Academic literature on the topic 'Intentionality; Intentional content'
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Journal articles on the topic "Intentionality; Intentional content"
1
Liu, Hao. "Intentional Directedness and Immanent Content." International Philosophical Quarterly 60, no. 1 (2020): 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq202013144.
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This paper will investigate the roots of intentionality in Aristotle’s theory of perception and assess the accuracy of Brentano’s proposed location of intentionality in Aristotle. When introducing intentionality into contemporary philosophy, Brentano attributed it to Aristotle, whose theory of psychology he believed to reveal the characteristics of intentional inexistence. After setting up a working definition of intentionality that stresses such features as immanent content and intentional directedness, I will then clarify Aristotle’s theory of perception with regard to these two characteristics. I draw the conclusion that we can only find the roots of immanent content in Aristotle’s perceptual theory. For him, directedness moves from the sensible object to the sensitive soul, and thus it does not correspond to what contemporary philosophers define as intentional directedness.
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Ratcliffe, Matthew. "Emotional Intentionality." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (July 2019): 251–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246118000784.
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AbstractThis paper sketches an account of what distinguishes emotional intentionality from other forms of intentionality. I focus on the ‘two-sided’ structure of emotional experience. Emotions such as being afraid of something and being angry about something involve intentional states with specific contents. However, experiencing an entity, event, or situation in a distinctively emotional way also includes a wider-ranging disturbance of the experiential world within which the object of emotion is encountered. I consider the nature of this disturbance and its relationship to the localized content of an emotional experience.
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Maslovets, O. A. "Regulated intentionality as a Modern Educational Model: Philosophical and Cultural Analysis." Concept: philosophy, religion, culture 4, no. 3 (September 28, 2020): 52–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2541-8831-2020-3-15-52-61.
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The article is devoted to new directions of personality formation in the postnonclassical value- semantic paradigm of education and science. The existing multidimensional understanding models are in close relationship with the reorientation of a goal-oriented education from a knowledge-centered to a competency-centered one. This shift requires new strategies and techniques for personality formation, with new mentality and objectives. A key role should be devoted to creating a special phenomenological educational environment with intentionality as the driving force of complex structures of consciousness which ensures the identifiability of an object and construction of its meaning. This process becomes possible only within the framework of an intentional act, when the perceptions of the object and its essential content are exposed. As mental intentions and the intentional of the Other are unknown, but new meanings are closely interconnected in the consciousness. In this way knowledge is created: transcendental experience integrates new meanings with those acquired earlier. Sense formation is regulated unconsciously in the mind of a subject. But within the framework of a modern education system, this process can ascend a superior level by regulated meaning formation based on conscious and unconscious intentional acts. Therefore, the development of mechanisms for managing intentional acts of a subject that are relative to sense formation through one’s transcendental experience should be the main focus of innovative education.
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Krokos, Jan. "THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF INTENTIONALITY." Studia Philosophiae Christianae 56, S1 (December 31, 2020): 107–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.21697/spch.2020.56.s1.07.
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The issue of intentionality was posed anew in philosophy by Franz Brentano. However, it was Brentano himself who indicated that the source of intentionality-related problems dates back to Classical Antiquity and the Middle Ages. The search for the original traces of this issue in the history of philosophy has led me to conclude that intentionality as an inalienable characteristic of consciousness is characterized by three-dimensionality, which is expressed in theoria, praxis and poiesis. Contemporary research focuses primarily on cognitive intentionality, examining in particular either the very subject-object relation or the immanent (intentional) object, in-existing in psychical experience (in the acts of consciousness). And yet, intentionality is a basic feature of the whole consciousness-anchored (mental) life of a human being. It determines the whole consciousness-based activity of the subject in abstract theorizing, practice and production. Therefore, it manifests itself as a mode of being of a conscious (mental) entity, i.e. an entity partially constituted by intentional content, relationality, reference, directionality, openness and conscious awareness , as well as determining the meaning and the creation of purely intentional beings. Intentionality is revealed as a primary factor in the awakening of consciousness, through the building (constituting) of conscious experiences that are poietic, practical and theoretical. Each of these three ways of categorizing the nature of experience, however, indicates only the predominant aspect of a given experience, for strictly speaking experiences are determined by all three aspects. Intentionality and – consequently – all conscious experience, are thus characterized by three-dimensions: cognitive, activistic and productive. Any act of consciousness is always a form of activity that is informed by its cognitive aspect and produces something transcendent with regard to itself. The recognition of the three-dimensional nature of intentionality allows us to understand the human being and the dilemmas concerning his actions, knowledge and creativity.
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Borghi, A. M., and F. Binkofski. "Intentionality of movement: Mirror neuron system and theory of mind." European Psychiatry 26, S2 (March 2011): 2113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0924-9338(11)73816-0.
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The ability to understand intentions of actions performed by others is one of the prerequisites for social interaction. This ability has been attributed to our capacity to mentalize others’ behaviour, by simulating or predicting their mental states that would cause that behaviour and make it comprehensible. Brain imaging studies revealed the so called “mentalizng network” including the pSTS/TPJ, the temporal poles and the medial prefrontal cortex. This network gets constantly activated anytime we try to take the perspective of others or try to simulate their state of mind. On the other hand the discovery of mirror neurons has provided an additional explanation for understanding of the content of actions. The functional properties of these neurons point out that action understanding is primarily based on a mechanism that directly matches the sensory representation of perceived actions with one's own motor representation of the same actions. We provide evidence that both systems interact closely during the processing of intentionality of actions. Thus mentalizing is not the only form of intentional understanding and motor and intentional components of action are closely interwoven. Both systems play an important role in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia.
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Zapparoli, Laura, Silvia Seghezzi, Paola Scifo, Alberto Zerbi, Giuseppe Banfi, Marco Tettamanti, and Eraldo Paulesu. "Dissecting the neurofunctional bases of intentional action." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 28 (June 27, 2018): 7440–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1718891115.
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Here we challenge and present evidence that expands the what, when, and whether anatomical model of intentional action, which states that internally driven decisions about the content and timing of our actions and about whether to act at all depend on separable neural systems, anatomically segregated along the medial wall of the frontal lobe. In our fMRI event-related paradigm, subjects acted following conditional cues or following their intentions. The content of the actions, their timing, or their very occurrence were the variables investigated, together with the modulating factor of intentionality. Besides a shared activation of the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) for all components and the SMA proper for the when component, we found specific activations beyond the mesial prefrontal wall involving the parietal cortex for the what component or subcortical gray structures for the when component. Moreover, we found behavioral, functional, anatomical, and brain connectivity evidence that the self-driven decisions on whether to act require a higher interhemispheric cooperation: This was indexed by a specific activation of the corpus callosum whereby the less the callosal activation, the greater was the decision cost at the time of the action in the whether trials. Furthermore, tractography confirmed that the fibers passing through the callosal focus of activation connect the two sides of the frontal lobes involved in intentional trials. This is evidence of non-unitary neural foundations for the processes involved in intentional actions with the pre-SMA/ACC operating as an intentional hub. These findings may guide the exploration of specific instances of disturbed intentionality.
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Pihlar, Tanja. "Zur Theorie der Vorstellungsproduktion (,,Grazer" Gestalttheorie I: France Weber)." Grazer Philosophische Studien 73, no. 1 (April 1, 2006): 27–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-073001002.
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In the following discussion, we are dealing with Weber's theory of the production of presentations, as presented in his article "The Problem of the Production of Presentations". In this article, published in 1928, Weber offers an essential modification of a version of the theory of objects which had been developed by the Graz school (and was closely linked with the theory of higher-order objects). According to Weber, the production of presentations consists in a primary transition from passive to corresponding active presentations (so there is active as well as passive presentation). Weber distinguishes several types of production of presentations: psychophysical, content, act, intentional, and surrogate production, all of which can be divided into many subtypes. Most interesting in this connection is his theory of intentional presentation. In the 1928 article, Weber postulates non-intentional presentations, on which intentional presentations are based. He distinguishes four levels of intentionality: non-intentional presentation, on the lowest level, is followed by presentational intentionality, isolative, and rational intentional presentation. Weber's 1928 article is of considerable importance for an understanding of his subsequent philosophical development.
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OTT, WALTER. "Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Representation." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2, no. 1 (2016): 131–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2016.4.
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ABSTRACT:According to the phenomenal intentionality research program, a state's intentional content is fixed by its phenomenal character. Defenders of this view have little to say about just how this grounding is accomplished. I argue that without a robust account of representation, the research program promises too little. Unfortunately, most of the well-developed accounts of representation—asymmetric dependence, teleosemantics, and the like—ground representation in external relations such as causation. Such accounts are inconsistent with the core of the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue that, however counterintuitive it may seem, the best prospect for explaining how phenomenal character represents is an appeal to resemblance.
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Biggs, Stephen. "The Scrambler: An Argument Against Representationalism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 2 (June 2009): 215–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0046.
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Brentano (1874) famously claimed that two features demarcate the mental: consciousness and intentionality. Although he claimed that these features are intimately related, subsequent generations of philosophers rarely treated them together. Recently, however, the tide has turned. Many philosophers now accept that consciousness is intentional, where to be intentional is to have representational content, is to represent ‘things as being thus and so — where, for all that, things need not be that way’ (Travis, 2004, 58). In fact, weak representationalism, which holds that perceptual experiences have representational content, is ‘now fairly uncontroversial’ (Lycan, 2004).
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Leclerc, André. "Artefacts: the big picture in broad terms." Filosofia Unisinos 22, no. 1 (March 15, 2021): 40–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.4013/fsu.2021.221.05.
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My aim in this programmatic paper is to explore the relationship among three important notions: intentionality, disposition and artefact. There wouldn’t be artefacts without what I call “intentional work,” a sustained activity directed to the production of some good. I first present contextualism as a method. Then I use it to delimit the problematic concept ARTEFACT, with the intention to apply it to repertoires of mental dispositions that affect directly our personal identity. The unavoidable but loose criterion of human intervention is used, at least to some degree. Attitudes are intentional states with conceptual content, and concepts are dispositions. We acquire concepts during our lives, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes explicitly through definition of some kind, and each cognitive agent has a unique repertoire of concepts and a unique idiolect as well. The idea that our mental representations (at least some of them) are artefacts might sound strange at first sight, but I shall try to show that it makes full sense. Most of our mental dispositions –those provided with a conceptual content– are themselves artefacts. At the end, we are all different psychologically and culturally because our idiolects and repertoires of concepts are different. For a large part, what makes our species so special is an ongoing process through which homo sapiens makes itself what it is.Keywords: Intentionality, disposition, artefact, contextualism, repertoire.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Intentionality; Intentional content"
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Price, Carolyn Susan. "Function and content : a teleological approach to mental representation." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.287111.
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Gozetlik, Servet. "Husserl." Phd thesis, METU, 2003. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/2/1070978/index.pdf.
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Husserl&rsquos phenomenology can be analyzed simply by relying on the conception of intentionality. What I want to do is to put forward the logical grounds on which I can construct an acceptable account of Husserl&rsquo
s theory of intentionality. For this aim, firstly, I need to put some light on the nature of intentional acts or experiences.This suggests us that there is a close connection between the acts and what they are directed towards. Actually many have specified the relation between the act and the object, but what they have ignored was to give an exclusive explication of how such a relation can be connected with the content component. The penomenological content mediates between the intentional act and the intended object. There are some disagreements as regards whether the act is also directed towards the content or not. One of the significant aims of this research is to shed some light on the adequate arguments by which I will try to clarify that one can speak of such a directedness of intentional acts. In other words I believe that one can not only describe an intentional relation between the act and the intended object but also similar relations between the act and the content. There seem to be three parts to be examined interconnectedly: these, namely, are act, content and the object. For, the act is directed towards the object with the intermediation of the content. So his theory is not the same as the object theory of intentionality of which there are some defenders. Husserl&rsquo
s content theory is firstly examined in Logical investigations and Ideas respectively.
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Wennström, Sofie. "Perspectives on Conceptual Change : An Exploration of the Intentional Context and the Phenomenographic Situation." Thesis, Stockholms universitet, Institutionen för pedagogik och didaktik, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-88860.
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Conceptual change is one of the most important influences in modern educational research and this theoretical framework can be used for empirical research aimed at improving our common knowledge about learning as well as developing new theories and practices within the education system. In its very basic meaning, conceptual change can be explained as a person who during the course of the learning experience changes their initial conception of a phenomenon (such as a object or a concept) from one specific point of view to another. The aim of this study is to map out the differences and similarities between two seemingly opposite movements within today’s pedagogical research community. Within phenomenography a constitutionalist approach to learning is used, which means that the conceptions formed by students are considered to be an internal representation of the individual’s interpretation of their own knowledge in relation to their surroundings. The intentional analytical approach suggests that contextualisation is necessary for conceptual change to take place, for the student to be able to interpret the assignment or task at hand and then incorporate that in meaningful activity that will lead to a successful learning process. Both the intentional and the phenomenographic approach agree that it is the meaning of a task that is important in the learning situation, but the differences lie in the ways of distinguishing what this meaning consists of as well as the means of finding out what the meaning is to an individual.Begreppsutveckling är en av de viktigaste influenserna inom det pedagogiska forskningsområdet. Denna teoretiska inriktning innebär att man genom empirisk forskning studerar lärande och dess kontext. Detta kan sedan bidra till vår kunskap om vad som påverkar lärprocessen samt hur denna skulle kunna användas i utvecklingen av nya didaktiska metoder och verktyg. Begreppsutveckling kan förstås som teorier om hur en individ, genom övning och reflektion ändrar en grundläggande uppfattning om ett fenomen eller objekt från en specifik uppfattning till en annan. I den här litteraturstudien, kommer jag att försöka kartlägga två skilda sätt att anta utmaningen att undersöka hur lärande genom begreppsutveckling kan förstås och tolkas, nämligen fenomenografi och intentionell analys. Fenomenografi är utvecklat med en konstitutionell ansats till lärandet, där man menar att de koncept som individen använder formas genom interna representationer av den egna tolkningen av omgivningen samt hur det egna konceptet relaterar till omgivningen. Intentionell analys å andra sidan menar att begreppsutveckling uppstår när individen kontextualiserar uppgiften genom meningsskapande processer i relation till omgivningen och att detta beskriver lärprocessen. Den gemensamma nämnaren för båda dessa perspektiv är att det är meningsskapandet för individen som är nyckeln till lärandet. Skillnaden mellan dem märks i synen på lärandet i de meningsskapande processerna där man närmar sig betydelsen av denna process som den ter sig för den lärande individen.
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Sheredos, Benjamin. "Motivating Emotional Content." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2009. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/51.
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Among philosophers of the emotions, it is common to view emotional content as purely descriptive – that is, belief-like or perception-like. I argue that this is a mistake. The intentionality of the emotions cannot be understood in isolation from their motivational character, and emotional content is also inherently directive – that is, desire-like. This view’s strength is its ability to explain a class of emotional behaviors that I argue, the common view fails to explain adequately. I claim that it is already implicit in leading theories of emotion elicitation in cognitive psychology – “appraisal theories.” The result is a deeper understanding of emotional intentionality. Employing Peter Goldie’s “Feeling Theory” of the emotions as an example of the common view, I suggest that emotional feelings, too, should be understood on this model: emotional feelings toward items in the world cannot be disentangled from felt motivation.
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Guirguis, Mazen Maurice. "A script theory of intentional content." Thesis, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/14766.
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Fred Dretske (1981) claimed that the essence of the kind of cognitive activity that gives rise to
Intentional mental states is a process by which the analogue information coming from a source-object
is transformed into digital form. It is this analogue-to-digital conversion of data that enables us to form
concepts of things. But this achievement comes with a cost, since the conversion must involve a loss
of information. The price we pay for the lost information is a proportional diminishment in our ability
to discriminate the source-object from others that may be similar to it. I argue that this fact underlies
an important distinction between what a mental state may be about and to what the state may be
directed,
Aboutness and directedness are two of four Intentional dimensions on which this project concentrates.
The other two are aspectual shape and misrepresentation. The distinction between aboutness and
directedness is a part of a proposed approach to Intentionality based on the script theory of Roger
Schank and Robert Abelson (1977). Scripts are schemata—organized knowledge structures that guide
our understanding of the world around us. Schank and Abelson's basic ideas are extended to yield four
different script-types: episodic (related to situations and events), instrumental (related to procedural
knowledge), personal (representing an agent's goals and plans), and definitional (involved in object-recognition).
The relationship between scripts and the Intentionality of thought is the main focus of this dissertation.
An important secondary concern is the viability of externalism and internalism. It is argued that
neither of these attitudes is independently adequate to provide a full account of Intentional content.
Rather, the proper approach is to confine externalistic influences to aboutness and then characterize
directedness in a manner that captures the world-according-to-the-agent. This strategy is implemented
in the following way: aboutness is construed causally-evolutionarily; directedness is constructed with
the help of the notion of an equivalence class; aspectual shape is shown to be a function of the kind of
information a script provides; and an account of misrepresentation is given by comparing the different
extensions generated from aboutness and directedness respectively.
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Brandão, Francisco Vasconcelos. "Evaluation of commercially available post-consumer recycled pet to produce bottles for mineral water." Master's thesis, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/32994.
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O Polietileno Tereftalato (PET) é o principal polímero para a produção de garrafas de água e refrigerantes, sendo cada vez mais importante, no contexto global, o combate ao desperdício e descarte através da reciclagem deste importante recurso. Neste trabalho, seis resinas processo mecânicos aprovados pela EFSA foram avaliadas. As propriedades de cor, viscosidade intrínseca, temperatura de fusão, concentração de benzeno, limoneno, oligómeros e substâncias não intencionalmente adicionadas (NIAS) foram avaliadas. No que toca à determinação das concentrações de Benzeno, Limoneno e Oligómeros, foram encontrados valores superiores comparativamente ao reportado em bibliografia. As concentrações obtidas foram de 30 – 410 μg kg-1 PET para o benzeno, 20 – 66 μg kg-1 PET para o limoneno; 52 – 78 mg kg-1 PET para o dímero e 999 – 1394 mg kg-1 PET para o trímero. A concentração de NIAS detetada nas resinas conduz a um nível de exposição estimado (considerando uma garrafa de 8,5 g e 0,3 L) inferior ao correspondente à Classe 3 de Cramer da abordagem TTC para o limite de risco toxicológico. A análise estatística dos dados pelo modelo paramétrico univariado agrupou as amostras em 3 sub-grupos de homogeneidade: o primeiro grupo compreende as amostras IN, NO e F, o segundo as amostras F, FBL e BA e o terceiro a amostra MO. A análise por componentes independentes (ICA) confirmou alguns dos resultados deste teste. Foi possível verificar a similaridade das amostras MO e BA pelos conteúdos em nonanal, F e FBL pelo etilhexilacetato, dodecano e o difenil éter e as amostras FBL e IN pelo farneceno. A amostra NO foi a única que não apresentou correlação com as restantes.Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) is the most important polymer for the production of bottles for water and soft drinks, being increasingly important globally to reduce waste by recycling this material. In this work, six PET resins from different mechanical recycling processes, with positive opinions from EFSA, were evaluated for the properties: color, intrinsic viscosity, melting temperature and for the concentration of benzene, limonene, oligomers, and non-intentionally added substances (NIAS). Regarding the determination of Benzene, Limonene, and Oligomers, the samples in study have higher concentration values than those found in the literature. The obtained concentrations are 30 – 410 μg kg-1 PET for benzene, 20 – 66 μg kg-1 PET, for limonene and 52 – 78 mg kg-1 PET for PET dimer and 999 – 1394 mg kg-1 PET for trimer. The unknowns and NIAS concentration detected in the resins, yield and estimated exposure levels (considering a bottle of 8,5 g and 0,3 L) lower than that corresponding to the Cramer Class 3 of TTC approach for toxicology risk. The statistical analysis by univariate approach grouped the samples into 3 subsets: one group including the samples IN, NO, and F, the second group including the samples F, FBL, and BA, and NO as the only sample in the third group. The ICA approach confirmed some results from the univariate model: it was found out that MO and BA correlate by nonanal, F and FBL by the ethylhexylacetate, dodecane and diphenyl ether, and FBL and IN by farnesene. NO showed no correlation with the remaining.
Books on the topic "Intentionality; Intentional content"
1
Functions in mind: A theory of intentional content. Oxford: Clarendon, 2001.
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2
Mendelovici, Angela. Is Intentionality a Relation to a Content? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0009.
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This chapter argues against the relation view of intentionality, on which intentionality is a relation to distinctly existing contents, and for the alternative aspect view, on which intentionality is a matter of having states with certain aspects. The relation view faces two problems: First, it cannot accommodate all the intentional contents we can manifestly represent without accepting a bloated ontology, which suggests that the view is wrong-headed. Second, it is not clear why being related to an item should make it perceptually represented, thought, entertained, or otherwise represented. The relation view might be thought to have many virtues that the aspect view lacks: It is arguably supported by common sense, allows for public contents, provides an account of structured intentional states, facilitates a theory of truth and reference, and is congenial to externalism. This chapter argues that the aspect view has any such truth-indicating virtues to the same extent as the relation view.
3
Searle, John R. Are there Non-Propositional Intentional States? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0011.
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Intentionality is that feature of the mind by which it is directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world. Intentionality is simply aboutness or directedness. “Proposition” is more difficult, but the essential idea is this: every intentional state has a content. Sometimes it seems that the content just enables a state to refer to an object. So if John loves Sally, then it appears that the content of his love is simply “Sally”. But if John believes that it is raining, then the specification of the content requires an entire “that” clause. “Are there non-propositional intentional states?” amounts to the question, “Are there intentional states whose content does not require specification with a ‘that’ clause?” This chapter explores whether there are any non-propositional states, and suggest that a very limited class, such as boredom, is in fact non-propositional.
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Stock, Kathleen. Extreme Intentionalism about Fictional Content. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198798347.003.0002.
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The defence of extreme intentionalism is launched. The notion of an intention is introduced in some detail, as well as some skeletal presuppositions about the sort of imagining called for by fiction. Grice’s theory of the meaning of conversational utterance is introduced, with an outline of how it might be extended to fictional content, with certain important adjustments. On the view favoured by the author, the content of fiction is what a reader is reflexively intended by the author to imagine, rather than what she is intended to believe. Finally four common objections to extreme intentionalism are introduced, and the first of these is rejected: namely, that extreme intentionalism entails that individual speakers can arbitrarily change or elude the conventionally given, rule-bound meanings of sentences, so that miswriting is ruled out as impossible.
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Stock, Kathleen. Intentionalist Strategies of Interpretation. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198798347.003.0003.
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This chapter addresses the complaint that extreme intentionalism standardly forces the reader who engages in interpretation to posit private, or hidden, authorial intentions, for which she has little or no evidence. It is first argued that there are no automatic strategies of interpretation of fictional content: at every stage, whether or not a given interpretative strategy is to be appropriately applied depends on the presence of relevant authorial intention as a sanction. (This section includes a discussion, and rejection, of the views of David Lewis and Gregory Currie about fictional truth; a discussion of the relevance of genre to fictional content; and a consideration of the issue of unreliable narration for an intentionalist view.) The foregoing material on strategies of interpretation is then used to show that it is false to think of the extreme intentionalist as being committed to ‘hidden’ or ‘secret’ meanings in the ordinary case.
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Mendelovici, Angela. The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0005.
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This chapter introduces the phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), on which all original intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness. It argues that PIT succeeds precisely where its main competitors, the tracking and functional role theories discussed in previous chapters, fail. The version of PIT that this chapter and the remainder of the book defends is strong identity PIT, on which all intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness (strong PIT), and (roughly) phenomenal states give rise to intentional states simply by being identical to them (identity PIT). In short, according to strong identity PIT, every intentional state is identical to a phenomenal state. This chapter closes by previewing how later chapters handle certain challenging cases for PIT, including those of thoughts, states with broad or object-involving contents, standing states, and nonconscious occurrent states. The recommended treatment rejects derived intentionality and so qualifies as a version of strong PIT.
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Stock, Kathleen. Extreme Intentionalism and its Rivals. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198798347.003.0004.
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The defence of extreme intentionalism is concluded by attacking its main rivals in the analytic tradition: ‘modest’ intentionalism, hypothetical intentionalism, and value-maximizing theory. First a source of apparent support for all three is addressed: the thought that extreme intentionalism takes an implausible stance towards unsuccessful authorial intentions that a fiction should have specific content. The author argues that in fact, extreme intentionalism is better positioned to accommodate unsuccessful intentions than its rivals. This is followed by general criticisms of hypothetical intentionalism and value-maximizing theory, with a particular focus on the extent to which each can accommodate the plausible thought that fictions often contain reliable testimony, and can act as a respectable source of belief. Also in this chapter the issue of ‘post hoc’ meanings is discussed; and how extreme intentionalism, though a monistic position, is compatible with many of the critical judgements which have tempted some towards critical pluralism.
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Amico, Stephen. Corporeal Intentions. University of Illinois Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/illinois/9780252038273.003.0004.
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This chapter explores how male homosexuality is suggested via the presentation of the sexualized male body as object of the gaze—an objectifying gaze placing the male in the position of the “feminine.” It looks at the efflorescence of images of male physical beauty in the musical discourses of numerous singers and bands in the first two decades of the twenty-first century in Russia and how these images were conflated with homosexuality or homoeroticism. To this end, the chapter examines instances of the male body's foregrounding in the work of Andrei Danilko, the groups Hi-Fi and Smash!!, and singer Dima Bilan (focusing on his appearances at the Eurovision Song Contest). It highlights not only the variable of the body's visibility (and, concomitantly, questions of power), but also the interrelated and phenomenologically inflected dynamics of intentionality, proximity, and orientation. It shows that visible male bodies, invoking the possibility of the homosexual, provide a sight/site for Russian gay men and also serve the goluboi.
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Mendelovici, Angela. Nonconscious States. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0008.
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Nonconscious states, like standing beliefs and nonconscious states involved in early visual processing, pose a challenge for PIT: They seem to be intentional but not phenomenal. This chapter addresses this challenge. It begins by considering versions of PIT that take nonconscious states to have derived intentionality, arguing that none of the suggested derivation mechanisms is up to the task of generating new instances of intentionality. This chapter then recommends an alternative treatment of nonconscious states on which neither standing states nor most nonconscious occurrent states are genuinely intentional, though the self-ascriptivist view described in Chapter 7 might be extended to accommodate some standing state contents, and perhaps even standing states in their entirety. This chapter also suggests that some nonconscious occurrent states might have phenomenal properties we are not aware of and so might have phenomenal intentionality we are also not aware of.
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Mendelovici, Angela. Goals and Methodology. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.003.0002.
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This chapter introduces the goals that will structure much subsequent discussion, as well as two theory-independent ways of knowing about intentionality. The overall goal of the book is to provide a theory of intentionality, which is a theory that describes the deep nature of intentionality—i.e., what it really is, metaphysically speaking. However, much of the discussion in later chapters is structured around the more modest goal of providing a theory that specifies what gives rise to actual instances of original intentionality. In order to meet this goal, it is helpful to have a theory-independent way of testing the predictions of competing theories of intentionality. This chapter proposes two such ways: (1) introspection and (2) consideration of psychological role. Importantly, these methods tell us which contents we represent, not what they consists of. In other words, they tell us about the superficial character of intentional states and contents, not their deep natures.
Book chapters on the topic "Intentionality; Intentional content"
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Davis, Matthew J., and Per Fors. "Towards a Typology of Intentionally Inaccurate Representations of Reality in Media Content." In Human-Centric Computing in a Data-Driven Society, 291–304. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62803-1_23.
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Hamstead, Zoé A. "How We Got Here: Producing Climate Inequity and Vulnerability to Urban Weather Extremes." In Resilient Urban Futures, 11–28. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63131-4_2.
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AbstractThis collected volume is intentionally future-oriented; it is authored by a team of interdisciplinary scientists and practitioners who collaborate to translate research findings into networked adaptive practices that we hope will protect urban communities against the impacts of extreme weather. While future-oriented, we cannot protect future generations against urban weather extremes without understanding the historical processes through which these existential and ethical crises came about. This chapter describes how economic and political institutions produced the climate crisis in ways that also constitute a humanitarian crisis, inscribing climate inequity into the urban built environment and institutions. It offers reflections on ways in which this history must be wrestled with in the context of equitable and resilient urban futures.
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Nikielska-Sekula, Karolina. "“Have You Just Taken a Picture of Me?”: Theoretical and Ethical Implications of the Use of Researcher-Produced Photography in Studying Migrant Minorities." In IMISCOE Research Series, 31–49. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67608-7_2.
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Abstract This paper aims at discussing the value of researcher-generated visual methods in studying migration. It focuses on photography as a data collection method, and the problem is presented in the context of researching urban and rural arenas of exercising transnational belonging by migrants and their descendants in new and ancestral homelands. Photography is approached here as a sensorial experience mediating a relationship between the researcher and the participants. The author argues that the relationships occurring around photo-taking in the field are as important as the data collected intentionally. Moreover, the chapter discusses ethical questions prompted by the employment of visual methods, problematizing them in a context of different social, cultural and national settings. With this chapter, the author attempts to answer a question whether researcher-generated visual data can open new angles of analyses of migrants’ life-words and how the employment of visual methods can influence theoretical perspectives within migration studies.
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Imms, Wesley, and Marian Mahat. "Where to Now? Fourteen Characteristics of Teachers’ Transition into Innovative Learning Environments." In Teacher Transition into Innovative Learning Environments, 317–34. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7497-9_25.
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AbstractThis chapter places the preceding papers into a wider context. As part of the Innovative Learning Environment and Teacher Change (ILETC) project, seven Transitions symposia were held in five cities across Australasia, Europe and North America during 2017, 2018 and 2019. Each aimed at investigating how teachers adapt to innovative learning environments. The resulting accumulation of approximately 150 papers by graduate researchers and research groups, of which this book’s chapters are a sample, constituted a reasonable representation of international thinking on this topic. When added to three years of ILETC case studies, surveys, systematic literature reviews and teacher workshops, the project team was able to identify consistent patterns in teachers’ spatial transition actions. This chapter places the material of this book within that larger picture, specifically in terms of one project output—the development of a Spatial Transition Pathway. The Pathway emerged from these data and can be seen as an output of the material sampled in previous chapters. Certainly, the considerable work teachers had been doing to re-conceptualise their pedagogies for new spaces (done both intentionally, and at times, without realising) deserved to be mapped as a resource for others undertaking this journey. This chapter makes the case that while each teacher or school’s journey from traditional to ‘innovative’ spaces is unique, there exists some common issues that most seem to face at some time, in some way. It provides a description of fourteen ‘grand themes’ that appear commonly through the data and describes how these can be organised in a way that provides temporal and theme-based strategies and tools, developed by fellow educators to assist in this transition. This final chapter leads the reader to consider ‘where to now’? It celebrates the fact that teachers have enormous capacity to work out how to utilise innovative learning environments well and provides a framework for evidence-based actions into the future.
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Schuhmann, Karl. "Intentionality and the Intentional Object in the Early Husserl." In Husserl, 141–62. Fordham University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823284467.003.0006.
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This chapter challenges the widely held view that Husserl’s early account of intentionality was a simple and direct development of Brentano’s theory. Husserl’s theory developed as a response to the account of intentionality in Twardowski’s On the Content and Object of Presentations. The chapter argues that Twardowski thought Brentano’s theory inadequate to address Bolzano’s problem of objectless presentations and that Husserl’s account, which differs from both Brentano’s and Twardowski’s, satisfactorily addressed this problem. Later developments in Husserl’s theory, he concludes, were the result of attempting to address problems other than the Bolzano problem.
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Neander, Karen. "Thinking about Thought." In A Mark of the Mental. The MIT Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262036146.003.0001.
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Thoughts are about items in (or aspects of) the world, and mental representations refer to them: how can this representational power be explained? In this chapter, the author introduces the philosophical problem of intentionality, clarifies how key terms will be used in this book, explains (and to some extent motivates) the author’s starting assumptions, and sets out her main aims. Among other things, she here discusses the naturalization project, relations between intentionality and consciousness, the distinction between original and derived intentionality, and the (natural-factive) notion of informational content as distinct from the notion of representational content involved in semantic evaluations. The aim in this book is to give a “modest” theory of original intentionality, a theory of referential-intentional content with its scope initially limited to sensory-perceptual (nonconceptual) representations. The focus will be on the origination question (what is the basis of original intentionality?), not on the derivation question (how do more sophisticated forms of intentionality derive from less sophisticated?).
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Perler, Dominik. "Productive Thoughts." In Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy Volume 9, 246–89. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192844637.003.0007.
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We often experience that we have ideas in our mind, which present possible things and incite us to produce some of them. But how can our ideas be intentional? And how can they give rise to actions? In his theory of exemplar causes, Suárez examines both problems and offers a comprehensive theory. The paper first discusses his solution to the intentionality problem, arguing that he subscribes to an act theory, according to which ideas are mental acts that are about something in virtue of their specific content. The paper then reconstructs his solution to the causation problem, showing that he appeals to efficient causation: ideas are powers and hence efficient causes that immediately produce other acts, thereby triggering the production of material things. The analysis of both problems sheds light on Suárez’s broader theory of cognitive activity by showing that he takes mental acts to be intrinsically intentional and productive.
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Abell, Catharine. "The Structure of Fictive Content." In Fiction, 88–119. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198831525.003.0004.
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This chapter addresses the structure of fictive content. It is usually held that fictive content outstrips the contents of authors’ fictive utterances. One account proposes that this additional content is determined by general principles of indirect generation. This chapter rejects the claim that additional fictive content is determined by general principles. It defends an alternative account on which fictive content is much more limited in scope than most rival accounts take it to be. It argues that fictive content consists in the contents of authors’ fictive utterances, together with interpretative fictive content. Interpretative fictive content consists in further contents that authors intentionally convey by making their fictive utterances. It argues that audiences grasp these further contents by drawing inferences to the best explanation about authors’ intentions, not by appeal to general principles.
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Rowlands, Mark. "Self-Awareness and Persons." In Can Animals Be Persons?, 165–75. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190846039.003.0009.
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Since there are two forms of self-awareness, there is question concerning which is relevant, or most relevant, in the formation of the person. The relevance of self-awareness in the formation of the person consists in the role it plays in underwriting the unity of a mental life. Intentional self-awareness is incapable of doing this. Appeal to the apparatus of intentional act and object presupposes the unity of a mental life and, therefore, cannot explain it. Pre-intentional self-awareness is much more promising as a candidate for underwriting the unity of a mental life. The identity of the person is imprinted on the content of each mental act of which he is pre-intentionally aware. Thus, to whom the act belongs is part of the content of the mental act. This can explain the unity of a mental life.
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Pautz, Adam. "Consciousness Meets Lewisian Interpretation Theory." In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 1, 263–314. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198845850.003.0010.
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In “Radical Interpretation” (1974), David Lewis asked: by what constraints, and to what extent, do the non-intentional, physical facts about Karl determine the intentional facts about him? There are two popular approaches: the reductive externalist program and the phenomenal intentionality program. I argue against both approaches. I will agree with friends of phenomenal intentionality that reductive externalists neglect the role of our internally determined conscious experiences in grounding intentionality, but I will fault them for not adequately explaining intentionality. They cannot just say “conscious experience explains it” and leave it at that. However, I will sketch an alternative multistage account incorporating ideas from both camps. In particular, by appealing to Lewisian ideas, we can explain how Karl’s conscious experiences help to ground the contents of his other mental states.
Conference papers on the topic "Intentionality; Intentional content"
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Spradling, Matthew, and Jeremy Straub. "Evaluation of Elements of a Prospective System to Alert Users to Intentionally Deceptive Content." In 2020 International Conference on Computational Science and Computational Intelligence (CSCI). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/csci51800.2020.00045.
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Willeke, Sebastian, Lukas Schwerdt, Lars Panning-von Scheidt, and Jörg Wallaschek. "Intentional Response Reduction by Harmonic Mistuning of Bladed Disks With Aerodynamic Damping." In ASME Turbo Expo 2018: Turbomachinery Technical Conference and Exposition. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/gt2018-76601.
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A harmonic mistuning concept for bladed disks is analyzed in order to intentionally reduce the forced response of specific modes below their tuned amplitude level. By splitting a mode pair associated with a specific nodal diameter pattern, the lightly damped traveling wave mode of the nominally tuned blisk is superposed with its counter-rotating complement. Consequently, a standing wave is formed in which the former wave train benefits from an increase in aerodynamic damping. Unlike previous analyses of randomly perturbed configurations, the mode-specific stabilization is intentionally promoted through adjusting the harmonic content of the mistuning pattern. Through a re-orientation of the localized mode shapes in relation to the discrete blades, the response is additionally attenuated by an amount of up to 7.6 %. The achievable level of amplitude reduction is analytically predicted based on the properties of the tuned system. Furthermore, the required degree of mistuning for a sufficient separation of a mode pair is derived.
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Friedrichs, Daniel, Paul Kuehl, and Lori Lucke. "Neutral Electrode Contact Quality Monitoring: Quantifying Latent Risks, Improving Testability." In 2018 Design of Medical Devices Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/dmd2018-6864.
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In high-frequency (“HF”) monopolar electrosurgery (or radio-frequency ablation), high current density causes heating of tissue adjacent to a surgical instrument. HF current passes through tissue at a frequency sufficiently high to avoid stimulation of muscle, but intentionally causes I2R heating of tissue for the purposes of ablation, dissection, and coagulation. In addition to the surgical tool, a Neutral Electrode (“NE”, often called a “ground pad”, “return electrode”, or simply “pad”) contacts the patient to complete the electrical circuit, as shown in Fig. 1.
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Hurst, K. M., C. B. Roberts, and W. R. Ashurst. "Reduced Microstructure Adhesion Provided by Gas-Expanded Liquid Deposited Gold Nanoparticles." In STLE/ASME 2008 International Joint Tribology Conference. ASMEDC, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/ijtc2008-71253.
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In order to alleviate or eliminate the occurrence of stiction during the actuation of microstructures, the real contact area available for contact must be reduced. Au nanoparticles were intentionally deposited using gas-expanded liquids onto polysilicon cantilever beam arrays to increase surface roughness. The nanoparticle-coated beams were subjected to an actuation voltage of 120 V. Following actuation, the adhesion of beams was quantified by estimating the apparent work of adhesion. Au nanoparticles deposited onto these microstructures were shown to drastically reduce the effects of in-use stiction. Capillary adhesion due to condensation of ambient moisture was effectively eliminated.
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Ishikawa, Nobuyuki, Hitoshi Sueyoshi, and Shigeru Endo. "Critical Condition for Hydrogen Induced Cold Cracking of High Strength Weld Metal." In 2014 10th International Pipeline Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/ipc2014-33373.
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The critical conditions of hydrogen content and residual stress in the high strength steel weld with the tensile strength level of over 980MPa were investigated. The critical hydrogen concentration for the cold cracking in the Y-grooved constraint weld joint was evaluated with intentionally introducing hydrogen gas. Residual stress conditions at the “root” portion in the weld joint were evaluated by the neutron diffraction technique. It was found that the root portion showed highest tensile stress of over 1110MPa in the transverse direction, and cracking occurred when the average hydrogen content was over 2ppm. In order to clarify the critical conditions of the principal tensile stress and local accumulated hydrogen concentration of the weld metal, the delayed fracture testing by using the notched round bar specimen with electrochemically hydrogen charged was conducted. It was seen that the cold cracking behavior in the Y-grooved weld joint was explained by the critical conditions of the maximum principal stress and the local accumulated hydrogen content obtained from the delayed fracture with the small specimen.
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So, Gavin, and S. Eren Semercigil. "A Natural Sloshing Absorber for Vibration Control." In ASME 2002 Joint U.S.-European Fluids Engineering Division Conference. ASMEDC, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/fedsm2002-31421.
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Sloshing liquid in a container may be used to suppress excessive structural vibrations. The principle of control of sloshing absorbers, is very similar to that of the conventional tuned vibration absorbers. The fluctuating pressure forces of sloshing liquid is employed to provide the control effect, instead of the intentionally resonated auxiliary oscillator of a tuned absorber. This paper presents the results of an experimental study to investigate the effectiveness of the sloshing of the raw contents of a hen’s egg. The objective is to explore the possibilities of borrowing design characteristics to enhance the effectiveness of sloshing absorbers for structural control. To this end, experimental observations are presented in the form of design charts.
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Al-Ogaidi, Ayad, and Douglas Bristow. "Uniform Ultimate Boundedness of Probe-to-Probe Dynamics in Dual Probe Atomic Force Microscopy." In ASME 2014 Dynamic Systems and Control Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/dscc2014-6307.
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Atomic force microscopes use a probe to interface with matter at the nanoscale through a variety of imaging or manipulation methods. A dual-probe atomic force microscope (DP-AFM) has been proposed for simultaneous imaging and manipulation. One challenge of DP-AFM is probe-to-probe contact, which may occur intentionally such as when locating one probe with the other. This work studies the stability for such interactions where the 1st probe is in the tapping mode (typically used for imaging) and 2nd probe is in the contact mode (typically used for manipulation). A state dependent switched model is proposed for DP-AFM. A theorem is proposed for uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) stability of switched systems under a sequence nonincreasing condition and applied to the DP-AFM problem.
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Caner, Nazli, and Jeffrey W. Ruberti. "Detection of MMP-13 Activity on Intentionally Strain-Released Type-II Collagen Network in Bovine Articular Cartilage." In ASME 2011 Summer Bioengineering Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/sbc2011-53913.
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Articular cartilage is a specialized avascular connective tissue found at the contact regions of diarthrodial joints. Cartilage has few cells (< 5% of the volume), though these cells can maintain the balance of turnover in healthy tissue, when the tissue is damaged, they are not able to repair the defects [1–3]. Extra cellular matrix (ECM) in cartilage comprises water, collagen (principally type II), proteoglycans and noncollagenous proteins. The type II collagen network, which is the dominant structural protein in cartilage ECM, constrains the expansion of the resident PGs and is generally held in mechanical tension. In osteoarthritis (OA), the balance of cartilage tissue production/degradation is thought to be affected by abnormal mechanical stimuli leading to net matrix resorption through production of excess degradative enzymes (e.g. matrix metalloproteinases (MMP) and aggrecanases) [4–8]. In OA tissue the amount of MMP-13 is thought to be increased relative to healthy tissue. OA typically occurs in older adults where, as cartilage ages, there is a marked decrease in the fixed charge density (FCD), the hydration and, consequently, mechanical tension on the collagen type II network [9–11]. We have hypothesized that loss of tension on the collagen network accelerates degradation by MMP. Detection of the effect of MMP on loaded, native cartilage could lead to insight about cartilage degradation kinetics in OA. However, it is quite difficult to controllably deliver MMP to cartilage, to activate the MMP during detensioning of the collagen network and to detect the effect on the cartilage mechanics (because cost limits the amount of MMP used). We have developed a transpirational enzyme loading method which is capable of precisely dosing bovine cartilage explants with a small, known quantity of MMP-13. Following enzyme insertion, we are able to detect the activity of the MMP on osmotically compressed cartilage (i.e. cartilage with a detensioned collagen network) via a simple hydration measurement.
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Foong, Shaohui, Karupppasamy Subburaj, and Kristin L. Wood. "An Inductive, Design-Centric Approach to Control Engineering Education With a Competitive Atmosphere." In ASME 2017 Dynamic Systems and Control Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/dscc2017-5157.
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Control engineering is a cornerstone of most undergraduate engineering programs in colleges and universities around the world. The analysis and synthesis of automatic controllers, in particular, the PID controller, is a central focus of these courses and modules. However, due to its highly abstract nature, students usually find the content challenging and difficult to comprehend. This is aggravated by the employment of traditional lecture/recitation deductive teaching formats as means of delivery of the content. Here, an inductive-based week long design activity strategically held in the middle of the semester was conceived to introduce and motivate the notion of feedback control. During the course of the week, students in teams design, analyze and synthesize automatic controllers to enable a standardized differential wheeled robotic platform to traverse a line circuit autonomously. The strategy to achieve this capability is intentionally left to be open-ended, and students have the design freedom to select and position sensors needed to sense the track, as well as implement and troubleshoot the programming required to enable autonomous control. The activity culminates with a pulsating head-to-head single elimination tournament to decide the overall champion.
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Bueno, David E. G. P., Aline Barbosa Figueiredo, Renan Martins Baptista, Felipe B. F. Rachid, and Gustavo C. R. Bodstein. "Featuring Pig Movement in Two-Phase Gas Pipelines." In 2012 9th International Pipeline Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/ipc2012-90187.
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This paper presents a mechanical model, along with a numerical scheme for obtaining approximating solutions for the resulting initial-boundary-value problem, for describing the pig movement in transient two-phase gas pipelines. By taking advantage of the best features of the existing models presented in the literature so far, an idealized general purpose pig model is proposed, contemplating the possibility of representing, within a same context, different types of pigs or pig functions. Both mechanical and hydrodynamic friction forces at the interface of the pig and the pipe wall, as well as by-pass flow rates for the liquid and gaseous phases, are naturally incorporated in the modeling in a coherent mechanical context. The governing equations of the two-phase flow model are intentionally written in a general form, so that different existing models can be used within the framework presented herein. Following this same strategy, a detailed numerical scheme is presented in which the discretization of the flux terms are left open, so that different numerical strategies of first or higher orders can be accommodated without any additional difficulties.