Relevant bibliographies by topics / Institutional Investors

Academic literature on the topic 'Institutional Investors'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 30 July 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Institutional Investors"

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Lee, Eun Jung, Yu Kyung Lee, and Joon Chae. "Investor Attention and Expected Return." Journal of Derivatives and Quantitative Studies 27, no. 1 (February 28, 2019): 49–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jdqs-01-2019-b0002.

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In this paper, we analyze the effect of investor attention level on expected return in the Korean stock market by investor type. We find that the risk-adjusted excess returns in the next period are significantly higher when the institutional and foreign investor’s attention is high. In other words, investment strategies that buy stocks in higher attention groups and sell those in lower attention groups provide significant excess returns. This result is in contrast to the argument that the market operates more competitively and moves more efficiently as the number of investors increases due to the increased investor attention. Next, we examine how the degree of attention of institutional, individual, and foreign investors affects each other. The analysis reveals that the attention of individual investors affects the attention of institutional investors in the next period, and vice versa. In addition, as a result of group analysis according to the size of company and stock price, we find that the investor's attention affects the market differently depending on the type of investors and stock price level.
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Song, Chan Young, and Saeyeul Park. "The Investment Horizon of Institutional Investors and Firm Value." East and West Studies 34, no. 2 (June 30, 2022): 275–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.29274/ews.2022.34.2.275.

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This study focuses on the investment horizon of institutional investors in verifying the effect of corporate value on institutional investors, and empirically analyzes the effect on corporate value according to the investment horizon of institutional investors. From 2011 to 2018, we utilize the annual data of 631 companies listed in KOSPI. First, the interaction variables of the investment horizon variables and the rate of the institutional investor shareholding were added to confirm the relationship between the corporate value and those variables. Second, the relationship between the institutional investor ownership and the corporate value was verified after two divisions of the entire sample into long-term and short-term investor groups over the period of the institutional investor's investment. Third, in order to address potential endogeneity concerns, the robustness test was conducted by verifying the relationship between the institutional investor ownership and the corporate value using the 2SLS method.
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Mustilli, Mario, Francesco Campanella, and Eugenio D’Angelo. "Abnormal Returns and Fundamental Analysis in Institutional Investors’ Decision-making: An Agency Theory Approach." International Business Research 11, no. 2 (January 8, 2018): 55. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v11n2p55.

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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the abnormal returns achieved by institutional investors. Distinguishing between institutional investors operating with a specific mandate to invest and those that operate their own choices independently from such a specific delegation, we show that the former achieve higher abnormal returns than the latter. The conceptual explanation of this result is attributable to the use of the fundamental analysis that the first type of institutional investors realized in a higher and more effective way than the second. This different approach in selecting securities might be due to the relationship between the institutional investor and the savers who provided capital. This different agency relationship might have been reflected in the institutional investor's investment policies through the agent behaviour, which changes depending on the nature of the principal who has given the mandate. The empirical analysis has been conducted on a sample of 5,500 institutional investors operating all around the world in 2014, drawing data from institutional investor's annual report, from their investment relations and from Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Bankscope, Eurostat and through Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews.
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Jaiyeoba, Haruna Babatunde, Moha Asri Abdullah, and Khairunisah Ibrahim. "Institutional investors vs retail investors." International Journal of Bank Marketing 38, no. 3 (November 25, 2019): 671–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijbm-07-2019-0242.

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Purpose Guided by several pioneered studies, the purpose of this paper is to comprehensively investigate the investment behaviours of Malaysian retail and institutional investors in an attempt to identify whether the influence of psychological biases is equally applicable to investor divides. Design/methodology/approach The researchers have adopted a quantitative research design by way of survey methodology to obtain data from institutional and retail investors in Malaysia. In addition, the authors have mainly employed second-order measurement invariance analysis to uncover the difference across investor divides. Findings The tests of measurement invariance at the model level indicate an insignificant difference between institutional investors and retail investors. The post hoc test (at the path level) reveals that institutional and retail investors are similar with respect to representative heuristic, overconfidence bias and anchoring bias; though the results also show that they are different with respect to religious bias and herding bias. Research limitations/implications Based on the findings of this study, it is generally not logical to assume that institutional investors completely behave rational during investment decisions. Besides, future researchers are called upon to directly compare the investment decisions of institutional and retail investors with respect to whether the influence of psychological biases is equally applicable to them, particularly on the investigated psychological biases and other psychological biases that are not covered in this study. Originality/value This study has offered insight into whether the influence of psychological biases is equally applicable to institutional and retail investors in Malaysia using second-order measurement invariance analysis. This study is unique in context and the approach it has adopted.
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Lamb, Reinhold P. "Institutional Investors." International Review of Economics & Finance 12, no. 1 (March 2003): 145–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1059-0560(02)00157-0.

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Chandy, Jacob. "Index Returns and Institutional Trading." Shanlax International Journal of Management 9, S1-Feb (February 25, 2022): 218–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.34293/management.v9is1.4863.

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It is acknowledged that only 2% of the Indian public invest in stock markets. This compares with 55% in the USA and about 25% in the EU. The Indian public is therefore a miniscule proportion of investors and the power of the Indian public to move markets is negligible.This means that most trading activity in Indian stock markets are by institutional investors consisting of Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) and Domestic Institutional Investors (DIIs). It seems reasonable to hypothesize that their trading activities influence market returns. This paper aims to verify whether this hypothesis can be sustained by analyzing historical data and calculating statistics such as correlations, regression coefficients and coefficients of determination between FII and DII trading activity and Nifty 500 returns. The key aspects that have been evaluated are buying and selling by these institutional investors. Buy/sell ratios of these institutional investors have also been evaluated since buy/sell ratios are a proxy indicator that indicates the strength of bullishness by these institutional investors.A similar analysis also been done on Mutual Fund trading activity although mutual fund trading activity is normally subsumed under DII trading activity. Since it can be assumed that Mutual Fund trading arises mostly from the ebb and flow of funds from the investing public, they are an important indicator of general public sentiment.Some significant unexpected results have been obtained as the result of the analysis. For example, it has been found that Domestic Institutional Investor buying has negative impact on Nifty 500 return. This is unexpected since it would normally be assumed that an increase in buying by an important constituency such as Domestic Institutional Investor would likely increase Nifty 500 returns on average.
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Verma, Rahul, Gökçe Soydemir, and Tzu-Man Huang. "Are smart beta funds really smart? Evidence from rational and quasi-rational investor sentiment data." Review of Behavioral Finance 12, no. 2 (August 12, 2019): 97–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/rbf-08-2018-0084.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relative effects of rational and quasi-rational sentiments of individual and institutional investors on a set of smart beta fund returns. The magnitudes of the impacts of institutional investor sentiments are greater than those of individual investor sentiments. In addition, both rational and quasi-rational sentiments of individual and institutional investors have significant impacts on smart beta fund returns. The magnitudes of the impacts of quasi-rational sentiments are greater than those of the rational sentiments for both types of investors (quasi-rational sentiments of institutional investors have the maximum impact). These results are consistent with the arguments that professional investors consider the sentiments of individual investors as contrarian leading indicators which are mainly driven by noise while conform the sentiments of institutional investors which are driven by more rational factors. A majority of smart beta funds in the sample outperform the S&P500 returns in the short term but fail to consistently beat the market. The authors find evidence that smart beta funds with consistently high returns are relatively less (more) driven by individual (institutional) investor sentiments. Overall, the authors argue that smart beta funds appear to follow quasi-rational sentiments of both individual and institutional investors that are not rooted in economic fundamentals. Design/methodology/approach The results of the impulse functions generated from a multivariate model suggest that the smart beta fund returns are negatively (positively) impacted by individual (institutional) investor sentiments. Findings The magnitudes of the impacts of institutional investor sentiments are greater than those of individual investor sentiments. In addition, both rational and quasi-rational sentiments of individual and institutional investors have significant impacts on smart beta fund returns. The magnitudes of the impacts of quasi-rational sentiments are greater than those of the rational sentiments for both types of investors (quasi-rational sentiments of institutional investors have the maximum impact). Originality/value These results are consistent with the arguments that professional investors consider the sentiments of individual investors as contrarian leading indicators which are mainly driven by noise while conform the sentiments of institutional investors which are driven by more rational factors. A majority of smart beta funds in the sample outperform the S&P500 returns in the short term but fail to consistently beat the market. The authors find evidence that smart beta funds with consistently high returns are relatively less (more) driven by individual (institutional) investor sentiments. Overall, the authors argue that smart beta funds appear to follow quasi-rational sentiments of both individual and institutional investors that are not rooted in economic fundamentals.
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Le, Thien. "Top institutional investors and accounting comparability." Corporate Ownership and Control 18, no. 4 (2021): 42–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv18i4art4.

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This study examines the relation between firm pair’s sharing of a top institutional investor (i.e., an institutional investor with the largest shareholding) and accounting comparability. Using data from Compustat, CRSP, and Thompson Reuters over the 1993–2017 period, the study finds that firm pairs that share the top institutional investor exhibit higher accounting comparability than other firm pairs. In addition, firm pairs whose top institutional investors are monitoring institutions (regardless of whether they are the same institutions) exhibit greater comparability than other firm pairs whose top institutional investors are non-monitoring institutions. Collectively, the study contributes to existing research on accounting comparability and large institutional investors by showing that the sharing of top institutional investors is an important determinant of accounting comparability
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Wang, Jianye, Yubing Ke, Huixue Zhang, and Yusi Cheng. "Which institutional investors can improve the level of corporate ESG information disclosure?" PLOS ONE 18, no. 11 (November 17, 2023): e0290008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0290008.

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The inconsistency of existing findings on the relationship between institutional investors’ shareholdings and the level of corporate Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) disclosure may lie in the insufficient consideration of the heterogeneity of institutional investors and investee firms. In this paper, from the perspective of institutional investor heterogeneity, we use a two-way fixed effects model to examine the impact of institutional investors on corporate ESG disclosure and the possible mechanism of this impact using a sample of Chinese A-share-listed firms from 2012 to 2020. We show that institutional investor shareholding can improve the level of corporate ESG information disclosure by enhancing auditor supervision and analyst attention to these external supervision. In terms of institutional investor heterogeneity, it is found that independent institutional investors and stable institutional investors play a stronger role in promoting the level of ESG information disclosure. Moreover, the positive net effect of the institutional investors on improving the level of ESG information disclosure is more pronounced in non-heavily polluting industries and state-owned enterprises. This paper enriches the impact of institutional investors’ shareholding on corporate ESG disclosure from a heterogeneity perspective.
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Vazhynskyi, Volodymyr, Mykola Pohoretskyi, and Zoriana Toporetska. "ASSESSMENT OF KEY MARKETS FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN UKRAINE IN THE CONTEXT OF WAR." Baltic Journal of Economic Studies 9, no. 4 (November 17, 2023): 44–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.30525/2256-0742/2023-9-4-44-49.

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The article is devoted to the assessment of key markets for institutional investors in Ukraine in the context of Russia's full-scale invasion. The purpose of this study is to assess the institutional investor market in Ukraine during the war. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following tasks: to study the legal status of an institutional investor in Ukraine and its types, to assess changes in the institutional investor market after the start of a full-scale invasion, to identify key risks that exist in the market now, and to provide proposals on the need to improve state regulation of the institutional investor market to protect citizen investors in times of war. The methodological basis of the study was formed by general scientific methods of cognition: the dialectical method of cognition of the phenomena of the surrounding reality and the comparative legal method for establishing the legal status of an institutional investor, methods of logic (analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, analogy), economic analysis, absolute and comparative advantages and statistical methods for analysing the market of institutional investors and making proposals, mathematical methods for calculating the volume of the market of institutional investors. In accordance with the systemic and structural approach, the institutional investor market was assessed by each of the structural elements of this market. The authors propose to consider an institutional investor as a financial intermediary that attracts and accumulates funds of individual investors (consumers of financial services) and carries out investment activities in the interests of individual investors aimed at financing socially and economically important sectors of the economy for the state and society. The authors pay special attention to the concept of responsible business conduct, pointing out that today, socially responsible business conduct is extremely important for the activities of an institutional investor, which includes "responsible attraction (accumulation) of funds" and "responsible spending (investment) of investors' funds". The study found that the main markets for institutional investors in Ukraine – banking, insurance and private pensions – showed stability and a slight increase in key indicators, which is very positive for Ukraine today. However, in the long term, there are a number of risks that should be taken into account by the government when formulating the state policy on the activities of institutional investors in these markets to protect the interests of citizen investors. The article provides suggestions on the main areas of improvement of the legislation on the activities of institutional investors to minimise the risks of citizen investors.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Institutional Investors"

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Nguyen, Hoang. "TWO ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS." Doctoral diss., University of Central Florida, 2007. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/3934.

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This dissertation consists of two essays investigating the trading by institutions and its impact on the stock market. In the first essay, I investigate why changes in institutional breadth predict return. I first show that changes in breadth are positively associated with abnormal returns over the following four quarters. I then demonstrate that this return predictability can be attributed to the information about the firms' future operating performance. When I examine different types of institutions independently, I find that the predictive power varies across the population of institutions. More specifically, institutions that follow active management style are better able to predict future returns than the passive institutions, and their predictive power appears to be associated with information about future earnings growth. These findings are consistent with the information hypothesis that changes in breadth of institutional ownership can predict return because they contain information about the fundamental value of firms. In the second essay, I examine institutional herding behavior and its impact on stock prices. I document that herds by institutions usually last for more than one quarter and that herds occur more frequently for small and medium size stocks. I find that after herds end, there are reversals in stocks returns for up to four quarters. The magnitude of reversals is positively related to the duration of herding, and negatively related to the price impact of current herding activity. This pattern in returns prevails for all sub-periods examined and is concentrated in small and medium size stocks. My findings suggest that institutional herding may destabilize stock prices.
Ph.D.
Department of Finance
Business Administration
Business Administration PhD
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Alshabibi, Badar. "Institutional investors and corporate governance." Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2017. https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/67698/.

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This study aims to explore the role of institutional investors in the improvement of corporate governance within the companies in which they invest (investee companies). This aim is accomplished by analysing evidence concerning the characteristics of numerous companies’ boards of directors, and of their key subcommittees, listed across the globe. These characteristics are related to board attributes (composition, activity, entrenchment and busyness) and board diversity (gender, age, nationality and education). Furthermore, this study also seeks to investigate the behaviour of institutional investors in improving corporate governance by considering different settings, including various economic conditions (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods), legal systems and ownership structures. Using a sample collected from 15 countries for the period of 2006 to 2012, this study finds that institutional investors promote more favourable corporate governance outcomes, with foreign institutional investors playing a lead role in the improvement and convergence of corporate governance practices around the world. This study provides evidence that institutional investors promote the enhanced composition of boards and of their audit and compensation committees, though not of nomination committees. Furthermore, institutional investors are positively associated with the activity of audit committees but not with the activity of boards nor of compensation and nomination committees. The results also demonstrate that institutional investors reduce board entrenchment though no evidence is found that institutional investors reduce board busyness. The findings also suggest that the role of institutional investors in corporate governance is determined by a company’s institutional environment including the prevalent economic condition, the legal system and the ownership structure of the country in which it operates. In particular, the findings show that institutional investors play a stronger role in the improvement of governance structures during crisis and post-crisis periods than they do during pre-crisis times. This result is also applicable to individual board attributes, such as the independence of audit committees. Additionally, institutional investors improve the independence of boards and of their key subcommittees (with the exception of nomination committees) in civil law countries and reduce board busyness in common law countries. However, there is no evidence that institutional investors reduce board entrenchment in either legal system. Furthermore, the results indicate that they improve governance outcomes in nonfamily-owned firms but not in family-owned firms. Moreover, this study presents no evidence that institutional investors promote board diversity; in fact, this study generally finds no association between institutional ownership and various board diversity attributes such as gender, age, nationality and education. However, the findings do show that institutional investors are positively associated with the education diversity of boards during times of crisis and are negatively associated with board age diversity during pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Furthermore, while in common law countries institutional investors are found to be negatively associated with board age diversity, they have no influence over board diversity attributes (i.e., gender, age, nationality and education) in civil law countries. The results also suggest that the associations between institutional investors and board diversity are mixed and insignificant within different ownership structures, i.e. in family- and non-family-owned firms.
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Li, Fan. "Two essays on institutional investors." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/99209.

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In the first essay, we study mutual funds' voting on compensation-related proposals initiated by corporate management. Compared with proposals on other topics, proposals on compensation issues are more likely to be challenged by mutual funds. Consistent with active institutional influence, mutual funds are more likely to vote against management at portfolio firms that make more excess CEO pay or depict other symptoms of poor governance such as bad performance and CEO entrenchment. Both active and passive funds' votes are significant drivers of the voting outcome of a proposal. Failed proposals are associated with lower CEO pay, especially excess pay, in the following year. Say-on-pay proposals opposed by more mutual funds are also followed by lower excess CEO pay. Collectively, evidence in this paper suggests that institutions (including passive institutions) play an important role in setting CEO pay through the voting channel. The second essay examines the equity loan supply for short selling. Using detailed stock lending data, we show that active equity funds, on average, are informed, stock lenders. The stocks they lend outperform those that they do not. The stocks they recall and sell perform worse in the future than those that remain on loan. These funds avoid lending stocks when lending fees are extremely high and use the shorting market's signals to form stock-selling decisions. Our findings help explain why institutional investors lend stocks. They also highlight a new source of short-sale constraints arising from the informed loan supply.
Doctor of Philosophy
Shareholders of a firm are expected to monitor executive compensation. Among all share-holders, institutional investors such as mutual funds play an important role in setting pay practices for executives. However, do they vote on related proposals at annual meetings or simply "vote by feet"? The first essay strives to answer the question using mutual fund proposal vote records data. Our findings suggest that mutual funds can affect CEO compensation in the future by voting against management-initiated pay proposals and the effect is both statistically and economically significant. Institutional investors such as mutual funds also participate in lending business on otherwise idle shares in their portfolio. While they are often considered passive and not informed in the equity loan market, their behavior has been much less investigated. We study the extent to which mutual funds exploit information in lending their shares using the first detailed stock lending dataset obtained from SEC filings. We find that mutual funds are informed lenders and important to market efficiency.
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Wang, Yong. "Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2010. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/68464.

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Business Administration
Ph.D.
The role of Institutional investors in alleviating the agent problem of management and its valuation effect has been studied extensively in corporate finance. We complement this stream of research by exploring management's control over institutional investors with misaligned objectives, particularly public pension fund, and the consequential valuation effect. We investigate the politic motive of public pension fund's shareholder activism and its impact on the target firms' operational performance, address the control of a strong management on public pension funds' self-serving agenda, and finally we compare the ownership adjustment pattern of public pension funds to other institutional investors to conclude public pension funds' ownership adjustment reflects their private pursuit. The first chapter explores the politic facet and performance effect of shareholder activism sponsored by public pension fund. In this study, we show that having a public pension fund as the leading sponsor of a shareholder proposal significantly improves the proposal's likelihood of being accepted by the target firm. The increased acceptance rate sources from the subset of proposals addressing a social responsibility issue, and targeting firms with weak insider control. An investigation of the public pension board reveals that the board's political profile is the primary determinant of public pension fund's propensity to lead a proposal, and the target firm's acceptance rate. We also assess the performance impact of shareholder proposals. For target firms with strong insider control, the performance impact of accepted social responsibility proposals is significantly positive; that of governance proposals is negligible. For target firms with weak insider control, the performance impact associated with public pension funds is either negative or negligible. These results suggest that the motive driving public pension funds' dominant presence in shareholder activism is not market based, but laden with purpose other than value creation. In the second chapter, we postulate that the widely documented negative valuation effect of ownership by public pension will be weak on firms with extra managerial control mechanism and/or whose managerial ownership of cash flow is high. For firms with high level managerial ownership of cash flow, management bears higher cost for a concession made with public pension fund's misaligned objective. An efficient market will expect this effect and value the managerial control over public pension fund to the extent that the management's benefit is aligned with outside shareholders. Consequently, the cross section valuation difference of firms held by public pension funds can be explained by the managerial ownership of cash flow, managerial control derived from extra mechanism such as dual class share, however, has no explanative power. The last chapter investigates the link between private benefits and institutional holding change. We assume the cross section equilibrium of block holding will break when market sentiment is high. Consequently, block holder tends to shed more shares loaded with less private benefits by taking advantage of opportunities available in a high sentiment market. The empirical results support this conjecture. When the market sentiment is high, Institutional block holders tend to shed more private benefits meager dual-class share than private benefits affluent non-dual class share. This pattern does not exist when the market sentiment is low. Most importantly, public pension fund is identified as the major driver of this effect.
Temple University--Theses
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Fredes, Salas Alex. "Institutional investors and firm value." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2016. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/145646.

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TESIS PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE MAGÍSTER EN FINANZAS FULL TIME
En esta tesis examinamos que rol juegan los inversionistas en las empresas y porqué de su importancia. Los principales inversionistas institucionales son fondos mutuos, fondos de pensión, asesores de inversión, bancos y compañías de seguro. La valiosa información que proveen las acciones de los institucionales al mercado financiero genera mejores estructuras de gobierno corporativo y un monitoreo más efectivo.
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Nguyen, Vinh Huy L. "Institutional Investors, Insiders and the Firm." FIU Digital Commons, 2016. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/2637.

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This dissertation is comprised of three chapters that focus on three topics related to institutional investors’ and registered insiders’ trading activities around corporate announcements. The purpose of the research is to provide more insights into the trading behavior of institutions and insiders around corporate events when they are influenced by the anticipation and arrival of new information. Data samples are stratified, regression models are estimated, and control variables are added to ensure the results are significant and robust. The first chapter discusses the information signaling hypothesis around share repurchase announcements. I examine if institutions can trade profitability around the announcement time using signals from insiders and the firm. I find that only transient institutional investors are able to adjust their portfolios to take advantage of the post-announcement price run-up. The second chapter explores the relationship between information asymmetry and the information acquisition process. It appears that institutions prefer using lower cost, small, round lot, 100-share multiples when they can acquire information in advance of the event as in earnings announcements. The last chapter looks at if the information hierarchy hypothesis holds true at the very top of the corporate pyramid. I find that CEO trades are largely ignored and president net purchases have positive effects on merger post-announcement returns. In summary, institutions, insiders, and the firm play important roles in the information dissemination and acquisition process. Hence, their decisions have profound effects on their complicated, interconnected relationships.
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Bengtsson, Elias. "Shareholder activism of Swedish institutional investors /." Stockholm : School of Business, Stockholm University, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-610.

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Scott, Ricky William. "Institutional Investors and Corporate Financial Policies." Scholar Commons, 2011. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/3338.

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Institutional investors influence corporate payout and research and development (R&D) investment policies. Higher payouts are encouraged by institutional investors, especially in firms with high free cash flow and poor investment opportunities. They also positively influence stock repurchases, particularly in firms with high information asymmetry. The substitution of stock repurchases for dividends as a percentage of total payout is encouraged by institutional investors. Institutional owners persuade firm management to increase research and development (R&D) investment overall and specifically in firms with higher stock liquidity, higher information asymmetry, lower free cash flow, and better investment opportunities. Institutional investors decrease agency costs in payout and R&D investment policy decisions.
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He, Yazhou. "Institutional investors and hedge fund activism." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2017. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/102339/.

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This thesis studies the institutional investor background in order to understand the working of hedge fund activism: how institutional investors affect hedge fund activists target selection and how activists share information and build alliances through social connections to achieve their goals. Chapter 2 utilizes a rich literature on institutional investors' governance roles and develops simple measures of institutional discontent expressed through holding, trading and voice channels, to predict hedge fund activism target selection. Discontent expressed through all three channels leads to subsequent targeting. Medium sized dissatisfied owners and sellers seem to be the main driving force, and institutions' discretionary disagreements on management compensation and governance related proposals have the highest explanatory power among other voice channels. Activists are more likely to gain higher announcement returns and threaten to take hostile actions against management with more discontented institutional investors in the target companies. Discontented institutions are more likely to vote pro-activist in the subsequent annual meetings after campaigns. Chapter 3 uses a social network framework to study information dissemination during activist campaigns. Actively managed funds whose managers are socially connected to the lead activist are more likely to increase their ownership in the target firms around the activist disclosure. In the cross sectional analysis, we find that the effect is stronger if the activists have better track records and if the ties are established via club membership, charity works, and other small circles. Connected institutions also earn significantly higher announcement returns relative to non-connected funds. The presence of connected institutions contributes to the activist's campaign success. Additional tests are performed to rule out alternative explanations such as fund manager ability or similarity in portfolio choices. Chapter 4 goes one step further to study alliance building among activist investors and institutional investors during the campaign period. A socially connected institution is 1.1 percentage points more likely to increase its ownership in the target firm during the campaign period, compared to funds that are not socially connected to the activist. We use a subsample that includes all institutions subject to M&As before activism events to identify plausibly exogenous shocks to social connections and find similar results. Furthermore, connected institutions also perform significantly better on their investments than non-connected institutions and they are more likely to vote pro-activist in routine proposals, especially director election proposals. The effect is stronger if connected institutions also purchase target stocks during a campaign. The thesis contributes to the literature by developing measures of revealed institutional governance preference based on theoretical and survey evidence in the literature. It also uncovers a channel through which hedge fund activists share information and build alliances and push for corporate changes facilitated by mutual benefits amongst their fellow institutional allies.
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Li, Xin. "Strategic Roles of Inactive Institutional Investors." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1627667913738102.

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Books on the topic "Institutional Investors"

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Burghardt, Galen. Treasury options for institutional investors. Chicago, IL: Chicago Board of Trade, 1997.

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Burghardt, Galen, and Brian Walls. Managed Futures for Institutional Investors. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118531600.

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Staub-Bisang, Mirjam, ed. Sustainable Investing for Institutional Investors. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119199137.

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Basile, Ignazio, and Pierpaolo Ferrari, eds. Asset Management and Institutional Investors. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32796-9.

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Gompers, Paul A. Institutional investors and equity prices. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998.

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Board, Conference, ed. Company relations with institutional investors. New York, NY: Conference Board, 1994.

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Downes, Gile R. Institutional investors and corporate behavior. Washington: The AEI Press, 1999.

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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs., ed. Institutional investors in Latin America. Paris: OECD, 2000.

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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Secretary-General. Strengthening Latin American corporate governance: The role of institutional investors. Paris: OECD, 2011.

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Aggarwal, Reena. Portfolio preferences of foreign institutional investors. Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2003.

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Book chapters on the topic "Institutional Investors"

1

Petersen, Henry L. "Institutional Investors." In Encyclopedia of Corporate Social Responsibility, 1429–33. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28036-8_291.

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Bebenroth, Ralf. "Institutional Investors." In International Business Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan, 153–69. Tokyo: Springer Japan, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54989-5_11.

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Basile, Ignazio. "Institutional Investors." In Asset Management and Institutional Investors, 3–30. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32796-9_1.

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Merbecks, Ute. "Institutional Investors." In Encyclopedia of Sustainable Management, 1976–83. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25984-5_492.

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Ramadorai, Tarun. "Institutional Investors." In Behavioral Finance, 595–611. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118258415.ch32.

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Forbes, William, and Lynn Hodgkinson. "Institutional Investors." In Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom, 41–49. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137451743_7.

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Merbecks, Ute. "Institutional Investors." In Encyclopedia of Sustainable Management, 1–8. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02006-4_492-1.

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Markham, Jerry W. "Institutional Investors." In From J.P. Morgan to the Institutional Investor, 315–25. New York: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003247104-24.

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Foley, Bernard J. "The Institutional Investors." In Capital Markets, 174–95. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21426-6_7.

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Fenwick, Mark, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Toshiyuki Kono, and Tronel Joubert. "Mobilizing Institutional Investors." In Organizing-for-Innovation, 45–75. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-7234-8_3.

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Conference papers on the topic "Institutional Investors"

1

Li, Huiyun, Jing Shi, and Shaoyan Fu. "Institutional investors and information disclosure." In 2018 International Conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3226116.3226139.

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Mattarocci, Gianluca, and Lucia Gibilaro. "Institutional Investors and Home Biased REITs." In 25th Annual European Real Estate Society Conference. European Real Estate Society, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.15396/eres2016_247.

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Liao, Mei hua, and Chia Yun Chang. "Analysts' Forecasts and Institutional Investors' Behavior." In 2014 Eighth International Conference on Innovative Mobile and Internet Services in Ubiquitous Computing (IMIS). IEEE, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/imis.2014.84.

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Wang, Shuyue, Yajuan Shangguan, and Rong Men. "Institutional Investors, ESG Performance, and Audit Quality." In The International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0012026400003620.

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"Preferences of Institutional Investors at Karachi Stock Exchange." In International Conference on Business, Marketing and Information System Management. International Centre of Economics, Humanities and Management, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.15242/icehm.ed1115006.

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Liu, Wei. "Institutional Investors Holding, Auditor Choice and Earnings Management." In 2021 5th Annual International Conference on Data Science and Business Analytics (ICDSBA). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icdsba53075.2021.00099.

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Jianjun, Cheng. "Role of Institutional Investors for Corporate Governance in China." In 2010 International Conference on Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering (ICIII). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iciii.2010.579.

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"Strategic asset allocation for institutional investors and real estate." In 20th Annual European Real Estate Society Conference: ERES Conference 2013. ÖKK-Editions, Vienna, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.15396/eres2013_ind_106.

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Liang, Yong, and Sheng-dao Gan. "Thinking about the problem of institutional investors qsocial responsibilityq." In 2014 2nd International Conference on Education Technology and Information System (ICETIS 2014). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icetis-14.2014.17.

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Lin, Xudong, Xin Han, and Weiwei Lai. "IPO Pricing Analysis Based on Institutional Investors Irrational Quotation." In 2011 International Conference on Internet Technology and Applications (iTAP). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/itap.2011.6006317.

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Reports on the topic "Institutional Investors"

1

Gompers, Paul, and Andrew Metrick. Institutional Investors and Equity Prices. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6723.

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Pound, John, and Robert Shiller. Speculative Behavior of Institutional Investors. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w1964.

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Gabaix, Xavier, Parameswaran Gopikrishnan, Vasiliki Plerou, and H. Eugene Stanley. Institutional Investors and Stock Market Volatility. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11722.

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Blommestein, Hans J. Institutional Investors, Pension Reform and Emerging Securities Markets. Inter-American Development Bank, October 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011567.

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Abstract:
This paper discusses the range of factors that can stimulate the further development of the domestic institutional sector through pension system reform measures. The development of the institutional sector in emerging market economies is compared with the experiences of OECD countries. The focus is on the key factors that have been (and are) driving the growth of OECD institutional investor activities and the impact of institutional investors on securities markets.
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Ben-David, Itzhak, Francesco Franzoni, Rabih Moussawi, and John Sedunov. The Granular Nature of Large Institutional Investors. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22247.

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Oosthuizen, Dick. Institutional Housing Investors and the Great Recession. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, September 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.21799/frbp.wp.2023.22.

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Shiller, Robert, and John Pound. Survey Evidence on Diffusion of Investment Among Institutional Investors. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w1851.

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Cavagnaro, Daniel, Berk Sensoy, Yingdi Wang, and Michael Weisbach. Measuring Institutional Investors’ Skill from Their Investments in Private Equity. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22547.

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Manconi, Alberto, Massimo Massa, and Ayako Yasuda. The Behavior of Intoxicated Investors: The role of institutional investors in propagating the crisis of 2007-2008. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w16191.

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Breugem, Matthijs, and Adrian Buss. Institutional Investors and Information Acquisition: Implications for Asset Prices and Informational Efficiency. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w23561.

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