mentioned in the source to reveal the social practices and motivations inherent in the Petrine era.
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Vasechko, V. Yu. "“Communism” maxim in Robert Merton’s code of ethics and its effect in the epistemological discourse of the traditional society." Philosophy of Science and Technology 26, no. 2 (2021): 148–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2413-9084-2021-26-2-148-163.
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The article examines one of the maxims of the code of scientific ethos, formulated in 1942 by R.K. Merton, namely “communism” (translated in Russian also as “communalism” and “collectivism”). Although the Merton Code was derived from the study of relationships among European scientists since the 17th century, the author substantiates the possibility of using this maxim to characterize the communication that develops between the subjects of epistemological discourse in traditional society, primarily in the civilizations of the ancient and medieval East (ancient Egypt and Babylon, India, China, the Arab-Muslim world). The epistemological dimension of “communism” is rendered relevant, provided that the re- search community, a community of researchers, is united by common cognitive and professional attitudes. This commune covers not only real-life people performing in various cognitive roles (pioneers, commentators, experts, analysts or popularizers), but also individuals represented virtually. The latter are either the authors of the surviving works, determining the format and problem field of definite epistemological fragment, or future successors of the study, which will connect to it after a while. Violations of ethical principles implicitly perceived by this maxim (such as full mutual trust and equality among study participants, respect for results achieved by others, the priority of common goals over personal competition, etc.) are perceived as treasonous to the spirit of science and behavior worthy of censure. Despite interpersonal and inter-group conflicts accompanying the research work, the view of knowledge as a common, communal property of a commonwealth of scientists or, at least, this team, is an important factor in the effectiveness of scientific research. On the contrary, the privatization of knowledge and its total secrecy, characteristic of periods of scientific stagnation, is accompanied by a break of contacts between the subjects of discourse and the fading of interest in cardinal, breakthrough, innovative epistemological problems.
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Strelnikova, Yulia Yu, Svetlana D. Gurieva, and Natalia A. Goncharova. "Mechanism of socio-psychological adaptation of students to the educational environment of a Russian university." Perspectives of Science and Education 53, no. 5 (November 1, 2021): 192–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.32744/pse.2021.5.13.
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Introduction. The relevance of the research is due to the need to improve the process of psychological support for foreign students of foreign countries (African countries, Afghanistan) for long-term training (5 years) in the educational organization of the Russian Interior Ministry. Violation of the process of psychological adaptation of foreign students to the realities of life in the new language environment can lead to frustration, emotional lability, pronounced fatigue, anxiety, emergence of intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts, as well as problems with academic performance and motivation for learning. The aim of the study was to reveal the features of psychological adaptation of foreign students to the study in the educational organization of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Materials and Methods. The empirical study involved 87 students enrolled in an educational institution of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, including 45 first-year foreign students (African police officers) aged 23-30 years old and 42 first-year investigative students aged 18-22 years old. The research was carried out with the help of questionnaires: "Assessment of the state of adaptation of personality" (OSADA), "Motivation of learning in University" (T.I. Ilyina), personal coping strategy "SACS" (S. Hobfall) as well as an anonymous questionnaire of studying motivation of learning in educational institution of the Russian MIA. Mathematical processing of the results included methods of descriptive, comparative and correlation analysis using statistical package SPSS Statistics ver. 23.0. Results of the study. The study revealed significant differences between social adaptability indicators of foreign students and Russian-speaking full-time first-year cadets, according to which the characteristic feature of foreign students is underestimation of their own actions, abilities and deeds, as expressed in the following indicators: self-satisfaction (t = 2,07; p ≤ 0,05), dissatisfaction with the situation of learning activities (t = 2,27; p ≤ 0,05), general dissatisfaction with activities (t = 2,40; p ≤ 0,05). As a result of the study of motivation of foreign students two groups of motives were identified, which reflect the focus on the satisfaction of cognitive needs (80% of respondents) and passive behavior in the form of submission to external circumstances, cautious actions (20% of respondents). As a consequence, one of the significant coping strategies for this group is the avoidance strategy. The received results of the research can be used in the organization of psychological and pedagogical support of training process of foreign students in order to provide preventive adaptability.
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Kalytenko, Tetyana. "Current Problems and the Ways to their Solution (on the Basis of Lewis Carrol’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass)." NaUKMA Research Papers. Literary Studies 3 (September 2, 2022): 82–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.18523/2618-0537.2022.3.82-90.
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We are living in the Multiverse realized in artistic phenomena, ontological states, revolutionary scientific discoveries and assumptions, and other areas of being. For instance, contemporary popular and nongenre literature base on the plural structure of the fictional Universe. Interpersonal conflicts escalated into interworld battles, interplanetary collisions have become the base of the fantasy genre, and hidden parallel dimensions are more and more often collapsing in various forms and interpretations. Despite the fact that multiple Universe structure has a form and appearance of modern artifact, the vision of the Universe as a plurality is a deep and ancient tradition that stretches us back to the Middle Ages and beyond. The Medieval period marks the time of development of typography which made it possible to fix the contemporary worldview in a clearer way. The investigations of Nicholas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno, and other thinkers opened the closed structure of the Universe, assuming an existence of infinity of the worlds. The literature of the Middle Ages represented the worlds’ plurality in a similar way but due to the theological foundations of the epoch. The ideology was based on the duality and contrasting of antonymous principles such as Heaven and Hell, Light and Dark, Spiritual and Physical, Sacred and Sinful. One of the basic values of the Middle Ages lies in the establishing of the divine and spiritual as an “objective” form of reality. The current article reveals the paradigm of the development of the phenomenon of plural worlds in theology, philosophy, modal logic, and literature studies. Also, it highlights the main principles of multiple fictional Universe constructing. Lewis Carroll’s “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland” and “Through the Looking-Glass” brightly reflect the multiple worlds’ structure. Considering all features of the principles of this plurality, we obtained the conclusions which demonstrate the function of multiple worlds, which not only discovers it in a decorative way but also has an identifying role at the personal level and at the level of the individual world.
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Gjorgjievska, Eva. "BAKHTIN'S DIALOGISM IN THE NOVEL THREE DAUGHTERS OFMADAME LIANG BY PEARL S. BUCK." Knowledge International Journal 32, no. 4 (July 26, 2019): 467–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.35120/kij3204467g.
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The paper analyzes the novel of the American writer Pearl S. Buck from the perspective of dialogism introduced as a concept by the Russian theorist and philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin, at the same time when was written the Pearl Buck`s novel (1969), that is, in the middle of the twentieth century, with no direct influence between the two authors but a similar arrangement of the narrative model in both of their works. Under Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogism, one can understand the abolition of the monologue principle of speech and its replacement with two or more perspectives or voices that exist in parallel and independently of the narrator's or author's voice. The author's point of view can no longer be explained by the ideology of one of his characters, because they occupy a dominant flow in the novel and their truth persists without the author's authoritative control, in constant interpersonal debate and dialogue. Such a diversity of ideological perspectives was observed in the novel written by Pearl Buck, where, at the height of the great changes on the Chinese soil, when the revolutionary movements resulted in the introduction of the communist order and the cultural revolution in the country, the three daughters of Madame Liang were called upon by the state to return from America and to adapt to the new living conditions in their home country. The conflict of mentality and the issue of patriotism for each one of them, including Madame Liang, evolves in a different way, each one finding herself in a unique situation to choose between her own good and the collective faith. Bakhtin's dialogism can be found on many levels in the novel: as a dialogue between the old traditional and the new modern worldview, as a dialogue between the various ideological perspectives of the characters who accept or reject the changes, as a dialogue between the scientific ethics of the Chinese and the American continent, as a critique of the monologic surveillance of China's new communist order, as an intertextual dialogue between the speech of the characters and the inserted excerpts of the traditional Book of Changes, as a blend or conflict of two cultures, Chinese and American, as a view of the past or towards the future ... As a concluding remark of the paper, one idea of Bakhtin's work is taken, and that is the connection between ethics and aesthetics in his theoretical works, as well as the concept of the ultimate freedom of the narrator's thought in building the integrity of his characters, which almost can not be achieved in any way other than through creation. As a consequence of this claim, the life choices of each of the characters of Pearl Buck's novel and their relationship with the creative activity are considered, and at the same time the approach of the narrator of the novel that distances himself, but at the same time confirms the existence of the literary characters.
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Tsygankov, Alexander S. "History of Philosophy. 2018, Vol. 23, No. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Theory and Methodology of History of Philosophy Rodion V. Savinov. Philosophy of Antiquity in Scholasticism This article examines the forms of understanding ancient philosophy in medieval and post-medieval scholasticism. Using the comparative method the author identifies the main approaches to the philosophical heritage of Antiquity, and to the problem of reviving the doctrines of the past. The Patristics (Epiphanius of Cyprus, Filastrius of Brixia, Lactantius, Augustine) saw the ancient cosmological doctrines as heresies. The early Middle Ages (e.g., Isidore of Seville) assimilated the content of these heresiographic treatises, which became the main source of information about ancient philosophy. Scholasticism of the 13th–14th cent. remained cautious to ancient philosophy and distinguished, on the one hand, the doctrinal content discussed in the framework of the exegetic problems at universities (Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, etc.), and, on the other hand, information on ancient philosophers integrated into chronological models of medieval chronicles (Peter Comestor, Vincent de Beauvais, Walter Burleigh). Finally, the post-medieval scholasticism (Pedro Fonseca, Conimbricenses, Th. Stanley, and others) raised the questions of the «history of ideas», thereby laying the foundation of the history of philosophy in its modern sense. Keywords: history of philosophy, Patristic, Scholasticism, reflection, critic DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2018-23-2-5-17 World Philosophy: the Past and the Present Mariya A. Solopova. The Chronology of Democritus and the Fall of Troy The article considers the chronology of Democritus of Abdera. In the times of Classical Antiquity, three different birth dates for Democritus were known: c. 495 BC (according to Diodorus of Sicily), c. 470 BC (according to Thrasyllus), and c. 460 BC (according to Apollodorus of Athens). These dates must be coordinated with the most valuable doxographic evidence, according to which Democritus 1) "was a young man during Anaxagoras’s old age" and that 2) the Lesser World-System (Diakosmos) was compiled 730 years after the Fall of Troy. The article considers the argument in favor of the most authoritative datings belonging to Apollodorus and Thrasyllus, and draws special attention to the meaning of the dating of Democritus’ work by himself from the year of the Fall of Troy. The question arises, what prompted Democritus to talk about the date of the Fall of Troy and how he could calculate it. The article expresses the opinion that Democritus indicated the date of the Fall of Troy not with the aim of proposing its own date, different from others, but in order to date the Lesser World-System in the spirit of intellectual achievements of his time, in which, perhaps, the history of the development of mankind from the primitive state to the emergence of civilization was discussed. The article discusses how to explain the number 730 and argues that it can be the result of combinations of numbers 20 (the number of generations that lived from the Fall of Troy to Democritus), 35 – one of the constants used for calculations of generations in genealogical research, and 30. The last figure perhaps indicates the age of Democritus himself, when he wrote the Lesser Diakosmos: 30 years old. Keywords: Ancient Greek philosophy, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Greek chronography, doxographers, Apollodorus, Thrasyllus, capture of Troy, ancient genealogies, the length of a generation DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2018-23-2-18-31 Bembya L. Mitruyev. “Yogācārabhumi-Śāstra” as a Historical and Philosophical Source The article deals with “Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra” – a treatise on the Buddhist Yogācāra school. Concerning the authorship of this text, the Indian and Chinese traditions diverge: in the first, the treatise is attributed to Asanga, and in the second tradition to Maitreya. Most of the modern scholars consider it to be a compilation of many texts, and not the work of one author. Being an important monument for both the Yogacara tradition and Mahayana Buddhism in general, Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra is an object of scientific interest for the researchers all around the world. The text of the treatise consists of five parts, which are divided into chapters. The contents of the treatise sheds light on many concepts of Yogācāra, such as ālayavijñāna, trisvabhāva, kliṣṭamanas, etc. Having briefly considered the textological problems: authorship, dating, translation, commenting and genre of the text, the author suggests the reconstruction of the content of the entire monument, made on the basis of his own translation from the Tibetan and Sanskrit. This allows him to single out from the whole variety of topics those topics, the study of which will increase knowledge about the history of the formation of the basic philosophical concepts of Yogācāra and thereby allow a deeper understanding of the historical and philosophical process in Buddhism and in other philosophical movements of India. Keywords: Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, Asaṅga, Māhāyana, Vijñānavāda, Yogācāra, Abhidharma, ālayavijñāna citta, bhūmi, mind, consciousness, meditation DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2018-23-2-32-43 Tatiana G. Korneeva. Knowledge in Nāșir Khusraw’s Philosophy The article deals with the concept of “knowledge” in the philosophy of Nāșir Khusraw. The author analyzes the formation of the theory of knowledge in the Arab-Muslim philosophy. At the early stages of the formation of the Arab-Muslim philosophy the discussion of the question of cognition was conducted in the framework of ethical and religious disputes. Later followers of the Falsafa introduced the legacy of ancient philosophers into scientific circulation and began to discuss the problems of cognition in a philosophical way. Nāșir Khusraw, an Ismaili philosopher of the 11th century, expanded the scope of knowledge and revised the goals and objectives of the process of cognition. He put knowledge in the foundation of the world order, made it the cause and ultimate goal of the creation of the world. In his philosophy knowledge is the link between the different levels of the universe. The article analyzes the Nāșir Khusraw’s views on the role of knowledge in various fields – metaphysics, cosmogony, ethics and eschatology. Keywords: knowledge, cognition, Ismailism, Nāșir Khusraw, Neoplatonism, Arab-Muslim philosophy, kalām, falsafa DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2018-23-2-44-55 Vera Pozzi. Problems of Ontology and Criticism of the Kantian Formalism in Irodion Vetrinskii’s “Institutiones Metaphysicae” (Part II) This paper is a follow-up of the paper «Irodion Vetrinskii’s “Institutiones Metaphysicae” and the St. Petersburg Theological Academy» (Part I). The issue and the role of “ontology” in Vetrinskii’s textbook is analyzed in detail, as well as the author’s critique of Kantian “formalism”: in this connection, the paper provides a description of Vetrinskii’s discussion about Kantian theory of the a priori forms of sensible intuition and understanding. To sum up, Vetrinskii was well acquainted not only with Kantian works – and he was able to fully evaluate their innovative significance – but also with late Scholastic textbooks of the German area. Moreover, he relied on the latters to build up an eclectic defense of traditional Metaphysics, avoiding at the same time to refuse Kantian perspective in the sake of mere reaffirming a “traditional” perspective. Keywords: Philosophizing at Russian Theological Academies, Russian Enlightenment, Russian early Kantianism, St. Petersburg Theological Academy, history of Russian philosophy, history of metaphysics, G.I. Wenzel, I. Ya. Vetrinskii DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2018-23-2-56-67 Alexey E. Savin. Criticism of Judaism in Hegel's Early “Theological” Writings The aim of the article is to reveal the nature of criticism of Judaism by the “young” Hegel and underlying intuitions. The investigation is based on the phenomenological approach. It seeks to explicate the horizon of early Hegel's thinking. The revolutionary role of early Hegel’s ideas reactivation in the history of philosophy is revealed. The article demonstrates the fundamental importance of criticism of Judaism for the development of Hegel's thought. The sources of Hegelian thematization and problematization of Judaism – his Protestant theological background within the framework of supranaturalism and the then discussion about human rights and political emancipation of Jews – are discovered. Hegel's interpretation of the history of the Jewish people and the origin of Judaism from the destruction of trust in nature, the fundamental mood of distrust and fear of the world, leading to the development of alienation, is revealed. The falsity of the widespread thesis about early Hegel’s anti-Semitism is demonstrated. The reasons for the transition of early Hegel from “theology” to philosophy are revealed. Keywords: Hegel, Judaism, history, criticism, anti-Semitism, trust, nature, alienation, tyranny, philosophy DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2018-23-2-68-80 Evgeniya A. Dolgova. Philosophy at the Institute of Red Professors (1921–1938): Institutional Forms, Methods of Teaching, Students, Lecturers The article explores the history of the Institute of the Red Professors in philosophy (1921–1938). Referring to the unpublished documents in the State Archives of the Russian Federation and the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the author explores its financial and infrastructure support, information sphere, characterizes students and teachers. The article illustrates the practical experience of the functioning of philosophy within the framework of one of the extraordinary “revolutionary” projects on the renewal of the scientific and pedagogical sphere, reflects a vivid and ambiguous picture of the work of the educational institution in the 1920s and 1930s and corrects some of historiographical judgments (about the politically and socially homogeneous composition of the Institute of Red Professors, the specifics of state support of its work, privileges and the social status of the “red professors”). Keywords: Institute of the Red Professors in Philosophy, Philosophical Department, soviet education, teachers, students, teaching methods DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2018-23-2-81-94 Vladimir V. Starovoitov. K. Horney about the Consequences of Neurotic Development and the Ways of Its Overcoming This article investigates the views of Karen Horney on psychoanalysis and neurotic development of personality in her last two books: “Our Inner Conflicts” (1945) and “Neurosis and Human Grows” (1950), and also in her two articles “On Feeling Abused” (1951) and “The Paucity of Inner Experiences” (1952), written in the last two years of her life and summarizing her views on clinical and theoretical problems in her work with neurotics. If in her first book “The Neurotic Personality of Our Time” (1937) neurosis was a result of disturbed interpersonal relations, caused by conditions of culture, then the concept of the idealized Self open the gates to the intrapsychic life. Keywords: Neo-Freudianism, psychoanalysis, neurotic development of personality, real Self, idealized image of Self DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2018-23-2-95-102 Publications and Translations Victoria G. Lysenko. Dignāga on the Definition of Perception in the Vādaviddhi of Vasubandhu. A Historical and Philosophical Reconstruction of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (1.13-16) The paper investigates a fragment from Dignāga’s magnum opus Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (“Body of tools for reliable knowledge with a commentary”, 1, 13-16) where Dignāga challenges Vasubandhu’s definition of perception in the Vādaviddhi (“Rules of the dispute”). The definition from the Vādaviddhi is being compared in the paper with Vasubandhu’s ideas of perception in Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (“Encyclopedia of Abhidharma with the commentary”), and with Dignāga’s own definition of valid perception in the first part of his Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti as well as in his Ālambanaparīkśavṛtti (“Investigation of the Object with the commentary”). The author puts forward the hypothesis that Dignāga criticizes the definition of perception in Vādaviddhi for the reason that it does not correspond to the teachings of Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, to which he, Dignāga, referred earlier in his magnum opus. This helps Dignāga to justify his statement that Vasubandhu himself considered Vādaviddhi as not containing the essence of his teaching (asāra). In addition, the article reconstructs the logical sequence in Dignāga’s exegesis: he criticizes the Vādaviddhi definition from the representational standpoint of Sautrāntika school, by showing that it does not fulfill the function prescribed by Indian logic to definition, that of distinguishing perception from the classes of heterogeneous and homogeneous phenomena. Having proved the impossibility of moving further according to the “realistic logic” based on recognizing the existence of an external object, Dignāga interprets the Vādaviddhi’s definition in terms of linguistic philosophy, according to which the language refers not to external objects and not to the unique and private sensory experience (svalakṣaṇa-qualia), but to the general characteristics (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa), which are mental constructs (kalpanā). Keywords: Buddhism, linguistic philosophy, perception, theory of definition, consciousness, Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Yogacara, Vasubandhu, Dignaga DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2018-23-2-103-117 Elizaveta A. Miroshnichenko. Talks about Lev N. Tolstoy: Reception of the Writer's Views in the Public Thought of Russia at the End of the 19th Century (Dedicated to the 190th Anniversary of the Great Russian Writer and Thinker) This article includes previously unpublished letters of Russian social thinkers such as N.N. Strakhov, E.M. Feoktistov, D.N. Tsertelev. These letters provide critical assessment of Lev N. Tolstoy’s teachings. The preface to publication includes the history of reception of Tolstoy’s moral and aesthetic philosophy by his contemporaries, as well as influence of his theory on the beliefs of Russian idealist philosopher D.N. Tsertelev. The author offers a rational reconstruction of the dialogue between two generations of thinkers representative of the 19th century – Lev N. Tolstoy and N.N. Strakhov, on the one hand, and D.N. Tsertelev, on the other. The main thesis of the paper: the “old” and the “new” generations of the 19th-century thinkers retained mutual interest and continuity in setting the problems and objectives of philosophy, despite the numerous worldview contradictions. Keywords: Russian philosophy of the nineteenth century, L.N. Tolstoy, N.N. Strakhov, D.N. Tsertelev, epistolary heritage, ethics, aesthetics DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2018-23-2-118-130 Reviews Nataliya A. Tatarenko. History of Philosophy in a Format of Lecture Notes (on Hegel G.W.F. Vorlesungen zur Ästhetik. Vorlesungsmitschrift Adolf Heimann (1828/1829). Hrsg. von A.P. Olivier und A. Gethmann-Siefert. München: Wilhelm Fink, 2017. XXXI + 254 S.) Released last year, the book “G.W.F. Hegel. Vorlesungen zur Ästhetik. Vorlesungsmitschrift Adolf Heimann (1828/1829)” in German is a publication of one of the student's manuskript of Hegel's lectures on aesthetics. Adolf Heimann was a student of Hegel in 1828/29. These notes open for us imaginary doors into the audience of the Berlin University, where Hegel read his fourth and final course on the philosophy of art. A distinctive feature of this course is a new structure of lectures in comparison with three previous courses. This three-part division was took by H.G. Hotho as the basis for the edited by him text “Lectures on Aesthetics”, included in the first collection of Hegel’s works. The content of that publication was mainly based on the lectures of 1823 and 1826. There are a number of differences between the analyzed published manuskript and the students' records of 1820/21, 1823 and 1826, as well as between the manuskript and the editorial version of H.G. Hotho. These features show that Hegel throughout all four series of Berlin lectures on the philosophy of art actively developed and revised the structure and content of aesthetics. But unfortunately this evidence of the permanent development was not taken into account by the first editor of Hegel's lectures on aesthetics. Keywords: G.W.F. Hegel, H.G. Hotho, philosophy of art, aesthetics, forms of art, idea of beauty, ideal DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2018-23-2-131-138 Alexander S. Tsygankov. On the Way to the Revival of Metaphysics: S.L. Frank and E. Coreth Readers are invited to review the monograph of the modern German researcher Oksana Nazarova “The problem of the renaissance and new foundation of metaphysics through the example of Christian philosophical tradition. Russian religious philosophy (Simon L. Frank) and German neosholastics (Emerich Coreth)”, which was published in 2017 in Munich. In the paper, the author offers a comparative analysis of the projects of a new, “post-dogmatic” metaphysics, which were developed in the philosophy of Frank and Coreth. This study addresses the problems of the cognitive-theoretical and ontological foundation of the renaissance of metaphysics, the methodological tools of the new metaphysics, as well as its anthropological component. O. Nazarova's book is based on the comparative analysis of Frank's religious philosophy and Coreth's neo-cholastic philosophy from the beginning to the end. This makes the study unique in its own way. Since earlier in the German reception of the heritage of Russian thinker, the comparison of Frank's philosophy with the Catholic theology of the 20th century was realized only fragmentarily and did not act as a fundamental one. Along with a deep and meaningful analysis of the metaphysical projects of both thinkers, this makes O. Nazarova's book relevant to anyone who is interested in the philosophical dialogue of Russia and Western Europe and is engaged in the work of Frank and Coreth. Keywords: the renaissance of metaphysics, post-Kantian philosophy, Christian philosophy, S.L. Frank, E. Coreth DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2018-23-2-139-147." History of Philosophy 23, no. 2 (October 2018): 139–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2018-23-2-139-147.
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Xiong, Mimi, and Fengyan Wang. "Gender Effect on Views of Wisdom and Wisdom Levels." Frontiers in Psychology 12 (October 26, 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.725736.
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Gender differences in wisdom are an important theme in mythology, philosophy, psychology, and daily life. Based on the existing psychological research, consensus and dispute exist between the two genders on the views of wisdom and in the levels of wisdom. In terms of the views of wisdom, the way men and women view wisdom is highly similar, and from the perspectives of both ordinary people and professional researchers of wisdom psychology, wise men and women are extremely similar. Regarding wisdom level, research has revealed that, although significant gender effects exist in the level of overall wisdom, reflective and affective dimension, and interpersonal conflict coping styles, the effect sizes were small, which indicated that these gender differences were not obvious. It would be desirable for future research to combine multiple wisdom measurements, strengthen research on the psychological gender effect of wisdom, and focus on the moderating role of age on the relationship between wisdom and gender.
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Ho, S. Shaun, Yoshio Nakamura, and James E. Swain. "Compassion As an Intervention to Attune to Universal Suffering of Self and Others in Conflicts: A Translational Framework." Frontiers in Psychology 11 (January 11, 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.603385.
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As interpersonal, racial, social, and international conflicts intensify in the world, it is important to safeguard the mental health of individuals affected by them. According to a Buddhist notion “if you want others to be happy, practice compassion; if you want to be happy, practice compassion,” compassion practice is an intervention to cultivate conflict-proof well-being. Here, compassion practice refers to a form of concentrated meditation wherein a practitioner attunes to friend, enemy, and someone in between, thinking, “I’m going to help them (equally).” The compassion meditation is based on Buddhist philosophy that mental suffering is rooted in conceptual thoughts that give rise to generic mental images of self and others and subsequent biases to preserve one’s egoism, blocking the ultimate nature of mind. To contextualize compassion meditation scientifically, we adopted a Bayesian active inference framework to incorporate relevant Buddhist concepts, including mind (buddhi), compassion (karuna), aggregates (skandhas), suffering (duhkha), reification (samaropa), conceptual thoughts (vikalpa), and superimposition (prapañca). In this framework, a person is considered a Bayesian Engine that actively constructs phenomena based on the aggregates of forms, sensations, discriminations, actions, and consciousness. When the person embodies rigid beliefs about self and others’ identities (identity-grasping beliefs) and the resulting ego-preserving bias, the person’s Bayesian Engine malfunctions, failing to use prediction errors to update prior beliefs. To counter this problem, after recognizing the causes of sufferings, a practitioner of the compassion meditation aims to attune to all others equally, friends and enemies alike, suspend identity-based conceptual thoughts, and eventually let go of any identity-grasping belief and ego-preserving bias that obscure reality. We present a brain model for the Bayesian Engine of three components: (a) Relation-Modeling, (b) Reality-Checking, and (c) Conflict-Alarming, which are subserved by (a) the Default-Mode Network (DMN), (b) Frontoparietal Network (FPN) and Ventral Attention Network (VAN), and (c) Salience Network (SN), respectively. Upon perceiving conflicts, the strengthening or weakening of ego-preserving bias will critically depend on whether the SN up-regulates the DMN or FPN/VAN, respectively. We propose that compassion meditation can strengthen brain regions that are conducive for suspending prior beliefs and enhancing the attunements to the counterparts in conflicts.
36
PARACEVSCHII, Nicolae. "Reflective Doctrine Analysis and Impact on the Internal and Foreign Policy of the Republic of Moldova." Perspective Politice 14, no. 1-2 (2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.25019/perspol/21.14.9.
Full textAbstract:
In this article, I aim to highlight the importance of the analysis on the impact of reflexive gameson the internal and foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova. Such analyzes are applied for the first time in our country regarding reflexive games. Until now, Moldova has been the subject and object of external reflexive applications. Advances in information technology are less visible and palpable for the reading public, which is not only a consumer of information, but also a subject and object of reflective informal technologies. Mathematics specialists model and create effective quantitative conflict management models. Experts in game theory and decision-making promote their own approaches in an increasingly wide range of fields (political, military, economic, etc.). But at the same time, the same specialists say that the individual is described too simplistically, the large sets and masses, with their properties, do not fit into mathematical models. One of the radical challenges for game theory and decision-making theory remains the need to develop the apparatus of reflection (first conceptually, then formally). Reflexive analysis refers to one’s own awareness of the meaning of reflexive communication and interpersonal interaction. At the same time, the reflection as an object of research, since the introduction of this category by J. Locke, is considered entirely belonging to the fields: philosophy and psychology.
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Subrahmanyam, Vishnu. "Expanding Conflicts of Interest in Public Health Research." Voices in Bioethics 7 (September 20, 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.52214/vib.v7i.8700.
Full textAbstract:
Photo by Mehdi Imani on Unsplash
ABSTRACT
Non-Profit and Non-Governmental Organizations (NPOs/NGOs) often receive research funds from private for-profit corporations through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Harm industries such as tobacco and alcohol have utilized this opportunity to clear themselves of any blame in contributing to the disease burden, thus obscuring the real danger of their products. The association of public health institutions with such harmful industries has given rise to both financial and non-financial Conflicts of Interest (COIs). To resolve conflicts that arise out of this association, institutions have sought prohibition and full disclosure models. This article highlights the necessity to expand conflict of interest and include industries of implicit harm (fast fashion, mining, cosmetics, and sugary drinks) and not limit itself to just tobacco and alcohol. Simultaneously, the article underlines the hurdles in such an expansion. In conclusion, the article provides a hybrid model for conflict assessment that attempts to account for the limitations of a prohibition model as well as a full disclosure model.
INTRODUCTION
As public health research lacks funding, corporations fill a funding gap by allocating money to non-governmental organizations and non-profits.[1] However, the financial involvement of private corporations in public health research raises questions about conflicts of interest and research integrity.[2] Conflicts of interest must be a consideration in the philosophical framework that public health institutions ought to adopt.
The recent focus on promoting a “socially conscious capitalistic environment” has led to the inception of corporate social responsibility[3] or an obligation of corporations to address social concerns their products or operations might bring about. Corporations engage in responsible actions to improve transparency and be more accountable for their actions.[4] Some corporations are motivated to be good corporate citizens through ethically profitable practices; they recognize a self-imposed obligation to use their resources to protect, and benefit society and they adhere to a social contract.[5]
Corporate social responsibility has strong parallels with entrepreneurial philanthropy. By investing in research, that benefits the socio-economically disadvantaged, social responsibility initiatives further social goals.[6] There are two distinct problems with corporate social responsibility models: First, they attempt (but fail) to make up for a poor corporate endeavor like selling cigarettes. Some companies abuse their responsibilities and produce unhealthy goods or engage in practices that are contrary to social good. Furthermore, their philanthropic engagement may be ill-motivated. It enables them to access the socio-political domain, benefit from tax breaks, and profit directly from the “generosity” label without changing their core practices.[7]
Second, corporate social responsibility leads to conflicts of interest in public research. Corporations fund public health research as a way to “act” responsible and to further a social goal.[8] Corporations that fund research at academic institutions, and non-profits pose financial conflicts of interest.[9]
l. Conflict of Interest: Funding Effect and Ethical Engagement
Arguably, tobacco and alcohol industries are in stark contrast to the goals of public health.[10] Their involvement in and contribution towards public health research may be motivated by a desire to improve their reputation. Harm industries engaging in public health research create a fundamental ethical tension.[11]
Many scholars have defined conflict of interest in a variety of ways. In this article, we take the definition of conflict of interest as "a set of circumstances that creates a risk that professional judgement or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary or a competing interest" [12]
Thus, a financial conflict of interest occurs when funding leads to the risk of compromising the research project that is financed by the corporation. "Funding Effect" was coined after a study showed significant differences in research outcomes of private and public-funded drug efficiency safety studies.[13] Private-industry-sponsored research produced commercially favorable outcomes in comparison to publicly sponsored studies.[14] Research sponsored by the tobacco industry had scientists produce biased data, often making the best case for industrial interests.[15] Receiving funds from for-profit corporations has also led to reduced dissemination of unfavorable results and under-reporting of negative findings.[16] There is not enough research to assess the value of corporate funding to those in academics.[17] Qualitative and quantitative empirical research may help shape best practices when engaging with private corporations.
Corporate social responsibility creates an illusion of righteousness. Tobacco companies have funded public health research designed to influence tobacco control policies.[18] Corporations have used research to further the narrative that personal responsibility plays an outsized role in alcohol consumption, thereby ignoring the social determinants of addiction and programs that include alcohol supply reduction.[19] A similar narrative has pervaded the sugary drinks discussion.[20]
While there are many considerations, there is no homogenous policy to help tackle conflicts of interest in public health research.[21] Academic journals mandate declaring financial conflicts of interest. [22] However, declarations should attempt to incorporate an institutional view of values and not restrict themselves to personal convictions. Rather than approaching each conflict of interest and using declarations, journals should evaluate conflicts of interest in terms of risk. Such an evaluation also would address embedded research practices that may appear ethical on the surface but represent unrecognized bias.[23] The Mohammed Ali effect is a good example of this phenomenon. Self-reporting of ethical research behavior by scientists is under representative of actual occurrences of misconduct simply because peers are held to different standards than self.[24]
ll. The Prohibition Model – A Deontological Framework
The prohibition model discards any research in association with industries that would create a conflict of interest.[25] Academic institutions or journals that prohibit research by industry limit the ability of harm industries to engage in philanthropic public health research that may reflect pro-industry bias. The non-association with harm industries draws from Kant’s categorical imperative. In From the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant[26] believes that moral behavior exists a priori. If we consider ethics a posteriori, we only deal with what we ‘already did,’ which is not the basis for a moral system. In a Kantian analysis, non-association with harm industries is the starting point of ethical behavior. Furthermore, in Metaphysics of Morals, Kant[27] outlines the motivations to act. He posits that ethical actions are motivated by duty and not by self-interest or immediate inclination. Thus, the prohibition model grounds itself in strong ethical imperatives. However, it would limit public health research funding.
lll. The Disclosure Model: Conflicts of Interest are Inevitable
The disclosure model claims that transparent disclosure procedures are enough to manage conflicts of interest. Often, a placating response to any concern is the disclosure of otherwise unavailable information.[28] Any disclosure should include enough information about the nature, scope, duration, and monetary forces within the for-profit organizational web to allow institutions to assess the risk to their own reputation of engaging in partnership or publishing research conducted by corporations.[29] In addition to transparency, disclosure allows for weighing risks and benefits by assessing proportionality. The proportionality principle requires that the benefits of the association or accepting funds from for-profits be great to justify the conflict of interest.[30] As a result of full disclosure, there is scope for increased accountability from private corporations and public health scholars to ensure that values are upheld throughout the association.
However, disclosure is not always effective as it does not prevent or remedy a conflict of interest.[31] Disclosure rests on a presumption of wrongdoing and can deter prospective corporate engagement in public health research. However, the risk of deterring research participation is not a concern strong enough to loosen the values a public health institution must strive to achieve. Values such as transparency, proportionality, precautionary measures, and accountability make it easier to navigate disclosure requirements. Disclosure as a standalone method is not a foolproof technique.[32] Thus, a tailor-made model that can switch between the prohibition model and the disclosure model on a case-by-case basis might be more effective. Furthermore, academics need to ensure reasonable confidence that corporations would disclose financial conflicts of interest as the disclosure requirement often acts on an honor system. In case of non-compliance, either terminating the ties or establishing a legal recourse could be sought as alternatives.
lV. The Case for Expanding the Definition of Conflicts of Interests
Many industries are explicitly harmful to people. Tobacco and alcohol corporations engage in actions and create products that work against the ideals of public health. Industries like fast fashion, cosmetics, and many others that are seemingly harmless contribute significantly to the deterioration of public health through their treatment of workers, environmental impacts, and lobbying efforts that include relaxing laws meant to protect consumers and workers.
The fashion industry produces large amounts of inexpensive clothing by outsourcing labor to lower- and middle-income countries,[33] creating environmental and occupational hazards for their citizens. Many countries lack institutional structures to prevent abuse of workers.[34] Fast fashion also leads to the production of solid waste that ends up in landfills with no efficient mechanism for its disposal.[35] The cosmetic industry releases a great number of micro-plastics into aquatic systems through face products which lead to a shift in their chemical composition.[36] The gambling industry harms health as gambling is addictive and can financially harm individuals, families, and interpersonal relationships.[37] The mining industry has occupational hazards such as inhaling of toxic substances as well as environmental hazards.[38] The sugary drink industry increases the burden of obesity, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease.[39]
A prohibition model works well with industries that explicitly harm. Thus, non-association with the tobacco and alcohol industry becomes obvious. The difficulty in deciphering conflict of interest through association arises when public health institutions are looking to expand their non-association to industries of implicit harm. When looking to expand non-association into industries such as mining, fast fashion, sugary drinks, etc., we need to move away from a one-size-fits-all approach. Disclosure is not enough as it does not resolve the risk of bias; it merely provides transparency. Yet, a prohibition model would require academic institutions and journals to research funding relationships as well as harmful practices and would lead to less funding for research.
V. The Traffic Light Model: A tailor-made hybrid of prohibition and disclosure
Academic institutions, non-profits, and public health organizations might shape market practices and unearth latent intentions to contradict the social determinants of health if they are able to eliminate bias in public health research.
This section presents a hybrid model for conflict-of-interest assessment and resolution that takes the metaphor of a traffic light. Figure 1 represents a schematic of the hybrid.
Figure 1: A Schematic of the Traffic Light Hybrid
As the schematic represents, industries that project values against public health, such as tobacco and alcohol, fall under the red light and hence can be put under non-association, i.e., the prohibition model. Expanding non-association to industries implicit in their harms, such as fast fashion, sugary drinks, mining, companies that exploit labor, would require us to proceed with the disclosure model. As mentioned before, disclosure would require assessing the conflict of interest in terms of proportionality, transparency, accountability, and ensuring that the precautionary principle has been met. Providing a legal recourse at every significant point during research might be helpful to eliminate conflicts that surface during the intermediate stages of research. The entire disclosure model falls under the yellow light urging us to go slow and err on the side of caution.
The green light comprises pro-public health values corporations and exercises impactful operational methods that do not devalue public health goals. However, this should not be taken for face value. Any suspicion of conflict must be dealt with disclosure, and risk-based assessment should precede every funding decision.
The three categories serve as a starting point for public health researchers to invest more in building a framework that helps assess such conflicts. Conflicts of interest are rather dynamic and require constant attention. Examining research practices and funder objectives is crucial. The impact of private corporations on public health research needs to be widely discussed in the academic community. Although the hybrid provides a starting point in designing a more dynamic and flexible framework, the presence of an institutional conflict of interest policy and committee with independent review and oversight of research is also a necessity.[40]
Considering decreased federal funding, scholars have argued the necessity for corporate funding. Besides meeting the financial demand, corporate funding has brought in benefits such as employment opportunities, access to otherwise unavailable tools and technology, and turning academic research into commercially viable practice.[41] Although the goals of public health research, such as the creation of public goods, affordable and safe housing, access to vaccines, etc., may seem utilitarian, it is important to understand that corporations influence research practices that are more deontological in nature. Research integrity has to do with ethical conduct of research and shaping best practices. Thus, an efficient way to deal with research practice and bias is by invoking the Kantian categorical imperative grounded in procedural ethics rather than consequentialist ethics. A Kantian perspective allows considering conflicts of interest as an institutional value. In addition to focusing on individual research practices, public health institutions need to develop an institutional conflict of interest framework where the values of a public health institution shape corporate engagement.
Another closely related discourse that has a significant bearing on corporate involvement is commercial determinants of health. It considers corporations as contributors to disease burden and holds them as part of a structural problem.[42] By shaping research practices and investing in designing conflicts of interest policies, public health institutions can redefine the narrative of accountability. By actively evaluating financial links within the corporation and assessing risks of bias and influence in research, public health institutions can check the power imbalance that corporations tend to misuse.[43] More importantly, furthering a narrative that defines disease burden in terms of corporate contribution signals support to those who fight against the injustices perpetrated by large-scale corporations. People from lower- and middle-income countries and several indigenous communities have been forced out of their neighborhoods for corporate expansion.[44] As a public health institution, it is important to support vulnerable groups outpowered and forced into poor living conditions by global corporations.
CONCLUSION
The consumption of tobacco, alcohol, polluting motor vehicles, and other products of disease-promoting corporations have presented a significant struggle in improving public health. Engaging with such corporations through corporate social responsibility ventures into the highly contentious ethical territory. From a fundamental difference in the values endorsed, for-profit corporations present a conflict of interest in public health research. Public health institutions should be wary of the influence of corporate funding provided through social responsibility programs. Academic bias and the use of corporate social responsibility as a backdoor to legitimizing questionable practices are problematic. The prohibition and disclosure models independently do not perform efficiently against the dynamic nature of conflicts of interest. The hybrid model for institutional conflict-of-interest policy incorporates both the prohibition and disclosure models and allows for switching between them on a case-by-case basis. Managing corporate power requires dealing with conflict of interests broadly and as a risk-susceptibility issue rather than an occurrence issue.
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[1] Denier, Y. (2008). Mind the gap! Three Approaches to Scarcity in Health Care. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 11(1), 73-87.
[2] Gupta, A., Holla, R., & Suri, S. (2015). Conflict of Interest in Public Health: Should There be a Law to Prevent It? Indian J Med Ethics, 12(3), 172-7.
[3] de Vries, H. (2016). Invited Commentary: Corporate Social Responsibility and Public Health: An Unwanted Marriage; Resnik, D. B. (2019). Institutional Conflicts of Interest in Academic Research. Science and Engineering Ethics, 25(6), 1661-1669.
[4] Lee, K., & Bialous, S. A. (2006). Corporate Social Responsibility: Serious Cause for Concern. Tobacco Control, 15(6), 419-419.
[5] Macassa, G., da Cruz Francisco, J., & McGrath, C. (2017). Corporate social responsibility and population health. Health Science Journal, 11(5), 1-6.
[6] Harvey, C., Gordon, J., & Maclean, M. (2021). The Ethics of Entrepreneurial Philanthropy. Journal of Business Ethics, 171(1), 33-49.
[7] Harvey, C., Gordon, J., & Maclean, M. (2021). The Ethics of Entrepreneurial Philanthropy. Journal of Business Ethics, 171(1), 33-49.
[8] Resnik, D. B. (2019). Institutional Conflicts of Interest in Academic Research. Science and Engineering Ethics, 25(6), 1661-1669.
[9] Royo Bordonada, M., & García López, F. (2018). What Is and What Is Not a Conflict of Interest in Public Health Research. European Journal of Public Health, 28(suppl_4), cky213-750.
[10] de Vries, H. (2016). Invited Commentary: Corporate Social Responsibility and Public Health: An Unwanted Marriage.
[11] Lee, K., & Bialous, S. A. (2006). Corporate Social Responsibility: Serious Cause for Concern. Tobacco Control, 15(6), 419-419.
[12] Gupta, A., Holla, R., & Suri, S. (2015). Conflict of Interest In Public Health: Should There Be A Law To Prevent It?. Indian J Med Ethics, 12(3), 172-7.
[13] Krimsky, S. (2013). Do Financial Conflicts of Interest Bias Research? An Inquiry into The “Funding Effect” Hypothesis. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 38(4), 566-587.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Nakkash, R. T., Mugharbil, S., Alaouié, H., & Afifi, R. A. (2017). Attitudes of Public Health Academics Toward Receiving Funds from For-Profit Corporations: A Systematic Review. Public Health Ethics, 10(3), 298-303.
[17] Nakkash, R. T., Mugharbil, S., Alaouié, H., & Afifi, R. A. (2017). Attitudes of Public Health Academics Toward Receiving Funds From For-Profit Corporations: A Systematic Review. Public Health Ethics, 10(3), 298-303. (An attempt to review the research failed as there was not data on the “Attitudes of Public Health Academics towards receiving funds from for-profit corporations.”)
[18] de Vries, H. (2016). Invited Commentary: Corporate Social Responsibility and Public Health: An Unwanted Marriage.
[19] Yoon, S., & Lam, T. H. (2013). The illusion of Righteousness: Corporate Social Responsibility Practices Of The Alcohol Industry. BMC Public Health, 13(1), 1-11.
[20] Gupta, A., Holla, R., & Suri, S. (2015). Conflict of interest in Public Health: Should There Be A Law To Prevent It?. Indian J Med Ethics, 12(3), 172-7.
[21] Shamoo, A. S., & Resnik, D. B. (2015). Responsible Conduct of Research (3rd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
[22] Resnik, D. B. (2019). Institutional Conflicts of Interest in Academic Research. Science And Engineering Ethics, 25(6), 1661-1669.
[23] Field, M. J., & Lo, B. (Eds.). (2009). Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education, And Practice.
[24] Fanelli, D. (2009). How Many Scientists Fabricate and Falsify Research? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis Of Survey Data. PloS one, 4(5), e5738.
[25] Field, M. J., & Lo, B. (Eds.). (2009). Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education, and Practice.
[26] Kant, I. (2008). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Yale University Press.
[27] Kant, I. (2008). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Yale University Press.
[28] Field, M. J., & Lo, B. (Eds.). (2009). Conflict of Interest In Medical Research, Education, And Practice.
[29] IbId.
[30] Childress, James F., R. Gaare Bernheim, R. J. Bonnie, and A. L. Melnick. "Introduction: A Framework For Public Health Ethics." Essentials Of Public Health Ethics 1 (2015): 1-20.
[31] Fleishman, J. L. (1981). The Disclosure Model and Its Limitations. Hastings Center Report, 15-17.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Bick, R., Halsey, E., & Ekenga, C. C. (2018). The Global Environmental Injustice of Fast Fashion. Environmental Health, 17(1), 1-4.
[34] Anguelov, N. (2015). The Dirty Side of The Garment Industry: Fast Fashion and Its Negative Impact on Environment and Society. CRC Press.
[35] Wicker, A. Fast Fashion Is Creating an Environmental Crisis. Newsweek. September 1, 2016; Available from: https://www.newsweek.com/2016/09/ 09/old-clothes-fashion-waste-crisis-494824.html. Accessed 13 Aug 2021
[36] Alabi, O. A., Ologbonjaye, K. I., Awosolu, O., & Alalade, O. E. (2019). Public and Environmental Health Effects of Plastic Wastes Disposal: A Review. J Toxicol Risk Assess, 5(021), 1-13.
[37] Wardle, H., Reith, G., Langham, E., & Rogers, R. D. (2019). Gambling and Public Health: We Need Policy Action to Prevent Harm. BMJ, 365.
[38] Hendryx, M. (2015). The Public Health Impacts of Surface Coal Mining. The Extractive Industries and Society, 2(4), 820-826.
[39] Flynn, A., & Okuonzi, S. A. (2016). Coca-Cola's Multifaceted Threat to Global Public Health. The Lancet, 387(10013), 25.
[40] Resnik, D. B. (2019). Institutional Conflicts of Interest in Academic Research. Science And Engineering Ethics, 25(6), 1661-1669.
[41] Bayer, R., & Sampat, B. N. (2016). Corporate Funding for Schools of Public Health: Confronting the Ethical and Economic Challenges. American Journal of Public Health, 106(4), 615-618.
[42] McKee, M., & Stuckler, D. (2018). Revisiting The Corporate and Commercial Determinants of Health. American Journal of Public Health, 108(9), 1167-1170.
[43] Daube, M. (2018). Shining a Light on Industry Research Funding. American Journal of Public Health, 108(11), 1441.
[44] Munarriz, G. (2008). Rhetoric and Reality: The World Bank Development Policies, Mining Corporations, and Indigenous Communities in Latin America. International Community Law Review, 10(4), 431-443.
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Butchart, Liam. "On the Status of Rights." Voices in Bioethics 7 (May 18, 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.52214/vib.v7i.8352.
Full textAbstract:
Photo by Patrick Tomasso on Unsplash
ABSTRACT
In cases where the law conflicts with bioethics, the status of rights must be determined to resolve some of the tensions. This paper considers the origins of both legal and philosophical rights, arguing that rights per se do not exist naturally. Even natural rights that are constitutional or statutory came from relationships rather than existing in nature. Once agreed upon, rights develop moral influence.
INTRODUCTION
l. The Question of Rights
The language of rights is omnipresent in current discourse in law, bioethics, and many other disciplines. Rights dialogue is frequently contentious – some thinkers take issue with various uses of rights in the modern dialogue. For example, some criticize “rights talk,” which heightens social conflict when used as a “trump” against disfavored arguments.[1] Others are displeased by what is termed “rights inflation,” where too many novel rights are developed, such that the rights these scholars view as “more important” become devalued.[2] Some solutions have been proposed: one recommendation is that rights should be restricted to extremely important or essential ones. Some Supreme Court justices make arguments for applying original meanings in legal cases.[3] Conflict over the quantity and status of rights has long been a subject of debate in law and philosophy. Even Jefferson had to balance his own strict reading of the Constitution with tendencies to exceed the plain text of the document.[4] This thread of discourse has grown in political prominence over the years, with more Supreme Court cases that suggest newly developed (or, perhaps, newly recognized) rights.
The theoretical conflict between textualists and those looking to intent or context could lead to repealing rights to abortion, sterilization, or marital privacy and deeply impacts our daily lives. Bioethics is ubiquitous, and rights discourse is fundamental. This paper analyzes the assumptions that underlie the existence of rights. The law is steeped in philosophy, though philosophical theories have an often-unacknowledged role. This is especially true in cases that navigate difficult bioethical issues. As a result of this interleaving, the ontological status of rights is necessary to resolve some of the theoretical tensions.
Many philosophers have either argued for or implicitly included human rights in their theories of morality and legality. However, there is no universally accepted definition of rights; various philosophers have their own approaches. For example: Louden comments, “Rights are permissions rather than requirements. Rights tell us what the bearer is at liberty to do”; Martin thinks that a right is “an established way of acting”; Hohfeld concludes that all rights are claims.[5] Similarly, there is dissent about the qualities of rights: The Declaration of Independence characterizes rights as unalienable, but not all thinkers agree. Nickel comments, “Inalienability does not mean that rights are absolute or can never be overridden by other considerations. . . Perhaps it is sufficient to say that [human] rights are very hard to lose.”[6] This discord necessitates additional analysis. “Many people tend to take the validity of. . . rights for granted. . . However, moral philosophers do not enjoy such license for epistemological complacency.”[7] Because of the fundamental impact that political and moral philosophy enacted as the law have, this paper considers the origins of both legal and philosophical rights, arguing that rights per se do not exist naturally. Even natural rights that are constitutional or statutory came from relationships rather than existing in nature. Once agreed upon, rights take on moral force.
ll. Legal Rights: From Case to Constitution
Bioethics and law sometimes address rights differently. Three Supreme Court cases marked the development of privacy rights in the United States: Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Roe v. Wade (1973) and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health (1990). These cases shape the normative dialogue and consider complex moral quandaries.
Griswold v. Connecticut concerned providing contraception to married couples in contravention of state law. Justice Douglas writes for the majority that, based in “a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights,” legally protected zones of privacy extend from the text of the Constitution. “Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”[8] Writing in dissent, Justice Black argues that there is not a broad right to privacy included in the provisions of the Constitution, and expresses concern over “dilut[ion] or expans[ion]” of enumerated rights by terms such as privacy, which he characterizes as abstract and ambiguous – and subject to liberal reinterpretation.[9] He concludes that the government does have the right to invade privacy “unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.”[10] Also dissenting, Justice Stewart finetunes the argument: rather than look to community values beyond the Constitution, the Court ought to rely solely on text of the document, in which he “can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever decided by this court.”[11] Thus, Griswold v. Connecticut is an example of the tensions within the Supreme Court over strict textualism or broader interpretations of the Constitution that look to intent and purpose.
Roe v. Wade held that there is a right to privacy found through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that includes the right to make medical decisions including abortion. While the conclusion – that there is a Constitutionally protected right to abortion, with certain limits seems to expand the Griswold doctrine of privacy rights, dissent to the ruling stems from much the same concern as before. Justice Rehnquist writes:
A transaction resulting in an operation such as this is not "private" in the ordinary usage of that word. Nor is the "privacy" that the Court finds here even a distant relative of the freedom from searches and seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which the Court has referred to as embodying a right to privacy.[12]
However, he then departs from the stricter approach of Justices Black and Stewart:
I agree… that the "liberty," against deprivation of which without due process the Fourteenth Amendment protects, embraces more than the rights found in the Bill of Rights. But that liberty is not guaranteed absolutely against deprivation, only against deprivation without due process of law.[13]
This is a tempering of the stricter constructionism found earlier, where more latitude is allowed for the interpretation of the text of the Constitution, even though there are clearly limits on how far the words may be stretched, with the genesis of a new right. Later, in Planned Parenthood of Southwestern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court further refined Roe v. Wade implementing an “undue burden” test.[14]
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court held that there is a general liberty interest in the refusal of medical treatment. The case continues the tradition of Griswold and Roe v. Wade ensuring a liberty that is beyond the text, but also allows states to impose a strict evidentiary burden to shape how the right is exercised. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision that “because there was no clear and convincing evidence of Nancy [Cruzan’s] desire to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn. . . her parents lacked authority to effectuate such a request.”[15] The Supreme Court found that the clear and convincing evidentiary burden applied by the Missouri Supreme Court was consistent with the Due Process clause. Justice Scalia notes that even though he agrees with the Court’s decision, he finds this judgment unnecessary or, perhaps counterproductive, because the philosophical underpinnings of the case “are neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of this Court any better than they are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory” and should be left to the states to legislate as they see fit.[16] He goes on to further argue that the Due Process clause “does not protect individuals against deprivations of liberty simpliciter”; rather, it protects them from infringements of liberty that are not accompanied by due process.[17] Justice Scalia’s textualist position likely influenced his remarks.[18]
Comparing these cases, I argue there is a distinct effort to make the Constitution amenable to contemporary mores and able to address present issues that is moderated by justices who adhere to the text. The legal evolution of rights that are beyond the text of the Constitution may reflect social norms as well as the framers’ intent. Rights are protected by the Constitution, but the Constitution is mutable, through both case law and legislation. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence declared:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.[19]
The Declaration of Independence gives insight into rights prior to the Constitution by referring to a priori rights extended by a creator, sheltered and supported by the state.[20]
For earlier evidence of rights, Supreme Court cases often reference English common law doctrines. The common law was informed by preexisting principles and drew on a historical body of thought: philosophy. Exploring philosophy can give insight about the evolution of law.
lll. Philosophical Rights: Issues of Ontology
A moral right, the precursor to many legal rights, in some ways is a claim that bears moral weight. One relevant distinction is between positive and negative rights: a positive right is a claim on another to do something for the right holder; a negative right is a claim on others to leave the rights holder alone. Some rights are per se (that is, rights that have a de novo ontological origin) and some are constructed (rights that are secondary to some other theoretical apparatus).
We must appeal to the state of nature to understand the origin of rights. If rights exist in the state of nature, they are de novo; if not, they are constructed. The state of nature is the theoretical realm where there are no social conventions or no normative rules. The theoretical state of nature is stateless. Hobbes writes about the state of nature. He constructs the person within as incorporating two normative qualities: the law of nature, “whereby individuals are forbidden to do anything destructive of their lives or to omit the means of self-preservation,” and the right of nature, where the person has the “right to all things” – those things required for self-preservation.[21] Similarly, more contemporary philosophers have also inferred that the right to freedom is a natural right.[22] I argue that nature allows every person the freedom to all things, or a natural right against limitation on freedom. Every person has the capacity to do whatever they want, in accordance with their reason; liberty, rather than being a normative claim, is a component of the essence of beings. Yet both nature and other people pose some limitations.
Early modern contractarians’ status theories maintain that human attributes engender rights. [23] A specific formulation of human status ethics can be found in Kantian deontology. From the autonomous and rational will, Kant evolves his Categorical Imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”[24] Without (or before) law, philosophers suggested behaviors should reflect moral rights.
Like Rawls, I maintain that the state of nature includes both a scarcity of resources and individuals with whom we may develop conflicts of interest.[25] Individually, we are vulnerable to others, and because of that natural vulnerability, we have an inclination toward self-interest.[26] Therefore, we eventually find the state of nature unsatisfactory and move to create a civil society. Then the subsequent pathway to creating “rights” is well known. People agree on them and act accordingly. Then, they are enshrined in the law.[27] I attribute the impetus to move from the state of nature toward government to interpersonal interaction that creates a form of the social contract. Rawls qualitatively describes this when he notes the “identity of interests” that powers interpersonal cooperation.[28]
To me, the development of positive social relations has three components. The first is the human capacity for empathy. Empathy is commonly accepted by psychologists as universal.[29] Kittay deepens the concept of human empathy, arguing that there is a “register of inevitable human dependency” – a natural sense of care found in the human experience of suffering and decay and death to which we all eventually succumb, necessitating a recognition of interdependence and cooperation.[30]
The second is the importance of identity in generating social cooperation.[31] There is a sense of familial resemblance that resonates when we see others in our lives, forming the base of the identification that allows us to create bonds of mutual assent. A microsociety develops when people are exposed to each other and acts as a miniaturized state, governed by what is at first an implicit social contract. An internal order is generated and can be codified.
The third component of social relations is the extension of the otherness-yet-sameness beyond human adults. Mirroring connects the fully abled adult man and the woman, as well as the child, the physically and mentally disabled, and could extend to animals as well.[32]
Therefore, to me, it seems that rights do not exist per se in the state of nature, but because of our human capacities, relationships yield a social contract. This contract governs interpersonal relations with normative power: rights are constructed. Once constructed based on people in micro-society and then larger groups, rights were codified. Negative rights like those found in the U.S. Constitution allow people in liberal society to codify nearly universal ground rules in certain arenas while respecting minority views and differing priorities. However, the social contract is not absolute: it may be broken by any party with the power to enforce their will upon the other and it will evolve to reflect changing standards. So, there is a subtle distinction to be made: in unequal contractual social relations, there are not constructed rights but rather privileges. In a social relationship that aims at equal status among members, these privileges are normative claims – rights that are not inherent or a priori but mandated to be equally applied by society’s governing body. In this way, I differ from Rawls. To me, justice is a fundamental moral principle only for societies that aim at cooperation, where advancing the interests of all is valued.[33]
CONCLUSION
From Liberty to Law
Social contractualism purports to provide moral rules for its followers even when other ethical systems flounder in the state of nature. Relationships consider the needs and wants of others. Rights exist, with the stipulation that they are constructed under social contracts that aim for equality of application. I also suggest that contractualist approaches may even expand the parties who may be allowed rights, something that has significant bearing on the law and practical bioethics.
The strict/loose constructionism debate that has played out in the Supreme Court’s decisions focuses on whether rights are enumerated or implied. Theoretical or implicit contracts may be change quickly, based on the power dynamics in a social relationship. Theoretical bounds of the social contract (possibly including animals, nonhumans, etc.) may be constricted by an official contract, so these concerns would need to be adjudicated in the context of the Constitution. In certain cases, strict interpretation reflects the rights determined by the social compact and limits new positive rights; in others, a broad interpretation keeps government out of certain decisions, expanding negative rights to reflect changing social norms. The negative rights afforded in the Constitution provide a framework meant to allow expansive individual choices and freedom. The underlying social compact has more to do with the norms behind societal structure than forcing a set of agreed upon social norms at the level of individual behavior. The Constitution’s text can be unclear, arbitrary, or open to multiple meanings. The literary theorist may be willing to accept contradiction or multiple meanings, but the legal scholar may not. The issue of whether the social compact is set or evolving affects constitutional interpretation.
The law is itself may be stuck in a state of indeterminacy: the law, in the eyes of the framers, was centered on a discourse steeped in natural, human rights, attributed to a creator. Today, there is an impulse toward inherent human dignity to support rights. The strict/loose constructionism debate concerns interpretation.[34] In conclusion, rights have no ontological status per se, but are derived from a complex framework that springs from our relationships and dictates the appropriateness of our actions. While the Constitution establishes the negative rights reflecting a social compact, interpretations recognize the limitations on rights that are also rooted in societal relationships.
The author would like to thank Stephen G. Post, PhD, and Caitlyn Tabor, JD, for providing feedback on early drafts of this paper.
[1] Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001), 14.
[2] James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University, 2008).
[3] Maurice Cranston, What Are Human Rights? (London: Bodley Head, 1973).
[4] Barry Balleck, “When The Ends Justify the Means: Thomas Jefferson and the Louisiana Purchase,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1992): 679-680.
[5] Robert Louden, “Rights Infatuation and the Impoverishment of Moral Theory,” Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (1983): 95; Rex Martin, A System of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University, 1993), 1; Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University, 1919), 36.
[6] James Nickel, "Human Rights", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed 27 April 2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/rights-human/.
[7] Andrew Fagan, “Human Rights,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. James Fieser and Bradley Dowden, accessed 27 April 2021, https://iep.utm.edu/hum-rts/.
[8] Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965), para. 18, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479.
[9] Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965), para. 69 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479.
[10] Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965), para. 69 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479.
[11] Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965), para. 92 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479.
[12] Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 172, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/410/113%26amp.
[13] Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 172-173, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/410/113%26amp.
[14] Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/505/833/#:~:text=Casey%2C%20505%20U.S.%20833%20(1992)&text=A%20person%20retains%20the%20right,the%20mother%20is%20at%20risk.
[15] Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 497 U.S. 261 (1990), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/88-1503.ZO.html.
[16] Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 497 U.S. 261 (1990), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/88-1503.ZO.html.
[17] Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 497 U.S. 261 (1990), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/88-1503.ZO.html.
[18] It is worth noting that some of the Supreme Court’s conservatives – like Scalia, Thomas, Roberts – have expressed explicit disdain for the right to privacy introduced in Griswold. Jamal Greene, “The So-Called Right to Privacy,” UC Davis Law Review 43 (2010): 715-747, https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/622.
[19] National Archives. “Declaration of Independence: A Transcription.” July 4, 1776; reviewed July 24, 2020, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript.
[20] However, the reference to a creator has come to mean a natural right and a priori best describes it rather than a religious underpinning. To borrow from Husserl, this approach will be bracketed out.
[21] DJC Carmichael, “Hobbes on Natural Right in Society: The ‘Leviathan’ Account,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 23, no. 1 (1990): 4-5.
[22] HLA Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?” The Philosophical Review 64, no. 2 (1955): 175.
[23] Warren Quinn, Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993), 170.
[24] Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. James Ellington, 3rd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 30.
[25] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge: Belknap, 1999), 109.
[26] JS Mill, Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. X, ed. JM Robson (Toronto: U of Toronto Press, 1985), 13-14.
[27] Rex Martin, A System of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University, 1993), 1; Kenneth Baynes, “Kant on Property Rights and the Social Contract,” The Monist 72, no. 3 (1989): 433-453.
[28] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge: Belknap, 1999), 109.
[29] Frederik von Harbou, “A Remedy Called Empathy: The Neglected Element of Human Rights Theory,” Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 99, no. 2 (2013): 141.
[30] Eva Feder Kittay. Learning from My Daughter: The Value and Care of Disabled Minds (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2019), 145-146.
[31] Jane Gallop, “Lacan’s ‘Mirror Stage’: Where to Begin,” SubStance 11, no. 4 (1983): 121; Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book X: Anxiety: 1962-1963, trans. Cormac Gallagher, 26-27, https://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/THE-SEMINAR-OF-JACQUES-LACAN-X_l_angoisse.pdf. (In Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, human development necessitates both recognition of the Self and the separation of the Self from the Other.)
[32] Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book X: Anxiety: 1962-1963, trans. Cormac Gallagher, 27-28, https://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/THE-SEMINAR-OF-JACQUES-LACAN-X_l_angoisse.pdf.
[33] There is an interesting discussion to be had about whether social contract theory allows for this gradation in quality of contracts, or whether the two are fundamentally different phenomena. I cannot answer this question here; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge: Belknap, 1999), 102-103.
[34] Ruthellen Josselson, “The Hermeneutics of Faith and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion,” Narrative Inquiry 14, no. 1 (2004): 2-4.
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Daigneault, Dawna, and Chris Brown. "Worth-Conscious theory: Understanding the role of birthright self-worth and application to clinical practice." Theory & Psychology, January 10, 2023, 095935432211355. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09593543221135559.
Full textAbstract:
In this article, we introduce a theory of worth consciousness that builds on the research from self-worth with attention to the importance of honoring birthright self-worth (BSW), which is foundational to human dignity. This new empirically testable construct, Worth-Conscious theory (WCT), concerns human worth and requires individuals to recognize and acknowledge their value and significance (i.e., worth) even when smaller (e.g., family) and larger (e.g., community and society) systems fail to support them in affirming and repairing their worth. Self-worth is the birthright of all individuals; hence our central aim is to introduce and explain the four pillars of self-worth, which are major tenets of WCT that align with Erikson’s developmental stages. These four pillars of self-worth (self-awareness, self-respect, self-esteem(ed), and self-confidence) are instrumental in understanding clients’ life challenges, presenting issues, and how to assist them in repairing and maintaining their worth. More specifically, many clients’ mental health issues, interpersonal conflicts, and other concerns can be directly or indirectly related to the experience of negative and critical beliefs about their worth and, more specifically, that their BSW has not been affirmed or realized throughout the lifespan.
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Zeng, Jing. "Theoretical typology of deceptive content (Conspiracy Theories)." DOCA - Database of Variables for Content Analysis, March 26, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.34778/5g.
Full textAbstract:
The conceptual fuzziness of terms like misinformation, disinformation, rumour, gossip, conspiracy theories has been discussed by various scholars (e.g. DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007; Rojecki & Meraz, 2016). In both academic research and media reports, it is common to see these terms being used interchangeably. To develop better understanding of how and why different forms of misinformation operate, it is important to clarify the conceptual boundaries between these terms in a meaningful way.
Field of Application/Theoretical foundation:
In their social psychology research, DiFonzo and Bordia (2007) propose an effective way to differentiate rumour from other terms, which emphasises the content, function, and context of each concept. This three-dimensional framework can be applied to systematically differentiate concepts related to misinformation.
In the field of media and communication studies, as research on digital misinformation continues to grow, it is crucial for researchers to understand the contexts of each concept and choose the appropriate term in accordance with their research agenda. It is worth noting that there are also overlapping dimensions between these concepts. For instance, rumour can contain misinformation, and conspiracy theories can be used for propaganda.
Example study:
Zeng (2018)
Information on Zeng, 2018
Author: Jing Zeng
Interest of the study: In her study on online rumours during times of crises, Zeng (2018) applies DiFonzo and Bordia’s (2007) framework to differentiate seven seemingly similar concepts: misinformation, disinformation, rumour, gossip, urban legend, propaganda, and conspiracy theories.
Table 1. Summary of main features of seven concepts related to misinformation
Content
Context
Function
Misinformation
Inaccurate information
Any circumstances of information circulation.
Does not have to have any specific function
Gossip
Talk about individuals or private behaviour
Shared between individuals or in casual social events.
Maintaining network, interpersonal relations
Urban legend
Meaning-making, value-endorsing stories related to contemporary life
Casual setting for storytelling.
Promote cultural and moral values
Disinformation
Deliberately deceptive information
Disseminated by institutions.
Undermine public support
Propaganda
Messages instrumentally disseminated to promote a political cause
Following a top-down pattern, disseminated by official sources.
Promote political and ideological values
Rumour
Unofficial information unverified by authorities
Circulated in circumstances of ambiguity, danger or threat.
Make sense of an uncertain circumstance
Conspiracy theory
Proposed explanations of an event or a practice that refer to the machinations of influential people, institutions, or a secret society
Emerged in responses to uncertainty and perceived threats posed by a coalition of elites/secret actors, and constructed as ‘alternative’ explanations challenging narratives provided by governments, mainstream media or scientific institutions.
Serves as a threat management response, and often also as an anti-establishment/anti-science, political and ideological stance
Misinformation is the most generic one among these terms, in the sense that it does not emphasise the social and political dimension of information. The concept of misinformation is mostly discussed in tandem with information, particularly by Information Science scholars. As a form of information, the defining feature of misinformation is its inaccuracy. Such inaccuracy is not necessarily caused by false information, but can also be caused by irrelevant and incomplete information.
Gossip is also a form of unverified information; however, the content is more private, and is mostly circulated in an interpersonal context (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007; Rojecki & Meraz, 2016). In terms of function, instead of sense making, gossip is propagated for social purposes. As summarised by Foster (2004), gossip functions to achieve the formation, adaptation, and maintenance of social networks. This is to say, individuals share gossip in the context of managing their relationship with members within their social group. For instance, early literature on gossip associated the practice of gossiping with female social networking. As Rysman (1977) pointed out, one key reason behind the patriarchal criticism on female gossiping is gossip’s ability ‘to develop social ties outside the institution of male dominance’ (p. 176). This personal and interpersonal focus on the concept of gossip is its most distinctive feature.
Disinformation and propaganda are two very closely related concepts, because they are both disseminated for political purposes (Lewandowsky, Stritzke, & Freund, 2013). In terms of content, disinformation is deliberately deceptive information that is used to undermine public support of a regime, whereas propaganda is information used to mobilise public support for a political cause or a regime (Rojecki & Meraz, 2016). The word disinformation originated from ‘dezinformacija’, a Russian term coined in the former Soviet Union (Karlova & Fisher, 2013). Given the particular cultural and political context in the region at that time, this term was originally closely associated with intelligence operations and political tactics. However, the definition of disinformation has, over time, expanded to include the propagation of misinformation that is non-politically motivated.
Urban legends are contemporary tales that are shared to promote moral and cultural values (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007). Construed in this way, urban legends are similar to propaganda in the sense that they encode and transmit values, but they are used mythologically rather than strategically. Furthermore, where propaganda emphasises political and ideological values, urban legends focus on cultural and moral values. One key criterion for an urban legend is that it must be grounded in the day-to-day affairs of contemporary life, hence the ‘urban’ in urban legend (Bennett & Smith, 2013). A classic example of an urban legend is the claim that a tooth left in a glass of Coca Cola can dissolve overnight. This story promotes health messages to avoid excessive consumption of soda drinks. Another case is the tale of a drugged traveller awakening in an ice-filled bathtub, only to discover one of his kidneys has been removed by organ thieves. This tale echoes a classic form of legend that teaches the moral lesson to avoid dangerous situations.
Rumour, in terms of content, is unofficial information – that is, information whose authenticity is not verified by an appeal to authority. By this definition, the defining characteristic of rumour content is not its falsity, but its ‘unofficial’ status and therefore its relationship to social institutions (Fine, 2007). Second, rumour arises in contexts that are ambiguous, threatening or potentially threatening (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2007, p. 20). In such uncertain contexts, rumour functions to make sense of the unknown situation. This may explain why rumour goes hand in hand with crisis events, during which there is often a paucity of information and a state of anxiety among the populace.
Conspiracy theories’ content is proposed explanations of an event or a practice that refer to the machinations of powerful people, institutions, or a secret society (e.g. Coady, 2003; Goertzel, 1994; Keeley, 1999). One distinctive feature of conspiracy theories is its reference to a coordinated group of deliberate actors. For instance, in anti-vaccination conspiracy theories, ‘big pharma’ companies are accused of conspiring with politicians; likewise, flat earthers implicate NASA in the plot to keep the truth about the “true nature” of the Earth from the public. Similar to rumour mongering, the context in which conspiracy theories emerge is often one of uncertainty and perceived risks, and conspiracy theorising represents a form of ‘alternative’ collective sensemaking to challenge established narratives provided by the mainstream media and institutions. Therefore, conspiracy theorising is not merely sensemaking, but also has anti-establishment and anti-science undercurrents. Therefore, in terms of function, conspiracy theories serve as (1) a threat management response to ‘secret coalitions’ that are perceived to pose direct threats to the collective well-being, health, and safety of the society (van Prooijen et al., 2018); and (2) a political and ideological stance (Hofstadter, 2012).
References
Bennett, G., & Smith, P. (2013). Contemporary legend: A reader. London: Routledge.
Coady, D. (2003). Conspiracy theories and official stories. International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 17(2), 197–209.
DiFonzo, N., & Bordia, P. (2007). Rumor, gossip and urban legends. Diogenes, 54(1), 19-35.
Fine, G. A. (2007). Rumor, trust and civil society: Collective memory and cultures of judgment. Diogenes, 54(1), 5-18.
Foster, E. K. (2004). Research on gossip: Taxonomy, methods, and future directions. Review of General Psychology, 8(2), 78-99.
Goertzel, T. (1994). Belief in conspiracy theories. Political Psychology, 15, 731–742.
Hofstadter, R. (2012). The paranoid style in American politics. New York: Vintage.
Karlova, N. A., & Fisher, K. E. (2013). A social diffusion model of misinformation and disinformation for understanding human information behaviour. Information Research, 18(1), paper 573.
Keeley, B. L. (1999). Of conspiracy theories. The Journal of Philosophy, 96(3), 109–126.
Lewandowsky, S., Stritzke, W. G. K., Freund, A. M, Oberauer, K., and Krueger, J. I. (2013). Misinformation, disinformation, and violent conflict: From Iraq and the ‘War on Terror’ to future threats to peace. American Psychologist, 68(7), 487-501.
Losee, R. M. (1997). A discipline independent definition of information. Journal of the American Society for Information Science, 48(3), 254-269
Rojecki, A., & Meraz, S. (2016). Rumors and factitious informational blends: The role of the web in speculative politics. New Media & Society, 18(1), 25-43.
Rysman, A. (1977). How the ‘gossip’ became a woman. Journal of Communication, 27(1), 176-180.
van Prooijen, J. W., & Van Vugt, M. (2018). Conspiracy theories: Evolved functions and psychological mechanisms. Perspectives on psychological science, 13(6), 770-788.
Zeng, J. (2018). Contesting rumours on social media during acute events: The 2014 Sydney siege and 2015 Tianjin blasts (Doctoral dissertation, Queensland University of Technology). Available at https://eprints.qut.edu.au/115786/.
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Matts, Tim, and Aidan Tynan. "The Melancholy of Extinction: Lars von Trier's "Melancholia" as an Environmental Film." M/C Journal 15, no. 3 (May 3, 2012). http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/mcj.491.
Full textAbstract:
Lars von Trier’s film Melancholia depicts the last days of the earth through the eyes of a young woman, Justine, who is suffering from a severe depressive illness. In the hours leading up to the Earth’s destruction through the impact of a massive blue planet named Melancholia, Justine tells her sister that “the Earth is evil, we don’t need to grieve for it. Nobody will miss it.” We can read this apparently anti-environmental statement in one sense as a symptom of Justine’s melancholic depression. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders defines melancholia as a form of depression that is “qualitatively different from the sadness experienced during bereavement” (419). It is as if Justine’s illness relates to some ungrievable loss, a loss so pathologically far reaching that it short circuits the normal psychology of mourning. But, in another sense, does her statement not strike us with the ring of an absolute and inescapable truth? In the wake of our destruction, there would be no one left to mourn it since human memory itself would have been destroyed along with the global ecosystems which support and sustain it. The film’s central dramatic metaphor is that the experience of a severe depressive episode is like the destruction of the world. But the metaphor can be turned around to suggest that ecological crisis, real irreparable damage to the environment to the point where it may no longer be able to support human life, affects us with a collective melancholia because the destruction of the human species is a strictly ungrievable event. The discoveries of Charles Darwin in the nineteenth century constituted a major thought event which placed the emergence of humanity within a temporal context extending far beyond the limits of human memory. Claire Colebrook suggests that the equivalent event for present times is the thought of our own extinction, the awareness that environmental changes could bring about the end of the species: “[the] extinction awareness that is coming to the fore in the twenty-first century adds the sense of an ending to the broader awareness of the historical emergence of the human species.” While the scientific data is stark, our mediated cultural experience provides us with plenty of opportunities to, in Colebrook’s words, “[domesticate] the sense of the human end” by affirming “various modes of ‘post-humanism’” in ways which ultimately deny the shattering truth of extinction. This domestication obviously takes place in one sense on the level of a conscious denial of the scale of the ecological crisis. On another level, however, environmentally conscious representations of “the planet” or “nature” as a sheer autonomous objectivity, a self-contained but endangered natural order, may ultimately be the greatest obstacle to genuine ecological thinking. By invoking the concept of a non-human nature in perfect balance with itself we factor ourselves out of the ecological equation while simultaneously drawing on the power of an objectifying gaze. Slavoj Žižek gives the example of Alan Weisman’s book The World Without Us which imagines a contemporary world in which all humans have disappeared and nature reasserts itself in the ruins of our abandoned cities. Žižek describes this as the ultimate expression of ideology because: we, the humans, are here reduced to a pure disembodied gaze observing our own absence [...] this is the fundamental subjective position of fantasy: to be reduced to a gaze observing the world in the condition of the subject’s non-existence—like the fantasy of witnessing the act of one’s own conception, parental copulation, or the act of witnessing one’s own burial (80). In many ways, the very spectacle or fantasy of our own destruction has provided us with a powerful means of naturalising it—environmental catastrophe occurs to and in a “nature” whose essence excludes us—and this renders it compatible with a psychology by which the human end is itself internalised, processed, and normalised. Ironically, this normalisation may have been affected to a great extent through the popularisation, over the last ten years or so, of environmental discourses relating to the grave threats of climate change. A film such as Wall-E, for example, shows us an entirely depopulated, desertified world in which the eponymous robot character sorts through the trash of human history, living an almost-human life among the ruins. The robot functions as a kind of proxy humanity, placing us, the viewers, in a position posterior to our own species extinction and thus sending us the ultimately reassuring message that, even in our absence, our absence will be noted. In a similar way, the drama-documentary The Age of Stupid presents a future world devastated by environmental collapse in which a lone archivist presides over the whole digitised memory of humanity and carefully constructs out of actual news and documentary footage the story of our demise. These narratives and others like them ultimately serve, whatever their intentions, to domesticate the end of humanity through the logic of a post-human mastery of the story of our own obliteration. The starker truth with which Melancholia confronts us is that the end of humanity cannot and will not be internalised by any process of human memorialisation. Von Trier’s film does not portray any post-catastrophe world from which we might be able to extract a degree of psychological comfort or residual sense of mastery. Rather, the narrative frame is entirely bounded by the impact event, which we witness first in the film’s opening shots and then again at its close. There is no narrative time posterior to the impact and yet for us, the viewers, everything happens in its shattering aftermath, according to the strange non-successional logic of the future-anterior. Everything begins and ends with the moment of impact. If the narrative itself is concerned with the lives of the characters, particularly the effects of the main character’s depression on her family relationships, then the film’s central event remains radically disjunctive, incapable of being processed on this interpersonal level through the standard cinematic tropes of the disaster or survival genres. The value of regarding Melancholia as an environmental film, then, is that it profoundly de-psychologises the prospect of our extinction while forcing the burden of this event’s unfathomable content onto us. Von Trier’s film suggests that melancholy, not mourning, is a more apt emotional register for ecological crisis and for the extinction awareness it brings, and in this sense Melancholia represents a valuable alternative to more standard environmental narratives which remain susceptible to ideological reinscriptions of human (or post-human) mastery. As ecocritic Timothy Morton suggests, “melancholy is more apt, even more ethically appropriate, to an ecological situation in which the worst has already happened, and in which we find ourselves [...] already fully implicated” (75–6). The most influential account of mourning and melancholia comes from Sigmund Freud, who described these attitudes as two different ways of dealing with loss. In the process of mourning, Freud states that there comes the realisation “that the loved object no longer exists” which “[demands] that all libido shall be withdrawn from its attachments to that object” (245). The healthy outcome of this very painful process is that our libidinal attachments are free once again to take on another object of love; the lost object can be replaced according to a logic of temporal succession. Melancholia also results from a loss, says Freud, but this time it relates not simply or primarily to a replaceable external object but, more complexly, to something in the ego itself, not a discrete thing in the world but a certain way of being in the world which the lost object facilitated. Freud writes that the trauma of melancholia is thus manifested by the ego itself taking on or embodying the loss. The ego, stripped of its sense of being, comes to mimic the non-existence of that which once supported it. The “delusion” of the melancholic’s depressive state, says Freud, stems from the fact that something has ruptured her affective and libidinal attachment to the world, but this cannot be psychologically processed in terms of a replaceable loss since what is lost was never simply an external object. Her world is struck by an absence that cannot be mourned because it is kept alive as a non-being which she is. She has taken on the burden of this structural impossibility and does not pursue an imaginary resolution of it which, to invoke Žižek’s Lacanian terms once more, would involve her submitting to the subjective position of fantasy (i.e. becoming a witness to her own non-existence). The melancholic’s attitude is, Freud observes, “psychologically very remarkable” because it involves “an overcoming of the instinct which compels every living thing to cling to life” (246). The melancholic carves out an existence apparently contrary to nature. This is the context in which Justine remarks that the earth, as an ungrievable object, is “evil.” Her melancholia is never explained in the course of the film, and, indeed, we see little of her personality apart from the events which manifest her psychological crisis. The film opens with the moment of interplanetary impact itself. The great blue planet of Melancholia approaches and begins to swallow the earth into its atmosphere. We cut immediately to Justine and her sister in the moments just before the impact: the air is electrified by the approaching collision and birds cascade from the trees. Our way into the narrative is this moment of chaos and dispersion, but von Trier’s depiction of it, his use of highly choreographed slow-motion shots resembling tableaux vivants, distance us from any sense of urgency or immediacy. It is as if the closer we come to the collision, the less real and the more stylised the world becomes; as if the impact holds a content which cannot be rendered in realist terms. By contrast, the subsequent scenes focusing on Justine’s interpersonal drama use a shaky, handheld camera which embeds us in the action. The narrative follows Justine on her wedding day. As events unfold we see cracks appear in the wedding party’s luxurious facade: Justine’s divorced parents argue viciously; her wealthy brother-in-law, who funded the wedding, fears that the occasion may be ruined by petty squabbling, to his great expense. Beneath these cracks, however, we realise that there is a deeper, more inexplicable crack opening up within Justine herself. At one point she retreats with her newlywed husband from the tumult of the wedding party. We expect from this scene an articulation or partial resolution, perhaps, of Justine’s mental conflict, or at least an insight into her character. In a more conventional story, this moment of conjugal intimacy would allow Justine to express an “authentic” desire, distinct from the superficial squabbling of her family, a means to “be herself.” But this doesn’t happen. Justine inexplicably rejects her husband’s overtures. In clinical terms, we might say that Justine’s behaviour corresponds to “anhedonia,” a loss of interest in the normal sources of pleasure or enjoyment. Invoking Freud, we could add to this that the very objective viability of her libidinal attachments has been called into question and that this is what precipitates her crisis. If such attachments are what ground us in reality, Justine’s desire seems to have become ungrounded through the emergence of something “nonobjectifiable,” to borrow a term from philosophers Deleuze and Guattari (What is Philosophy?, 209). This “something” is revealed only in the second half of the film with the appearance of Melancholia and the prospect of its obliterating impact. Justine is drawn to this new planet, in one scene luxuriating naked beneath its blue glow. We could argue, in one sense, that she has discovered in Melancholia a correlate to her own self-destructive desire: the only thing that can possibly gratify her is the annihilation of the earth itself. However in another, more constructive sense, we can say that her melancholic desire amounts to a kind of geophilosophical critique, a political and ultimately ecological protest against the territorialisation of her desire according to a supposed acceptability of objects. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that, if desire’s libidinal attachments form a kind of ground or “territory” then all territories interact with one another at some level because they are all equally founded on “lines of deterritorialization” sweeping them towards a mutually shared, extra-territorial outside (A Thousand Plateaus, 9). Or, putting it in plainer terms: beneath every ground is a non-ground such that the earth cannot ultimately ground itself in itself. Every mental, material, or social territory is founded upon this global movement of ungrounding. The trauma of Justine’s melancholia refers us to something which cannot be resolved within the given territories of her social or interpersonal milieus. While her illness can be registered in terms of the events of the film’s narrative time, the film’s central event—the collision with Melancholia—remains irreducible to the memorial properties of storytelling. We may thus argue that the impact event is not strictly speaking an element of the film’s narrative, but rather a pure cinematic sign evoking a radical form of ecological openness. The film moves through different territories—conjugal, familial, economic, scientific—but what propels us from one territory to another is the impact event whose content is reducible to none of these territories. Of all the film’s characters, only Justine is “open” to this absolute irreducibility, this resistance to closure. Her openness to Melancholia is not determined by whether or not it can be objectified, that is, rendered assimilable to the terms of a given territory. Both her brother-in-law (an amateur astronomer) and her sister attempt to calculate the chances of impact, but Justine remains open to it in a manner which does not close off that which precludes survival. In the end, as Melancholia bears down on the Earth, Justine’s attitude—which in Freud’s terms is antithetical to the instinct for life—turns out to be the most appropriate one. The point of this article is certainly not to argue that we should acquiesce to the traumatic realities of environmental crisis. Its aim, rather, is to suggest that well-being and harmony may no longer describe the appropriate emotional register for ecological thinking, given the current urgency of the crisis. Human and ecological health may, after all, be radically different and incommensurable things. The great anthropologist and structuralist thinker Claude Lévi-Strauss once remarked: I am concerned with the well-being of plants and animals that are threatened by humanity. I think ecologists make the mistake of thinking that they can defend humans and nature at the same time. I think it is necessary to decide if one prefers humans or nature. I am on the side of nature (qtd in Conley, 66). Lévi-Strauss may well be right when he says that a common human and ecological health may be an illusion of wishful thinking. However, what if there is a common trauma, whose ineradicability would not be a tragedy but, rather, evidence of radical openness in which we no longer have to pick sides (humans or plants and animals)? What if the proper “base” from which to begin thinking ecologically were not a conception of a harmonious human-ecological whole but a foundational non-harmony, an encounter with which contains something ineliminably traumatising? In a recent paper, the philosopher Reza Negarestani proposes just such a traumatic account of ecological openness. All existence, understood geophilosophically, is, says Negarestani, “conditioned by a concatenation of traumas or cuts [...] there is no single or isolated psychic trauma [...] there is no psychic trauma without an organic trauma and no organic trauma without a terrestrial trauma that in turn is deepened into open cosmic vistas.” Ecological openness, in this sense, would be necessarily melancholic, in the terms described above, in that it would necessitate the perpetual precariousness of those links by which we seek to ground ourselves. Ecology is all too often given to a “mournful” attitude, which is, as we’ve argued, the very attitude of psychological incorporation, healing, and normalisation. Similarly, “nature,” we are told, holds the key to harmonious self-regulation. But what if today such notions are obstacles to a genuine awareness of the ecological realities facing us all (humans and non-humans)? What if this ideal of nature were just a product of our own desire for stability, order, and regularity—for some imaginary extra-social and non-human point of reference by which to attain to a position of mastery in the telling of the story of ourselves? References Age of Stupid, The. Dir. Fanny Armstrong. Spanner Films, 2009. American Psychological Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 4th Ed. Text Revision. Washington: American Psychological Association, 2000. Colebrook, Claire. “Introduction: Framing the End of the Species.”.Extinction. Ed. Claire Colebrook. Open Humanities Press. 2012. 14 April 2012. Conley, Vera Andermatt. Ecopolitics: The Environment in Poststructuralist Thought. London: Routledge, 1997. Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987. Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. What is Philosophy? Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia UP, 1994. Freud, Sigmund. “Mourning and Melancholia.” The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 24. Ed. and trans. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1917. 237–58. Melancholia. Dir. Lars von Trier. Zontropa, 2011. Morton, Timothy. Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007. Negarestani, Reza. “On the Revolutionary Earth: A Dialectic in Territopic Materialism.” Dark Materialism Conference. Natural History Museum, London. January 12th 2011. Weisman, Alan. The World Without Us. New York: Picador, 2007. WALL-E. Dir. Andrew Stanton. Pixar, 2008. Žižek, Slavoj. Living in the End Times. London: Verso, 2010.
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Reid Boyd, Elizabeth, Madalena Grobbelaar, Eyal Gringart, Alise Bender, and Rose Williams. "Introducing ‘Intimate Civility’: Towards a New Concept for 21st-Century Relationships." M/C Journal 22, no. 1 (March 13, 2019). http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/mcj.1491.
Full textAbstract:
Fig. 1: Photo by Miguel Orós, from unsplash.comFeminism has stalled at the bedroom door. In the post-#metoo era, more than ever, we need intimate civil rights in our relationships to counter the worrisome prevailing trends: Intimate partner violence. Interpersonal abuse. Date rape. Sexual harassment. Online harassment. Bullying. Rage. Sexual Assault. Abusive relationships. Revenge porn. There’s a lot of damage done when we get up close and personal. In the 21st century, we have come far in terms of equality and respect between the genders, so there’s a lot to celebrate. We also note that the Australian government has stepped in recently with the theme ‘Keeping Australians safe and secure’, by pledging $78 million to combat domestic violence, much of which takes place behind closed doors (Morrison 2019). Herein lies the issue: while governments legislate to protect victims of domestic violence — out of the public eye, private behaviours cannot be closely monitored, and the lack of social enforcement of these laws threatens the safety of intimate relationships. Rather, individuals are left to their own devices. We outline here a guideline for intimate civility, an individually-embraced code of conduct that could guide interpersonal dynamics within the intimate space of relationships. Civility does not traditionally ‘belong’ in our most intimate relationships. Rather, it’s been presumed, even idealised, that intimacy in our personal lives transcends the need for public values to govern relationships between/among men and women (i.e., that romantic love is all you need). Civility developed as a public, gendered concept. Historically, a man’s home – and indeed, his partner – became his dominion, promoting hegemonic constructions of masculinity, and values that reflect competition, conquest, entitlement and ownership. Moreover, intimate relationships located in the private domain can also be considered for/by both men and women a retreat, a bastion against, or excluded from the controls and demands of the public or ‘polis’ - thus from the public requirement for civility, further enabling its breakdown. The feminist political theorist Carole Pateman situated this historical separation as an inheritance of Hegel’s double dilemma: first, a class division between civil society and the state (between the economic man/woman, or private enterprise and public power) and second, a patriarchal division between the private family (and intimate relationships) and civil society/the state. The private location, she argues, is “an association constituted by ties of love, blood … subjection and particularity” rather than the public sphere, “an association of free and equal individuals” (225). In Hegel’s dilemma, personal liberty is a dualism, only constructed in relation to a governed, public (patriarchal) state. Alternately, Carter depicts civility as a shared moral good, where civility arises not only because of concern over consequences, but also demonstrates our intrinsic moral obligation to respect people in general. This approach subsequently challenges our freedom to carry out private, uncivil acts within a truly civil society.Challenges to Gender EthicsHow can we respond to this challenge in gender ethics? Intimate civility is a term coined by Elizabeth Reid Boyd and Abigail Bray. It came out of their discussions proposing “a new poetics of romance” which called for rewritten codes of interpersonal conduct, an “entente cordiale; a cordial truce to end the sex wars”. Reid Boyd and Bray go further:Politeness is personal and political. We reclaim courtesy as applied sexual and social ethics, an interpersonal, intimate ethics, respectful and tolerant of difference. Gender ethics must be addressed, for they have global social and cultural ramifications that we should not underestimate. (xx)As researchers, we started to explore the idea of intimate civility in interpersonal violence, developing an analysis using social construction and attachment theory simultaneously. In defining the term, we soon realised the concept had wider applications that could change how we think about our most intimate relationships – and how we behave in them. Conceptualising intimate civility involves imagining rights and responsibilities within the private sphere, whether or not loving, familial and natural. Intimate civility can operate through an individually embraced code of conduct to guide interpersonal dynamics within the intimate space of relationships.Gringart, Grobbelaar, and Bender explored the concept of intimate civility by investigating women’s perspectives on what may harmonise their intimate relationships. Women’s most basic desires included safety, equality and respect in the bedroom. In other words, intimate civility is an enactment of human-rights, the embodiment of regard for another human being, insofar as it is a form of ensuring physical and mental integrity, life, safety and protection of all beings. Thus, if intimate civility existed as a core facet of each individual’s self-concept, the manifestation of intimate partner violence ideally would not occur. Rage, from an intimate civility perspective, rips through any civil response and generates misconduct towards another. When we hold respect for others as equal moral beings, civility is key to contain conflicts, which prevents the escalation of disagreements into rage. Intimate civility proposes that civility becomes the baseline behaviour that would be reciprocated between two individuals within the private domain of intimate relationships. Following this notion, intimate civility is the foremost casualty in many relationships characterised by intimate partner violence. The current criminalisation of intimate partner violence leaves unexplored the previously privatised property of the relational – including the inheritance of centuries of control of women’s bodies and sexuality – and how far, in this domain, notions of civility might liberate and/or oppress. The feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray argues that these kinds of ‘sexuate rights’ must apply to both men and women and the reality of their needs and desires. Equality, she argued, could not be achieved without a rewriting of the rights and obligations of each sex, qua different, in social rights and obligations (Yan).Synonyms for intimacy include, amongst others, closeness, attachment, togetherness, warmth, mutual affection, familiarity and privacy. Indirectly, sexual relations are also often synonymous with intimate relationships. However, sex is not intimacy, as both sex and intimacy both exist without the other. Bowlby proposed that throughout our lives we are attentive to the responsiveness and the availability of those that we are attached to, and suggested that “intimate attachments to other human beings are the hub around which a person’s life revolves, not only when he is an infant or a toddler, but throughout his adolescence and his years of maturity as well, and on into old age” (442). Although love is not by nature reciprocal, in intimacy we seek reciprocity – to love one another at the same time in a shared form of commitment. Kierkegaard hypothesised that genuine love is witnessed by one continuing to love another after their death as it obviates any doubt that the beloved was loved and was not merely instrumental (Soble).Intimate Civility as a Starting PointCivility includes qualities such as trust, duty, morality, sacrifice, self-restraint, respect, and fairness; a common standard allowing individuals to work, live and associate together. Intimacy encourages caring, loyalty, empathy, honesty, and self-knowledge. Thus, intimate civility should begin with those closest to us; being civil in our most intimate relationships. It advocates the genuine use of terms of endearment, not terms of abuse. We can only develop qualities such as morality and empathy, crucial for intimate relationships, if we have experienced secure, intimate relationships. Individuals reared in homes devoid of intimate civility will be challenged to identify and promote the interest or wellbeing of their intimate counterparts, and have to seek outside help to learn these skills: it is a learnt behaviour, both at an interpersonal and societal level. Individuals whose parents were insensitive to their childhood needs, and were unable to perceive, interpret and respond appropriately to their subtle communications, signals, wishes and mood will be flailing in this interpersonal skill (Holmes and Slade). Similarly, the individual’s inclusion in a civil society will only be achieved if their surrounding environment promotes and values virtues such as compassion, fairness and cooperation. This may be a challenging task. We envisage intimate civility as a starting point. It provides a focus to discuss and explore civil rights, obligations and responsibilities, between and among women and men in their personal relationships. As stated above, intimate civility begins with one's relationship with oneself and the closest relationships in the home, and hopefully reaches outwards to all kinds of relationships, including same sex, transgender, and other roles within non-specific gender assignment. Therefore, exploring the concept of intimate civility has applications in personal therapy, family counselling centres and relationship counselling environments, or schools in sexual education, or in universities promoting student safety. For example, the 2019 “Change the Course” report was recently released to augment Universities Australia’s 2016 campaign that raised awareness on sexual assault on campus. While it is still under development, we envision that intimate civility decalogue outlined here could become a checklist to assist in promoting awareness regarding abuse of power and gender roles. A recent example of cultural reframing of gender and power in intimate relationships is the Australian Government’s 2018 Respect campaign against gender violence. These recent campaigns promote awareness that intimate civility is integrated with a more functional society.These campaigns, as the images demonstrate, aim at quantifying connections between interactions on an intimate scale in individual lives, and their impacts in shaping civil society in the arena of gender violence. They highlight the elasticity of the bonds between intimate life and civil society and our collective responsibility as citizens for reworking both the gendered and personal civility. Fig. 2: Photo by Tyler Nix: Hands Spelling Out LOVE, from unsplash.comThe Decalogue of Intimate Civility Overall, police reports of domestic violence are heavily skewed towards male on female, but this is not always the case. The Australian government recently reported that “1 in 6 Australian women and 1 in 16 men have been subjected, since the age of 15, to physical and/or sexual violence by a current or previous cohabiting partner” (Australian Institutes of Health and Welfare). Rather than reiterating the numbers, we envisage the decalogue (below) as a checklist of concepts designed to discuss and explore rights, obligations and responsibilities, between and among both partners in their intimate relationships. As such, this decalogue forms a basis for conversation. Intimate civility involves a relationship with these ten qualities, with ourselves, and each other.1) Intimate civility is personal and political. Conceptualising intimate civility involves imagining rights and responsibilities within the private sphere. It is not an impingement on individual liberty or privacy but a guarantor of it. Civil society requires us not to defend private infringements of inter-personal respect. Private behaviours are both intimate in their performance and the springboard for social norms. In Geoffrey Rush’s recent defamation case his defence relied not on denying claims he repeatedly touched his fellow actor’s genitalia during their stage performance in a specific scene, despite her requests to him that he stop, but rather on how newspaper reporting of her statements made him out to be a “sexual pervert”, reflecting the complex link between this ‘private’ interaction between two people and its very public exposé (Wells). 2) Intimate civility is an enactment of a civil right, insofar as it is a form of ensuring physical and mental integrity, life, safety and protection. Intimate civility should begin with those closest to us. An example of this ethic at work is the widening scope of criminalisation of intimate partner abuse to include all forms of abusive interactions between people. Stalking and the pre-cursors to physical violence such as controlling behaviours, online bullying or any actions used to instil fear or insecurity in a partner, are accorded legal sanctions. 3) Intimate civility is polite. Politeness is more than manners. It relates to our public codes of conduct, to behaviours and laws befitting every civilian of the ‘polis’. It includes the many acts of politeness that are required behind closed doors and the recognition that this is the place from which public civility emerges. For example, the modern parent may hope that what they sanction as “polite” behaviour between siblings at home might then become generalised by the child into their public habits and later moral expectations as adults. In an ideal society, the micro-politics of family life become the blueprint for moral development for adult expectations about personal conduct in intimate and public life.4) Intimate civility is equitable. It follows Luce Irigaray’s call for ‘sexuate rights’ designed to apply to men and women and the reality of their needs and desires, in a rewriting of the social rights and obligations of each sex (Yan and Irigaray). Intimate civility extends this notion of rights to include all those involved in personal relations. This principle is alive within systemic family therapy which assumes that while not all members of the family system are always able to exert equal impacts or influence, they each in principle are interdependent participants influencing the system as a whole (Dallos and Draper). 5) Intimate civility is dialectical. The separation of intimacy and civility in Western society and thought is itself a dualism that rests upon other dualisms: public/private, constructed/natural, male/female, rational/emotional, civil/criminal, individual/social, victim/oppressor. Romantic love is not a natural state or concept, and does not help us to develop safe governance in the world of intimate relationships. Instead, we envisage intimate civility – and our relationships – as dynamic, dialectical, discursive and interactive, above and beyond dualism. Just as individuals do not assume that consent for sexual activity negotiated in one partnership under a set of particular conditions, is consent to sexual activity in all partnerships in any conditions. So, dialectics of intimate civility raises the expectation that what occurs in interpersonal relationships is worked out incrementally, between people over time and particular to their situation and experiences. 6) Intimate civility is humane. It can be situated in what Julia Kristeva refers to as the new humanism, emerging (and much needed) today. “This new humanism, interaction with others – all the others – socially marginalised, racially discriminated, politically, sexually, biologically or psychically persecuted others” (Kristeva, 2016: 64) is only possible if we immerse ourselves in the imaginary, in the experience of ‘the other’. Intimate civility takes on a global meaning when human rights action groups such as Amnesty International address the concerns of individuals to make a social difference. Such organisations develop globally-based digital platforms for interested individuals to become active about shared social concerns, understanding that the new humanism ethic works within and between individuals and can be harnessed for change.7) Intimate civility is empathic. It invites us to create not-yet-said, not-yet-imagined relationships. The creative space for intimate civility is not bound by gender, race or sexuality – only by our imaginations. “The great instrument of moral good is the imagination,” wrote the poet Shelley in 1840. Moral imagination (Reid Boyd) helps us to create better ways of being. It is a form of empathy that encourages us to be kinder and more loving to ourselves and each other, when we imagine how others might feel. The use of empathic imagination for real world relational benefits is common in traditional therapeutic practices, such as mindfulness, that encourages those struggling with self compassion to imagine the presence of a kind friend or ally to support them at times of hardship. 8) Intimate civility is respectful. Intimate civility is the foremost casualty in many relationships characterised by forms of abuse and intimate partner violence. “Respect”, wrote Simone Weil, “is due to the human being as such, and is not a matter of degree” (171). In the intimate civility ethic this quality of respect accorded as a right of beings is mutual, including ourselves with the other. When respect is eroded, much is lost. Respect arises from empathy through attuned listening. The RESPECT! Campaign originating from the Futures without Violence organisation assumes healthy relationships begin with listening between people. They promote the understanding that the core foundation of human wellbeing is relational, requiring inter-personal understanding and respect.9) Intimate civility is a form of highest regard. When we regard another we truly see them. To hold someone in high regard is to esteem them, to hold them above others, not putting them on a pedestal, or insisting they are superior, but to value them for who they are. To be esteemed for our interior, for our character, rather than what we display or what we own. It connects with the humanistic psychological concept of unconditional positive regard. The highest regard holds each other in arms and in mind. It is to see/look at, to have consideration for, and to pay attention to, recently epitomised by the campaign against human trafficking, “Can You See Me?” (Human Trafficking), whose purpose is to foster public awareness of the non-verbal signs and signals between individuals that indicate human trafficking may be taking place. In essence, teaching communal awareness towards the victimisation of individuals. 10) Intimate civility is intergenerational. We can only develop qualities such as morality and empathy, crucial for intimate relationships, if we have experienced (or imagined) intimate relationships where these qualities exist. Individuals reared in homes devoid of intimate civility could be challenged to identify and promote the interest or wellbeing of their intimate counterparts; it is a learnt behaviour, both at an interpersonal and societal level. Childhood developmental trauma research (Spinazzola and Ford) reminds us that the interaction of experiences, relational interactions, contexts and even our genetic amkeup makes individuals both vulnerable to repeating the behaviour of past generations. However, treatment of the condition and surrounding individuals with people in their intimate world who have different life experiences and personal histories, i.e., those who have acquired respectful relationship habits, can have a positive impact on the individuals’ capacity to change their learned negative behaviours. In conclusion, the work on intimate civility as a potential concept to alleviate rage in human relationships has hardly begun. The decalogue provides a checklist that indicates the necessity of ‘intersectionality’ — where the concepts of intimate civility connect to many points within the public/private and personal/political domains. Any analysis of intimacy must reach further than prepositions tied to social construction and attachment theory (Fonagy), to include current understandings of trauma and inter-generational violence and the way these influence people’s ability to act in healthy and balanced interpersonal relationships. While not condoning violent acts, locating the challenges to intimate civility on both personal and societal levels may leverage a compassionate view of those caught up in interpersonal violence. The human condition demands that we continue the struggle to meet the challenges of intimate civility in our personal actions with others as well as the need to replicate civil behaviour throughout all societies. ReferencesBowlby, John. Attachment and Loss. Vol. 3. New York: Basic Books, 1980.Carter, Stephen. Civility: Manners, Morals and the Etiquette of Democracy. New York: Basic Books, 1998.Dallos, Rudi, and Ros Draper. An Introduction to Family Therapy: Systemic Theory and Practice. 2nd ed. Open University Press: Berkshire, 2005.Australian Institutes of Health and Welfare, Australian Government. Family, Domestic and Sexual Violence in Australia. 2018. 6 Feb. 2019 <https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/domestic-violence/family-domestic-sexual-violence-in-australia-2018/contents/summary>. Fonagy, Peter. Attachment Theory and Psychoanalysis. New York: Other Press, 2001.Gringart, Eyal, Madalena Grobbelaar, and Alise Bender. Intimate Civility: The Perceptions and Experiences of Women on Harmonising Intimate Relationships. Honours thesis, 2018.Holmes, Jeremy, and Arietta Slade. Attachment in Therapeutic Practice. Los Angeles: Sage, 2018. Human Trafficking, Jan. 2019. 14 Feb. 2019 <https://www.a21.org/content/can-you-see-me/gnsqqg?permcode=gnsqqg&site=true>.Kristeva, Julia. Teresa My Love: An Imagined Life of the Saint of Avila. New York: Columbia UP, 2016.Morrison, Scott. “National Press Club Address.” 11 Feb. 2019. 26 Feb. 2019 <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/national-press-club-address-our-plan-keeping-australians-safe-and-secure>.Pateman, Carole. “The Patriarchal Welfare State.” Defining Women: Social Institutions and Gender Divisions. Eds. Linda McDowell and Rosemary Pringle. London: Polity Press, 1994. 223-45.Reid Boyd, Elizabeth. “How Creativity Can Help Us Cultivate Moral Imagination.” The Conversation, 30 Jan. 2019. 11 Feb. 2019 <http://theconversation.com/how-creativity-can-help-us-cultivate-moral-imagination-101968>.Reid Boyd, Elizabeth, and Abigail Bray. Ladies and Gentlemen: Sex, Love and 21st Century Courtesy. Unpublished book proposal, 2005.Commonwealth of Australia. Respect Campaign. 2018, 9 Jan. 2019 <http://www.respect.gov.au/the-campaign/campaign-materials/>.Shelley, Percy Bysshe. A Defence of Poetry. London: Ginn and Company, 1840.Soble, Alan. Philosophy of Sex and Love. St Paul, MN: Paragon House, 1998.Weil, Simone. Waiting on God. London: Fontana Collins, 1968.Wells, Jamelle. “Geoffrey Rush, Erin Norvill and the Daily Telegraph: The Stakes Are High in This Defamation Trial.” ABC News 12 Nov. 2018. 23 Feb. 2019 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-10/geoffrey-rush-defamation-trial-a-drama-with-final-act-to-come/10483944>.Yan, Liu, and Luce Irigaray. “Feminism, Sexuate Rights and the Ethics of Sexual Difference: An Interview with Luce Irigaray.” Foreign Literature Studies (2010): 1-9.
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Rall, Denise N. "Rage – beyond the Point of Boiling Over." M/C Journal 22, no. 1 (March 13, 2019). http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/mcj.1517.
Full textAbstract:
Rage can come from anywhere, it ignites as a flash of lightening and hisses rapidly down a darkened tunnel, landing wherever it finds a target. Sigmund Freud, and many other psychoanalysts, have attempted to explain the inception of human’s two primordial emotions, rage and fear – encapsulated in the popular phrase, fight or flight. Our earliest historical records detail the myriad battles that determined the world’s future course of events. Without rage, and its adjutants, violence and war, the world’s countries would not exist with their current boundaries. In fact, our species, Homo sapiens would necessarily have evolved through a different course. Since 2016, the public has been outraged by current events at an unprecedented level: the confluence of the election of US President Donald Trump, the struggles over the UK’s Brexit, and the revelations of systematic sexual abuse of women and African Americans, culminating in the recent #metoo and the #blacklivesmatter social media campaigns. More and more women have protested against sexual abuse, and recently the free-verse poem book Shout, from pop cultural icon Laurie Halse Anderson, “raise[s] urgent alarms, warning against the evils propagated by a culture that values dominance over respect” (Feldman 52). The rage revolution is here now. The nine articles included in this issue of M/C Journal on ‘rage’ unpack the concept of rage and its significant linkages to injustice, anger, personal and sexual abuse of women and minority cultures, violence and war. It is no surprise that many authors have chosen to focus on women’s rage and anger. Below, three articles develop the themes of political disenfranchisement for women and Indigenous cultures with a special emphasis on Australia, and the significant role that clothing plays in group-based activism.In the feature article, Angelika Heurich explores the fraught territory of women’s rights starting with the slogan: ‘the personal is the political’. In both the First and Second Waves of feminism, she reports, “concerns about issues of inequality, including sexuality, the right to abortion, availability of childcare, and sharing of household duties” became “personal problems” rather than a matter for national debate and policy changes (Hanisch qtd. in Heurich). Heurich cites the need for “feminist intervention in the state” (van Acker 120). These issues are very much alive today: how can enraged women change government policy in a meaningful way to address past and present injustices? Author Jo Coghlan further develops the theme of protestation with how clothing depicts the history of dissent. Coghlan’s argument suggests that the political efficacy of dress can perform “an ideological function that either bring[s] diverse members of society together for a cause ... or act[s] as a fence to keep identities separate” (Coghlan qtd Barnard). Clothing, as liberation, was celebrated in Mahatma Gandhi’s hand-spun cotton that symbolised the separation of India from Great Britain. Later, the Australian Aborigines’ Black Protest Committee adopted a set of particular colours for their movement towards equality, in this case, red, black and yellow worn first in 1982. To continue the theme, Lisa Hackett outlines the response of women’s rage’ to how their garments remain unsuitable from several standpoints. Hackett notes that the issues that surround fast fashion inspire women’s anger by its production: clothing that is cheaply made, in workplaces of virtual slavery, and made of unsustainable fabrics which lead to mountains of discarded garments in the world’s landfills. These problems inspire the rage of women who desire to protect the environment and also seek clothing that fits over forced obsolescence. Even as this issue on ‘rage’ widely presents people, activities and events that are driven by rage – across the broad spectrum of personal, artistic and cultural and socio-political storytelling, we also sought solutions in productive and/or philosophical frameworks that could explore how to ameliorate conditions under which rage arises. So the next two articles address the under-used (and under-implemented) word civility. In his article “Of ‘Rage of Party’ and the Coming of Civility”, Greg Melleuish presents the English Civil War as a case study. This conflict between the Royalists and Parliamentarians disrupted the authority of the crown, and resulted in a more moderated English government, in stark contrast to regime changes later on the European continent (e.g., the French Revolution). Melleuish offers that a “new ideal of ‘politeness and moderation’ had conquered English political culture” and promoted civility as a standard of behaviour for the government and worthy individuals. This concept of civility would later evolve to introduce philosophies of the Enlightenment. A collection of authors (Elizabeth Reid Boyd, Madalena Grobbelaar, Eyal Gringart, Alise Bender, and Rose Williams) have worked through the serious issues of ‘intimate civility’ – to encourage pathways to counteract ‘rage’ and its impact on the most vulnerable in society, especially women and children. The authors, in their coinage of the term, “envisage intimate civility – and our relationships – as dynamic, dialectical, discursive and interactive, above and beyond dualism.” They introduce a ‘decalogue’ of civility, relying on notions of politeness, respect, and emphasise dialogue between the affected parties and the Australian government’s campaigns and policies on domestic and sexual violence to reduce rage in the arena of interpersonal and intergenerational conflicts. The last articles in this M/C Journal issue on ‘rage’ address the media side of the equation. These authors all deal with aspects of rage as expressed on various screens, as films, television series or downloads to other devices. Richard Gehrmann, in his analysis of the Hollywood film American Sniper (2014), first provides a capsule timeline of conflicts in the Middle East, from the Second World War to the current day’s ongoing battles in Syria and elsewhere in the region. He highlights the propaganda-based, pro-American ‘jingoism’ presented in American Sniper, contrasting its portrayal of the returned veteran Chris Kyle with other true-life accounts of US Iraqi and Afghan soldiers. Gehrmann presents a bleak commentary on the ‘hot and cold rage’ required of the lone sniper, while many ‘hot’ unresolved issues, including the refugee crisis, remain in the Middle East situation. American Sniper’s celebration of the lone gunman contributes to the acceptance of violence in an America where mass shootings indicate an ever-growing expression of individual rage.”In his article on ‘Cage rage’, Sasa Miletic outlines Hollywood actor Nicholas Cage and his violent, sometimes over-acted outbursts on film as one of “the most famous Internet memes”. Miletic asks: has the overexpression of anger depicted in ‘Cage rage’ become “a pop cultural reminder “that rage, for a lack of a better word, is good ... or can [his filmic rage] only serve for catharsis on an individual level?” With this question, Miletic explores Nicholas Cage throughout his acting career, and presents his argument that the potential for ‘double-reading’ of his angry overacting in movies is a sort of ‘parapraxis’ – or “a Freudian slip of the tongue, a term borrowed by Elsaesser and Wedel (131). Miletic’s exploration of ‘Cage rage’ introduces new concepts of rage from the contemporary Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek.The exploration of rage in film now turns to Jessica Gildersleeve’s article that locates ambiguous meanings of rage in recent television adaptations based in the Australian outback. Guildersleeve explores the two adaptations Wake in Fright (2017) and Mystery Road (2108) for how they depict rage: “in this context rage is turned to melancholy and thus to self-destruction, [serving] as an allegory for the state of the contemporary nation.” Gildersleeve notes that previous Australian authors have outlined the trope of ‘outback noir,’ and in her analysis of these two adaptations, she realigns the previous literary analysis of ‘noir’ to the emerging genre of Outback Gothic horror. The two shows depict the force of inward rage that turns to melancholy from different perspectives. While Wake in Fright (2107) seems to offer no hope for the future, Mystery Road harnesses the power of rage to locate a potential way to reconcile the two ‘classic’ opposing factions that inhabit the Outback: the colonisers and the indigenous Aborigines. Lastly, this collection on ‘rage’ comes full circle, back to the omnipresent ‘women’s rage’.From the viewpoint of Gothic literary traditions, and their challengers, author Katharine Hawkins develops the trope of Monstrous gothic through women’s roles depicted in Showtime’s television series, Penny Dreadful (2014-2016). Here, Hawkins echoes the themes from the introductory articles: as women must comply with men and their comforts, women’s rage turns both inward and outward. In Penny Dreadful, the actress Billie Piper constitutes a figure of the “Monstrous Gothic Feminine” arising from “the parlours of bored Victorian housewives into a contemporary feminist moment that is characterised by a split between respectable diplomacy and the visibility of female rage.” Piper’s Bride figure then mutates “from coerced docility [towards] abject, sexualised anger” which makes itself heard in the show’s second season (2016). Hawkins discussion introduces Ahmed’s figure of the “kill joy”, which becomes “a term to refer to feminists – particularly black feminists – whose actions or presence refuse this obligation, and in turn project their discomfort outwards, instead of inwards.” In summary, rage is with us, always. But there is hope that the outward expression of women’s rage, and of other disenfranchised populations as echoed in the #metoo and #blacklivesmatter movements will change the culture of global politics to value respect over violence. References Anderson, Laurie Halse. Shout. New York: Penguin Random House.Barnard, Malcolm. Fashion as Communication. New York: Routledge, 1996.Elsaesser, Thomas, and Michael Wedel, Körper Tod und Technik: Metamorphosen des Kriegsfilms. Paderborn: Konstanz University Press, 2016.Feldman, Lucy. “A Voice for Others Speaks for Herself.” TIME, 11 Mar. 2019: 52-53.Hanisch, Carol. “Introduction: The Personal Is Political.” 2006. 18 Sep. 2016 <http://www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PIP.html>.Van Acker, Elizabeth. Different Voices: Gender and Politics in Australia. Melbourne: MacMillan Education Australia, 1999.Žižek, Slavoj. Violence: Six Sideways Reflections. London: Profile Books, 2009.
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Purvis Lively, Cathy. "Social Isolation of Older Adults in Long Term Care as a Result of COVID-19 Mitigation Measures During the COVID-19 Pandemic." Voices in Bioethics 7 (July 28, 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.52214/vib.v7i.8526.
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Photo by Jeremy Wong on Unsplash ABSTRACT In response to the threat of COVID-19, CMS issued unprecedented restrictions severely limiting the liberty of older adults residing in long-term care. Older adults are identified as at a high risk of becoming infected through exposure to SARS-Cov-2 and of suffering the most severe morbidity and mortality. While protecting the individual from disease, the restrictions also had a determinantal effect. The restrictions exacerbated social isolation and loneliness, two pervasive public health concerns within the older adult population. Legally, the restrictions pass constitutional muster. The ethical analysis presents more questions and debates. Initially, the restrictions to protect the older adult were grounded in public health ethics and bioethics principles. However, the ethical lines become blurred as the risk of harm secondary to isolation increased over the time that the restrictions remained in effect. The ethical point of view becomes more divergent considering the restrictions also preserved medical resources for the greater good of society, arguably diverting them to serve younger people. We have a moral obligation to reduce social isolation and recognize the older adult as a valuable member of society with equal worth and dignity. INTRODUCTION In response to the threat of COVID-19, CMS issued unprecedented restrictions severely limiting the liberty of older adults residing in long-term care. Older adults are identified as at a high risk of becoming infected from exposure to SARS-Cov-2 and from suffering the most severe morbidity and mortality. While protecting the individual from disease, the restrictions also had a determinantal effect. The restrictions exacerbated social isolation and loneliness, two pervasive public health concerns within the older adult population. Legally, the restrictions pass Constitutional muster. The ethical analysis presents more questions and debates. Initially, the restrictions to protect the older adult were grounded in public health ethics and bioethics principles. However, the ethical lines become blurred as the risk of harm secondary to isolation increased over the time that the restrictions remained in effect. The devastation of COVID-19 within the older adult population extends beyond the immediate risk and harm of infection. At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, experts determined that older adults, especially those living in long-term care, were at a greater risk of becoming infected and depleting scarce medical resources. Two days after WHO declared the pandemic, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) followed the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) recommendations and announced mitigation measures that required long-term care facilities to (1) restrict volunteers and nonessential personnel from entering the facility; (2) cancel all group activities and communal dining; (3) screen residents and health care personnel for fever and respiratory symptoms; and (4) encourage residents to stay in their rooms. The social isolation resulting from the mitigation measures posed a credible threat to five core domains of healthy aging: (1) promoting health; preventing injury and managing chronic conditions; (2) cognitive health; (3) physical health; (4) mental health; and (5) facilitating social engagement.[1] l. Social Isolation and Loneliness COVID-19 highlighted two pervasive public health concerns confronting older adults—social isolation and loneliness. Social isolation is an objective deficit in the number of relationships and the frequency of contact with family, friends, and the community.[2] Social Isolation is a risk factor for loneliness. Loneliness is the subjective perception of a lack of meaningful relationships.[3] Loneliness has three dimensions: (1) absence of a significant person to provide emotional support and affirm one’s value as a person; (2) absence of a small group of people seen regularly, such as a card group; and (3) absence of a larger network group of people who provide support by being together as a group, for example, church services or rotary meetings.[4] COVID-19 restrictions affected all three dimensions. Social isolation can be as dangerous as smoking fifteen cigarettes per day, earning its designation as a public health priority.[5] Isolation increases the risk of cardiovascular disease, obesity, anxiety, and depression. Loneliness can lead to depression, alcoholism, and suicidal thoughts.[6] Some studies found that loneliness is also a factor in cognitive decline. For example, caregivers reported that 63 percent of older adults with cognitive impairment experienced cognitive decline during the COVID-19 pandemic.[7] In 2017, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) reported that social isolation accounted for $6.7 billion in additional Medicare spending although only 14 percent of older adults in the US reported being socially isolated.[8] Approximately 24 percent of community-dwelling older adults in the US are socially isolated. Forty-three percent of adults aged 60 and older report feeling lonely. Those living in long-term care report loneliness at a rate of at least double of community-dwelling older adults.[9] WHO defines health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”[10] A broad definition of health highlights the detriment of social isolation in older adults. There is a moral obligation to mitigate the effect of isolation.[11] The additional Medicare spending costs attributable to the effects of social isolation secondary to COVID-19 will be extraordinary. Providing social support will directly benefit older adults and indirectly benefit society by reducing Medicare spending associated with the effects of social isolation. Combating the pervasiveness of social isolation requires immediate collaborative community action. Many long-term care residents who depend on visits from family and friends to socialize increasingly felt lonely, abandoned, and despondent,[12] increasing the risk of feeling grief and loss, including individual and collective trauma reactions.[13] Also, normally social opportunities, medical, and legal appointments defaulted to telephone or virtual appointments. The cessation of in-person medical appointments interfered with optimal management of chronic conditions and preventive care. Some older adults lack access to the technology, are unfamiliar with technology, or cannot use technology for other reasons. At least one study supports the potential for older adults to benefit from technology and suggests that training could promote long-term benefits in older adults aged 80 years and over.[14] Focusing on technological advances specific to older adults with input from older adults should be a priority. When communal dining abruptly stopped, residents had to eat all their meals alone in their rooms. Older adults often mention the difficulty of eating meals alone, especially if recently divorced, widowed, or otherwise separated from a spouse or partner. Closure of the exercise facilities limited the ability of an older adult to stay physically active. Reduced physical activity creates long-term adverse health effects.[15] ll. Measures to Mitigate Isolation To facilitate some contact, long-term care facilities devised window visits. The resident remained safely inside the locked facility, standing or seated in front of a window. Visitors stood outside in the grass or parking lot. Any conversation took place over the telephone. To simulate physical contact, residents and visitors pressed their palms together, separated by the glass barrier. The window visits recall the prison visits depicted in movies and television. In late June 2020, CMS relaxed the restrictions and advised that long-term care facilities could resume some communal activities and permit outdoor visits. Although CMS eased the restrictions, interpersonal contact remained minimal. Outdoor visits required scheduling an appointment during limited hours of availability. The facilities limited the visits per week and the duration of each visit to thirty minutes. In addition, the staff enforced wearing personal protective equipment and maintaining physical distancing. Several impracticalities diminished the optimism of the relaxed restrictions. Residents could leave their rooms for meals but remained physically separated at a distance that prevented any meaningful interaction. Similarly, the limitations on the in-person visits presented problems. Non-resident spouses with mobility challenges found the outdoor access difficult, if not impossible. Residents or spouses with hearing and vision losses experienced challenges in communicating while sitting outside, six feet apart, and wearing masks.[16] lll. Legal Precedent for Emergency Measures The primary legal issue stems from the conflict between individual liberty and the public good or health. Jacobson v. Massachusetts provides a framework for balancing individual liberty rights and the public good during a pandemic.[17] Jacobson clarified an essential point of law - the rights and liberties secured by the US Constitution are not absolute.[18] Faced with a pandemic, a community has the right to protect members of the community.[19] Jacobson outlines four standards for imposing public health mandates during a pandemic. First, the State overreaches when it uses public health powers unnecessarily.[20] Second, the state must use the least restrictive means to prevent harm.[21] Third, the state must use reasonable means expected to prevent or ameliorate a health threat.[22] Finally, the intervention must not pose an undue risk.[23] The guidelines in Jacobson, established during the smallpox pandemic, apply to COVID-19. In response to the threat of COVID-19, public health authorities enacted mandates to protect the public, especially older adults, against the highly contagious and virulent virus. The CMS restrictions specifically addressed older adults living in long-term care facilities. While the CMS directives obstructed residents’ liberties, they also contradicted the Assisted Living Facility social model, which places autonomy and independence at the forefront. Given the gravity of harm and the uncertainties in the early phases of the pandemic, the restrictions were arguably the least restrictive means to manage the immediate threat. The effectiveness varied from facility to facility, with many deaths throughout the US in long-term care facilities. While valuable early in the pandemic, at some point the continuation of the mitigation measures increased social isolation and its associated risks. In Jew Ho v. Williamson, the Supreme Court overturned a quarantine order to contain the bubonic plague.[24] The officials enforced the order only against a targeted ethnic population which did not present an identified risk.[25] In reaching its decision, the Court determined that the quarantine order was not a reasonable regulation to prevent the spread of the bubonic plague. Rather, it was racially motivated. The Court ruled that the government cannot impose public health orders in a racially invidious manner.[26] There are similarities between Jew Ho and the CMS restrictions. Like the quarantine order in Jew Ho, the restrictions targeted a specific population. But with COVID-19 older adults were an identified high-risk population because of their susceptibility to infection and severe illness. During the early phases of the pandemic, the directives were reasonable to accomplish the purpose of preventing the spread in the identified high-risk population. They were not discriminatory according to the rule of law in Jew Ho. The argument supporting the constitutionality of the CMS restrictions wanes as the length of the safety precautions increased. lV. Ethical Analysis of the Lengthy Social Isolation The CMS restrictions require the ethical analysis of harm, proportionality, reciprocity, and transparency. As well as analysis under the principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. a. Harm and Proportionality As previously discussed, older adult long-term care residents were more susceptible to COVID-19 and to severe physical effects requiring hospitalization. In addition, older adults are more likely to die from COVID-19. Based on a totality of the circumstances and what we knew about the virus in the early phases of the pandemic, the restrictions were the least restrictive means to protect this high-risk population. But the question of proportionality requires ongoing assessment and re-evaluation. While the initial uncertainty and chaos justified the restrictions, as the pandemic continued and the risk of harm from the restrictions increased, the pendulum began to swing. At some point, upon proof or likelihood of safety, less restrictive alternatives should have been adopted. b. Reciprocity The concept of reciprocity is a core principle of public health and requires the balancing of the benefits and burdens of the social cooperation.[27] When individuals sacrifice their liberty for the benefit of others, they should not be penalized as a result of making the sacrifice, and thus society owes a reciprocal obligation to the individuals, such as providing individuals support and not discriminating against them.[28] Residents did not have any input or choice when CMS and the administrators stripped away their autonomy and liberties. While the restrictions protected the individual resident from the direct harm of infection, the restrictions also protected society from the indirect harm of the depletion of scarce medical resources. Public health officials identified long-term care residents as most likely to require significant medical resources. One talking point repeatedly broadcast was the need to prevent the depletion of hospital beds, ventilators, medications, and supplies. Most assisted-living facilities are for-profit, and residents pay for their food, shelter, and personal needs. What does society owe these long-term care residents in return for the liberty they sacrificed for the benefit of society at large? At the very least, I suggest we owe these individuals the commitment to conduct research exploring and addressing the effects of the restrictions. c. Transparency by Government, the Media, and the Long-Term care Facilities The communications from government and public health officials about the pandemic and the restrictions were opaque, leaving unanswered questions, doubts, and speculation. Some facilities provided families with basic information communicated through robocall messaging, with words of encouragement, painting rosy pictures of the residents' sequestered daily lives. Public health officials assert the common good and protecting the public’s safety and health justify paternalism and compulsory powers.[29] One counterargument is that the compulsory interventions or restrictions push paternalism to new levels.[30] The COVID-19 pandemic and the mitigation interventions highlight this tension between libertarian and epidemiological models based on (1) shortages that triggered rationing and prioritization; and (2) measures that safeguarded public health but infringed on individual rights.[31] d. Autonomy, Beneficence, and Non-Maleficence Through a bioethical lens, we immediately see the clash between the CMS restrictions and the long-term care residents’ autonomy. However, autonomy is not absolute. There was a benefit for the individual resident: the protection from a deadly virus. Thus, I argue that the initial restrictions were beneficent. Yet I also point to the deleterious secondary physical and emotional effects of the isolation and assert that the restrictions should have been safely modified as new information on viral spread and safety came about. We can accept the beneficence of protecting the high-risk resident from a deadly disease while acknowledging the associated harm. However, at some point, we must also ask if the harm experienced due to prolonged severe restrictions reached a level that exceeded the boundaries of beneficence and became maleficent. Perceiving the long-term care resident as a passive recipient of care is paternalistic and antithetical to autonomy and a person-centered approach.[32] Instead, society must recognize older adults as essential stakeholders in policymaking. The direct and active involvement of older adults allows the individual to retain agency rather than becoming a passive recipient of care.[33] Prioritization of the older adult as an autonomous active participant counters ageism and promotes autonomy. e. Justice Justice calls for analysis of several discrepancies. First, the special protection of long-term care residents seems justifiable due to their special vulnerability. CMS treated long-term care facilities alike. Most community-dwelling older adults could decide whether to adhere to stay-at-home restrictions and were not subject to the same level of enforcement that existed within long-term care facilities. The restrictions were far more oppressive for long-term care residents. In response to the assertion that selective lockdown discriminates against older adults, the same arguments discussed above demonstrate the morally relevant justification: older adults are more likely to require hospitalization and die from COVID-19.[34] One convincing argument against restrictions on older adults echoing Kant’s categorical imperative argues that selectively restricting older adults for the good of other people amounts to treating older adults as a means to an end for others.[35] While the restrictions imposed on the individual might slow the spread of the disease within the specific long-term care facility, which protects that individual resident, they also impose on the individual resident to serve the greater good: the preservation of scarce medical resources. The second application pushes the restrictive measures closer to violating Kant’s categorical imperative by treating the older adult as a means to the end of others. That is, younger people and those living outside of long-term care would have more hospital resources available to them if long-term care residents were more severely isolated keeping them from needing hospitalization. From a Kantian perspective, the categorical imperative demands respecting the dignity of persons—Kant’s supreme (formal) principle.[36] When we consider the restrictions, I suggest that we must also consider the impact on dignity. It has been suggested that dignity is the “overarching principle of bioethics.”[37] In the context of an analysis of the socially isolating COVID-19 mitigation measures on older adults in long-term care facilities, we should consider the relational aspect of dignity, recognizing the adult as having value and equal worth. The protracted imposed isolation of older adults to preserve medical resources devalues older adults. Ongoing COVID-19 restrictions should be analyzed for their unjustified harms. A second justice concern outside the scope here is that long-term care facilities are resourced differently, and had different results due to quality of care, number of staff, infection control protocols, and previous health infraction records. CONCLUSION The myopic focus on mortality ignores the risks of morbidity secondary to the devastating effects of social isolation on the older adult’s health and quality of life. The paternalistic prevention eclipsed the resident’s autonomy. At some point, the attention and priority must shift. When formulating policies, we must figure out at what point or in which situations the negative impact of restrictions outweighs the protective benefits. Although the restrictions may have slowed the spread of COVID-19, we must not discount the negative consequences, which may be long-term. From an ethical perspective, we must acknowledge the harm that has occurred within this population and accept the responsibility to redress the harm and prevent repeating the mistakes. The prolonged restrictions stretched legal and ethical boundaries. The mixed purpose of the restrictions (protecting the individual resident and preserving healthcare resources) makes the ethical analysis more challenging. Yet doing something for someone’s own good is still paternalistic and problematic. The public health justification includes the collective. We must confront the tough questions about the efficacy of pandemic mitigation measures and the mitigation measures’ adverse consequences. Leaving the doors to long-term care facilities open during the pandemic would have exposed every resident and staff member to a contagion that presented a significant risk of morbidity and mortality. But locking the doors exacerbated social isolation and loneliness, increasing the risk of morbidity and mortality. Julian Savulescu may be correct that there was no desirable solution. We must still work to find better solutions that will reduce social isolation and recognize the older adult as a valuable member of society with equal worth and dignity. [1] Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Nursing Homes & Long-term care Facilities. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html. [2]Escalante, E., Golden, R. L., & Mason, D. J. (2020). Social Isolation and Loneliness: Imperatives for Health Care in a Post-COVID World. JAMA Health Forum, 1(12),e201597. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamahealthforum.2020.1597. [3] D'cruz, M., & Banerjee, D. (2020). ‘An invisible human rights crisis’: The marginalization of older adults during the COVID-19 pandemic – An advocacy review. Psychiatry Research, 292, 113369. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2020.113369. [4] Simard, J., & Volicer, L. (2020). Loneliness and Isolation in Long-term care and the COVID-19 Pandemic. Journal of the American Medical Directors Association, 21(7), 966–967. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jamda.2020.05.006. [5] Escalante, E., Golden, R. L., & Mason, D. J. (2020). Social Isolation and Loneliness: Imperatives for Health Care in a Post-COVID World. JAMA Health Forum, 1(12). https://doi.org/10.1001/jamahealthforum.2020.1597. [6] Simard, J., & Volicer, L. (2020). Loneliness and Isolation in Long-term care and the COVID-19 Pandemic. Journal of the American Medical Directors Association, 21(7), 966–967. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jamda.2020.05.006. [7] Batsis, J. A., Daniel, K., Eckstrom, E., Goldlist, K., Kusz, H., Lane, D., … Friedman, S. M. (2021, January 26). Promoting Healthy Aging During COVID‐19. American Geriatrics Society. https://agsjournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jgs.17035. [8] Escalante, E., Golden, R. L., & Mason, D. J. (2020). Social Isolation and Loneliness: Imperatives for Health Care in a Post-COVID World. JAMA Health Forum, 1(12), e201597. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamahealthforum.2020.1597. [9] Simard, J., & Volicer, L. (2020). Loneliness and Isolation in Long-term care and the COVID-19 Pandemic. Journal of the American Medical Directors Association, 21(7), 966–967. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jamda.2020.05.006. [10] World Health Organization. Frequently Asked Questions. https://www.who.int/about/frequently-asked-questions. [11] Chu, C. H., Donato‐Woodger, S., & Dainton, C. J. (2020). Competing crises: COVID‐19 countermeasures and social isolation among older adults in long‐term care. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 76(10), 2456–2459. https://doi.org/10.1111/jan.14467. [12] Gardner, W., States, D., & Bagley, N. (n.d.). The Coronavirus and the Risks to the Elderly in Long-term care. Journal of aging & social policy. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32245346/. [13] Campbell, A. D. (2020). Practical Implications of Physical Distancing, Social Isolation, and Reduced Physicality for Older Adults in Response to COVID-19. Journal of Gerontological Social Work, 63(6-7), 668–670. https://doi.org/10.1080/01634372.2020.1772933. [14] Radwan, E., Radwan, A., & Radwan, W. (2020). Challenges Facing Older Adults during the COVID-19 Outbreak. European Journal of Environment and Public Health, 5(1), em0059. https://doi.org/10.29333/ejeph/8457. [15] Plagg, B., Engl, A., Piccoliori, G., & Eisendle, K. (2020). Prolonged social isolation of the elderly during COVID-19: Between benefit and damage. Archives of Gerontology and Geriatrics, 89, 104086. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.archger.2020.104086 . [16] Chu, C. H., Donato‐Woodger, S., & Dainton, C. J. (2020). Competing crises: COVID‐19 countermeasures and social isolation among older adults in long‐term care. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 76(10), 2456–2459. https://doi.org/10.1111/jan.14467. [17] Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). [18] Jacobson. [19] Jacobson. [20] Jacobson. [21] Jacobson. [22] Jacobson. [23] Jacobson. [24] Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F.10 (C.C.N.D. Cal., 1900). [25] Jew Ho v. Williamson . [26] Jew Ho v. Williamson. [27] Viens, A. M. (2008). Public Health, Ethical Behavior and Reciprocity. The American Journal of Bioethics, 8(5), 1–3. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160802180059. [28] Upshur, R. (2003, November 1). The Ethics of Quarantine. Retrieved from https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/ethics-quarantine/2003-11. [29] Kamweri, J. M. M. (2013). The Ethical Balance Between Individual and Population Health Interests To Effectively Manage Pandemics and Epidemics (dissertation). [30] Argued by Ken Wing Professor Emeritus, Seattle University School of Law. Kamweri, J. M. M. (2013). The Ethical Balance Between Individual and Population Health Interests To Effectively Manage Pandemics and Epidemics (dissertation). [31] Interests To Effectively Manage Pandemics and Epidemics (dissertation). [32] Chu, p. 2457. [33] D'cruz, p.7. [34] Savulescu, J., & Cameron, J. (2020). Why lockdown of the elderly is not ageist and why levelling down equality is wrong. Journal of Medical Ethics, 46(11), 717–721. https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2020-106336. [35] Hugh McLachlan, Professor Emeritus of Applied Philosophy, [36] Heinrichs, B. (2010). Single-Principle Versus Multi-Principles Approaches in Bioethics. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 27(1), 72-83. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.2009.00474.x. [37] Gedge, E. by impact ethics · in C. E. (2015, July 27). What Is Dignity and Does Bioethics Need to Talk About It? Impact Ethics. https://impactethics.ca/2015/07/27/what-is-dignity-and-does-bioethics-need-to-talk-about-it/, citing, The 2005 UNESCO Declaration of Bioethics and Human Rights https://en.unesco.org/themes/ethics-science-and-technology/bioethics-and-human-rights.
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Fordham, Helen A. "Friends and Companions: Aspects of Romantic Love in Australian Marriage." M/C Journal 15, no. 6 (October 3, 2012). http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/mcj.570.
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Introduction The decline of marriage in the West has been extensively researched over the last three decades (Carmichael and Whittaker; de Vaus; Coontz; Beck-Gernshein). Indeed, it was fears that the institution would be further eroded by the legalisation of same sex unions internationally that provided the impetus for the Australian government to amend the Marriage Act (1961). These amendments in 2004 sought to strengthen marriage by explicitly defining, for the first time, marriage as a legal partnership between one man and one woman. The subsequent heated debates over the discriminatory nature of this definition have been illuminating, particularly in the way they have highlighted the ongoing social significance of marriage, even at a time it is seen to be in decline. Demographic research about partnering practices (Carmichael and Whittaker; Simons; Parker; Penman) indicates that contemporary marriages are more temporary, fragile and uncertain than in previous generations. Modern marriages are now less about a permanent and “inescapable” union between a dominant man and a submissive female for the purposes of authorised sex, legal progeny and financial security, and more about a commitment between two social equals for the mutual exchange of affection and companionship (Croome). Less research is available, however, about how couples themselves reconcile the inherited constructions of romantic love as selfless and unending, with trends that clearly indicate that romantic love is not forever, ideal or exclusive. Civil marriage ceremonies provide one source of data about representations of love. Civil unions constituted almost 70 per cent of all marriages in Australia in 2010, according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics. The civil marriage ceremony has both a legal and symbolic role. It is a legal contract insofar as it prescribes a legal arrangement with certain rights and responsibilities between two consenting adults and outlines an expectation that marriage is voluntarily entered into for life. The ceremony is also a public ritual that requires couples to take what are usually private feelings for each other and turn them into a public performance as a way of legitimating their relationship. Consistent with the conventions of performance, couples generally customise the rest of the ceremony by telling the story of their courtship, and in so doing they often draw upon the language and imagery of the Western Romantic tradition to convey the personal meaning and social significance of their decision. This paper explores how couples construct the idea of love in their relationship, first by examining the western history of romantic love and then by looking at how this discourse is invoked by Australians in the course of developing civil marriage ceremonies in collaboration with the author. A History of Romantic Love There are many definitions of romantic love, but all share similar elements including an intense emotional and physical attraction, an idealisation of each other, and a desire for an enduring and unending commitment that can overcome all obstacles (Gottschall and Nordlund; Janowiak and Fischer). Romantic love has historically been associated with heightened passions and intense almost irrational or adolescent feelings. Charles Lindholm’s list of clichés that accompany the idea of romantic love include: “love is blind, love overwhelms, a life without love is not worth living, marriage should be for love alone and anything less is worthless and a sham” (5). These elements, which invoke love as sacred, unending and unique, perpetuate past cultural associations of the term. Romantic love was first documented in Ancient Rome where intense feelings were seen as highly suspect and a threat to the stability of the family, which was the primary economic, social and political unit. Roman historian Plutarch viewed romantic love based upon strong personal attraction as disruptive to the family, and he expressed a fear that romantic love would become the norm for Romans (Lantz 352). During the Middle Ages romantic love emerged as courtly love and, once again, the conventions that shaped its expression grew out of an effort to control excessive emotions and sublimate sexual desire, which were seen as threats to social stability. Courtly love, according to Marilyn Yalom, was seen as an “irresistible and inexhaustible passion; a fatal love that overcomes suffering and even death” (66). Feudal social structures had grounded marriage in property, while the Catholic Church had declared marriage a sacrament and a ceremony through which God’s grace could be obtained. In this context courtly love emerged as a way of dealing with the conflict between the individual and family choices over the martial partner. Courtly love is about a pure ideal of love in which the knight serves his unattainable lady, and, by carrying out feats in her honour, reaches spiritual perfection. The focus on the aesthetic ideal was a way to fulfil male and female emotional needs outside of marriage, while avoiding adultery. Romantic love re-appeared again in the mid-eighteenth century, but this time it was associated with marriage. Intellectuals and writers led the trend normalising romantic love in marriage as a reaction to the Enlightenment’s valorisation of reason, science and materialism over emotion. Romantics objected to the pragmatism and functionality induced by industrialisation, which they felt destroyed the idea of the mysterious and transcendental nature of love, which could operate as a form of secular salvation. Love could not be bought or sold, argued the Romantics, “it is mysterious, true and deep, spontaneous and compelling” (Lindholm 5). Romantic love also emerged as an expression of the personal autonomy and individualisation that accompanied the rise of industrial society. As Lanz suggests, romantic love was part of the critical reflexivity of the Enlightenment and a growing belief that individuals could find self actualisation through the expression and expansion of their “emotional and intellectual capacities in union with another” (354). Thus it was romantic love, which privileges the feelings and wishes of an individual in mate selection, that came to be seen as a bid for freedom by the offspring of the growing middle classes coerced into marriage for financial or property reasons. Throughout the 19th century romantic love was seen as a solution to the dehumanising forces of industrialisation and urbanisation. The growth of the competitive workplace—which required men to operate in a restrained and rational manner—saw an increase in the search for emotional support and intimacy within the domestic domain. It has been argued that “love was the central preoccupation of middle class men from the 1830s until the end of the 19th century” (Stearns and Knapp 771). However, the idealisation of the aesthetic and purity of love impacted marriage relations by casting the wife as pure and marital sex as a duty. As a result, husbands pursued sexual and romantic relationships outside marriage. It should be noted that even though love became cemented as the basis for marriage in the 19th century, romantic love was still viewed suspiciously by religious groups who saw strong affection between couples as an erosion of the fundamental role of the husband in disciplining his wife. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries romantic love was further impacted by urbanisation and migration, which undermined the emotional support provided by extended families. According to Stephanie Coontz, it was the growing independence and mobility of couples that saw romantic love in marriage consolidated as the place in which an individual’s emotional and social needs could be fully satisfied. Coontz says that the idea that women could only be fulfilled through marriage, and that men needed women to organise their social life, reached its heights in the 1950s (25-30). Changes occurred to the structure of marriage in the 1960s when control over fertility meant that sex was available outside of marriage. Education, equality and feminism also saw women reject marriage as their only option for fulfilment. Changes to Family Law Acts in western jurisdictions in the 1970s provided for no-fault divorce, and as divorce lost its stigma it became acceptable for women to leave failing marriages. These social shifts removed institutional controls on marriage and uncoupled the original sexual, emotional and financial benefits packaged into marriage. The resulting individualisation of personal lifestyle choices for men and women disrupted romantic conventions, and according to James Dowd romantic love came to be seen as an “investment” in the “future” that must be “approached carefully and rationally” (552). It therefore became increasingly difficult to sustain the idea of love as a powerful, mysterious and divine force beyond reason. Methodology In seeking to understand how contemporary partnering practices are reconstituting romantic love, I draw upon anecdotal data gathered over a nine-year period from my experiences as a marriage celebrant. In the course of personalising marriage ceremonies, I pose a series of questions designed to assist couples to explain the significance of their relationship. I generally ask brides and grooms why they love their fiancé, why they want to legalise their relationship, what they most treasure about their partner, and how their lives have been changed by their relationship. These questions help couples to reflexively interrogate their own relationship, and by talking about their commitment in concrete terms, they produce the images and descriptions that can be used to describe for guests the internal motivations and sentiments that have led to their decision to marry. I have had couples, when prompted to explain how they know the other person loves them say, in effect: “I know that he loves me because he brings me a cup of coffee every morning” or “I know that she loves me because she takes care of me so well.” These responses are grounded in a realism that helps to convey a sense of sincerity and authenticity about the relationship to the couple’s guests. This realism also helps to address the cynicism about the plausibility of enduring love. The brides and grooms in this sample of 300 couples were a socially, culturally and economically diverse group, and they provided a wide variety of responses ranging from deeply nuanced insights into the nature of their relationship, to admissions that their feelings were so private and deeply felt that words were insufficient to convey their significance. Reoccurring themes, however, emerged across the cases, and it is evident that even as marriage partnerships may be entered into for a variety of reasons, romantic love remains the mechanism by which couples talk of their feelings for each other. Australian Love and Marriage Australians' attitudes to romantic love and marriage have, understandably, been shaped by western understandings of romantic love. It is evident, however, that the demands of late modern capitalist society, with its increased literacy, economic independence and sexual equality between men and women, have produced marriage as a negotiable contract between social equals. For some, like Carol Pateman, this sense of equality within marriage may be illusory. Nonetheless, the drive for individual self-fulfilment by both the bride and groom produces a raft of challenges to traditional ideas of marriage as couples struggle to find a balance between independence and intimacy; between family and career; and between pursuing personal goals and the goals of their partners. This shift in the nature of marriage has implications for the “quest for undying romantic love,” which according to Anthony Giddens has been replaced by other forms of relationship, "each entered into for its own sake, for what can be derived by each person from a sustained association with another; and which is continued only in so far as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfactions for each individual to stay within it” (qtd. in Lindholm 6). The impact of these social changes on the nature of romantic love in marriage is evident in how couples talk about their relationship in the course of preparing a ceremony. Many couples describe the person they are marrying as their best friend, and friendship is central to their commitment. This description supports research by V.K. Oppenheimer which indicates that many contemporary couples have a more “egalitarian collaborative approach to marriage” (qtd. in Carmichael and Whittaker 25). It is also standard for couples to note in ceremonies that they make each other happy and contented, with many commenting upon how their partners have helped to bring focus and perspective to their work-oriented lives. These comments tend to invoke marriage as a refuge from the isolation, competition, and dehumanising elements of workplaces. Since emotional support is central to the marriage contract, it is not surprising that care for each other is another reoccurring theme in ceremonies. Many brides and grooms not only explicitly say they are well taken care of by their partner, but also express admiration for their partner’s treatment of their families and friends. This behaviour appears to be seen as an indicator of the individual’s capacity for support and commitment to family values. Many couples admire partner’s kindness, generosity and level of personal self-sacrifice in maintaining the relationship. It is also not uncommon for brides and grooms to say they have been changed by their love: become kinder, more considerate and more tolerant. Honesty, communication skills and persistence are also attributes that are valued. Brides and grooms who have strong communication skills are also praised. This may refer to interpersonal competency and the willingness to acquire the skills necessary to negotiate the endless compromises in contemporary marriage now that individualisation has undermined established rules, rituals and roles. Persistence and the ability not to be discouraged by setbacks is also a reoccurring theme, and this connects with the idea that marriage is work. Many couples promise to grow together in their marriage and to both take responsibility for the health of their relationship. This promise implies awareness that marriage is not the fantasy of happily ever after produced in romantic popular culture, but rather an arrangement that requires hard work and conscious commitment, particularly in building a union amidst many competing options and distractions. Many couples talk about their relationship in terms of companionship and shared interests, values and goals. It is also not uncommon for couples to say that they admire their partner for supporting them to achieve their life goals or for exposing them to a wider array of lifestyle choices and options like travel or study. These examples of interdependence appear to make explicit that couples still see marriage as a vehicle for personal freedom and self-realisation. The death of love is also alluded to in marriage ceremonies. Couples talk of failed past relationships, but these are produced positively as a mechanism that enables the couple to know that they have now found an enduring relationship. It is also evident that for many couples the decision to marry is seen as the formalisation of a preexisting commitment rather than the gateway to a new life. This is consistent with figures that show that 72 per cent of Australian couples chose to cohabit before marriage (Simons 48), and that cohabitation has become the “normative pathway to marriage” (Penman 26). References to children also feature in marriage ceremonies, and for the couples I have worked with marriage is generally seen as the pre-requisite for children. Couples also often talk about “being ready” for marriage. This seems to refer to being financially prepared. Robyn Parker citing the research of K. Edin concludes that for many modern couples “rushing into marriage before being ‘set’ is irresponsible—marrying well (in the sense of being well prepared) is the way to avoid divorce” (qtd. in Parker 81). From this overview of reoccurring themes in the production of Australian ceremonies it is clear that romantic love continues to be associated with marriage. However, couples describe a more grounded and companionable attachment. These more practical and personalised sentiments serve to meet both the public expectation that romantic love is a precondition for marriage, while also avoiding the production of romantic love in the ceremony as an empty cliché. Grounded descriptions of love reveal that attraction does not have to be overwhelming and unconquerable. Indeed, couples who have lived together and are intimately acquainted with each other’s habits and disposition, appear to be most comfortable expressing their commitment to each other in more temperate, but no less deeply felt, terms. Conclusion This paper has considered how brides and grooms constitute romantic love within the shifting partnering practices of contemporary Australia. It is evident “in the midst of significant social and economic change and at a time when individual rights and freedom of choice are important cultural values” marriage remains socially significant (Simons 50). This significance is partially conveyed through the language of romantic love, which, while freighted with an array of cultural and historical associations, remains the lingua franca of marriage, perhaps because as Roberto Unger observes, romantic love is “the most influential mode of moral vision in our culture” (qtd. in Lindholm 5). It is thus possible to conclude, that while marriage may be declining and becoming more fragile and impermanent, the institution remains important to couples in contemporary Australia. Moreover, the language and imagery of romantic love, which publicly conveys this importance, remains the primary mode of expressing care, affection and hope for a partnership, even though the changed partnering practices of late modern capitalist society have exposed the utopian quality of romantic love and produced a cynicism about the viability of its longevity. It is evident in the marriage ceremonies prepared by the author that while the language of romantic love has come to signify a broader range of more practical associations consistent with the individualised nature of modern marriage and demystification of romantic love, it also remains the best way to express what Dowd and Pallotta describe as a fundamental human “yearning for communion with and acceptance by another human being” (571). References Beck, U., and E. Beck-Gernsheim, Individualisation: Institutionalised Individualism and Its Social and Political Consequences. London: Sage, 2002. Beigel, Hugo G. “Romantic Love.” American Sociological Review 16.3 (1951): 326–34. Carmichael, Gordon A, and Andrea Whittaker. “Forming Relationships in Australia: Qualitative Insights into a Process Important to Human Well Being.” Journal of Population Research 24.1 (2007): 23–49. Coontz, Stephanie. Marriage, A History: How Love Conquered Marriage. New York: Viking, 2005. Croome, Rodney. “Love and Commitment, To Equality.” The Drum Opinion, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) News. 8 June 2011. 14 Aug. 2012 < http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/2749898.html >. de Vaus, D.L. Qu, and R. Weston. “Family Trends: Changing Patterns of Partnering.” Family Matters 64 (2003): 10–15. Dowd, James T, and Nicole R. Pallotta. “The End of Romance: The Demystification of Love in the Postmodern Age.” Sociological Perspectives 43.4 (2000): 549–80. Gottschall, Jonathan, and Marcus Nordlund. “Romantic Love: A Literary Universal?” Philosophy and Literature 30 (2006): 450–70. Jankowiak, William, and Ted Fischer, “A Cross-Cultural Perspective on Romantic Love,” Ethnology 31 (1992): 149–55. Lantz, Herman R. “Romantic Love in the Pre-Modern Period: A Sociological Commentary.” Journal of Social History 15.3 (1982): 349–70. Lindholm, Charles. “Romantic Love and Anthropology.” Etnofoor 19:1 Romantic Love (2006): 5–21. Parker, Robyn. “Perspectives on the Future of Marriage.” Australian Institute of Family Studies 72 Summer (2005): 78–82.Pateman, Carole. “Women and Consent.” Political Theory (1980): 149–68. Penman, Robyn. “Current Approaches to Marriage and Relationship Research in the United States and Australia.” Family Matters 70 Autumn (2005): 26–35. Simons, Michelle. “(Re)-forming Marriage in Australia?” Australian Institute of Family Matters 73 (2006): 46–51.Stearns, Peter N, and Mark Knapp. “Men and Romantic Love: Pinpointing a 20th-Century Change.” Journal of Social History 26.4 (1993): 769–95. Yalom, Marilyn. A History of the Wife. New York: Harper Collins, 2001.
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Barbour, Kim, P. David Marshall, and Christopher Moore. "Persona to Persona Studies." M/C Journal 17, no. 3 (June 17, 2014). http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/mcj.841.
Full textAbstract:
Sometimes a particular concept—a simple term—is the spark to a series of ideas. It might be ostentatious and perhaps hubristic that the editors of an issue on persona might imagine that their choice of the term persona has provided this intellectual spark. Fully aware of that risk, we want to announce that it has. The response to the call for papers related to persona was our first sign that something special was being initiated. The sheer number and interdisciplinary breadth of the abstracts and ultimate submissions was evidence that the term ‘persona’ was the catalyst to an explosion of ideas. As the responses flowed into the journal and to us, we became aware of the meme-like qualities of the many interpretations and history of the term, each with its own idiosyncratic coding of patterned similarity. The reality of this development is that it was not entirely unexpected. The editors have been developing the concept of persona and persona studies over the past four years, and persona studies has emerged from a congruence in our collective research interests as an interdisciplinary investigation of the presentation of the self in the contemporary moment. Together, we have been involved in the development of the Persona Celebrity Publics Research Group (PCP) at Deakin University. Within that group, we have concentrated ourselves in the Persona Research cluster, made up of a group of 15 or so academics along with another smaller group from other institutions. Emerging from our work is the forthcoming book entitled Persona Studies: Celebrity, Identity, and the Transformation of Public Culture (forthcoming Wiley 2015). Both the book and the research group are intent on exploring what has been altering in our worlds, our cultures, and our communities that make us think the new intensified play of the personal in public needs closer scrutiny. The impetus for us as a team of scholars is quite clearly linked to the uses of online culture and how greater aspects of our lives are now involved in public displays, mediated displays, and a peculiar new blend of interpersonal and presentational constructions of identities and selves. Persona as a specific area of inquiry has emerged from the close study of the public self. Its immediate intellectual past has its strongest links with research on celebrity. In the Celebrity Studies Reader collection, Marshall began forming the idea that a new public self was emerging through new media (New Media). In subsequent work, Marshall identifies celebrity culture as one of the pedagogic sources for how the wider population presented itself in online culture and social media (Marshall, Promotion). Barbour and Marshall expanded their thinking about the presentation of the self through a closer study of online academic persona and the different strategic ways individuals were managing and building reputations and prestige through these techniques. Terms such as the ‘comprehensive,’ ’networked’, and ‘uncontained’ self, mapped the various kinds of public personalities that were emerging through the most prominent academics (Barbour and Marshall). In a similar vein, Barbour’s research has looked closely at the online and public personas that fringe artists—specifically tattoo artists, craftivists, performance poets and street artists—produce and maintain in the contemporary moment (Hiding; Finding). Her work has advanced the concepts of “registers of performance” (Registers), where a closer analysis of how the personal, the professional, and sometimes the intimate registers are constructed and deployed to produce a public persona that demonstrates ‘artistness’. By analysing persona through registers of performance, Barbour is able to differentiate between the types of identity building activity that occurs online. This provides insight into the ways that impression management occurs in spaces that suffer from context collapse due to the intersection of friends, family, fans, and followers. Moore’s work (Hats; Magic; Invigorating) on the player’s assembly of a networked online ‘gamer’ persona considers the intersection of social media and video game culture and contributes analysis of the affective dimensions of player-oriented game objects and their public curation and display. His recent research visualising Twitter and Flickr data (Screenshots, forthcoming) advances an understanding of the accumulation and online presentation of the self through digital game artefacts, specifically video game screenshots. He is currently researching the interaction of social media activity, reputation management, and everyday identity ‘play’ within public game cultures and the larger dynamics of production and consumption of games and play in the video game industry. Most recently, Marshall called for what he titled a “persona studies manifesto”: the public presentation of the self demands a more extensive analysis of the play and deployment of persona in contemporary culture. Beyond popular culture, the development of reputation and persona and its intersection with online culture especially needs to be explored in those professions, disciplines and activities where this form of investigation has never been attempted (Marshall, Persona Studies). The initiative of persona studies then is in some ways turning the cultural studies’ approach to the study of the audience on its head: it is a study of agency and the processes by which agency has been individualized and assembled across contemporary culture, but highly privileged in online culture (Marshall, Personifying). Persona studies involves a close investigation of the personalized and negotiated presentation of the self. So, what is persona? The articles here assume different, but connected, understandings of the term, each with levels of deference to writers such as Jung, Goffman, Butler, and Foucault, along with some expected allusions to the ancient Greeks and Romans who coined the term. The Greek origins identify that persona is a mask and derived from performance and acting. From Hannah Arendt’s reading of the Greeks this mask of public identity was not seen in a derogatory way; rather it was natural to assume a public/political persona that was quite removed from the private and home sphere. A political persona defined by citizenry was a clearly conscious separation from the household of activity. Jung’s take on persona is that it was designed for collective experience and for the outside world and therapy would lead to an understanding of the individual that delved beneath the persona. The resurgence in interest in Goffman’s dramaturgical analogy allows us to consider persona as an everyday performance, where the purpose of the presentation of self is to convince the audience (and at times, the performer) that the performance is genuine and authentic. All of us know what it is like to act in a role, to wear a uniform or costume, to create a profile. More than a few of us know what it is to suffer through the ‘individualising’ categories of a social networking sign-up survey that do not adequately account for distinctions. Persona is all these things, or rather, through the various everyday activities of our work, social, and online selves we contribute to the accretion of the identity at the base of its structure. Persona functions like the construct or automated script that we assemble to interact with the world with on our behalf. This involves the technologies of computation and mediation and their interfaces that function to automate, produce and filter communication with us; email, blogs, Twitter accounts, and so on. These golems interconnect and can interact on their own in unpredictable ways on our behalf; connecting our Facebook account to a product, brand or petition; using Google as a portal to login into other web enabled services; or authorising an app to record our location. Then there are the traces that we leave scattered across digital networks, intranets, hard drives, and lost USB memory sticks, from scattered collections of digital photos to the contact lists of our mobile devices and the ‘achievements’ in our online gaming profiles. Persona can also be something that happens to us, as friends tag unflattering images via Facebook, or another Twitter user publicly addresses us with a unwanted, or unwarranted commentary, using the ‘@’ and the ‘#’ functions. We have an extensive degree of control over the ways we assemble ourselves online and yet the contemporary experience is one of constant negotiation with forces that seeks to disavow their responsibilities to us, and maximise the limitations under which we can act. Our personas serve as a buffer to these forces. We can strategically assemble our persona to participate in, influence and use to our advantage to transmit messages across the network and communicate a mediated form of ourselves. The many ways to account persona stands as a primary and apparently Sisyphean task for persona studies: no sooner than when we might assemble a complete topology of the many accounts, traditions, domains, methodologies and theories for account of for the self, we will have arrived at possibly entirely new way of conceptualising the presentation of online persona through some post-Facebook, Oculus Rift, or Google Glass augmented reality experience. One of the challenges of persona studies will be to provide a series of methodological and theoretical tools, as well as a common touchstone from which multiple perspectives may converge around the meme-like qualities of this dramatic term. It will be necessary to consider the future of the presentation of the self, as much as the past accounts for the understanding of the self and its compositions. In the contemporary moment we consider a series of common currents and features of the iterations of persona with which we might begin this endeavour. The collective objective of the ‘persona’ theme edition is to coalesce around the emerging significance of the public self, and to map that activity within disciplinary traditions, historical precedents and the cultural and technological predispositions that have made this kind of reading of the contemporary world valuable, important, and ultimately, sensible. This collection of articles on persona is innovative in terms of the diversity of issues it tackles through the term. Given the massive change in public identity that we have identified as an elemental part of online culture, it is not surprising that social media and online constructions of persona figure prominently throughout the issue. However, we are also pleased to include papers that consider fictional performances from both television and film and even character studies of public figures. Marshall’s feature article for the edition continues his theorisation of persona. Seriality is identified as one of the ways that a consistency of persona is developed and the article charts the usefulness in analogizing how the construction of a serial character or ‘personnage’ for an actor/performer provides insights into the relationship between the person and persona in other settings that are emerging in the contemporary moment. In ‘Darkly Dreaming (in) Authenticity: The Self/Persona Opposition in Dexter,’ Glenn D'Cruz uses Dexter Morgan, the novelised serial killer and Showtime TV anti-hero to examine the connections between self and persona and the discourse of authenticity. D’Cruz foresees a series of challenges for persona studies and considers key concerns ahead, in terms of the critical vocabulary and scholarly agenda and addresses the need for critical genealogy of the term ‘persona’. Talia Morag, in ‘Persons and Their Personas: Living with Yourself’, considers the tensions identified in the persona of the private domain, and examines the patterns of social interaction that work to affect an ‘endorsed’ private persona, compared to those patterns classified as ‘hidden’. She frames the negotiation of these tensions as a move to better understand the sphere of the private self, as well as the those strains which arise on the private persona and the grounds from which they come to occupy our time. Together these two approaches predict the convergence of the private, the performed and the public persona which occupies Neil Henderson’s ‘The Contingency of Online Persona and Its Tension with Relationship Development’. Henderson’s engagement with the dimensions of online persona in the short film, Noah, takes a position at the crossroads between Marshall’s celebrity-inscribed approach to persona studies and the application of actor-network theory in order to map the potential pitfalls of identity management through ubiquitous technologies and broader critical questions about the play of our online selves in the everyday. Moving to the multi-user virtual environment of Second Life, Lesley Procter draws on the symbolic interactionist theories of social identity and the role of the avatar in ‘A Mirror without a Tain: Personae, Avatars, and Selves in a Multi-User Virtual Environment’. Procter’s contribution to persona studies highlights the actual and conceptual mirroring involved in the sense of the self involved in the interaction with others online. Taina Bucher’s ‘About a Bot: Hoax, Fake, Performance Art’ is a revealing examination of the Twitter bot phenomenon. Bucher’s case study on ‘bot fakeness’ considers the automation and performance of persona and the interactions and relationships between people and bots. Brady Robards, in ‘Digital Traces of the Persona through Ten Years of Facebook’, offers a critical reading of the Facebook ‘look back’ video creation application made to celebrate the social network’s ten year. As with Bucher and Proctor, Robards is concerned with the ways persona is created through highly mediated social networking platforms, where the agency of the individual is countered by the intervention of the software itself. Robards considers in particular two functions of Facebook: first as a site for the performance of life narratives, and second as a location for reflection on public and private disclosure. Taking a specific element of this idea of disclosure—the sharing of one’s legal name—as a starting point, Ellen Moll’s ‘What’s in a Nym?: Gender, Race, Pseudonymity, and the Imagining of the Online Persona’ is a study of the reactions of feminist and anti-racist bloggers in the ongoing battles over pseudonymity online. Moll’s contribution centres around current concerns with the ‘real name policies’ of social media and web-based platforms and services. What is at stake here in the negotiation between the individuals, technologies and institutions over the rights of self-determination and agency in the digital and online environments. Narrowing the focus to a single case study, Emma Maguire’s study of author website as a site of self-presentation in ‘Home, About, Shop, Contact: Constructing an Authorial Persona via the Author Website’ examines the authorial persona produced for consumption within literary markets. Framing of the authorial website as ‘automedial text’, rather than as direct representations of a pre-existing self, Maguire employs authorship theory to understand the website as a genre of persona performance and textuality. Shifting away from the focus on social media, this issue concludes with a trio of character studies, each of which involves a detailed and critical account of the dimensions of a public assembly of a persona. Nathan Farrell’s ‘From Activist to Entrepreneur: Peace One Day and the Changing Persona of the Social Campaigner’ is the first, and considers the ways that an individual manages his persona for different audiences. Farrell’s focus is Jeremy Gilley, a documentary filmmaker and peace campaigner, and the paper speaks to the dimensions of overlapping audiences connected to an articulation of a socially aware entrepreneurial persona. Sally Totman and Mat Hardy have a very different figure in their contribution as they examine the many different public personas of Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. In ‘The Many Personas of Colonel Qaddafi’, Totman and Hardy interrogate the multiple aspects of Qaddafi’s construction as a brotherly revolutionary, philosopher, liberator, leader, and clown. The authors chart the progression of his often conflicted and chaotic legacy, and of this political, ideological and even messianic presentation of the self to the Western and Arab worlds. Anastasia Denisova, completes the triptych of persona case studies for this collection, with ‘How Vladimir Putin's Divorce Story Was Constructed and Received, or When the President Divorced His Wife and Married the Country Instead’. Denisova contends Vladimir Putin’s divorce is representative of the degree to which political and private persona are mediated and merged across often competing channels of communication. The analysis contends with online discourse, images, and texts, which reveal the extensive personification of politics in Putin’s public persona in an environment of reception by an audience which also consider the values and attributes of their own country as a national persona. Conclusion We have structured the narrative flow of articles in this issue on persona from the fictional through to the online transformations of the self and then even further into the analyses of the public and political dimensions that are part of the constitution of public selves. No doubt, you as a reader will see different connections and intersections and will play with what makes the idea of persona so meaningful and valuable in understanding the strategic construction of a public identity and so central to comprehending the contemporary moment. We invite you to engage with this further with the issue editors’ planned 2015 launch of a journal called Persona Studies. Until then, this issue of M/C Journal certainly represents the most comprehensive and, we think, interesting, collection of writing on persona as we explore the implications behind the mask of public identity. We hope the issue stimulates discussion and with that hope, we hope to hear from you.AcknowledgmentsThe editors would like to thank Alison Bennett for creating an original gif for the cover image of this issue. More of Bennett's work, including her augmented reality images of tattoos from the internationally acclaimed exhibition Shifting Skin, can be found at her website, alisonbennett.com.au.Thanks also to Trent Griffiths for his copy-editing assistance. References Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Charles R. Walgreen Foundation Lectures. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1958. Barbour, Kim. “Hiding in Plain Sight: Street Artists Online.” Platform Journal of Media and Communication. 5.1 (2013). Barbour, Kim. “Registers of Performance: Negotiating the professional, personal, and intimate.” MeCCSA 2014. Bournemouth, 8-10 Jan. 2014. Barbour, Kim. “Finding the Edge: Online persona creation by fringe artists.” Contemporary Publics International Symposium. 24-25 Feb. 2014. Barbour, Kim, and P. David Marshall. "The Academic Online: Constructing Persona through the World Wide Web." First Monday 17.9 (2012). ‹http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/viewArticle/3969/3292›. Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. USA: Anchor Books, 1959. Jung, Carl Gustav. Two Essays on Analytical Psychology. Bollingen Series. 2nd ed. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. Marshall, P. David. "New Media New Self, the Changing Power of the Celebrity." The Celebrity Culture Reader. Ed. P. David Marshall. London: Routledge, 2006. 634-44. Marshall, P. David. "The Promotion and Presentation of the Self: Celebrity as Marker of Presentational Media." 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