Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Interbank markets'

This dissertation comprises three chapters on banking system liquidity. The first chapter models various policies for injecting liquidity into banks during a cri-sis. Liquidity injections through secured lending, relative to unsecured lending or bank-debt guarantees, can better disincentivise liquidity risk taking while also mitigating ex-post capital losses, in part by limiting fire selling of securities. Asset purchases cannot credibly disincentivise liquidity risk taking. The second chapter uses Australian loan-level data to compare secured and unsecured interbank lend-ing markets during the crisis. We find that the secured (i.e. repo) market expands to absorb heightened liquidity demand, and risky borrowers substitute into the repo market if they hold sufficient collateral. Scarcity of the highest-quality collateral pushes the repo market expansion into the next-best collateral, but risky borrowers are less capable of accessing this market. The third chapter presents and analyses an algorithm for extracting loan-level repo data from securities transactions data, to facilitate further research on repo markets<br>Esta disertación comprende de tres capítulos sobre la liquidez del sistema ban-cario. El primer capítulo trata modelos analíticos que exploran políticas para aumentar liquidez durante una crisis financiera. Las políticas que aumentan liquidez por medio de préstamos garantizados con aval pueden reducir la toma de riesgos de liquidez, mientras también sirven para reducir perdidas tras la crisis al reducir liquidaciones. Esto contrasta con las políticas de créditos no garantizados y las garantías de deudas bancarias. Las compras directas de activos no desincentivan de manera creíble la toma de riesgos. El segundo capítulo es empíırico, y explora la experiencia de Australia durante la crisis financiera de 2007-08. Utilizando microdatos sobre préstamos interbancarios garantizados y no garantizados durante la crisis, encontramos que el mercado asegurado (es decir, de recompra) se expandió para absorber la demanda de liquidez, y que inclusive los prestatarios riesgosos pudieron acceder a ese mercado al tener suficiente garantía. La escasez de garantías de la mayor calidad causo la expansión en un mercado de recompra de menor calidad, pero los prestatarios riesgosos fueron menos capaces de accederlo. El tercer capítulo presenta y analiza un algoritmo para extraer datos de préstamos individuales (de recompra) a partir de datos de transacciones de titulas de deuda, para facilitar la investigación de los mercados de préstamos garantizados.

Risk assessment on interbank networks has drawn attention from researchers since the 2007 Subprime mortgage crisis. The lack of data for interbank transactions, which are usually not disclosed unless required by regulatory bodies, is one of the most critical difficulties to this research. A remedy to this issue is the dense reconstruction of interbank networks by using balance sheet data. The Maximum-Entropy estimation has been adopted by literature, however, this method produces networks with unrealistic properties: too dense in terms of having too many links. One alternative is sparse reconstruction that proposed by literature recently. This thesis applies the Message-Passing algorithm, which is extensively applied in Thermodynamics or Computer Science, and is suggested by Mastromatteo et al. [2012] for application in network reconstruction. Dense networks and sparse networks are reconstructed from Statistics on Depository Institutions data provided by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and are compared by performance in both network properties and contagion simulations. The popular contagion mechanisms proposed by Furfine [2003] and the model of liquidity dry-up contagion proposed by Malherbe [2014] are adopted and compared in contagion simulations. Results show that dense networks and sparse networks perform differently in network properties and in contagions triggered by single-bank failures, while for contagions triggered by multiple-bank failures, both types of networks perform similarly. Furfine’s mechanism fail to predict some bank failures via the credit risk contagion on liquidity side, while these failures can be simulated by the liquidity dry-up model via fire-sale and marking-to-market effect. Both mechanisms overestimate the losses before the crisis, yet this signals the instability of the banking system, while the liquidity dry-up model proposes an explanation for why the banking system did not fail before the crisis, regarding to whether the equilibrium of high liquidity will shift to the self-fulfilling liquidity dry-up equilibrium. Implications on regulation are given.

This thesis consists of three essays, with each comprised of an empirical analysis of microstructural issues in over-the-counter interbank markets. It uses a confidential transaction-level database from the Australian fixed-income market that is comprehensive in scope, covering virtually all cash trades and repurchase agreements across multiple asset classes over an extended 7.5-year period. To exploit this wide scope, the essays are framed to investigate issues that have both a strong policy import (given the prominence of over-the-counter and collateral markets during the Global Financial Crisis) and the potential to remedy a gap in the academic literature (given they have been largely ignored by prior researchers due to data limitations). The first paper addresses the question of whether bank relationships affect asset prices. Using simple intuition, it conjectures that traders have a natural incentive to circumvent search frictions by entering bilateral relationships (in contrast to random matching in current theoretical approaches); to compensate for this immediacy, however, an initiating relationship trader sacrifices a higher execution cost relative to search-based trades. By focusing on cash trades across several safe and homogenous asset classes, the paper then tests this hypothesis in a setting that isolates countervailing information frictions. The results, which include extensive robustness checks across normal and crisis periods, provide strong support to the central hypothesis. The second paper addresses the question of whether global banks react to shocks in their home countries by adjusting their bond inventories in geographically-distant markets. Using a difference-in-differences methodology with fixed effects, it examines the relationship between daily U.S. interbank funding shocks and the Australian fixed-income holdings of exposed foreign branches. In line with expectations, the analysis shows that global banks reduce their Australian bond holdings after increases in their U.S. interbank funding costs. Moreover, the variability in the results is consistent with fire-sale theory (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992): the effect is present across asset classes, stronger during the crisis when most global banks were highly capital-constrained and stronger for higher value bonds with a lower fire-sale cost. A supplementary analysis then finds some evidence that these holdings adjustments negatively affected market outcomes, including prices and liquidity. The third paper addresses the question of whether the novel phenomenon of collateral reuse (commonly referred to as rehypothecation) acts as a direct funding mechanism for intermediating banks in repo markets. In addition to one of the first exploratory analyses of this phenomenon, the paper tests a new theoretical literature that models how dealers set haircut margins between source repos and secondary reuse repos backed by the same collateral. The analysis surprisingly finds that haircut spreads are negative, suggesting that on average dealers incur a net loss between the two initial repo legs. Nonetheless, the regression analysis finds that the determinants of haircut spreads are more intuitive and consistent with theoretical predictions; for instance, haircut spreads are negatively related to the delayed income obtained from interest rate spreads, and positively related (albeit weak evidence) to the dealer’s funding costs. Both individually and as a whole, these studies add to our current understanding of over-the-counter markets in ways that are of interest to academics and regulators alike. The first paper introduces and presents evidence consistent with an alternative conception of trading that synthesises the ubiquitous notion of search costs with the empirical dominance of bilateral relationships; it broadly underscores the importance of considering both these intertwined factors for a proper understanding of the dynamics of price formation and liquidity in such markets. The second paper extends the shock transmission literature from loan markets – which it is currently largely constrained to – to a fundamentally different, secondary-asset-market setting; such research is intrinsically connected to the issue of systemic risk, which is at the fore of current global banking regulation movements. And finally, the third paper presents one of the first empirical analyses on rehypothecation, a novel and widely-unknown practice that has the potential for far-reaching implications given increasing collateralisation of both financial and non-financial transactions worldwide; it also provides the first test of theoretical models that conjecture its use as a direct funding mechanism.

The 2007-2008 global financial turmoil is the most severe crisis since the Great Depression. Starting with the sub-prime defaults in the United States, it quickly spills over into other markets leading to the collapses of many financial institutions, worldwide banks bailouts, downturns in asset prices and also to sovereign debt crises. The aim of this thesis is to empirically investigate the repercussions of this financial crisis on interbank market and sovereign risk. In Chapter one, we empirically explore the effect of bank lending relationships in the interbank market. We use data from the e-MID market that represents the only transparent electronic platform in Europe and the United States, unaffected by search costs and other actions. We show that stable relationships exist and that they play a significant role during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Trading with preferred counterparts is associated with more favorable rates for both lenders and borrowers, and carries larger trading volumes. The results point to a peer monitoring role of relationship lending, which contributes, at a time of financial distress, to a smooth liquidity redistribution among banks. Relationship lending thus plays an important positive role for financial stability. Chapter two investigates the role of banks' network centrality in the interbank market on their funding rates. Specifically we analyze transaction data from the e-MID market, over the 2006-2009 period, which encompasses the global financial crisis. We show that interbank spreads are significantly affected by both local and global measures of connectedness. The effects of network centrality increased as the financial crisis evolved. Local measures show that having more links increases borrowing costs for borrowers and reduces premia for lenders. For global network centrality, borrowers receive a significant discount if they increase their intermediation activity and become more central, while lenders pay in general a premium (i.e. receive lower rates) for centrality. This provides evidence of the `too-interconnected-to-fail' hypothesis. Chapter three draws attention to the effect of monetary policies and international linkages on European countries sovereign risks. Using a Global VAR method that allows for interdependencies across individual variables within and across units, we model government bond credit default swaps (CDS) relative to Germany by domestic, global, monetary and weighted foreign variables, where weights are calculated based on the countries' fiscal positions. We find evidence of positive correlation between sovereign bond CDS and risk aversion for almost all countries in the eurozone. When the European Central Bank (ECB) increases the refinancing rate, we observe an increase in risk of sovereign bonds of all countries due to negative environment in Euro area. A decline in money aggregate (M3) leads to all countries becoming more fragile, hence increasing sovereign risk. The shocks that stem from monetary policy changes (i.e. an increase in ECB refinancing rate) causes a rise in sovereign risk due to sensitivity to crisis and uncertainty in Euro area. In contrast, monetary policies have an opposite impact on Greece due to its relative worse performance.

As the events of the 2007 Crisis unfolded, it was clear that the failure or even rumors about the failure of one single institution could trigger freezes in numerous capital markets and widespread default in other financial institutions. How this was brought about, however, was everything but clear. Ten years later, as we stand today, the literature has progressed but many questions remain unresolved. The first question at hand is of course how banks were related and how these bilateral relationships were able to act as a passage of contagion. On the liability side, borrowing between banks provides liquidity insurance against their idiosyncratic shocks. In bad times however, insurance networks malfunctioned, and more centrally connected banks were able to monopolize on their market power to secure a larger surplus in the scramble for liquidity. My first paper further explores the relationship between network position and the ability to hoard liquidity. In addition, assets on bank balance comprise another important channel of contagion and one should ask to which extent cross holding of asset portfolios is optimal. When does the benefit from diversification over idiosyncratic risks dominate? And when does market risk increase systemic risk of common portfolio holdings? The second essay analyzes these questions from the perspectives of private and social welfare. In the end, one must also wonder how these networks were formed at the beginning and how the endogenous formation correlates with the structural implications. The third paper takes a step back and begins with a world where banks optimally choose links, prices and the amounts of trade. This endogenously determined network structure then serves as a coherent laboratory for understanding various frictions in the interbank market such as market freezes. Financial networks are complex and so is the research about them. Hence, in this thesis, I have attempted to shed light on them from various angles, utilizing both bilateral network data as well as theoretical analytical tools. It is my hope that taken together, this set of essays can contribute to a holistic understanding of interconnectedness in financial market.

The global crisis of 2007-2008 is the most severe crisis since the Great Depression in the financial markets. Starting with the subprime defaults in the United States, it quickly spills over into other markets leading to the collapses of many financial institutions, bail-outs of banks worldwide and downturns in asset prices. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the repercussions of this crisis on CDS and interbank market and provide empirical evidence on the changes in the pricing of CDS contracts and interbank deposits. Chapter 2 discusses the determinants of CDS spread changes on European contracts. The most remarkable finding of the study is that the relation between credit spreads and their determinants is regime dependant and depends on the sector of economic activity. Before the crisis the underlying credit risk in the overall CDS market is sufficient to explain credit risk. During the crisis investors have a differing view on the risk of financial and non--financial contracts Interestingly, non-financial CDS contracts reflect the credit risk of the counterparty, but financial contracts do not. This implies that governments are expected to bail out dealers to prevent systemic risk. Chapter 3 provides further insight into the European corporate CDS spreads and proposes an equilibrium model accommodating the occurrence of structural breaks in the long-run relationship between the variables. These breaks are endogenously determined within unit root specifications used to describe the dynamics of the explanatory factors. The findings highlight that crisis shocks are persistent and have the potential to change long-run equilibrium dynamics. The systematic credit risk factor is proxied by the European iTraxx index and the idiosyncratic factor by the stock price of reference entity. The model indicates that stock market leads price discovery process. Vector error correction model confirms the strong predictive ability of the iTraxx index and the error correcting vector for changes in the CDS spreads. Chapter 4 focuses on European interbank market and has two main contributions. First, it estimates the cross-sectional density of interbank funding rates using nonparametric kernel methods. Second, it analyzes the effect of banks size, the operating currency and banks' nationality on the cross-sectional distribution of these rates. The findings strongly support the statistical significance of these effects and highlight the importance of these factors as early warning indicators of financial distress. Prior to the crisis, the borrowing segment of the market exhibits distinctive features such as highly volatile and multimodal distributions suggesting the occurrence of distortions in the cross-section of funding rates. During crisis, large domestic banks operating in Euros enjoy the most favourable rates. Banks' nationality analysis further confirms that interbank market provided early warning signals of incoming sovereign crisis.

The recent debates in economics, following the 2008 crisis, have pointed out a necessity for micro-founded macroeconomic modelling approaches for policy analyses. Agent based models have been adopted to address two underlining aspects of a micro-founded macroeconomic approach. This dissertation as a whole is an effort at fulfilling this necessity. It is composed of a number of interrelated studies. Specific research questions are raised around the debates on monetary unions, housing markets and interbank networks. The overall objective in these works is to be able to address policy questions while employing sound and reusable stock-flow-consistent models. A common methodological practice is elicited at reaching this objective: delineating the design of a top-down policy experimentation set-up from the design of individual agent behaviors for a bottom up emergence first, and then coupling them back to reach a conceptual coherence between the policy issue and the assumptions on agents’ behavioral choices.<br>Los recientes debates en economía tras la crisis de 2008, han señalado la necesidad de utilizar modelos macroeconómicos micro fundados para el análisis de políticas. Se han utilizado modelos basados en agentes para abordar dos aspectos destacados dentro de los modelos macroeconómicos micro fundados. Esta tesis es un esfuerzo para satisfacer esta necesidad. Se compone de una serie de es tudios interrelacionados. En ella se plantean cuestiones específicas en torno a los debates sobre uniones monetarias, mercados de vivienda y redes interbancarias. El objetivo general de estos trabajos es poder abordar diferentes cuestiones de política económica, a la vez que se utilizan modelos sólidos y stock-flujo consistentes reutilizables. Se utiliza una misma metodología para lograr este objetivo: primero, delinear un entorno de experimentación de políticas de arriba hacia abajo a partir del diseño de comportamientos de agentes individuales para una emergencia ascendente, para luego unirlos de nuevo para alcanzar una coherencia conceptual entre la cuestión de política introducida y los supuestos sobre las elecciones de comportamiento de los agentes.

Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2018.<br>This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.<br>Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (pages 77-81).<br>Our goal is to understand the functioning of the interbank lending market in times of market stress. Working towards this goal, we conduct theoretical analysis and simulation to study the effects of network structure and shock scenarios on systemic risk in the market. We consider shocks of various sizes at both global and local scales. In terms of risk measures, we study relative systemic loss and the default rate, separating the latter quantity into fundamental default and contagion. Our simulations suggest that all systemic risk measures are similar on the well-studied directed Erdős-Rényi model and the more complex fitness model if we match the mean density and the mean edge weight of these two models. We show through both derivations and simulations that the network size has little effect on systemic risk when the network is sufficiently large. Moreover, as the mean degree grows, the different default rates considered all increase, while relative systemic loss decreases. Furthermore, simulations suggest that local shocks tend to cause more harm than global shocks of the same total size. We also derive upper and lower bounds on a bank's probability of default, only using its neighbors' information. For implementation, we build a method for real-time, automatic, interpretable assessment of financial systemic risk, which only requires temporal snapshots of observable data. Our algorithm takes in partial data, inferring a random graph model, and then generates empirical distributions for risk measures. The first part relies on inferring a fitness model that is compatible with observed information. For the second part, we use simulations to obtain empirical distributions for systemic risk that arises from interbank clearing. We test our method on synthetic data and apply it to the federal funds market using empirical data. Our method is fast enough to be incorporated into algorithms that produce intraday time trajectories of risk prediction. The data requirement is practical for investors as well as regulators, policy-makers, and financial institutions.<br>by Xianglin Meng.<br>S.M.

Cette thèse étudie les conditions d’accès des banques européennes au financement interbancaire non sécurisé entre 2006 et 2012. Elle contient trois essais empiriques explorant des micro-données relatives aux transactions interbancaires. La première étude empirique adopte une approche en termes de paires banque prêteuse/banque emprunteuse et montre que, une fois le risque de contrepartie et les imperfections de marché contrôlées, les banques ayant un risque de liquidité plus élevé paient une prime de taux d’intérêt. Nous montrons également que cette prime est augmentée par les banques disposant d’excès de liquidités, sans doute motivées par la thésaurisation ou des stratégies de “short-squeezing” des banques en besoin de liquidité. Cette étude souligne finalement l’imperfection du marché interbancaire et l’importance des diverses interventions de la BCE qui ont cherché à réduire le risque de liquidité des banques au cours de la crise. La seconde étude, par le biais d’un model 2P-FRM, explore empiriquement l’impact des relations de clientèle entre banques sur la structure de maturité de la dette interbancaire. Les résultats dévoilent que l’accès aux prêts interbancaires longs et non sécurisés est facilité par les relations durables avant et durant les périodes de stress. Cependant, lors des moments aigus de la crise suivant la chute de la banque Lehman, ces effets positifs des variables bilatérales de relations fortes, calculées comme la concentration des actifs sur une banque emprunteuse, ne sont pas là. La deuxième partie de notre modèle montre que la part en volume des crédits à terme est plus faible pour les couples de banques partenaires. Finalement, notre variable unilatérale de relation interbancaire, qui mesure la concentration du réseau d’emprunt de la banque prêteuse, s’avère impacter négativement les prêts à terme post-Lehman. Cela confirme l’hypothèse que le propre risque de refinancement court du prêteur peut être l’origine du gel post-Lehman des prêts interbancaires à terme. Finalement, le troisième essai explore le lien entre la segmentation du marché interbancaire et le noeud de corrélation des risques souverains/bancaires. En utilisant les changements des primes des CDS souverains et bancaires, nous proposons une mesure originale de corrélation partielle des spillovers souverains-banques, qui permet d’attribuer une direction pays-banques à la contagion. Les résultats montrent que ces spillovers accentuent la segmentation du marché monétaire Italien lors de la phase critique de la crise des dettes souveraines. De plus, l’étude montre que, même si l’impact pays d’origine/banques est important, la contagion venant d’autres souverains en crise est loin d’être négligeable<br>This thesis studies European banks’ terms to access to unsecured interbank funding during the period 2006 to 2012. It contains three empirical essays exploring micro-data on interbank transactions. The first empirical study adopts a bank pair panel approach evidencing that, once counterparty risk and other market imperfections are controlled for, banks with higher funding liquidity risk (liquidity-short banks) pay an interest rate premium. The bank pair level analysis also permits to show that this premium is charged by liquidity-long banks, probably motivated by strategic short-squeezing or prudential hoarding purposes during the crisis. This study emphasizes the imperfection of interbank markets and the importance of theECB’s emergency interventions dedicated to dampening banks’ funding risk concerns. The second essay explores empirically the impact of relationship lending on the interbank debt maturity structure of banks by mean of a two-part fractional response model. The findings show that durable bilateral liquidity partnerships can positively impact the probability of contracting term loans before and during periods of acute stress. The positive effects of the bilateral relationship lending variable measured as asset-side concentration, is however, not straightforward, especially after the Lehman default. The second part of our model shows that the post-Lehman maturity shift is pronounced for partner banks. Finally, we find that our unilateral (lender level) relationship variable impacts negatively long term lending confirming the rollover risk viewpoint of the term interbank market freeze. Finally, the third essay investigates the link between interbank market segmentation and bank–sovereign risk nexus. Using bank and country CDS spread changes it suggests an original partial correlation based measurement of sovereign/bank spillovers providing us with a direction of contagion. Empirical findings from this part of the thesis evidence that bank-sovereign risk correlation is a significant source of fragmentation during the most acute phase of the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, the study shows that, even if home country/bank ties impact seriously interbank market integration, the risk from other distressed countries is far from negligible

Mestrado em Economia Monetária e Financeira<br>Interbank money markets play a fundamental role in financial systems, since they allow for the redistribution of liquidity between financial institutions. However, they can also be a channel through which problems in one institution can spread to the remaining ones. In particular, the potential for contagion stemming from interbank money markets is closely related with the pattern of interbank lending relationships. In this study, we characterize the Portuguese overnight interbank money market between 1999 and 2009 and analyze its inherent potential for contagion, based on bilateral interbank exposures obtained from the application of Furfine's procedure to settlement data from the Portuguese TARGET component. We conclude that: (i) the Portuguese overnight interbank money market is ruled out by a multiple money center structure, where some banks have, simultaneously, an important role as lenders as well as borrowers; (ii) although unlikely, the failure of one institution can have contagion effects, pushing-others into failure. However, even under the most extreme assumptions, institutions that fail by contagion represent less than 10 per cent of the total banking system assets. On the other hand, even if there are no defaults due to contagion, a foreign bank failure can have non-negligible knock-on effects under national banks. Yet, overnight interbank lending relationships do not generally represent a major threat to the stability of the Portuguese financial system.<br>O mercado monetário interbancário desempenha um papel fundamental no sistema financeiro, permitindo a redistribuição de liquidez entre as instituições financeiras. Porém, pode representar igualmente um canal para a propagação de problemas entre instituições. Em particular, o potencial de contágio existente no mercado interbancário está intimamente relacionado com a estrutura das relações estabelecidas através dos empréstimos interbancários. O presente estudo caracteriza o mercado monetário interbancário overnight português, entre 1999 e 2009, e analisa o potencial de contágio inerente ao mesmo, com base nas exposições interbancárias bilaterais obtidas através da aplicação do procedimento de Furfine aos dados sobre as transacções liquidadas na componente portuguesa do TARGET. É possível concluir que: (i) o mercado monetário interbancário overnight português assenta numa estrutura do tipo "multiple money center", sendo que alguns bancos desempenham um papel fundamental quer como financiadores, quer como mutuários; (ii) apesar de improvável, a falência de uma das instituições participantes no mercado pode ter efeitos de contágio, conduzindo à falência de outras instituições. No entanto, mesmo com pressupostos extremos, as instituições que poderiam falir por contágio representam menos de 10 por cento do activo total do sistema bancário. Por outro lado, mesmo não ocorrendo falências por contágio, a falência de um banco estrangeiro pode ter efeitos não negligenciáveis sobre os bancos nacionais. Não obstante, de uma forma geral, os empréstimos interbancários overnight não representam uma ameaça significativa à estabilidade do sistema financeiro português.

Questo lavoro analizza le peculiarità delle banche che partecipano al mercato interbancario, utilizzando dati semestrali ricavati dai bilanci di 539 banche dell’Area Euro tra la fine del 2005 e la fine del 2011. Mediante regressioni con dati panel si testa empiricamente il legame tra la posizione netta assunta nel mercato interbancario e caratteristiche specifiche alle banche, quali la dimensione, le scelte di investimento e di finanziamento, la rischiosità e il grado di liquidità. Spiegare il comportamento dei prestatori e dei prenditori di fondi nel mercato interbancario è utile per motivi sia di ricerca, sia di regolamentazione. I risultati mostrano che le banche net lender, a differenza di quelle net borrower, tendono ad essere più piccole, meno rischiose, finanziate dai depositi retail e meno liquide.

Compte-tenu du degré de complexité des interconnexions au sein du système financier mondial, mis en avant pendant la crise financière 2007-2009, l'adoption des modèles de réseaux, comme paradigme d'analyse et d'amélioration de la robustesse du système, paraît particulièrement pertinent, sinon nécessaire. Les institutions financières sont vues comme des nœuds d'un réseau où les transactions interbancaires constituent les liens au travers desquels la propagation des chocs se matérialise. En outre, la crise a également mis en évidence le rôle d'un rationnement de la liquidité comme canal majeur de transmission des chocs. Cette thèse examine les interactions entre les tensions sur le marché monétaire, la contagion interbancaire et la structure du réseau, avec une application au marché interbancaire européen et au système de paiement. La contribution de cette étude à la littérature sur les réseaux financiers s'articule autour de trois axes. Le premier est un modèle intégrant trois canaux de propagation des chocs, à l'œuvre durant la crise 2007-2009, à savoir les expositions à un facteur de risque commun, aux risques de contrepartie et, enfin, au risque de liquidité. Le deuxième axe est une application de ce modèle étudiant les expositions interbancaires dans le système financier européen entre 2008 et 2012, et ce, au niveau individuel des agents, i.e. de banque à banque; constituant ainsi, et à notre connaissance, l'unique contribution académique dans ce domaine. Cette étude souligne notamment le rôle de la structure du réseau dans la propagation des chocs et reproduit la fragmentation du marché européen observée en 2011-2012. Enfin, la troisième contribution porte sur la propension des banques à retarder leurs transactions sur la base des données du système de paiement TARGET2. Cette étude souligne une divergence des comportements des banques au niveau de leur gestion de la liquidité intra-journalière. En effet, deux types de comportements se distinguent à cet égard : le premier consiste à fixer un niveau de liquidité initiale suffisant pour répondre aux besoins de la journée et un second qui a tendance à gérer cette liquidité en flux tendus. Les banques adoptant ce deuxième type de comportement sont à l'origine de la majorité des retards de paiements constatés au niveau du système financier. L'ampleur des retards de paiement est par ailleurs fortement corrélée au niveau des tensions sur le marché, constituant de ce fait un indicateur avancé d'une éventuelle crise à venir.Le résumé substantiel n'a pas été fourni par l'auteur<br>Given the extent and importance of financial interconnectedness in recent years that were particularly underlined by the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the adoption of the network paradigm to analyze and improve robustness of a financial system appears to be fully relevant. Financial institutions are viewed as nodes of a network and their short- or long-term loans extended to each other as links or exposures through which a shock may propagate. Moreover, the same crisis accentuated the role of funding shortage as a channel of shock transmission. This dissertation focuses on the interplay of liquidity stress, interbank contagion and a network structure with application to the European interbank market and payment system. The contribution of this research to the literature on financial networks is threefold. The first develops a model that allows analyzing three contagion channels that happened to be at play during the financial crisis: exposures to a common risk factor; exposures to credit and counterparty risk in the interbank market; exposures to short-term liquidity risk. The second contribution is the unique analysis of cross-border contagion in the European banking system from 2008 to 2012 at the bank level using the developed model. Overall, the study finds the importance of the network structure for the extent of contagion propagation and captures the fragmentation of the market observed in 2011-2012. The third contribution consists of analysis of payment delays in the European payment system TARGET2. More specifically, this chapter provides evidence that banks differ in the way they manage their daily liquidity and can be split into two groups in this regard: those which put enough initial liquidity into the system, and those which economize on liquidity and rely on incoming payments to make outgoing transactions. The second group is responsible for the majority of the delayed payments, particularly during the period of low liquidity in the market, which constitutes an early warning indicator of stress

Submitted by Jadi Castro (jadiana.castro@ucb.br) on 2017-02-21T18:01:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 AdaoVoneTeixeiradeAssuncaoDissertacao2016.pdf: 1069424 bytes, checksum: 2cec9cf848a40c34902559e8d8f0c95c (MD5)<br>Approved for entry into archive by Kelson Anthony de Menezes (kelson@ucb.br) on 2017-02-21T18:02:23Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 AdaoVoneTeixeiradeAssuncaoDissertacao2016.pdf: 1069424 bytes, checksum: 2cec9cf848a40c34902559e8d8f0c95c (MD5)<br>Made available in DSpace on 2017-02-21T18:02:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 AdaoVoneTeixeiradeAssuncaoDissertacao2016.pdf: 1069424 bytes, checksum: 2cec9cf848a40c34902559e8d8f0c95c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-31<br>Aplicamos o Modelo Autoregressivo de Dura????o Condicional (ACD) Mercado de Futuros de Taxa Interbanc??ria Brasileira. A amostra foi constru??da com base em contratos M??s antes da expira????o para replicar a curva de obriga????es de um m??s eo per??odo estudado Vai de julho de 2013 a setembro de 2015. Utilizamos M??xima Verossimilhan??a Estimativa baseada nas distribui????es de probabilidade mais populares na literatura ACD: Exponencial, gama e Weibull e verificou-se que a estimativa baseada na A distribui????o exponencial foi a melhor op????o para modelar os dados.<br>We applied the basic Autoregressive Conditional Duration Model (ACD) to the Brazilian Interbank Rate Futures Market. The sample was built using contracts in the month prior to expiration to replicate a one month bond curve and the period studied goes from july of 2013 to september of 2015. We used Maximum Likelihood Estimation based on the most popular probability distributions in the ACD literature: exponential, gamma and Weibull and we found that the estimation based on the exponential distributional was the best option to model the data.

Regulations require banks to hold a minimum amount of capital for market risk resulting from their trading operations and prescribe two approaches to calculating this minimum capital requirement: (i) a Standardised Approach (SA); and (ii) an Internal Models Approach (IMA). The global financial crisis of 2008 highlighted flaws in the Basel 2 regulatory framework used by banks to calculate market risk capital charges for trading operations. In 2009, Basel 2.5 was introduced to deal with some but not all of the flaws of Basel 2. Both Basel 2 and 2.5 use the Value at Risk (VaR) risk measure as the basis to determine IMA capital charges. From 2022 onwards, Basel 2.5 will be replaced by the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB), a new framework for calculating market risk capital charges for trading operations. The FRTB replaces VaR with the Expected Shortfall (ES) risk measure in the IMA and introduces a new SA. This dissertation investigates the impact the FRTB will have on market risk capital charges for portfolios of linear South African interbank interest rate products. Capital charges are calculated for these portfolios under the Basel 2, Basel 2.5 and FRTB regulatory frameworks. A comparison and analysis of the resulting capital charges is then presented.

This thesis examines both conventional and unconventional monetary policies in a DSGE model with an interbank market friction. The recent crisis during 2007-2009 affected economies worldwide and forced central banks to implement not just conventional monetary policies, but also direct interventions in financial markets. We investigate a DSGE model with financial frictions, to test conventional and unconventional monetary policies. The thesis starts by using the Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)'s modelling framework, to examine eight different shocks under imperfect interbank market conditions. Unlike Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) who consider the two extreme cases for the banking system, I firstly extend the analysis to a case in between the two extreme cases that they examined. The shocks considered include supply and demand shocks and also two shocks from the financial system itself (an interbank market shock and a shock to the deposit market). It is found that a negative shock to the interbank market has only a moderate impact to the banking system. However, a shock to the deposit market has a much stronger impact. Even though the impacts of these shocks are not large it is shown that thefinancial frictions magnify the effects of other shocks. The model is extended to include price stickiness. A modified Taylor rule is analysed to test how conventional monetary policy should respond to the shocks in the presence of financial frictions. Specifically the credit spread is added as a third term in the monetary policy rule. The stabilising properties of the policy rule are analysed and a welfare analysis is conducted. The model is further developed to include unconventional monetary policy in the form of direct lending to private sector firms from the central bank. A policy rule for unconventional policy is tested and its stabilising and welfare properties are analysed.

This thesis studies the emergence of financial exposures between banks and introduces a novel game of financial network formation. It shows empirically that governance structures influence how banks use the interbank market to manage liquidity and that strategic factors are additional drivers of interbank lending for private banks (Ch. 2). It further develops a model of optimal bank behaviour in the absence of liquidity shocks considering the effect of an exogenous bailout probability (Ch. 3), and introduces a model of endogenous liquidity co-insurance formation (Ch. 4). The first chapter, The Purpose of Interbank Markets, tests competing theories of interbank lending using 43 quarters (2002-2012) of confidential data on the German banking sector and interbank market. It shows that banks use the interbank market for liquidity co-insurance as traditionally assumed. However, the importance of the liquidity management function is higher for regionally-focused credit cooperatives and savings banks than for private commercial banks. A distinct effect for private banks is identified; for private banks, increases in interbank liabilities are shown to correlate with a proxy for the bailout probability of banks. The chapter thus offers empirical support for an emerging literature on strategic behaviour in interbank markets and highlights the need to extend the traditional model of liquidity co-insurance. The second chapter, The Emergence of Interbank Exposures, develops a model showing that, even in the hypothetical absence of liquidity shocks, under some conditions the presence of conditional liability guarantees can lead to interbank exposures as an equilibrium outcome. It shows that such an equilibrium is characterised by banks of different sizes and asymmetric bank behaviour. Some banks are active only as lenders with others investing in a productive technology while borrowing in the interbank market. An equilibrium interbank rate is derived which depends on parameters characterising the bailout probability, including different parameters of government behaviour. The third chapter, Coordination and Competition in the Formation of Financial Networks, introduces a generalisation and extension of the seminal work of Allen and Gale (2000). It studies liquidity co-insurance between deposit-taking banks in an n-region economy. Both a static and a dynamic model of the endogenous formation of interbank liquidity co-insurance links are examined. Using a novel approach to model liquidity co-insurance, it is shown that contrary to previous findings it is not possible for banks with limited information to insure optimally against liquidity shocks. However, in a dynamic formulation of the model with best-response dynamics and learning, socially optimal insurance is an evolutionary stable equilibrium. The chapter also studies an extension to the model that introduces non-zero bailout probabilities, which endogenously leads to interbank networks consistent with the structure of interbank exposure networks documented empirically.

This thesis conducts three different empirical studies and finds that some of the pre-2007 risk assessment model could underestimate the systemic risk of the banking sector and justifies an overhaul. First, it simulates the contagion impact of the UK interbank market. Subject to a number of assumptions (netting agreement, seniority, etc), it finds that the contagion is much severer if the simulation uses consolidated data than using unconsolidated data. Second, the thesis tests whether the riskiness of banks can be mitigated by peer interbank monitoring. Applying to UK market, the thesis finds little evidence of market discipline. The results are attributed to the lenders’ assumption of “too-big-to-fail” and the shortness of loan maturity. Last, the thesis investigates whether banking sector difficulties are preceded by macroeconomic distress. In contrast to most existing studies, the thesis finds that economy still thrives in the “pre-crisis” in terms of increasing GDP growth and the recession is generally associated with the “post-crisis” period. The inconsistency of results is very likely due to imprecise crisis identification of earlier studies which identify crises too late on the basis of “event studies”.

Monetary policy in South African is the primary means by which the authorities can influence activity in the overall economy. The South African Reserve Bank accommodates banks through repo transactions for which they charge the repo rate. The most important market in the transmission of the repo rate to the rest of the economy is the interbank market. As such, a detailed discussion of this market is given. In September 200 I the monetary authorities made certain adjustments to the repo system of accommodation, which included changing the repo rate from a floating rate to a fixed rate that would be administratively determined by the MPC. This was done to address certain weaknesses in the floating rate system. This thesis examines and compares the period before and after the adjustments to the repo system, with the aim of determining whether or not the monetary authorities achieved the goals intended from making this change. The repo rate, prime interbank rate, 3-month NCO rate and the prime lending rate are analysed using the Engle-Granger two variable approach and an ECM model to test for causality. It was found that the monetary authorities did not achieve their intended goals as the relationship between the repo rate and the interbank rate was more significant in the first period. Furthermore, the direction of causality the authorities hoped to achieve by implementing the changes were in fact already in place. As such the adjustments to the system changed the transmission mechanism from the one desired by the authorities to one that was not intended. The conclusions reached by this study show that, in terms of the objectives of the monetary authorities, the previous repo system functioned better.<br>KMBT_363<br>Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in

Міжбанківський ринок є невід’ємною частиною фінансової систе- ми будь-якої країни з розвинутим банківським сектором. Важливість цього ринку насамперед обумовлюється його роллю в процесах пере- тікання ліквідності між банками та в передачі монетарних імпульсів від центрального банку до реального сектора економіки.

This dissertation, in its three essays, investigates the role played by the risk of rollover with respect to banks’ funding decisions and potential interbank market tensions. Since the recent financial crisis, researchers have increasingly acknowledged the relevance of interbank market liquidity frictions in undermining financial stability, weakening monetary policy transmission mechanism and central bankers’ ability to stimulate credit expansion and the real economy. In an attempt to find plausible explanations of the recent economic downturn, banks inability or unwillingness to rollover short-run debt among each other has gathered greater attention. For this purpose, the present dissertation i) explores the issue of the rollover-channel within monetary theories and in the most recent economic literature about refinancing risk and interbank market freeze, ii) proposes a Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) dynamic model which accounts for banks’ debt maturity structure decisions and interbank relations, and iii) provides an extension of the model in (ii) to an Agent-Based Stock-Flow Consistent (AB-SFC) framework. The aim of the 1st chapter is two-fold: i) to contextualize potential vulnerability in banks’ refinancing practises within modern heterodox monetary theories, and ii) to provide a broader picture of the role played by the risk of rollover in deteriorating bank-to-bank relations. From the analysis of the existing literature, this work draws two main conclusions. First, rising interest rates and credit-supply shrinking should not be expected only in case of central banks’ non-accommodative behaviours. Second, the rollover-channel should be interpreted as a ‘rollover-circuit’ that intensifies two vicious cycles. On the one hand, increasing rollover risk leading to higher maturity mismatch (first cycle) impacts the value of collaterals and forces banks to sell assets at fire-sale prices. On the other hand, this mechanism induces a double causality between low market liquidity and low funding liquidity (second cycle), making banks more reluctant to lend to each other, and funds more difficult to be rolled over. In turn, banks become more dependent on overnight funding with daily refinancing frequencies, further intensifying the first cycle, which might be harmful for the desirable balance between discipline and elasticity. In line with this, the 2nd chapter extends the current SFC framework to interbank relations in the attempt to capture both potential intra-sectoral flows, so far neglected in this methodological structure, and the second causal link of endogenous monetary theory, from changes in deposits to changes in reserves. For this purpose, the model consists of a more complex banking system which includes banks’ funding choices and reserve management strategies, with the aim of analyzing the impact of funding liquidity risk, considered as a proxy for the risk of rollover, on the performances of the postulated interbank market. Starting from the functioning of a payment system within an overdraft economy, two banks can interact in two segments of the unsecured interbank market: the overnight and the term one. The main feature of this model is the introduction of a measure for maturity mismatch and funding liquidity risk according to which the borrowing bank can choose the demanded duration of interbank loans. The central bank is modelled in both its accommodating and disciplinary roles, in case interbank lending comes to a standstill. The main results of the simulations are: i) interbank volumes seem to be highly dependent on the maturity composition of the two banks’ balance sheets; ii) as the stress perceived in the interbank market increases, banks’ maturity preferences lead the interbank market rates spread to its highest possible levels; iii) the constant excessive maturity mismatch leads the volumes of the overnight segment to be lower with respect to the term one, suggesting the importance of studying the interactions of the two segments when accounting for funding liquidity risk. The 3rd and final chapter analyzes the functioning of modern payment systems through the lens of banks’ maturity mismatch practises proposing an Agent-Based Stock-Flow Consistent model. Again, banks can interact in two segments of the interbank market diversified by maturity, overnight and term. Their funding sources are chosen according to a Margin of Stability constructed on the basis of the residual duration of their assets and liabilities, following the Net Stable Funding Ratio introduced by Basel III. From the simulations of the model, the following results emerge: (i) the postulated economy is resilient to the potential frictions arising from payment liquidity shocks; (ii) when banks decide their funding sources with the objective of limiting their degree of maturity transformation and risk of rollover the economic system appears more stable; (iii) the impact of banks’ margins of stability on the maturity composition of their assets and liabilities is pro-cyclical, and leads to an inverted process of maturity mismatch where short-term investments are funded by long-term sources; (iv) when maturity mismatch is very low, as resulting from the simulations of this analysis, increasing tensions on the market do not impact banks’ preferences for maturities and the overall stability of the economy.

Chapter 1 builds a two-bank bargaining model of the overnight interbank market in which, due to the commitment of the central bank to its interest rate target, bargaining between banks impacts loan sizes rather than interest rates (the converse of existing models). As a result, policy changes have a different impact to what is posited by existing models. The model is applied to a market where the commitment of the central bank is well documented (Australia). With reasonable parameter values, the model replicates five stylised facts of the Australian market. Moreover, the stylised facts are replicated without recourse to any asymmetries. Chapter 2 extends the two-bank model to incorporate a large number of heterogeneous banks. This model is able to replicate the asymmetric shape of banks' end-of-day central bank deposit distributions (despite symmetric initial distributions); a novel contribution to the literature. Moreover, after inputting recent changes in Australian central bank policy, this model produces percentage changes in interbank trading volumes that closely align with the data. Central banks typically supply more overnight deposits than banks desire to hold (in aggregate), but this aggregate is typically small relative to interbank lending. With commitment, this is not required for the central bank to achieve its interest rate target (the typical explanation in the literature). So, to explain this phenomenon, Chapter 3 builds a DSGE model that incorporates commitment and the results from the previous chapters. Due to asymmetric information, there may be stigma associated with borrowing from the central bank's overnight lending facility, which is costly. But while the central bank can reduce use of its lending facility, by increasing aggregate deposits, the resulting fall in interbank lending is also costly; because the interbank market helps banks monitor their counterparties. Therefore, low but positive aggregate deposits can be explained as the welfare-optimising point in the trade-off between stigma and monitoring costs (a novel contribution to the literature).

Дослідження взаємозв’язків між валютами, з якими працює банк, дає можливість не лише зменшувати ризик, а й збільшувати його прибутки, уникаючи відкриття таких позицій, які у підсумку призводять до одержання взаємно протилежного результату.<br>Investigation of the interrelationship between the currencies with which the bank operates allows not only to reduce the risk, but also to increase its profits, avoiding the discovery of such positions, which eventually result in a mutually opposite result.

La tesi si compone di tre capitoli che trattano il problema del settore in modelli Dynamic General Equilibrium Model. Il tema in questione `e rapidamente diven- tato uno dei pi`u rilevanti per i policy maker per comprendere il ruolo giocato dagli intermediari finanziari nella recente crisi finanziaria. Il primo capitolo `e una review dei pi`u recenti contributi in letteratura su modelli DSGE con frizioni finanziarie. La rassegna si sofferma soprattutto su due categorie di modelli: a) Modelli che hanno come obbiettivo primario quello di analizzare il ruolo del mercato del credito interbancario b) Modelli che cer- cano di incorporare le politiche non convenzionali che le banche centrali hanno condotto dal 2008 ad oggi. Il secondo capitolo propone un modello DSGE con interbancario il cui ob- biettivo `e quello di analizzare le risposte dell’economia quando il mercato in- terbancario `e colpito da shock esogeni di rischiosit`a. Un incremento del rischio genera uno spostamento di risorse dall’interbancario al mercato dei titoli gover- nativi creando una recessione tramite la riduzione del credito disponibile per le aziende ed il credito al consumo. Il terzo capito propone un altro modello DSGE basato su quello del prece- dente capitolo dove si analizzano le politiche non convenzionali della banca cen- trale. Nel modello la crisi `e generata dalla contrazione del capitale bancario che a sua volta determina una diminuzione del credito, una diminuzione degli investimenti ed infine un recessione. L’utilizzo di modelli Markov switching DSGE permette di analizzare l’economia in tre differenti stati: non crisi, crisi senza intervento della banca centrale, crisis con intervento della banca centrale. L’introduzione di una regola non convenzionale sembra attenuare la crisi senza effetti negativi sull’ obbiettivo primario della stabilit`a dei prezzi.<br>We propose three essays that deal with the problem of financial frictions into a general equilibrium framework. This topic quickly became one of the most relevant for the policy maker in order to understand the role played by the financial intermediaries in the recent financial downturn. The first chapter is a review of the most recent contributions about dynamic general equilibrium models with financial frictions. We focus our attention on contributions that have as primary target to better understand the role played by the interbank market in the business cycle fluctuation and the role of macroprudential policy. The second chapter sets up a DSGE model with an active interbank market. In our model an interbank riskiness shock that increases the riskiness of the interbank market could divert resources from the interbank lending to the gov- ernment bonds market causing a recession due to the decrease of credit available for the firms and the households. Empirical studies confirm that the sudden col- lapse of the interbank market during financial crisis played an important role our model seems to reconcile the empirical evidence and the economic theory. The third chapter builds a Markov switching DSGE model with banks based in order to understand the role of unconventional monetary policy. The finan- cial crisis is triggered by an exogenous shock on the quality of bank that shrinks the balance sheet of the bank. A contraction of the bank capital could gen- erate a decrease of the credit supply and a recession. The introduction of an unconventional monetary rule seems to dampen this mechanism. Moreover, no notable drawbacks on the primary target of price stability is caused by the unconventional intervention of the central bank.

Submitted by Weichao Wang (weichao.wang@fgv.edu.br) on 2018-05-11T16:03:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Wang2018_Thesis_TARP_Interbank_Risk_May9.pdf: 2618673 bytes, checksum: dc1254edf6febf9dacf740dc3f7d48a8 (MD5)<br>Rejected by Diego Andrade (diego.andrade@fgv.br), reason: A ordem dos documentos está errada. on 2018-05-14T18:11:37Z (GMT)<br>Submitted by Weichao Wang (weichao.wang@fgv.edu.br) on 2018-05-14T18:24:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Wang2018_Thesis_TARP_Interbank_Risk_May9.pdf: 2618806 bytes, checksum: add9b0e474645e1acb2fd7f4b86eb1f2 (MD5)<br>Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2018-05-15T16:30:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Wang2018_Thesis_TARP_Interbank_Risk_May9.pdf: 2618806 bytes, checksum: add9b0e474645e1acb2fd7f4b86eb1f2 (MD5)<br>Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-18T12:30:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Wang2018_Thesis_TARP_Interbank_Risk_May9.pdf: 2618806 bytes, checksum: add9b0e474645e1acb2fd7f4b86eb1f2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-09<br>I investigate how the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) affected the stressed interbank money market trading during the recent financial crisis via a difference-in-difference (DiD) design. I find that the TARP capital injection significantly enlarged the interbank exposure for the TARP recipients relative to others, particularly for banks in smaller size, with lower level of interbank trading and located in relatively poor economic conditions. I further test whether the distorted interbank liquidity position of the TARP recipients stimulated their credit risk appetite. I find that TARP recipient banks with larger interbank exposure also significantly shifted to riskier credit portfolios than others after the TARP implementation, suggested by estimates on forward- and backward-looking risk measures. Results are robust to the instrumental variable analysis, the sample self-selection model, the propensity score matching analysis, various placebo experiments and alternative econometric models. My results are most consistent with the “capital spillover” hypothesis that banks used the TARP capital to develop more interconnected interbank relationships, and the moral hazard effect that higher future bailout expectation and increased systemic relevance jointly construct a “new government safety net” for the TARP beneficiaries to take excessive credit risks under the implicitly perceived “too interconnected to fail” protection.

Детальне дослідження узгодженості потреб реального сектора та здійсненого банками фінансування у розрізі секторів економіки не показує їх повну збалансованість, що дозволяє надати узагальнену оцінку щодо невідповідності української банківської системи потребам реального сектора економіки. Для вирішення виявленої проблеми та активізації довгострокового кредитування реального сектора економіки потрібні комплексні заходи держави, Національного банку України, спільні зусилля законодавчої та виконавчої влади щодо формування попиту на інвестиції, але це в кінцевому підсумку сприятиме загальному економічному зростанню.

The recent financial crisis beginning in August 2007 depressed the world economies and disrupted the operation of conventional monetary policy instruments. Dramatic increases of three-month LIBOR rate in different currencies were observed and the spread between three-month LIBOR and OIS widened. These phenomena implied a broken transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The central banks of the UK and the US launched unconventional monetary policy tools i.e. liquidity provision and quantitative easing to stimulate domestic economies bypassing the banking systems. The European Central Bank implemented the Enhanced Credit Support scheme to provide liquidity to the banking system as well as fixing the monetary transmission mechanism. As a consequence, much research has been undertaken to study the impact of the unconventional monetary policies on economies. Most of the literature has studied the effect on long-term variables e.g. GDP, inflation and unemployment. But, our study here focuses on the impact of those policies on the credit and liquidity premia in the money market as represented by interest rate spreads. This aspect is important because the transmission of quantitative easing in the UK and the US to ultimate targets relies intermediately on reducing the cost of borrowing and interbank lending rates are the foundation for many market rates. In the EMU, to fix the monetary transmission mechanism, restoring the communication between EURIBOR and OIS is the primary step. Our results show that both credit and liquidity premia were the drivers of the widening LIBOR and OIS spreads. The quantitative easing in the UK and the US and Enhanced Credit Support in the EMU reduced credit risks and liquidity premia significantly, relying on the causality between the two premia, respectively.

Submitted by João Paulo Carvalho Aveiro (joaoaveiro@gmail.com) on 2013-03-04T21:54:29Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese.pdf: 465880 bytes, checksum: cdd3bccd1924aa197532a369970ae371 (MD5)<br>Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-04-03T17:56:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese.pdf: 465880 bytes, checksum: cdd3bccd1924aa197532a369970ae371 (MD5)<br>Made available in DSpace on 2013-04-03T17:56:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese.pdf: 465880 bytes, checksum: cdd3bccd1924aa197532a369970ae371 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-06-25<br>In this work, we studied the literature of the interbank market and how a central bank can improve its functioning. We developed a framework that could accommodate the different models of the interbank market and central bank intervention created from Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983). With this we show that, in most cases, banks with access to the interbank market are unable to provide the efficient allocation for its consumers. In this environment we find a role for a central bank that, by intervening in the interbank market, is able to induce banks to offer the same allocations that would be provided by a social planner, that is, efficient allocations.<br>Neste trabalho, estudamos a literatura de mercado interbancário e como um banco central pode melhorar o seu funcionamento. Criamos um framework que pudesse acomodar os diferentes modelos de mercado interbancário e intervenção do banco central criados a partir de Bryant (1980) e Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Com isso mostramos que, em grande parte dos casos, os bancos com acesso ao mercado interbancário são incapazes de prover a alocação eficiente para os seus consumidores. Nesse ambiente, encontramos uma função para um banco central que, ao intervir no mercado interbancário, é capaz de induzir os bancos a oferecerem as mesmas alocações que seriam providas por um planejador central, ou seja, alocações eficientes.

Міжбанківський ринок є невід’ємною частиною фінансової системи будь-якої країни з розвинутим банківським сектором. Важливість цього ринку насамперед обумовлюється його роллю в процесах перетікання ліквідності між банками та в передачі монетарних імпульсів від центрального банку до реального сектора економіки.

У тезах розглянуті питання застосування теорії фракталів до аналізу міжбанківського валютного ринку України. Автором представлені результати визначення фрактальної розмірності міжбанківського ринку України на основі методу нормованого розмаху.<br>Questions of application of the theory of fractals to the analysis of interbank foreign exchange market of Ukraine were examined in theses. Results of the determination of fractal dimension of the interbank market of Ukraine on the basis of Rescaled Range Analysis were presented by the author.

The thesis consists of three independent chapters on the role of endogenous money on shadow banking and international finance. In the first chapter (Endogenous Money, Eurodollar, and the Shadow Banking System), I examine the consequence of endogenous money for banks and shadow banks at both the national and international level by considering the importance that the Eurodollar market played in the emergence of shadow banking. In the second chapter (The shadow banking system in a stock-flow consistent framework), I develop an SFC model that includes complex financial markets and important components of the shadow banking sector, which enables us to explore the relationship between core commercial banks and shadow banks. Building a complete financial sector and its interaction with the real sectors within an SFC framework allowed us to shed light on the role that shadow banking plays in the origination of credit. In the third chapter (Repo lending and its implications for the central bank monetary policy and government debt issues), I examine the transformation of money markets over the past four decades and the implications of this transformation for the implementation of monetary policy and government debt issues.

Depuis son éruption en septembre 2009, la crise de la zone euro a été au centre de l'attention des économistes et des décideurs politiques. L'objectif principal de cette thèse est de développer des modèles théoriques pertinents afin d'analyser les facteurs à l'origine de la crise jumelle des banques et de la dette souveraine dans une union monétaire avec une architecture institutionnelle globalement similaire de l'Union économique et monétaire avant 2012. Tout en mettant l'accent sur la vulnérabilité financière, nous explorons la relation entre le secteur bancaire, l'économie réelle et le budget du gouvernement dans le contexte d 'une union monétaire. Cette thèse se compose de quatre modèles théoriques de la crise bancaire, avec le premier illustrant la crise financière qui avait éclaté en 2008 dans les petites économies européennes en dehors de l 'UEM et les trois modèles suivants élucidant la situation de crise dans la zone euro en2009 jusqu'en 2012<br>In this Ph. D. thesis, we analyze the conditions for the emergence and the aggravation of the recent crisis in Europe from 2008 to 2012. The major objective of this Ph. D. thesis is to develop theoretical models which will be effective in investigating the twin banking and sovereign debt crises in a monetary union with a broadly similar institutional design to the EMU before 2012. Different from 'traditional' financial crisis models that shed light on the role of the central bank in crisis policy response, the models developed in this thesis investigate and underline the importance of fiscal crisis management. White accentuating financial vulnerability, we explore the relationship between the banking sector, the realeconomy and the public budget in the context of a monetary union. This thesis consists of four theoretical models of the banking crisis, with the first framework depicting the financial crisis which burst in 2008 in small European economies outside the EMU and the next three models elucidating the crisis situation in the Eurozone from early 2009 until August 2012

La mia tesi di dottorato consiste di tre articoli empirici sul mercato interbancario europeo non collateralizzato e il suo funzionamento durante la crisi finanziaria del 2007-2008. Il primo articolo, intitolato “Il funzionamento del mercato interbancario europeo durante la crisi finanziaria del 2007-2008”1 fornisce un’analisi dettagliata del funzionamento del mercato interbancario europeo dei prestiti non collateralizzati con scadenza overnight (O/N) durante la crisi finanziaria del 2007-2008, studiando le serie storiche dei tassi di interesse, del turnover del mercato, e dei costi di indebitamento delle banche. Lo scopo è cercare di distinguere l’impatto degli eventi di mercato – sin dall’inizio delle tensioni nell’estate del 2007 fino alla fine di novembre 2008 – da pattern stagionali, dinamiche regolari determinate dalla cornice istituzionale dell’operatività dell’Eurosistema, dall’impatto degli interventi eccezionali intrapresi dalla Banca Centrale Europea (BCE) durante la crisi. I risultati mostrano il ruolo importante, accanto agli eventi di mercato, della liquidità addizionale fornita dalla BCE e dell’accresciuta tendenza delle istituzioni finanziarie a trattenere la liquidità in eccesso piuttosto che scambiarla sul mercato interbancario. L’aumento del rischio di controparte e fattori stagionali sono importanti determinanti dei tassi d’interesse e dei volumi O/N; la fornitura eccezionale di liquidità da parte dell’Eurosistema e i notevoli cambiamenti alla cornice istituzionale di implementazione della politica monetaria hanno influenzato gli incentivi delle banche a scambiare liquidità nel mercato. L’analisi dei tassi di interesse pagati dalle singole banche per i prestiti non collateralizzati documenta il ruolo chiave della reputazione al fine di ottenere migliori condizioni di funding e, durante la crisi, mostra un ripiegamento verso controparti nazionali e la garanzia implicita goduta dalle banche con i maggiori volumi d’affari di essere “too-big-to-fail”. Il secondo articolo, intitolato “La microstruttura del mercato monetario prima e dopo la crisi finanziaria: una prospettiva di rete”2, fornisce una dettagliata analisi sulla microstruttura del mercato monetario europeo secondo l’approccio della teoria delle reti. Le banche sono i nodi delle reti; i prestiti overnight non collateralizzati formano i link che connettono i nodi. L’analisi statica degli indicatori di rete conferma molti fatti stilizzati verificati per altri sistemi complessi: le reti interbancarie sono molto sparse – lungi dall’essere complete – esibiscono la proprietà “small world” e una distribuzione del grado (il numero di controparti con cui ogni banca stabilisce dei link) che segue una legge esponenziale. D’altra parte la tendenza della banche al clustering, cioè a formare gruppi dove i link sono relativamente più densi, è molto più bassa rispetto ad altri sistemi reali. L’analisi della topologia delle reti prima versus dopo l’inizio della crisi fornisce intuizioni interessanti sul potenziale per il contagio finanziario; la partizione delle reti in diverse sotto-reti più piccole e internamente connesse documenta un movimento contro l’integrazione del mercato; pattern eterogenei degli indicatori per banche che hanno dimensioni diverse offrono intuizioni sul loro comportamento. Infine, 1 CEIS Working Paper No. 158 (December 2009). Submitted to the International Journal of Central Banking. 2 CEIS Working Paper No. 181 (January 2011). l’analisi degli indicatori di centralità di rete indica chiaramente che le banche più grandi sono anche le più centrali/influenti nel sistema prima della crisi. Questo cambia dopo Agosto 2007, quando le banche di medie dimensioni e quelle molto piccolo gradualmente aumentano la loro influenza nel mercato come prestatori di liquidità. Il terzo articolo, intitolato “Too-connected versus too-big-to-fail: la centralità di rete delle banche e i tassi di interesse overnight”3 studia cosa determina i costi di indebitamento delle banche nel mercato monetario non collateralizzato. L’obiettivo è testare se misure di centralità, che quantificano gli effetti di rete dovuti alle interazioni tra le banche nel mercato, possono aiutare a spiegare i pattern eterogenei nei tassi di interesse pagati per prendere a prestito fondi non collateralizzati una volta che si controlla per la dimensione della banca e per altri fattori specifici di ogni banca e del mercato. Evidenza preliminare mostra che le banche grandi si indebitano in media a tassi migliori rispetto alle istituzioni più piccole, sia prima che dopo l’inizio della crisi finanziaria. Tuttavia, controllando per la dimensione, le misure di centralità riescono a catturare parte della variazione cross-section nei tassi overnight. Più in particolare: (1) Prima dell’inizio della crisi tutte le banche, indipendentemente dalla loro dimensione, beneficiano di forme diverse di interconnessione, ma l’effetto è piccolo in termini economici. La reputazione della banca e il rischio di controparte sono i fattori più rilevanti per ridurre i tassi d’interesse medi giornalieri. Le banche straniere prendono a prestito a sconto rispetto a quelle italiane. (2) Dopo Agosto 2007 l’impatto della centralità delle banche diventa più forte ma assume segno opposto: la “ricompensa” derivante da una maggiore interconnessione diventa una “punizione”, segnale questo forse di disciplina di mercato. La reputazione della banca diventa ancora più importante. (3) Dopo la bancarotta di Lehman l’effetto della centralità sullo spread mantiene lo stesso segno che aveva dopo Agosto 2007, ma la sua dimensione economica è notevolmente più grande. Le banche straniere pagano un premio significativo rispetto a quelle Italiane; la reputazione diventa estremamente più importante rispetto a prima della crisi.<br>My doctoral thesis consists of three empirical papers on the unsecured euro money market and its functioning during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The first paper, titled “The functioning of the European interbank market during the 2007-2008 financial crisis”1 provides a detailed analysis of the functioning of the overnight (O/N) unsecured euro money market during the 2007-2008 financial crisis by looking at the time patterns of interest rates, market turnover and banks’ borrowing costs. The aim is to disentangle the impact of market events – since the outbreak of tensions in the summer of 2007 until the end of November 2008 – from seasonal patterns of market activity, movements determined by the Eurosystem’s operational framework, the impact of the ECB’s exceptional crisis-related interventions. The results show the important role, alongside market events, of the additional refinancing provided by the ECB and of credit institutions’ increased tendency to hoard surplus reserves rather than trading them in the secondary market. Higher counterparty credit risk and seasonal factors are important determinants of O/N rates and volumes; the exceptional provision of liquidity by the Eurosystem and the relevant changes to the operational framework have influenced banks’ incentives to trade liquidity in the market. The analysis of banks’ costs for uncollateralised loans provides evidence of the major role of bank reputation to obtain better funding and, during the crisis, of a retreat towards national counterparties and of a too-big-to-fail guarantee implicitly granted to the banks with the highest volumes of business. The second paper, titled “The microstructure of the money market before and after the financial crisis: a network perspective”2, provides a detailed microstructure analysis of the euro money market by taking a network perspective. Banks are the nodes of the networks; overnight unsecured loans form the links connecting the nodes. The static analysis of network indicators confirms a number of stylised facts verified for other real complex systems: interbank networks are highly sparse, far from being complete, exhibit the small world property and a power-law distribution of degree (the number of counterparties each bank establishes links with). On the other hand the tendency of banks to cluster, i.e. to form groups where links are relatively denser, is much lower than in other real systems. The analysis of the topology before versus after the start of the crisis provides interesting insights into the potential for financial contagion; the partition of the network into several smaller sub-networks documents a move against market integration; heterogeneous patterns of indicators across banks of different size offer insights into banks’ behaviour. Finally, the analysis of network centrality indicates unambiguously that the biggest banks are also the most central/influent in the system before the onset of the crisis. Things change after August 2007 since medium-sized and very small banks progressively increase their influence in the market as liquidity providers. 1 CEIS Working Paper No. 158 (December 2009). Submitted to the International Journal of Central Banking. 2 CEIS Working Paper No. 181 (January 2011). The last paper, titled “Too-connected versus too-big-to-fail: banks’ network centrality and overnight interest rates”3 aims at studying what influences banks’ borrowing costs in the unsecured euro money market. The objective is to test whether measures of centrality, quantifying network effects due to interactions among banks in the market, can help explain heterogeneous patterns in the interest rates paid to borrow unsecured funds once bank size and other bank and market factors that affect the overnight segment are controlled for. Preliminary evidence shows that large banks borrow on average at better rates compared to smaller institutions, both before and after the start of the financial crisis. Nonetheless, controlling for size, centrality measures can capture part of the cross-sectional variation in overnight rates. More specifically: (1) Before the start of the crisis all the banks, independently of their size, profit from different forms of interconnectedness, but the economic size of the effect is small. Bank reputation and perceived credit riskiness are the most relevant factors to reduce average daily interest rates. Foreign banks borrow at a discount over Italian ones. (2) After August 2007 the impact of banks’ interconnectedness becomes larger but changes sign: the “reward” stemming from a higher centrality becomes a “punishment”, which possibly reflects market discipline. Bank reputation becomes even more important. (3) After Lehman’s bankruptcy the effect of centrality on the spread maintains the same sign as after August 2007, but the magnitude increases remarkably. Foreign banks borrow at a relevant premium over Italian ones; reputation becomes outstandingly more important than in normal times.

L'obiettivo della tesi è lo sviluppo e nell'analisi di un modello macro-finanziario con aspetti reali e finanziari dell'economia, nell'ottica di ottenere un quadro comprensivo per l'analisi del rischio sistemico e delle instabilità. Il primo capitolo verte sulla costruzione di un modello ad agenti che si caratterizza per la presenza del mercato dei beni, del credito, del lavoro e interbancario. Il modello riproduce fluttuazioni endogene ed è in grado di replicare alcuni fatti stilizzati riguardanti i cicli economici e creditizi, mentre il mercato interbancario ha un ruolo importante dal punto di vista della stabilità e dell'efficienza. In particolare la regolazione prudenziale combinata con le aspettative adattive può esacerbare il comportamento precauzionale delle banche durante una recessione, inducendo a trattenere liquidità anche le banche solide. Inoltre la connettività del mercato interbancario ha un duplice effetto: da un lato favorisce l'accesso al credito nell'economia reale, dall'altro accresce l'accumulo di liquidità. Il secondo capitolo si concentra su un insieme di esperimenti condotti tramite il modello precedentemente sviluppato. Lo scopo è di confrontare tra loro politiche macro-prudenziali in cui le banche sono soggette a requisiti minimi di capitale derivati da misure di rischio sistemico. Nello specifico gli indicatori di rischio sistemico sono suddivisi in misure di mercato e di rete. Ogni categoria è ulteriormente scomposta in misure di vulnerabilità e misure di impatto. I risultati rivelano che le politiche costruite su indicatori di vulnerabilità sono migliori di quelle basate sull'impatto, dato che riducono i fallimenti da contagio senza peggiorare la performance macroeconomica.<br>The purpose of the thesis is to develop and analyse a macro-financial model with real and financial aspects of the economy to obtain a comprehensive framework for the analysis of systemic risk and instabilities. The first chapter concerns the construction of an agent-based-model, whose characteristic is the presence of goods, credit, labour and interbank markets. The model reproduces endogenous business cycles and it is able to replicate some stylized facts about business and credit cycles, while the interbank market has an important role for stability and efficiency. In particular prudential regulation, combined with adaptive expectations can exacerbate the precautionary behaviour of banks during a recession, inducing liquidity hoarding by sound banks. Furthermore connectivity of the interbank market has a twofold effect: on one side it supports credit to the real economy, on the other it increases liquidity hoarding. The second chapter is focused on a set of policy experiments performed performed on the model previously developed. The aim is to compare different macroprudential policies where banks are subject to minimum capital requirements derived from systemic risk measures. In detail systemic risk indicators are divided in market-based and network based measures. Each class is further decomposed in measures of vulnerability and measures of impact. The results reveal that policies based on vulnerability indicators perform better than those based on impact, reducing contagious defaults without worsening the macroeconomic performance.

L'obiettivo della tesi è lo sviluppo e nell'analisi di un modello macro-finanziario con aspetti reali e finanziari dell'economia, nell'ottica di ottenere un quadro comprensivo per l'analisi del rischio sistemico e delle instabilità. Il primo capitolo verte sulla costruzione di un modello ad agenti che si caratterizza per la presenza del mercato dei beni, del credito, del lavoro e interbancario. Il modello riproduce fluttuazioni endogene ed è in grado di replicare alcuni fatti stilizzati riguardanti i cicli economici e creditizi, mentre il mercato interbancario ha un ruolo importante dal punto di vista della stabilità e dell'efficienza. In particolare la regolazione prudenziale combinata con le aspettative adattive può esacerbare il comportamento precauzionale delle banche durante una recessione, inducendo a trattenere liquidità anche le banche solide. Inoltre la connettività del mercato interbancario ha un duplice effetto: da un lato favorisce l'accesso al credito nell'economia reale, dall'altro accresce l'accumulo di liquidità. Il secondo capitolo si concentra su un insieme di esperimenti condotti tramite il modello precedentemente sviluppato. Lo scopo è di confrontare tra loro politiche macro-prudenziali in cui le banche sono soggette a requisiti minimi di capitale derivati da misure di rischio sistemico. Nello specifico gli indicatori di rischio sistemico sono suddivisi in misure di mercato e di rete. Ogni categoria è ulteriormente scomposta in misure di vulnerabilità e misure di impatto. I risultati rivelano che le politiche costruite su indicatori di vulnerabilità sono migliori di quelle basate sull'impatto, dato che riducono i fallimenti da contagio senza peggiorare la performance macroeconomica.<br>The purpose of the thesis is to develop and analyse a macro-financial model with real and financial aspects of the economy to obtain a comprehensive framework for the analysis of systemic risk and instabilities. The first chapter concerns the construction of an agent-based-model, whose characteristic is the presence of goods, credit, labour and interbank markets. The model reproduces endogenous business cycles and it is able to replicate some stylized facts about business and credit cycles, while the interbank market has an important role for stability and efficiency. In particular prudential regulation, combined with adaptive expectations can exacerbate the precautionary behaviour of banks during a recession, inducing liquidity hoarding by sound banks. Furthermore connectivity of the interbank market has a twofold effect: on one side it supports credit to the real economy, on the other it increases liquidity hoarding. The second chapter is focused on a set of policy experiments performed performed on the model previously developed. The aim is to compare different macroprudential policies where banks are subject to minimum capital requirements derived from systemic risk measures. In detail systemic risk indicators are divided in market-based and network based measures. Each class is further decomposed in measures of vulnerability and measures of impact. The results reveal that policies based on vulnerability indicators perform better than those based on impact, reducing contagious defaults without worsening the macroeconomic performance.