Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Institutional Investors'
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Nguyen, Hoang. "TWO ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS." Doctoral diss., University of Central Florida, 2007. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/3934.
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This dissertation consists of two essays investigating the trading by institutions and its impact on the stock market. In the first essay, I investigate why changes in institutional breadth predict return. I first show that changes in breadth are positively associated with abnormal returns over the following four quarters. I then demonstrate that this return predictability can be attributed to the information about the firms' future operating performance. When I examine different types of institutions independently, I find that the predictive power varies across the population of institutions. More specifically, institutions that follow active management style are better able to predict future returns than the passive institutions, and their predictive power appears to be associated with information about future earnings growth. These findings are consistent with the information hypothesis that changes in breadth of institutional ownership can predict return because they contain information about the fundamental value of firms. In the second essay, I examine institutional herding behavior and its impact on stock prices. I document that herds by institutions usually last for more than one quarter and that herds occur more frequently for small and medium size stocks. I find that after herds end, there are reversals in stocks returns for up to four quarters. The magnitude of reversals is positively related to the duration of herding, and negatively related to the price impact of current herding activity. This pattern in returns prevails for all sub-periods examined and is concentrated in small and medium size stocks. My findings suggest that institutional herding may destabilize stock prices.Ph.D.
Department of Finance
Business Administration
Business Administration PhD
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Alshabibi, Badar. "Institutional investors and corporate governance." Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2017. https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/67698/.
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This study aims to explore the role of institutional investors in the improvement of corporate governance within the companies in which they invest (investee companies). This aim is accomplished by analysing evidence concerning the characteristics of numerous companies’ boards of directors, and of their key subcommittees, listed across the globe. These characteristics are related to board attributes (composition, activity, entrenchment and busyness) and board diversity (gender, age, nationality and education). Furthermore, this study also seeks to investigate the behaviour of institutional investors in improving corporate governance by considering different settings, including various economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods), legal systems and ownership structures. Using a sample collected from 15 countries for the period of 2006 to 2012, this study finds that institutional investors promote more favourable corporate governance outcomes, with foreign institutional investors playing a lead role in the improvement and convergence of corporate governance practices around the world. This study provides evidence that institutional investors promote the enhanced composition of boards and of their audit and compensation committees, though not of nomination committees. Furthermore, institutional investors are positively associated with the activity of audit committees but not with the activity of boards nor of compensation and nomination committees. The results also demonstrate that institutional investors reduce board entrenchment though no evidence is found that institutional investors reduce board busyness. The findings also suggest that the role of institutional investors in corporate governance is determined by a company’s institutional environment including the prevalent economic condition, the legal system and the ownership structure of the country in which it operates. In particular, the findings show that institutional investors play a stronger role in the improvement of governance structures during crisis and post-crisis periods than they do during pre-crisis times. This result is also applicable to individual board attributes, such as the independence of audit committees. Additionally, institutional investors improve the independence of boards and of their key subcommittees (with the exception of nomination committees) in civil law countries and reduce board busyness in common law countries. However, there is no evidence that institutional investors reduce board entrenchment in either legal system. Furthermore, the results indicate that they improve governance outcomes in nonfamily-owned firms but not in family-owned firms. Moreover, this study presents no evidence that institutional investors promote board diversity; in fact, this study generally finds no association between institutional ownership and various board diversity attributes such as gender, age, nationality and education. However, the findings do show that institutional investors are positively associated with the education diversity of boards during times of crisis and are negatively associated with board age diversity during pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Furthermore, while in common law countries institutional investors are found to be negatively associated with board age diversity, they have no influence over board diversity attributes (i.e., gender, age, nationality and education) in civil law countries. The results also suggest that the associations between institutional investors and board diversity are mixed and insignificant within different ownership structures, i.e. in family- and non-family-owned firms.
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Li, Fan. "Two essays on institutional investors." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/99209.
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In the first essay, we study mutual funds' voting on compensation-related proposals initiated by corporate management. Compared with proposals on other topics, proposals on compensation issues are more likely to be challenged by mutual funds. Consistent with active institutional influence, mutual funds are more likely to vote against management at portfolio firms that make more excess CEO pay or depict other symptoms of poor governance such as bad performance and CEO entrenchment. Both active and passive funds' votes are significant drivers of the voting outcome of a proposal. Failed proposals are associated with lower CEO pay, especially excess pay, in the following year. Say-on-pay proposals opposed by more mutual funds are also followed by lower excess CEO pay. Collectively, evidence in this paper suggests that institutions (including passive institutions) play an important role in setting CEO pay through the voting channel.
The second essay examines the equity loan supply for short selling. Using detailed stock lending data, we show that active equity funds, on average, are informed, stock lenders. The stocks they lend outperform those that they do not. The stocks they recall and sell perform worse in the future than those that remain on loan. These funds avoid lending stocks when lending fees are extremely high and use the shorting market's signals to form stock-selling decisions. Our findings help explain why institutional investors lend stocks. They also highlight a new source of short-sale constraints arising from the informed loan supply.Doctor of Philosophy
Shareholders of a firm are expected to monitor executive compensation. Among all share-holders, institutional investors such as mutual funds play an important role in setting pay practices for executives. However, do they vote on related proposals at annual meetings or simply "vote by feet"? The first essay strives to answer the question using mutual fund proposal vote records data. Our findings suggest that mutual funds can affect CEO compensation in the future by voting against management-initiated pay proposals and the effect is both statistically and economically significant. Institutional investors such as mutual funds also participate in lending business on otherwise idle shares in their portfolio. While they are often considered passive and not informed in the equity loan market, their behavior has been much less investigated. We study the extent to which mutual funds exploit information in lending their shares using the first detailed stock lending dataset obtained from SEC filings. We find that mutual funds are informed lenders and important to market efficiency.
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Wang, Yong. "Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2010. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/68464.
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Business AdministrationPh.D.
The role of Institutional investors in alleviating the agent problem of management and its valuation effect has been studied extensively in corporate finance. We complement this stream of research by exploring management's control over institutional investors with misaligned objectives, particularly public pension fund, and the consequential valuation effect. We investigate the politic motive of public pension fund's shareholder activism and its impact on the target firms' operational performance, address the control of a strong management on public pension funds' self-serving agenda, and finally we compare the ownership adjustment pattern of public pension funds to other institutional investors to conclude public pension funds' ownership adjustment reflects their private pursuit. The first chapter explores the politic facet and performance effect of shareholder activism sponsored by public pension fund. In this study, we show that having a public pension fund as the leading sponsor of a shareholder proposal significantly improves the proposal's likelihood of being accepted by the target firm. The increased acceptance rate sources from the subset of proposals addressing a social responsibility issue, and targeting firms with weak insider control. An investigation of the public pension board reveals that the board's political profile is the primary determinant of public pension fund's propensity to lead a proposal, and the target firm's acceptance rate. We also assess the performance impact of shareholder proposals. For target firms with strong insider control, the performance impact of accepted social responsibility proposals is significantly positive; that of governance proposals is negligible. For target firms with weak insider control, the performance impact associated with public pension funds is either negative or negligible. These results suggest that the motive driving public pension funds' dominant presence in shareholder activism is not market based, but laden with purpose other than value creation. In the second chapter, we postulate that the widely documented negative valuation effect of ownership by public pension will be weak on firms with extra managerial control mechanism and/or whose managerial ownership of cash flow is high. For firms with high level managerial ownership of cash flow, management bears higher cost for a concession made with public pension fund's misaligned objective. An efficient market will expect this effect and value the managerial control over public pension fund to the extent that the management's benefit is aligned with outside shareholders. Consequently, the cross section valuation difference of firms held by public pension funds can be explained by the managerial ownership of cash flow, managerial control derived from extra mechanism such as dual class share, however, has no explanative power. The last chapter investigates the link between private benefits and institutional holding change. We assume the cross section equilibrium of block holding will break when market sentiment is high. Consequently, block holder tends to shed more shares loaded with less private benefits by taking advantage of opportunities available in a high sentiment market. The empirical results support this conjecture. When the market sentiment is high, Institutional block holders tend to shed more private benefits meager dual-class share than private benefits affluent non-dual class share. This pattern does not exist when the market sentiment is low. Most importantly, public pension fund is identified as the major driver of this effect.
Temple University--Theses
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Fredes, Salas Alex. "Institutional investors and firm value." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2016. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/145646.
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TESIS PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE MAGÍSTER EN FINANZAS FULL TIMEEn esta tesis examinamos que rol juegan los inversionistas en las empresas y porqué de su importancia. Los principales inversionistas institucionales son fondos mutuos, fondos de pensión, asesores de inversión, bancos y compañías de seguro. La valiosa información que proveen las acciones de los institucionales al mercado financiero genera mejores estructuras de gobierno corporativo y un monitoreo más efectivo.
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Nguyen, Vinh Huy L. "Institutional Investors, Insiders and the Firm." FIU Digital Commons, 2016. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/2637.
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This dissertation is comprised of three chapters that focus on three topics related to institutional investors’ and registered insiders’ trading activities around corporate announcements. The purpose of the research is to provide more insights into the trading behavior of institutions and insiders around corporate events when they are influenced by the anticipation and arrival of new information. Data samples are stratified, regression models are estimated, and control variables are added to ensure the results are significant and robust.
The first chapter discusses the information signaling hypothesis around share repurchase announcements. I examine if institutions can trade profitability around the announcement time using signals from insiders and the firm. I find that only transient institutional investors are able to adjust their portfolios to take advantage of the post-announcement price run-up. The second chapter explores the relationship between information asymmetry and the information acquisition process. It appears that institutions prefer using lower cost, small, round lot, 100-share multiples when they can acquire information in advance of the event as in earnings announcements. The last chapter looks at if the information hierarchy hypothesis holds true at the very top of the corporate pyramid. I find that CEO trades are largely ignored and president net purchases have positive effects on merger post-announcement returns. In summary, institutions, insiders, and the firm play important roles in the information dissemination and acquisition process. Hence, their decisions have profound effects on their complicated, interconnected relationships.
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Bengtsson, Elias. "Shareholder activism of Swedish institutional investors /." Stockholm : School of Business, Stockholm University, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-610.
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Scott, Ricky William. "Institutional Investors and Corporate Financial Policies." Scholar Commons, 2011. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/3338.
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Institutional investors influence corporate payout and research and development (R&D) investment policies. Higher payouts are encouraged by institutional investors, especially in firms with high free cash flow and poor investment opportunities. They also positively influence stock repurchases, particularly in firms with high information asymmetry. The substitution of stock repurchases for dividends as a percentage of total payout is encouraged by institutional investors. Institutional owners persuade firm management to increase research and development (R&D) investment overall and specifically in firms with higher stock liquidity, higher information asymmetry, lower free cash flow, and better investment opportunities. Institutional investors decrease agency costs in payout and R&D investment policy decisions.
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He, Yazhou. "Institutional investors and hedge fund activism." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2017. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/102339/.
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This thesis studies the institutional investor background in order to understand the working of hedge fund activism: how institutional investors affect hedge fund activists target selection and how activists share information and build alliances through social connections to achieve their goals. Chapter 2 utilizes a rich literature on institutional investors' governance roles and develops simple measures of institutional discontent expressed through holding, trading and voice channels, to predict hedge fund activism target selection. Discontent expressed through all three channels leads to subsequent targeting. Medium sized dissatisfied owners and sellers seem to be the main driving force, and institutions' discretionary disagreements on management compensation and governance related proposals have the highest explanatory power among other voice channels. Activists are more likely to gain higher announcement returns and threaten to take hostile actions against management with more discontented institutional investors in the target companies. Discontented institutions are more likely to vote pro-activist in the subsequent annual meetings after campaigns. Chapter 3 uses a social network framework to study information dissemination during activist campaigns. Actively managed funds whose managers are socially connected to the lead activist are more likely to increase their ownership in the target firms around the activist disclosure. In the cross sectional analysis, we find that the effect is stronger if the activists have better track records and if the ties are established via club membership, charity works, and other small circles. Connected institutions also earn significantly higher announcement returns relative to non-connected funds. The presence of connected institutions contributes to the activist's campaign success. Additional tests are performed to rule out alternative explanations such as fund manager ability or similarity in portfolio choices. Chapter 4 goes one step further to study alliance building among activist investors and institutional investors during the campaign period. A socially connected institution is 1.1 percentage points more likely to increase its ownership in the target firm during the campaign period, compared to funds that are not socially connected to the activist. We use a subsample that includes all institutions subject to M&As before activism events to identify plausibly exogenous shocks to social connections and find similar results. Furthermore, connected institutions also perform significantly better on their investments than non-connected institutions and they are more likely to vote pro-activist in routine proposals, especially director election proposals. The effect is stronger if connected institutions also purchase target stocks during a campaign. The thesis contributes to the literature by developing measures of revealed institutional governance preference based on theoretical and survey evidence in the literature. It also uncovers a channel through which hedge fund activists share information and build alliances and push for corporate changes facilitated by mutual benefits amongst their fellow institutional allies.
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Li, Xin. "Strategic Roles of Inactive Institutional Investors." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1627667913738102.
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Choi, Nicole Yunjeong. "Institutional investors and financial statement analysis." Pullman, Wash. : Washington State University, 2009. http://www.dissertations.wsu.edu/Dissertations/Spring2009/N_Choi_041709.pdf.
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Hamid, Bushra. "The value relevance of greenhouse gas emissions to institutional investors." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2019. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/130564/9/Bushra%20Hamid%20Thesis.pdf.
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This thesis examines whether capital markets value corporate environmental performance (CEP) as measured by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions intensity. Core to this examination is the role played by large institutional investors. To fulfil their fiduciary duty to safeguard the long-term interests of their stakeholders, it is argued that institutional investors assign higher values to firms with lower GHG emissions intensity. The findings show a positive relation between firm value and environmental performance in low GHG intensive firms, but the reverse for high GHG intensive firms. Thus, the market appears to treat these two groups of firms differently. The research suggests that most market participants consider reducing GHG emissions a shareholder value destroying activity.
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Nam, Sangwook S. M. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Korean institutional investors and real estate investments." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/92598.
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Thesis: S.M. in Real Estate Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Program in Real Estate Development in conjunction with the Center for Real Estate, 2014.This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.
Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 50-52).
Korean institutional investors comprise one of the major investor groups in the financial market. Given their characteristics and constraints, asset allocation of such institutional investors is dominated by 'traditional assets' such as stocks, bonds and cash. The recent global financial crisis increased uncertainty, and corresponding low interest rate trends have made it difficult for institutions to meet their own required returns. To accomplish higher and more stable return profiles, major institutional investors in Korea have begun restructuring asset allocation strategies, moving toward greater exposure in the real estate sector. In the context of this trend, where do Korean institutional investors stand on real estate investment? This thesis attempts to cast light on the current and future approaches to real estate investments by the major institutional investors in Korea, including major pension funds and insurance companies. To achieve this goal, the thesis is largely composed of two parts: (i) a prior investigation of real estate and Korean institutional investors with academic literatures and industry data and (ii) comprehensive interviews with Korean institutional investors and their external partners. As a prior investigation, academic literatures show that despite drawbacks, investments in real estate have clear benefits for institutional investors. The industry data clearly demonstrates that the growth of Korean investors' assets under management, intensifying competition in domestic markets, and recent low-interest market environments have all led Korean institutional investors to pay more attention to the global markets. Their real estate investment practices in the global market have been diversified in terms of the destination and property types. Analyzing key interview findings, the study reorganizes practical industry applications and compares them with the prior investigation. The thesis concludes that Korean institutional investors have attempted to establish their own asset allocation strategies based on each unique investment appetite and liability.
by Sangwook Nam.
S.M. in Real Estate Development
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Shang, Qi. "Essays in asset pricing and institutional investors." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2012. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/458/.
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The thesis includes three papers: 1. Limited Arbitrage Analysis of CDS Basis Trading By modeling time-varying funding costs and demand pressure as the limits to arbitrage, the paper shows that assets with identical cash-flows have not only different expected returns, but also different expected returns in excess of funding costs. I solve the model in closed-form to show that the arbitrage on the CDS and corporate bond market is a risky arbitrage. The sign of the expected excess return of the arbitrage is decided by the sign and size of market frictions rather than the observed price discrepancy. The size and risk of the arbitrage excess return are increasing in market friction levels and assets' maturities. High levels of market frictions also destruct the positive predictability of credit spread term structure on credit spread changes. Results from the empirical section support the above-mentioned model predictions. 2. General Equilibrium Analysis of Stochastic Benchmarking This paper applies a closed-form continuous-time consumption-based general equilibrium model to analyze the equilibrium implications when some agents in the economy promise to beat a stochastic benchmark at an intermediate date. For very risky benchmark, these agents increase volatility and risk premium in the equilibrium. On the other hand, when they promise to beat less risky benchmark, they decrease volatility and risk premium in the equilibrium. In both cases, the degree of effect is state-dependent and stock price rises. 3. Institutional Asset Pricing with Heterogenous Belief (Co-authored) We propose an equilibrium asset pricing model in which investors with heterogeneous beliefs care about relative performance. We find that the relative performance concern leads agents to trade more similarly, which has two effects. First, similar trading directly decreases volatility. Second, similar trading decreases the impact of the dominant agents. When the economy is extremely good or bad, the second effect is dominant so that the relative performance concern enlarges the excess volatility caused by heterogeneous beliefs. When the first effect is dominant, which corresponds to a normal economy, the volatility is lower than without the relative performance concern. Moreover, this paper shows that the relative performance concern also influences investors' holdings, stock prices and risk premia.
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Schiefelbein, Peter Noel. "What about companies matters to share investors? An exploratory study of Australian institutional and individual investor preferences." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2016. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/97739/4/Peter_Schiefelbein_Thesis.pdf.
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This thesis is an exploratory study of the attributes of companies and their shares that are most important to the investment decision making of institutional and individual investors. This study employed personal interviews using the technique of Repertory Grid Analysis (RGA) and found that individual investors mostly have a preference for different kinds of companies to those preferred by institutional investors.
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Binay, Murat Mehmet. "Anatomy of institutional investors preferences, performance, and clienteles /." Access restricted to users with UT Austin EID Full text (PDF) from UMI/Dissertation Abstracts International, 2001. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/fullcit?p3024994.
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Shin, Jae Yong. "Institutional investors and CEO compensation does the composition of institutional ownership matter?" Saarbrücken VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2006. http://d-nb.info/989329909/04.
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Ashraf, Rasha. "Three Essays on Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/16158.
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The first essay analyzes mutual funds proxy voting records on shareholder proposals. The results indicate that mutual funds support shareholder proposals and vote against management for proposals that are likely to increase shareholders wealth and rights, in firms with weaker external monitoring mechanisms, in firms with entrenched management, and when funds have longer investment horizon. Mutual funds mostly take management sides on executive compensation related proposals, when they have higher ownership concentration, and when they belong to bigger fund families. The results further indicate that there is a positive reputational effect for the funds undertaking a monitoring role. Moreover, mutual funds reduce holdings when they disapprove of managements policy, but before doing so they take on an activist role by supporting shareholder proposals. The second essay investigates institutional investors trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities. We label investment companies and independent investment advisors as active institutions and banks, nonbank trusts and insurance companies as passive institutions. We find active institutions increase holdings of acquiring firm stocks for mergers with higher wealth implications. However, active institutions overreact to stock mergers at the announcement, which they appear to correct at the resolution quarter of the merger. The trading behavior of passive institutions suggests that these institutions disregard the market response of merger announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks at the announcement quarter. The passive institutions gradually update their beliefs and trade on the basis of merger wealth effect at the resolution quarter. The third essay examines relation between executive compensation structure with the existing level and changes of takeover defense mechanisms of firms. According to managerial entrenchment hypothesis, higher managerial power from adoption of takeover defense mechanisms would lead to generating higher rents for executives. Efficient contracting hypothesis argue that higher anti-takeover provisions would contribute in achieving efficient contracting by deferring compensation into the future due to the low possibility of hostile takeover. The results support managerial entrenchment hypothesis with regard to existing level of takeover defense mechanisms. With regard to changes in anti-takeover provisions, the existing level of managerial power influence the future pay structure.
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Lee, Yong Seung. "The influence of institutional investors on firm value." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/81026.
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Thesis (M. Fin.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Master of Finance Program, 2013.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 44-45).
The impact of corporate governance on firm value has been extensively debated by academics and business practitioners. Some studies show that companies that allow minority shareholders to have more control are likely to create greater shareholder value than those firms with concentrated control, while other studies suggest that the impact of having democratic governance is either negligible or even negative. In developed countries institutional investors have a significant stake in most of the companies. Active engagement by institutional investors is expected to decrease agency costs by strengthening monitoring mechanisms of operations and performance evaluations of the management, resulting in an increase in firm value. However, some academics and business practitioners argue that such minority shareholders' active engagement could be detrimental to firm value. In this thesis, I study the influence of institutional investors' active shareholder engagement on firm value and the relationship between the characteristics of corporate governance and firm value of target companies. I review previous studies that have evaluated both the effect of corporate governance and of institutional investors' activism on firm value. I conduct empirical analyses to examine the relationship between the institutions' shareholder engagement and firm value.
by Yong Seung Lee.
M.Fin.
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Huang, Jiekun. "Three Essays in Corporate Finance and Institutional Investors." Thesis, Boston College, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/1402.
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Thesis advisor: Thomas J. ChemmanurMy Ph.D. dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay examines the effect of hedge funds on target shareholder gains in leveraged buyouts (LBOs). I find that the initial buyout premium is increasing in the preannouncement presence of hedge funds, measured as the fraction of target equity held by hedge funds before the announcement. Using a geographic instrument for the presence of hedge fund, I find that this relationship persists even after controlling for endogeneity. I further show that this effect holds only for active hedge funds and long-term hedge funds, and is stronger for management-led LBOs than for third-party LBOs. Overall, the findings suggest that hedge funds protect target shareholder interests in LBOs by using their hold-out power. The second essay examines the relation between expected market volatility and the demand for liquidity in open-end mutual funds. The empirical results are consistent with precautionary motives for holding liquid assets, i.e., fund managers tilt their holdings more heavily toward liquid stocks when the market is expected to be more volatile. This dynamic preference for liquid stocks is more pronounced among small fund families, low-load funds, funds whose past performance has been unfavorable, funds with high return volatility, growth-oriented funds, and high-turnover funds. I further show that this type of behavior is valuable for fund investors during high volatility periods because it has led to significantly (both statistically and economically) higher subsequent abnormal returns. The third essay, co-authored with Thomas Chemmanur and Gang Hu, directly tests Brennan and Hughes' (1991) information production theory of stock splits by making use of a large sample of transaction-level institutional trading data. We compare brokerage commissions paid by institutional investors before and after a split, and relate the informativeness of institutional trading to brokerage commissions paid. We also compute realized institutional trading profitability net of brokerage commissions and other trading costs. Our results can be summarized as follows. First, both commissions paid and trading volume by institutional investors increase after a stock split. Second, institutional trading immediately after a split has predictive power for the firm's subsequent long-term stock return performance; this predictive power is concentrated in stocks which generate higher commission revenues for brokerage firms and is greater for institutions that pay higher brokerage commissions. Third, institutions make positive abnormal profits during the post-split period even after taking brokerage commissions and other trading costs into account; institutions paying higher commissions significantly outperform those paying lower commissions. Fourth, the information asymmetry faced by firms decreases after a split; the greater the increase in brokerage commissions after a split, the greater the reduction in information asymmetry. Overall, our results are broadly consistent with the implications of the information production theory
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009
Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management
Discipline: Finance
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Teo, Terence. "Essays on disclosure of holdings by institutional investors." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2012. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/417/.
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This thesis contains three essays on disclosure of holdings by institutional investors. Chapter 1 presents a theoretical model that examines the impact of confidential treatment requests made by institutional investors to the Securities and Ex- change Commission (SEC) to delay disclosure of their holdings. Chapter 2 presents another theoretical model that analyses how an informed trader trades strategically in the presence of copycats who track his disclosed trades. Chapter 3 is an empirical study that examines the impact of more frequent portfolio disclosure on mutual funds' performance.
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Bonizzi, Bruno. "Institutional investors and capital flows to emerging markets." Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2016. http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23797/.
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This dissertation represents an investigation into the determinants of capital flows to emerging markets. It argues that the existing literature can be enriched by explicitly recognising the monetary nature of capital flows, which can be effectively drawn out on the basis of post- Keynesian monetary theory, and recognising the importance of institutional investors as key actors in today's financial markets. As such, the current cycle of capital flows to emerging markets can be understood as the demand for emerging markets assets by institutional investors. The determinants of such a demand are therefore the key focus of this dissertation. Two factors, alongside many others already considered by the literature, stand out. Firstly, in line with post-Keyensian theories of exchange rates, currency liquidity plays an important role. Emerging markets currencies are structurally less liquid and thus subordinated to advanced countries currencies, but the extent of their subordination is mitigated by context-specific 'fundamentals'. This dissertation argues that the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is a primary factor in these respects. Secondly, this dissertation points out that liabilities play a key role in the institutional investors' portfolio choice mechanism. Rather than mechanically optimising over the risk/return tradeoff, the asset allocation of institutional investors is primarily driven by the goal of achieving sufficient returns to face their obligations. In the post-crisis environment, institutional investors' balance sheet condititions have deteriorated, and - due to low interest rates and low financial market returns on safe assets - traditional asset classes cannot be relied upon to generate sufficient returns to cover liabilities. Institutional investors are therefore induced to look for alternative assets that can promise higher returns and allocate a growing part of their assets to emerging markets assets as part of this strategy. This dissertation uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to support these arguments. It uses advanced macro-panel econometrics techniques to estimate assets demand equations for emerging markets equities and bonds. The econometric results confirm the macro-level significance of the hypothesised relationships, suggesting that higher level of foreign exchange reserves and weaker balance sheet conditions - proxied by lower pension funding ratios - increase allocations to emerging markets. Qualitative methods, in the form of semi-structured interviews, shed further light on the processes that lead to such results. In particular they highlight the complexity of the relationship between the 'fundamentals' and their effect on asset allocation, and the interaction between regulation and the way through which liabilities affect investors' behaviour. Finally the macroeconomics implications of these findings are analysed through a Stock- Flow Consistent model. It is shown that institutional investors may have a pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical impact on the system. Crucially, this is determined by how the dynamics of the model affect institutional investors' balance sheet conditions. Overall, this dissertation warrants caution about the present situation of emerging markets. Institutional investors may be less panic-prone, but ultimately their interest in emerging markets seems to be caused more by their weaker balance sheets, as low returns make it impossible for assets to match their growing liabilities, rather than 'fundamentals'.
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Usrey, Spencer Conley. "Three essays on institutional investors and income taxes." Thesis, [Tuscaloosa, Ala. : University of Alabama Libraries], 2009. http://purl.lib.ua.edu/22.
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LAW, Yui. "U.S. cross-listing, institutional investors, and equity returns." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2012. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/econ_etd/23.
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Cross-listing refers to firms listing their equities on more than one stock exchange. Cross-listing is an interesting topic of international finance. This is because along with the deeper integration of the global financial market, we should see lesser importance of geographic factors. Thus, the motivations and effects of listing a firm on exchanges of different regions should have essential economic implications. The reputation bonding hypothesis suggests that U.S. cross-listing improves the information environment of a firm because of the higher disclosure standard and more analyst coverage. The legal bonding hypothesis argues that U.S. cross-listing improves the investor protection and corporate governance of a firm since the firm is under more stringent law and regulation. The firm growth hypothesis points out that U.S. cross-listing lowers the external capital cost of a firm and thus enables the firm to achieve a higher growth rate.
Using a sample with 12532 firms of 23 developed regions from 2006 to 2011, this thesis tests the three hypotheses of cross-listing. Firstly, my empirical results show that a cross-listing on the U.S. exchanges improves the equity returns predictability of institutional investors. I find a stronger positive correlation between the changes in institution ownership level and future equity returns of U.S. cross-listed firms. This suggests that the information environment is improved after a U.S. cross-listing. However, the improvement in information environment exists only in non-crisis period. Secondly, the results support the firm growth hypothesis. The U.S. cross-listing event only has a positive effect on equity returns of firms with younger age and lower dividend yield. This effect becomes less obvious during the crisis period. Thirdly, the legal bonding effect of U.S. cross-listing only exists during the crisis period, when the financial market is volatile. During the crisis period, a U.S. cross-listing increases the equity returns of the firms form non-common-law regions, but not the firms from common-law regions.
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Hellman, Niclas. "Investor behaviour : an empirical study of how large Swedish institutional investors make equity investment decisions." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics [Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.] (EFI), 2000. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/543.htm.
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Lawrence, Stephen Caleb. "Essays in empirical corporate finance." Thesis, Boston College, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/591.
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Thesis advisor: Edith HotchkissChapter one of this dissertation provides new evidence on the existence of dividend clienteles for institutional investors. We directly examine individual institutions' preferences for dividend paying stocks based on the characteristics of stocks held in their portfolio. Many institutions follow persistent investment styles, maintaining relatively high or low dividend yield portfolios over time. Institutions which hold portfolios of higher yielding stocks are significantly more likely to increase their holdings in response to a dividend increase or sell their stock in response to a decrease. For a subset of institutions, we directly observe the proportion of their portfolio managed on behalf of taxable clients. Consistent with tax-induced dividend clienteles, institutions with more taxable clients are less likely to increase their holdings in response to a dividend increase. Finally, we show that stock price reactions to announcements of dividend increases are related to characteristics of the institutions holding the stock. Our results suggest that tax status, as well as other factors are important in explaining observed clientele behavior. Chapter two explores the determinants of heterogeneity in institutional investor portfolio preferences and the relationship between institutions and the clients they serve. I find that the characteristics of an institution's clients and the characteristics of the institution itself are both important determinants of portfolio preferences and trading behavior. Specifically, I find that institutions traditionally subject to prudent investor laws are more likely to invest in high quality stocks, although, institutions sub-managing money for pension funds are less prudent than pension managers themselves. In addition, I find that institutions with taxable clients are likely to avoid unnecessary dividend taxation and turn over their portfolios less frequently. More generally, institutions exhibit systematic shifts in their exposure to common risk factors that may be explained in part by the levels and changes in client composition. While evidence for a causal link between client shifts and institutional preferences is limited to mutual funds, contemporaneous changes in clients and portfolio characteristics suggest that the dynamics of institutional investment are closely related to the nature of the clients served
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2007
Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management
Discipline: Finance
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Liu, Jinjing. "Investor sentiment, institutional investors and the accrual anomaly : an empirical analysis of China's listed companies." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104518.
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Thesis: S.M. in Management Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2016.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 29-32).
The accrual anomaly is a phenomenon that investors gain future abnormal returns through accruals-based hedge portfolios. This paper first shows that China's institutional investors have a better understanding of the persistence of accounting accruals and they more accurately assess stock prices, and that an accrual-based hedge portfolio yields smaller future abnormal returns for firms with high institutional ownership. The results suggest that in China's stock market, the accrual anomaly can be weakened by the activities of institutional investors. Second, with the cross-section data of listed companies from 2001 to 2013, this paper uses empirical analysis of the classified samples to examine how the stock prices react to accruals with the level of investor sentiment. The results suggest stock prices of companies with a small proportion of institutional investors are more sensitive to the impact of investor sentiment on the accrual anomaly. Lastly, this paper examines the effect of investor sentiment on managers' accrual decisions. I find that accruals are higher in positive sentiment environments for companies with high proportion of individual investors, which suggests managers might be exploiting naive individual investor behavior.
by Jinjing Liu.
S.M. in Management Studies
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El-Diftar, Doaa. "Institutional investors and voluntary disclosure and transparency in Egypt." Thesis, Cardiff Metropolitan University, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10369/8133.
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Corporate governance, especially disclosure and transparency, have become critical issues in today’s business environment. Greater, especially voluntary, disclosure promotes overall transparency enhancing investor confidence. This thesis explores how institutional ownership impacts voluntary disclosure and transparency in Egypt: first, by assessing corporate voluntary disclosure/transparency levels, and second, by analysing how institutional investors’ ownership impact these levels. Voluntary disclosure/transparency was determined using a voluntary disclosure and transparency index – using a checklist against which annual reports of companies on the Egyptian Exchange were examined. Institutional ownership was considered from two perspectives: 1) aggregate; 2) subdivided into, banks; insurance companies; mutual funds; blockholders; government; foreign. Four firm characteristics believed to impact disclosure and transparency were integrated into the study: firm size; leverage; profitability; age. Regression models were constructed and seven main hypotheses and five sub-hypotheses developed and tested using various multivariate techniques to determine the impact of institutional ownership. The models were tested using data from 191 annual reports of the 50 most active companies on the Egyptian Exchange over the period 2007-2011. The results showed: relatively low levels of voluntary disclosure and transparency prevail in Egypt with the lowest levels of disclosure relating to corporate governance and corporate social responsibility information; institutional ownership in aggregate positively impacted levels of voluntary disclosure and transparency. However, when analysed separately, ownership by banks and foreign institutional investors were found to be the most influential in improving corporate voluntary disclosure. Institutions with over fifty percent of ownership were also found to have a positive impact. Overall, the results revealed that the type of institutional ownership does matter in relation to promoting disclosure/transparency; and should not be treated as one homogenous group. It is suggested to better integrate and utilize those institutions with potential for improving corporate disclosure. This research adds to the very few studies on how different kinds of institutional ownership impact corporate governance in emerging markets.
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Dhaliwal, Spinder. "The role of institutional investors in the UK economy." Thesis, Brunel University, 1992. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/5783.
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The purpose of this research is to investigate the importance of institutional investors in the UK economy, in particular, the capital market. Institutional investors have grown considerably in size over the past three decades and are involved in many aspects of the economy, consequently investigation of this issue is essential in order to determine their influence. There are three main empirical studies in this thesis. The first examines a sample of UK non-financial firms in an attempt to explain the ownership structure. It will attempt to show which firm variables attract institutional investors. A second aspect of the research is an analysis of the buying and selling activities of institutional investors to see whether they effect the general level of share prices. A third focus of the research is to analyse the switching activities of the institutional investors. This refers to their switching of funds from one type of asset to another e.g. from real property into equities and vice versa. By examining these activities the study illustrates the demand characteristics these institutional investors create for certain assets and in addition it provides a clearer understanding of the economic conditions that influence such investment behaviour. The thesis confirms the continuing importance of institutional investors.
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Willand, John A. (John Abbot). "Property management strategies for institutional investors in the '90s." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70705.
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Helmy, Ingy. "Three essays on institutional investors participation in infrastructure projects." Thesis, Paris 1, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020PA01E016.
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Malgré une adéquation théorique parfaite entre les objectifs des investisseurs institutionnels et les opportunités d’investissement en infrastructure, la participation de ce type d’investisseur a été très modeste. Cette thèse étudie, à l'aide de méthodes empiriques, les modalités pour accroitre et faciliter la participation des investisseurs institutionnels dans les projets d’infrastructure. La thèse contribue à la littérature sur la participation du secteur privé dans le financement des projets d’infrastructure et explore des pistes et des solutions potentielles qui pourraient accroitre les flux de capitaux des investisseurs institutionnels vers les projets d'infrastructure. Tout d'abord. la relation entre les différents risques du projet et l'attractivité du projet pour les investisseurs institutionnels est étudiée, afin d'identifier les risques majeurs qui peuvent entraver leur participation. Deuxièmement. nous nous focalisons sur le rôle du soutien financier des organismes multilatéraux comme catalyseur de l'investissement privé provenant des investisseurs institutionnels. L'analyse est effectuée à la fois sur les pays développés et les pays en voie de développement. Le dernier chapitre de cette thèse explore l'efficacité d’introduire dans le cadre d'un PPP, une option de sortie sous certaines conditions, à la fois pour l’investisseur et pour le gouvernement. Les micro-mécanismes comportementaux sous-jacents sont ensuite testés dans le laboratoireDespite a theoretical perfect match between institutional investors and infrastructure investments, allocations to infrastructure have been slow and small. This dissertation investigates using empirical methods the question of how to make a better match between infrastructure investments and institutional investors. The dissertation contributes to the literature on private participation in infrastructure and shifts the debate from private participation in infrastructure as a public policy matter to what is needed to be done from an investment standpoint to unlock the full potential of institutional investors in infrastructure. First, the relation between infrastructure project risks and projects’ attractiveness for institutional investors is investigated. The results highlight that higher macroeconomic, regulatory and political risk can hinder investment by institutional investors. Furthermore, a different risk appetite among direct institutional investors, asset managers and infrastructure funds is found. Second, the role of financial multilateral support in crowding-in institutional investors’ capital into infrastructure is analyzed in developed and developing countries. The results suggest a positive effect in developed countries and a crowding-out effect in developing countries. Finally, an exit and bail-out options mechanism to overcome ex-ante fear of investment in infrastructure is proposed and tested in the lab. Concurrent exit and bail-out options were found to increase partnership formation, cooperative behavior and partnership sustainability compared to situations without exit or unilateral exit from the government only
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Пластун, В. Л. "The Role of Institutional Investors in Stock Market Stability." Thesis, Nauka i Studia, 2013. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/59254.
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Mandaza, Kudzai, and Neba Mirad. "Institutional Investors and Board Independence : The case of Sweden." Thesis, Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för ekonomistyrning och logistik (ELO), 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-95908.
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This study provides an insight into the behavior of foreign institutional investors in Swedish corporate governance matters. We look at the presence of foreign institutional investors on the Swedish nomination committee and their voting power, to show their influence on board independence in Sweden. Collecting data for two years that is 2018 and 2019, from Swedish firms listed on the Swedish stock exchange markets, and analyze the data using the panel regression analysis. The result shows that foreign institutional investors only influence board independence in Sweden when a controlling owner has more than 50 % of the voting right. Also, we show that foreign institutional investors generally have little or no influence on the number of independent directors on Swedish listed firms. However, it is the controlling owners and the board sizes that significantly determine the level of board independence in Sweden. This study concluded that for foreign institutional investors to influence board independence they should participate on the nomination committee.
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Ko, Ching-Chun, and 柯靜君. "Institutional Investors'' Herding Behavior." Thesis, 1998. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/66506292320259949024.
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Chen, Yang. "Essays on Institutional Investors." Thesis, 2013. https://doi.org/10.7916/D8JD545X.
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This dissertation analyzes the role of institutional investors in capital markets. The first essay studies what affect mutual fund decisions on hiring and firing sub-advisors and the ex-post effects. We show that deterioration in mutual fund performance or increase in outflows predicts a higher propensity of a fund to change its sub-advisors. However, mutual funds continue to underperform by about 1% in the 18-months after a change in sub-advisor, even after controlling for fund category, past returns and past flows. The continuing underperformance of mutual funds can be attributed to decreasing returns for sub-advisors in deploying their ability as suggested in Berk and Green (2004). The second essay provides empirical analysis on hedge fund exposures to overpriced real estate assets. Consistent with models in which delegated portfolio managers may want to invest in overpriced assets, I find that hedge funds were holding real estate stocks instead of selling short during the period of overpricing (2003Q1-2007Q2). The third essay finds that investor composition affect fund managers' portfolio choices. Specifically, I show that retail-oriented hedge funds invested more in overpriced real estate assets than institution-oriented hedge funds.
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Zellweger, Oliver. "Risk tolerance of institutional investors /." 2003. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/363115838.pdf.
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Zhong, LIGANG. "Three Essays on Institutional Investors." Thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1974/7056.
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In this dissertation, I investigate the impact of institutional investors on security prices and corporate policies, and offer a new perspective on the vital role that institutional investors play in the modern capital market. Specifically, on the impact on security price movements, I design a new measure of stock-level sentiment based on mutual fund publically disclosed portfolio information and provide a new dimension to better predict stock returns. A trading strategy based on the new sentiment metrics can generate an annualized alpha of 21.27%. The abnormal returns cannot be explained by the time-varying expected returns and transaction costs, and can be best explained by mutual fund overreactions. Hence, my findings can be interpreted as a new anomaly in a new era-when institutional investors are the marginal traders. On the impact on corporate policy side, I document two pieces of new empirical evidence on the importance of long-term institutional holdings: the entrenchment effect of long-term institutional holdings in the context of corporate financing decisions and the active monitoring role of long-term institutional investors in the context of international firms’ accounting qualities. Combined with previous studies which favour a long-term institutional investor, the evidence on the cost side of long-term holding I document here can serve as the first call for an optimal investment horizon for firms operating in the U.S.Thesis (Ph.D, Management) -- Queen's University, 2012-04-11 22:22:17.627
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Yang, Che-Ming, and 楊哲明. "Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/55876978145566925560.
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碩士國立雲林科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
94
Corporate governance already becomes the subject that all parties pay attention to most in recent years. The internal controlling of a company can functioning well, administrative authority observe decree norm inside or outside really, and express the management performance of the company trully, is cared about really by investor. As for investors, can be divided into two kinds of private investors and institutional investors in accordance with its identity. Israel Taiwan''s security market on but speech, the private investor is still a majority, the institutional investors because possesses professional investment knowledge and analyses tools, target that its investment decision more often consults for private investors. This research regards listing electronics corporation of the security market of Taiwan as the research object, probe into the company and manage the relation while holding share with institutional investors in real example. The real example result is found: ( 1) In the company in the ones that corporate governance index and company to manage the performance are related, the effect that its company of company finding the financial rate good manages is better; ( 2) institutional investors will be managed the influence of the index and financial information to hold share by the company, but divide it into the three kinds institutional investors while observing separately, it is the influence not managed the index by the company that the foreign institutional investors hold share; ( 3) The stock that organization''s investors held share, its rate of returns is relatively good; But when the rate is the same period that the rate of returns of the stock price and organization''s investor hold share, not established . The result of this research means that the holding share of institutional investors will be managed quality and influence of company''s corporate governance performance by the company, but the information paid attention to have a difference to exist in fact among the three kinds corporate governance.
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Chuan-Tien, Su, and 蘇川田. "A Performance Study of Stock Investor Strategy of Three Institutional Investors." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/8ad8b6.
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碩士國立高雄應用科技大學
金融資訊研究所
102
Institutional investors include foreign institutional investors, dealers, and investment trusts (investment trusts). We use top twenty overbuy/oversell portfolio of institutional investors to investigate whether the operation of institutional investors have excess return policy and compare the Taiwan stock index return in bullish period and bearish period. The results show that in the bullish period, the foreign investment and dealers to trade the overbuy/ oversold portfolio and foreign investment, dealers and investment trust portfolio oversold do not have the information advantage that foreign investors and dealers buy the information if it is wrong that is enough information to sell. However, investment trust to trade the overbuy portfolio has information advantages, but this does not imply the longer the holding period to buy there over higher returns, but buying a short-term portfolio yields positive abnormal returns and there is an increasing trend. The investment trust sold the portfolio does not have super-information advantage which tells us to redeem the investment trust investing in pressure so fund managers can not choose the best selling point to sell off. Finally, in bearish period, all Institutional investors to trade overbuy/ oversold portfolio fail to have information advantage.
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Chang, Yi-Hsien, and 張逸嫻. "Private-placement Firms’ Performance and Institutional Investors: The Roles of New and Old Institutional Investors." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/z7kz5j.
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碩士國立中興大學
財務金融學系所
102
This paper investigates the relationship between private-placement firms' long-run performance and institutional investors by examining three issues: (1) the impact of institutional holdings on private-placement firms' performance, (2) the firms' characteristics that affect the institutional holding around private-placement and (3) how the participation of the new institutional investors in private-placements would affect the long-run performance. The results show that the change of the institutional holding and firms' size are positively and significantly related to the long-run stock performance. The new and old institutional investors are likely to increase their ownership around the private-placements for big firms, and the institutional investors tend to increase their ownership when the firms' stock price is lower than book value. In addition, the new institutional investors will increase their ownership when firms issue more shares. When firms have private-placements: the increase of the old institutional investors ownership does not affect the firms' long-run performance, but the new institutional investors improves the firms' long-run performance.
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Chen, Tsai-Lai, and 陳再來. "Institutional Investors and Financial Reports Lag." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/72313010674878500941.
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碩士輔仁大學
會計學系碩士班
102
The study aims to examine the influence of different types of institutional investors on the timeliness of financial statements. The sample of this study consists of listed companies from 2006 to 2013 in Taiwan Empirical test results of this study are as follows: 1. Compared to other types of institutional investors, speculative institutional investors (i.e. institutional investors with high stockholding rates and high variation coefficient of stock holding rates) will strengthen company managers’ motivation to release financial statements earlier. Consequently, financial reports lag will be shorter. 2. Compared to other types of institutional investors, long-term institutional investors (i.e. institutional investors with high stockholding rates and low variation coefficient of stock holding rates) will extend the releasing time of financial statements. Consequently, financial reports lag will be longer.
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Yen, Chen-hui, and 顏甄慧. "Insiders, Institutional Investors, and Firm Performance." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/pqy2ec.
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碩士國立高雄第一科技大學
金融營運所
96
This study is to examine the relationship among of insiders, institutional investors and firm performance. This model is applied to the data of the Taiwan stock market for 2002 to 2006. We will apply linear regression models for panel data. Furthermore, applies Redundant Fixed Effects Test and Hausman Test to determine the best statistic method. The empirical results are summarized as follows：the announcement of the change in the insiders’ shareholding will produce positive abnormal return. Institutional investors’ excess buy will produce positive abnormal return and excess sale will produce negative abnormal return. Insider ownership has significant positive impact on performance. Institutional ownership has significant positive impact on performance. And we also find institutional ownership on performance is superior to insider ownership on performance. In stock return volatility, we find insider ownership and institution ownership have significant negative impact on stock return volatility. And we also find the degree of stock return volatility for the institutional ownership is smaller compared to the insider ownership.
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Lee, Pei-Shuang, and 李珮雙. "Revisiting Institutional Investors and Share Repurchases." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93148780983068303667.
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碩士元智大學
財務金融學程
99
While previous papers use whole institutional investor holdings as an independent variable to see the relationship between repurchases and institutional investor holdings. In this paper, we examine the impact of institutional investors with influence and institutional investors with monitor ability on repurchases, respectively. Our main finding is that institutional investors with well monitor ability (18 largest public pension funds) have significant positive impact on repurchases. However, we didn’t find enough evidence that influential institutional investors (share holdings larger than 5%) have more impact than other institutional investors on repurchases.
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Chang, Kai-Fen, and 張鐦分. "Institutional Investors and Stock Return Volatility." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4aucfb.
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碩士國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
107
This study investigates the influence of different types of Institutional Investors on future stock return volatility. Institutional Investors are classified into Growth and Non-Growth by their investing preference, and are classified into Transient and Non-Transient by their investing style. The empirical results indicate that greater ownership of Growth institutional investors is associated with higher future stock return volatility, and that greater ownership of Non-Growth institutional investors is negatively associated with future stock return volatility. In addition, this study provides evidences for a stronger impact of investing preference on future stock return volatility. Our findings remain consistent before and after global financial crisis.
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Shih, Cheng-Ho, and 施承和. "A Study on Investment Strategy between Institutional Investors and Individual Investors." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/03139555891006755117.
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碩士朝陽科技大學
財務金融系
104
In this paper, use four facets, a total of seventeen variables. We instigate the investment strategy of institutional investors and individual investors . This study proposes the DEMATEL-based Multi-Screen Diagram (DMSD) method to analyze the importance of criteria and the casual relations among the criteria were constructed. The empirical results show that the Stochastic Oscillator (KD) is an effect factor of institutional investors. The Return on Equity (ROE) is the cause factor of investment decisions of Institutional Investors. The empirical results show that the Earnings per Share (EPS) is an effect factor of individual investors. The margin balance is the cause factor of investment decisions of institutional investors.
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徐子晴. "Do individual investors follow the trading behavior of foreign institutional investors." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/52004040894134526036.
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碩士國立政治大學
財務管理研究所
99
According to Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TWSE), individual investors accounted for 68% trading volume and foreign institutional investors accounted for 18.5% in stock market in 2010. In general, we regard foreign institutional investors as traders with professional analysis abilities. However, we thought individual investors are noise trader. We would like to know whether the individual investors follow foreign institutional investors’ transactions and elaborate their transaction behavior. In order to understand whether individual investors follow the foreign institutional investors, we used event study and VAR to analyze their transaction behavior. We observed that foreign institutional investors are momentum traders. On contrary, we noticed that domestic institute investors and individuals are contrarian traders. Nevertheless, during financial crisis, foreign institutional investors became contrarian traders and individual turned to momentum traders. Through VAR model, we found that individual did not follow foreign institutional investors.
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Chen, Sing-Ping, and 陳杏萍. "Relationship between Institutional Investors and Tax Aggressiveness." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/qr4yqv.
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碩士國立東華大學
會計與財務碩士學位學程
105
This paper mainly examines the relationship between institutional investors and tax aggressiveness by using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms from 2000-2015, the required data from the Database of the Taiwan Economic Journal (for financial accounting information), and the industrial sustainable development clearinghouse on-line platform (for CSR information). The result shows that firms with more institutional investors are more tax aggressive; then, institutional investors are divided into two categories: domestic institutional investors and foreign institutional investors. The result finds that firms with relatively higher levels of foreign institutional investors are tax aggressive. Finally, this paper examines whether the relationship between institutional investors and tax aggressiveness is moderated by CSR. The results show that moderators are negatively significant to tax aggressiveness in some situations. Overall, the results of this paper find that institutional investors prefer that firms engage in more tax aggressive behavior to increase firm value, especially foreign institutional investors.
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Shih, Sheng-Yuan, and 施生元. "Herding Behavior by Institutional and Individual Investors." Thesis, 2001. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/64637314189460370102.
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碩士元智大學
管理研究所
89
This study examines the trading activity of the mutual fund industry from 1995 through 2000 to determine whether funds “herd” when they trade stocks and to investigate the impact of herding on stock prices on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE). We also use “Probit model” to examine interdependencies among mutual funds, foreign investors, and individual investors. The overall average level of herding is about 5.22 percent, which is higher than reported by Wermers (1999) for their sample of mutual funds in U.S. (3.4 percent). We find much higher levels in trades of large market capitalization stocks and high-tech stocks. We also find that herds form much more often on the buy-side (BHM) than on the sell-side (SHM) in our sample. Because our sample period includes financial crisis period from the second half of 1997 through 1998, we can investigate the herding behavior during the financial crisis period separately from all sample period. We find that the herding measures decrease in buy-side and increase in sell-side during the financial crisis. The effects magnify in trades of small stocks, banking stocks, and technology stocks. We find no evidence that trades by mutual find had a destabilizing effect on the Taiwan Stock Exchange over non-crisis period. Our results are consistent with mutual fund herding speeding the price-adjustment process in the stable investment environment. However, during financial crisis, we find some evidences of overreaction, especially in financial shares. Finally, we find that mutual funds have the contemporarily positive correlations with foreign investors, especially in trading financial shares. However, the investment behaviors between mutual funds and individual investors are significant negative correlations.
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Pai, Shu-Yuan, and 白舒媛. "Institutional Investors’ Investment Horizon and Corporate Investment." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/6v8juf.
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碩士國立中正大學
財務金融研究所
102
This paper investigates how institutional investors influence on firms’ investment policies and stock performance. Using institutional turnover level to capture investor’s trading horizons, we find that an increase in the holding period of institutional investors is associated with a subsequent decrease (increase) in real investment of firm’s that over- (under-) investment. Both of the situations represent that the firms’ capital expenditure becomes better. More importantly, firms with long-term institutional investors are associated with higher stock performance. Overall, the evidence indicates that long-term institutional investors can influence managers’ capital expenditure decisions and lower agency problems effectively.
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Wu, Yu-Han, and 吳鈺涵. "Institutional Investors, Cash Holdings, and Investment Opportunities." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/61706623682498620505.
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碩士元智大學
會計學程
99
Cash holdings in firms have become one of important tools in maintaining the operating of corporate, but are possibly abused by entrenched managers. Institutional investors improve the corporate governance and also mitigate the agency problems of cash holdings in firms. The purpose of the study is to investigate the impacts of institutional investors on firms’ cash holdings and further the effect of investment opportunities on the relationship between institutional investors and cash holdings. The results show that the ownership of institutions increases firms’ cash holdings and further find that the relationship is enhanced in firms with more investment opportunities. In addition, this study examines whether the value of cash holdings is higher in the firms with more institutional investors and the empirical evidences indicate that the value of cash holdings is significantly increased through institutional ownership. Therefore, it shows that institutional investors can play the role of monitoring in firms to provide more protection of firms’ cash resources for investors.