Academic literature on the topic 'International Politics and Economics'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'International Politics and Economics.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Journal articles on the topic "International Politics and Economics"
Conroy, F. Hilary, Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugh Dobson. "Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security." Pacific Affairs 75, no. 3 (2002): 454. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4127307.
Full textRedmon, Alonzo. "The Politics Of Economics." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 11, no. 4 (September 13, 2011): 39. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v11i4.5844.
Full textIng, Stanley. "Review: International Economics: Nuclear Exports and World Politics." International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 41, no. 1 (March 1986): 257–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002070208604100114.
Full textReich, Michael R. "Essential drugs: economics and politics in international health." Health Policy 8, no. 1 (August 1987): 39–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0168-8510(87)90129-1.
Full textCoyne, Christopher J. "INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND CONFUSING POLITICS - by David Robertson." Economic Affairs 27, no. 4 (December 6, 2007): 93–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2007.00792_9.x.
Full textJensen, James T. "Politics, economics affecting international transportation systems for gas." Natural Gas 15, no. 7 (January 9, 2007): 7–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/gas.3410150703.
Full textAsma Rashid and Anjum Ghouri. "International Liberal Order: Competing Trends and Narratives." Strategic Studies 41, no. 2 (August 10, 2021): 16–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.53532/ss.041.02.0052.
Full textFitzé, E. "INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE “ALEXANDER CHAYANOV: DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICS, SCIENCE AND ART”." Russian Peasant Studies 6, no. 3 (2021): 191–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/2500-1809-2021-6-3-191-195.
Full textMityakov, Sergey, Heiwai Tang, and Kevin K. Tsui. "International Politics and Import Diversification." Journal of Law and Economics 56, no. 4 (November 2013): 1091–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/674132.
Full textDe Mesquita, Bruce Bueno. "Negotiation in International Politics." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21, no. 3 (July 2004): 155–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07388940490487234.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "International Politics and Economics"
Lu, Tailai. "International Debt Crisis: Interaction of Economics and Politics." Thesis, North Texas State University, 1987. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc935791/.
Full textO'Trakoun, John. "Essays on Conflict, Corruption, and International Trade Politics." Thesis, Boston College, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104393.
Full textThis dissertation is a collection of three essays which examine issues at the intersection of international economics, political economy, and macroeconomics. A common theme which emerges in the subsequent chapters is a reliance on intuitive models of economies populated by rational agents engaging in both political and economic decisionmaking. Each chapter also presents empirical evidence using aggregate data to highlight new angles on issues related to macroeconomic development policy. Concurrent cross-country political change, such as the recent ``Arab spring" revolutions in the Middle East, the experience of South American military dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s, and political transition in former Soviet-bloc countries at the end of the Cold War, suggests that global forces impacting multiple countries can serve as a trigger for intrastate conflict. A common conjecture is that economic forces have been a primary impetus for such episodes. In the first chapter, I analyze the effects of worldwide commodity price fluctuations in generating political conflict in developing countries. I develop a simple model to show that shocks to both the level and uncertainty of commodity export prices can elicit conflict events in developing countries. Econometric evidence from a dataset combining major intrastate political resistance campaigns and global food commodity price data lends support to this hypothesis. In the second chapter, I examine whether corruption within one country affected by corruption within another. Understanding the interactions between political-economic culture across countries can allow us to better grasp the implications of greater global and regional integration in recent history. Until now, few studies have examined this question in detail due to the difficulty of measuring corruption and paucity of consistent data over an adequate time span. I use a panel dataset of countries in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East over a span of fifteen years to examine how domestic corruption reacts to the culture of corruption in the region in which the country is located. Contrary to the results of past literature, I find evidence that a reduction in regional corruption can actually lead to a worsening of corruption within a country, and vice versa. If in an open economy, regional graft lowers the level of income that a rent-seeking government can tax, a reduction in regional corruption can increase the marginal benefit of imposing a more extractive domestic policy by increasing the pool of exploitable funds. My results offer an economic reason for why corruption will be an enduring institution in a more interconnected world. Finally, are less democratic governments more apt to intervene in the prices of imported goods than exported goods? In the third chapter of this dissertation I offer an explanation for why this might be the case, focusing on a government's choice between two alternative interventionist trade policies: import tariffs and export subsidies. If governments have incentives to exploit their political power to extract rents from citizens, they can achieve this by taxing imports rather than subsidizing exports. However, if citizens are able to discipline their governments through elections, the extent of this rent-seeking behavior can be constrained. I present a model that captures this behavior, distinguishing between the level of electoral accountability of a government and the level of bargaining power that citizens have in negotiations. Preliminary empirical evidence is presented which suggests that more authoritarian countries spend greater amounts on import tariffs than on export subsidies. These findings give insight into some of the challenges in establishing free trade amongst countries with different attitudes toward democratic institutions, both on a bilateral basis and within multilateral organizations
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics
Zhu, Lin. "Law, politics and finance." Thesis, University of Macau, 2012. http://umaclib3.umac.mo/record=b2580077.
Full textPal, Deep. "India-China Relationship Since 1988 -- Ensuring Economics trumps Politics." Thesis, The George Washington University, 2015. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=1586663.
Full textThe Sino-Indian relationship marked by mutual mistrust for the last six decades has seen definitive changes since the late 1980s. Though considerable issues remain unresolved, the two have begun establishing mechanisms to establish a certain level of trust that began with the visit of Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988. The paper analyzes recent literature on this relationship and finds them predicting two outcomes primarily - either one where India admits Chinese supremacy and kowtows to it, or one that foresees increased clashes between the two. Neither outcome takes into account the complex association that the two nations are building guided by a series of frameworks, mechanisms and agreements. This paper posits that in the evolutionary arc of interstate relations, Sino-Indian relations have not reached a point where only one of the two options - cooperation and competition, will be chosen. This paper argues that economic interests of the two rising powers is behind the present behavior where the two are courting each other but at the same time, preparing for the other's rise. Both countries consider their economic identity to be primary and do not want to be distracted from the key national goal of economic development. They are particularly careful that their disagreements with each other do not come in the way of this goal. The paper analyzes the various frameworks and suggests that they are created with this end in consideration. Both India and China aim to continue collaboration in economic matters bilaterally or in international issues of mutual interest even when they don't see eye to eye on disputes left over from history. It is likely that competition will at times get the better of cooperation, driven by factors like strategic influence in the neighborhood, finding newer providers of energy as well as markets for their goods and services. But periodic flare-ups notwithstanding, in the absence of serious provocations, the two countries will avoid clashes that can escalate. The paper also analyzes certain black-swan events that might disturb the balancing act. Incidents like the death of the Dalai Lama creating a vacuum within the Tibetan leadership is one such scenario; a terrorist attack on India planned and executed form Pakistan like the one in Mumbai in 2008 is another. However, the presence of multiple bilateral platforms will continue to automatically insulate alternate channels of communication even in these situations. In conclusion, the paper suggests that as they grow, India and China will continue to engage each other at several levels, competing and cooperation, deterring and reassuring each other at once.
Elgendy, Alaadin M. "The political economy of international organizations and the new world order: North-south relations from a southern perspective." CSUSB ScholarWorks, 1994. https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/904.
Full textCao, Xun. "Convergence, divergence, and networks in international political economy /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/10793.
Full textBist, Ambika. "The Politics and Economics of Outsourcing: Where did all the jobs go?" Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/530.
Full textEl, Mughrabi Marei A. "An exploration of the impact of international and domestic factors on economic reform programmes in Libya 1987-2004." Thesis, Northumbria University, 2005. http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/1937/.
Full textBlemings, Travis I. "The Politics of Development Aid: Understanding the Lending Practices of the World Bank Group." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2017. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/454225.
Full textPh.D.
This study examines variations in the lending strategies of the four main agencies of the World Bank. Countries with similar basic development and demographic attributes often receive very different amounts of financial support from the different agencies of the World Bank. Utilizing regression analysis of panel-data covering the years between 1990 through 2011, the study finds that variation in the allocation of development aid both within and between the different World Bank agencies (IBRD, IDA, IFC, and MIGA) do not generally reflect patterns in objective indicators of economic need or institutional quality among recipients. Rather, statistical analysis shows that World Bank aid is positively correlated with several measures of donor influence. Utilizing a multi-donor model of political influence, the study finds evidence that the Bank’s top donors, countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan disproportionately influence the Bank to lend in ways that support their foreign policy interests. Countries with close economic, political, and geostrategic ties to powerful donors tend to receive more aid on average than their less well-connected peers. The data show that the Bank often lends in ways that contradict its own lending criteria. Despite the Bank’s explicit emphasis on economic need and institutional quality, the agencies of the World Bank often provide greater amounts of assistance to those with less need and poor quality governance. The study has implications for the study of international organizations, institutional design, and how donor influence at the World Bank is mediated by variations in internal agency structures.
Temple University--Theses
Woo, Byungwon. "The Strategic Politics of IMF Conditionality." The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1275420293.
Full textBooks on the topic "International Politics and Economics"
International economics and confusing politics. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2006.
Find full textH, Mutti John, ed. International economics. 5th ed. London: Routledge, 2000.
Find full textInternational Economics. London: Taylor & Francis Inc, 2002.
Find full textC, Ingram James, ed. International economics. 4th ed. New York: Wiley, 1996.
Find full textDunn, Robert M. International economics. 6th ed. London: Routledge, 2004.
Find full textHusted, Steven L. International economics. 3rd ed. New York, NY: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994.
Find full text1948-, Melvin Michael, ed. International economics. 2nd ed. New York, NY: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1993.
Find full textHusted, Steven L. International economics. 8th ed. Boston: Pearson Addison Wesley, 2010.
Find full textHusted, Steven L. International economics. 3rd ed. New York, NY: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995.
Find full textHusted, Steven L. International economics. New York: Harper & Row, 1990.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "International Politics and Economics"
Frieden, Jeffry A., and David A. Lake. "International Politics and International Economics." In International Political Economy, 25–33. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24443-0_3.
Full textLong, William J. "Buddha on Politics, Economics, and Statecraft." In A Buddhist Approach to International Relations, 35–50. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68042-8_3.
Full textArrow, Kenneth J. "International Peace-Keeping Forces: Economics and Politics." In The Economics of International Security, 81–86. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23695-4_9.
Full textSödersten, Bo, and Geoffrey Reed. "The Political Economy of Protection." In International Economics, 303–21. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15030-4_15.
Full textSödersten, Bo, and Geoffrey Reed. "The Political Economy of Protection." In International Economics, 303–21. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23320-5_15.
Full textKiesow Cortez, Florian. "Enforcing International Deals: The System of International Organizations from a Politics-as-Exchange Perspective." In International Law and Economics, 97–122. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85194-1_5.
Full textTyler, Colin. "Rethinking the International Economic Architecture." In Common Good Politics, 205–32. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32404-3_7.
Full textHeater, Derek, and G. R. Berridge. "Economic Power." In Introduction to International Politics, 75–88. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14901-8_6.
Full textPezoa, Álvaro E. "Virtue Ethics and Political Ethics: The Relationship Between Politics, Ethics, and Economics." In International Handbooks in Business Ethics, 1331–41. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6510-8_105.
Full textKugler, Tadeusz. "Demography and International Relations: Economics, Politics, Sociology, and Conflict." In Advancing Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Relations, 229–61. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40823-1_8.
Full textConference papers on the topic "International Politics and Economics"
Grégoire, Jean-Claude. "Economics and politics." In 2016 International Congress of Entomology. Entomological Society of America, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1603/ice.2016.90880.
Full text"Research on the Fusion Development Trend of International Trade Theory and International Direct Investment Theory." In 2018 International Conference on Economics, Politics and Business Management. Francis Academic Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.25236/icepbm.2018.05.
Full text"Measuring Social Media and Advertising Effects on Brand Image of Tishk International University." In International Conference on Accounting, Business, Economics and Politics. Ishik University, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.23918/icabep2019p52.
Full textHaydaroğlu, Ceyhun. "Political Economy of Russia’s Voting Power on Eurasian Countries." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c04.00635.
Full text"Motivation, Adjustment and Retention of Academic Expatriates: The Case Study of Tishk International University." In International Conference on Accounting, Business, Economics and Politics. Ishik University, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.23918/icabep2019p4.
Full text"Study on the Environmental Barriers in International Trade." In 2018 International Conference on Economics, Politics and Business Management. Francis Academic Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.25236/icepbm.2018.82.
Full text"The Quest for Peace: A Thematic Analysis of The International Architecture for Preventing Violent Political Conflicts." In International Conference on Accounting, Business, Economics and Politics. Ishik University, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.23918/icabep2019p29.
Full textGrahovac, Dijana, and Senad Softić. "DEVELOPMENT OF CEFTA 2006 – MINI SCHENGEN -ECONOMICS VERSUS POLITICS." In Sixth International Scientific-Business Conference LIMEN Leadership, Innovation, Management and Economics: Integrated Politics of Research. Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans, Belgrade, Serbia, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.31410/limen.2020.113.
Full textKurtoğlu, Ramazan. "Economy and National Security." In International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c04.00644.
Full text"Discussion on the Popularization and Application of the Standardization of International Trade Documents." In 2018 International Conference on Economics, Politics and Business Management. Francis Academic Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.25236/icepbm.2018.65.
Full textReports on the topic "International Politics and Economics"
Lunsgaarde, Erik, Kevin Adams, Kendra Dupuy, Adis Dzebo, Mikkel Funder, Adam Fejerskov, Zoha Shawoo, and Jakob Skovgaard. The politics of climate finance coordination. Stockholm Environment Institute, October 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.51414/sei2021.022.
Full textWalsh, Alex. The Contentious Politics of Tunisia’s Natural Resource Management and the Prospects of the Renewable Energy Transition. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), February 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/k4d.2021.048.
Full textMigliori, Albert. Renewable Energy: science, politics, and economics. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), March 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1122038.
Full textBlank, Stephen J. Politics and Economics in Putins Russia. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, December 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada590426.
Full textMillner, Antony, and Geoffrey Heal. Resolving Intertemporal Conflicts: Economics vs Politics. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w20705.
Full textDoepke, Matthias, Michèle Tertilt, and Alessandra Voena. The Economics and Politics of Women's Rights. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17672.
Full textAcemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson. Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18921.
Full textAuer, Raphael, Barthélémy Bonadio, and Andrei Levchenko. The Economics and Politics of Revoking NAFTA. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25379.
Full textMankiw, N. Gregory, and Phillip Swagel. The Politics and Economics of Offshore Outsourcing. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12398.
Full textCaselli, Francesco, and Nicola Gennaioli. Economics and Politics of Alternative Institutional Reforms. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12833.
Full text