Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Information contracts'

Consider companies who rely on revenue generating equipment that fails from time to time. Assume that a company owns one unit of equipment, whose maintenance and repair services are outsourced to a qualified service provider. We assume that the company (the principal) outsources the maintenance and repair services using performance based contracts. Such contractual relationships fall into economics' principal-agent framework. The owners of the revenue generating units are referred to as principals, and the service provider as the agent. We address the following questions: What are the optimal contracting strategies for a principal and an agent? Can the agent benefit from pooling the service demands from multiple principals? This dissertation contains two main bodies of work contained in chapters 2-7 and chapters 8-13 respectively. In the first part of this dissertation (chapters 2-7) we examine the contractual options between a single principal and a single agent. The contractual options of a principal and an agent are modeled as a Markov process with an undetermined time horizon. For a risk neutral principal we identify the conditions under which a principal contracts with a risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-seeking agent and derive the principal's optimal offer and the agent's service capacity response. In essence, we provide an extensive formulating analysis of principal-agent contracts given any exogenous parameter values. That is, we derive mathematical formulas for the optimal contract offers and the agent's optimal service capacity. It turns out that a small number of formulas cover a large spectrum of principal-agent conditions. In the second part of this dissertation (chapters 8-13), in a counter distinction to the vast literature in economics on principal-agent contractual interplay and its predominant concern with the principal, here we focus on the agent. In the case of performance based service contracts it is known that the principal extracts all the economic surplus and the agent breaks even. But this is not the case for an agent of good standing contracting with multiple principals. We show that an agent who contracts a collection of principals with interdependent failure characteristics does better than break-even - such an agent realizes a profit rate that is convexly increasing in the number of principals. The corresponding cooperative game assessing each principal's contribution to the agent's profit is convex and its easily computable Louderback's value seems always to be in its core. In chapter 14 we present the outline of a future study that compares several different options of contract structure faced by the principal and the agent, because the optimal contracting strategies for the principal and the agent may not necessarily be the same under different contract structures. We discuss briefly the agent's and the principal's behavior under different forms of performance based contract, which serves as a starting point for future extensions of this dissertation. To summarize, this dissertation provides practical mathematical results and important managerial insights into the principal-agent contract in equipment repair services industry.

The dissertation explores the effect of limited contractual commitment on the form of contracts and studies its welfare implications. The main focus is on foundations of incomplete contracts. The thesis studies to what extent incompleteness of contracts can be linked to contract renegotiation. Particular emphasis is put onto explaining the absence of a contract from a relationship. Chapter 1 reviews the literature on contract renegotiation and incomplete contracting. Chapter 2 is based on a version of the hold-up problem. It shows that contracts that are vulnerable to renegotiation cannot provide better investment incentives than no contract. The main driving force is that investment, although beneficial from a total surplus point of view, has an ambivalent effect on the investing party's payoff. It increases the benefit of an efficient action and decreases the benefit of an inefficient action. An example is investment into human capital, such as additional job training. It increases personal satisfaction in a challenging job but may also increase the frustration from a job that consists only of repetitive tasks. If an exact job description is not feasible ex-ante and if the non-investing party has all the bargaining power ex-post, contracts cannot compensate for the cost of investment. Chapter 3 formalizes the intuition that contracting involves a cost because a contract constitutes a less flexible status quo for ex-post bargaining than no contract. For this, asymmetric information is introduced. With asymmetric information contracting is potentially costly because an inefficient outcome is not necessarily undone by an ex-post bargain. For example, during the renegotiation of the contract between General Motors and Fisher Body, the latter adopted a cost intensive production technology in order to convince its partner to renege on the former agreement. In the model of this chapter, parties weigh the benefit of a contract against lost flexibility. If these effects are similar, no contract is written. The possibility that a contract might be strictly dominated by no contract is explored in chapters 4 and 5. Such a strict dominance result is interesting because it is a more forceful advocate for the incomplete contract assumption. Chapter 4 contains a version of the durable good monopoly model with no discounting but costly contracting. These could be writing or legal costs. Early contracting is less costly than late contracting which highlights the idea that bargaining at a deadline is more costly. But also, early contracting suffers from the ratchet effect because it releases information. The main result says that the costs of the ratchet effect outweigh the cost savings, even if initial contracting costs are of order of magnitude smaller than late contracting costs. The seller strictly prefers to offer no contract. In chapter 5, a sequential screening model endogenizes the fixed contracting cost. The buyer is privately informed about one part of the good's value but ignores the second part, which is revealed later. Early contracting is beneficial because it suffers less from asymmetric information than does late contracting. Nevertheless, if uncertainty with respect to the first variable is greater than uncertainty with respect to the second variable, the seller cannot take advantage of this fact and he strictly prefers to wait. Moreover, if this is not the case, contracts are partially incomplete because they are not conditioned on the second variable. Finally, the thesis reports the new effect that all contracts are renegotiated in equilibrium. This is in contrast to the renegotiation proofness principle, which states that in models of contracting with renegotiation one can restrict attention to renegotiation proof contracts.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, c1999.
Includes bibliographical references.
Chapter 1: I study the design and functioning of self-enforcing incentive contracts under imperfect observability, using a model of repeated agency that allows for both common and private performance monitoring. When performance measures are mutually observed, optimal relational agreements always keep the parties on the Pareto frontier. When performance measures are privately observed, self-enforcing agreements involve the possibility of separation on the equilibrium path, but optimal contracts still take a basic "termination" form. Using these results, one can view optimal long-term contracts as the solution to a static optimization problem. I use this static program to describe the shape of optimal contracts and the nature of second-best inefficiencies. Under standard conditions, optimal moral hazard contracts are "one-step" - a fixed discretionary transfer is made to the agent any time performance is above some cut-off. Hidden information contracts are also characterized and it is shown that optimal contracts call for effort distortion by all types. Chapter 2: This chapter considers self-enforcing relational contracts between a firm and many agents. Even when contracting opportunities are technologically independent, firms will benefit from reaching multilateral contracts that link their transactional arrangements. Optimal multilateral contracts equalize the shadow cost of incentive constraints on each relationship, something bilateral contracts will generally fail to do. I derive some novel implications for asset ownership and ex ante investment, and consider ways in which firms might be able to use existing relationships as "leverage" in reaching new agreements. I also investigate conditions under which firms might want to refrain from multilateral contracting and conduct relationships separately - this may be the case if firm is concerned about a breakdown in one relationship acting as a catalyst that brings down others. The results are applied to discuss two-tier workforce arrangements, supplier associations and the prevalence of diversified business groups in developing countries. Chapter 3: A seminal theorem due to Blackwell (1951) shows that every Bayesian decision-maker prefers an informative signal Y to another signal X if and only if Y is statistically sufficient for X. Sufficiency is an unduly strong requirement in most economic!'problems because it does not incorporate any structure the model might impose. This chapter develops a general theory of information that allows a characterization of the information preferences of decision-makers based on how their marginal returns to acting vary with the underlying (unknown) state of the world. The analysis focuses on "monotone decision problems," in which all decision-makers in the relevant class choose higher actions when higher values of the signal are realized. This restriction allows a characterization of information preferences in terms of stochastic dominance orders over distributions of posterior beliefs. Conditions are also given under which one decision-maker has a higher marginal value of information than another decision-maker, and thus will acquire more information. The results are applied to oligopoly models, labor markets with adverse selection, hiring problems, and a coordination game. (This chapter is co-authored with Susan Athey.) Chapter 4: This chapter revisits Akerlof's classic adverse selection market and asks the following question: do greater information asymmetries reduce the gains from trade? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is no. Greater asymmetries worsen the "buyer's curse," thus lowering the demand curve, but may shift the supply curve as well. Whether trade increases or decreases depends on where the information impacts the market. A characterization is given for the case of partition information and then for the general case using a definition of information formulated in the previous chapter.
by Jonathan David Levin.
Ph.D.

This dissertation is a collection of essays on principal-agent contracts under asymmetry of information. The papers investigate how the possibility of acquiring information influences contracts. The first essay analyzes the contract between a principal and an agent, when the principal can conduct an audit of the agent's cost of production. The principal can choose an audit policy after output is produced - but he cannot commit to an audit policy at the beginning. The probability of audit is a best reply to the agent's probability of misreporting given the contract. The interaction between the contract, the audit strategy and the reporting strategy is analyzed. The main result obtained is that, when the cost of production is high the optimal contract requires the agent to produce an amount greater than the output under full information. The principal audits randomly and truthful cost announcements cannot be induced with certainty. It is also shown that the principal audits with a higher probability when he cannot commit as compared to when he can. The second essay considers an effort monitoring problem. It analyzes the contract the principal will offer an agent when the monitoring strategy cannot be committed to. Given the contract, the monitoring strategy is a best reply to the agent's effort strategy. The interaction between the contract, the monitoring strategy and the effort strategy is analyzed. The source of the principal's gain from monitoring is explained. It is shown that the wage payments to the agent may be decreasing in the outcome of the agent's effort. The third essay endogenizes the amount of information the agent will rely on when deciding whether or not to accept the contract. By incurring an observation cost, the agent can observe the state of nature after the contract is offered. If he does so he will be able to turn it down whenever his payoff is negative. It is shown that the principal will always find it in his best interest to offer a contract such that the agent has no incentive to use his ability to observe the state of nature. Furthermore. an increase in the cost of observation is very valuable to the principal. The paper also looks at the case in which the principal is allowed to put several agents in competition for the contract. It is shown that, though the principal has monopoly power and can force the single agent to his reservation utility, having several agents compete for the contract increases the principal's payoff.
Ph. D.

Smart contracts are a new form of contracts that handle transactions of economical value between users on a network, without the need for a middle man. This is possible as the integrity of the transactions are ensured using Blockchain technology. However, safe transactions are not always a guarantee as secure smart contracts can be difficult to write. Security vulnerabilities in smart contracts can be exploited and result in great financial losses for contract users. In this report we examine how interference can be counteracted in transactions involving smart contracts. This is to ensure that assets of economical value do not run the risk of disappearing and that the flow of information between smart contracts remains truthful. The term "interference" is coined precisely in relation to smart contracts. Moreover, two different solutions for two interference problems are examined, which mainly involve locking the access to certain functions for specific contracts so that no modification of the state of one contract can take place until a transaction is finished. The methods for counteracting interference in the transactions work, but the solutions are adapted to the specific pr blems and do not serve as a "general" solution to the problem of interference.
Smarta kontrakt är en ny form av kontrakt som används för att utfärda ekonomiska transaktioner utan någon mellanman eftersom att transaktionernas integritet säkerställs med hjälp av Blockchain-teknologi. Detta säkerställer dock inte alltid säkra transaktioner eftersom det kan vara svårt att skriva säkra smarta kontrakt. Säkerhetsproblem i smarta kontrakt kan utnyttjas och orsaka stora ekonomiska förluster för kontraktanvändarna. I denna rapport undersöker vi hur störningar kan motverkas i transaktioner som involverar sådana smarta kontrakt. Detta för säkerställa att tillgångar av ekonomiskt värde inte riskerar att försvinna och att informationsflödet mellan smarta kontrakt förblir sanningsenligt. Termen störningdefinieras precist i förhållande till smarta kontrakt. Därefter undersöks två olika lösningar till de olika störningsproblemen, som huvudsakligen involverar att låsa tillgången till vissa funktioner för vissa kontrakt så att ingen modifikation av tillstånd kan ske tills dess att transaktionerna avslutats. Metoderna för att motverka störningar i transaktionerna fungerar men dessa lösningar är anpassade till de specifika prob emen och fungerade inte som en allmän lösning på störningsproblematiken.

This thesis is concentrated broadly in the field of mathematical industrial economics and more specifically upon what is known in the literature as principal-agent relationships. It focuses on investigating the nature of optimal contracts between, say, owners of the firm and the manager appointed by them to run the affairs of the firm or yet again between the owners and the workers employed in the firm. Chapter 1 introduces by first establishing the background of the analysis and then summarising the results of the thesis. The background consists mainly of implicit contract models, both of the symmetric and asymmetric information kind, and models of moral-hazard. The results of the thesis are contained in four chapters following the introduction. Chapters 2 and 3 are concerned primarily with the use made of principal agent models in the asymmetric-information implicit contract literature. This literature attempts to explain involuntary unemployment by showing that the inefficiency generated by the asymmetry in information between the principal (firm) and the workers (agent) manifests itself in employment lower than the efficient level. We show instead that results are altered in quite striking ways depending not only on the eventual asymmetry of information but also the asymmetry prevailing, say, when the agent takes his action, but before production occurs. Chapter 4 makes the case in favour of using the first-order approach in solving principal-agent models by proposing a weakening of the sufficient conditions which make this approach valid. Such weakening extends the range of cases - given by particular configurations of utility and density functions - for which the analytical convenience of the first-order approach may be utilised. Chapter 5 uses moral-hazard models and the first-order approach to answer the specific question "Should owner-managed firms with limited liability be taxed a higher rate than similar firms with unlimited liability?". The answer is "Yes, but only under certain conditions". Chapter 6 summarises and draws together the various strands of the arguments presented in the thesis.

The purpose of this Master's thesis is to explore blockchain technology and smart contracts as a way of building privacy-sensitive applications. The main focus is on a medication plan containing prescriptions, built on a blockchain system of smart contracts. This is an example use case, but the results can be transferred to other ones where sensitive data is being shared and a proof of validity or authentication is needed. First the problem is presented, why medication plans are in need of digitalisation and why blockchain technology is a fitting technology for implementing such an application. Then blockchain technology is explained, since it is a very new and relatively unfamiliar IT construct. Thereafter, a design is proposed for solving the problem. A system of smart contracts was built to prove how such an application can be built, and suggested guidelines for how a blockchain system should be designed to fulfil the requirements that were defined. Finally, a discussion is held regarding the applicability of different blockchain designs to the problem of privacy-handling applications.
Syftet med detta examensarbete är att utforska blockkedje teknologi och s.k. smarta kontrakt för att bygga applikationer där känslig information hanteras. Huvudsakligen ligger fokus på att utveckla en struktur baserad på blockkedje teknologi och smarta kontrakt för en medikationsplan. Detta är ett typ-exempel för att visa hur en sådan applikation kan byggas, men resultaten kan överföras till andra områden där känslig data delas mellan parter, eller där ett bevis för korrekthet krävs. Först presenteras problemet, varför medikationsplaner behöver digitaliseras och varför blockkedje teknologi är väl anpassat för att implementera en sådan applikation. Sedan förklaras blockkedje teknologi något djupare i detalj, eftersom det är ett relativt nytt koncept. Därefter föreslås en design för att lösa problemet.  Ett system av smarta kontrakt är byggt för att visa hur en medikationsplan kan byggas, och riktlinjer ges för hur ett blockkedje system bör se ut för att stödja systemet av smarta kontrakt. Till slut hålls en kortare diskussion om hur olika blockkedje-designer kan användas för att appliceras på problemet med känslig information.

Presentation held externally at Technical University Munich on the 29-5-2017 10.50.

This thesis studies financial and insurance markets under various specifications of asymmetric information. The opening chapter considers project financing under adverse selection and moral hazard. There are three main contributions. First, the issue of combinations of debt and equity is explained as the outcome of the interaction between adverse selection and moral hazard. Second, it shows that, in the presence of moral hazard, adverse selection may result in the conversion of negative into positive NPV projects leading to an improvement in social welfare. Third, it provides two rationales for the use of warrants. It also shows that, under certain conditions, a debt-warrant combination can implement the optimal contract as a competitive equilibrium. Chapter 2 examines insurance markets when some clients misperceive risk. Optimism may either increase or decrease precautionary effort and we show that this determines whether optimists or realists are quantity-constrained in equilibrium. Intervention may lead to a strict Pareto improvement on the laissez-faire equilibria. These results provide a more convincing justification for the imposition of minimum coverage requirements than standard models as well as a case for the use of taxes and subsidies in insurance markets. Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship between coverage and accident rates. In contrast to the prediction of competitive models of asymmetric information that if all agents buy at least some insurance there must be positive correlation between coverage and accident probability, some recent empirical studies find either negative or zero correlation. If optimism discourages precautionary effort there exist separating equilibria that potentially explain the puzzling empirical findings. It is also shown that zero correlation between coverage and risk does not imply the absence of barriers to trade in insurance markets. We conclude with some implications for empirical testing.

Master of Science
Department of Architectural Engineering and Construction Science
Kimberly W. Kramer
Building Information Modeling (BIM) is altering the way that the construction industry is developing design documents by involving all members of the design team as well as the general contractor early in the design process. The members are encouraged to offer advice on the design and constructability on the project. However, not only is the design process changing, but the liability and responsibility of each team member is changing as well. The alteration in responsibility can severely impact structural engineers because of the level of responsibility already associated with their role in the design process. This report looks at the concerns industry leaders and legal professionals have with how BIM is altering the liability landscape, such as standard contracts, software interoperability, data misuse, intellectual property, loss of data, the legal status of the model, the standard of care, and design delegation. In addition to the liability concerns, this report examines the steps that industry leaders have taken to prevent any unnecessary additional liability from affecting structural engineers.

1997/1998
Il titolo stesso descrive la metodologia e l'ambito di analisi del presente lavoro di tesi. In sintesi, per contratto intendiamo un meccanismo allocativo. La metodologia della teoria dei contratti e' caratterizzata dal fatto che si sostituisce ad un problema di equilibrio, un problema di massimizzazione vincolata (ottimo paretiano). Questa sostituzione avviene anche quando non troviamo solo vincoli tecnologici (e il vincolo di garanzia del livello minimo di utilità dell'altro agente). Nel caso in cui ci siano altri vincoli (ad esempio vincoli informativi) si parla di ricerca del ottimo di second-best. La nostra analisi e' focalizzata sugli aspetti intertemporali di detti meccanismi allocativi ed in particolare si studiano i modi in cui le tecniche ricorsive della programmazione dinamica possono essere adattate per poter caratterizzare contratti multiperiodali di second-best. Il termine informazione completa chiarisce che il lavoro non si occupa di problemi di selezione avversa, ma assume che gli agenti conoscano perfettamente le preferenze dei rivali. Infine, "teoria ed applicazioni" sta ad indicare che la tesi e' suddivisa in due parti: una parte metodologica ed una piu' applicata. In questa parte si delineano i fondamenti metodologici delle tecniche usate. Game Theoretical Foundations: Repeated Games. Il capitolo analizza alcuni aspetti dei giochi ripetuti con informazione completa. E' focalizzato sull'approccio di Abreu (Econometrica 1988) e Abreu, Pierce e Stacchetti (Econometrica 1990) che legano l'analisi degli insiemi dei payoffs di equlibrio a mappe ricorsive. Nella prima parte del capitolo viene presentato l'approccio, applicandolo ai giochi ripetuti con monitoraggio perfetto. Nella seconda parte si mostra come le tecniche possano essere estese al caso con monitoraggio imperfetto. Giochi, questi ultimi, strettamente legati al modello Principale-Agente dinamico. I contributi dell'autore in questo capitolo sono. (i) Alcune semplificazioni delle prove legate al fatto che si impongono assunzioni piu' restrittive al fine di avere una trattazione unitaria. (ii) Vengono dimostrate due nuove proposizioni sulla natura stazionaria degli insiemi dei payoffs degli equilibri nella caso di monitoraggio imperfetto. Contractual Approach: Recursive Contracts. Questo capitolo presenta specificatamente l'approccio metodologico e le tecniche ricorsi ve oggetto della tesi. Il capitolo e', per quanto ne sa l'autore, la prima trattazione formale unitaria di queste tecniche per anni utilizzate da alcuni economisti, senza un rigoroso fondamento matematico. Buona parte delle proposizioni nelle Sezioni 3.1 e 3.2.3 possono essere viste come prove formali di congetture proposte da altri autori. Uno dei classici paradigmi in economia e' il problema assicurativo con agenti avversi al rischio. Simmetricamente al capitolo precedente, la prima parte del presente capitolo assume monitoraggio perfetto e si concentra sull'analisi del problema assicurativo in presenza di vincoli di partecipazione. Questi modelli di default sono la base teorica delle nuove applicazioni di teoria del consumo e dei modelli di credito con possibilità di insolvenza (debito sovrano, credito alle piccole imprese, etc ... ) . La seconda parte del capitolo analizza il classico modello Principale-Agente (o azzardo morale). In questi modelli l'assicurazione e' limitata dal fatto che si devono dare i giusti incentivi all'agente, il quale deve compiere uno sforzo non osservabile (monitor aggio imperfetto). La caratteristica essenziale che permette di scrivere il modello in forma ricorsiva e' chiamata efficienza sequenziale. Il contratto ottimale e' caratterizzato dal fatto che in ogni periodo risolve un problema di second-best in cui la variabile di stato e' il livello di utilità attesa garantita all'agente. Questa seconda parte contiene due originali contributi applicativi dello studente. Inefficiencies in Dynamic Family Decisions: An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Labor Supply. In questo capitolo viene criticata la principale assunzione delle moderne analisi ( teoriche ed empiriche) dell'offerta di lavoro: la Pareto ottimalità dell'allocazione delle risorse all'interno della famiglia. Il lavoro propone un approccio contrattuale all'economia della famiglia e vede il matrimonio come un contratto essenzialmente incompleto (ossia che non specifica dettagliatamente come i coniugi devono comportarsi in tutti i possibili eventi futuri). Viene mostrato come siano possibili inefficienze nelle scelte lavorative solo a causa di questa incompletezza; assumendo quindi informazione perfetta e permettendo ai coniugi di scrivere contratti di lungo periodo. Le inefficienze sono legate al fatto che, quando il divorzio può essere chiesto senza il consenso dell'altra parte, allora, in ogni periodo, ciascun coniuge puo' minacciare il divorzio per ricontrattare la divisione di eventuali (inaspettate) rendite. Come conseguenza vengono scoraggiate le attività che creano queste rendite ed incoraggiate le atti vita' che aumentano il potere contrattuale (come ad esempio l'accumulazione di capitale umano). Il modello ha un'importante implicazione empirica. Riesce a spiegare un'apparente anomalia nella serie temporale dell'offerta di lavoro americana, legandola al cambio di legge sul divorzio avvenuta in USA negli anni '70. Moral Hazard, Career Concerns and the Trade-off Between Incentives, Intertemporal Consumption Smooting and Human Capitai Insurance: Some Preliminary Results. Questo capitolo utilizza ed estende le tecniche ricorsive presentate nel Capitolo 3 per analizzare un'importante variante del modello Principale-Agente; il caso in cui ci siano possibilità di carriera. In letteratura il modello viene presentato come un modello di azzardo morale ripetuto in cui viene inserito un processo di apprendimento sulla produttività del lavoratore e si permette all'agente (e solo ad esso) di rescindere il contratto di lavoro in ogni periodo. L'elevata complessità del modello ha portato la letteratura a specializzare l'analisi al caso in cui la tecnologia produttiva e' lineare ed additivamente separabile in: parametro di produttività, sforzo e shock tecnologico. Inoltre, nelle poche analisi del contratto ottimale esistenti in letteratura si assume che l'agente non abbia preferenze per l'appiattimento intertemporale del consumo. Le tecniche ricorsive oggetto della tesi permettono di trattare un caso più generale ed ottenere nuovi interessanti risultati. In primo luogo, come prevedibile, una delle principali componenti che caratterizzano il contratto ottimale di lungo periodo e' il trade-off tra incentivi, appiattimento intertemporale del consumo ed assicurazione rispetto shocks negativi nella dotazione di capitale umano. In secondo luogo c'è un nuovo effetto, chiamato "effetto informativo". Nel modello proposto si puo' verificare il caso in cui un'azione, in se' molto costosa e poco redditizia, venga implementata. Ciò è dovuto al fatto che - a differenza del modello con tecnologia lineare in cui tutte le azioni sono egualmente informative sul parametro della produttività - detta azione ha un elevato contenuto informativo. Questa nuova informazione permette di ridurre considerevolmente l'incertezza sul parametro produttivo e quindi di abbassare i costi di incentivo nei periodi successivi. Il capitolo presenta risultati preliminari. In particolare - benché alcuni risultati possano essere facilmente generalizzati - allo stato attuale dell'analisi il modello e' stato sviluppato per il caso con agente ad utilità logaritmica. Per questo caso specifico e' stata inoltre ricavata la soluzione in forma chiusa per il modello di azzardo morale ripetuto ad orizzonte infinito.
The title itself describes the methodology and the thesis' field of research. Broadly speaking, for contract we mean an allocation mechanism. The methodology of contracts is characterized by the fact that a constrained maximization (a Pareto optimal ) problem substitute an equilibrium one. This substitution is made also when we do not ha ve only technological constraints ( and the constraint of giving to the other party a minimum expected utility level). When t h ere are other constraints (for example informational constraints) we talk about second-best problems. The analysis is focused on the intertemporal aspects of allocation mechanisms, in particular we study ways of adapting recursive dynamic programming techniques to characterize multiperiod second-best contracts. Complete information in the title emphasizes that we do not analyze adverse selection problems, we assume instead that agents know perfectly other agents payoffs. Finally, "theory and applications" means the thesis is divided in two parts: a methodological part and an applied one. In this part we present the methodological foundations of the techniques object of this thesis. Game Theoretical Foundations: Repeated Games. The chapter analyzes some aspects of repeated games with complete information. The chapter is focused on the Abreu (Econometrica 1988) and Abreu Pierce and Stacchetti (Econometrica 1990) approach that links the analysis of equilibrium payoffs sets to recursive set-valued maps. In the first part of the chapter we present the approach applied to games with perfect monitoring. In the second part we show how those techniques can be extended to the case with imperfect monitoring. Games, these last ones, strictly linked with the classica! Principal-Agent model. The originai contributions in this chapter are: (i) some proof simplification due to the fact that we impose more stringent assumptions in order to keep an unified analysis. (ii)· In the second part of the chapter two new propositions are proved about the stationarity of the equilibrium payoff set with imperfect monitoring. Contractual Approach: Recursive Contracts. This chapter presents more specifically the methodological approach and the recursive techniques object of the thesis. The chapter is, to our knowledge, the first unitary formai analysis of those techniques; techniques used by many economists without giving rigorous foundations. Most of the results in Section 3.1 and 3.2.3 can be seen as formai proofs of existing conjectures. One of the classica! paradigms in economics is the insurance problem with risk adverse agents. Symmetrically t o the previous chapter, the first part of the Chapter assumes perfect monitoring and focuses the analysis on the insurance problem with limited commitment. These models of default are the theoretical basis of the new applications to consumption theory and credit models with default (sovereign debt, small firm financing, etc ... ). The second part of the chapter analyses the classica! Principal-Agent model (or moral hazard). In this model, insurance is limited because the principal has to give the right incentives to the agent who has to supply an unobservable effort (imperfect monitoring). The essential characteristic that allows to write the problem in recursive form is said sequential efficiency. The optimal contract is characterized by the fact that in each period it solves a second-best problem where the state variable in the expected utility level guaranteed to the agent. This second part contains two originai applied contributions. Inefficiencies in Dynamic Family Decisions: An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Labor Supply. In this chapter we criticize the principal assumption used in modern (theoretical and applied) analysis of labor supply: the Pareto optimality of intrahousehold resources allocation. The work proposes a contractual approach to the economie of the family and see the marriage as an essentially incomplete contract (i.e. it does not specifies how the partners should behave in all future contingencies). We show how inefficiencies can arise only because of this contractual incompleteness; thus we assume throughout perfect information and the possibility of writing long-term contracts. The inefficiencies are due to the fact that divorce can be asked without requiring the other party consensus, because of that, in each period, each partner can threaten divorce to recontract the division of unexpected surpluses. As a consequence the activities that generate such surpluses are discouraged and, in contrast, are encouraged those activities that raise the bargaining power (such as the accumulation of human capitai). The model has an important empirica! implication. We can explain an anomaly on the US labor supply time series motivating it with the change in divorce law occurred during 70s. Moral Hazard, Career Concerns and the Trade-off Between Incentives, Intertemporal Consumption Smooting and Human Capital Insurance: Some Preliminary Results. Chapter 5 applies and extends the recursive techniques presented in Chapter 3 to analyze an important variation of the Principal-Agent model: the case with career concerns. The literature presents the model as a repeated moral hazard problem where is introduced a process of learning on the productivity parameter of the worker. Moreover, there is limited commitment: the agent can, in any period walk away from the contract and accept a profitable offer from the market. The complexity of the problem induced economists to restrict the analysis to the case where the production technology is linear and additively separable in: productivity parameter, effort and technological shock. Finaliy, the few contributions about the analysis of the optimal contract assume that the agent do not like intertemporal consumption smoothing. Using recursive techniques we can analyze a more generai case and obtain new interesting results. First, as expected, one of the main components that characterize the optimallong term contract is the trade-off between incentives, intertemporal consumption smoothing and insurance against shocks on human capitai endowment. Secondly, there is a new effect that we cali information effect. In the proposed model is possible that a costly and non remunerative action be implemented. This result is due to the fact that- in contrast to the linear technology model where ali actions are equaliy informative about the productivity parameter - this action has high informational content. This new information aliows to reduce the uncertainty about the productivity parameter, reducing incentive costs in future periods. In this chapter we present only preliminary results. In particular - although some results have more generai applications - the model has been fuliy analyzed only for the case in which agent has log-utility. For this particular case we further find a closed form solution of the infinite horizon optimal wage contract for the repeated case ( without learning).
X Ciclo
1968
Versione digitalizzata della tesi di dottorato cartacea. Nell'originale cartaceo mancano le pagg. 37, 41, 60, 87, 91, 95, 112, 137

In this work, we apply game-theoretic and statistical models to examine an open problem regarding asymmetric information in loan contracts. Under these asymmetries, the effect of higher collateral requirements on the interest rates applied by banks to borrowers is not clear. In literature both a positive and a negative link has been backed, based on different hypotheses and econometric analyses. We discuss how this effect cannot be decided a-priori. In the first part we construct three game-theory models under different hypotheses, rigorously proving the theoretical undecidability of an univocal effect. Then, to assess what is the prevailing effect in the reality, we analyze loan big-data for millions of borrowers among various European countries, as collected by the European DataWarehouse. We examine some mathematical and practical aspects of: the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), the Principal Component Regression (PCR), the regularization theory, the LASSO and RIDGE regressions, applying them to our datasets. Finally, we combine a regression model with the Probabilistic PCA, discussing the EM algorithm in presence of sparse datasets. These datasets are characteristic of our database and others, and defining the Probabilistic PCR we propose a new technique which will show itself useful in the hypothesis that the availability of loan data will increase over time conserving some data sparsity.

This dissertation considers three problems related to the issue of asymmetric information. The first problem is that of increased information in markets with unknown quality. I show that an increase in information need not produce an increase in market efficiency, even if the volume of trade in the market increases. The second problem is the use of non-monotonic contracts. I show that subjects do not typically employ non-monotonic contracts when they are optimal, although they will more frequently if they know the agent receiving the contract is fully rational and profit-maximizing. The third problem is the use of relative performance evaluation in situations where agents make risky decisions. I show that relative performance evaluation is rarely better, and frequently worse, than other contracting structures.

"Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Administration from the Naval Postgraduate School, March 2010."
Advisor(s): Cook, Glenn. ; Simon, Cary. "March 2010." "MBA Professional report"--Cover. Description based on title screen as viewed on May 18, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Information Technology, Baseline Assessment, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, CNSF Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-92). Also available in print.

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This work considers a relationship between a regulator and an oil company. There are many uncertainties inherent in this relationship and we focus on the e ects of asymmetric information. We characterize the optimal regulation under asymmetric information, when the regulator must design a mechanism that induces truthful revelation about the rm's private information. We show that, when the rm cannot commit not to quit the relationship, the regulator may not be able to implement the optimal rst-best regulatory outcome. In this case, the regulator cannot achieve the optimal risk-sharing with the rm. We also provide an example, in which we show that the Spence-Mirrlees condition (SMC) may not hold. As it turs out, this is a natural result in our model rather than an imposition.
Neste trabalho é analisada a relação entre um regulador e uma empresa petrolífera. Há várias incertezas inerentes à essa relação e o trabalho se concentra nos efeitos da assimetria de informação. Fazemos a caracterização da regulação ótima sob informação assimétrica, quando o regulador deve desenhar um mecanismo que induz a firma a revelar corretamente sua informação privada. No caso em que a rma não pode se comprometer a não romper o acordo, mostramos que o regulador pode não implementar o resultado ótimo que é obtido sob informação completa. Nesse caso, o regulador não consegue compartilhar os riscos com a firma de forma ótima. Por fim, é apresentado um exemplo, em que mostramos que a condição de Spence-Mirrlees (SMC) pode não valer. Esse resultado aparece de forma natural no modelo.

This thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the design of profit-sharing contracts which maximise the surplus a principal extracts from an agency relationship, whereby a pay floor limits the liability of an agent in low profit states, and information is either unilaterally or bilaterally asymmetric.

MBA Professional Report
This project developed a baseline assessment for assisting Commander, Naval Surface Forces (CNSF) leaders and managers in understanding and improving the following information technology programs: Training and Operational Readiness Information Services (TORIS), Continuous Monitoring Program (CMP), and the CNSF Web. The programs were described, assessed, and evaluated in terms of their backgrounds, mission needs, performance, technical requirements, functionality, and contractual terms. One conclusion was that the contractual statement of work does not measure the performance of the system; rather, it is designed to mandate the requirements for the contractor's performance (e.g., indicators that measure downtime, trouble calls, and software bugs are missing). An overarching recommendation is to integrate all staff information technology functions under one authority, while establishing simple and relevant program performance benchmarks to measure and track actual performance.

Blockchain technology with its distributed ledgers attracts massive attention today and creates interest in many different industries. One of the most promising areas for implementation of blockchain technology is its use to create fully automated and decentralized contract solutions, so-called smart contracts. The blockchain technology is also expected to develop the concept of BIM by facilitating the creation of a common model. The problem addressed in this study is the limited amount of research carried out in the blockchain field and the potential use of smart contracts in procurement of services in the construction industry.  The construction industry differs from many other industries as it is project-based with changing circumstances and conditions. The study shows that the construction industry is an industry focused on discussions and disputes, the majority of which are linked to payments and contractual interpretations. Two of the key concepts of the study are therefore moral hazard and opportunistic behavior. Opportunistic behavior can affect norms, the willingness for cooperation and the degree to which parties trust each other. Designing contracts to reduce the risk of moral hazard and opportunistic behavior is therefore an important aspect. The study has chosen to study both relationships that are hierarchical to nature but also peer-to-peer.  The purpose of the study has been to conceptually reflect on percived opportunities and challenges with blockchains in the construction industry regarding two identified applications, smart contracts and BIM. To investigate this, a qualitative interview study has been conducted. The study points to the need for a more standardized building process that is subject to a certain degree of repetition to achieve successful use of a blockchain network and smart contracts. The study also shows that there is a positive attitude from the respondents regarding a possible development for several of the potential applications of blockchain technology. Blockchain technology and smart contracts have the potential to improve the reliability and credibility of logbooks, self-checks and work performed within a building project. Furthermore, the study highlights the importance of long-term relationships and confidence in reducing opportunistic behavior. Based on previous research and empirical analysis, the study contributes to an increased understanding of which levels in the construction industry smart contracts may be applicable. The study shows that smart contracts are not perceived suitable for complex contracts where the work to be performed can be changed many times during the contract period. The study, on the other hand, indicates that blockchain development with BIM is not demanded at the present time. Finally, the study points out that blockchain technology is perceived to have the potential to make the building process more transparent and open with reduced power conditions at the same time as it gets less centralized which opens up the need for research in that direction.
Blockkedjetekniken med sina distribuerade liggare lockar idag massiv uppmärksamhet och skapar intresse inom många olika branscher. Ett av de mest lovande områdena för implementering av blockkedjetekniken är dess användning för att skapa helt automatiserade och decentraliserade kontraktslösningar, så kallade smarta kontrakt. Blockkedjetekniken spås även kunna utveckla begreppet BIM genom att underlätta skapandet av en gemensam modell. Problemet som adresseras i denna studie är den begränsade mängd forskning som har utförts gällande blockkedjor och smarta kontrakts potentiella användning vid upphandling av tjänster i byggbranschen.  Byggbranschen skiljer sig från många andra branscher då den är projektbaserad med föränderliga förhållanden och förutsättningar. Studien visar på att byggbranschen är en bransch kantad av diskussioner och tvister, vars majoritet är kopplad till betalningar och kontraktstolkningar. Två för studien centrala begrepp är därmed moral hazard och opportunistiskt beteende. Opportunistiskt beteende kan påverka normer, viljan till samarbete och i hur hög grad parter litar på varandra. Att utforma kontrakt så att risken för moral hazard och opportunistiskt beteende minskar är därmed en viktig aspekt. Studien har valt att studera både relationer som är hierarkiska till naturen men också peer-to-peer.  Syftet med studien har varit att konceptuellt reflektera över uppfattade nya möjligheter och utmaningar som finns med blockkedjor i byggbranschen gällande två identifierade användningsområden, smarta kontrakt och BIM. För att undersöka detta har en kvalitativ intervjustudie genomförts. Studien pekar på att det krävs en mer standardiserad byggnadsprocess som omfattas av en viss grad av upprepning för att få en lyckad använding av ett blockkedje-nätverk och smarta kontrakt. Studien visar också på att det finns en positiv grundinställning från respondenternas sida kring en möjlig utveckling för flera av blockkedjeteknikens potentiella applikationer. Blockkedjetekniken och smarta kontrakt har potentialen att förbättra tillförlitligheten och trovärdigheten hos loggböcker, egenkontroller och utförda arbeten inom ett byggnadsprojekt. Vidare belyser studien vikten av långsiktiga relationer och tillit för att minska opportunistiskt beetende. Baserat på tidigare forskning, empiri och analys bidrar studien till en ökad förståelse kring vilka nivåer inom byggbranschen smarta kontrakt kan vara applicerbara. Studien förevisar att smarta kontrakt inte uppfattas lämpa sig för komplicerade kontrakt där arbetet som ska utföras kan ändras många gånger under kontraktsperioden. Studien indikerar däremot att blockkedje utvecklingen med BIM inte efterfrågas i dagsläget. Slutligen pekar studien på att blockkedjetekniken uppfattas ha potential att göra byggprocessen mer transparent och öppen med minskade maktförhållanden samt mindre centraliserade vilket öppnar upp behov av forskning i den riktningen.

The world is becoming more and more digitized. Recently many industries have started to research the blockchain technology and particularly smart contracts. One industry that so far has not adopted new technology in the same pace as other industries, is the insurance industry so this interview study aims at finding opportunities and challenges for insurance companies that want to learn about smart contracts and its use cases.By doing a literature review and performing interviews with blockchain experts and insurance company employees, this study found that both IT companies working with smart contracts and the insurance companies have limited knowledge of the legal aspect of smart contracts. The lack of standards and regulations allows IT companies to freely create smart contracts without much quality control. The insurance companies must innovate themselves in order to not be disrupted. The blockchain technology will offer many new insurance types and if the insurance industry fails to adopt the blockchain technology they may face market disruption.There is much room for future research following this study. It would be beneficial to research how contract theory could be used in practice during the creation of legally binding smart contracts. Furthermore, research around fraud prevention in smart contracts would be interesting as would an in-depth exploration of the ecosystem of third party software and services around smart contracts.

Enterprise Resource Planning systems have been available since the 1990s and come with several business benefits for the users. One of the major advantages is improved decision making through current and accessible information about strategical, tactical and operational levels of the organization. Although several Enterprise Resource Planning system vendors provide several features for contract management, more decision support regarding the total profitability of service contracts is desired by the customers. Estimating the total profitability of service contracts is a challenging task for all service providers and implies a lot of manual data processing by the contract manager. This master’s thesis is conducted in collaboration with IFS World Operations AB and aims to investigate how functionality for budget and forecasting of the profitability of service contracts can be designed to be usable in terms of effectiveness. The implementation was performed iteratively and the resulting prototypes were evaluated and refined throughout the project. The final high-fidelity prototype for budgeting of service contracts was evaluated using the task success rate in conjunction with the System Usability Scale to assess how well the system conformed to the needs of the users. The study revealed that two of the key characteristics of financial follow-up information of service contracts is the support of creating a budget and graphical visualizations of both budgeted and actual values. The final usability evaluation indicated that the developed functionality was usable in terms of effectiveness and has an overall usability clearly above the average.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. Dept. of Accounting and Information Studies, 2008.
Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Apr. 8, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 96-101). Also issued in print.

Dans des chaînes logistiques décentralisées, chaque entité prend ses décisions sur la base de ses seuls intérêts. Les conflits d’intérêt entre entités conduisent dès lors à des décisions sous-optimales et à une performance dégradée de la chaîne logistique considérée dans sa globalité. Ceci nuit également gravement à la crédibilité des échanges d'informations entre entités. Ce mémoire traite de l’étude de la coordination des décisions dans des chaînes logistiques dans un contexte de problème de capacité d'approvisionnement (Capacity Procurement problem), dans différentes situations et en s’appuyant sur 3 modèles. Le premier modèle considère une chaîne logistique dyadique confrontée à une demande stochastique et étudie l’impact des prix sur la performance. Des contrats PARD (PARtially Deductible, reservation contract) et RCRS (Revenue Sharing Reservation contract with Penalty) sont conçus et proposés pour une coordination des décisions dans un contexte d’information partielle ou totale. Il est mathématiquement démontré que la coordination est réalisée par la mise en œuvre de ces contrats dans ces deux situations. Dans le second modèle, l’hypothèse de prix endogène est posée. La demande est alors modélisée comme la somme d’une fonction linéaire décroissante du prix et d’un paramètre stochastique. Le modèle s’intéresse en premier lieu à une structure dyadique, et un contrat RSRP (Revenue Sharing Reservation contract with Penalty) est proposé pour une coordination par les prix, délais et taux de production. Il est démontré que la coordination est assurée par un contrat RSRP dans une structure dyadique. L’application d’un contrat RSRP est ensuite étendue pour application dans une chaîne logistique divergente avec de multiples détaillants. Il est démontré que la performance de la chaîne logistique est considérablement améliorée au regard de la performance résultant de la mise en place d’un seul contrat de vente. Dans le troisième modèle, une chaîne logistique divergente comprenant un fournisseur et de multiples détaillants est étudiée lorsque ces derniers font face à une demande stochastique et dépendante des prix. Un des facteurs non financiers cause de déviations dans les décisions humaines est la Confiance. Dans ce modèle, les détaillants ont des prévisions plus fiables de la demande en raison de leur proximité au marché. Afin de sécuriser la disponibilité des produits lors des périodes de vente, les détaillants sont incités à transmettre des prévisions de vente majorées. Un mécanisme de coordination de la chaîne logistique est proposé, reposant sur un modèle d’optimisation, un système de notation et un système de récompense-punition. S’appuyant sur une approche de simulation, la performance de ce mécanisme est alors comparée à deux autres mécanismes, un mécanisme sans confiance et un mécanisme asymétrique
In decentralized Supply Chains, each member decides based on his own interests. Conflict of interests results in suboptimal decisions and poor performance for entire supply chains, as well seriously harms credibly information sharing across them. In this thesis, coordination of decisions in supply chains in the context of Capacity Procurement problem are studied in different situations in form of three models. In first model, a dyadic supply chain with stochastic demand and exogenous price is investigated by taking various costs into account. PARD and RCRS contracts are designed and proposed in order for coordination of decisions respectively in full and partial information updating situations. It is mathematically shown that coordination is achieved by using each contract in its corresponding situation. In second model, endogenous price is assumed. That is, demand is modeled as sum of a decreasing linear function of price and a stochastic parameter. The model is first examined in a dyadic structure, and RSRP contract is proposed for coordinating of price, production time and production rate decisions. It is proved that coordination is achieved by RSRP contract in the dyadic structure. The application of RSRP contract is then extended to be employed in a divergent supply chain with multiple retailers, and shown that the supply chain performs considerably better than the same supply chain with a wholesale contract. In third model, a divergent supply chain comprising a supplier and multiple retailers is studied where retailers face stochastic and price-dependent demand. Since main decision makers in supply chain interactions are human, paying attention to human decision making process and their biases from theoretical predictions are important in designing coordination mechanisms. One of the non-pecuniary factors which cause deviations in human-decisions is Trust. In this model, the retailers have more accurate demand forecast information due to their proximity to market. In order to secure availability of products during the selling season, the retailers have incentives to inflate their private forecast information. A coordination mechanism is proposed, which consists of an optimization model, a scoring system and a rewarding-punishing system, in order to coordinate the supply chain. Using simulation approach, performance of the mechanism is then compared to those of two other mechanisms, namely Without Trust an Asymmetric mechanism. According to the results, employing the mechanism in situations with any demand variability is advised. More accurately, in situations with high demand variability, the mechanism achieves a proper profit improvement and moderate capability for identifying deceptive agents, while in situations with low demand variability, the mechanism shows insignificant profit improvement and considerable ability in identifying deceptive agents

PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO
CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO
Contratos de software podem ser escritos como expressões lógicas capazes de identificar falhas que ocorrem durante a utilização de um software. É possível implementar a verificação de um contrato em um software através de assertivas executáveis. No entanto, a forma como assertivas convencionais são implementadas não é diretamente aplicável a sistemas distribuídos, uma vez que apresentam dificuldades para avaliar expressões temporais, tampouco as expressões podem envolver propriedades de diferentes processos. Este trabalho propõe um mecanismo baseado em logs com meta-informações para a verificação de contratos em sistemas distribuídos. Uma gramática para redigir contratos possibilita operações temporais, ou seja, permite a especificação de condições entre eventos, em diferentes instantes de tempo, ou mesmo garante uma sequência de eventos, durante um período de tempo. O fluxo de eventos gerado é avaliado assincronamente em relação à utilização do sistema, pela comparação com contratos, previamente escritos de acordo com a gramática, que representam as expectativas sobre o comportamento normal do sistema.
Software contracts can be written as assertions that identify failures observed while using the software. Software contracts can be implemented through executable assertions. However, conventional assertions are not directly applicable in distributed systems, as they present difficulties to evaluate temporal expressions, as well as expressions involving properties of different processes. This work proposes a mechanism based on logs with meta-information to evaluate contracts in distributed systems. A grammar to write contracts enable temporal operations, e.g., allows specifying conditions between events at different timestamps, or even guaranteeing a sequence of events over a period of time. The flow of events is evaluated asynchronously in relation to the system execution, by comparison with contracts, previously written according to the grammar, representing the expectations on the behavior of the system.

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Universidade Federal da Bahia. Escola de Administração. Salvador, BA, Brasil
O objetivo desta pesquisa foi identificar de que forma as contratações de Tecnologia da Informação – TI no âmbito do setor público são influenciadas pelo estabelecimento de instruções normativas, verificando a aderência a essas normas e as razões que levam a esta aderência. As contratações na área de TI no setor público vem sendo alvo de normatizações com o objetivo de aprimorar a qualidade dos serviços prestados e controlar o uso de recursos públicos. A introdução, em 2008, das Instruções Normativas 02/2008 e 04/2008 pela Secretaria de Logística e Tecnologia da Informação – SLTI do Ministério do Planejamento Orçamento e Gestão e suas atualizações, a IN 04/2010 e a IN 02/2012, trouxeram novas regras para essa área, com implicações para os contratos firmados no âmbito da Administração Pública Federal – APF. Esse processo se deu num ambiente institucional de isomorfismo coercitivo e legitimidade em que as organizações procuram se modelar a outras de quem dependem, em busca de um reconhecimento que garanta a sua continuidade. A pesquisa é exploratória, descritiva e explicativa, com abordagem qualitativa e estratégia de estudo de caso único, desenvolvido no Centro de Pesquisas Gonçalo Moniz – CPqGM,unidade técnico-científica da Fundação Oswaldo Cruz – Fiocruz, na Bahia. As implicações da normatização foram analisadas sob a ótica das dimensões gerencial, econômica e organizacional, identificadas a partir do referencial teórico reunido para o embasamento do estudo. Durante a revisão da literatura foi identificado um modelo de contratação de serviços de TI, a partir do qual foram elaborados 14 indicadores, agrupados entre as dimensões identificadas. Os dados foram coletados a partir de 3 contratos de mesmo objeto, firmados em anos distintos e sujeitos a ambientes normativos diferentes, o que permitiu buscar características das normas em vigor em seus conteúdos. Os resultados obtidos mostraram o incremento da aderência aos desígnios normativos com a evolução temporal das contratações. Foi feita uma análise acerca do ambiente institucional em que estão inseridas organizações com as características do CPqGM, buscando entender as razões que levam à aderência às normas, uma vez que não estão claramente definidas as sanções pelo não cumprimento destas. A partir da análise dos resultados da pesquisa inferiu-se a existência de processos de isomorfismo coercitivo, na pressão de órgãos de controle para a adesão a normas, e de busca por legitimidade, na adaptação ao ambiente legal e normativo para garantir a continuidade da organização.
The objective of this research was to identify how Information Technology – IT contracting in the public sector are influenced by the establishment of normative instructions, verifying adherence to those standards and the reasons that lead to this adherence. Contracting in the IT area in the public sector has been the target of norms in order to improve the quality of services and control the use of public resources. The introduction in 2008 of the Normative Instructions 02/2008 and 04/2008 by the Secretariat of Logistics and Information Technology from the Ministry of Planning and Budget and its updates, IN 04/2010 and IN 02/2012, brought new rules for that area, with implications for contracts within the Federal Public Administration. This process took place in an environment of institutional legitimacy and coercive isomorphism in which organizations seek to model themselves like others of whom depends of, in search of a recognition that guarantees its continuity. The research is exploratory, descriptive and explanatory, with qualitative approach and strategy of single case study, developed on Gonçalo Moniz Research Center – CPqGM, a technical-scientific unit of the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation – Fiocruz, from Bahia. The implications of normalization were analyzed from the perspective of managerial, economic and organizational dimensions, identified from the theoretical references for meeting the study. During the literature review it was identified a contracting model of IT services, from which were developed 14 indicators, grouped between the identified dimensions. Data were collected from 3 contracts of the same object, signed in different years and subject to different regulatory environments, allowing the search of features of the norms in force in their content. The results showed increased adherence to the normative designs with the temporal evolution of the contracts. An analysis on the institutional environment in which organizations with the characteristics of CPqGM are embedded, seeking to understand the reasons for adherence to standards, since there are no clearly defined penalties for non-compliance of these. From the analysis of the research results it was inferred the existence of processes of coercive isomorphism, in the pressure of control agencies for adherence to standards, and the search for legitimacy, in adapting the legal and normative environment to ensure the continuity of the organization.

The objective of this thesis is to explore BIM, IPD and their implementation into a building project contract. The Integrated Delivery Processes is comprised of a collaborative team of Designers, Constructors, and Owners working side by side to create a successful project. BIM has been introduced as a technology into the industry, as a tool that these parties can use for better understanding the project. Through case studies of IPD projects using BIM are observed, it was determined that although BIM was used, one problem faced is the lack of BIM standards included initially in a contract for in an IPD project. There are templates available by the AIA, AGC, and USACE, but they are not all standalone documents. A guideline for the parities to discuss will be introduced as conversation piece that would help segue into what might be included in the contract documents.

We consider the applicability of the Revelation Principle under the possibility of collusive behavior among players in some Bayesian framework. In doing this, since the coalition formation itself suffers information asymmetry problems, we assume that the coalition is formed if the colluding parties can successfully find some coalitional mechanism whose outcome is a set of messages in the original mechanism. Recently Cremer [1986] proposes a coalitional mechanism in the framework of the well known Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism. We assume that the agents successfully collude if they can find coalitional a mechanism such that (i) coalitional mechanism is incentive-compatible and (ii) the payoff of this mechanism is strictly Pareto-improving in terms of the agent’s expected utility. Our analysis is undertaken in a one principal/two agent framework. We first ünd that the Revelation Principle is still applicable in the pure adverse selection model. We then extend this result to a model with both adverse selection and moral hazard aspects. Finally, we consider a three-tier principal/supervisor/agent hierarchical organization, as in Tirole (1986). We explicitly present the coalitional mechanism as a side-contract between the supervisor and the agent. We apply the previous result of applicability of the Revelation Principle and characterize the coalition-proof mechanism. We find that the principal can design an optimal collusion free contract with some additional cost by specifying proper individual and coalitional incentive-compatibility conditions and individual rationality conditions. Moreover, we find that the results of Tirole (1986)’s paper hinge on the fact that he considers only “hard,” verifiable, information.
Ph. D.

This thesis examines the regulation of the direct-to-consumer genetic testing industry through analysis of the industry's use of wrap contracts (clickwrap and browsewrap), A significant portion of the thesis consists of a comparative document review of the publicly available wrap contracts of DTCGT companies provided tests for health purposes. It also considers other regulatory responses to date. Due to the lack of industry specific regulation it argues that the use of wrap contracts can be viewed as a means of industry self-regulation and a form of private legislation. This means that governance is skewed heavily in favour of companies and it creates an imbalance in the respective rights and obligations of the parties - company and consumer - which is likely to result in consumer detriment. It is argued that certain types of terms commonly include in DTCGT contracts, including: unilateral variation clauses; some exclusion clauses; choice of law clauses; indemnity; and consent clauses are likely to be deemed unfair and unenforceable under UK law. It recommends that in the short-term the Competition and Markets Authority should undertake a compliance review of DTCGT contracts in order to improving contracts for consumers. In the long term, companies should also be complying with data protection law, as well as legislation on medical devices and the provisions of the Human Tissue Act and there may be a need for industry specific legislation.

The objective in this thesis is to pose and to answer to some questions concerning the role played by information in decisions on the economic allocation of natural resources. In chapter 2 the design of a voluntary incentive scheme for the provision of ecosystem services is considered, having in mind the forested areas in developing countries where a governmental agency plans to introduce a set-aside policy. Payments are offered to the landowners to compensate the economic loss for not converting land to agriculture. The information asymmetry between the agency and the landowners on the opportunity cost of conservation gives incentive to the landowners to misreport their own "type". A principal - agent analysis is developed, adapted and extended to capture real issues concerning conservation programs in developing countries. I show that the information asymmetry may seriously impact on the optimal scheme performance and, under certain conditions, may lead to pay a compensation even if any additional conservation is induced with respect to that in absence of the scheme. In chapter 3 an intergenerational dynamic game is solved under time- inconsistency. The optimal harvest timing for a natural forest is determined under uncertainty on the flow of amenity value derived from conservation and irreversibility. Due to time-varying declining discount rates intertemporal inconsistent harvest strategies arise. The value of the option to harvest is eroded and earlier harvest occurs under both the assumptions of naïve and sophisticated belief on future generations time-preferences. This results in a bias toward the current generation gratification which affects the intergenerational allocation of benefits and costs from harvesting and conserving. In chapter 4 a forest owner with hyperbolic time preferences is considered. At each period the irreversible decision to harvest an old-growth forest could be taken, while conservation is the alternative. Flows of future amenity value are uncertain while the net value of stumpage timber is known and constant. The decision problem is expressed as an optimal stopping problem and solved analytically in a time-inconsistent framework under the assumption of sophisticated belief on future trigger strategies. Premature harvesting occurs. To avoid socially undesirable harvesting the impact of hyperbolic discounting must be accounted and a modified optimal pigovian tax on the wood revenues is proposed. Finally, in chapter 5 a government bargains a mutually convenient agreement with a foreign firm to extract a natural resource. The firm bears the initial investment in field research and infrastructures and earns as a return a share on the profits. The firm must cope with uncertainty due to market conditions and, as initial investment is totally sunk, also due to the risk of successive expropriation. In a real options framework where the government holds an American call option on expropriation I show under which conditions Nash bargaining is feasible and leads to attain a cooperative agreement maximizing the joint venture surplus keeping into account both the sources of uncertainty on profit realizations. I show that the investment trigger does not change under the threat of expropriation, while the set of feasible bargaining outcomes is restricted and the distributive parameter is adjusted to account for the additional risk of expropriation.

PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO
Conhecer o perfil da população brasileira que possui planos privados de saúde é fundamental para orientar as políticas da Agência Nacional de Saúde (ANS) e a linha de ação das seguradoras e operadoras de saúde. A proposta deste projeto é de fazê-lo sob a ótica do mercado de trabalho, levando em consideração a morbidade auto-referida dos indivíduos, e controlando também pelas variáveis demográficas e sócio-econômicas. Para tanto, primeiramente, realizou-se um estudo exploratório relacionando a posse de planos de saúde com estas variáveis. Depois disso, ajustamos modelos logísticos de regressão para explicar as morbidades auto referidas a partir da situação do indivíduo no mercado de trabalho, controlando pelas variáveis demográficas. A mesma classe de modelos foi utilizada como ferramenta para investigar o fenômeno conhecido como Assimetria de Informação na contratação de planos privados de saúde. Os resultados concentram os casos de assimetria de informação em algumas doenças. Pudemos identificar também grupos de trabalhadores com alta propensão a determinadas doenças em determinadas grandes regiões do país.
Knowing about the profile of the Brazilian population covered by private health plans is very important to guide the National Health Agency policies, the health insurance companies` action strategies in many ways and how the many agents involved should stand toward this process. Our purpose is to do this in the light of the work market situation, taking into account his/her self-reported morbidity, controlling for the demographical and social-economical variables. We start by presenting an exploratory study linking health plan owning with these variables. We then make use of logistic regression models, which have been adjusted to explain de self-reported morbidity according to the individual`s position in the job market, controlling for the demographical variables. The same class of model has also been used as a tool to investigate the existence of Information Asymmetry in this type of contract. Our results show that information asymmetry cases are concentrated in some diseases. We could also find some worker groups very likely to being ill from specific diseases in some specific regions of the country.

This thesis consists of three related essays that examine the role of information in the market for corporate debt. The three essays collectively examine the role of information produced by the firm and its agents on alleviating information asymmetries facing public debtholders. In particular, the thesis examines the impact of bondholders' demand for reputation and information on the firm's disclosure choices and accounting attributes; and the impact of information produced by monitoring the firm's private debt before its entry to the public debt market on the yield spread of its initial bond. The first essay investigates the influence of public corporate debt on the willingness of UK firms to issue profit warnings. UK firms operate within a legal environment that is less litigious compared to their US counterparts. This setting allows for motives other than fear of litigation to affect UK companies' decision to warn. The results of this essay indicate that UK firms with public debt are more forthcoming with the disclosure of permanent negative news. Also, the results show that UK firms without public debt are more likely to hide bad news when they are closer to financial distress. However, for firms with public debt, the results indicate that the effect of closeness to financial distress on the willingness to warn is attenuated. These findings suggest that firms with public debt are deterred from hiding negative news for fear of damaging their reputation for truthful and timely disclosure. Public debt appears to act as a disciplinary mechanism on corporate disclosure policy.The second essay examines the impact of the initial public debt offering (IPDO) on the timeliness properties of the firm's accounting income. Firms are more likely to communicate with private lenders on a private, insider-basis, while they are more likely to communicate with bondholders using public information. Therefore, bondholders, compared to private lenders, are expected to be more sensitive to the quality of public information. The results indicate that firms adopt a timelier policy of economic loss recognition after their initial public debt offering using Basu's (1997) time series measure of timely loss recognition. These findings suggest that firms face higher demand for public information from a large number of external and dispersed bondholders.The third essay investigates the impact of information associated with prior private debt financing on the yield spread of companies' initial public debt offerings. Specifically, this essay focuses on information produced through monitoring by credit rating agencies and monitoring by banks. The findings indicate that IPDOs with the same or upgraded credit ratings enjoy significantly lower yield spreads. This finding suggests that changes in credit ratings could convey new information to investors regarding the firm's commitment to maintain a high credit quality. In addition, the findings of this essay indicate that strong banking relationships significantly reduce yield spreads for initial public debt offerings. This suggests that a strong banking relationship conveys a positive signal to bondholders regarding the bank's assessment of the quality of the firm.

The outcome of this research is an Intelligent Retrieval System for Conditions of Contract Documents. The objective of the research is to improve the method of retrieving data from a computer version of a construction Conditions of Contract document. SmartDoc, a prototype computer system has been developed for this purpose. The system provides recommendations to aid the user in the process of retrieving clauses from the construction Conditions of Contract document. The prototype system integrates two computer technologies: hypermedia and expert systems. Hypermedia is utilized to provide a dynamic way for retrieving data from the document. Expert systems technology is utilized to build a set of rules that activate the recommendations to aid the user during the process of retrieval of clauses. The rules are based on experts knowledge. The prototype system helps the user retrieve related clauses that are not explicitly cross-referenced but, according to expert experience, are relevant to the topic that the user is interested in.

This study has covered the duty to provide pre-contractual information and the right of cancellation, the two important key areas of consumer protection in distance selling contracts. These two protection models are invented to rebalance the distance contract in favour of the consumer albeit differently. The duty to provide information rebalances the contract in terms of information, and the right of cancellation provides the distance consumer with an opportunity to rethink the decision about the contract. The study has looked at pertinent laws of distance selling contracts in England and Iraq. In doing so, the study has followed comparative and analytical methodology, whereby strengths and weaknesses, similarities and dissimilarities between the selected laws under a chosen theme are addressed. The aim is to explore problems and loopholes, which may need future amendments, including legal gaps, ambiguity, and incomplete treatment. During the study, specific challenges related to the theme of study are critically analysed. Apparently, the quantity and type of information required, the time and manner of sending information, and the remedy available at the breach are challenges of the information requirements. Challenges of the right of cancellation are the conditions and effects of using the right. The study has concluded that many aspects of protection under both laws need further improvements. The need for changes is more obvious with Iraqi Law than English Law, where distance selling protection has not been recognised yet.

Thesis (LLM)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This dissertation examines the conclusion of contracts on the Internet in English and South African law on the one hand, and German law on the other. Because these legal systems have not developed specific rules for the formation of contracts by way of this medium of communication, the question is whether the traditional doctrines are adequate to the demands of tecnological innovation. The study accordingly proceeds from a detailed discussion of the traditional rules of offer and acceptance developed in each of the systems. To this end, the leading cases and of English and South African law are considered with an emphasis on the points of difference between the approach of the courts in these systems. Where there is uncertainty or different points of view, regard is had to the critical points of view of English and South African commentators. In respect of the codified German civil law, the authoritative provisions of the general part of the civil code are discussed against the background of the commentary of academic authors. An investigation of the technical structure of the Internet and the various methods of communication afforded by it, provides a foundation for an examination of the application of the general principles of the various legal systems to contract formation on the Internet. It is concluded that despite fundamental differences in the of approach of the systems under consideration, the general principles of each system are capable of application in the context of electronic contracting. The dissertation endeavours to develop proposals regarding adequate solutions to the problems typical of the process of contract formation on the Internet.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis is afgestem op die hantering van kontraksluiting op die Internet in die Engelse en Suid-Afrikaanse Reg aan die een kant, en die Duitse Reg aan die ander kant. Omrede geeneen van hierdie stelsels tot op hede spesifieke maatreëls daargestel het vir kontraksluiting deur middel van hierdie kommunikasiemiddel nie, is die vraag of tradisionele beginsels afdoende is met die oog op eise van die nuwe tegnologie. Die ondersoek gaan derhalwe uit van 'n behandeling van die tradisionele reëls van aanbod en aanname soos wat dit in elkeen van die stelsels ontwikkel het. Met die oog hierop, word sleutelvonnisse van die Engelse en Suid-Afrikaanse reg ontleed, veral dan ook met klem op verskille in die benadering van die howe in hierdie twee stelsels. In geval van onsekerheid en verskille van mening, word verwys na die kritiese standpunte van Engelse en Suid-Afrikaanse kommentatore. Met verwysing na die gekodifiseerde Duitse stelsel word die gesaghebbende bepalings van die Burgerlike Wetboek behandel teen die agtergrond van die kommentaar van Duitse akademiese skrywers. 'n Ontleding van die tegniese struktuur van die Internet en die verskillende kommunikasiemetodes wat dit bied, verskaf die grondslag vir 'n ondersoek na die toepaslikheid van die algemene beginsels aangaande kontraksluiting van die onderskeie regstelsels in die konteks van elektroniese kontraktering. Die gevolgtrekking is dat ten spyte van fundamentele verskille in benadering, die algemene beginsels van die verkillende stelsels wel aanwendbaar is in die nuwe omgewing. Die verhandeling poog om 'n bydrae te lewer tot die ontwikkeling van aanvaarbare oplossings tot die probleme wat tipies is aan kontraksluiting deur middel van die Internet.

The architecture, engineering and construction industry faces challenges when dealing withprocurement contract design and risk-handling. The optimal contracting practices have beenworldwide studied in areas of contract theory which studies how the optimal incentivemechanism (“contracts”) can be designed to encourage the parties to behave more efficiently.The parties usually consist of a principal and an agent, where the principal hires an agent todeliver goods or services. However, the complexity of contract theory calls for a morepracticable approach in an attempt to understand the procurement problem in the industry andincrease knowledge-sharing between projects. The purpose of this study is to propose a model based on contract theory that can be used inpractice to investigate the effects of project endogenous risks in three different types ofprocurement contracts: fixed-price, time and material, and incentive. Thus, this study usesquantitative methods with the aim to explain the current procurement problem in the Swedisharchitecture, engineering, and construction industry, compare theory and practice, andcontribute to knowledge about the linkage between endogenous risks, optimal risk sharing andcontract design. The conclusions from this study are that the current contracting practices in the industry arenot aligned with the optimal contract design described by the theory. The theory in this researchshowed that, given endogenous project risks, the optimal incentives vary in the agent’saversion to risk resulting in a non-monotone relationship between optimal contract power andproject risk. Further, a contract becomes optimal and efficient when cost savings and qualityincentives are aligned. However, the analysis of real-world projects presented no clearrelationship between contract power and project risk, i.e. some projects with fixed-pricecontracts or time and material contracts presented the same risk level. Hence, this researchproposes a method for computing the optimal incentive contract which can be used in manycases where the other two types of contract are currently being used. Based on the theory, theoptimal incentive contract may add valuable benefits for both parties involved since it aims toefficiently share the project risk between them while providing the agent the right incentivesto work more efficiently to reduce costs and deliver high-quality services or goods.
Byggbranschen står inför utmaningar när det gäller kontraktsdesign och riskhantering. Deoptimala upphandlingsmetoderna har studerats över hela världen inom områden avkontraktsteori som i sin tur studerar hur den optimala incitamentsmekanismen ("kontrakt") kanutformas för att uppmuntra parterna att agera mer effektivt. Parterna består vanligtvis av enprincipal och en agent, där principalen anställer en agent för att leverera varor eller tjänster.Men komplexiteten i kontraktsteori kräver ett mer praktiskt tillvägagångssätt i ett försök attbättre förstå upphandlingsproblemet i byggbranschen samt att öka kunskapsutbytet mellanprojekt. Syftet med denna studie är att föreslå en modell baserad på kontraktsteori som kan användas ipraktiken för att undersöka effekter av endogena risker i tre olika typer avupphandlingskontrakt: fastpris, rörligt pris (time and material) och incitament. Denna studieanvänder därmed kvantitativa metoder i syfte att förklara det aktuella upphandlingsproblemeti den svenska byggbranschen, jämföra teori och praktik, och bidra till utökad kunskap omsambandet mellan endogena risker, optimal riskdelning och kontraktsdesign. Slutsatsen från denna studie är att den nuvarande upphandlingspraxisen i branschen inte är ilinje med den optimala kontraktsdesignen som beskrivs av teorin. Teorin i denna studie visaratt, förutsatt endogena projektrisker, så varierar de optimala incitamenten med agentensriskaversion vilket resulterar i ett icke-monoton förhållande mellan optimal kontraktsdesignoch projektrisk. Dessutom blir ett kontrakt optimalt och effektivt när kostnadsbesparingar ochkvalitetsincitament är i linje med varandra. Men analysen av verkliga projekt visar inget tydligtsamband mellan kontraktsdesign och projektrisk, det vill säga en del projekt med fastpris ellerrörligt pris visade sig ha samma risknivå. Därför föreslår denna studie en metod för beräkningav det optimala incitamentet som kan användas i många fall där de andra två typerna avkontrakt för närvarande används. Teorin säger att det optimala incitamentet kan ge värdefullafördelar för de inblandade parterna eftersom det syftar till att på ett effektivt sätt fördelaprojektrisken mellan dem samtidigt som agenten får rätt incitament att arbeta mer effektivt föratt sänka kostnaderna och leverera högkvalitativa tjänster eller varor.

Since the rise of Bitcoin in 2008, many have speculated about the scope of blockchain technology applications. Prediction markets, i.e. markets in which uncertain outcomes of future events are tradeable, is such an application; blockchain technology may offer several technological attributes that may facilitate prediction market implementations. This study describes and compares the platforms of three organizations that build blockchain prediction market platforms: Augur, Gnosis and Stox. By this, we provide a pertinent overview of current blockchain prediction market applications. Additionally, we conduct interviews with three Swedish blockchain experts clarifying blockchain technology strengths and weaknesses in relation to prediction markets. We identify five factors that are essential for prediction markets to aggregate and reflect information accurately: many actors participating, no actors being prevented from participating, a trustworthy setting function, freedom to create new contracts, and transparency. We conclude that blockchain technology has attributes that facilitate future prediction market implementations in accordance with these requirements. However, blockchain scalability issues pose a key challenge.
Sedan Bitcoins introduktion 2008 har många spekulerat kring omfattningen av blockkedjeteknologins tillämpningsområden. Prediktionsmarknader (eng. prediction markets), d.v.s. marknader i vilka det går att spekulera i osäkra resultat av framtida händelser, är ett sådant tillämpningsområde; blockkedjeteknologi kan tillhandahålla aspekter som främjar implementationer av prediktionsmarknader. Denna artikel beskriver och jämför plattformarna som tillhandahålls av tre organisationer som använder sig av blockkedjeteknologi for att bygga prediktions­marknadsplattformar: Augur, Gnosis och Stox. Genom detta tillhandahåller vi en helhetssyn över nuvarande prediktionsmarknadsplattformar som bygger på blockkedjeteknologi. Dessutom genomför vi intervjuer med tre svenska blockkedjeteknologiexperter, detta för att klargöra blockkedjeteknologis styrkor och svagheter i förhållande till prediktionsmarknader. Vi identifierar fem faktorer som är essentiella för prediktionsmarknaders förmåga att framgångsrikt aggregera och reflektera information: att många aktorer deltar, att inga aktorer är förhindrade från att delta, en tillförlitlig funktion för avgörande av utfall, frihet att skapa nya kontrakt, samt transparens. Vi drar slutsatsen att blockkedjeteknologi, med avseende på dessa faktorer, har egenskaper som förenklar implementationen av prediktionsmarknader. Å andra sidan utgör blockkedjors skalbarhetsproblem en signifikant utmaning.

A assimetria informacional é característica inerente ao mercado financeiro, transparecendo através de problemas de seleção adversa e risco moral. Não é diferente no tocante às operações de crédito bancário. Cientes disso, as instituições bancárias lançam mão de mecanismos de filtragem e monitoramento, bem como da exigência de garantias, para a redução da assimetria informativa. O contrato ocupa papel central nesse processo. Porque é do instrumento contratual a função de mitigar os efeitos deletérios da assimetria informacional, o presente trabalho objetiva avaliar se as cláusulas em contratos usuais de concessão de crédito pelo Banco Regional de Desenvolvimento do Extremo Sul (BRDE) são de fato desenhadas visando ao incentivo de publicidade de informações e prevenção de ações ocultas.
Informational asymmetry is an inherent characteristic of the financial market that presents itself as problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. It is not different in regard to bank loan operations. Aware of this situation, the banking institutions utilise screening and monitoring mechanisms, as well as collateral exigencies, in order to reduce the informational asymmetry. The contract plays a central role within this process. Because the contractual instrument has the purpose of mitigating the deleterious effects of the informational asymmetry, the present work intends to evaluate if the clauses employed in usual credit concession contracts by the Regional Development Bank of the Far South (BRDE) are indeed designed aiming at incentives to information disclosure and prevention of hidden actions.

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Master of Technology of Technology: Business Information Systems in the Faculty of Business at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology
This study evaluates the utilisation and effectiveness of contract clauses in Information Technology (IT) and Information System (IS) projects in South Africa to address and mitigate key risks associated with these types of projects. This study established whether specific clauses were being utilised to address key risks, and where clauses were being utilised, whether these clauses were effective in addressing and mitigating the impact of these key risks. The need for the study arose because the researcher had experienced on several occasions in his workplace that contracts which appeared fail-safe during the negotiation stage did not reach the proposed targets, let alone maturity of the agreement. To establish whether colleagues in similar positions in computer-based organisations experienced similar disruptions a quantitative questionnaire was distributed to organisations in the Johannesburg area to gain an insight into their risk profile. Risk could arise from the contract construction and/or wording. Reference was made to the contracts in the engineering environment where standard contracts have been in place for a number of years. Specifically the New Engineering Contract (NEC) of 2011 and the Professional Services Contract were consulted. The study concentrated on four categories of risk identified in a literature review, namely corporate management risk, project management risk, resource utilisation risk and technology risk, which resulted in 42 sub-factors examined. The population of suitable and relevant IT and IS companies could not be definitely established but the researcher made telephonic contact with known organisations and 24 participants agreed to participate in the exercise; 12 service providers and 12 clients of providers, where 78% of participants experienced one or more of the risk factors, and 53% used NEC standard contracts.