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Books on the topic 'Intentionality'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 June 2024

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1

Necessary intentionality: A study in the metaphysics of aboutness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

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2

Intentionality, source of intelligibility: The genesis of intentionality. New York: P. Lang, 1989.

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3

Asheim, Olav. Reference and intentionality. [Oslo]: Solum Forlag, 1992.

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4

Padilla Gálvez, Jesús, and Margit Gaffal, eds. Intentionality and Action. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110560282.

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5

Approaches to intentionality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

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6

Approaches to intentionality. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

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7

Intentionality and intersubjectivity. Göteborg: Göteborgs Universitet, 2007.

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8

Parıldar, Sümeyye. Intentionality in Mulla Sadra. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39884-2.

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9

Georg, Meggle, ed. Social facts & collective intentionality. Frankfurt: Deutsche Bibliothek der Wissenschaften, 2002.

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10

The sources of intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

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11

Härtel, Charmine E. J., 1959-, Ashkanasy Neal M. 1945-, Zerbe W. J, and International Conference on Emotions and Organizational Life (5th : 2006 : Atlanta, Ga.), eds. Functionality, intentionality and morality. Amsterdam: Elsevier JAI, 2007.

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12

Andrae, Benjamin. The ontology of intentionality. München: Philosophia, 2014.

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13

1959-, McIntosh Jillian Scott, ed. Naturalism, evolution, and intentionality. Calgary, Alta., Canada: University of Calgary Press, 2001.

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14

International Conference on Emotions and Organizational Life. Functionality, intentionality and morality. Oxford, UK: Elsevier/JAI, 2007.

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15

Heidegger's theory of intentionality. Odense: Odense University Press, 1986.

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16

Open minds: The social making of agency and intentionality. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2012.

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17

Intentional horizons: The mind from an epistemic point of view. Paderborn: Mentis, 2009.

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18

Preyer, Gerhard, and Georg Peter, eds. Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33236-9.

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19

Hopkins, Burt C. Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8145-5.

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20

The intentionality of human action. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1989.

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21

Searle, John R. Intentionality: Historical and systematic perspectives. Munich: Philosophia Verlag GmbH, 2012.

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22

Stalnaker, Robert. Context and content: Essays on intentionality in speech and thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

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23

Drummond, John J. Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-1974-7.

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24

Richard, Menary, ed. Radical enactivism: Intentionality, phenomenology, and narrative. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins Pub. Co., 2006.

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25

Naturalising intentionality: Inquiries into realism & relativism. Göteburg, Sweden: Göteborg Univeristy, 2007.

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26

Natural signs: A theory of intentionality. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989.

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27

Sacks, Robert D. Beginning biblical Hebrew: Intentionality and grammar. Santa Fe, NM: Kafir Yaroq Books, 2008.

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28

Kriegel, Uriah. Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791485.003.0003.

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This chapter argues for two main claims. First, it is argued that, unlike the notion of intentionality central to modern philosophy of mind, Brentano’s notion of intentionality has nothing to do with mental states’ capacity to track elements in the environment; rather, it has to do with a phenomenal feature in virtue of which conscious experiences present something to the subject. Secondly, it is argued that, contrary to common wisdom in Brentano scholarship, there is no real evidence that Brentano took intentionality to be a relation to immanent objects; rather, his mature theory clearly casts intentionality as an intrinsic, non-relational property, and a property in the first instance of subjects (rather than of subjects’ internal states).

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29

Moran, Dermot. Intentionality. Edited by Dan Zahavi. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198755340.013.36.

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This chapter traces the history of intentionality in the phenomenological tradition, from Brentano and Husserl through Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to Iris Marion Young, emphasizing the continuity and deepening of the concept through the tradition. Brentano’s conceptions of the intentional relation and the intentional inexistence of the object were taken up and transformed in Husserl’s expansive conception of intentionality as the sense-apprehension and sense-making that runs through the whole of experiential and cognitive life. Intentionality, moreover, encompasses not just consciousness’s explicit relation to objects, but also the vaguer awareness of horizons and habitualities (“horizon-intentionality”). Heidegger radicalizes Husserlian intentionality by reframing it in terms of the transcendence of existence. Merleau-Ponty further expands Husserl’s conceptions of embodied and practical intentionality as ambiguous transcendence. Iris Marion Young adds an interesting new dimension through her concept of the socially constituted, inhibited intentionality of women’s bodies.

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30

Segal, Gabriel. Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.003.0011.

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31

Johnson, Rebekah. Intentionality. Troubador Publishing Limited, 2015.

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32

Johnson, Rebekah. Intentionality. Troubador Publishing Limited, 2015.

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33

Gallagher, Shaun. Enactive Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198794325.003.0004.

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This chapter offers an in-depth discussion of the concept of intentionality from neo-behaviorist, neo-pragmatist, and enactivist perspectives. It argues that intentionality need not be conceived in representationalist terms, and that both phenomenology and pragmatism point to a more basic form of non-derived intentionality—the notion of operative intentionality, which is embodied in motoric, action-related processes, and embedded in socially situated behavior. Concepts of intentionality also reflect specific conceptions of social cognition. The enactive, neo-pragmatic, operative concept of intentionality turns out to be the relevant concept needed to support enactivist and extended mind approaches to understanding mind. Operative (embodied, motoric) intentionality is shown to be the real original or non-derived intentionality generated in our interactions with others.

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34

Kriegel, Uriah, ed. Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199764297.001.0001.

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35

Textor, Mark. Intentionality Primitivism. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199685479.003.0004.

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Brentano endorsed (conceptual) primitivism about intentionality and the view that intentionality is fully revealed to us in its instantiations. The pros and cons of Brentano’s view that intentionality is a conceptually primitive property of every mental act are discussed. On the one hand, it makes clear why we need to distinguish between the immanent object (intentional correlate) and the external object. But, on the other hand, propositional attitudes turn out to be a major problem for intentionality primitivism. Meinong accepted Brentano’s Thesis as well as the existence of ‘propositional attitudes’ but one cannot defend Brentano’s Thesis by saying that propositional attitudes are directed on objectives or the like. A plausible mark of the mental needs to disentangle being a mental act (process) from having an object.

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36

Salice, Alessandro. Practical Intentionality. Edited by Dan Zahavi. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198755340.013.7.

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The aim of this chapter is to mine, reconstruct, and evaluate the phenomenological notion of practical intentionality. It is claimed that the phenomenologists of the Munich and Göttingen Circles substantially modify the idea of practical intentionality originally developed by Franz Brentano. This development, it is further contended, anticipates the switch that occurred within contemporary theory of action from a belief-desire (BD) to a belief-desire-intention (BDI) model of deliberation. While Brentano’s position can be interpreted as a variant of the BD model, early phenomenologists propose a general theory of deliberation that, in line with the BDI account, puts the notion of intention at the very core of practical intentionality. On their understanding, the concept of intention points to a primitive kind of mental state that cannot be reduced to a combination of beliefs and desires.

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37

Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2013.

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38

Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2013.

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39

Kriegel, Uriah. Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2013.

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40

Simchen, Ori. Necessary Intentionality: A Study in the Metaphysics of Aboutness. Oxford University Press, 2015.

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41

Bruno, Verbeek, ed. Reasons and intentions. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008.

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42

Archaeology and Intentionality. Taylor & Francis Group, 2022.

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43

Grzankowski, Alex, and Michelle Montague, eds. Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198732570.001.0001.

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This book is about the possibility and the prospects of making sense of non-propositional intentionality. Intentionality lies at the centre of a great deal of the philosophy of mind and, by and large, it is understood in propositional terms. Typically, the examples of intentionality deemed fundamental and the explanations of their natures rely on the idea of propositional content. But these commitments cannot go unquestioned and the (often implicit) acceptance of “propositionalism” has impeded philosophical discussion about the nature of intentionality in at least three noteworthy ways: (i) a precise statement of propositionalism has been left undeveloped; (ii) the motivations for propositionalism are rarely articulated; and (iii) apparent counterexamples and challenges to propositionalism, along with non-propositional theories of intentionality, are underexplored. The contributors to this volume explore and correct these impediments by discussing in detail what the commitment to propositionalism amounts to; by shedding light on why one might find the thesis attractive (or unattractive); and by exploring the ways in which one might depart from propositionalism.

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44

Grzankowski, Alex, and Michelle Montague. Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0001.

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The editors provide a brief introduction to the landscape of the debate in order to set up the issues and to display the interrelations amongst the contributions. First, some history is provided as well as some examples of the typical focus on propositionalism in much of the present literature. Second, a closer look is given to what exactly the propositionalist thesis might be. Third, motivations for propositionalism are discussed. Fourth, ways of and reasons for departing from propositionalism are offered. With the hope of showing how the various contributions connect to these four points as well as to each other, the chapter is guided by brief overviews of the contributions that will follow.

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45

Drummond, John J. Intentionality without representationalism. Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199594900.013.0007.

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46

Sainsbury, Mark. Intentionality and Intensionality. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198803348.003.0002.

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Intentionality is a property of mental states: their being directed on things, or about things. Intensionality is a semantic property, marked by such features as failure of truth preservation when one referring expression is replaced by another with the same reference. Attributions of intentional states are intensional. This first chapter sets out the basic distinctions, describes some puzzles about intensionality (for example, how it is possible to think about unicorns when there are none to think about), and sketches the path to be taken in the rest of the book.

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47

Hattiangadi, Anandi. Normativity and Intentionality. Edited by Daniel Star. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.45.

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The hard problem of intentionality is to explain what makes it the case that an arbitrary sentence or thought has the semantic properties that it does rather than some other semantic properties or none at all. Some hold that intentionality is normative, and that this has a crucial bearing on the hard problem of intentionality. This chapter investigates whether this is so. It is possible to distinguish four versions of the thesis that intentionality is normative: grasp of a concept or meaning involves following a rule or making a normative judgment of some kind; the concepts of meaning and content are normative; meaning and content are sources of normativity; the semantic facts are in some sense reducible to the normative (and natural) facts. I discuss all four versions of the thesis, and argue that the normativity of intentionality has little bearing on the hard problem of intentionality.

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48

Baldwin, Dare A., Bertram F. Malle, and Louis J. Moses, eds. Intentions and Intentionality. The MIT Press, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/3838.001.0001.

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49

Prospects for intentionality. Canberra: Australian National University. Research Schoolof Social Sciences, 1993.

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50

Kriegel, Uriah. Sources of Intentionality. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2011.

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