Academic literature on the topic 'Information services Government policy United States Public opinion'

Abstract This paper analyses public opinion during the João Goulart government in Brazil (1961-1964), focusing on public perceptions on domestic and foreign policies. We employ a recently declassified public opinion survey conducted on behalf of United States Information Agency (USIA) in urban areas. We found that the Brazilian public opinion was somewhat coherent, supporting redistributive reforms domestically and a neutralist approach in foreign affairs.

As public libraries are becoming e-government access points relied on by both patrons and government agencies, it is important for libraries to consider the implications of these roles. While providing e-government access serves to reinforce the tremendously important role of public libraries in the United States social infrastructure, it also creates new demands on libraries and opens up significant new opportunities. Drawing upon several different strands of research, this paper examines the nexus of public libraries, values, trust, and e-government, focusing on the ways in which the values of librarianship and the trust that communities place in their public libraries reinforce the role of public libraries in the provision of e-government. The unique values embraced by public libraries have not only shaped the missions of libraries, they have influenced popular opinion surrounding public libraries and fostered the confidence that communities place in them as a source of trusted information and assistance in finding information. As public libraries have embraced the provision of Internet access, these values and trust have become intertwined with their new social role as a public access point for e-government both in normal information activities and in the most extreme circumstances. This paper explores the intersections of these issues and the relation of the vital e-government role of public libraries to library funding, public policy, library and information science education, and research initiatives.

In United States ex rel. Quirk v. Madonna Towers, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the failure of a skilled nursing facility's executives to seek a legal opinion regarding a billing practice they considered valid did not meet the definition of knowingly presenting a false claim for payment to the federal government under the False Claims Act (FCA). Alleging that the facility that provided care to his aunt fraudulently submitted claims to Medicare for services provided free of charge, the appellant brought this case qui tam on behalf of the federal government under the FCA.The FCA was passed by the legislature in an effort to punish and deter fraud against the federal government. It provides financial incentives for private individuals to come forward with information about fraudulent activity.

The global reaction to US President Donald Trump's executive order, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” of January 27, 2017,1 revealed great public sympathy for the fate of refugees and the principle of refugee protection. In the case of Europe, such sympathy has, however, been dismissed by politicians who have read concerns regarding security and integration as reason for introducing restrictive policies on asylum and humanitarian assistance. These policies are at odds with public sentiment. Drawing upon public opinion surveys conducted by Amnesty International, the European Social Survey (ESS), and Pew Global Attitudes Survey across the European Union and neighboring states, this article records a marked divide between public attitudes towards the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers and official policies regarding asylum and humanitarian assistance, and seeks to understand why this is the case. The article suggests that post-9/11 there has been a reconfiguration of refugee policy and a reconnecting of humanitarian and security interests which has enabled a discourse antithetical to the universal right to asylum. It offers five possible explanations for this trend: i) fears over cultural antagonism in host countries; ii) the conflation of refugees and immigrants, both those deemed economically advantageous as well as those labelled as “illegal”; iii) dominance of human capital thinking; iv) foreign policy justification; and v) the normalization of border controls. The main conclusion is that in a post-post-Cold War era characterized in part by the reconnecting of security and humanitarian policy, European governments have developed restrictive policies despite public sympathy. Support for the admission of refugees is not, however, unqualified, and most states and European populations prefer skilled populations that can be easily assimilated. In order to achieve greater protection and more open policies, this article recommends human rights actors work with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partners to challenge the above discourse through media campaigns and grassroots messaging. Further recommendations include: • Challenging efforts to normalize and drawing attention to the extreme and unprecedented activities of illegal and inhumane practices, e.g., detention, offshore processing, and the separation of families through the courts as part of a coordinated information campaign to present a counter moral argument. • Identifying how restrictive asylum policies fail to advance foreign policy interests and are contrary to international law. • Evidencing persecution by sharing information with the press and government agencies on the nature of claims by those currently considered ineligible for refugee protection as part of a wider campaign of information and inclusion. • Engaging with minority, and in particular Muslim, communities to redress public concerns regarding the possibility of cultural integration in the host country. • Clarifying the rights of refugees and migrants in line with the UNHCR and International Organization for Migration (IOM) guidelines and European and national law in order to hold governments to account and to ensure that all — irrespective of their skills, status, nationality or religion — are given the opportunity to seek asylum. • Identifying and promoting leadership among states and regional bodies to advance the rights of refugees.

No longer restricted to access to information laws and accountability measures, “open government” is now associated with a broad range of goals and functions, including public participation, open data, the improvement of public services and government efficiency. The 59 country strong Open Government Partnership (OGP) suggests that consensus on the value of open government is emerging amongst public officials. Similarly, academics have shown a renewed interest in open government as they discuss, debate and critique the meaning and role of open government reforms today. Yet, despite the diverse aims and tools characterizing contemporary open government, public officials and academics typically approach the subject as a cohesive unit of analysis, making sweeping—and generally non-empirical—claims about its implications, without accounting for the homegrown flavours that may characterize open government in practice. Simply put, the practice and study of contemporary open government suffers a lack of definitional clarity: what exactly is open government today, and how does it vary across governments? In response to these questions, this paper analyses the content of open government policy documents in seven OGP member states (Azerbaijan, Brazil, Canada, Netherlands, Kenya, United Kingdom, and the United States), providing the first systematic, empirically-grounded multi-country comparison of contemporary open government. The paper suggests where the term departs from and retains its original meaning, and how its definition varies across different governments

Despite its growing economic and political importance, this is the first study in economics to investigate public opinion in the United States regarding both the allocation of government disaster aid to stricken households and communities as well as total expenditures by government on such aid. This is also the first study to bridge a gap in previous research on disasters by comparing and contrasting our results to related behavioral studies from political science, social psychology and sociology. Combining individual data from the 2006 General Social Survey with county-level information about the local environment of survey respondents, we estimate probit models to ascertain the magnitude and significance of the socioeconomic, demographic, political and experiential determinants of public opinion on these issues. Among other results, we find that Black survey respondents strongly support increasing total aid expenditures and aid to affected households and communities while income, age and a conservative political ideology largely exert a negative influence on these same variables. Surprisingly, the effects of prior experience with disasters and educational level have only a weak effect on the allocation of aid and none on the level of expenditures on aid. These and other results are consistent with only a portion of previous findings from other disciplines. Several implications of our results for current federal disaster policy are discussed and we also suggest directions for further research into this important topic.

In the mid-1930s, the notion that the U.S. government would collaborate with the country’s private industries to project official policies and shape public opinion abroad as well as at home would have been controversial and considered a violation of the nation’s democratic values. Yet, by the early 1950s, institutions and practices were in place to make this a regular activity. Much of this ideological work was done surreptitiously, in conjunction with commercial media, and there was little public or news media discussion demanding exposure and accountability for it. What had once been unthinkable had become unquestionable. This monograph chronicles the development of U.S. “information services” in the immediate postwar years. It chronicles the synergetic relationship between government interests, represented by the U.S. State Department, and major American corporations, represented by groups like the Committee for Economic Development and the Advertising Council in portraying the rapidly escalating Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union in a manner that would secure economic world dominance for American interests in the postwar era.

The article analyzes the characteristics of the program of Assistance to Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) in the United States. This program is aimed at support and subsequent commercialization of high technology developed by small firms. The government agencies involved in the implementation of the program determine the research areas manage the allocated funds themselves. The program has been in operation for over 30 years and has proven to be effective. It provides business with funds necessary at the primary, the most risky phase of production of innovative goods and services, and also gives signals to the market about popular areas of innovation development. Participation in the program is a guarantee of a high level for innovative product or service produced by the firm and allows companies to raise additional funds. Conclusions drawn from the analysis of the SBIR may be useful for the policy support of science and technology in Russia. The implementation of programs similar to SBIR in Russia will solve the actual problem of innovation development, to reduce information asymmetry in the market of innovative products and services and help in attracting venture capital in high-technology projects.

The article analyses main principles and mechanism of international environmental policy of the different economic levels. Particularly is evaluated the role of United Nations, European Union and national states in framework of sustainable concept of economic development and Millennium development goals. Are used market-based instruments such as taxes, subsidies and certificates, quantitative methods of regulation; government spending on public goods, environmental investments (e.g. water pollution) and planning environmental education etc. Among the institutional instruments of the international environmental policy are first of all three types of international agreements depending of deploying of situation in global environment. The focus of main environmental problems, according to the OECD / Eurostat classification, include air pollution control, water management, solid waste management, soil remediation and purification, noise reduction and vibration, environmental research and development, environmental commitments and engineering, analytical services, data processing, analysis and evaluation, education, training, and information.

<em>Background</em>. In public health, interpersonal influence has been identified as an important factor in the spread of health information, and in understanding and changing health behaviors. However, little is known about influence in public health leadership. Influence is important in leadership settings, where public health professionals contribute to national policy and practice agendas. Drawing on social theory and recent advances in statistical network modeling, we examined influence in a network of tobacco control leaders at the United States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). <em>Design and Methods.</em> Fifty-four tobacco control leaders across all 11 agencies in the DHHS were identified; 49 (91%) responded to a web-based survey. Participants were asked about communication with other tobacco control leaders, who influenced their work, and general job characteristics. Exponential random graph modeling was used to develop a network model of influence accounting for characteristics of individuals, their relationships, and global network structures. <em>Results</em>. Higher job ranks, more experience in tobacco control, and more time devoted to tobacco control each week increased the likelihood of influence nomination, as did more frequent communication between network members. Being in the same agency and working the same number of hours per week were positively associated with mutual influence nominations. Controlling for these characteristics, the network also exhibited patterns associated with influential clusters of network members. <em>Conclusions</em>. Findings from this unique study provide a perspective on influence within a government agency that both helps to understand decision-making and also can serve to inform organizational efforts that allow for more effective structuring of leadership.

Indianapolis
This thesis examines the evolution of the adolescent sex education during from 1907 to 1975, from the perspective of Indiana and highlights the contingencies, continuities, and discontinuities across place and time. This period represents the establishment of the defining characteristics of sex education in Indiana as locally controlled and school-based, as well as the Social Health Association’s transformation from one of a number of local social hygiene organizations to the nation’s only school based social health agency. Indiana was not a local exception to the American sex education movement, but SHA was exceptional for SHA its organizational longevity, adaptation, innovation in school-based curriculum, and national leadership in sex education. Indiana sex education leadership seems, at first glance, incongruous due to Indiana’s conservative politics. SHA’s efforts to adapt the message, curriculum, and operation in Indiana’s conservative climate helped it endure and take leadership role on a national stage. By 1975, sex education came to be defined as school based, locally controlled and based on the medicalization of health, yet this growing national consensus belied deep internal contradictions where sex education was not part of the regular school health curriculum and outside of the schools’ control. Underlying this story is fundamental difference between social hygiene and health, that hygiene is a set of practices to prevent disease, while health is an internal state to promote wellness.

Abstract This chapter provides an overview of the policy infrastructure and key policies in place concerning the social rights of Danish citizens residing abroad. It builds on evidence from legal and administrative documents, on communications with key informants, as well as on existing studies and reports concerning the Danish Government’s approach to emigration and diaspora policies. Concrete cases for this study are five countries where the largest Danish diaspora concentrate: Sweden, Norway, Germany, the United States of America and the United Kingdom. It argues that reliance on supra-national agreements, previous rather negative public opinion about emigrants as well as the residence principle embedded in the qualifying conditions for social benefits are three main factors which explain the limited attention currently given by the Danish Government to diaspora policies, in particular the social protection of Danish citizens residing abroad.

Nigeria has made frantic efforts towards achieving the millennium development goals (MDGs) as spelt out in the United Nations’ Agenda for the world. A critical assessment of the e-Government strategies in Nigeria is important being responsible for 20% of the population of the entire African continent. This paper presents a review of the e-Government strategies in Nigeria; the human capital development initiatives; the information and communications technology (ICT) diffusion and e-Inclusion. The global and continental ranking of the country is presented as well as recommendations to accelerate developments towards achieving the MDGs. Findings revealed that there are ongoing efforts in Nigeria to address the issue of poverty. The various initiatives of government include: the National/State Economic Empowerment Strategies (NEEDS/SEEDS), the Vision 2020, the National e-Government Strategy (NeGST) and a well-formulated National IT policy to mention a few. The little hindrance encountered in the research is that the available data was only up to the year 2005 and 2006 in some cases. However, based on the human capital development indices such as: economic empowerment and poverty reduction, education, health, employment generation, etc, it was observed that the adult literacy level of 64.2% is satisfactory and better results are expected before 2015. The life expectancy level is constant (54 years) from 2002 to 2007, which is the one of the lowest in Africa. On school enrolment, the major problem is access and poverty. It was observed that only 25% of primary school leavers made it to the secondary school level, while about 14% of the students at this level made it to the tertiary level. Similarly, the average percentage of female enrolment in schools is 45%. The health facilities are under-funded and are grossly inadequate both in quality and quantity. There is an average of 1,700 persons per hospital bed and the ratio of physicians to the populace is about 1:6000. This calls for a state of emergency in this sector. One major sector of the economy that is experiencing a boost is the ICT and Telecoms. The sector had brought about a teledensity growth of 0.73 to 37.05 from 2001 to 2007. Consequently, Nigeria has been named the fastest growing Telecoms nation in Africa and the third in the world, with a number of direct and indirect jobs created. Similarly, the rate of Internet diffusion is encouraging bearing in mind that the level was almost nonexistent in 1999. It is obvious that Nigeria would be able to bridge the divide by 2015. Generally, there are some meaningful developments in the country arising from the various poverty eradication schemes but the resultant effect has not imparted positively on unemployment. This is the opinion of the populace and hence the need for government to restrategize, otherwise, fulfilling MDGs by 2015 may not be realistic.

In 2020, the United States government passed legislation and stabilization packages to respond to the COVID-19 outbreak by providing paid sick leave, tax credits, and free virus testing; expanding food assistance and unemployment benefits; and increasing Medicaid funding. However, the response to the global pandemic might have been hindered by the lassitude of the state and the prevailing conception of social policy that leaves the most vulnerable unprotected. The “zero tolerance” immigration campaign that was executed until January 2021 had negative public health consequences, especially for the prevention of communicable diseases. In addition to the systemic obstacles noncitizens face in their access to healthcare, changes to immigration law that penalize recipients of some social services on grounds that they are a public charge further restricted their access to treatment and hindered the fight against the pandemic.

Land administration strategies and processes need to be structured within a broad policy framework, the shape of which will depend on the jurisdiction concerned. A common thread between systems will be the promotion of economic development, social justice and equity, political stability, and environmentally sustainable development. The processes of re-engineering, total quality management, and other management reforms discussed in Chapter 9 were originally designed for use in the private sector so that organizations could respond better to the demands of the market place. More recently, they have increasingly been adopted by public sector administrators who have been forced to respond to the market oriented approach and hence have been required to upgrade land administration systems. In the United States the processes of re-engineering have been packaged under such labels as ‘entrepreneurial government’ and ‘reinventing government’ and were addressed in the National Performance Review (known as the Gore Commission) which had a mandate to ‘re-invent and to reinvigorate the entire national government’. The ideas were picked up by many other governments—from Australia to the UK (Butler 1994), the Netherlands to New Zealand, and Singapore to Sweden-regardless of party or ideology. Although reinventing government means different things to different people, it has generally entailed: 1. restructuring the way government services are organized; 2. developing new strategies and processes for managing government services (for instance, simplifying administrative programmes); 3. empowering the recipients of public services. As with the private sector, a crucial component of reinventing government has been the effective use of information technology (IT). Governments in general have only recently begun to review their national information strategies and to develop new ways in which they deliver services to citizens and businesses. Over the past few years, IT has changed the way that many people live through the creation of new products and services. Examples include the use of credit and debit cards, the ability to withdraw cash from a ‘hole in the wall’ even in a foreign country, the mobile phone and fax machine, and access to information on the Internet. Information technology now makes it possible for citizens and businesses to deal directly with government agencies if they so wish (UK Government 1996).

El Niño 97-98 will be remembered as one of the strongest ever recorded (Glantz, 1999). For the first time, climate anomalies associated with the event were anticipated by scientists, and this information was communicated to the public and policy makers to prepare for the “meteorological mayhem that climatologists are predicting will beset the entire globe this winter. The source of coming chaos is El Niño . . .” (Brownlee and Tangley, 1997). Congress and government agencies reacted in varying ways, as illustrated by the headlines presented in Figure 7-1. The link between El Niño events and seasonal weather and climate anomalies across the globe are called teleconnections (Glantz and Tarlton, 1991). Typically, during an El Niño cycle hurricane frequencies in the Atlantic are depressed, the southeast United States receives more rain than usual (chapter 2), and parts of Australia, Africa, and South America experience drought. Global attention became focused on the El Niño phenomenon following the 1982-1983 event, which, at that time, had the greatest magnitude of any El Niño observed in more than a century. After El Niño 82-83, many seasonal anomalies that had occurred during its two years were attributed, rightly or wrongly, to its influence on the atmosphere. As a consequence of the event, societies around the world experienced both costs and benefits (Glantz et al., 1987). Another lasting consequence of the 1982-1983 event was an increase in research into the phenomenon. One result of this research in the late 1990s has been the production of forecasts of El Niño (and La Niña) events and the seasonal climate anomalies associated with them. This chapter discusses the use of climate forecasts by policy makers, drawing on experiences from El Niño 97-98, which replaced the 1982-1983 eventas the” climate event of the century.” The purpose of this chapter is to draw lessons from the use of El Niño -based climate forecasts during the 1997-1998 event in order to improve the future production, delivery, and use of climate predictions. This chapter focuses on examples of federal, state, and local responses in California, Florida, and Colorado to illustrate the lessons.

Aim/Purpose: This paper provides the results of the preliminary analysis of the findings of an ongoing study that seeks to examine the social media use, cultural and political awareness, civic engagement, issue prioritization, and social activism of Gen Z students enrolled at four different institutional types located in the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States. The aim of this study is to look at the group as a whole as well as compare findings across populations. The institutional types under consideration include a mid-sized majority serving or otherwise referred to as a traditionally white institution (TWI) located in a small coastal city on the Atlantic Ocean, a small Historically Black University (HBCU) located in a rural area, a large community college located in a county that is a mixture of rural and suburban and which sits on the border of Maryland and Pennsylvania, and graduating high school students enrolled in career and technical education (CTE) programs in a large urban area. This exploration is purposed to examine the behaviors and expectations of Gen Z students within a representative American region during a time of tremendous turmoil and civil unrest in the United States. Background: Over 74 million strong, Gen Z makes up almost one-quarter of the U.S. population. They already outnumber any current living generation and are the first true digital natives. Born after 1996 and through 2012, they are known for their short attention spans and heightened ability to multi-task. Raised in the age of the smart phone, they have been tethered to digital devices from a young age with most having the preponderance of their childhood milestones commemorated online. Often called Zoomers, they are more racially and ethnically diverse than any previous generation and are on track to be the most well-educated generation in history. Gen Zers in the United States have been found in the research to be progressive and pro-government and viewing increasing racial and ethnic diversity as positive change. Finally, they are less likely to hold xenophobic beliefs such as the notion of American exceptionalism and superiority that have been popular with by prior generations. The United States has been in a period of social and civil unrest in recent years with concerns over systematic racism, rampant inequalities, political polarization, xenophobia, police violence, sexual assault and harassment, and the growing epidemic of gun violence. Anxieties stirred by the COVID-19 pandemic further compounded these issues resulting in a powder keg explosion occurring throughout the summer of 2020 and leading well into 2021. As a result, the United States has deteriorated significantly in the Civil Unrest Index falling from 91st to 34th. The vitriol, polarization, protests, murders, and shootings have all occurred during Gen Z’s formative years, and the limited research available indicates that it has shaped their values and political views. Methodology: The Mid-Atlantic region is a portion of the United States that exists as the overlap between the northeastern and southeastern portions of the country. It includes the nation’s capital, as well as large urban centers, small cities, suburbs, and rural enclaves. It is one of the most socially, economically, racially, and culturally diverse parts of the United States and is often referred to as the “typically American region.” An electronic survey was administered to students from 2019 through 2021 attending a high school dual enrollment program, a minority serving institution, a majority serving institution, and a community college all located within the larger mid-Atlantic region. The survey included a combination of multiple response, Likert scaled, dichotomous, open ended, and ordinal questions. It was developed in the Survey Monkey system and reviewed by several content and methodological experts in order to examine bias, vagueness, or potential semantic problems. Finally, the survey was pilot tested prior to implementation in order to explore the efficacy of the research methodology. It was then modified accordingly prior to widespread distribution to potential participants. The surveys were administered to students enrolled in classes taught by the authors all of whom are educators. Participation was voluntary, optional, and anonymous. Over 800 individuals completed the survey with just over 700 usable results, after partial completes and the responses of individuals outside of the 18-24 age range were removed. Findings: Participants in this study overwhelmingly were users of social media. In descending order, YouTube, Instagram, Snapchat, Twitter, Facebook, Pinterest, WhatsApp, LinkedIn and Tik Tok were the most popular social media services reported as being used. When volume of use was considered, Instagram, Snapchat, YouTube and Twitter were the most cited with most participants reporting using Instagram and Snapchat multiple times a day. When asked to select which social media service they would use if forced to choose just one, the number one choice was YouTube followed by Instagram and Snapchat. Additionally, more than half of participants responded that they have uploaded a video to a video sharing site such as YouTube or Tik Tok. When asked about their familiarity with different technologies, participants overwhelmingly responded that they are “very familiar” with smart phones, searching the Web, social media, and email. About half the respondents said that they were “very familiar” with common computer applications such as the Microsoft Office Suite or Google Suite with another third saying that they were “somewhat familiar.” When asked about Learning Management Systems (LMS) like Blackboard, Course Compass, Canvas, Edmodo, Moodle, Course Sites, Google Classroom, Mindtap, Schoology, Absorb, D2L, itslearning, Otus, PowerSchool, or WizIQ, only 43% said they were “very familiar” with 31% responding that they were “somewhat familiar.” Finally, about half the students were either “very” or “somewhat” familiar with operating systems such as Windows. A few preferences with respect to technology in the teaching and learning process were explored in the survey. Most students (85%) responded that they want course announcements and reminders sent to their phones, 76% expect their courses to incorporate the use of technology, 71% want their courses to have course websites, and 71% said that they would rather watch a video than read a book chapter. When asked to consider the future, over 81% or respondents reported that technology will play a major role in their future career. Most participants considered themselves “informed” or “well informed” about current events although few considered themselves “very informed” or “well informed” about politics. When asked how they get their news, the most common forum reported for getting news and information about current events and politics was social media with 81% of respondents reporting. Gen Z is known to be an engaged generation and the participants in this study were not an exception. As such, it came as no surprise to discover that, in the past year more than 78% of respondents had educated friends or family about an important social or political issue, about half (48%) had donated to a cause of importance to them, more than a quarter (26%) had participated in a march or rally, and a quarter (26%) had actively boycotted a product or company. Further, about 37% consider themselves to be a social activist with another 41% responding that aren’t sure if they would consider themselves an activist and only 22% saying that they would not consider themselves an activist. When asked what issues were important to them, the most frequently cited were Black Lives Matter (75%), human trafficking (68%), sexual assault/harassment/Me Too (66.49%), gun violence (65.82%), women’s rights (65.15%), climate change (55.4%), immigration reform/deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA) (48.8%), and LGBTQ+ rights (47.39%). When the schools were compared, there were only minor differences in social media use with the high school students indicating slightly more use of Tik Tok than the other participants. All groups were virtually equal when it came to how informed they perceived themselves about current events and politics. Consensus among groups existed with respect to how they get their news, and the community college and high school students were slightly more likely to have participated in a march, protest, or rally in the last 12 months than the university students. The community college and high school students were also slightly more likely to consider themselves social activists than the participants from either of the universities. When the importance of the issues was considered, significant differences based on institutional type were noted. Black Lives Matter (BLM) was identified as important by the largest portion of students attending the HBCU followed by the community college students and high school students. Less than half of the students attending the TWI considered BLM an important issue. Human trafficking was cited as important by a higher percentage of students attending the HBCU and urban high school than at the suburban and rural community college or the TWI. Sexual assault was considered important by the majority of students at all the schools with the percentage a bit smaller from the majority serving institution. About two thirds of the students at the high school, community college, and HBCU considered gun violence important versus about half the students at the majority serving institution. Women’s rights were reported as being important by more of the high school and HBCU participants than the community college or TWI. Climate change was considered important by about half the students at all schools with a slightly smaller portion reporting out the HBCU. Immigration reform/DACA was reported as important by half the high school, community college, and HBCU participants with only a third of the students from the majority serving institution citing it as an important issue. With respect to LGBTQ rights approximately half of the high school and community college participants cited it as important, 44.53% of the HBCU students, and only about a quarter of the students attending the majority serving institution. Contribution and Conclusion: This paper provides a timely investigation into the mindset of generation Z students living in the United States during a period of heightened civic unrest. This insight is useful to educators who should be informed about the generation of students that is currently populating higher education. The findings of this study are consistent with public opinion polls by Pew Research Center. According to the findings, the Gen Z students participating in this study are heavy users of multiple social media, expect technology to be integrated into teaching and learning, anticipate a future career where technology will play an important role, informed about current and political events, use social media as their main source for getting news and information, and fairly engaged in social activism. When institutional type was compared the students from the university with the more affluent and less diverse population were less likely to find social justice issues important than the other groups. Recommendations for Practitioners: During disruptive and contentious times, it is negligent to think that the abounding issues plaguing society are not important to our students. Gauging the issues of importance and levels of civic engagement provides us crucial information towards understanding the attitudes of students. Further, knowing how our students gain information, their social media usage, as well as how informed they are about current events and political issues can be used to more effectively communicate and educate. Recommendations for Researchers: As social media continues to proliferate daily life and become a vital means of news and information gathering, additional studies such as the one presented here are needed. Additionally, in other countries facing similarly turbulent times, measuring student interest, awareness, and engagement is highly informative. Impact on Society: During a highly contentious period replete with a large volume of civil unrest and compounded by a global pandemic, understanding the behaviors and attitudes of students can help us as higher education faculty be more attuned when it comes to the design and delivery of curriculum. Future Research This presentation presents preliminary findings. Data is still being collected and much more extensive statistical analyses will be performed.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.