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1
Liu, Hao. "Intentional Directedness and Immanent Content." International Philosophical Quarterly 60, no. 1 (2020): 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq202013144.
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This paper will investigate the roots of intentionality in Aristotle’s theory of perception and assess the accuracy of Brentano’s proposed location of intentionality in Aristotle. When introducing intentionality into contemporary philosophy, Brentano attributed it to Aristotle, whose theory of psychology he believed to reveal the characteristics of intentional inexistence. After setting up a working definition of intentionality that stresses such features as immanent content and intentional directedness, I will then clarify Aristotle’s theory of perception with regard to these two characteristics. I draw the conclusion that we can only find the roots of immanent content in Aristotle’s perceptual theory. For him, directedness moves from the sensible object to the sensitive soul, and thus it does not correspond to what contemporary philosophers define as intentional directedness.
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Ratcliffe, Matthew. "Emotional Intentionality." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (July 2019): 251–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246118000784.
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AbstractThis paper sketches an account of what distinguishes emotional intentionality from other forms of intentionality. I focus on the ‘two-sided’ structure of emotional experience. Emotions such as being afraid of something and being angry about something involve intentional states with specific contents. However, experiencing an entity, event, or situation in a distinctively emotional way also includes a wider-ranging disturbance of the experiential world within which the object of emotion is encountered. I consider the nature of this disturbance and its relationship to the localized content of an emotional experience.
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Maslovets, O. A. "Regulated intentionality as a Modern Educational Model: Philosophical and Cultural Analysis." Concept: philosophy, religion, culture 4, no. 3 (September 28, 2020): 52–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2541-8831-2020-3-15-52-61.
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The article is devoted to new directions of personality formation in the postnonclassical value- semantic paradigm of education and science. The existing multidimensional understanding models are in close relationship with the reorientation of a goal-oriented education from a knowledge-centered to a competency-centered one. This shift requires new strategies and techniques for personality formation, with new mentality and objectives. A key role should be devoted to creating a special phenomenological educational environment with intentionality as the driving force of complex structures of consciousness which ensures the identifiability of an object and construction of its meaning. This process becomes possible only within the framework of an intentional act, when the perceptions of the object and its essential content are exposed. As mental intentions and the intentional of the Other are unknown, but new meanings are closely interconnected in the consciousness. In this way knowledge is created: transcendental experience integrates new meanings with those acquired earlier. Sense formation is regulated unconsciously in the mind of a subject. But within the framework of a modern education system, this process can ascend a superior level by regulated meaning formation based on conscious and unconscious intentional acts. Therefore, the development of mechanisms for managing intentional acts of a subject that are relative to sense formation through one’s transcendental experience should be the main focus of innovative education.
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Krokos, Jan. "THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF INTENTIONALITY." Studia Philosophiae Christianae 56, S1 (December 31, 2020): 107–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/spch.2020.56.s1.07.
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The issue of intentionality was posed anew in philosophy by Franz Brentano. However, it was Brentano himself who indicated that the source of intentionality-related problems dates back to Classical Antiquity and the Middle Ages. The search for the original traces of this issue in the history of philosophy has led me to conclude that intentionality as an inalienable characteristic of consciousness is characterized by three-dimensionality, which is expressed in theoria, praxis and poiesis. Contemporary research focuses primarily on cognitive intentionality, examining in particular either the very subject-object relation or the immanent (intentional) object, in-existing in psychical experience (in the acts of consciousness). And yet, intentionality is a basic feature of the whole consciousness-anchored (mental) life of a human being. It determines the whole consciousness-based activity of the subject in abstract theorizing, practice and production. Therefore, it manifests itself as a mode of being of a conscious (mental) entity, i.e. an entity partially constituted by intentional content, relationality, reference, directionality, openness and conscious awareness , as well as determining the meaning and the creation of purely intentional beings. Intentionality is revealed as a primary factor in the awakening of consciousness, through the building (constituting) of conscious experiences that are poietic, practical and theoretical. Each of these three ways of categorizing the nature of experience, however, indicates only the predominant aspect of a given experience, for strictly speaking experiences are determined by all three aspects. Intentionality and – consequently – all conscious experience, are thus characterized by three-dimensions: cognitive, activistic and productive. Any act of consciousness is always a form of activity that is informed by its cognitive aspect and produces something transcendent with regard to itself. The recognition of the three-dimensional nature of intentionality allows us to understand the human being and the dilemmas concerning his actions, knowledge and creativity.
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Borghi, A. M., and F. Binkofski. "Intentionality of movement: Mirror neuron system and theory of mind." European Psychiatry 26, S2 (March 2011): 2113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0924-9338(11)73816-0.
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The ability to understand intentions of actions performed by others is one of the prerequisites for social interaction. This ability has been attributed to our capacity to mentalize others’ behaviour, by simulating or predicting their mental states that would cause that behaviour and make it comprehensible. Brain imaging studies revealed the so called “mentalizng network” including the pSTS/TPJ, the temporal poles and the medial prefrontal cortex. This network gets constantly activated anytime we try to take the perspective of others or try to simulate their state of mind. On the other hand the discovery of mirror neurons has provided an additional explanation for understanding of the content of actions. The functional properties of these neurons point out that action understanding is primarily based on a mechanism that directly matches the sensory representation of perceived actions with one's own motor representation of the same actions. We provide evidence that both systems interact closely during the processing of intentionality of actions. Thus mentalizing is not the only form of intentional understanding and motor and intentional components of action are closely interwoven. Both systems play an important role in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia.
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Zapparoli, Laura, Silvia Seghezzi, Paola Scifo, Alberto Zerbi, Giuseppe Banfi, Marco Tettamanti, and Eraldo Paulesu. "Dissecting the neurofunctional bases of intentional action." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 28 (June 27, 2018): 7440–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1718891115.
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Here we challenge and present evidence that expands the what, when, and whether anatomical model of intentional action, which states that internally driven decisions about the content and timing of our actions and about whether to act at all depend on separable neural systems, anatomically segregated along the medial wall of the frontal lobe. In our fMRI event-related paradigm, subjects acted following conditional cues or following their intentions. The content of the actions, their timing, or their very occurrence were the variables investigated, together with the modulating factor of intentionality. Besides a shared activation of the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) for all components and the SMA proper for the when component, we found specific activations beyond the mesial prefrontal wall involving the parietal cortex for the what component or subcortical gray structures for the when component. Moreover, we found behavioral, functional, anatomical, and brain connectivity evidence that the self-driven decisions on whether to act require a higher interhemispheric cooperation: This was indexed by a specific activation of the corpus callosum whereby the less the callosal activation, the greater was the decision cost at the time of the action in the whether trials. Furthermore, tractography confirmed that the fibers passing through the callosal focus of activation connect the two sides of the frontal lobes involved in intentional trials. This is evidence of non-unitary neural foundations for the processes involved in intentional actions with the pre-SMA/ACC operating as an intentional hub. These findings may guide the exploration of specific instances of disturbed intentionality.
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Pihlar, Tanja. "Zur Theorie der Vorstellungsproduktion (,,Grazer" Gestalttheorie I: France Weber)." Grazer Philosophische Studien 73, no. 1 (April 1, 2006): 27–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-073001002.
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In the following discussion, we are dealing with Weber's theory of the production of presentations, as presented in his article "The Problem of the Production of Presentations". In this article, published in 1928, Weber offers an essential modification of a version of the theory of objects which had been developed by the Graz school (and was closely linked with the theory of higher-order objects). According to Weber, the production of presentations consists in a primary transition from passive to corresponding active presentations (so there is active as well as passive presentation). Weber distinguishes several types of production of presentations: psychophysical, content, act, intentional, and surrogate production, all of which can be divided into many subtypes. Most interesting in this connection is his theory of intentional presentation. In the 1928 article, Weber postulates non-intentional presentations, on which intentional presentations are based. He distinguishes four levels of intentionality: non-intentional presentation, on the lowest level, is followed by presentational intentionality, isolative, and rational intentional presentation. Weber's 1928 article is of considerable importance for an understanding of his subsequent philosophical development.
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OTT, WALTER. "Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2, no. 1 (2016): 131–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2016.4.
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ABSTRACT:According to the phenomenal intentionality research program, a state's intentional content is fixed by its phenomenal character. Defenders of this view have little to say about just how this grounding is accomplished. I argue that without a robust account of representation, the research program promises too little. Unfortunately, most of the well-developed accounts of representation—asymmetric dependence, teleosemantics, and the like—ground representation in external relations such as causation. Such accounts are inconsistent with the core of the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue that, however counterintuitive it may seem, the best prospect for explaining how phenomenal character represents is an appeal to resemblance.
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Biggs, Stephen. "The Scrambler: An Argument Against Representationalism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 2 (June 2009): 215–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0046.
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Brentano (1874) famously claimed that two features demarcate the mental: consciousness and intentionality. Although he claimed that these features are intimately related, subsequent generations of philosophers rarely treated them together. Recently, however, the tide has turned. Many philosophers now accept that consciousness is intentional, where to be intentional is to have representational content, is to represent ‘things as being thus and so — where, for all that, things need not be that way’ (Travis, 2004, 58). In fact, weak representationalism, which holds that perceptual experiences have representational content, is ‘now fairly uncontroversial’ (Lycan, 2004).
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Leclerc, André. "Artefacts: the big picture in broad terms." Filosofia Unisinos 22, no. 1 (March 15, 2021): 40–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.221.05.
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My aim in this programmatic paper is to explore the relationship among three important notions: intentionality, disposition and artefact. There wouldn’t be artefacts without what I call “intentional work,” a sustained activity directed to the production of some good. I first present contextualism as a method. Then I use it to delimit the problematic concept ARTEFACT, with the intention to apply it to repertoires of mental dispositions that affect directly our personal identity. The unavoidable but loose criterion of human intervention is used, at least to some degree. Attitudes are intentional states with conceptual content, and concepts are dispositions. We acquire concepts during our lives, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes explicitly through definition of some kind, and each cognitive agent has a unique repertoire of concepts and a unique idiolect as well. The idea that our mental representations (at least some of them) are artefacts might sound strange at first sight, but I shall try to show that it makes full sense. Most of our mental dispositions –those provided with a conceptual content– are themselves artefacts. At the end, we are all different psychologically and culturally because our idiolects and repertoires of concepts are different. For a large part, what makes our species so special is an ongoing process through which homo sapiens makes itself what it is.Keywords: Intentionality, disposition, artefact, contextualism, repertoire.
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Faichney, Robin. "Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information." tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society 11, no. 1 (December 12, 2012): 36–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v11i1.323.
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This article aims to show how mind, matter and meaning might be united in one theory using certain concepts of information, building on ideas of empathy and intentionality. The concept of intentionality in philosophy of mind (“aboutness”), which is “the ineliminable mark of the mental” according to Brentano, can be viewed as the relationship between model and object, and empathy can be viewed as a form of mental modelling, so that the inclination to attribute mentality can be identified with the inclination to empathise with the relevant entity. Physical information, a concept quite well established within the discipline of physics, is basically a reconceptualization of material form. Daniel Dennett's concept of the intentional stance allows the development of a concept of “intentional information,” a broad term that encompasses mental content and semantic information generally, as encoded within physical information/material form.
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Maslovets, O. A. "The role and place of intentionality as the basis for teaching foreign languages in line with the dialogue of cultures." Philology at MGIMO 23, no. 3 (September 17, 2020): 88–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2410-2423-2020-3-23-88-95.
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The article represents an effort to specify the essential characteristics of the relationship between the intentionality of consciousness, language and culture, and on this basis to reveal the features of the process of foreign language teaching.The author considers intentionality as a phenomenon that defines and provides the content of consciousness, allowing one to commit an act of self-determination and gaining subjectivity. In the activity of consciousness, the author distinguishes intentional flows of both relatively objects and subjects, which is a prerequisite for comprehending another I, a different cultural entity, and at the same time a condition for self-knowledge and deeper penetration into one’s own culture.Culture is a complex semiotic text, it is a context in which the language being studied as a secondary modeling system acts as a means where various phenomena can be sequentially described and interpreted by students.The openness of the subject to the world, nurtured in the course of intentional teaching of language and culture, allows its utter uniqueness, and at the same time utmost universality, to manifest itself. Such an attitude actualizes the internal regularity of human actions, the possibility of self-development and the formation of a system of deferred actions, which allows a person to realize, take place, actualizes the intentional field of his capabilities.The author comes to the conclusion that the process of foreign language teaching should be interpretative, significative, semiotic in nature. Taking into account during teaching а foreign language the intentional conditioning of any action, including speech, will ensure the achievement of a coordinated consciousness.
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Seliverstov, Vladimir V. "The problem of intentionality in the school of Brentano." Philosophy Journal 14, no. 2 (2021): 82–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2021-14-2-82-94.
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From the moment Franz Brentano formulated his definition of intentionality, it immediately began to undergo modifications in the works of his students. Brentano’s original definition included reference to the scholastic tradition, but it differs from the one that was formulated by the scholastics. In his work “Psychology from an Empirical Point of View”, Brentano defines intentionality both as an orientation towards an object and as a relation to some content, but at no later time, neither in this work, nor in other published works, does he clarify the meaning of the concept of «content». In this regard, the students and interpreters of Brentano’s works had a question: does the scheme of intentionality consist exclusively of an intentional act and an object, or does it also include the content of a representation? Brentano’s disciples did not view this definition as clear and unambiguous. In order to clarify this concept, they often studied other similar philosophical conceptions in search of a more precise definition. In particular, they looked for a similar concept in the theory of Bernard Bolzano. The first version of the schema of intentionality, including the content of representation, appeared in the works of Hoeffler and Twardowski. For this reason, for a long time they were considered by historians to be the discoverers of the distinction between object and content. However, after the notes of Brentano’s lectures, which he also read to his students, were recovered, it became clear that Brentano himself made this distinction. In this regard, it seems extremely important to interpret the history of the relationships in the Brentano school through the prism of the discussions devoted to the definition of intentionality and the structure of an intentional act, as well as to understand the origins of each individual interpretation of this concept proposed by Brentano’s students
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Jing, Feilong. "Investigating Intentionality of Linguistic Landscapes from the Multilingual Commercial Signs." International Journal of Linguistics, Literature and Culture 3, no. 5 (September 18, 2017): 42. http://dx.doi.org/10.21744/ijllc.v3i5.538.
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This article examines multilingual commercial signs of 329 businesses from 3 representative department stores and malls in the major commercial districts of N China’s Shanghai. By using photographs and interviews as the data sources, the article focuses on the intentionality conveyed by the commercial linguistic landscapes in terms of the intentional attitude and the intentional content. Based on data gained in this empirical research in March of 2016, it is found that there are three main categories of shop signs: monolingual (70.58%), bilingual (23.13%) and multilingual (6.29%). Results indicate that the signs in foreign languages is overabundant and that the monolingual tendency with English as a dominant language takes a proportion of 70%, while Chinese (25%) to a lower degree sees its status as a supplement for overall commercial Linguistic landscapes. It can also be concluded that most customers hold positive attitudes towards the bilingual and multilingual shop signs. They consider using foreign languages in shop signs more attractive and stylish and deem it more acceptable as it reflects a kind of internationalization. However, critical comments are evident as some respondents hold that the widespread utilization of foreign languages on shop signs heavily hinders the creation of harmonious domestic shopping environment, resulting in much inconvenience and discomfort. The research aims to provide suggestions on the planning of foreign languages use in public spaces and to promote the construction of spiritual civilization in commercial linguistic landscapes.
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Płotka, Witold. "Twardowski, Ingarden, and Blaustein on Creative Imagination." Social Imaginaries 5, no. 1 (2019): 121–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/si2019517.
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The article is a critical elaboration of two phenomenological theories of imagination formulated by Ingarden and Blaustein in their discussion with Twardowski. Ingarden, as well as Blaustein were students of both Twardowski and Husserl, however, they defined imagination in two different contexts: whereas for Ingarden a proper way of analysis of imagination is ontology, for Blaustein imagination is the object of descriptive psychology, connected mainly with an aesthetic experience. As a result, the question of creativity of imagination is described in two different, but intertwined ways. For Ingarden, creative imagination is understood as a noematical structure which generates the imagined object as a purely intentional object. Ingarden’s description expresses the ontological status of the imagined object as ontologically dependent on the act of imagining, and on the content of the imagined object. In his review of Ingarden’s Das literarische Kunstwerk, Blaustein was clear that one has to revise Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional object by adopting it to imaginative intentionality and aesthetic experience. To elaborate Ingarden’s theory of imagination, Blaustein discusses it also with reference to Twardowski. Blaustein claims that Twardowski’s Cartesian differentiation between perceptive, reproductive, and creative imagination is based on a vague criterion, and moreover it does not refer to two key notions of descriptive psychology, i.e., the notion of the representative content, and the intentional object. As a result of his critique, Blaustein limits the concept of creative imagination to ‘fantasy’, understood as secondary imagination.
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Shapiro, Lawrence A. "Representation from Bottom and Top." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 4 (December 1996): 523–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1996.10717466.
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I would like to nominate one more principle for initial inclusion in the science of teleonomy. This principle is that the nature of the stimuli that initiate and regulate a response may be no indication of the function of the response.George Williams could not have anticipated the special relevance his principle has for contemporary analyses of representational content. In particular, his principle provides both a concise statement of where a currently popular strategy for naturalizing representational content has gone wrong and a positive suggestion for how we should right this wrong. I characterize the kind of naturalistic analysis of representation I have in mind asbottom-upbecause it seeks to build representation up from a non-intentional, and hence naturalistically unimpeachable, correlation relation. Many authors have suggested such an approach to naturalizing intentionality, but for clarity and completeness perhaps Fred Dretske'sExplaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causesought to be construed as the exemplary source.
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Christensen, Carleton B. "The Horizonal Structure of Perceptual Experience." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 16, no. 1 (April 5, 2013): 109–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01601006.
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Edmund Husserl’s account of the horizonal character of simple, sensuous perception provides a sophisticated account of perceptual intentional content which enables plausible responses to key issues in the philosophy of perception and in Heidegger interpretation. Section 2 outlines Husserl’s account of intentionality in its application to such perceptual experience. Section 3 then elaborates the notion of perceptual horizon in order to draw out, in Section 4, its implications for four issues: firstly, the relation between the object perceived and perceptual appearance (qua item “in consciousness”); secondly, the relation between the subject perceiving and perceptual appearance; thirdly, what sense of the body is inherent to perceptual experience of the horizonal kind; and fourthly, what John McDowell is getting at when he claims that traditional conceptions fail to capture how perception puts us in cognitive contact with the world. The paper concludes by using the interpretation developed to show how Husserl’s account of perceptual experience as horizonal enables one to draw out the sense and worth of what Heidegger means by worldliness and the “Da” of Dasein.
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Whiting, Mark J. "Psalms 1 and 2 as a hermeneutical lens for reading the Psalter." Evangelical Quarterly 85, no. 3 (April 30, 2013): 246–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/27725472-08503004.
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Psalms 1 and 2 are considered unimportant in many interpretative paradigms. It is argued that this is due, in part, to the canonisation of the presupposition that there is no coherent determinable literary structure in the Psalter. This presupposition is challenged by noting the evidence that exists of literary intentionality at the micro-, meso- and macro-structural levels within the Psalter. The content of Psalms 1 and 2 is identified and the use of these themes and motifs within the Psalter is explored. A unifying overarching concern with Zion Theology is tentatively considered. The hermeneutical and theological potential of Psalms 1 and 2 as an intentional introduction are explored. Such an editorial agenda indicates that the collected Psalter is a deliberate rereading of its individual compositions. We conclude with the suggestion that this rereading might usefully be seen as a step in the direction of the more radical rereading demanded by NT faith.
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Fraisopi, Fausto. "Genèse et transcendantalisation du concept d’,horizon‘ chez Husserl." Phänomenologische Forschungen 2008 2008, no. 1 (2008): 43–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000107947.
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The concept of ,horizon‘ is fundamental for a theory of subjectivity and even more for a theory of transcendental subjectivity. This concept was introduced by Leibniz and discussed by Wolff, Baumgarten, Meier, to the aim of exploring more deeply its function in relation to the subject. Kant adopted this concept as a key-concept for his theory of experience and for his definition of logical forms as such. After Kant, the concept of ,horizon‘ reappeared in Husserl as a necessay correlate of the intentionality from a transcendental point of view. In 1913, when Husserl was working to rewrite the third chapter of the sixth Logical Investigation, he was forced to reintegrate the structures related to intuitive fulfillment with the coupled core/halo concepts, developed in 1908. On the basis of this integration, the concept of horizon emerged as a fundamental structure of perception. The structure of a single perception thus became integrated into a whole system of perception. This function of ,horizon‘ of correlating each intentional act is explicited in his late works, as the Cartesian Meditations and Experience and Judgement: each appearance consists of a whole system of appearances that are empty of content but are also potential manifestations of the same type.
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Mkhatshwa, E. "Authorial intention and agency in Luke’s Acts." Literator 31, no. 1 (July 13, 2010): 99–122. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/lit.v31i1.39.
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This article affirms the presence of the intentional consciousness in texts which purport to depict reality or real events. Intentionality, in the context of this article, is not conceived as a pre-existing thought or idea, which precedes the text, but as something which inheres in the text and is produced in it. The Cartesian split between consciousness and being which the former conception enacts is here elided and authorial intention is seen as something which is reproduced in the processes of writing and interpretation. This distinction is significant because the main argument of this article is that authorial intention in texts that purport to depict real events and intervene in a particular socio-historical process for mobilisational purposes, leads to the production of a certain kind of text which deploys specific narrative strategies that consolidate its reading and rendering of events and reinforce narrative closures. These intentionally motivated closures are embedded in narrative strategies, which are seen as both necessary and imperative for the consolidation and legitimation of the message and to foreclose other readings. Very briefly, this article seeks to reinscribe the agency of the author in his/her intentional stance with regard to the text. It further shows how this agency is enacted within the world of the text.
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Jovanovic, Monika. "Intentions and interpretation." Theoria, Beograd 56, no. 4 (2013): 33–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo1304033j.
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As Kendall Walton correctly noticed, which aesthetic properties a work of art will possess does not depend solely on its directly percetible properties but also to which ?category of art? it belongs. However, appropriate interpretation of an artwork, especially a literary work requires knowing of intentional context in which the work was made. Concerning the relationship between meaning of some literary work and semantic intentions of its author, in contemporary aesthetics there is a debate between actual and hypothetical intentionalists. In this paper I will exemine the main questions which are posed in this debate, and try to show how we can improve Levinson's hypothetical intentionalism, appealing to the dispositional conception of intentions. I will finally suggest an alternative way of understanding the relationship between suitable intentional factors and meaning of a given literary work.
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Szécsi, Gábor. "Context, Intention and Historical Understanding." Belvedere Meridionale 31, no. 4 (2019): 5–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/belv.2019.4.1.
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The aim of this article is to indicate how a version of intentionalist theory of linguistic communication can be adapted as a part of a contextualist methodology of the history of ideas. In other words, we attempt to clear up the way of harmonizing the theory that communication takes place when a hearer/reader grasps an utterer’s intention with the methodological conception according to which a historian of ideas must concentrate his attention on the context in which in his past author was writing. This article argues that a plausible solution to this problem is suggested in some influential methodological essays by Quentin Skinner. Therefore we shall discuss, on the one hand, the place of an intentionalist model of communication in Skinner’s methodology by providing a brief outline of the main theses of contextualism and intentionalism. On the other hand, we deal with some epistemological problems raised by the application of contextualist method. In particular, we consider the questions that can be raised about the manner in which a historian can grasp an author’s intention.
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Jovanov, Rastko. "Hostile emotions and the problem of their collectivity." Theoria, Beograd 63, no. 4 (2020): 53–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2004053j.
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The paper discusses the nature of negative (hostile) emotions and their role in the cultural, i.e. the ethical world of life. A distinction is made between positive and negative emotions on the basis of their orientation towards the outside world and towards the bearer of emotional states. It is claimed that the bearer of negative emotions, unlike positive ones, becomes, in fact, their hostage over time, and that he is intentionally turned towards himself as an object instead of towards other people. I also claimed that this kind of intentionality is ?empty?, because the object of intention exists only in the memory of the subject of intention. In the end, I presented arguments in favor of the existence of collective hostile emotions that can have a positive meaning in a certain social context, which is characterized by obvious social inequality and injustice.
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Cane, Peter. "Fleeting Mental States." Cambridge Law Journal 59, no. 2 (June 29, 2000): 273–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197300000118.
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The philosophical concept of acting intentionally does not entail a perceptible time gap between intention and action. We may say of a person who acts on the spur of the moment that their action was intended or intentional; but in such circumstances, intention and action may seem to merge in a way that makes it difficult to disentangle the mental and physical elements of the person's conduct. The author argues that in this context the tools and techniques used by philosophers of mind and action may not provide us with the best understanding of the social practices of blaming found in the criminal law.
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Schwarz, Kathryn. "Chastity, Militant and Married: Cavendish's Romance, Milton's Masque." Publications of the Modern Language Association of America 118, no. 2 (March 2003): 270–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1632/003081203x67668.
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This essay takes up the issue of chaste intentionality in John Milton's A Mask Presented at Ludlow Castle and Margaret Cavendish's Assaulted and Pursued Chastity. Each of these narratives presents a female protagonist who simultaneously embodies and theorizes sexual virtue, creating a problem of will: when women intentionally participate in the ideological structures that constrain their acts, whose agency is at stake? The essay locates this question in the context of early modern conduct manuals and other prescriptive codifications of feminine sexuality, in which the performance of chastity, even as it is idealized, often involves actual or potential acts of violence against patriarchal structures and the male subjects who inhabit them. Milton and Cavendish raise the stakes by creating characters whose chastity is militant even as it tends toward marriage, identifying intentional virtue as a profoundly social problem.
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Sverdlik, Steven. "Consistency Among Intentions and the ‘Simple View’." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26, no. 4 (December 1996): 515–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1996.10717465.
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What is the relation between the intention to A and doing A intentionally? It is natural to suppose that the latter entails the former. That is, it is natural to accept what Michael Bratman has called the ‘Simple View’ of the relation between acting intentionally and having an intention. Bratman is one noteworthy writer who has denied that the Simple View is true. In the present paper I do not defend this view. I contend that one well-known argument that Bratman offers for thinking that the Simple View is false fails, in fact, to disprove it. If there are reasons for thinking that the Simple View is false, as I believe there are, they are not the ones that Bratman has offered. My discussion of Bratman also raises some more general questions about the principles governing the rational formation of intentions. I suggest that a special sort of example casts doubt on the tenability of a commonly accepted principle that Bratman, among others, utilizes.
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Opanasyuk, Alexander P. "To the Definition of the Intentional Art Style." Observatory of Culture, no. 3 (June 28, 2014): 4–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.25281/2072-3156-2014-0-3-4-10.
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Is dedicated to the definition of its typical features. The essence and content of this style is linked to the substitution of the dynamical principle by the extensive one in the processual existence of culture together with the formation of the intentional reflection with the cultural space. The latter simulates the related intentionally connotative senses and stipulates the appropriate style of cultural entity - the intentional style.
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Sugarman, Stephen D. "Restating the Tort of Battery." Journal of Tort Law 10, no. 2 (September 25, 2018): 197–236. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2017-0020.
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AbstractThis article offers a bold proposal: eliminate the intentional tort of battery and merge cases of both the negligent and intentional imposition of physical harm into a single new tort. The advantages of a single tort of wrongfully causing physical harm to persons are many. It would (a) do away with complex and unneeded doctrinal details now contained within battery law, (b) pave the way to a sensible regime of comparative fault for all such physical injuries, (c) properly shift the legal focus away from the plaintiff’s conduct and onto the defendant’s, (d) eliminate the Restatement’s need to supplement battery law with yet a separate intentional physical harm tort when an injury is intentionally caused but without the contact or other requirements of battery, and (e) force courts to decide various collateral issues (like whether punitive damages are available or whether liability insurance coverage is applicable) on their own terms and not by linking them to whether this case involves a battery (and then making exceptions, since it turns out that battery is not a reliable basis for deciding those collateral matters). More broadly, the new tort is intellectually more insightful as it anchors acts that now count as batteries more in their wrongfulness than in their intentionality as battery law does today.
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Vanwalleghem, Stéphanie, Raphaële Miljkovitch, Alyssa Counsell, Leslie Atkinson, and Annie Vinter. "Validation of the Intention Attribution Test for Children (IAC)." Assessment 27, no. 7 (March 5, 2019): 1619–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1073191119831781.
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The Intention Attribution Test for Children (IAC) was created to assess hostile attribution bias in preschool- and early school-aged children. It comprises 16 cartoon strips presenting situations in which one character (either a child or an adult) causes harm to another, either intentionally, accidentally (nonintentional), or without his or her intention being clear (ambiguous). Its validity was tested on 233 children aged 4 to 12 years. Exploratory factor analysis and item response theory models demonstrated support for a single factor of hostile attribution bias for the ambiguous and nonintentional items. Analyses revealed, however, that the intentional items did not contribute to this same overall construct of hostile intention attribution bias. Correlations with the Social Perception Test and with sociometry suggest good validity of the IAC. The IAC may be a useful instrument for research and in the context of therapeutic intervention addressing socially inappropriate behavior in childhood.
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Koike, Takahiko, Hiroki C. Tanabe, Saori Adachi-Abe, Shuntaro Okazaki, Eri Nakagawa, Akihiro T. Sasaki, Koji Shimada, et al. "Role of the right anterior insular cortex in joint attention-related identification with a partner." Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 14, no. 10 (October 1, 2019): 1131–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsz087.
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Abstract Understanding others as intentional agents is critical in social interactions. We perceive others’ intentions through identification, a categorical judgment that others should work like oneself. The most primitive form of understanding others’ intentions is joint attention (JA). During JA, an initiator selects a shared object through gaze (initiative joint attention, IJA), and the responder follows the direction of the initiator’s gaze (reactive joint attention, RJA). Therefore, both participants share the intention of object selection. However, the neural underpinning of shared intention through JA remains unknown. In this study, we hypothesized that JA is represented by inter-individual neural synchronization of the intention-related activity. Additionally, JA requires eye contact that activates the limbic mirror system; therefore, we hypothesized that this system is involved in shared attention through JA. To test these hypotheses, participants underwent hyperscanning fMRI while performing JA tasks. We found that IJA-related activation of the right anterior insular cortex of participants was positively correlated with RJA-related activation of homologous regions in their partners. This area was activated by volitional selection of the target during IJA. Therefore, identification with others by JA is likely accomplished by the shared intentionality of target selection represented by inter-individual synchronization of the right anterior insular cortex.
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FJELSTUL, JOSHUA C., and CLIFFORD J. CARRUBBA. "The Politics of International Oversight: Strategic Monitoring and Legal Compliance in the European Union." American Political Science Review 112, no. 3 (March 16, 2018): 429–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055418000096.
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States often violate international agreements, both accidentally and intentionally. To process complaints efficiently, states can create formal, pretrial procedures in which governments can negotiate with litigants before a case ever goes to court. If disputes are resolved during pretrial negotiations, it can be very difficult to tell what has happened. Are governments coming into compliance? If so, are they only doing so when they have accidentally committed a violation or even when they are intentionally resisting? Or are challenges simply being dropped? This paper presents a formal model to address these questions. We develop our theory in the context of the European Union (EU). To test our model, we collect a new dataset of over 13,000 Commission infringement cases against EU member states (2003–2013). Our results suggest that accidental and intentional noncompliance both occur, but that intentional noncompliance is more common in the EU. We find that the Commission is an effective, if imperfect, monitor and enforcer of international law. The Commission can correct intentional noncompliance, but not always. It strategically drops cases that it believes it is unlikely to win.
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Shabat-Savka, Svitlana. "Psycholinguistic Dimension of Communicative Intention: Speaker’s Substance and Syntaxing." PSYCHOLINGUISTICS 24, no. 2 (October 3, 2018): 321–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.31470/2309-1797-2018-24-2-321-339.
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The article analyzes the communicative intention as a linguistic category which has a direct connection with the psychological space of the linguistic personality, with a number of psychic phenomena, a sphere of consciousness and thinking, with the motivation of the speech activity of communicants and the explication of their intentions in textual communication; the terminological correlation of intention is defined in the context of psycholinguistic concepts «need», «motive», «intent», «intentionality». It was noted that the speaker’s motivation-need generates the preverbal intention, which in the process of communication and text-formation is verbalized through syntactic units.
With the help of well-chosen linguistic methodology, it was found that the communicative intention is the prerogative of the speaker, who enters into the process of communication with his/her emotions and desires, personal beliefs and preferences, with successes and failures, which ultimately marks the intentional horizons of the communication, determines the course of tolerant or atolerant interaction, the choice of commonly used or ethnomarked, direct or indirect means, figurative-rhetorical structures for the verbalization of various intentions.
The illustrative material presents the functioning of tolerant and atolerant registers of communication; it was highlighted that tolerance implies a respectful attitude to the interlocutor, the free realization of the speaker’s individual needs, and the friendly atmosphere of the communication process. Atolerant communication reveals disequilibria which exists in the relationships between the communicants resulting in the asymmetric speech activity – differences in communicants’ age, physiological and mental state, their intellectual and cultural level make conflicts, aggressiveness and negative behavior of communicants unavoidable.
In the context of research done by foreign and domestic scientists, the opinion was substantiated that the intention is an important component of a person's mental state which can be explicated and become accessible to other subjects of the communication process only with the help of syntactic and discursive-genre resources of the language.
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Lau, Stephan, and Rainer Reisenzein. "Evidence for the Context Dependence of the Side-Effect Effect." Journal of Cognition and Culture 16, no. 3-4 (September 21, 2016): 267–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12342180.
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In four experiments involving 565 German speakers we tested several hypotheses about possible determinants of the side-effect effect (see), which consists of judging foreseen bad, but not good, side-effects of actions as intentionally produced. Experiment 1 failed to find intentionality ascriptions for bad side-effects for the majority of the participants in two different scenarios and obtained no consistent support for two hypothesized social-cognitive determinants of the see, the agent’s attitude and the mode of effect description. Experiment 2 replicated the see in the original ceo scenario, but again found no evidence that the effect was influenced by the agent’s attitude towards the side-effect. The see was also not influenced by a manipulation of the moral quality of the agent’s primary goal. Experiment 3 investigated six additional scenarios used in previous studies and again obtained clear evidence for the see only in the ceo scenario. In addition, Experiment 3 demonstrated that judgments of both intent and intentionality strongly increased if the original side-effect was described as a means to the agent’s primary goal, or as an independently pursued goal. Taken together, the findings suggest that for German speakers, the see depends on the specifics of the scenario content and is difficult to obtain outside the original ceo scenario. Consistent with these conclusions, Experiment 4 documented parallel difficulties replicating the “means effect”, an analogue of the see on the level of means, but replicated the see in a scenario closely modeled after the original ceo scenario.
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Rassi, Fatemeh, and Zeiae Shahabi. "Husserl's Phenomenology and Two Terms of Noema and Noesis." International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences 53 (June 2015): 29–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.18052/www.scipress.com/ilshs.53.29.
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In Ideas, Husserl usesthis pair of terms, "Noema" and "Noesis" to refer to correlated elements of the structure of any intentional act. In fact in Ideas, Husserl uses the term ‘Noesis’ to refer to intentional acts or “act-quality” and ‘Noema’ to refer to what, in the Logical Investigationshad been referred to as “act-matter”. He also says that every intentional act has noetic content. This noetic content is that mental act-process which becomes directed towards the intentionally held object. Every act also has a Noematic correlate that which is meant by it. In other words, every intentional act has an "I-pole and an "object-pole. According to Husserl, noesis is the real content, namely, noesis is real character, the part of the act that gives the character to a thing. Noema is the ideal essence of the character. Husserl says also about the noema as the Sinn or sense of the act. Husserl also, refers to full noema. According to Husserl the full noema is the object of the act as meant in the act, the perceived object as perceived, the judged object as judged, and so on. In fact the full noema is a complex structure comprised of at least a noematic sense and a noematic core.
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Antusch, S., R. Custers, H. Marien, and H. Aarts. "Studying the sense of agency in the absence of motor movement: an investigation into temporal binding of tactile sensations and auditory effects." Experimental Brain Research 239, no. 6 (April 7, 2021): 1795–806. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00221-021-06087-8.
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AbstractPeople form coherent representations of goal-directed actions. Such agency experiences of intentional action are reflected by a shift in temporal perception: self-generated motor movements and subsequent sensory effects are perceived to occur closer together in time—a phenomenon termed intentional binding. Building on recent research suggesting that temporal binding occurs without intentionally performing actions, we further examined whether such perceptual compression occurs when motor action is fully absent. In three experiments, we used a novel sensory-based adaptation of the Libet clock paradigm to assess how a brief tactile sensation on the index finger and a resulting auditory stimulus perceptually bind together in time. Findings revealed robust temporal repulsion (instead of binding) between tactile sensation and auditory effect. Temporal repulsion was attenuated when participants could anticipate the identity and temporal onset (two crucial components of intentional action) of the tactile sensation. These findings are briefly discussed in the context of differences between intentional movement and anticipated bodily sensations in shaping action coherence and agentic experiences.
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Nefedova, L. K. "INTENTIONALITY OF NUMINOUS." Review of Omsk State Pedagogical University. Humanitarian research, no. 28 (2020): 33–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.36809/2309-9380-2020-28-33-37.
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On the basis of the phenomenological concept of the sacrednuminous R. Otto, the development of the meanings of numinous in modern culture in the context of a pandemic is considered. The specificity of the sacred with its foundation in the numinous, as presented by R. Otto, is studied as a methodology for comprehending the empiricism of a pandemic. An appeal to the empirical cut leads to the identification of transformations in the phenomenological status of the numinous. It is noted that the religious experience of a person at the beginning of the 20th century and the religious experience of the modern man has certain differences associated with the development of secular culture. R. Otto’s thought about the reality of the numinous, understood as the Divine expression of the will of an incomprehensible transcendental object, whose intentions largely determine human life, are presented in correlation with the intentionality of the challenge thrown to humanity by the pandemic. At the same time, a certain reduction of the components of the experience of the numinous by the modern man is noted.
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Held, Manfred. "Trigger Contact Arrangement for Intentionally Initiated Explosive Reactive Armour." Propellants, Explosives, Pyrotechnics 23, no. 6 (December 1998): 292–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1521-4087(199812)23:6<292::aid-prep292>3.0.co;2-h.
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Macedo, Rodrigo Santana, Wenceslau Geraldes Teixeira, Hedinaldo Narciso Lima, Adriana Costa Gil de Souza, Francisco Weliton Rocha Silva, Omar Cubas Encinas, and Eduardo Góes Neves. "Amazonian dark earths in the fertile floodplains of the Amazon River, Brazil: an example of non-intentional formation of anthropic soils in the Central Amazon region." Boletim do Museu Paraense Emílio Goeldi. Ciências Humanas 14, no. 1 (April 2019): 207–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1981-81222019000100013.
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ABSTRACT Amazonian dark earths (ADEs) are fertile soils created by pre-Columbian Amerindian societies of the Amazon Basin. However, it is still not clear whether these soils were produced intentionally to improve infertile Amazonian upland soils or if they resulted from the accumulation of organic matter from sedentary settlements. This study characterizes the ADEs found in the naturally fertile alluvial floodplains of the Amazon River in the Central Brazilian Amazon according to total, exchangeable, and available contents of elements and organic carbon in soil profiles. ADEs contained higher levels of available elements and total P, Ca, Zn, and Cu. High total Cr, Ni, Co, and V content in these soils indicate that mafic minerals contributed to their composition, while higher contents of P, Zn, Ba, and Sr indicate anthropic enrichment. The presence of ADEs in floodplain areas strongly indicates non-intentional anthropic fertilization of the alluvial soils, which naturally contain levels of P, Ca, Zn, and Cu higher than those needed to cultivate common plants. The presence of archaeological sites in the floodplains also shows that pre-Columbian populations lived in these regions as well as on bluffs above the Amazon River.
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Bisson, Marie-Josée, Anuenue Kukona, and Angelos Lengeris. "An ear and eye for language: Mechanisms underlying second language word learning." Bilingualism: Language and Cognition 24, no. 3 (January 26, 2021): 549–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1366728920000723.
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AbstractTo become fluent in a second language, learners need to acquire a large vocabulary. However, the cognitive and affective mechanisms that support word learning, particularly among second language learners, are only beginning to be understood. Prior research has focused on intentional learning and small artificial lexicons. In the current study investigating the sources of individual variability in word learning and their underlying mechanisms, participants intentionally and incidentally learned a large vocabulary of Welsh words (i.e., emulating word learning in the wild) and completed a large battery of cognitive and affective measures. The results showed that, for both learning conditions, native language knowledge, auditory/phonological abilities and orthographic sensitivity all made unique contributions to word learning. Importantly, short-term/working memory played a significantly larger role in intentional learning. We discuss these results in the context of the mechanisms that support both native and non-native language learning.
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Prichard, Alex. "Collective intentionality, complex pluralism and the problem of anarchy." Journal of International Political Theory 13, no. 3 (July 6, 2017): 360–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1755088217715789.
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In this article, I argue that contemporary theories of collective intentionality force us to think about anarchy in new and challenging ways. In the years since Wendt declared the state a person, the collective intentionality of groups has become the focus of important scholarship across the humanities and social sciences. But this literature will not sit easily with mainstream International Relations for two reasons. First, contemporary theories of collective intentionality are difficult to square with the idea that the personified state is an intentional agent, with first-person plural self-awareness and moral obligations. However, by contrast, the same theories make it eminently plausible for all sorts of other groups to be intentional, agential, moral persons and can tell us how states are constructed. In short, this set of theories radically pluralises and transforms standard political ontology while also accounting for common misperceptions. I push these insights further to argue that radical pluralisation suggests that anarchy may be the structural context for politics as such. What we know from mainstream International Relations theory is that politics without an orderer is well-ordered regardless. It may be time to recast these insights in order to demonstrate how complex pluralism is not chaos but anarchy.
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Rossmann, Doralyn, and Scott W. H. Young. "Social media optimization: making library content shareable and engaging." Library Hi Tech 33, no. 4 (November 16, 2015): 526–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/lht-05-2015-0053.
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Purpose – Social Media Optimization (SMO) offers guidelines by which libraries can design content for social shareability through social networking services (SNSs). The purpose of this paper is to introduce SMO and discuss its effects and benefits for libraries. Design/methodology/approach – Researchers identified and applied five principles of SMO. Web analytics software provides data on web site traffic and user engagement before and after the application of SMO. Findings – By intentionally applying a program of SMO, the library increased content shareability, increased user engagement, and built community. Research limitations/implications – Increasing use of SNSs may influence the study results, independent of SMO application. Limitations inherent to web analytics software may affect results. Further study could expand analysis beyond web analytics to include comments on SNS posts, SNS shares from library pages, and a qualitative analysis of user behaviors and attitudes regarding library web content and SNSs. Practical implications – This research offers an intentional approach for libraries to optimize their online resources sharing through SNSs. Originality/value – Previous research has examined the role of community building and social connectedness for SNS users, but none have discussed using SMO to encourage user engagement and interactivity through increased SNS traffic into library web pages.
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MAAS, FAY K., and LEONARD ABBEDUTO. "Children's judgements about intentionally and unintentionally broken promises." Journal of Child Language 28, no. 2 (June 2001): 517–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000901004743.
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Astington (1988) found that seven- to nine-year-olds often fail to distinguish between promises and predictions when judging the utterances of characters in simple stories. Instead, these children attend only to the outcome of the story (i.e. whether the promised event occurred) when deciding whether a promise has been made and, to a lesser extent, when deciding whether the speaker is responsible for the outcome. The purpose of the present study was to examine whether seven- to nine-year-olds (a) vary their judgements of responsibility according to the reason that the promised action was not completed, and (b) recognize that an unfulfilled promise is a promise regardless of whether the speaker's failure is unavoidable or intentional. Seven-year-olds, nine-year-olds, and adults were asked to make promise and responsibility judgements for two story types: stories in which the promiser intentionally failed to fulfil his or her promise and stories in which an unforeseen event prevented the promiser from fulfilling the promise. Participants at all ages assigned responsibility correctly across both story types. In making promise judgements, however, the seven-year-olds' decisions about promises reflected a misguided attention to the outcome of a promise or the obstacle to its fulfilment. The nine-year-olds recognized that an unfulfilled promise is a promise but only when there was a clear reason for the speaker's failure to fulfil his or her obligation. We suggest that children consider only sincere promises to be instances of promising and make inferences about speaker sincerity by looking to external factors in the communicative context.
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Zahourek, Rothlyn P. "Theory: Intentionality the Matrix of Healing: A Theory Revised With Nonnurse Care Providers." Journal of Holistic Nursing 38, no. 3 (December 9, 2019): 287–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0898010119892093.
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Purpose: To explore and conceptualize the nature of intentionality in the context of healing through the descriptive experiences of nonnurse professional care providers and natural healers and to determine if the previously developed theory (intentionality: the matrix of healing [IMH]) was supported or needed revision. Method: Ten care providers and two natural healers were interviewed. Data were analyzed using a modified grounded theory—constant comparative method. Coding, memos, diagraming, and concept development were used to compare these results with the previous two cohorts. The study had institutional review board approval. Results: The theory of IMH was supported. All cohorts agreed that intentionality is essential for healing and similar to, but different from and greater than, intention. The core process of nonlinear expanding personal development, viewed as both an attribute and the core process, is now called dynamic differentiation. The theory IMH describes intentionality as a dynamically evolving process that creates the energy, shape, and structure, or matrix, for intention, actions, and healing.
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Varela-Neira, Concepción, Rodolfo Vázquez-Casielles, and Víctor Iglesias. "Intentionality attributions and humiliation." European Journal of Marketing 48, no. 5/6 (May 6, 2014): 901–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ejm-01-2012-0035.
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Purpose – This paper aims to determine whether intentionality attributions have an effect on the customer’s complaint and switching behavior after a service failure, after accounting for the effects of the traditional dimensions of attribution (stability and controllability), and to examine whether intentionality attributions give rise to humiliation and to what degree this negative emotion enables us to understand the customer’s complaint and switching behavior after a service failure. Design/methodology/approach – A contribution of this investigation is that it studies real complaint and switching behaviors, as the few studies that focus on understanding customers’ complaint and defection behaviors mostly analyze customers’ intentions. Findings – The results of the study indicate that intentionality attributions have an effect on the customer’s switching behavior after a service failure, in addition to the impact of the traditional dimensions of attribution. The findings also show that humiliation is the emotion that mediates the relationship between intentionality attributions and switching behavior, opposite to other emotions that may also be related to attributions. Finally, the results also support that the effect of attribution of intentionality on complaint behavior is indirect; it only exists because attribution of intentionality influences negative emotions like humiliation, which in turn influences complaint behavior. Practical implications – To understand what makes customers complain after a service failure or switch service providers without giving them first the possibility of recovering the failure may help managers reduce the damage caused by the failure and increase the company’s profits. Originality/value – This study will try to contribute to the service failure research by analyzing the role of two variables that have not been analyzed before in this context: intentionality attribution and humiliation.
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Moore, Richard, Kristin Liebal, and Michael Tomasello. "Three-year-olds understand communicative intentions without language, gestures, or gaze." Interaction Studies 14, no. 1 (May 6, 2013): 62–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/is.14.1.05moo.
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The communicative interactions of very young children almost always involve language (based on conventions), gesture (based on bodily deixis or iconicity) and directed gaze. In this study, ninety-six children (3;0 years) were asked to determine the location of a hidden toy by understanding a communicative act that contained none of these familiar means. A light-and-sound mechanism placed behind the hiding place and illuminated by a centrally placed switch was used to indicate the location of the toy. After a communicative training session, an experimenter pressed the switch either deliberately or accidentally, and with or without ostension (in the form of eye contact and child-directed speech). In no condition did she orient towards the hiding place. When the switch was pressed intentionally, children used the light-and-sound cue to find the toy – and tended to do so even in the absence of ostensive eye contact. When the experimenter pressed the switch accidentally, children searched randomly – demonstrating that they were tracking her communicative intent, and not merely choosing on the basis of salience. The absence of an effect of ostension contradicts research that ostension helps children to interpret the communicative intentions underlying unfamiliar signs. We explain this by concluding that while it may play a role in establishing a communicative interaction, it is not necessary for sustaining one; and that even with a highly novel communicative act – involving none of the means of communication on which children typically rely – three-year-olds can comprehend the communicative intentions behind an intentionally produced act.
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Meier, Hans-Rudolf. "Verkörpern, Verwandeln und Autorisieren mittels Spolien." Zeitschrift für Medien- und Kulturforschung 8, no. 1 (2017): 177–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.28937/1000107629.
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"Spolien – intentional wiederverwendete Bauglieder – referenzieren auf etwas nicht mehr Vorhandenes und machen dieses zugleich materiell präsent. Als einstiger Teil des Ab- wesenden verweisen sie im neuen Kontext zurück auf ihre Herkunftsobjekte. Sie verkörpern abstrakte Konzepte, Autorisierung und Authentisierung. In den präsentierten Bei- spielen werden verschiedene Ähnlichkeitsbezüge zum Herkunftsmonument diskutiert, die von formalen Referenzen über die exzessive Verkörperung zur formlosen Verarbeitung des Materials in einer neuer Oberfläche reichen. Spoils – intentionally reused architectural fragments – refer to something that no longer exists and re-present it materially. As a former part of the absent, they refer back to their original objects in their new context. They embody abstract concepts, authorization and authentication. In the examples presented, different ways of referring to the original monuments are discussed, ranging from formal references to excessive embodiment and complete loss of shape. "
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Carr-Chellman, Davin J., and Michael Kroth. "The Spiritual Disciplines as Practices of Transformation." International Journal of Adult Vocational Education and Technology 8, no. 1 (January 2017): 23–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijavet.2017010103.
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Spiritual disciplines are practices of transformation intentionally pursued through the day-to-day actions of deeper living. The spiritual disciplines are conceptualized here in their relationship to profound learning. The authors contend that profound learners exhibit certain dispositions, such as curiosity, that facilitate continual growth. These dispositions, when developed, become practices, habits, or routines which result in continual exploration, skill development, growth in understanding and, over time, transformation of the individual. Spiritual disciplines, such as prayer, fasting, and worship, which move the individual toward the divine, are experienced in all the traditional religious traditions. This is an intentional process of personal transformation, evolving over time, and not contingent on serendipitous circumstance. Transformational learning within this framework is a process of individual conversion from shallowness toward becoming an ever deeper, more authentic person.
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Alois, Jaclyn, Srinidhi Bellamkonda, Eamon T. Campolettano, Ryan A. Gellner, Amaris Genemaras, Jonathan G. Beckwith, Richard M. Greenwald, et al. "Do American Youth Football Players Intentionally Use Their Heads for High-Magnitude Impacts?" American Journal of Sports Medicine 47, no. 14 (November 7, 2019): 3498–504. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0363546519882034.
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Background: Concern for head injuries is widespread and has been reported by the media to be the number one cause of decreased participation in football among the American youth population. Identifying player mechanisms associated with intentional, or purposeful, head impacts should provide critical data for rule modifications, educational programs, and equipment design. Purpose: To investigate the frequency of intentional and unintentional head impacts and to examine the player mechanisms associated with intentional high-magnitude head impacts by comparing the impact mechanism distributions among session type, player position, and ball possession. Study Design: Cross-sectional study; Level of evidence, 3. Methods: Head impact sensors and video footage of 68 players were used to analyze and classify 1319 high-magnitude impacts recorded over 1 season of youth football. Results: In total, 80% of the high-magnitude head impacts were classified as being caused by intentional use of the head. Head-to-head impact was the primary impact mechanism (n = 868; 82.7%) within the 1050 intentional high-magnitude impacts, with classifiable mechanisms, followed by head-to-body (n = 139; 13.2%), head-to-ground (n = 34; 3.2%), and head-to-equipment (n = 9; 0.9%). Head-to-head impacts also accounted for a greater proportion of impacts during practices (n = 625; 88.9%) than games, for linemen (n = 585; 90.3%) than perimeters and backs, and for ball carriers (n = 72; 79.1%) than tacklers. Conclusion: Overall, the majority of high-magnitude head impacts were intentional and resulted from head-to-head contact. The proportion of head-to-head contact was significantly higher for practices than games, linemen than backs and perimeter players, and ball carriers than tacklers.
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Juris, Jeffrey. "Spaces of Intentionality: Race, Class, and Horizontality at the United States Social Forum." Mobilization: An International Quarterly 13, no. 4 (November 25, 2008): 353–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.17813/maiq.13.4.232j1557h7658813.
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The World Social Forum process has sought to provide an "open space" for diverse movements to exchange ideas, interact, and coordinate as they build another world. Despite this inclusive impulse, many of the forums have been disproportionately white and middle class. Through an ethnographic account of the 2007 United States Social Forum (USSF) in Atlanta, I examine one high-profile attempt to overcome this lack of diversity by establishing what I refer to as an "intentional" space. I argue that the intentional strategy pursued by USSF organizers achieved a high level of diversity in racial and class terms, but de-emphasized the role of the forum as a "contact zone" for translation, sharing, and exchange among diverse movement sectors. However, given the strong desire to overcome past exclusions among participants, the privileging of intentionality over openness and horizontality was widely viewed as legitimate, which has important implications for democratic practice.
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Fisher, Kirsten J. "Purpose-based or knowledge-based intention for collective wrongdoing in international criminal law?" International Journal of Law in Context 10, no. 2 (May 1, 2014): 163–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744552314000020.
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AbstractDue to the distinct nature of international crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity originating out of and contributing to the pervasive collective character of mass atrocity, the appropriate mens rea for individual commission of these crimes is difficult to pin down. The mens rea for these international crimes has been deliberated, disputed and inconsistently applied, leaving what it means for individuals to intend to commit crimes of mass atrocity mired in confusion. This paper explores the meaning of intentional commission of collective crime, and demonstrates that from both philosophical and legal perspectives, acting intentionally in the context of mass atrocity can be interpreted in different ways, resulting in a condition of international criminal law which is at risk of unpredictability and expressive uncertainty. The paper endorses purpose-based, rather than knowledge-based, intent as the appropriate standard in the context of international crimes by arguing that mere knowledge of outcomes is insufficient.