Journal articles on the topic 'International relations – United States – Public opinion'
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INOGUCHI, TAKASHI. "Introduction to the Special Issue: Soft Power of Civil Society in International Relations." Japanese Journal of Political Science 13, no. 4 (November 1, 2012): 473–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109912000229.
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This special issue focuses on the role of civil society in international relations. It highlights the dynamics and impacts of public opinion on international relations (Zaller, 1992). Until recently, it was usual to consider public opinion in terms of its influence on policy makers and in terms of moulding public opinion in the broad frame of the policy makers in one's country. Given that public opinion in the United States was assessed and judged so frequently and diffused so globally, it was natural to frame questions guided by those concepts which pertained to the global and domestic context of the United States.
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Ortiz, Reynaldo Yunuen Ortega. "The United States-Iraq War and Mexican Public Opinion." International Journal 61, no. 3 (2006): 648. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40204195.
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Haman, Michael, and Milan Školník. "Trump and the Image of the United States in Latin America." Central European Journal of International and Security Studies 15, no. 1 (March 31, 2021): 58–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.51870/cejiss.a150103.
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In our research, we focus on the image of the United States in Latin America. We use mainly data from Latinobarómetro, and we analyse Obama’s last year and Trump’s first year in the presidency in 18 countries in Latin America. We use logistic regression to reach conclusions. We also analyse Trump’s tweets to see his Twitter rhetoric. We find that Trump’s election has strongly worsened the image of the United States in the public opinion of Latin America. However, we find that people that believe more in democracy, the free market and national political institutions are more likely to have a positive opinion of the United States. Also, we find that the more left-wing citizens are, the more likely they have a bad opinion of the United States. This article contributes to the theory of trust and research on the public opinion across nations. Also, this article offers insights into the topical research agenda concerning the influence of political ideology on public opinion.
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Erikson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver. "Political Parties, Public Opinion, and State Policy in the United States." American Political Science Review 83, no. 3 (September 1989): 729–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1962058.
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When comparing states in the United States, one finds little correlation between state opinion and party control of the state legislature or between party control and state policy. Although these low correlations seeming to indicate that partisan politics is irrelevant to the representation process, the opposite is true. State opinion influences the ideological positions of state parties, and parties' responsiveness to state opinion helps to determine their electoral success. Moreover, parties move toward the center once in office. For these reasons, state electoral politics is largely responsible for the correlation between state opinion and state policy.
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TOMZ, MICHAEL R., and JESSICA L. P. WEEKS. "Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace." American Political Science Review 107, no. 4 (November 2013): 849–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055413000488.
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One of the most striking findings in political science is the democratic peace: the absence of war between democracies. Some authors attempt to explain this phenomenon by highlighting the role of public opinion. They observe that democratic leaders are beholden to voters and argue that voters oppose war because of its human and financial costs. This logic predicts that democracies should behave peacefully in general, but history shows that democracies avoid war primarily in their relations with other democracies. In this article we investigate not whether democratic publics are averse to war in general, but whether they are especially reluctant to fight other democracies. We embedded experiments in public opinion polls in the United States and the United Kingdom and found that individuals are substantially less supportive of military strikes against democracies than against otherwise identical autocracies. Moreover, our experiments suggest that shared democracy pacifies the public primarily by changing perceptions of threat and morality, not by raising expectations of costs or failure. These findings shed light on a debate of enduring importance to scholars and policy makers.
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Hartley, Thomas, and Bruce Russett. "Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who Governs Military Spending in the United States?" American Political Science Review 86, no. 4 (December 1992): 905–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1964343.
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We measure the extent to which military spending policy reflects public opinion, while controlling for other reasonable influences on policy. We use survey data as an indicator of aggregate public opinion on military spending and find evidence that changes in public opinion consistently exert an effect on changes in military spending. The influence of public opinion is less important than either Soviet military spending or the gap between U.S. and Soviet military spending and more important than the deficit and the balance of Soviet conflict/cooperation with the United States. We also examine the hypothesis that public opinion does not influence the government but that the government systematically manipulates public opinion. We find no evidence to support this hypothesis.
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Erikson, Robert S., John P. McIver, and Gerald C. Wright. "State Political Culture and Public Opinion." American Political Science Review 81, no. 3 (September 1987): 797–813. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1962677.
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Do the states of the United States matter (or are they of no political consequence)? Using a data set with over 50 thousand respondents, we demonstrate the influence of state political culture on partisanship and ideology. For individuals, we find that the state of residence is an important predictor of partisan and ideological identification, independent of their demographic characteristics. At the aggregate level, state culture dominates state demography as a source of state-to-state differences in opinion. In general, geographic location may be a more important source of opinion than previously thought. One indication of the importance of state culture is that state effects on partisanship and ideology account for about half of the variance in state voting in recent presidential elections.
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Chapman, Terrence L. "Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy." International Organization 63, no. 4 (October 2009): 733–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818309990154.
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AbstractRecent work suggests that multilateral security institutions, such as the UN Security Council, can influence foreign policy through public opinion. According to this view, authorization can increase public support for foreign policy, freeing domestic constraints. Governments that feel constrained by public opinion may thus alter their foreign policies to garner external authorization. These claims challenge traditional realist views about the role of international organizations in security affairs, which tend to focus on direct enforcement mechanisms and neglect indirect channels of influence. To examine these claims, this article investigates the first link in this causal chain—the effect of institutional statements on public opinion. Strategic information arguments, as opposed to arguments about the symbolic legitimacy of specific organizations or the procedural importance of consultation, posit that the effect of institutional statements on public opinion is conditional on public perceptions of member states' interests. This article tests this conditional relationship in the context of changes in presidential approval surrounding military disputes, using a measure of preference distance between the United States and veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council. Findings indicate that short-term changes in presidential approval surrounding the onset of military disputes in the United States between 1946 and 2001 have been significantly larger when accompanied by a positive resolution for a Security Council that is more distant in terms of foreign policy preferences. The article also discusses polling data during the 1990s and 2000s that support the strategic information perspective.
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TOMZ, MICHAEL, and JESSICA L. P. WEEKS. "Public Opinion and Foreign Electoral Intervention." American Political Science Review 114, no. 3 (April 14, 2020): 856–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055420000064.
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Foreign electoral intervention is an increasingly important tool for influencing politics in other countries, yet we know little about when citizens would tolerate or condemn foreign efforts to sway elections. In this article, we use experiments to study American public reactions to revelations of foreign electoral intervention. We find that even modest forms of intervention polarize the public along partisan lines. Americans are more likely to condemn foreign involvement, lose faith in democracy, and seek retaliation when a foreign power sides with the opposition, than when a foreign power aids their own party. At the same time, Americans reject military responses to electoral attacks on the United States, even when their own political party is targeted. Our findings suggest that electoral interference can divide and weaken an adversary without provoking the level of public demand for retaliation typically triggered by conventional military attacks.
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Rix, Sara E. "Public Policy and the Ageing Workforce in the United States." Social Policy and Society 3, no. 2 (March 29, 2004): 171–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474746403001635.
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Despite an ageing work force and the impending retirement of millions of baby boomers that could lead to serious labour, skills, and occupational shortages, older workers are not high on the policy agenda in the United States. Nonetheless, labour force participation rates for the older population have been rising, and public opinion polls reveal a sizeable demand for post-retirement employment. The challenge lies in meeting that demand and fostering longer worklives on the part of even more older Americans. A substantial public policy response is by no means certain, although raising the retirement age is likely to feature prominently in the debate on Social Security reform.
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Western, Jon. "Humanitarian Intervention, American Public Opinion, and the Future of R2P." Global Responsibility to Protect 1, no. 3 (2009): 324–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187598409x450794.
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AbstractThis article examines the evolution of humanitarian interventions in the 1990s and examines whether or not R2P can be a catalyst for shifting the norm of humanitarian intervention from a permissive condition – whereby it is generally considered allowable in the international system – to an obligation on states to protect against mass violence against civilians. I conclude that shifting to a norm of obligation is likely to be a tough sell in the United States. While Americans express general support for responding to genocide, there are strong indications that both the public and elites are not likely to endorse a new norm that obligates the deployment of American troops into regional and civil conflicts around the globe. This article examines the prospects of American support for this pillar of R2P. It begins with an examination of the literature on how norms are created and then provides an overview of the process by which the norm of humanitarian intervention emerged in the 1990s and the degree to which it is embedded in American public opinion and decision-making circles. It then examines the challenges of gaining American public and political support for transforming the permissive norm of humanitarian intervention into a more formal obligation under R2P.
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Lewis, Daniel C., and Matthew L. Jacobsmeier. "Evaluating Policy Representation with Dynamic MRP Estimates: Direct Democracy and Same-Sex Relationship Policies in the United States." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 17, no. 4 (November 8, 2017): 441–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532440017739423.
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Does direct democracy strengthen popular control of public policy in the United States? A major challenge in evaluating policy representation is the measurement of state-level public opinion and public policy. Although recent studies of policy responsiveness and congruence have provided improved measures of public opinion using multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) techniques, these analyses are limited by their static nature and cross-sectional design. Issue attitudes, unlike more general political orientations, often vary considerably over time. Unless the dynamics of issue-specific public opinion are appropriately incorporated into the analyses, tests of policy responsiveness and congruence may be misleading. Thus, we assess the degree of policy representation in direct democracy states regarding same-sex relationship recognition policies using dynamic models of policy adoption and congruence that employ dynamic MRP estimates of attitudes toward same-sex marriage. We find that direct democracy institutions increase both policy responsiveness and congruence with issue-specific public opinion.
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PANG, YANG HUEI. "Helpful Allies, Interfering Neighbours: World opinion and China in the 1950s." Modern Asian Studies 49, no. 1 (September 17, 2014): 204–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x13000395.
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AbstractIn the aftermath of the Korean War, the People's Republic of China was effectively an international pariah. Accounts of this period in Chinese textbooks emphasize how the Chinese turned this around, either during the Geneva Conference or the Bandung Conference, through deft planning and enterprise. Yet few pay any attention to how such manipulation of world opinion became increasingly difficult for Beijing after that initial success. One outcome of China's public relations campaign meant friendly Afro-Asia leaders voiced their opinions, in alarming numbers, to their Chinese counterparts regarding issues such as Asian security, mainland China's economic development, and the Taiwan problem. Indeed, recently declassified Chinese Foreign Affairs archive documents demonstrate that China tried to marshal such non-Soviet bloc opinions to its advantage during the first Taiwan Strait crisis (1955). Chinese efforts were successful in that there was no lack of volunteers to air dissent with American foreign policy. But these new allies also wished to mediate between the United States and the Republic of China, on the one side, and mainland China on the other. Moreover, such efforts were often at variance with China's domestic and strategic outlook in the region. China thus had to embark upon an active ‘management’ of disparate world opinions, which was an entirely new endeavour. Although China tried to provide a sanitized ‘script’ for its new friends, most had their own ideas. By the time of the second Taiwan Strait crisis (1958), the volume of third party interference had grown. Overwhelmed by such international attention, China responded by openly rejecting unwelcome mediation efforts and demanded outright condemnation of the United States. Thus, ironically, with its growing prominence on the international stage, China found itself unbearably weighted down by the burden of world opinion, a position previously occupied by the United States.
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Clinton, David. "The Distinction between Foreign Policy and Diplomacy in American International Thought and Practice." Hague Journal of Diplomacy 6, no. 3-4 (March 21, 2011): 261–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187119111x583950.
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Throughout his writings, Harold Nicolson advocates a distinction between ‘policy’ (to be subject to democratic control) and ‘negotiation’ (to remain the province of professional diplomatists), preferring to separate these two quite different activities, rather than lumping them together under the general term ‘diplomacy’ (an intermingling that he found conceptually muddled and politically impossible to sustain once general public opinion becomes politically mobilized). Nicholas Murray Butler and George Kennan, who may be taken as representing idealist and realist American opinion in the twentieth century, found themselves at one in rejecting Nicolson’s distinction. Butler believed that the progressive enlightenment of public opinion, resulting in the attainment of the ‘international mind’, would improve both the formulation of policy and the conduct of negotiations; Kennan deprecated public opinion, at least in the United States, as irredeemably clumsy and ill-informed, and was convinced that this domestic political force would not be satisfied with directing policy, but would insist on interfering with negotiation as well. Across the board, American opinion seems to be hostile to Nicolson’s differentiation. This rejection of Nicolson’s view illustrates a more general influence of distinctively American thinking about international relations on American attitudes towards, and expectations of, diplomacy.
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Rehman, Javaid, and Saptarshi Ghosh. "International Law, US Foreign Policy and Post-9/11 Islamic Fundamentalism: The Legal Status of the 'War on Terror'." Nordic Journal of International Law 77, no. 1-2 (2008): 87–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/090273508x290708.
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AbstractThe days immediately after 11 September 2001 saw considerable tension, anger and anxiety. These politically charged days witnessed significant activity within the United Nations and various agencies of international law. The world community rightly condemned the 9/11 attacks as cowardly actions and an unforgivable crime against humanity. The entire global public opinion expressed sympathy for the victims of 9/11 and empathised with the people of the United States. The show of human solidarity as well as the Resolutions within the United Nations were the responses from the international community and international law to the terrorist attacks on the United States. It becomes, therefore, quite ironic that the enormity of the 9/11 human tragedy was used by the United States government to undermine the established norms, practices, principles and framework of international law. Over the past six years, the United States foreign policy has continued to violate international law and brutalise human dignity. This paper critically examines the systematic violation of international norms under the banner of 'war on terror'. It takes the view that the 'war on terror' has had exactly the effect which it proclaimed to prevent-namely the growth of radicalisation, terrorism and Islamic extremism.
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Preston, Andrew. "Selling the Korean War: propaganda, politics, and public opinion in the United States, 1950-1953." Cold War History 9, no. 4 (November 2009): 530–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682740903268537.
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Valentino, Benjamin A., and Ethan M. Weinberg. "More than words? “Genocide,” Holocaust analogies, and public opinion in the United States." Journal of Human Rights 16, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 276–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2016.1239067.
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ALLEN, MICHAEL A., MICHAEL E. FLYNN, CARLA MARTINEZ MACHAIN, and ANDREW STRAVERS. "Outside the Wire: U.S. Military Deployments and Public Opinion in Host States." American Political Science Review 114, no. 2 (February 3, 2020): 326–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055419000868.
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How do citizens within countries hosting U.S. military personnel view that presence? Using new cross-national survey data from 14 countries, we examine how different forms of exposure to a U.S. military presence in a country affect attitudes toward the U.S. military, government, and people. We find that contact with U.S. military personnel or the receipt of economic benefits from the U.S. presence correlates with stronger support for the U.S. presence, people, and government. This study has profound implications for the role that U.S. installations play in affecting the social fabric of host nations and policy implications for the conduct of U.S. military activities outside the United States.
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Chow, Wilfred M., Enze Han, and Xiaojun Li. "Brexit identities and British public opinion on China." International Affairs 95, no. 6 (November 1, 2019): 1369–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz191.
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Abstract Many studies have explored the importance of public opinion in British foreign policy decision-making, especially when it comes to the UK's relations with the United States and the European Union. Despite its importance, there is a dearth of research on public opinion about British foreign policy towards other major players in the international system, such as emerging powers like China. We have addressed this knowledge gap by conducting a public opinion survey in the UK after the Brexit referendum. Our research findings indicate that the British public at large finds China's rise disconcerting, but is also pragmatic in its understanding of how the ensuing bilateral relations should be managed. More importantly, our results show that views on China are clearly split between the two opposing Brexit identities. Those who subscribe strongly to the Leave identity, measured by their aversion to the EU and antipathy towards immigration, are also more likely to hold negative perceptions of Chinese global leadership and be more suspicious of China as a military threat. In contrast, those who espouse a Remain identity—that is, believe that Britain would be better served within the EU and with more immigrants—are more likely to prefer closer engagement with China and to have a more positive outlook overall on China's place within the global community.
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Erikson, Robert S. "Public Opinion at the Macro Level." Daedalus 141, no. 4 (October 2012): 35–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_00172.
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My book “The Macro Polity,” coauthored with Michael B. MacKuen and James A. Stimson and published in 2002, depicts the dynamics of public opinion and electoral politics in the United States at the macro level; the analysis is based on micro-level foundations of micro-level political behavior. This essay presents the book's main arguments, in some instances extending the analysis beyond its original 1956–1996 time frame to incorporate data from the George W. Bush administration. The central thesis is that there is more rationality and predictability to American politics when viewed in the aggregate than one might infer from considering only the limited political awareness of the average citizen.
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McKercher, Asa, and Michael D. Stevenson. "“Under your inspired leadership”: Dwight Eisenhower, Canadians, and the Canada–United States consensus, 1945–1961." International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 75, no. 4 (December 2020): 471–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020702020978409.
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Drawing on newspaper and archival sources, this article examines post-war Canadian attitudes towards Dwight D. Eisenhower, particularly during his time in office as the United States President from 1953 to 1961. Eisenhower emerged from the Second World War as a trusted figure for many Canadians due to his inspiring leadership of the Allied cause. Once in the White House, however, his reputation began to suffer, and public opinion in Canada increasingly questioned core elements of the traditional Canada–United States relationship and America's ability to lead the Western alliance during a period of heightening Cold War tensions.
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Bailey, Stanley R. "Public Opinion on Nonwhite Underrepresentation and Racial Identity Politics in Brazil." Latin American Politics and Society 51, no. 4 (2009): 69–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2009.00064.x.
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AbstractBrazil has an “African-origin” population that is proportionally more than four times larger that of African Americans in the United States, but white Brazilians mostly dominate electoral politics. How do ordinary citizens explain this phenomenon? Drawing on a large-sample survey of public opinion in the state of Rio de Janeiro, this article explores perceived explanations for nonwhite underrepresentation in the political arena. It also examines attitudes toward a particular black candidate, Benedita da Silva, to discern the state ofnegroidentity politics. Most Brazilians in Rio de Janeiro cite racial prejudice to explain nonwhite exclusion, although whites do this less than nonwhites. Indicators of a racial undercurrent in political preferences suggest the importance of allegiances based on perceived common racial origins. Class is robustly associated with voting preferences, suggesting that, in contrast to the United States, class differences among nonwhites in Brazil could attenuate the success ofnegroidentity politics.
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Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies." World Politics 43, no. 4 (July 1991): 479–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010534.
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The paper discusses the role of public opinion in the foreign policy-making process of liberal democracies. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, public opinion matters. However, the impact of public opinion is determined not so much by the specific issues involved or by the particular pattern of public attitudes as by the domestic structure and the coalition-building processes among the elites in the respective country. The paper analyzes the public impact on the foreign policy-making process in four liberal democracies with distinct domestic structures: the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan. Under the same international conditions and despite similar patterns of public attitudes, variances in foreign policy outcomes nevertheless occur; these have to be explained by differences in political institutions, policy networks, and societal structures. Thus, the four countries responded differently to Soviet policies during the 1980s despite more or less comparable trends in mass public opinion.
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Goldsmith, Benjamin E., and Yusaku Horiuchi. "In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for US Foreign Policy?" World Politics 64, no. 3 (June 27, 2012): 555–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887112000123.
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Does “soft power” matter in international relations? Specifically, when the United States seeks cooperation from countries around the world, do the views of their publics about US foreign policy affect the actual foreign policy behavior of these countries? The authors examine this question using multinational surveys covering fifty-eight countries, combined with information about their foreign policy decisions in 2003, a critical year for the US. They draw their basic conceptual framework from Joseph Nye, who uses various indicators of opinion about the US to assess US soft power. But the authors argue that his theory lacks the specificity needed for falsifiable testing. They refine it by focusing on foreign public opinion about US foreign policy, an underemphasized element of Nye's approach. Their regression analysis shows that foreign public opinion has a significant and large effect on troop commitments to the war in Iraq, even after controlling for various hard power factors. It also has significant, albeit small, effects on policies toward the International Criminal Court and on voting decisions in the UN General Assembly. These results support the authors' refined theoretical argument about soft power: public opinion about US foreign policy in foreign countries does affect their policies toward the US, but this effect is conditional on the salience of an issue for mass publics.
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Kitagawa, Risa, and Jonathan A. Chu. "The Impact of Political Apologies on Public Opinion." World Politics 73, no. 3 (June 9, 2021): 441–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887121000083.
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ABSTRACTApology diplomacy promises to assuage historical grievances held by foreign publics, yet in practice appears to ignite domestic backlash, raising questions about its efficacy. This article develops a theory of how political apologies affect public approval of an apologizing government across domestic and foreign contexts. The authors test its implications using large-scale survey experiments in Japan and the United States. In the surveys, the authors present vignettes about World War II grievances and randomize the nature of a government apology. They find that apology-making, both as statements acknowledging wrongdoing and as expressions of remorse, boosts approval in the recipient state. But in the apologizing state, backlash is likely among individuals with strong hierarchical group dispositions—manifested as nationalism, social-dominance orientation, and conservatism—and among those who do not consider the recipient a strategically important partner. This microlevel evidence reveals how leaders face a crucial trade-off between improving support abroad and risking backlash at home, with implications for the study of diplomatic communication and transitional justice.
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Spilker, Gabriele, Quynh Nguyen, and Thomas Bernauer. "Trading Arguments: Opinion Updating in the Context of International Trade Agreements." International Studies Quarterly 64, no. 4 (September 17, 2020): 929–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa061.
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Abstract Public opinion can often become a key challenge to international cooperation efforts. In their attempt to garner support for their position, stakeholders fight for the hearts and minds of the public based on arguments about the consequences of different policy options. But to what extent do individuals’ preferences change when exposed to such information? And how does this depend on the information being congruent or contradictory to pre-existing preferences? We address these questions in the context of the negotiations on the potentially largest regional trade agreement in history: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Based on a two-waves-panel-survey-experiment fielded in Germany and the United States, we examine how individuals’ prior opinion influences the way they process new information. We argue that individuals’ existing priors about how they generally think about economic openness interact with new information to inform their opinion about the specific policy proposal at hand. Our experimental results show that while prior opinion constrains opinion updating to some degree, overall, citizens update their existing beliefs in line with new information. This updating process can even result in respondents changing their opinion, although only in one direction: namely to turn from a TTIP supporter to a TTIP opponent.
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Aspinwall, Mark, and Gerardo Maldonado. "¡Despierta México! Changing Public Attitudes Toward NAFTA, 2008–2018." Latin American Politics and Society 64, no. 1 (February 2022): 23–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.52.
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ABSTRACTRegional trade agreements have important consequences for developing countries, but the public opinion literature on trade agreements suffers from several shortcomings. Most significant is that studies tend to take a single year as the point of analysis, leaving us uncertain as to how opinion evolves. This study uses polling data to examine Mexicans’ attitudes toward NAFTA over a ten-year period. Results from regression analyses show an association between Mexicans’ support for the United Nations and their support for NAFTA, and a weaker relationship for other types of cues (presidential, the United States), than other studies have found. The data also reveal an association between Donald Trump’s arrival in the presidency and increased support for NAFTA.
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PARMARA, INDERJEET. "Engineering consent: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the mobilization of American public opinion, 1939–1945." Review of International Studies 26, no. 1 (January 2000): 35–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500000358.
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The role of private organizations and think tanks in the United States have been well documented. The Council on Foreign Relations in particular has been much discussed—less so, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This article seeks to fill that gap by exploring its influence on American public opinion during World War II. Based upon archival research, the essay examines the background of the key members of the Endowment, their outlook and the impact their work had in shaping US attitudes. Using Gramsci's notion of an ‘historic bloc’ wedded to the insights of the ‘corporatist’ school of American foreign relations, the conclusion reached is that the organization—along with other key bodies situated at the interface between the private and public spheres—played a not inconsiderable part in educating Americans for internationalism before the end of the war and the onset of the Cold War two years later.
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Gueorguiev, Dimitar, Daniel McDowell, and David A. Steinberg. "The Impact of Economic Coercion on Public Opinion: The Case of US–China Currency Relations." Journal of Conflict Resolution 64, no. 9 (March 24, 2020): 1555–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002720912323.
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In recent years, the United States has increasingly tried to change other governments’ economic policies by threatening to punish those countries if they do not change course. To better understand the political consequences of these tactics, this paper examines how external threats influence public support for policy change in targeted states. We consider three mechanisms through which economic coercion might alter public opinion: by changing individuals’ interests, by activating their national identities, and by providing them with new information about a policy’s distributive effects. To test these rival explanations, we focus on the case of China–US currency relations. Using data from a survey experiment of Chinese internet users, we find strong support for the informational updating theory. Our evidence suggests that economic coercion can reduce support for policy change because it leads individuals to update their beliefs about who wins and loses from economic policy changes.
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Merolla, Jennifer, S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, and Chris Haynes. "“Illegal,” “Undocumented,” or “Unauthorized”: Equivalency Frames, Issue Frames, and Public Opinion on Immigration." Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 3 (September 2013): 789–807. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592713002077.
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Immigration has been a salient and contentious topic in the United States, with a great deal of congressional debate, advocacy efforts, and media coverage. Among conservative and liberal groups, there is a vigorous debate over the terms used to describe this population, such as “undocumented” or “illegal,” as both sides perceive significant consequences to public opinion that flow out of this choice in equivalency frames. These same groups also compete over the ways in which immigration policies are framed. Here, for the first time, we examine the use of both types of frames (of immigrants themselves, and the policies affecting them) in media coverage. Importantly, we also test for whether these various frames affect preferences on three different policies of legalization. Our results suggest that efforts to focus on the terms used to describe immigrants have limited effect, and that efforts to frame policy offer greater promise in swaying public opinion on immigration.
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Allen, David. "Realism and Malarkey: Henry Kissinger's State Department, Détente, and Domestic Consensus." Journal of Cold War Studies 17, no. 3 (July 2015): 184–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00548.
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This article uses recently declassified archival documents to reassess public opinion in the United States regarding East-West détente. When Henry Kissinger was U.S. secretary of state during the Nixon and Ford administrations, he made dozens of speeches intended to educate the public in what he considered the proper methods of diplomacy. By analyzing those “heartland” speeches using recently released documents, the article shows that Kissinger and the State Department tried much harder to create a foreign policy consensus behind détente and realism than previously understood. Despite these efforts, Kissinger's message was lost on the public. The article provides the first extended analysis of a series of fact-finding “town meetings” held by the State Department in five locations across the United States—meetings that revealed how badly Kissinger had failed. By February 1976, all those involved in U.S. foreign policymaking—Kissinger's opponents, his advisers, and the wider public—desired a greater role for moral values in foreign policy.
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Rolfe, Mark. "Rhetorical Traditions of Public Diplomacy and the Internet." Hague Journal of Diplomacy 9, no. 1 (2014): 76–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1871191x-12341266.
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Summary Many calls have been made since 2001 for a ‘new public diplomacy’ of the information age that utilizes the internet to reach public opinion. They have been especially forthcoming from the Obama administration, although they have been just as popular with the political classes in the United States and elsewhere. However, such recent calls form only the latest instalment of a rhetorical tradition of public diplomacy that stretches back to Woodrow Wilson and beyond to the 1790s. There is a thematic recurrence in the rhetoric of public diplomacy, as there is in the rhetoric of democracy, and for the same reason: representative democracy has always involved a complex tension between, on the one hand, the political class of politicians and diplomats and, on the other, public opinion, which needs to be appeased since it confers legitimacy on representatives. This results in a recurring pattern of language involving suspicions of the political class, declarations of a new era of diplomacy and claims to credibility. There are hence frequent bouts of anti-politics politics and anti-diplomacy politics, sometimes utilizing a discourse of technological optimism, which politicians and diplomats attempt to assuage with similar calls for new political dawns.
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Zvobgo, Kelebogile. "Human Rights versus National Interests: Shifting US Public Attitudes on the International Criminal Court." International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 4 (August 13, 2019): 1065–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz056.
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Abstract The United States—an architect of international criminal tribunals in the twentieth century—has since moderated its involvement in international justice. Striking to many observers is the United States’ failure to join the International Criminal Court—the institutional successor to the tribunals the nation helped install in Germany, Japan, the Balkans, and Rwanda. Interestingly, the US public’s support of the ICC increases yearly despite the government’s ambivalence about, and even hostility toward, the Court. Drawing on the US foreign policy public opinion literature, I theorize that human rights frames increase support for joining the ICC among Americans, whereas national interest frames decrease support. I administer an online survey experiment to evaluate these expectations and find consistent support. I additionally test hypotheses from the framing literature in American politics regarding the effect of exposure to two competing frames. I find that participants exposed to competing frames hold more moderate positions than participants exposed to a single frame but differ appreciably from the control group. Crucially, I find that participants’ beliefs about international organizations’ effectiveness and impartiality are equally, if not more, salient than the treatments. Thus, the ICC may be able to mobilize support and pressure policy change by demonstrating effectiveness and impartiality.
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Ellis, Chris. "Response to Justin Gest’s review of Putting Inequality in Context: Class, Public Opinion, and Representation in the United States." Perspectives on Politics 16, no. 4 (November 23, 2018): 1112–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s153759271800333x.
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Kaufman, Robert R., and Leo Zuckermann. "Attitudes toward Economic Reform in Mexico: The Role of Political Orientations." American Political Science Review 92, no. 2 (June 1998): 359–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585669.
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Since the debt crisis of 1982, Mexico has experienced more than a decade of market-oriented economic reform, but research on public opinion toward reform is limited. Drawing on general findings from opinion research in the United States, this study examines how policy preferences of Mexicans are shaped by social background, judgments about the economy, and political loyalties. The effect of these variables is examined across three national surveys, conducted in 1992, 1994, and 1995. We found that favorable orientations toward the president and the ruling party were consistently the strongest predictors of preferences about reform. Furthermore, as in the United States, sociotropic evaluations of the economy outweigh “pocketbook” concerns; despite many years of reform, both expectations and retrospective judgments are important in shaping preferences, particularly since the 1994 crisis; and social background variables have limited direct influence.
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Bush, Sarah Sunn, and Lauren Prather. "Foreign Meddling and Mass Attitudes Toward International Economic Engagement." International Organization 74, no. 3 (2020): 584–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818320000156.
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AbstractWhat explains variation in individual preferences for foreign economic engagement? Although a large and growing literature addresses that question, little research examines how partner countries affect public opinion on policies such as trade, foreign aid, and investment. We construct a new theory arguing that political side-taking by outside powers shapes individuals’ support for engaging economically with those countries. We test the theory using original surveys in the United States and Tunisia. In both cases, the potential partner country's side-taking in the partisan politics of the respondents’ country dramatically shapes support for foreign economic relations. As the rise of new aid donors, investors, and trade partners creates new choices in economic partners, our theory and findings are critical to understanding mass preferences about open economic engagement.
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Hicks, William D., Kevin J. Mullinix, and Robert J. Norris. "The Politics of Wrongful Conviction Legislation." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 21, no. 3 (March 22, 2021): 306–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/spq.2020.4.
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AbstractWrongful convictions are an increasing salient feature of criminal justice discourse in the United States. Many states have adopted reforms to mitigate the likelihood of wrongful convictions, discover errors, and provide redress in the wake of exonerations, yet we know little about why some are seemingly more committed to reducing such errors than others. We argue that public opinion is consequential for policy reform, but its effects are contingent on the electoral vulnerability of state lawmakers. We also suggest that advocacy organizations play a critical role in policy adoption. Incorporating data from all 50 states from 1989 to 2018, we investigate the adoption of five types of wrongful conviction reforms: (1) changes to eyewitness identification practices, (2) mandatory recording of interrogations, (3) the preservation of biological evidence, (4) access to postconviction DNA testing, and (5) exoneree compensation. Our results highlight a more nuanced view of how public opinion shapes policy.
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Dill, Janina, Scott D. Sagan, and Benjamin A. Valentino. "Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel." Security Studies 31, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 1–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2022.2038663.
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Kastellec, Jonathan P. "How Courts Structure State-Level Representation." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 18, no. 1 (January 23, 2018): 27–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532440017745522.
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I examine how courts condition the relationship between state-level public opinion and policy. The system of federalism in the United States allows federal and state courts to establish the types of policies that states are constitutionally allowed to implement. In particular, federal courts can set “federal floors” for policy, below which no states can go. State courts, in turn, can raise the level of this floor. Thus, both federal and state courts shape whether state policy can match the preferences of the median voter in a given state. Analyzing data on public opinion, judicial decisions, and state-level policy on the issue of abortion, from 1973 to 2012, I show that changes in the set of allowable abortion restrictions, according to the combined decisions of state and federal courts, significantly affect whether states implement majority-preferred policies. I also show that ignoring the influence of courts on the policymaking environment significantly affects the estimated level of policy congruence and thus conclusions about the scope of representation. These results demonstrate the importance of placing courts in the larger study of state-level representation.
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Martynov, Andrii. "Hryshchenko T. A. Zbigniew Brzezinski. International strategist in the coordinates of history. Kyiv-Nizhyn: Publisher Lysenko M. M., 2020. 341 p." American History & Politics: Scientific edition, no. 11 (2021): 89–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2521-1706.2021.11.8.
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The review dissects a monograph on the intellectual biography of Z. Brzezinski. The author of the monograph systematically and comparatively considered the conceptual and theoretical approaches of this American strategist against the backdrop of Cold War era and the unipolar world after the victory of the United States over the USSR. Z. Brzezinski was a great promoter and visionary of Ukraine, consistently advocated the rapprochement of the Ukrainian and Polish peoples in a united democratic Europe. In our opinion, an important place in the historiography of research on the influence of Z. Brzezinski on world history will be occupied by the study of Taras A. Hryshchenko. The author of the monograph advanced into methodological agenda seven groups of typologically different sources related to the stages of formation, development and public perception of international strategic concepts of Z. Brzezinski. Z. Brzezinski’s world outlooks and anti-communist guidelines were optimal for the development and implementation of a course in the field of US national security during the administration of President J. Carter. Particularly relevant to current international relations is the author’s rethinking the comparative aspect of the concepts of globalization and the role of the United States in this process, which belong to Z. Brzezinski and his colleagues S. Huntington and G. Kissinger. Z. Brzezinski’s strategic concepts best meet the needs of preserving the global leadership role of the United States in the complex and contradictory world of the 21st century. The conclusions of the monograph brief why the hereditary generation of intellectual successors of the tradition of analysis of international relations, founded by Z. Brzezinski, was not formed clearly enough. These reasons include the declining interest in American society in grand strategy, the excessive social impact of the information technology sector and entertainment manufacturers, and the tendency toward self-destructive hostility among the American political establishment.
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SHIRK, SUSAN L. "Changing Media, Changing Foreign Policy in China." Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 1 (March 14, 2007): 43–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109907002472.
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China has undergone a media revolution that has transformed the domestic context for making foreign policy as well as domestic policy. The commercialization of the mass media has changed the way leaders and publics interact in the process of making foreign policy. As they compete with one another, the new media naturally try to appeal to the tastes of their potential audiences. Editors make choices about which stories to cover based on their judgments about which ones will resonate best with audiences. In China today, that means a lot of stories about Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, the topics that are the objects of Chinese popular nationalism. The publicity given these topics makes them domestic political issues because they are potential focal points for elite dis-agreement and mass collective action, and thereby constrains the way China' leaders and diplomats deal with them. Even relatively minor events involving China' relations with Japan, Taiwan, or the United States become big news, and therefore relations with these three governments must be carefully handled by the politicians in the Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee. Because of the Internet, it is impossible for Party censors to screen out news from Japan, Taiwan or the United States that might upset the public. Common knowledge of such news forces officials to react to every slight, no matter how small. Foreign policy makers feel especially constrained by nationalist public opinion when it comes to its diplomacy with Japan. Media marketization and the Internet have helped make Japan China' most emotionally charged international relationship.
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Larson, Stephanie Greco. "A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial Societies By Pippa Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 398p. $59.95 cloth, $21.95 paper." American Political Science Review 96, no. 1 (March 2002): 244–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055402404339.
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Scholars of media and public opinion in Western Europe and the United States will find plenty of useful information and much to argue about in A Virtuous Circle. The data are rich and broad, and the conclusions drawn are provocative and relevant to some of the major debates in the field. The central question addressed is whether the news media discourages political engagement.
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Nolan, Cathal J. "Detachment from despotism: US responses to tsarism, 1776–1865." Review of International Studies 19, no. 4 (October 1993): 349–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026021050011825x.
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The implosion of the Soviet idea over the course of 1989 to 1991, culminating in the collapse of the Soviet Union itself, promises to reshape the region along lines of historic ethnic, and even religious division. That development requires those interested in American-Russian relations to take a more historical approach to analysis than might have been the case hitherto. The past is, of course, not necessarily a guide to events in the present or future. None the less, current debates about how deeply the United States should be involved in Russian affairs should benefit from better familiarity with the historical record, in particular of that period before the relationship between the two countries suffered from mutual ideological and geopolitical animus. It is sometimes forgotten, or else too briefly remembered, that relations between the United States and Russia extend back to the dawn of an independent American diplomacy. Similarly, it is not always recalled that for much of the nineteenth century, especially prior to the Civil War, those relations were relatively amicable, although also distant and detached. An overview of the period may therefore be useful today, for the degree to which the United States can afford o t detach itself from Russia is again of main concern. A related area of interest and debate is the role of public opinion in possibly forcing confrontation on issues where national elites might prefer to maintain cordial relations. This essay seeks to cast light on these areas of current interest, by focusing on the interplay between public enthusiasms in the United States for diplomatic intervention in Russia, and official political calculations in American diplomacy prior to 1865. It argues that the resulting policy had mostly to do with a detachment from Russian despotism, born of the physical isolation of the United States, its lack of truly significant contacts with Russia, but also its own deeply flawed republicanism.
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Chu, Jonathan A. "A Clash of Norms? How Reciprocity and International Humanitarian Law affect American Opinion on the Treatment of POWs." Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 5 (July 31, 2018): 1140–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002718789751.
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Reciprocity is one of the oldest principles of warfare, but humanitarian norms embedded in international humanitarian law (IHL) prohibit reciprocity over various wartime acts. When it comes to the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs), how do these conflicting norms shape public opinion? One perspective is that citizens who learn about IHL acquire an unconditional aversion to abusing POWs. Alternatively, people may understand IHL as a conditional commitment that instead strengthens their approval for reciprocal conduct. Survey experiments fielded in the United States support the latter view: people’s preferences depend on the enemy’s behavior, and this “reciprocity effect” is largest among those who believe that the United States is legally committed to treating POWs humanely. Puzzlingly, prior studies do not find a reciprocity effect, but this is due to their use of a no-information experimental control group, which led to a lack of control over the subjects’ assumptions about the survey.
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Leep, Matthew, and Jeremy Pressman. "Foreign cues and public views on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 21, no. 1 (November 21, 2018): 169–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1369148118809807.
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As foreign sources in the news might help the public assess their home country’s foreign policies, scholars have recently turned attention to the effects of foreign source cues on domestic public opinion. Using original survey experiments, we explore the effects of domestic (United States) and foreign (Israeli, British, and Palestinian) criticism of Israel’s military actions and settlements on US attitudes towards the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. We find that foreign cues by government officials and non-governmental organisations have modest effects, and are generally not more influential than domestic cues. We also show that individuals might discount foreign criticism of Israel in the context of US bipartisan support for Israel. While our experiments reveal some heterogeneous effects related to partisanship, we are sceptical of significant movement in opinion in response to foreign cues. These findings provide insights into foreign source cue effects beyond the context of the use of military force.
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Min, Jeonghun, and Paul-Henri Gurian. "Do campaigns matter outside the United States? Equilibrium and enlightenment in Korean presidential elections." International Political Science Review 38, no. 1 (July 7, 2016): 21–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512115598566.
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Do presidential campaigns matter outside the United States? We examine how public opinion responds to campaign events during Korean presidential campaigns. The fundamental variables of the election year influence vote intention before the campaign begins and substantially influence eventual vote choice. Campaign events assist voters to learn more about the fundamental variables – regionalism, party identification, and retrospective evaluations of the incumbent administration – and this leads to more informed intentions during the campaign. The results suggest that there is substantial congruence in the explanatory power of Holbrook’s ‘equilibrium’ theory and Gelman and King’s ‘enlightenment’ theory in presidential campaigns held in the US and in Korea.
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Gil Guerrero, Javier. "Propaganda Broadcasts and Cold War Politics: The Carter Administration's Outreach to Islam." Journal of Cold War Studies 19, no. 1 (January 2017): 4–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00716.
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After the Islamic revolution in Iran in early 1979 and the hostage crisis that began at the U.S. embassy in Tehran later that year, the Carter administration launched a public diplomacy campaign specifically directed at Muslims, the first of its kind. The idea was to counter the narrative of a Western crusade against Islam while highlighting the differences between the United States and militant Islam. In time, the damage control effort was transformed into an attempt to rally Muslims—both outside and inside the Soviet Union—against Soviet Communism. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created an opportunity for the United States to bolster its standing in the Islamic world. Influencing Muslim opinion was no longer just a matter of delegitimizing the discourse of radical Islam, but also one of using the growth of religious sentiment among Muslims against the Soviet Union. The initiative's spearhead was the increased multilingual radio broadcasts directed at Muslim audiences across the globe.
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Burdzhalov, F. "How the Law on Health Care Reform Was Being Adopted in USA." World Economy and International Relations, no. 1 (2011): 35–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2011-1-35-47.
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The article develops the theme of American health care reform (the beginning see in: F. Burzhalov, Health Care Reform in the United States (Socio-Economic Aspects). “MEMO Journal”, 2010, no. 10). The author examines institutional and procedural aspects of the adoption of the law on health care, in particular how its ideas and main points were formed and promoted, what difficulties the government encountered in doing so, what effort were undertaken to convince public opinion in the need to support the reform, etc.
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Jović, Dejan. "Accession to the European Union and Perception of External Actors in the Western Balkans." Croatian International Relations Review 24, no. 83 (October 1, 2018): 6–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/cirr-2018-0012.
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Abstract This paper focuses on perceptions of the European Union (EU) and external actors (such as the United States, Russia, and Turkey) in six countries of the Western Balkans (WB) and Croatia in a comparative perspective. We present data generated by public opinion polls and surveys in all countries of that region in order to illustrate growing trends of EU indifferentism in all predominately Slavic countries of the region. In addition, there is an open rejection of pro-EU policies by significant segments of public opinion in Serbia and in the Republic of Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the contrary, there is much enthusiasm and support for the West in general and the EU in particular in predominately non-Slavic countries, Kosovo and Albania. We argue that the WB as a region defined by alleged desire of all countries to join the the EU is more of an elite concept than that shared by the general population, which remains divided over the issue of EU membership. In explaining reasons for such a gap we emphasise a role of interpretation of the recent past, especially when it comes to a role the West played in the region during the 1990s.
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Muir-Harmony, Teasel. "The Limits of U.S. Science Diplomacy in the Space Age." Pacific Historical Review 88, no. 4 (2019): 590–618. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/phr.2019.88.4.590.
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A moon rock, resting on a pedestal in the American Pavilion at the 1970 Osaka World Exposition, became the latest trophy for the United States in its fierce space race with the Soviet Union. The exhibit was part of a broader approach to U.S. diplomacy in this period, where science and technology, or in this case a scientific specimen, were deployed to spread Western democratic values, win over international public opinion, and counter anti-American sentiment. But the moon rock’s physical resemblance to earth rocks prompted a broader discussion among Japanese audiences at the Expo about the aims of U.S. scientific and technological progress, and the practicality and applicability of American cultural norms to Japanese visions of modernity. By considering what happens when a scientific specimen travels outside of the laboratory context, outside the world of scientists, and into the world of foreign relations, this article investigates the complicated dynamics of science, material culture, and power during this critical juncture in the United States’ engagement with Japan.