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Journal articles on the topic 'Institutional norms and rules'
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GËRXHANI, KLARITA, and JACQUELINE VAN BREEMEN. "Social values and institutional change: an experimental study." Journal of Institutional Economics 15, no. 2 (August 7, 2018): 259–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137418000231.
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AbstractWe experimentally investigate whether and how individuals change formal institutions governing an organization. The focus is on formal rules prescribing individual cooperation to achieve a collective goal. Our analysis accounts for the role of social norms and individuals’ social values. We observe that prosocial individuals –who value cooperation and have a conflict between this value and existing rules allowing for low cooperation– attempt to change this rule. In line with our theoretical discussion, we also find that prosocial individuals first try to change the institutional environment by changing social norms. If this fails, these individuals change formal rules directly.
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COLE, DANIEL H. "Laws, norms, and the Institutional Analysis and Development framework." Journal of Institutional Economics 13, no. 4 (February 28, 2017): 829–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137417000030.
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AbstractElinor Ostrom's Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework has been described as ‘one of the most developed and sophisticated attempts to use institutional and stakeholder assessment in order to link theory and practice, analysis and policy’. But not all elements in the framework are sufficiently well developed. This paper focuses on one such element: the ‘rules-in-use’ (a.k.a. ‘rules’ or ‘working rules’). Specifically, it begins a long-overdue conversation about relations between formal legal rules and ‘working rules’ by offering a tentative and very simple typology of relations. Type 1: Some formal legal rules equal or approximate the working rules; Type 2: Some legal rules plus (or emended by) widely held social norms equal or approximate the working rules; and Type 3: Some legal rules bear no evident relation to the working rules. Several examples, including some previously used by Ostrom, are provided to illustrate each of the three types, which can be conceived of as nodes or ranges along a continuum. The paper concludes with a call for empirical research, especially case studies and meta-analyses, to determine the relevant scope of each of these types of relations, and to provide data for furthering our understanding of how different types of rules, from various sources, function (or not) as institutions.
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CARDOSO, HENRIQUE LOPES, and EUGÉNIO OLIVEIRA. "INSTITUTIONAL REALITY AND NORMS: SPECIFYING AND MONITORING AGENT ORGANIZATIONS." International Journal of Cooperative Information Systems 16, no. 01 (March 2007): 67–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218843007001573.
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Norms and institutions have been proposed to regulate multi-agent interactions. However, agents are intrinsically autonomous, and may thus decide whether to comply with norms. On the other hand, besides institutional norms, agents may adopt new norms by establishing commitments with other agents. In this paper, we address these issues by considering an electronic institution that monitors the compliance to norms in an evolving normative framework: norms are used both to regulate an existing environment and to define contracts that make agents' commitments explicit. In particular, we consider the creation of virtual organizations in which agents commit to certain cooperation efforts regulated by appropriate norms. The supervision of norm fulfillment is based on the notion of institutional reality, which is constructed by assigning powers to agents enacting institutional roles. Constitutive rules make a connection between the illocutions of those agents and institutional facts, certifying the occurrence of associated external transactions. Contract specification is based on conditional prescription of obligations. Contract monitoring relies on rules for detecting the fulfillment and violation of those obligations. The implementation of our normative institutional environment is supported by a rule-based inference engine.
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Crawford, Sue E. S., and Elinor Ostrom. "A Grammar of Institutions." American Political Science Review 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 582–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2082975.
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The institutional grammar introduced here is based on a view that institutions are enduring regularities of human action in situations structured by rules, norms, and shared strategies, as well as by the physical world. The rules, norms, and shared strategies are constituted and reconstituted by human interaction in frequently occurring or repetitive situations. The syntax of the grammar identifies components of institutions and sorts them into three types of institutional statements: rules, norms, and shared strategies. We introduce the grammar, outline methods for operationalizing the syntax, apply the syntax to an analysis of cooperation in collective dilemma situations, and discuss the pragmatics of the grammar for analyses of behavior within complex institutional settings.
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Чеботаренко, Елена, and Elena Chebotarenko. "Institutional Background of Social Market Economy." Bulletin of Kemerovo State University. Series: Political, Sociological and Economic sciences 2018, no. 4 (January 14, 2019): 164–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.21603/2500-3372-2018-4-164-169.
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The quality of life of people and the degree of focus of market economy on the interests of people depend to a great extent on the structure of public institutes, which include formal and informal norms, rules and the organizations that support them. To develop these norms and rules, it is necessary to rely not only on rational considering and calculation of the interacting parties, but also on habits, customs, and traditions. The universal nature of functions of public institutes always acts in the specific ethical cover that reflects the culture of people, their idea of the social justice focused on three fundamental values: equal opportunities, overcoming excess inequalities, and providing honest rules of the game. The institutionalization process includes stages connected with understanding and acceptance by the majority of the principles of socially oriented economy, development of the particular rules, and mechanisms supporting them. Some institutes perform functions of control over the flaws of the market mechanism, others are aimed at alignment of excess social and economic inequalities and ensuring the compensating advantages to everyone.
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BASTAKOTI, RAM C., and GANESH P. SHIVAKOTI. "Rules and collective action: an institutional analysis of the performance of irrigation systems in Nepal." Journal of Institutional Economics 8, no. 2 (October 19, 2011): 225–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137411000452.
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Abstract:This paper focuses on understanding rule systems by documenting existing rules and their development in irrigation management in Nepal. We analyze the rule formation of a sample of irrigation systems based on the ADICO syntax (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom, 2005). Farmer-managed irrigation systems generally are autonomous in devising their own rules based on local context considering the ideas, norms and beliefs shared within the community. Rule formation in agency-managed irrigation systems, however, is mostly done by external officials. Strong rule enforcement mechanisms were found in farmer-managed systems compared with agency-managed systems. Better rule enforcement created favorable conditions for collective action among the users and ensured better performance of the irrigation systems. Results imply that the formation of new rules should fully consider biophysical attributes as well as community beliefs and ideas.
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Graham, Erin R., and Alexandria Serdaru. "Power, Control, and the Logic of Substitution in Institutional Design: The Case of International Climate Finance." International Organization 74, no. 4 (2020): 671–706. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818320000181.
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AbstractHow do powerful states control international organizations (IOs)? In contrast to the conventional wisdom that treats weighted voting rules as the primary means that powerful states use to codify their asymmetric control in institutional design, we propose that funding rules are equally important. Our framework develops a logic of substitution whereby permissive earmark rules—that allow donors to stipulate how their contributions to an IO are used—are a design substitute for weighted voting from wealthy states’ perspective. Whether asymmetric control is incorporated in design through voting or funding rules depends on whether egalitarian norms emphasizing political and legal equality, or shareholder norms emphasizing influence commensurate with financial power, govern voting and representation rights at the IO. Focusing on the domain of climate finance, we demonstrate that weighted voting rules are used at international climate finance institutions (ICFIs) associated with multilateral development banks, but that wealthy states pursued permissive earmark rules at ICFIs within the United Nations system where egalitarian norms are strong. In this way, powerful donors can exert control over resource allocation even when developing states appear to hold equal influence on governing bodies. In addition to providing a reassessment of how power translates into control at IOs, our framework offers insight into forum-shopping behavior and sheds light on substitution dynamics that involve other dimensions of design across a range of issue areas.
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Büthe, Tim. "Engineering Uncontestedness? The Origins and Institutional Development of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)." Business and Politics 12, no. 3 (October 2010): 1–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1338.
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Private regulation often entails competition among multiple rule-makers, but private rules and regulators do not always compete. For substantial parts of the global economy, a single private body (per issue) is recognized as the focal point for global rule-making. The selection of the institutional setting here effectively takes place prior to drawing up the specific rules, with important consequences for the politics of regulating global markets. In this paper, I develop a theoretical explanation for how a private transnational organization may attain such preeminence—how it can become the focal point for rule-making—in its area of expertise. I emphasize the transnational body's capacity to pursue its organizational self-interest, as well as timing and sequence. I then examine empirically a particularly important body of this kind, which today is essentially uncontested as the focal point for private regulation in its area, even though its standards often have substantial distributive implications: the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). I analyze the persistence and changes in the IEC's formal rules or procedures and informal norms, as well as the broadening scope of its regulatory authority and membership over more than a century.
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CALCAGNO, PETER T., and EDWARD J. LÓPEZ. "Informal norms trump formal constraints: the evolution of fiscal policy institutions in the United States." Journal of Institutional Economics 13, no. 1 (November 3, 2016): 211–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137416000321.
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AbstractTwo shifts of informal rules occurred in the decades around the turn of the 20th century that continue to shape U.S. fiscal policy outcomes. Spending norms in the electorate shifted to expand the scope of the government budget to promote economic security and macroeconomic stability. Simultaneously, norms for elected office shifted to careerism. Both norms were later codified into formal rules as legislation creating entitlement programs, macroeconomic responsibility, and organizational changes to the fiscal policy process. This institutional evolution increased demand for federal expenditures while creating budgetary commons, thus imparting strong motivations to spend through deficit finance in normal times. Despite the last four decades of legislative attempts to constrain spending relative to taxes, the informal norms have trumped the formal constraints. While the empirical literature on deficits has examined the constraining effects of informal rules, this paper offers a novel treatment of shifting norms as having expansionary effects on deficits.
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O’Mullane, Monica. "Developing a theoretical framework for exploring the institutional responses to the Athena SWAN Charter in higher education institutions—A feminist institutionalist perspective." Irish Journal of Sociology 29, no. 2 (March 2, 2021): 215–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0791603521995372.
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Why does the institutional response of higher education institutions to a ‘potentially institutionally transformative’ gender equality programme such as the Athena SWAN (AS) Charter matter? If a higher education institution seeks and attains the AS award, then the institutional response would be to embed the Charter’s action plans thoroughly without resistance or variation across higher education institutional contexts? These are the initial and broader reflective questions underpinning and inspiring this article. The reality is that the Athena SWAN Charter actions and commitments are not simply installed into the technical rules and procedures of higher education institutions, resulting in the organisational and cultural change it seeks. It is argued in this article that applying a feminist institutionalist lens, which deals with the exchange between formal and informal rules, norms and practices, and the roles played by actors working with the rules – the micro-foundations of gendered institutions – will inform our understanding of how a change programme such as Athena SWAN can instil institutional change- if any change. This article details a theoretical framework, drawing from the FI perspective, which will be applied to an empirical study exploring the institutional responses of higher education institutions to the Athena SWAN process in Ireland.
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Vinslav, Yu B., and S. V. Lisov. "Institutional aspects of the improvement of the management in the mineral and raw complex." Proceedings of higher educational establishments. Geology and Exploration, no. 3 (June 28, 2017): 24–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.32454/0016-7762-2017-3-24-31.
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A conclusion has been justified, that the institutional norms and rules existing for the mineral resources use relations, extremely poorly affect industrial and innovative aspect of the activity of the mineral and raw complex (MRC). Actually these norms and rules preserve a hypertrophied export and raw orientation of activity of the MRC enterprises. Perspective development of the domestic MRC has to be based on the considering of the requirements of a set of the institutional norms relating as directly to the sphere of production and reproduction of mineral raw materials, and to the industrial innovative regulation assuming transition to the economy of the highest technological ways. The purpose, tasks, the basic principles of the industrial policy in relation to MRC’s activity have been formulated. A methodical approach to the development of the strategic courses of the development of the geological sector has been offered. Suggestions for the improvement of the mechanisms of staffing of the sphere of mineral resources use have been given.
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Yas’kova, Natal’ya Yur’evna, and Tat’yana Romanovna Alekseeva. "Development of institutional bases of leasing." Vestnik MGSU, no. 2 (February 2016): 146–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.22227/1997-0935.2016.2.146-158.
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Institutional approach to the research of leasing in modern conditions is considered in the article. Formal and informal institutions of the leasing relations are investigated. Ratios of public and subjective expenses and benefits in institutional system of leasing are shown. Features of interaction of agents of the leasing relations, their interests and tendency to manifestation of opportunistic behavior are investigated. The typology of mechanisms of implementation of institutional changes is considered. The need of structural changes of the institutes of leasing relations is proved. It is offered to introduce “institution of engineering” in the structure of institutions of leasing relations. It will allow providing harmonization of the interests of the agents of leasing relations, decreasing their opportunistic behavior, and reducing the transactional expenses of the participants of leasing. It will promote prevention of their opportunistic behavior and reduction of transaction expenses of the participants of leasing. In our opinion, “the institution of leasing” is a set of formal and informal rules, norms and mechanisms of enforcement of their performance (institutes of property, financial rent (leasing), crediting, insurance and other institutes of leasing relations), which govern the property and economic relations, the arising relations with acquisition of ownership and its subsequent assignment for use for a certain time with payment. These norms and rules are necessary for ensuring stability and definiteness in the relations between the participants of leasing, and also for protection of their rights and economic interests.
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Sharyi, Hryhorii, and Svitlana Nesterenko. "Institutional Mechanisms of Land Development Management." ЕКОНОМІКА І РЕГІОН Науковий вісник, no. 4(79) (December 28, 2020): 6–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.26906/eir.2020.4(79).2157.
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A new institutional and neo-institutional theory theoretical apparatus in the field of land economy are revised and the necessity for further land development institutionalization in Ukraine is determined. Social economic relations are analyzed. It is revealed that land relations have an essential structure: in the form of an institutional complex, based on the traditional, customary and religious norms of individuals behavior, as well as social, political, economic, legal and other institutions, as stable socio-economic, organizational and legal structures, institutions and organizations. The main principles of new institutional and neo-institutional economy in the land sphere are determined, namely institute-centrism, limited rationality, historicism, economic opportunism, land good. The relationship nature of land relations institutionalization means with peculiarities of state financial and economic space formation in the author's interpretation is considered at the development level in Ukraine of land circulation institutional infrastructure, The State Land Bank and the National Land Fund formation as state institutions. It has been found that evolutionary institutional changes are inherent in social land development when partial peripheral gradual changes in rules and regulations cause gradual changes and land development. It is proved that state, having administrative advantages, acting by economic methods and methods of legal influence, should change and adapt the institutional environment, as a set of rules, norms that form the basis of production, exchange and redistribution in the land sphere, because the main link in the bundle of land rights, belongs to the people of Ukraine.
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Roeben, Volker. "Institutions of International Law: How International Law Secures Orderliness in International Affairs." Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online 22, no. 1 (October 7, 2019): 187–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18757413_022001009.
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This article is a plea for adopting a reinvigorated, analytic perspective on contemporary international law, building on MacCormick’s powerful insights into law’s essential structure. The article proposes that international law as whole forms an institutional normative order. The idea of institutional normative order has certain conditions. These link a normative conception of international law with the means of achieving it. The article makes three arguments on these conditions. It first argues that the function of international law is to create order in the sense of orderliness for its principal users, States and international organizations. It then claims that international law establishes normative order through international rules that are binding from the viewpoint of States and international organizations. An international process of rule-making embedded in State practice turns norms into such rules. The process is being held as a bindingness-creating mechanism because it formalizes rules through recognized means and organizes collective consent to authorize them. States and international organizations then apply these rules by exercising international legal powers under a defeasible presumption of legality. Third, the article argues that this normative order becomes institutionalized. The institutions of international law are grounded in ideas about agencies, arrangements, and master-norms that integrate the mass of international rules and principles. The article exemplifies these arguments for UN-driven international law with the relating recent jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and Annex vii tribunals, and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The upshot of this idea of international law as institutional normative order is unity, or indeed a system. No part of international law can be seen outside of this context and hence the burden of argumentation is on those wishing to make the case for divergence.
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Asif M Shahan, Asif M. "One Step Forward or One Step Back? Explaining the Performance Paradox in the Civil Service of Bangladesh." Making of Contemporary Maldives: Isolation, Dictatorship and Democracy 2, no. 1 (July 1, 2021): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.52823/asuf9612.
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In Bangladesh, two contrasting scenarios regarding the responsiveness of the bureaucrats working at the field level are present. Whereas some bureaucrats reach out to the people and respond to their demands, others remain unresponsive and unapproachable. So, why do the bureaucrats working at the grassroots, while performing under the same rules, same institutional context and reality, perform in two different ways while interacting with citizens? How can these two contradictory sets of understanding regarding bureaucratic responsiveness coexist in Bangladesh? This article attempts to unpack this puzzle by relying on a slightly modified version of historical institutionalism. Building on Bell’s model of ‘agent-centric institutional change’ and by using a modified version of Mahoney & Thelen’s framework of institutional change, it argues that dialectical interaction between agents (bureaucrats) and institutions (i.e., rules- both formal and informal, norms that affect the behavior of the agents) within the broader political setting can best explain the variation in behavioral pattern of the bureaucrats. The political context allows agents to exercise discretion in a specific manner in executing their roles and functions while being constrained by institutional rules and norms. The dialectical interaction between structure (political context), agent, and institution determines the current administrative reality, which has allowed the contradiction to emerge and sustain.
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Simchenko, Nataliia, and Stas Nagornyi. "Institutional environment for the development of the sharing economy." SHS Web of Conferences 106 (2021): 01038. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202110601038.
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The article is devoted to studying prerequisites for the formation of the institutional environment of the economy of joint consumption in the current digital environment. From the standpoint of institutional theory, the institutional environment is understood as an ordered set of institutions that determine the constraints for economic agents in making innovative managerial decisions. The peculiarities of the institutional environment functioning are determined by the mutual support of the institutions, which is ensured by performing their respective functions. It is proved that the development of the relationship between formal and informal institutions is one of the key factors of institutional dynamics. It needs not only the formation but also the perception of the rules and norms accepted in society. Formal constraints, rules, and institutions emerge for the most part from the principles of already existing informal rules and mechanisms that enforce them. The functions of the institutional environment, which generally represent the activities aimed at streamlining the actions to maintain stability in society, are highlighted.
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Cino, Luigi. "Tunisia’s Institutional Change after the Revolution." Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science 43 (December 13, 2019): 32–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.22151/politikon.43.2.
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The Arab Uprisings started with the Tunisian revolution. These events brought the country to profound change, especially in its institutional asset. Relying on New Institutionalism theory and in particular on the Gradual Change Theory by Mahoney and Thelen, this paper analyses three fundamental dimensions of institutional change in order to establish which type of institutional change has occurred in post-revolution Tunisia. The paper looks at the characteristics of the institutions, the characteristics of the political context and the type of dominant change agent to determine the type of institutional change. In Tunisia, a low level of discretion in the interpretation of norms and rules, weak veto possibilities for the former regime supporters and an insurrection type of dominant change agent have resulted in a so-called “displacement” type of institutional change, where the removal of old rules is accompanied by the introduction of new ones.
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Olsevich, Yu, and V. Mazarchuk. "On the Specifics of Economic Institutions in the Social Sphere (Theoretical Aspect)." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 5 (May 20, 2005): 50–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2005-5-50-64.
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The authors consider the organizations in different branches of the social sphere (schools, clinics, theatres) as complex institutional formations where the "cluster" of economic norms and rules is subordinated to the "cluster" of social values. These organizations perform the dual function: formation of human capital and compensation of poverty of poor people. According to the authors' opinion, complex reforming of the health care branch requires creation of new economic norms and rules combining plan, semimarket and market relations. This approach will rise the effectiveness of this sphere and will not undermine its social function.
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Murray, Gregor, Christian Lévesque, Glenn Morgan, and Nicolas Roby. "Disruption and re-regulation in work and employment: from organisational to institutional experimentation." Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 26, no. 2 (April 28, 2020): 135–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1024258920919346.
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This article proposes experimentation as a framework for understanding actor agency in the changing regulation of work and employment. This involves contrasting institutional change with organisational and institutional experimentation approaches in order to understand how, in the context of uncertainty, actors in the world of work experiment with new ways of organising and seek to institutionalise them into new understandings, norms and rules. The article describes the fault lines of disruption that are generating a vast range of experiments in the world of work. These fault lines invite resilient responses and the development of collective capabilities at two levels: first, organisational experimentation, where social actors seek to modify or renew their organisations, networks and alliances and reflect on, assess and learn from their experiments; second, institutional experimentation, where these responses are scaled up and institutionalised over time through more general understandings, norms and rules. A key challenge for comparative research and strategising is to find the appropriate institutional conditions that will facilitate and enable organisational experiments, whilst overcoming constraining institutional conditions. This challenge is illustrated through the examples of co-working and the development of new forms of collective representation.
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Lewis, Jeffrey. "Institutional Environments And Everyday EU Decision Making." Comparative Political Studies 36, no. 1-2 (February 2003): 97–124. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414002239373.
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What difference do institutional environments make? Do they primarily affect strategy, with constraining and enabling effects on behavior as rationalists hold? Or do they also affect attitudes, identities, and how interests are formulated as constructivists assert? Within a given institutional environment, what impact does the "style" of decision making-which beyond formal characteristics such as the decision rule includes informal rules, norms, and shared understandings-play in determining bargaining outcomes? This article examines these questions in the context of EU decision making by focusing on the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper). Coreper is an ideal laboratory to test these questions empirically, because this committee represents the needle's eye through which the legislative workload of the Council flows. And the permanent representatives who live in Brussels and meet weekly to prepare upcoming ministerial meetings are exemplars of state agents given their prominence in articulating and defending national interests across the gamut of EU affairs.
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Карпова, О., O. Karpova, Я. Формулевич, and Ya Formulevich. "Legal Regulatory Gaps in Russian Internal Audit: Institutional Aspect." Auditor 5, no. 11 (December 2, 2019): 19–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/article_5dcbeb9d84e0a3.07612096.
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The article defines the role of internal audit in the financial and economic activities of economic entity. The advantages of internal auditing are analyzed. The authors also described the interaction between internal audit and external independent control. Special attention is paid to the problems of the Russian internal audit, namely the formal rules (norms). As a result, the authors propose the ways to eliminate gaps in the legal regulation of the Russian internal audit.
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Ng, Desmond. "Balancing Agency with Structure: Institutional Entrepreneurship as an Embedded Discovery Process." Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation in Emerging Economies 7, no. 2 (April 27, 2021): 147–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/23939575211010611.
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While mainstream research has treated entrepreneurship as a highly individualised and agentic process, institutional researchers contend that entrepreneurship operates within a greater embedded setting. Various researchers have appealed to Giddens’ dual structure to explain an entrepreneur’s embedded-agency. According to Giddens’ dual structure, this embedded-agency consists of the rules or norms of a social group in which these rules constrain and enable an entrepreneur’s resources. Yet, despite Giddens’ contributions, Giddens is criticised for conflating the rules of this embedded setting with an entrepreneur’s resources in which neither affects the other in any significant way. By drawing on concepts of the Austrian entrepreneur and embeddedness, a theory of institutional entrepreneurship is developed to address this conflation problem. This institutional entrepreneurship offers an embedded-agency to explain how an entrepreneur can create, maintain and disrupt their embedded social settings. This embedded-agency addresses Giddens’ conflation problem and broadens the agent-centric focus of institutional entrepreneurship research.
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Riegner, Michael. "Towards an International Institutional Law of Information." International Organizations Law Review 12, no. 1 (November 20, 2015): 50–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15723747-01201003.
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How does international institutional law shape the way in which international institutions govern information and exercise cognitive authority? Drawing from the existing literature on indicators, data collection and transparency in international institutions such as the World Bank and the un, this paper argues that existing legal norms can be reconstructed as an overarching framework that legally structures global information governance. Indicators thus do not, as is often assumed, “escape” legal regulation; law rather co-constitutes the lens through which information about the world is generated. The paper analyses the institutional architecture and the modalities of informational action as well as the sources and regulatory modus of the existing legal framework. It exemplifies rules on institutional powers, participation, review and transparency and discusses general principles that structure the field. Taken together, these rules and principles circumscribe the emerging contours of an “international institutional law of information” that normatively frames the informational relationships between international institutions, states and individuals.
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Doluwarawaththa Gamage, Sujeewa Damayanthi, and Tharusha Gooneratne. "Management controls in an apparel group: an institutional theory perspective." Journal of Applied Accounting Research 18, no. 2 (May 8, 2017): 223–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jaar-09-2015-0075.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore how management controls in an organization take shape amidst the tensions between external institutional forces and the internal dynamics arising from the different powers and interests of managers as well as from intra-organizational norms, rules and taken-for-granted assumptions. Design/methodology/approach Adopting an interpretivist stance, this study employs the embedded (nested) case study approach drawing evidence from an apparel group which consists of a head office and four clusters. Theoretically, the paper is informed by institutional theory, and particularly draws on concepts such as organizational field, ceremonials, rational myths, isomorphism, institutional logics and loose coupling. It is further complemented by strategic responses of Oliver (1991), as well as materials and discursive elements in elaborating how external pressures influence control practices of an organization, and how internal actors strategically respond to those pressures in balancing external legitimacy and internal efficiency requirements. Findings The field-study findings reveal that management controls of the case-study organization have taken shape amidst external pressures, specifically from customers and internal dynamics such as interests of key actors, who strategically respond to external pressures and head -office specifications. Research limitations/implications Situating management controls within external pressures and internal dynamics, the findings of this study have implications for research on organizational heterogeneity, and it offers learning points for managers in formulating management controls by balancing conflicting internal and external pressures. Practical implications In reality, practicing managers are faced with conflicting logics arising from external pressures and internal dynamics stemming from different power- and interest-holding managers as well as intra-organizational norms, rules and taken-for-granted assumptions in their everyday encounters in organizations. This study provides some pointers for such practicing managers in designing and implementing management control systems by effectively balancing these opposing influences and formulating systems suited to the circumstances of a particular organization. Originality/value Moving beyond the widely held narrow conceptualization of institutional theory akin to (external) isomorphism and organizational conformity, this paper brings out organizational heterogeneity through the active agency of actors in terms of their power, interest and proclivities as well as their use of organizational norms and rules in responding to such external institutions.
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Nee, Victor, and Sonja Opper. "Endogenous Institutional Change and Dynamic Capitalism." SOCIOLOGIA DEL LAVORO, no. 118 (July 2010): 15–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/sl2010-118002.
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State-centered theory asserts that political institutions and credible commitment by political elite to formal rules securing property rights provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for economic growth to take place. In this approach, the evolution of institutions favorable to economic performance is a top-down process led by politicians who control the state. Hence, in less developed and poor countries, the counterfactual is that if formal institutions secure property rights and check predatory action by the political elite, then sustained economic growth would follow. The limitation of state-centered theory stems from the problem that behavioral prescriptions - formal rules and regulations - that reflect what politicians prefer can be ignored. In contrast, we lay out the bottomup construction of economic institutions that gave rise to capitalist economic development in China. Entrepreneurship in the economically developed regions of the coastal provinces was not fueled by exogenous institutional changes. When the first entrepreneurs decided to decouple from the traditional socialist production system, the government had neither initiated financial reforms inviting a broader societal participation, nor had it provided property rights protection or transparent rules specifying company registration and liabilities. Instead, it was the development and use of innovative informal arrangements within close-knit groups of like-minded actors that provided the necessary funding and reliable business norms. This allowed the first wave of entrepreneurs to survive outside of the state-owned manufacturing system. This bottom-up process resembles earlier accounts of the rise of capitalism in the West.
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Searing, Donald D. "Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism." American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (December 1991): 1239–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963944.
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I seek to reinvigorate the study of politicians' roles by showing how motivational role theory can be used to examine the impact of goals and incentives upon behavior and thereby integrate economic and sociological perspectives. I address three reasons for the recent neglect of politicians' roles—changes in interdisciplinary tastes, conceptual and theoretical muddles, and failures to demonstrate consequences for behavior—and find them unconvincing. I further argue that the most promising framework for the new institutionalism is one that incorporates not just formal but also informal institutional structures (like roles and norms), a framework that incorporates, rather than excludes, political behavior.
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Norman, Ludvig. "When norms and rules collide: the social production of institutional conflict in the European Union." Journal of European Public Policy 22, no. 5 (November 26, 2014): 630–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2014.982155.
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Onyshko, S. V., and D. O. Savenko. "A Theoretical Conceptualization of Institutional Provision of the Financial Market." Business Inform 9, no. 512 (2020): 219–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.32983/2222-4459-2020-9-219-228.
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The article is concerned with the problems of formation and development of institutional provision of the financial market. The relevance of the problem is caused by the relationship of formal and informal norms of economic processes and phenomena, the understanding of which provides the key to achieving the effectiveness of the financial market development. Understanding the essence of institutional provision of the financial market and the factors of its formation and development makes it possible to make more informed and effective decisions in the sphere of financial market development. The article is aimed at substantiating the conceptual approaches to the structuring of institutional provision of the financial market. It is substantiated that institutional provision of the financial market includes both formal and informal institutions. The formal institutions, in turn, consist of institutions-organizations and institutions-norms. The factors of occurrence of institutional deformations in the financial market are systematized. The institutions of the financial market are structured, in particular, in the composition of the institutions-norms the authors allocate the formal (international legal framework for concluding and implementing agreements in financial markets, national regulatory framework for concluding and implementing agreements in financial markets, norms of related national and international law, ensuring the conclusion and implementation of agreements in financial markets) and the informal norms (norms stipulated by religion, informal agreements and conspiracies between the financial market participants, unofficial (shadow) markets for the conclusion and implementation of financial agreements). In the composition of institutions-organizations the authors allocate the institutions-buyers of financial resources; institutions – sellers of financial resources; institutions that serve the functioning of institutions-sellers and institutions – buyers of financial resources; institutions-regulators. The institutional provision of the financial market is structured and the relationship between institutions-norms, institutions-rules and the State is defined. The principles of institutional provision of the financial market are substantiated and its functions are defined.
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Syme, Tim. "The pervasive structure of society." Philosophy & Social Criticism 44, no. 8 (December 4, 2017): 888–924. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453717730874.
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What does it mean to say that the demands of justice are institutional rather than individual? Justice is often thought to be directly concerned only with governmental institutions rather than individuals’ everyday, legally permissible actions. This approach has been criticized for ignoring the relevance to justice of informal social norms. This paper defends the idea that justice is distinctively institutional but rejects the primacy of governmental institutions. I argue that the ‘pervasive structure of society’ is the site of justice and injustice. It includes all widely enforced social rules and norms, governmental and otherwise, such as informal norms of gender, language and class, and provides a revisionary foundation for the theoretical elucidation and practical pursuit of justice. It provides a framework for evaluating the ways in which people can and should promote justice in their everyday lives.
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FAUDE, BENJAMIN, and JULIA FUSS. "Coordination or conflict? The causes and consequences of institutional overlap in a disaggregated world order." Global Constitutionalism 9, no. 2 (July 2020): 268–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2045381719000376.
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AbstractInstitutional overlap emerges not only as an unintended by-product of purposive state action but also as its deliberate result. In two ways, this article expands existing research on the causes and consequences of institutional overlap. First, we establish that three different types of dissatisfaction may lead states to deliberately create institutional overlap: dissatisfaction with substantive norms and rules, dissatisfaction with decision-making rules and dissatisfaction with the institutional fit of an existing governance arrangement for a given cooperation problem. Each type of dissatisfaction triggers a distinct motivation for the creation of institutional overlap: to induce policy change, to increase influence on collective decision-making or to enhance governance effectiveness. Second, we demonstrate that whereas the motivation to induce policy change leads to interface conflicts, the motivations to increase influence on collective decision-making and to enhance governance effectiveness give rise to inter-institutional coordination. Three empirical case studies on global energy governance, the governance of global development banking and global environmental governance probe these analytical claims.
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Okello Candiya Bongomin, George, Charles Akol Malinga, John C. Munene, and Joseph Mpeera Ntayi. "Institutional framework in developing economies." Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 26, no. 2 (May 14, 2018): 271–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-02-2017-0025.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to establish the relationship between institutional framework of regulative (formal rules), normative (informal norms) and cultural-cognitive (cognition), and their effects on financial intermediation by microfinance deposit taking institutions (MDIs) in developing economies like Uganda. Design/methodology/approach Data collected from a total sample of 400 poor households and 40 relationship officers located in rural Uganda were processed using statistical package for social sciences and analysis of moment structures to establish the relationship between institutional framework of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive, and their effects on financial intermediation by MDIs in developing economies. Findings The results showed that the three dimensions of regulative (formal rules), normative (informal norms) and cultural-cognitive (cognition) significantly affect financial intermediation by MDIs in developing economies like Uganda. In addition, as a unique finding, two new dimensions of procedural and declarative cognition emerged from cultural-cognitive framework to determine financial intermediation among MDIs in developing economies, specifically in Uganda. Research limitations/implications The study collected data from only poor households and relationship officers located in rural Uganda. It ignored peri-urban and urban areas in Uganda. In addition, the study focused only on MDIs and ignored other financial institutions. Besides, the study was purely quantitative, therefore, further research through interviews may be useful in future. Furthermore, the study was carried out in rural Uganda as a developing economy. Thus, future research using the same variables in other developing economies may be useful. Practical implications Managers of financial institutions and policy makers should know that market functions of financial intermediaries in developing economies are promoted by institutional framework of regulative, normative and procedural and declarative cognition that lowers transaction cost and promotes information sharing. Therefore, more efforts should be directed towards strengthening the existing institutional framework of regulative, normative and cognition to promote financial intermediation by financial institutions such as MDIs. Originality/value This paper is the first to test the relationship between institutional framework and their effects on financial intermediation by MDIs in developing economies. The results revealed existence of two new factor structures of procedural and declarative cognition in explaining financial intermediation by MDIs in developing economies like Uganda. This is sparse in financial intermediation literature and theory.
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Mertzanis, Harilaos. "Institutional change and corporate governance reform." Corporate Board role duties and composition 7, no. 1 (2011): 140–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv7i1c1art5.
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The global financial crisis has posed challenges to financial institutions governance. Meeting these challenges requires an understanding of governance dynamics in relation to institutions’ performance within a changing environment. The nature and scope of institutional response to a changing environment depends upon inherited governance structures, including socioeconomic conventions and rules of behavior at the macro level and time, expertise and common commitment of directors at the micro level. Innovation and learning-by-doing in governance can be an effective reform strategy. Innovation in governance may include the establishment of new norms of economic behavior and the transformation of decision-making process and the reallocation of responsibilities to directors and senior management. This may also inform regulatory approaches in strengthening financial institutions governance, based on improved disclosure, independent and competent boards.
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COUYOUMDJIAN, JUAN PABLO. "Are institutional transplants viable? An examination in light of the proposals by Jeremy Bentham." Journal of Institutional Economics 8, no. 4 (June 7, 2012): 489–509. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137412000100.
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Abstract:The problem of institutional transplantation is an important issue. In Jeremy Bentham's work, we find practical as well as theoretical proposals regarding this problem. Here, we view his work as an invitation to reflect on the overall nature of the question of institutional design and transplantation. The transfer of institutions requires knowledge of ‘place and time’ that will allow for an accommodation of the transferred institutions to their new soil. However, an awareness of this type of knowledge and thus relying on its actually being available is not viable from a practical point of view. This is due to the fact that the core of informal institutions is tacit, which imposes a fundamental constraint on the process of institutional transplantation; informal norms must co-exist with formal rules, and such merging requires some accommodation of both types of rules.
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ZOUBOULAKIS, MICHEL S. "Customary rule-following behaviour in the work of John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall." Journal of Institutional Economics 11, no. 4 (October 29, 2014): 783–801. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137414000502.
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AbstractThe informal institutional structure embraces the social norms and moral values of a particular society and together with the formal institutional frame, they compose the social environment. Social norms and values, congealed into customary rules of behaviour, provide a stable and enduring context to economic life that acts positively or negatively on economic activity. Despite their methodological and theoretical differences, Mill and Marshall have both suggested that individual economic decisions are fully embedded in their social environment. Thus, in order to explain the economic phenomena, from simple transaction processes to long term development, they adopted a broader perspective by including the social frame inside which economic choices are made, divulging the role of custom, yet in a quite distinctive way.
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HAYES, RICHARD N., and JEFFREY A. ROBINSON. "A RESEARCH NOTE ON INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTION: THE CASE OF BLACK CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS." Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship 16, no. 04 (December 2011): 499–515. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1084946711001963.
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What role do institutions play in the development of entrepreneurial ventures? What factors influence whether organizations will engage in entrepreneurial activity? While research has examined the individual and group-level characteristics of entrepreneurs, this paper explores the role of institutions and organizations in the development of entrepreneurial ventures. Using the "Black Church" as an institutional context, we predict entrepreneurial activity patterns of individual congregations based on denomination-specific institutional logics — rules and norms that either facilitate or constrain organizational action.
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Carter, David Paul. "Institutional enforcement, signaling, and deliberation: Rock climbers attempting to maintain rules and norms through social sanctioning." International Journal of the Commons 13, no. 1 (April 8, 2019): 353. http://dx.doi.org/10.18352/ijc.878.
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Piers Ludlow, N. "Did We Ever Really Understand How the eu Works?" Diplomatica 1, no. 1 (April 10, 2019): 94–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/25891774-00101011.
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One of the stranger aspects of the Brexit saga has been the ignorance of eu norms, rules, history, and institutional practices appearing throughout the public debate in the United Kingdom. This has led to several predictable and rather basic errors of diplomacy, and a far more arduous “negotiation” than some on both sides –uk and eu – may have wanted or intended.
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Kryukov, V. "Analysis of the Development of the Subsoil Use System in Russia (On the Necessity of Hardening Institutional Conditions)." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 1 (January 20, 2006): 86–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2006-1-86-101.
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A peculiarity of the subsoil use system that is currently being formed in Russia is the neglect of development of complementary institutions such as norms and rules of the subsoil use or conflict resolution procedures. Instead, soft institutional conditions are emerging that allow subsoil-using companies to manipulate business rules and extract quasi-rents. As a result the property rights assignment process in the petroleum industry is biased towards the private form of ownership to the detriment of its public form. This also undermines the due process of key capital assets’ reproduction including reserves development.
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WILLIAMS, COLIN C., and SLAVKO BEZEREDI. "AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF INFORMAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: SOME LESSONS FROM FYR MACEDONIA." Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship 23, no. 03 (September 2018): 1850019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s108494671850019x.
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In recent years, a new institutionalist theory has emerged to explain the prevalence of informal sector entrepreneurship. This argues that formal institutional failures lead to the emergence of an asymmetry between the formal rules (laws and regulations) and the norms, values and beliefs of entrepreneurs regarding the acceptability of participating in the informal sector, which in turn leads to the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship. The aim of this paper is to evaluate this social actor approach by reporting evidence from 453 face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of entrepreneurs in FYR Macedonia. This reveals not only a significant association between participation in the informal economy and the non-alignment of entrepreneurs’ views with the formal rules, but specific formal institutional failings that are significantly associated with the acceptability of informal entrepreneurship, namely poor quality public services, a lack of tax fairness, corruption and instability in the formal institutions. The theoretical and policy implications are then discussed.
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OSTROM, ELINOR, and XAVIER BASURTO. "Crafting analytical tools to study institutional change." Journal of Institutional Economics 7, no. 3 (August 16, 2010): 317–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744137410000305.
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Abstract:Most powerful analytical tools used in the social sciences are well suited for studying static situations. Static and mechanistic analysis, however, is not adequate to understand the changing world in which we live. In order to adequately address the most pressing social and environmental challenges looming ahead, we need to develop analytical tools for analyzing dynamic situations – particularly institutional change. In this paper, we develop an analytical tool to study institutional change, more specifically, the evolution of rules and norms. We believe that in order for such an analytical tool to be useful to develop a general theory of institutional change, it needs to enable the analyst to concisely record the processes of change in multiple specific settings so that lessons from such settings can eventually be integrated into a more general predictive theory of change.
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Llanos Reynoso, Luis Felipe, Alfonso Brown del Rivero, and Hugo Javier Fuentes Castro. "The Institutional Framework as a competitiveness factor in Latin America." Latin American Journal of Trade Policy 3, no. 6 (April 30, 2020): 49. http://dx.doi.org/10.5354/0719-9368.2020.57166.
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This document objective is to analyze the performance of selected Latin American countries in relation to their institutional framework, that is to say their legal systems, rules, norms and other regulatory provisions. These elements define, to large extent, the functioning and performance of markets linked to good and services, labor and financial systems. Specifically, by means of a factorial analysis along with a clustering process, the most significant explanatory variables on the trend and behavior of six out of 12 pillars for competitiveness as stated by the World Economic Forum have been identified and, likewise, the countries have been classified into a homogenous regional subgroups according to their performance.
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Adams, Melinda, and Michal Smrek. "Making Institutions and Context Count: How Useful Is Feminist Institutionalism in Explaining Male Dominance in Politics?" Politics & Gender 14, no. 2 (June 2018): 271–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1743923x18000156.
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While the same formal candidate selection rules are generally in place throughout a state, there is often intracountry variation in male descriptive overrepresentation. To explain this variation, scholars cannot focus exclusively on women (e.g., how do women respond to formal institutional opportunities?) or femininity (e.g., how do norms governing appropriate female behavior affect women's odds of being selected as a candidate?). Rather, scholars must attend to the ways that informal norms regarding masculinity operate across space and time within a country. Drawing on the insights of feminist institutionalism, this essay examines two intracountry sources of variation in candidate selection: the spatial urban-rural divide and temporal differences between first-time recruitment and renomination. While the formal candidate selection rules are uniform, informal institutions vary depending on where and when we look, leading to different levels of male overrepresentation.
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Danilov, Dmitry. "INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF INNOVATIONS IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: SCOPE OF THE SOFTWARE." Scientific Research of Faculty of Economics. Electronic Journal 9, no. 2 (June 28, 2017): 42–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.38050/2078-3809-2017-9-2-42-50.
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Firms that operate in the field of software (software) have their own specifics and face certain problems that are solved with the help of legal acts regulating interaction. In this regard, the article identifies the situation of the need to introduce certain norms and rules in the context of the globalization of economic markets, in which prerequisites arise for innovations in such a segment of the digital economy as the software market.
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Toboso, Fernando. "Explaining the process of change taking place in legal rules and social norms: The cases of institutional economics and new institutional economics." European Journal of Law and Economics 2, no. 1 (January 1995): 63–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01540824.
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Kasper, Agnes, and Csaba Krasznay. "Towards Pollution-Control in Cyberspace: Problem Structure and Institutional Design in International Cybersecurity." International and Comparative Law Review 19, no. 2 (December 1, 2019): 76–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/iclr-2019-0015.
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Summary In their contest for domination in cyberspace states engage powers of technology, money, persuasion and norms. Clashes between two competing approaches resulted in the creation of two parallel working groups in the UN that address issues of international cybersecurity, including principles, norms and laws. Although there are very few treaties that deal expressly with cyber activities, normative aspirations and frequent use of imported rules and principles from other realms to cyberspace suggest the emergence of a new cyber normative regime – though, in the short term probably short of a global treaty. The substantive content of existing and potentially applicable norms to cyberspace has been examined to a great extent, but less scholarly attention has been paid to mechanisms that can produce cooperation and compliant behavior with international norms in cyberspace. This study draws inspiration from environmental agreements from procedural aspects and we identified two environmental regimes, which address problems sufficiently similar to the challenges of international cyber security and which have been the most successful in terms of cooperation. Selection of the Montreal Protocol and REDD+ mechanism was based on the following main factors: incentives in terms of game theory, capacities of actors, information and scientific uncertainty, the time of institution creation in normative lifecycle, number of actors, and asymmetry in power and positions taken among actors. Further analysis focuses on institutional design elements in the chosen cases, and examines if or under what conditions could these be used for international normative frameworks on cyberspace.
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Katelouzou, Dionysia, and Konstantinos Sergakis. "When Harmonization is Not Enough: Shareholder Stewardship in the European Union." European Business Organization Law Review 22, no. 2 (February 1, 2021): 203–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40804-020-00198-5.
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AbstractOn 10 June 2019 the transposition and implementation deadline for the shareholder engagement rules imposed upon institutional investors and asset managers by the revised Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD II) expired. This article offers an original account of the rationale, the dynamics and the evolution of this EU-driven policy, which aims to promote long-term institutional shareholder engagement within (or in the absence of) nationally embedded frameworks. We place the SRD II shareholder engagement rules within what we see as a multi-layered regulatory landscape consisting in some Member States of soft-law stewardship codes or similar principles and guidelines, and we find—perhaps surprisingly—that the SRD II stewardship-related provisions were transposed in a literal and minimalistic fashion without any customization to divergent national specifications and despite the fact that the SRD II is only a minimum harmonization directive. We search for explanations for this transposition pattern by pointing to three key issues: the policy and institutional misfit between the harmonized rules and national regimes, the lack of a strong market demand for shareholder stewardship, and the more apt soft, flexible and mostly bottom-up norms (contained in codes or similar principles and guidelines)—rather than (semi-)hard top-down rules—in inculcating good shareholder stewardship practices. Against this background of minimalist intervention (both at the EU and national levels), we find that pre-SRD II soft stewardship initiatives have had two key positive effects. First, they increased market actors’ familiarity and preparedness with the SRD II transposed rules, thereby increasing the likelihood of effective compliance with good shareholder stewardship standards whilst maintaining national idiosyncrasies. Second, soft-law stewardship codes or similar principles and guidelines, despite their own weaknesses, are vital mechanisms of innovative norm-generation and can expand or adjust the SRD II stewardship-related rules to provide tailored shareholder stewardship frameworks and serve as a signalling function for key market actors. From this it follows that the uniform, but minimalistic, transposition of the SRD II stewardship-related rules across the EU, although welcome in shaping the minimum standards, needs to be supported by tailored, soft-law stewardship codes or similar principles and guidelines. Such a symbiosis of the harmonized SRD II shareholder engagement rules and supporting soft-law stewardship developments will allow the tailoring of shareholder stewardship norms to local conditions and the provision of guidance and meaning to the SRD II rules, while a minimum harmonization of shareholder stewardship is already secured.
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Jalali Aliabadi, Farzaneh, Muhammad Bilal Farooq, Umesh Sharma, and Dessalegn Getie Mihret. "Institutional work and the interplay of stability and change in public budgeting reform: the case of public universities in Iran." Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 34, no. 4 (March 2, 2021): 786–818. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/aaaj-11-2019-4261.
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PurposeThe purpose of this study is to understand the efforts of key social actors in influencing the reform of Iranian public universities budgeting system, from incremental to performance-based budgeting (PBB), the tensions that arose as competing efforts of institutional change were undertaken, and ultimately the impact of these efforts on the extent to which the Iranian government transitioned to a system of PBB in public universities.Design/methodology/approachData comprises of semi-structured interviews with managers and experts involved in the budget setting process and an analysis of budgetary policy documents, reports and archival material such as legislation. An institutional work lens is employed to interpret the findings.FindingsWhile actors advocating the change were engaged in institutional work directed at disrupting the old budgetary rules by disassociating the rules moral foundations and creating new budgetary rules (through new legislation), universities undertook subtle resistance by engaging in extended evaluation of the new proposed PBB rules thereby maintaining the old budgetary rules. The reforms undertaken to introduce PBB in Iranian universities achieved minimal success whereby incremental budgeting continued to constitute by far a larger percentage of the budget allocation formula for university budgets. This finding illustrates change and continuity in university budgetary systems resulting from institutional work of actors competing to control the basis of resource allocation under the proposed PBB system by proposing contradicting models.Practical implicationsThe findings highlight the importance of understanding the interplay of institutional work undertaken by competing social actors as they seek to advance their goals in shaping budgetary reforms in the public-sector. Such an understanding may inform policy makers who intend to introduce major reforms in public-sector budgeting approaches.Originality/valueUnlike prior studies that largely focused on how organization-level budgeting practices responded to changes in public budgeting rules (i.e. at the site of implementation of the rules), this paper highlights how strategies of change and resistance are played out at the site of setting budgetary norms.
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Pedro, Antonio C. "Ending institutions: Rule enforcement in self-governance systems." Rationality and Society 30, no. 1 (December 26, 2017): 80–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1043463117734176.
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How are rules enforced in the absence of an organization with coercive powers? I examine the role of informal institutions in supporting self-enforcement of rules through ethnographic research on a popular form of community-based gambling in the Philippines. In ending, a reputation-based mechanism shapes exchange relations between bettors and bet-takers, and among members of a local community. Social norms about sharing one’s winnings ( balato) provide community members with an interest in the outcome of these exchange relations, thereby strengthening the ability of bettors to acquire information about the reputation of various bet-takers. In consequence, bet-takers exert efforts to safeguard their reputation, and comply with informal rules about the immediate and complete delivery of winnings. The findings suggest that when communities are small enough so that members are able to observe each other, but not too small so that no individual possesses all the relevant information, then social norms that generate effective transmission of reputational information provide sufficient institutional support for self-governance.
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Sakawati, Herlina, Sulmiah Sulmiah, Novayanti Sopia Rukmana, Widyawati Widyawati, and Andi Tenri Citra Sari. "Institutional Capacity in Clean Water Management in Jeneponto Regency." Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Administrasi Publik 9, no. 2 (February 4, 2020): 295. http://dx.doi.org/10.26858/jiap.v9i2.12311.
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This study aims to analyze the institutional capacity in Jeneponto Regency in the management of clean water. The study was conducted using descriptive qualitative methods. Data collection is done through observation and interview techniques, which are strengthened from data from related institutions. The results showed that five dimensions were used to look at institutional capacity, only one dimension contributed to increasing the existing institutional capacity, namely the Social Norms, Values and Practice dimensions. And for the other four dimensions namely, individual dimensions, organizational dimensions, organizational network dimensions, and public governance dimensions still need to be improved. Institutional capacity in the management of clean water in Jeneponto Regency requires rules that govern cooperation between all agencies that have a connection in the management of clean water. The government needs to give training and education to employees.
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Bátora, Jozef. "States, interstitial organizations and the prospects for liberal international order." International Affairs 97, no. 5 (September 2021): 1433–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab108.
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Abstract This article proposes a complementary approach to analysing destabilization of the liberal international order (LIO) and argues that such challenges are related to endogenous institutional processes within the LIO. Faced with constraints of the core norms, rules and institutions of the LIO, states use interstitial organizations (INTOs)—new organizational forms recombining resources, rules, practices and structures from multiple institutional domains—allowing for innovative ways of delivering foreign policies. Using organization theory and new institutionalist approaches, the article outlines a three-dimensional analytical framework to the study of emergence of interstitial organizational forms and interstitial institutional change of international institutions. It applies this framework to the study of two types of INTOs—the European External Action Service (EEAS) and private military companies (PMCs)—both of which are shown to have transformational impacts on two core primary institutions of the modern state order, namely diplomacy and war. The article argues that reliance on INTOs can both enhance and constrain states' ability to promote the core principles of the LIO and concludes with a discussion of two possible paths of adaptation of this order.